prelink should not mess with running executables

[Chris Adams]

Once upon a time, Sam Varshavchik <mrsam at courier-mta.com> said:
> If what prelink is doing is perfectly fine, then there's no reason to have  
> the /sbin/telinit hack in /etc/cron.daily, is it? That statement, of 
> course,  would be either true or false irrespective of what I'm doing, 
> which is  completely irrelevant.

As others have pointed out, that's because init is NOT a standard daemon
(if you don't understand why PID 1 is special, I can't help you).

You seem to be putting a lot of weight on the executable somebody ran to
access your program, over and above all the kernel facilities for
handling that (that are sufficient for everybody else, including heavily
security-minded folk like OpenBSD devs).  Aside from how a pathname is
not really a good indicator (see SELinux vs. AppArmor), how do you know
the binary hasn't been modified in place?  What good is your
super-special pathname security then?
-- 
Chris Adams <cmadams at hiwaay.net>
Systems and Network Administrator - HiWAAY Internet Services
I don't speak for anybody but myself - that's enough trouble.