Proposed F19 Feature: OpenAttestation

[Bill Nottingham]

Wei, Gang (gang.wei at intel.com) said: 
> > If you're attempting to create a framework that attests the integrity
> > of systems for use by 'trusted' software, it would (in theory) only be as
> > secure as its weakest link. Given that... PHP?
> 
> I am not sure whether PHP is the weakest link, but the integrity checking done 
> by OpenAttestation is to ensure the system is running the expected software 
> like BIOS/OS/etc. As to whether the expected software is secure enough it is 
> another story.
> 
> > How does it intend to attest the OS in a rapidly updating Fedora
> > environment? Just the kernel + initramfs? An image-based checksum such
> > as what is used in ChromeOS?
> 
> By far, just kernel + initramfs. Every time the kernel/initramfs got updated, 
> the Know Good Value in OpenAttestation Server should be updated to take new 
> kernel/initramfs as "trusted" one.

Hm, I guess that's OK as far as the feature goes, but that doesn't give me
a lot of good feelings about the level of trust to ascribe to the
OS that's being booted by that kernel & initramfs.

Bill