Close of 48241, let's not support bad crypto

[William Brown]

Hi,

I want to close #48241 [0] as "wontfix". I do not believe that it's
appropriate to provide SHA3 as a password hashing algorithm.

The SHA3 algorithm is designed to be fast, and cryptographically secure.
It's target usage is for signatures and verification of these in a rapid
manner.

The fact that this algorithm is fast, and could be implemented in
hardware is the reason it's not appropriate for password hashing.
Passwords should be hashed with a slow algorithm, and in the future, an
algorithm that is CPU and memory hard. This means that in the (hopefully
unlikely) case of password hash leak or dump from ldap that the attacker
must spend a huge amount of resources to brute force or attack any
password that we are storing in the system.

As a result, I would like to make this ticket "wontfix" with an
explanation of why. I think it's better for us to pursue #397 [1].
PBKDF2 is a CPU hard algorithm, and scrypt is both CPU and Memory hard.
These are the direction we should be going (asap).

Thanks,

[0] https://fedorahosted.org/389/ticket/48241
[1] https://fedorahosted.org/389/ticket/397

[Rich Megginson]

On 10/03/2016 08:58 PM, William Brown wrote:
> Hi,
>
> I want to close #48241 [0] as "wontfix". I do not believe that it's
> appropriate to provide SHA3 as a password hashing algorithm.
>
> The SHA3 algorithm is designed to be fast, and cryptographically secure.
> It's target usage is for signatures and verification of these in a rapid
> manner.
>
> The fact that this algorithm is fast, and could be implemented in
> hardware is the reason it's not appropriate for password hashing.
> Passwords should be hashed with a slow algorithm, and in the future, an
> algorithm that is CPU and memory hard. This means that in the (hopefully
> unlikely) case of password hash leak or dump from ldap that the attacker
> must spend a huge amount of resources to brute force or attack any
> password that we are storing in the system.

If the crypto/security team is ok with not supporting SHA3 for 
passwords, works for me.
> As a result, I would like to make this ticket "wontfix" with an
> explanation of why. I think it's better for us to pursue #397 [1].
> PBKDF2 is a CPU hard algorithm, and scrypt is both CPU and Memory hard.
> These are the direction we should be going (asap).
>
> Thanks,
>
> [0] https://fedorahosted.org/389/ticket/48241
> [1] https://fedorahosted.org/389/ticket/397
>
> 389-devel mailing list -- [e-mail]
> To unsubscribe send an email to [e-mail]

[William Brown]

On Mon, 2016-10-03 at 21:26 -0600, Rich Megginson wrote:
> On 10/03/2016 08:58 PM, William Brown wrote:
> > Hi,
> >
> > I want to close #48241 [0] as "wontfix". I do not believe that it's
> > appropriate to provide SHA3 as a password hashing algorithm.
> >
> > The SHA3 algorithm is designed to be fast, and cryptographically secure.
> > It's target usage is for signatures and verification of these in a rapid
> > manner.
> >
> > The fact that this algorithm is fast, and could be implemented in
> > hardware is the reason it's not appropriate for password hashing.
> > Passwords should be hashed with a slow algorithm, and in the future, an
> > algorithm that is CPU and memory hard. This means that in the (hopefully
> > unlikely) case of password hash leak or dump from ldap that the attacker
> > must spend a huge amount of resources to brute force or attack any
> > password that we are storing in the system.
>
> If the crypto/security team is ok with not supporting SHA3 for 
> passwords, works for me.

Who would be a point of contact to ask this?
> > As a result, I would like to make this ticket "wontfix" with an
> > explanation of why. I think it's better for us to pursue #397 [1].
> > PBKDF2 is a CPU hard algorithm, and scrypt is both CPU and Memory hard.
> > These are the direction we should be going (asap).
> >
> > Thanks,
> >
> > [0] https://fedorahosted.org/389/ticket/48241
> > [1] https://fedorahosted.org/389/ticket/397
> >
> > 389-devel mailing list -- [e-mail]
> > To unsubscribe send an email to [e-mail]
>
> 389-devel mailing list -- [e-mail]
> To unsubscribe send an email to [e-mail]

[Rich Megginson]

On 10/03/2016 09:34 PM, William Brown wrote:
> On Mon, 2016-10-03 at 21:26 -0600, Rich Megginson wrote:
> > On 10/03/2016 08:58 PM, William Brown wrote:
> > > Hi,
> > >
> > > I want to close #48241 [0] as "wontfix". I do not believe that it's
> > > appropriate to provide SHA3 as a password hashing algorithm.
> > >
> > > The SHA3 algorithm is designed to be fast, and cryptographically secure.
> > > It's target usage is for signatures and verification of these in a rapid
> > > manner.
> > >
> > > The fact that this algorithm is fast, and could be implemented in
> > > hardware is the reason it's not appropriate for password hashing.
> > > Passwords should be hashed with a slow algorithm, and in the future, an
> > > algorithm that is CPU and memory hard. This means that in the (hopefully
> > > unlikely) case of password hash leak or dump from ldap that the attacker
> > > must spend a huge amount of resources to brute force or attack any
> > > password that we are storing in the system.
> >
> > If the crypto/security team is ok with not supporting SHA3 for
> > passwords, works for me.
>
> Who would be a point of contact to ask this?

Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
> > > As a result, I would like to make this ticket "wontfix" with an
> > > explanation of why. I think it's better for us to pursue #397 [1].
> > > PBKDF2 is a CPU hard algorithm, and scrypt is both CPU and Memory hard.
> > > These are the direction we should be going (asap).
> > >
> > > Thanks,
> > >
> > > [0] https://fedorahosted.org/389/ticket/48241
> > > [1] https://fedorahosted.org/389/ticket/397
> > >
> > > 389-devel mailing list -- [e-mail]
> > > To unsubscribe send an email to [e-mail]
> >
> > 389-devel mailing list -- [e-mail]
> > To unsubscribe send an email to [e-mail]
>
> 389-devel mailing list -- [e-mail]
> To unsubscribe send an email to [e-mail]

[William Brown]

On Mon, 2016-10-03 at 21:42 -0600, Rich Megginson wrote:
> On 10/03/2016 09:34 PM, William Brown wrote:
> > On Mon, 2016-10-03 at 21:26 -0600, Rich Megginson wrote:
> > > On 10/03/2016 08:58 PM, William Brown wrote:
> > > > Hi,
> > > >
> > > > I want to close #48241 [0] as "wontfix". I do not believe that it's
> > > > appropriate to provide SHA3 as a password hashing algorithm.
> > > >
> > > > The SHA3 algorithm is designed to be fast, and cryptographically secure.
> > > > It's target usage is for signatures and verification of these in a rapid
> > > > manner.
> > > >
> > > > The fact that this algorithm is fast, and could be implemented in
> > > > hardware is the reason it's not appropriate for password hashing.
> > > > Passwords should be hashed with a slow algorithm, and in the future, an
> > > > algorithm that is CPU and memory hard. This means that in the (hopefully
> > > > unlikely) case of password hash leak or dump from ldap that the attacker
> > > > must spend a huge amount of resources to brute force or attack any
> > > > password that we are storing in the system.
> > >
> > > If the crypto/security team is ok with not supporting SHA3 for
> > > passwords, works for me.
> >
> > Who would be a point of contact to ask this?
>
> Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos

The response I received was unanimous and against SHA3 for password
storage. I have closed the issue as a result, and will not pursue an
implementation of this.