[selinux-policy: 1068/3172] add irc
Daniel J Walsh
dwalsh at fedoraproject.org
Thu Oct 7 20:37:11 UTC 2010
commit 8cffa788409f794c526e01c4feebff1e3ce145bd
Author: Chris PeBenito <cpebenito at tresys.com>
Date: Fri Jan 6 19:46:44 2006 +0000
add irc
refpolicy/Changelog | 1 +
refpolicy/policy/modules/apps/irc.fc | 11 ++
refpolicy/policy/modules/apps/irc.if | 166 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
refpolicy/policy/modules/apps/irc.te | 10 ++
refpolicy/policy/modules/system/init.if | 17 +++
5 files changed, 205 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
---
diff --git a/refpolicy/Changelog b/refpolicy/Changelog
index aa940d0..3d13ece 100644
--- a/refpolicy/Changelog
+++ b/refpolicy/Changelog
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@
automount
ddcprobe
fetchmail
+ irc
openct
readahead
slrnpull
diff --git a/refpolicy/policy/modules/apps/irc.fc b/refpolicy/policy/modules/apps/irc.fc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..618588c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/refpolicy/policy/modules/apps/irc.fc
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+#
+# /home
+#
+HOME_DIR/\.ircmotd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:ROLE_irc_home_t,s0)
+
+#
+# /usr
+#
+/usr/bin/[st]irc -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:irc_exec_t,s0)
+/usr/bin/ircII -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:irc_exec_t,s0)
+/usr/bin/tinyirc -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:irc_exec_t,s0)
diff --git a/refpolicy/policy/modules/apps/irc.if b/refpolicy/policy/modules/apps/irc.if
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2eb7109
--- /dev/null
+++ b/refpolicy/policy/modules/apps/irc.if
@@ -0,0 +1,166 @@
+## <summary>IRC client policy</summary>
+
+#######################################
+## <summary>
+## The per user domain template for the irc module.
+## </summary>
+## <desc>
+## <p>
+## This template creates a derived domains which are used
+## for an irc client sessions.
+## </p>
+## <p>
+## This template is invoked automatically for each user, and
+## generally does not need to be invoked directly
+## by policy writers.
+## </p>
+## </desc>
+## <param name="userdomain_prefix">
+## The prefix of the user domain (e.g., user
+## is the prefix for user_t).
+## </param>
+## <param name="user_domain">
+## The type of the user domain.
+## </param>
+## <param name="user_role">
+## The role associated with the user domain.
+## </param>
+#
+template(`irc_per_userdomain_template',`
+ gen_require(`
+ type irc_exec_t;
+ ')
+
+ ########################################
+ #
+ # Declarations
+ #
+
+ type $1_irc_t;
+ domain_type($1_irc_t)
+ domain_entry_file($1_irc_t,irc_exec_t)
+ role $3 types $1_irc_t;
+
+ type $1_irc_exec_t;
+ userdom_home_file($1,$1_irc_exec_t)
+ domain_entry_file($1_irc_t,$1_irc_exec_t)
+
+ type $1_irc_home_t;
+ userdom_home_file($1,$1_irc_home_t)
+
+ ########################################
+ #
+ # Local policy
+ #
+
+ allow $1_irc_t self:dir search;
+ allow $1_irc_t self:lnk_file read;
+ allow $1_irc_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
+ allow $1_irc_t self:tcp_socket create_socket_perms;
+ allow $1_irc_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms;
+
+ allow $1_irc_t $1_irc_home_t:dir create_dir_perms;
+ allow $1_irc_t $1_irc_home_t:file create_file_perms;
+ allow $1_irc_t $1_irc_home_t:lnk_file create_lnk_perms;
+ userdom_create_user_home($1,$1_irc_t,{ dir file lnk_file },$1_irc_home_t)
+
+ # access files under /tmp
+ allow $1_irc_t $1_tmp_t:dir create_dir_perms;
+ allow $1_irc_t $1_tmp_t:file create_file_perms;
+ allow $1_irc_t $1_tmp_t:lnk_file create_lnk_perms;
+ allow $1_irc_t $1_tmp_t:sock_file create_file_perms;
+ allow $1_irc_t $1_tmp_t:fifo_file create_file_perms;
+ files_create_tmp_files($1_irc_t,$1_tmp_t,{ file dir lnk_file sock_file fifo_file })
+
+ # Transition from the user domain to the derived domain.
+ domain_auto_trans($2,irc_exec_t,$1_irc_t)
+ allow $2 $1_irc_t:fd use;
+ allow $1_irc_t $2:fd use;
+ allow $1_irc_t $2:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
+ allow $1_irc_t $2:process sigchld;
+
+ allow $2 $1_irc_t:process signal;
+
+ allow $2 $1_irc_exec_t:file { relabelfrom relabelto create_file_perms };
+
+ # allow ps to show irc
+ allow $2 $1_irc_t:dir { search getattr read };
+ allow $2 $1_irc_t:{ file lnk_file } { read getattr };
+ allow $2 $1_irc_t:process getattr;
+ # We need to suppress this denial because procps tries to access
+ # /proc/pid/environ and this now triggers a ptrace check in recent kernels
+ # (2.4 and 2.6). Might want to change procps to not do this, or only if
+ # running in a privileged domain.
+ dontaudit $2 $1_irc_t:process ptrace;
+
+ kernel_read_proc_symlinks($1_irc_t)
+
+ corenet_non_ipsec_sendrecv($1_irc_t)
+ corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if($1_irc_t)
+ corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if($1_irc_t)
+ corenet_raw_sendrecv_generic_if($1_irc_t)
+ corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_nodes($1_irc_t)
+ corenet_udp_sendrecv_all_nodes($1_irc_t)
+ corenet_raw_sendrecv_all_nodes($1_irc_t)
+ corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_ports($1_irc_t)
+ corenet_udp_sendrecv_all_ports($1_irc_t)
+ corenet_tcp_bind_all_nodes($1_irc_t)
+ corenet_udp_bind_all_nodes($1_irc_t)
+ # cjp: this seems excessive:
+ corenet_tcp_connect_all_ports($1_irc_t)
+
+ domain_use_wide_inherit_fd($1_irc_t)
+
+ files_dontaudit_search_pids($1_irc_t)
+ files_search_var($1_irc_t)
+ files_read_etc_files($1_irc_t)
+ files_read_usr_files($1_irc_t)
+
+ fs_getattr_xattr_fs($1_irc_t)
+ fs_search_auto_mountpoints($1_irc_t)
+
+ term_use_controlling_term($1_irc_t)
+ term_list_ptys($1_irc_t)
+
+ # allow utmp access
+ init_read_script_pid($1_irc_t)
+ init_dontaudit_lock_pid($1_irc_t)
+
+ libs_use_ld_so($1_irc_t)
+ libs_use_shared_libs($1_irc_t)
+
+ miscfiles_read_localization($1_irc_t)
+
+ # Inherit and use descriptors from newrole.
+ seutil_use_newrole_fd($1_irc_t)
+
+ sysnet_read_config($1_irc_t)
+
+ # Write to the user domain tty.
+ userdom_use_user_terminals($1,$1_irc_t)
+
+ tunable_policy(`use_nfs_home_dirs',`
+ fs_manage_nfs_dirs($1_irc_t)
+ fs_manage_nfs_files($1_irc_t)
+ fs_manage_nfs_symlinks($1_irc_t)
+ ')
+
+ tunable_policy(`use_samba_home_dirs',`
+ fs_manage_cifs_dirs($1_irc_t)
+ fs_manage_cifs_files($1_irc_t)
+ fs_manage_cifs_symlinks($1_irc_t)
+ ')
+
+ optional_policy(`nis',`
+ nis_use_ypbind($1_irc_t)
+ ')
+
+ ifdef(`TODO',`
+ optional_policy(`ircd.te', `
+ allow $1_irc_t ircd_t:tcp_socket { connectto recvfrom };
+ allow ircd_t $1_irc_t:tcp_socket { acceptfrom recvfrom };
+ kernel_tcp_recvfrom($1_irc_t)
+ kernel_tcp_recvfrom(ircd_t)
+ ')
+ ')
+')
diff --git a/refpolicy/policy/modules/apps/irc.te b/refpolicy/policy/modules/apps/irc.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..01fcbeb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/refpolicy/policy/modules/apps/irc.te
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+
+policy_module(irc,1.0.0)
+
+########################################
+#
+# Declarations
+#
+
+type irc_exec_t;
+files_type(irc_exec_t)
diff --git a/refpolicy/policy/modules/system/init.if b/refpolicy/policy/modules/system/init.if
index 38ab298..32f4902 100644
--- a/refpolicy/policy/modules/system/init.if
+++ b/refpolicy/policy/modules/system/init.if
@@ -833,6 +833,23 @@ interface(`init_dontaudit_write_script_pid',`
')
########################################
+## <summary>
+## Do not audit attempts to lock
+## init script pid files.
+## </summary>
+## <param name="domain">
+## Domain allowed access.
+## </param>
+#
+interface(`init_dontaudit_lock_pid',`
+ gen_require(`
+ type initrc_var_run_t;
+ ')
+
+ dontaudit $1 initrc_var_run_t:file lock;
+')
+
+########################################
#
# init_rw_script_pid(domain)
#
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