[selinux-policy: 1269/3172] add evolution, bug 1384
Daniel J Walsh
dwalsh at fedoraproject.org
Thu Oct 7 20:54:47 UTC 2010
commit edf241cd9b8de964d2636e4af7b6d0e5642d8d19
Author: Chris PeBenito <cpebenito at tresys.com>
Date: Mon Mar 13 21:36:49 2006 +0000
add evolution, bug 1384
refpolicy/Changelog | 1 +
refpolicy/policy/global_tunables | 7 +
refpolicy/policy/modules/apps/evolution.fc | 20 +
refpolicy/policy/modules/apps/evolution.if | 822 +++++++++++++++++++++
refpolicy/policy/modules/apps/evolution.te | 22 +
refpolicy/policy/modules/apps/gpg.if | 29 +
refpolicy/policy/modules/apps/gpg.te | 2 +-
refpolicy/policy/modules/services/automount.if | 19 +
refpolicy/policy/modules/services/automount.te | 2 +-
refpolicy/policy/modules/services/spamassassin.if | 152 ++++
refpolicy/policy/modules/services/spamassassin.te | 2 +-
11 files changed, 1075 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
---
diff --git a/refpolicy/Changelog b/refpolicy/Changelog
index d97bbc5..ad2ede6 100644
--- a/refpolicy/Changelog
+++ b/refpolicy/Changelog
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@
apt (Erich Schubert)
clamav (Erich Schubert)
dpkg (Erich Schubert)
+ evolution
mozilla
mplayer
rhgb
diff --git a/refpolicy/policy/global_tunables b/refpolicy/policy/global_tunables
index 6af4c0a..35c21eb 100644
--- a/refpolicy/policy/global_tunables
+++ b/refpolicy/policy/global_tunables
@@ -378,6 +378,13 @@ gen_tunable(cron_can_relabel,false)
## <desc>
## <p>
+## Disable transitions to evolution domains.
+## </p>
+## </desc>
+gen_tunable(disable_evolution_trans,false)
+
+## <desc>
+## <p>
## Disable transitions to user mozilla domains
## </p>
## </desc>
diff --git a/refpolicy/policy/modules/apps/evolution.fc b/refpolicy/policy/modules/apps/evolution.fc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c3ded67
--- /dev/null
+++ b/refpolicy/policy/modules/apps/evolution.fc
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+
+#
+# /tmp
+#
+/tmp/\.exchange-USER(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:ROLE_evolution_exchange_tmp_t,s0)
+
+#
+# /usr
+#
+/usr/bin/evolution.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:evolution_exec_t,s0)
+
+/usr/libexec/evolution/.*evolution-alarm-notify.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:evolution_alarm_exec_t,s0)
+/usr/libexec/evolution/.*evolution-exchange-storage.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:evolution_exchange_exec_t,s0)
+/usr/libexec/evolution-data-server.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:evolution_server_exec_t,s0)
+/usr/libexec/evolution-webcal.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:evolution_webcal_exec_t,s0)
+
+ifdef(`strict_policy',`
+HOME_DIR/\.evolution(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:ROLE_evolution_home_t,s0)
+HOME_DIR/\.camel_certs(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:ROLE_evolution_home_t,s0)
+')
diff --git a/refpolicy/policy/modules/apps/evolution.if b/refpolicy/policy/modules/apps/evolution.if
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4c3c559
--- /dev/null
+++ b/refpolicy/policy/modules/apps/evolution.if
@@ -0,0 +1,822 @@
+## <summary>Evolution email client</summary>
+
+#######################################
+## <summary>
+## The per user domain template for the evolution module.
+## </summary>
+## <desc>
+## <p>
+## This template creates a derived domains which are used
+## for evolution email client and other related evolution applications such as webcal and alarm
+## type is also created to protect the user evolution keys.
+## </p>
+## <p>
+## This template is invoked automatically for each user, and
+## generally does not need to be invoked directly
+## by policy writers.
+## </p>
+## </desc>
+## <param name="userdomain_prefix">
+## <summary>
+## The prefix of the user domain (e.g., user
+## is the prefix for user_t).
+## </summary>
+## </param>
+## <param name="user_domain">
+## <summary>
+## The type of the user domain.
+## </summary>
+## </param>
+## <param name="user_role">
+## <summary>
+## The role associated with the user domain.
+## </summary>
+## </param>
+#
+template(`evolution_per_userdomain_template',`
+
+ ########################################
+ #
+ # Declarations
+ #
+
+ type $1_evolution_t;
+ domain_type($1_evolution_t)
+ domain_entry_file($1_evolution_t,evolution_exec_t)
+ role $3 types $1_evolution_t;
+
+ type $1_evolution_tmpfs_t;
+ files_tmpfs_file($1_evolution_tmpfs_t)
+
+ type $1_evolution_home_t alias $1_evolution_rw_t;
+ files_poly_member($1_evolution_home_t)
+ userdom_user_home_content($1,$1_evolution_home_t)
+
+ type $1_evolution_orbit_tmp_t;
+ files_type($1_evolution_orbit_tmp_t)
+
+ type $1_evolution_alarm_t;
+ domain_type($1_evolution_alarm_t)
+ role $3 types $1_evolution_alarm_t;
+
+ type $1_evolution_alarm_tmpfs_t;
+ files_tmpfs_file($1_evolution_alarm_tmpfs_t)
+
+ type $1_evolution_alarm_orbit_tmp_t;
+ files_type($1_evolution_alarm_orbit_tmp_t)
+
+ type $1_evolution_exchange_t;
+ domain_type($1_evolution_exchange_t)
+ role $3 types $1_evolution_exchange_t;
+
+ type $1_evolution_exchange_tmpfs_t;
+ files_tmpfs_file($1_evolution_exchange_tmpfs_t)
+
+ type $1_evolution_exchange_tmp_t;
+ files_tmp_file($1_evolution_exchange_tmp_t)
+
+ type $1_evolution_exchange_orbit_tmp_t;
+ files_type($1_evolution_exchange_orbit_tmp_t)
+
+ type $1_evolution_server_t;
+ domain_type($1_evolution_server_t)
+ role $3 types $1_evolution_server_t;
+
+ type $1_evolution_server_orbit_tmp_t;
+ files_type($1_evolution_server_orbit_tmp_t)
+
+ type $1_evolution_webcal_t;
+ domain_type($1_evolution_webcal_t)
+ role $3 types $1_evolution_webcal_t;
+
+ type $1_evolution_webcal_tmpfs_t;
+ files_tmpfs_file($1_evolution_webcal_tmpfs_t)
+
+ type $1_orbit_tmp_t;
+ files_type($1_orbit_tmp_t)
+
+ ########################################
+ #
+ # Evolution local policy
+ #
+
+ allow $1_evolution_t self:capability { setuid setgid sys_nice };
+ allow $1_evolution_t self:process { signal getsched setsched };
+ allow $1_evolution_t self:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
+ allow $1_evolution_t self:tcp_socket create_socket_perms;
+ allow $1_evolution_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms;
+
+ allow $1_evolution_t $1_evolution_alarm_t:dir search_dir_perms;
+ allow $1_evolution_t $1_evolution_alarm_t:file read;
+
+ allow $1_evolution_t $1_evolution_alarm_t:unix_stream_socket connectto;
+ allow $1_evolution_t $1_evolution_alarm_orbit_tmp_t:sock_file write;
+
+ can_exec($1_evolution_t,evolution_alarm_exec_t)
+
+ allow $1_evolution_t $1_evolution_exchange_t:unix_stream_socket connectto;
+ allow $1_evolution_t $1_evolution_exchange_orbit_tmp_t:sock_file write;
+
+ allow $1_evolution_t $1_evolution_home_t:dir manage_dir_perms;
+ allow $1_evolution_t $1_evolution_home_t:file manage_file_perms;
+ allow $1_evolution_t $1_evolution_home_t:lnk_file create_lnk_perms;
+
+ allow $1_evolution_t $1_evolution_orbit_tmp_t:dir manage_dir_perms;
+ allow $1_evolution_t $1_evolution_orbit_tmp_t:file manage_file_perms;
+ files_tmp_filetrans($1_evolution_t,$1_evolution_orbit_tmp_t,{ dir file })
+
+ allow $1_evolution_t $1_evolution_server_t:dir search_dir_perms;
+ allow $1_evolution_t $1_evolution_server_t:file read;
+
+ allow $1_evolution_t $1_evolution_server_t:unix_stream_socket connectto;
+ allow $1_evolution_t $1_evolution_server_orbit_tmp_t:sock_file write;
+
+ can_exec($1_evolution_t,evolution_server_exec_t)
+
+ allow $1_evolution_t $1_evolution_tmpfs_t:dir rw_dir_perms;
+ allow $1_evolution_t $1_evolution_tmpfs_t:file manage_file_perms;
+ allow $1_evolution_t $1_evolution_tmpfs_t:lnk_file create_lnk_perms;
+ allow $1_evolution_t $1_evolution_tmpfs_t:sock_file manage_file_perms;
+ allow $1_evolution_t $1_evolution_tmpfs_t:fifo_file manage_file_perms;
+ fs_tmpfs_filetrans($1_evolution_t,$1_evolution_tmpfs_t,{ dir file lnk_file sock_file fifo_file })
+
+ allow $1_evolution_t $2:dir search;
+ allow $1_evolution_t $2:fd use;
+ allow $1_evolution_t $2:file read;
+ allow $1_evolution_t $2:lnk_file read;
+ allow $1_evolution_t $2:process sigchld;
+ allow $1_evolution_t $2:unix_stream_socket connectto;
+ allow $1_evolution_t $2:dir search;
+ allow $1_evolution_t $2:file read;
+
+ domain_auto_trans($2, evolution_exec_t, $1_evolution_t)
+
+ allow $2 $1_evolution_t:unix_stream_socket connectto;
+ allow $2 $1_evolution_t:process noatsecure;
+ allow $2 $1_evolution_t:process signal_perms;
+
+ # Access .evolution
+ allow $2 $1_evolution_home_t:dir manage_dir_perms;
+ allow $2 $1_evolution_home_t:file manage_file_perms;
+ allow $2 $1_evolution_home_t:lnk_file create_lnk_perms;
+ allow $2 $1_evolution_home_t:{ dir file lnk_file } { relabelfrom relabelto };
+ userdom_search_user_home_dirs($1,$1_evolution_t)
+
+ # Allow the user domain to signal/ps.
+ allow $2 $1_evolution_t:dir { search getattr read };
+ allow $2 $1_evolution_t:{ file lnk_file } { read getattr };
+ allow $2 $1_evolution_t:process getattr;
+ # We need to suppress this denial because procps tries to access
+ # /proc/pid/environ and this now triggers a ptrace check in recent kernels
+ # (2.4 and 2.6). Might want to change procps to not do this, or only if
+ # running in a privileged domain.
+ dontaudit $2 $1_evolution_t:process ptrace;
+
+ #FIXME check to see if really needed
+ kernel_read_kernel_sysctls($1_evolution_t)
+ kernel_read_system_state($1_evolution_t)
+ # Allow netstat
+ kernel_read_network_state($1_evolution_t)
+ kernel_read_net_sysctls($1_evolution_t)
+
+ corecmd_exec_shell($1_evolution_t)
+ # Run various programs
+ corecmd_exec_bin($1_evolution_t)
+ corecmd_exec_sbin($1_evolution_t)
+
+ corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if($1_evolution_t)
+ corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if($1_evolution_t)
+ corenet_raw_sendrecv_generic_if($1_evolution_t)
+ corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_nodes($1_evolution_t)
+ corenet_udp_sendrecv_all_nodes($1_evolution_t)
+ corenet_raw_sendrecv_all_nodes($1_evolution_t)
+ corenet_tcp_sendrecv_pop_port($1_evolution_t)
+ corenet_tcp_sendrecv_smtp_port($1_evolution_t)
+ corenet_tcp_sendrecv_innd_port($1_evolution_t)
+ corenet_tcp_sendrecv_ldap_port($1_evolution_t)
+ ###corenet_tcp_sendrecv_ipp($1_evolution_t)
+ corenet_udp_sendrecv_pop_port($1_evolution_t)
+ corenet_udp_sendrecv_smtp_port($1_evolution_t)
+ corenet_udp_sendrecv_innd_port($1_evolution_t)
+ corenet_udp_sendrecv_ldap_port($1_evolution_t)
+ ###corenet_udp_sendrecv_ipp($1_evolution_t)
+ corenet_non_ipsec_sendrecv($1_evolution_t)
+ corenet_tcp_bind_all_nodes($1_evolution_t)
+ corenet_udp_bind_all_nodes($1_evolution_t)
+ corenet_tcp_connect_pop_port($1_evolution_t)
+ corenet_tcp_connect_smtp_port($1_evolution_t)
+ corenet_tcp_connect_innd_port($1_evolution_t)
+ corenet_tcp_connect_ldap_port($1_evolution_t)
+ ###corenet_tcp_connect_ipp_port($1_evolution_t)
+ # not sure about this bind
+ corenet_udp_bind_generic_port($1_evolution_t)
+
+ dev_read_urand($1_evolution_t)
+
+ files_read_etc_files($1_evolution_t)
+ files_read_usr_files($1_evolution_t)
+ files_read_usr_symlinks($1_evolution_t)
+ files_read_var_files($1_evolution_t)
+
+ fs_search_auto_mountpoints($1_evolution_t)
+
+ libs_use_ld_so($1_evolution_t)
+ libs_use_shared_libs($1_evolution_t)
+
+ logging_send_syslog_msg($1_evolution_t)
+
+ miscfiles_read_localization($1_evolution_t)
+
+ sysnet_read_config($1_evolution_t)
+ sysnet_dns_name_resolve($1_evolution_t)
+
+ udev_read_state($1_evolution_t)
+
+ userdom_rw_user_tmp_files($1,$1_evolution_t)
+ userdom_manage_user_tmp_dirs($1,$1_evolution_t)
+ userdom_manage_user_tmp_sockets($1,$1_evolution_t)
+ userdom_manage_user_tmp_files($1,$1_evolution_t)
+ # FIXME: suppress access to .local/.icons/.themes until properly implemented
+ # FIXME: suppress access to .gaim/blist.xml (buddy list synchronization)
+ # until properly implemented
+ userdom_dontaudit_read_user_home_content_files($1,$1_evolution_t)
+
+ mta_read_config($1_evolution_t)
+
+ xserver_user_client_template($1,$1_evolution_t,$1_evolution_tmpfs_t)
+
+ tunable_policy(`use_nfs_home_dirs',`
+ fs_manage_nfs_dirs($1_evolution_t)
+ fs_manage_nfs_files($1_evolution_t)
+ fs_manage_nfs_symlinks($1_evolution_t)
+ ')
+
+ tunable_policy(`use_samba_home_dirs',`
+ fs_manage_cifs_dirs($1_evolution_t)
+ fs_manage_cifs_files($1_evolution_t)
+ fs_manage_cifs_symlinks($1_evolution_t)
+ ')
+
+ tunable_policy(`mail_read_content && use_nfs_home_dirs',`
+ fs_list_auto_mountpoints($1_evolution_t)
+ files_list_home($1_evolution_t)
+ fs_read_nfs_files($1_evolution_t)
+ fs_read_nfs_symlinks($1_evolution_t)
+
+ ',`
+ files_dontaudit_list_home($1_evolution_t)
+ fs_dontaudit_list_auto_mountpoints($1_evolution_t)
+ fs_dontaudit_read_nfs_files($1_evolution_t)
+ fs_dontaudit_list_nfs($1_evolution_t)
+ ')
+
+ tunable_policy(`mail_read_content && use_samba_home_dirs',`
+ fs_list_auto_mountpoints($1_evolution_t)
+ files_list_home($1_evolution_t)
+ fs_read_cifs_files($1_evolution_t)
+ fs_read_cifs_symlinks($1_evolution_t)
+ ',`
+ files_dontaudit_list_home($1_evolution_t)
+ fs_dontaudit_list_auto_mountpoints($1_evolution_t)
+ fs_dontaudit_read_cifs_files($1_evolution_t)
+ fs_dontaudit_list_cifs($1_evolution_t)
+ ')
+
+ tunable_policy(`mail_read_content',`
+ userdom_list_user_tmp($1,$1_evolution_t)
+ userdom_read_user_tmp_files($1,$1_evolution_t)
+ userdom_read_user_tmp_symlinks($1,$1_evolution_t)
+ userdom_search_user_home_dirs($1,$1_evolution_t)
+ userdom_read_user_home_content_files($1,$1_evolution_t)
+ userdom_read_user_home_content_symlinks($1,$1_evolution_t)
+
+ ifdef(`mls_policy',`',`
+ fs_search_removable($1_evolution_t)
+ fs_read_removable_files($1_evolution_t)
+ fs_read_removable_symlinks($1_evolution_t)
+ ')
+ ',`
+ files_dontaudit_list_tmp($1_evolution_t)
+ files_dontaudit_list_home($1_evolution_t)
+ fs_dontaudit_list_removable($1_evolution_t)
+ fs_donaudit_read_removable_files($1_evolution_t)
+ userdom_dontaudit_list_user_tmp($1,$1_evolution_t)
+ userdom_dontaudit_read_user_tmp_files($1,$1_evolution_t)
+ userdom_dontaudit_list_user_home_dirs($1,$1_evolution_t)
+ userdom_dontaudit_read_user_home_content_files($1,$1_evolution_t)
+ ')
+
+ tunable_policy(`mail_read_content && read_default_t',`
+ files_list_default($1_evolution_t)
+ files_read_default_files($1_evolution_t)
+ files_read_default_symlinks($1_evolution_t)
+ ',`
+ files_dontaudit_read_default_files($1_evolution_t)
+ files_dontaudit_list_default($1_evolution_t)
+ ')
+
+ tunable_policy(`mail_read_content && read_untrusted_content',`
+ files_list_tmp($1_evolution_t)
+ files_list_home($1_evolution_t)
+ userdom_search_user_home_dirs($1,$1_evolution_t)
+
+ userdom_list_user_untrusted_content($1,$1_evolution_t)
+ userdom_read_user_untrusted_content_files($1,$1_evolution_t)
+ userdom_read_user_untrusted_content_symlinks($1,$1_evolution_t)
+ userdom_list_user_tmp_untrusted_content($1,$1_evolution_t)
+ userdom_read_user_tmp_untrusted_content_files($1,$1_evolution_t)
+ userdom_read_user_tmp_untrusted_content_symlinks($1,$1_evolution_t)
+ ',`
+ files_dontaudit_list_tmp($1_evolution_t)
+ files_dontaudit_list_home($1_evolution_t)
+ userdom_dontaudit_list_user_home_dirs($1,$1_evolution_t)
+ userdom_dontaudit_list_user_untrusted_content($1,$1_evolution_t)
+ userdom_dontaudit_read_user_untrusted_content_files($1,$1_evolution_t)
+ userdom_dontaudit_list_user_tmp_untrusted_content($1,$1_evolution_t)
+ userdom_dontaudit_read_user_tmp_untrusted_content_files($1,$1_evolution_t)
+ ')
+
+ tunable_policy(`write_untrusted_content && use_nfs_home_dirs',`
+ files_search_home($1_evolution_t)
+
+ fs_search_auto_mountpoints($1_evolution_t)
+ fs_manage_nfs_dirs($1_evolution_t)
+ fs_manage_nfs_files($1_evolution_t)
+ fs_manage_nfs_symlinks($1_evolution_t)
+ ',`
+ fs_dontaudit_list_auto_mountpoints($1_evolution_t)
+ fs_dontaudit_manage_nfs_dirs($1_evolution_t)
+ fs_dontaudit_manage_nfs_files($1_evolution_t)
+ ')
+
+ tunable_policy(`write_untrusted_content && use_samba_home_dirs',`
+ files_search_home($1_evolution_t)
+
+ fs_search_auto_mountpoints($1_evolution_t)
+ fs_manage_cifs_dirs($1_evolution_t)
+ fs_manage_cifs_files($1_evolution_t)
+ fs_manage_cifs_symlinks($1_evolution_t)
+ ',`
+ fs_dontaudit_list_auto_mountpoints($1_evolution_t)
+ fs_dontaudit_manage_cifs_dirs($1_evolution_t)
+ fs_dontaudit_manage_cifs_files($1_evolution_t)
+ ')
+
+ tunable_policy(`write_untrusted_content',`
+ files_search_home($1_evolution_t)
+
+ userdom_manage_user_untrusted_content_files($1,$1_evolution_t,{ dir file })
+ ',`
+ files_dontaudit_list_home($1_evolution_t)
+ files_dontaudit_list_tmp($1_evolution_t)
+
+ userdom_dontaudit_list_user_home_dirs($1,$1_evolution_t)
+ #userdom_dontaudit_manage_user_tmp($1,$1_evolution_t)
+ #userdom_dontaudit_manage_user_tmp_files($1,$1_evolution_t)
+ #userdom_dontaudit_manage_user_home_subdirs($1,$1_evolution_t)
+ ')
+
+ optional_policy(`automount',`
+ automount_read_state($1_evolution_t)
+ ')
+
+ # Allow printing the mail
+ optional_policy(`cups',`
+ cups_read_rw_config($1_evolution_t)
+ ')
+
+ optional_policy(`dbus',`
+ dbus_system_bus_client_template($1_evolution,$1_evolution_t)
+ dbus_send_system_bus($1_evolution_t)
+ dbus_user_bus_client_template($1,$1_evolution,$1_evolution_t)
+ dbus_send_user_bus($1,$1_evolution_t)
+ ')
+
+ # Encrypt mail
+ optional_policy(`gpg',`
+ gpg_domtrans_user_gpg($1,$1_evolution_t)
+ gpg_signal_user_gpg($1,$1_evolution_t)
+ ')
+
+ optional_policy(`lpd',`
+ lpd_domtrans_user_lpr($1,$1_evolution_t)
+ ')
+
+ # Allow POP/IMAP/SMTP/NNTP/LDAP/IPP(printing)
+ optional_policy(`nis',`
+ nis_use_ypbind($1_evolution_t)
+ ')
+
+ optional_policy(`nscd',`
+ nscd_socket_use($1_evolution_exchange_t)
+ ')
+
+ ### Junk mail filtering (start spamd)
+ optional_policy(`spamassassin',`
+ spamassassin_exec_spamd($1_evolution_t)
+ spamassassin_domtrans_user_client($1,$1_evolution_t)
+ spamassassin_domtrans_user_local_client($1,$1_evolution_t)
+ # Allow evolution to signal the daemon
+ # FIXME: Now evolution can read spamd temp files
+ spamassassin_read_spamd_tmp_files($1_evolution_t)
+ spamassassin_signal_spamd($1_evolution_t)
+ spamassassin_dontaudit_getattr_spamd_tmp_sockets($1_evolution_t)
+ ')
+
+ ifdef(`TODO',`
+
+ #dbus connect to
+ allow $1_evolution_t $1_dbusd_t:unix_stream_socket connectto;
+
+ # Gnome common stuff
+ gnome_application($1_evolution, $1)
+
+ #TODO gnome stuff
+ # Store passwords in .gnome2_private
+ # Type for storing secret data
+ # (different from home, not directly accessible from ROLE_t)
+ type $1_evolutioin_secret_t;
+ userdom_user_home_content($1,$1_evolutioin_secret_t)
+
+ # Put secret files in .gnome2_private
+ allow $1_evolution_t $1_gnome_secret_t:dir rw_dir_perms;
+ allow $1_evolution_t $1_evolutioin_secret_t:file create_file_perms;
+ type_transition $1_evolution_t $1_gnome_secret_t:file $1_evolutioin_secret_t;
+
+ allow $2 $1_evolution_secret_t:file unlink;
+
+ ifdef(`TODO',`
+ gnome_file_dialog($1_evolution, $1)
+ ')
+ # Start links in web browser
+ ifdef(`mozilla', `
+ corecmd_exec_shell($1_evolution_t)
+ domain_auto_trans($1_evolution_t, mozilla_exec_t, $1_mozilla_t)
+ ')
+
+ ')
+
+ ########################################
+ #
+ # Evolution alarm local policy
+ #
+
+ allow $1_evolution_alarm_t self:fifo_file { read write };
+
+ allow $1_evolution_alarm_t $1_evolution_t:unix_stream_socket connectto;
+ allow $1_evolution_alarm_t $1_evolution_orbit_tmp_t:sock_file write;
+
+ allow $1_evolution_alarm_t $1_evolution_alarm_tmpfs_t:dir rw_dir_perms;
+ allow $1_evolution_alarm_t $1_evolution_alarm_tmpfs_t:file manage_file_perms;
+ allow $1_evolution_alarm_t $1_evolution_alarm_tmpfs_t:lnk_file create_lnk_perms;
+ allow $1_evolution_alarm_t $1_evolution_alarm_tmpfs_t:sock_file manage_file_perms;
+ allow $1_evolution_alarm_t $1_evolution_alarm_tmpfs_t:fifo_file manage_file_perms;
+ fs_tmpfs_filetrans($1_evolution_alarm_t,$1_evolution_alarm_tmpfs_t,{ dir file lnk_file sock_file fifo_file })
+
+ allow $1_evolution_alarm_t $1_evolution_exchange_t:unix_stream_socket connectto;
+ allow $1_evolution_alarm_t $1_evolution_exchange_orbit_tmp_t:sock_file write;
+
+ # Access evolution home
+ allow $1_evolution_alarm_t $1_evolution_home_t:dir manage_dir_perms;
+ allow $1_evolution_alarm_t $1_evolution_home_t:file manage_file_perms;
+ allow $1_evolution_alarm_t $1_evolution_home_t:lnk_file create_lnk_perms;
+
+ allow $1_evolution_alarm_t $1_evolution_server_t:unix_stream_socket connectto;
+ allow $1_evolution_alarm_t $1_evolution_server_orbit_tmp_t:sock_file write;
+
+ domain_auto_trans($2, evolution_alarm_exec_t, $1_evolution_alarm_t)
+ allow $1_evolution_alarm_t $2:fd use;
+
+ fs_search_auto_mountpoints($1_evolution_alarm_t)
+
+ miscfiles_read_localization($1_evolution_alarm_t)
+
+ # Access evolution home
+ userdom_search_user_home_dirs($1,$1_evolution_alarm_t)
+ # FIXME: suppress access to .local/.icons/.themes until properly implemented
+ # FIXME: suppress access to .gaim/blist.xml (buddy list synchronization)
+ # until properly implemented
+ userdom_dontaudit_read_user_home_content_files($1,$1_evolution_alarm_t)
+
+ xserver_user_client_template($1,$1_evolution_alarm_t,$1_evolution_alarm_tmpfs_t)
+
+ # Access evolution home
+ tunable_policy(`use_nfs_home_dirs',`
+ fs_manage_nfs_files($1_evolution_alarm_t)
+ ')
+
+ tunable_policy(`use_samba_home_dirs',`
+ fs_manage_cifs_files($1_evolution_alarm_t)
+ ')
+
+ optional_policy(`nscd',`
+ nscd_socket_use($1_evolution_alarm_t)
+ ')
+
+ ifdef(`TODO',`
+ # Gnome common stuff
+ gnome_application($1_evolution_alarm,$1)
+ ')
+
+ ########################################
+ #
+ # Evolution exchange connector local policy
+ #
+
+ allow $1_evolution_exchange_t self:tcp_socket create_socket_perms;
+ allow $1_evolution_exchange_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms;
+
+ allow $1_evolution_exchange_t $1_evolution_t:unix_stream_socket connectto;
+ allow $1_evolution_exchange_t $1_evolution_orbit_tmp_t:sock_file write;
+
+ allow $1_evolution_exchange_t $1_evolution_alarm_t:unix_stream_socket connectto;
+ allow $1_evolution_exchange_t $1_evolution_alarm_orbit_tmp_t:sock_file write;
+
+ # Access evolution home
+ allow $1_evolution_exchange_t $1_evolution_home_t:dir create_dir_perms;
+ allow $1_evolution_exchange_t $1_evolution_home_t:file create_file_perms;
+ allow $1_evolution_exchange_t $1_evolution_home_t:lnk_file create_lnk_perms;
+
+ allow $1_evolution_exchange_t $1_evolution_server_t:unix_stream_socket connectto;
+ allow $1_evolution_exchange_t $1_evolution_server_orbit_tmp_t:sock_file write;
+
+ # /tmp/.exchange-$USER
+ allow $1_evolution_exchange_t $1_evolution_exchange_tmp_t:dir create_dir_perms;
+ allow $1_evolution_exchange_t $1_evolution_exchange_tmp_t:file create_file_perms;
+ files_tmp_filetrans($1_evolution_exchange_t, $1_evolution_exchange_tmp_t, { file dir })
+
+ allow $1_evolution_exchange_t $1_evolution_exchange_tmpfs_t:dir rw_dir_perms;
+ allow $1_evolution_exchange_t $1_evolution_exchange_tmpfs_t:file manage_file_perms;
+ allow $1_evolution_exchange_t $1_evolution_exchange_tmpfs_t:lnk_file create_lnk_perms;
+ allow $1_evolution_exchange_t $1_evolution_exchange_tmpfs_t:sock_file manage_file_perms;
+ allow $1_evolution_exchange_t $1_evolution_exchange_tmpfs_t:fifo_file manage_file_perms;
+ fs_tmpfs_filetrans($1_evolution_exchange_t,$1_evolution_exchange_tmpfs_t,{ dir file lnk_file sock_file fifo_file })
+
+ allow $1_evolution_exchange_t $2:unix_stream_socket connectto;
+ #FIXME, who should own this. I dont think this module should
+ allow $1_evolution_exchange_t $1_orbit_tmp_t:sock_file write;
+
+ # Clock applet talks to exchange (FIXME: Needs policy)
+ allow $2 $1_evolution_exchange_t:unix_stream_socket connectto;
+ allow $2 $1_evolution_exchange_orbit_tmp_t:sock_file write;
+
+ # Transition from user domain
+ domain_auto_trans($2, evolution_exchange_exec_t, $1_evolution_exchange_t)
+
+ kernel_read_network_state($1_evolution_exchange_t)
+ kernel_read_net_sysctls($1_evolution_exchange_t)
+
+ # Allow netstat
+ corecmd_exec_bin($1_evolution_exchange_t)
+
+ # Access evolution home
+ fs_search_auto_mountpoints($1_evolution_exchange_t)
+
+ # Access evolution home
+ userdom_search_user_home_dirs($1,$1_evolution_exchange_t)
+ # FIXME: suppress access to .local/.icons/.themes until properly implemented
+ # FIXME: suppress access to .gaim/blist.xml (buddy list synchronization)
+ # until properly implemented
+ userdom_dontaudit_read_user_home_content_files($1,$1_evolution_exchange_t)
+
+ xserver_user_client_template($1,$1_evolution_exchange_t,$1_evolution_exchange_tmpfs_t)
+
+ # Access evolution home
+ tunable_policy(`use_nfs_home_dirs',`
+ fs_manage_nfs_files($1_evolution_exchange_t)
+ ')
+
+ tunable_policy(`use_samba_home_dirs',`
+ fs_manage_cifs_files($1_evolution_exchange_t)
+ ')
+
+ optional_policy(`nscd',`
+ nscd_socket_use($1_evolution_exchange_t)
+ ')
+
+ ifdef(`TODO',`
+ # Gnome common stuff
+ gnome_application($1_evolution_exchange, $1)
+ ')
+
+ ########################################
+ #
+ # Evolution data server local policy
+ #
+
+ allow $1_evolution_server_t self:fifo_file { read write };
+ allow $1_evolution_server_t self:unix_stream_socket { accept connectto };
+ # Talk to ldap (address book),
+ # Obtain weather data via http (read server name from xml file in /usr)
+ allow $1_evolution_server_t self:tcp_socket create_socket_perms;
+
+ allow $1_evolution_server_t $1_evolution_t:unix_stream_socket connectto;
+ allow $1_evolution_server_t $1_evolution_orbit_tmp_t:sock_file write;
+
+ allow $1_evolution_server_t $1_evolution_exchange_t:unix_stream_socket connectto;
+ allow $1_evolution_server_t $1_evolution_exchange_orbit_tmp_t:sock_file write;
+
+ # Access evolution home
+ allow $1_evolution_server_t $1_evolution_home_t:dir create_dir_perms;
+ allow $1_evolution_server_t $1_evolution_home_t:file create_file_perms;
+ allow $1_evolution_server_t $1_evolution_home_t:lnk_file create_lnk_perms;
+
+ allow $1_evolution_server_t $1_evolution_alarm_t:unix_stream_socket connectto;
+ allow $1_evolution_server_t $1_evolution_alarm_orbit_tmp_t:sock_file write;
+
+ allow $1_evolution_server_t $2:fd use;
+
+ kernel_read_system_state($1_evolution_server_t)
+
+ corecmd_exec_shell($1_evolution_server_t)
+
+ # Obtain weather data via http (read server name from xml file in /usr)
+ corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if($1_evolution_server_t)
+ corenet_raw_sendrecv_generic_if($1_evolution_server_t)
+ corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_nodes($1_evolution_server_t)
+ corenet_raw_sendrecv_all_nodes($1_evolution_server_t)
+ corenet_tcp_sendrecv_http_port($1_evolution_server_t)
+ corenet_tcp_sendrecv_http_cache_port($1_evolution_server_t)
+ corenet_non_ipsec_sendrecv($1_evolution_server_t)
+ corenet_tcp_bind_all_nodes($1_evolution_server_t)
+ corenet_tcp_connect_http_cache_port($1_evolution_server_t)
+ corenet_tcp_connect_http_port($1_evolution_server_t)
+ # Talk to ldap (address book)
+ corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if($1_evolution_server_t)
+ corenet_raw_sendrecv_generic_if($1_evolution_server_t)
+ corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_nodes($1_evolution_server_t)
+ corenet_raw_sendrecv_all_nodes($1_evolution_server_t)
+ corenet_tcp_sendrecv_ldap_port($1_evolution_server_t)
+ corenet_non_ipsec_sendrecv($1_evolution_server_t)
+ corenet_tcp_bind_all_nodes($1_evolution_server_t)
+ corenet_tcp_connect_ldap_port($1_evolution_server_t)
+
+ files_read_etc_files($1_evolution_server_t)
+ # Obtain weather data via http (read server name from xml file in /usr)
+ files_read_usr_files($1_evolution_server_t)
+
+ fs_search_auto_mountpoints($1_evolution_server_t)
+
+ libs_use_ld_so($1_evolution_server_t)
+ libs_use_shared_libs($1_evolution_server_t)
+
+ # Look in /etc/pki
+ miscfiles_read_certs($1_evolution_server_t)
+
+ # Talk to ldap (address book)
+ # Obtain weather data via http (read server name from xml file in /usr)
+ sysnet_read_config($1_evolution_server_t)
+ sysnet_dns_name_resolve($1_evolution_server_t)
+
+ # Access evolution home
+ userdom_search_user_home_dirs($1,$1_evolution_server_t)
+ # FIXME: suppress access to .local/.icons/.themes until properly implemented
+ # FIXME: suppress access to .gaim/blist.xml (buddy list synchronization)
+ # until properly implemented
+ userdom_dontaudit_read_user_home_content_files($1,$1_evolution_server_t)
+
+ # Transition from user type
+ tunable_policy(`!disable_evolution_trans',`
+ domain_auto_trans($2, evolution_server_exec_t, $1_evolution_server_t)
+ ')
+
+ # Access evolution home
+ tunable_policy(`use_nfs_home_dirs',`
+ fs_manage_nfs_files($1_evolution_server_t)
+ ')
+
+ tunable_policy(`use_samba_home_dirs',`
+ fs_manage_cifs_files($1_evolution_server_t)
+ ')
+
+ optional_policy(`nscd',`
+ nscd_socket_use($1_evolution_server_t)
+ ')
+
+ ifdef(`TODO',`
+ # Gnome common stuff
+ gnome_application($1_evolution_server, $1)
+ ')
+
+ ########################################
+ #
+ # Evolution webcal local policy
+ #
+
+ allow $1_evolution_webcal_t self:tcp_socket create_socket_perms;
+
+ # X/evolution common stuff
+ allow $1_evolution_webcal_t $1_evolution_webcal_tmpfs_t:dir rw_dir_perms;
+ allow $1_evolution_webcal_t $1_evolution_webcal_tmpfs_t:file manage_file_perms;
+ allow $1_evolution_webcal_t $1_evolution_webcal_tmpfs_t:lnk_file create_lnk_perms;
+ allow $1_evolution_webcal_t $1_evolution_webcal_tmpfs_t:sock_file manage_file_perms;
+ allow $1_evolution_webcal_t $1_evolution_webcal_tmpfs_t:fifo_file manage_file_perms;
+ fs_tmpfs_filetrans($1_evolution_webcal_t,$1_evolution_webcal_tmpfs_t,{ dir file lnk_file sock_file fifo_file })
+
+ # Transition from user type
+ domain_auto_trans($2, evolution_webcal_exec_t, $1_evolution_webcal_t)
+
+ corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if($1_evolution_webcal_t)
+ corenet_raw_sendrecv_generic_if($1_evolution_webcal_t)
+ corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_nodes($1_evolution_webcal_t)
+ corenet_raw_sendrecv_all_nodes($1_evolution_webcal_t)
+ corenet_tcp_sendrecv_http_port($1_evolution_webcal_t)
+ corenet_tcp_sendrecv_http_cache_port($1_evolution_webcal_t)
+ corenet_non_ipsec_sendrecv($1_evolution_webcal_t)
+ corenet_tcp_bind_all_nodes($1_evolution_webcal_t)
+ corenet_tcp_connect_http_cache_port($1_evolution_webcal_t)
+ corenet_tcp_connect_http_port($1_evolution_webcal_t)
+
+ # Networking capability - connect to website and handle ics link
+ sysnet_read_config($1_evolution_webcal_t)
+ sysnet_dns_name_resolve($1_evolution_webcal_t)
+
+ # Search home directory (?)
+ userdom_search_user_home_dirs($1,$1_evolution_webcal_t)
+ # FIXME: suppress access to .local/.icons/.themes until properly implemented
+ # FIXME: suppress access to .gaim/blist.xml (buddy list synchronization)
+ # until properly implemented
+ userdom_dontaudit_read_user_home_content_files($1,$1_evolution_webcal_t)
+
+ xserver_user_client_template($1,$1_evolution_webcal_t,$1_evolution_webcal_tmpfs_t)
+
+ optional_policy(`nscd',`
+ nscd_socket_use($1_evolution_webcal_t)
+ ')
+
+ ifdef(`TODO',`
+ # Gnome common stuff
+ gnome_application($1_evolution_webcal, $1)
+ ')
+')
+
+########################################
+## <summary>
+## Create objects in users evolution home folders.
+## </summary>
+## <desc>
+## <p>
+## This is a templated interface, and should only
+## be called from a per-userdomain template.
+## </p>
+## </desc>
+## <param name="prefix">
+## <summary>
+## The prefix of the user domain (e.g., user
+## is the prefix for user_t).
+## </summary>
+## </param>
+## <param name="domain">
+## <summary>
+## Domain allowed access.
+## </summary>
+## </param>
+## <param name="object">
+## <summary>
+## The object class of the object being created. If
+## no class is specified, dir will be used.
+## </summary>
+## </param>
+#
+template(`evolution_home_filetrans',`
+ gen_require(`
+ type $1_evolution_home_t;
+ ')
+
+ allow $2 $1_evolution_home_t:dir rw_dir_perms;
+ type_transition $2 $1_evolution_home_t:$4 $3;
+')
+
+########################################
+## <summary>
+## Connect to user evolution unix stream socket.
+## </summary>
+## <desc>
+## <p>
+## Connect to user evolution unix stream socket.
+## </p>
+## <p>
+## This is a templated interface, and should only
+## be called from a per-userdomain template.
+## </p>
+## </desc>
+## <param name="userdomain_prefix">
+## <summary>
+## The prefix of the user domain (e.g., user
+## is the prefix for user_t).
+## </summary>
+## </param>
+## <param name="domain">
+## <summary>
+## Domain allowed access.
+## </summary>
+## </param>
+#
+template(`evolution_stream_connect',`
+ gen_require(`
+ type $1_evolution_t;
+ ')
+
+ allow $2 $1_evolution_t:unix_stream_socket connectto;
+ allow $2 $1_evolution_home_t:dir search;
+')
diff --git a/refpolicy/policy/modules/apps/evolution.te b/refpolicy/policy/modules/apps/evolution.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3b6950d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/refpolicy/policy/modules/apps/evolution.te
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+
+policy_module(evolution,1.0.0)
+
+########################################
+#
+# Declarations
+#
+
+type evolution_exec_t;
+files_type(evolution_exec_t)
+
+type evolution_alarm_exec_t;
+files_type(evolution_alarm_exec_t)
+
+type evolution_exchange_exec_t;
+files_type(evolution_exchange_exec_t)
+
+type evolution_server_exec_t;
+files_type(evolution_server_exec_t)
+
+type evolution_webcal_exec_t;
+files_type(evolution_webcal_exec_t)
diff --git a/refpolicy/policy/modules/apps/gpg.if b/refpolicy/policy/modules/apps/gpg.if
index db8f672..0d9786b 100644
--- a/refpolicy/policy/modules/apps/gpg.if
+++ b/refpolicy/policy/modules/apps/gpg.if
@@ -391,3 +391,32 @@ template(`gpg_domtrans_user_gpg',`
allow $1_gpg_t $2:process sigchld;
')
+########################################
+## <summary>
+## Send generic signals to user gpg processes.
+## </summary>
+## <desc>
+## <p>
+## This is a templated interface, and should only
+## be called from a per-userdomain template.
+## </p>
+## </desc>
+## <param name="userdomain_prefix">
+## <summary>
+## The prefix of the user domain (e.g., user
+## is the prefix for user_t).
+## </summary>
+## </param>
+## <param name="domain">
+## <summary>
+## Domain allowed access.
+## </summary>
+## </param>
+#
+template(`gpg_signal_user_gpg',`
+ gen_require(`
+ type $1_gpg_t;
+ ')
+
+ allow $2 $1_gpg_t:process signal;
+')
diff --git a/refpolicy/policy/modules/apps/gpg.te b/refpolicy/policy/modules/apps/gpg.te
index e9271c6..22fb375 100644
--- a/refpolicy/policy/modules/apps/gpg.te
+++ b/refpolicy/policy/modules/apps/gpg.te
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
-policy_module(gpg, 1.0.1)
+policy_module(gpg, 1.0.2)
########################################
#
diff --git a/refpolicy/policy/modules/services/automount.if b/refpolicy/policy/modules/services/automount.if
index 5c17e86..5f97e34 100644
--- a/refpolicy/policy/modules/services/automount.if
+++ b/refpolicy/policy/modules/services/automount.if
@@ -46,6 +46,25 @@ interface(`automount_exec_config',`
########################################
## <summary>
+## Allow the domain to read state files in /proc.
+## </summary>
+## <param name="domain">
+## <summary>
+## Domain to allow access.
+## </summary>
+## </param>
+#
+interface(`automount_read_state',`
+ gen_require(`
+ type automount_t;
+ ')
+
+ allow $1 automount_t:dir search_dir_perms;
+ allow $1 automount_t:file r_file_perms;
+')
+
+########################################
+## <summary>
## Do not audit attempts to get the attributes
## of automount temporary directories.
## </summary>
diff --git a/refpolicy/policy/modules/services/automount.te b/refpolicy/policy/modules/services/automount.te
index 9346dca..990cd01 100644
--- a/refpolicy/policy/modules/services/automount.te
+++ b/refpolicy/policy/modules/services/automount.te
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
-policy_module(automount,1.2.0)
+policy_module(automount,1.2.1)
########################################
#
diff --git a/refpolicy/policy/modules/services/spamassassin.if b/refpolicy/policy/modules/services/spamassassin.if
index cf3cf5b..060b714 100644
--- a/refpolicy/policy/modules/services/spamassassin.if
+++ b/refpolicy/policy/modules/services/spamassassin.if
@@ -161,6 +161,11 @@ template(`spamassassin_per_userdomain_template',`
files_read_default_pipes($1_spamc_t)
')
+ optional_policy(`evolution',`
+ # Allow connection to spamd socket above
+ evolution_stream_connect($1,$1_spamc_t)
+ ')
+
optional_policy(`mount',`
mount_send_nfs_client_request($1_spamc_t)
')
@@ -310,6 +315,11 @@ template(`spamassassin_per_userdomain_template',`
fs_manage_cifs_symlinks($1_spamassassin_t)
')
+ optional_policy(`evolution',`
+ # Write pid file and socket in ~/.evolution/cache/tmp
+ evolution_home_filetrans($1,spamd_t,spamd_tmp_t,{ file sock_file })
+ ')
+
optional_policy(`nis',`
# cjp: clearly some redundancy here
@@ -351,6 +361,77 @@ interface(`spamassassin_exec',`
########################################
## <summary>
+## Singnal the spam assassin daemon
+## </summary>
+## <param name="domain">
+## <summary>
+## The type of the process performing this action.
+## </summary>
+## </param>
+#
+interface(`spamassassin_signal_spamd',`
+ gen_require(`
+ type spamd_t;
+ ')
+
+ allow $1 spamd_t:process signal;
+')
+
+########################################
+## <summary>
+## Execute the spamassassin daemon
+## program in the caller directory.
+## </summary>
+## <param name="domain">
+## <summary>
+## Domain allowed access.
+## </summary>
+## </param>
+#
+interface(`spamassassin_exec_spamd',`
+ gen_require(`
+ type spamd_exec_t;
+ ')
+
+ can_exec($1,spamd_exec_t)
+')
+
+########################################
+## <summary>
+## Execute spamassassin client in the user spamassassin client domain.
+## </summary>
+## <desc>
+## <p>
+## This is a template and should only be called
+## from per user domain tempaltes.
+## </p>
+## </desc>
+## <param name="prefix">
+## <summary>
+## The prefix of the user domain. eg user would be the prefix of user_t.
+## </summary>
+## </param>
+## <param name="domain">
+## <summary>
+## The type of the process performing this action.
+## </summary>
+## </param>
+#
+template(`spamassassin_domtrans_user_client',`
+ gen_require(`
+ type $1_spamc_t, spamc_exec_t;
+ ')
+
+ domain_auto_trans($2,spamc_exec_t,$1_spamc_t)
+
+ allow $2 $1_spamc_t:fd use;
+ allow $1_spamc_t $2:fd use;
+ allow $1_spamc_t $2:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
+ allow $1_spamc_t $2:process sigchld;
+')
+
+########################################
+## <summary>
## Execute the spamassassin client
## program in the caller directory.
## </summary>
@@ -367,3 +448,74 @@ interface(`spamassassin_exec_client',`
can_exec($1,spamc_exec_t)
')
+
+########################################
+## <summary>
+## Execute spamassassin in the user spamassassin domain.
+## </summary>
+## <desc>
+## <p>
+## This is a template and should only be called
+## from per user domain tempaltes.
+## </p>
+## </desc>
+## <param name="prefix">
+## <summary>
+## The prefix of the user domain. eg user would be the prefix of user_t.
+## </summary>
+## </param>
+## <param name="domain">
+## <summary>
+## The type of the process performing this action.
+## </summary>
+## </param>
+#
+template(`spamassassin_domtrans_user_local_client',`
+ gen_require(`
+ type $1_spamassassin_t, spamassassin_exec_t;
+ ')
+
+ domain_auto_trans($2,spamassassin_exec_t,$1_spamassassin_t)
+
+ allow $2 $1_spamassassin_t:fd use;
+ allow $1_spamassassin_t $2:fd use;
+ allow $1_spamassassin_t $2:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
+ allow $1_spamassassin_t $2:process sigchld;
+')
+
+########################################
+## <summary>
+## Read temporary spamd file.
+## </summary>
+## <param name="domain">
+## <summary>
+## The type of the process performing this action.
+## </summary>
+## </param>
+#
+interface(`spamassassin_read_spamd_tmp_files',`
+ gen_require(`
+ type spamd_tmp_t;
+ ')
+
+ allow $1 spamd_tmp_t:file r_file_perms;
+')
+
+########################################
+## <summary>
+## Do not audit attempts to get attributes of temporary
+## spamd sockets/
+## </summary>
+## <param name="domain">
+## <summary>
+## Domain to not audit.
+## </summary>
+## </param>
+#
+interface(`spamassassin_dontaudit_getattr_spamd_tmp_sockets',`
+ gen_require(`
+ type spamd_tmp_t;
+ ')
+
+ dontaudit $1 spamd_tmp_t:sock_file getattr;
+')
diff --git a/refpolicy/policy/modules/services/spamassassin.te b/refpolicy/policy/modules/services/spamassassin.te
index 35f1513..31167a0 100644
--- a/refpolicy/policy/modules/services/spamassassin.te
+++ b/refpolicy/policy/modules/services/spamassassin.te
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
-policy_module(spamassassin,1.3.1)
+policy_module(spamassassin,1.3.2)
########################################
#
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