<div dir="ltr">strategic voting is voting in a less expressive way that increases your personal expected utility. for instance, the DH3 pathology with condorcet voting (used by debian, unfortunately) is where a candidate wins whom virtually everyone agrees is the worst, because they all use a strategy that is _beneficial_ at the individual level. it's like the prisoners' dilemma. everyone is worse off because they each use an advisable strategy.<br>
<br>an example of strategic voting was when 90% of the nader-supporting voters voted for someone else (namely gore) back in 2000, because that had a higher expected value (where expected value is the chance your vote changes the election outcome times the difference in utility that causes for you).<br>
<br>in score voting, you might actually feel that X=10, Y=7, and Z=0 -- but if Y and Z are the clear front-runners, you can increase your expected value by voting X=10, Y=10, Z=0. that's more strategic.<br><br>the nice thing about score voting is that it behaves quite nicely even when people are strategic. here are some links which discuss this.<br>
<br><a href="http://rangevoting.org/StratHonMix.html">http://rangevoting.org/StratHonMix.html</a><br><a href="http://rangevoting.org/ShExpRes.html">http://rangevoting.org/ShExpRes.html</a><br><a href="http://rangevoting.org/PleasantSurprise.html">http://rangevoting.org/PleasantSurprise.html</a><br>
<a href="http://rangevoting.org/RVstrat1.html">http://rangevoting.org/RVstrat1.html</a><br><a href="http://rangevoting.org/RVstrat2.html">http://rangevoting.org/RVstrat2.html</a><br><a href="http://rangevoting.org/RVstrat3.html">http://rangevoting.org/RVstrat3.html</a><br>
<a href="http://rangevoting.org/RVstrat4.html">http://rangevoting.org/RVstrat4.html</a><br><a href="http://rangevoting.org/RVstrat5.html">http://rangevoting.org/RVstrat5.html</a><br><a href="http://rangevoting.org/RVstrat6.html">http://rangevoting.org/RVstrat6.html</a><br>
<a href="http://rangevoting.org/CondBurial.html">http://rangevoting.org/CondBurial.html</a><br><br>regards,<br>clay<br><br><div class="gmail_quote">On Wed, Jul 23, 2008 at 11:08, inode0 <<a href="mailto:inode0@gmail.com">inode0@gmail.com</a>> wrote:<br>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="border-left: 1px solid rgb(204, 204, 204); margin: 0pt 0pt 0pt 0.8ex; padding-left: 1ex;"><div class="Ih2E3d">On Wed, Jul 23, 2008 at 1:02 PM, CLAY S <<a href="mailto:clay@brokenladder.com">clay@brokenladder.com</a>> wrote:<br>
> On Wed, Jul 23, 2008 at 10:37, inode0 <<a href="mailto:inode0@gmail.com">inode0@gmail.com</a>> wrote:<br>
>><br>
>> Why should Fedora make any of it public knowing that doing so will<br>
>> affect the way people vote?<br>
><br>
</div><div class="Ih2E3d">> i'm saying it will affect it _for the better_. which is "bad" from a<br>
> research point of view, but good for fedora.<br>
<br>
</div>I misunderstood strategic voting to be a supposed benefit of this.<br>
<br>
What is meant by "strategic" voting and why is it bad?<br>
<div><div></div><div class="Wj3C7c"><br>
John<br>
<br>
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</div></div></blockquote></div><br><br clear="all"><br>-- <br>clay shentrup<br>phone: 206.801.0484<br><br>"Iraq? No, YOU rock!"
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