Entire process's environment attached to bugzillas by ABRT

[Richard W.M. Jones]

On Fri, Nov 28, 2014 at 07:39:47AM +0100, Jakub Filak wrote:
> The discussion I mentioned above was primarily about OpenStack (but the
> participants also expressed concerns about sending 'environ' to Bugzilla
> at all), where people are regularly storing their passwords and tokens
> as environment variables.

Yes unfortunately OpenStack does by default encourage people to source
a 'keystonerc_admin' file which contains authentication tokens.  The
file will look something like this:

export OS_USERNAME=admin
export OS_TENANT_NAME=admin
export OS_PASSWORD=mysecretpassword
export OS_AUTH_URL=http://127.0.0.1:35357/v2.0/

For a public cloud, knowing those values could give anyone access to
the account.

How about having abrt just remove or scrub all variables that start
with /^OS_/ ?  I know it's nasty to have application-specific
treatment of environment variables like this, but the number of
applications that pass auth information through environment variables
is small.

For Amazon EC2 you'd want to scrub /^AWS_/

Rich.

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