Hi, we are using SSLv3 certs, and have a multi-master replication environment.
I have over 2000 clients currently using these CAs, and updating them to TLS seems highly disruptive.
Does anyone know of a way to add the updated TLS cert, while still honoring the old SSLv3 certs from clients? Or perhaps a way to add new replicas in to the environment with the new TLS certs, but also add them in to the replication pool with the old SSLv3 systems?
Maybe a good guide/white paper on how to achieve this for PCI requirements?
Alexander Mayberry Enterprise Systems Engineer SD Group: EIT Infrastructure – OMA Enterprise.Systems Engineering.Infrastructure
On Mon, 2015-12-28 at 17:50 +0000, Mayberry, Alexander wrote:
Hi, we are using SSLv3 certs, and have a multi-master replication environment.
I have over 2000 clients currently using these CAs, and updating them to TLS seems highly disruptive.
There is no difference between an "SSLv3" and a "TLS" cert. They are just "certificates" to DS. SSLv3 and TLS are the connection protocols to the directory server.
Does anyone know of a way to add the updated TLS cert, while still honoring the old SSLv3 certs from clients? Or perhaps a way to add new replicas in to the environment with the new TLS certs, but also add them in to the replication pool with the old SSLv3 systems?
Maybe a good guide/white paper on how to achieve this for PCI requirements?
So really, what you are doing is certificate rollover. It's a fun / difficult thing to do.
If you are not changing the signing CA, then you just need to replace the certificates in a rolling fashion on your DS instances. They will need a restart to take effect, and all your clients will "just work".
If you are changing the certificate and the CA that signs them, you are in for some fun.
First, you can do what you are suggesting, and make new replicas that run the new certs vs the old:
Say you have A and B now in MMR, you can setup two more replicas, A, B, C, D.
If you make sure the certificate's CA's are on ALL A, B, C, D, you can run certificates signed by CA1 on A and B, and CA2 on C and D. Then you point the clients where they need to be.
But that's pretty messy I think. And overly complicated. So please don't do this.
Best bet is on all your clients to roll out the new CA so they accept CA1 and CA2. Once you have done this, then you can change over one DS instance out of A and B, to have the new certificate signed by the new CA. Most clients will work, any that you have missed will have a 50% of throwning a problem at this point.
Clients that throw an issue, you can point at B in the interim so they work, then you can update thier ldap CA store to include the new CA, and put them back as connecting to A and B.
Then you can change over B to the new CA, and repeat the process.
There is really no way around it, but there is a risk when changing CA provider that you will mess something up.
Finally, if you don't want to mess around that much, you could set TLS_REQCERT=Never, but I really, really, really don't advise that. Use it as a work around until you can update the CA bundle.
When I managed a certificate roll over in my past environments, this is what I did, coordinating with other business units, getting the new CA out, lots of testing in a stage environment with application etc. Took about 3 months to do all the testing and due diligence, and pre- loading the new CA, but on the day of the cut over there were no issues at all.
I hope this helps.
Thanks, William. I had missed this reply last week.
We will be switched from 389DS to RHDS sometime in the next few months, and our audits will start failing us in March if we are still using sslv3.
I'd like to address these gaps pro-actively, and minimize the amount of impact on my client base by allowing a gradual migration of client systems. This is why I was asking about adding "secured" systems to the replication pools, and gradually cutting over the clients.
If the new RHDS replicas "pass" these tests and are in the replication pool with the 389ds systems that fail, and I could have our ops teams schedule batches of client systems to reconfigure, we could process through this gradually.
Here's where I'm falling down: --> Testing protocols (via sockets except TLS 1.2 and SPDY/NPN)
SSLv2 not offered (OK) SSLv3 offered (NOT ok) TLS 1 offered TLS 1.1 not offered TLS 1.2 not offered (NOT ok) SPDY/NPN not offered
--> Testing ~standard cipher lists
Null Ciphers offered (NOT ok) Anonymous NULL Ciphers not offered (OK) Anonymous DH Ciphers not offered (OK) 40 Bit encryption offered (NOT ok) 56 Bit encryption Local problem: No 56 Bit encryption configured in /usr/bin/openssl Export Ciphers (general) offered (NOT ok) Low (<=64 Bit) offered (NOT ok) DES Ciphers offered (NOT ok) Medium grade encryption offered (NOT ok) Triple DES Ciphers offered (NOT ok) High grade encryption offered (OK)
--> Testing (perfect) forward secrecy, (P)FS -- omitting 3DES, RC4 and Null Encryption here
Not OK: No ciphers supporting Forward Secrecy offered
--> Testing server preferences
Has server cipher order? yes (OK) Negotiated protocol TLSv1 Negotiated cipher AES256-SHA Cipher order SSLv3: AES256-SHA RC4-MD5 RC4-SHA AES128-SHA DES-CBC3-SHA DES-CBC-SHA EXP-RC4-MD5 EXP-RC2-CBC-MD5 TLSv1: AES256-SHA RC4-MD5 RC4-SHA AES128-SHA DES-CBC3-SHA DES-CBC-SHA EXP-RC4-MD5 EXP-RC2-CBC-MD5
Alexander Mayberry Enterprise Systems Engineer SD Group: EIT Infrastructure – OMA Enterprise.Systems Engineering.Infrastructure
-----Original Message----- From: William Brown [mailto:wibrown@redhat.com] Sent: Sunday, January 03, 2016 3:53 PM To: General discussion list for the 389 Directory server project. Subject: [389-users] Re: PCI SSL TLS certificate requirements change
On Mon, 2015-12-28 at 17:50 +0000, Mayberry, Alexander wrote:
Hi, we are using SSLv3 certs, and have a multi-master replication environment.
I have over 2000 clients currently using these CAs, and updating them to TLS seems highly disruptive.
There is no difference between an "SSLv3" and a "TLS" cert. They are just "certificates" to DS. SSLv3 and TLS are the connection protocols to the directory server.
Does anyone know of a way to add the updated TLS cert, while still honoring the old SSLv3 certs from clients? Or perhaps a way to add new replicas in to the environment with the new TLS certs, but also add them in to the replication pool with the old SSLv3 systems?
Maybe a good guide/white paper on how to achieve this for PCI requirements?
So really, what you are doing is certificate rollover. It's a fun / difficult thing to do.
If you are not changing the signing CA, then you just need to replace the certificates in a rolling fashion on your DS instances. They will need a restart to take effect, and all your clients will "just work".
If you are changing the certificate and the CA that signs them, you are in for some fun.
First, you can do what you are suggesting, and make new replicas that run the new certs vs the old:
Say you have A and B now in MMR, you can setup two more replicas, A, B, C, D.
If you make sure the certificate's CA's are on ALL A, B, C, D, you can run certificates signed by CA1 on A and B, and CA2 on C and D. Then you point the clients where they need to be.
But that's pretty messy I think. And overly complicated. So please don't do this.
Best bet is on all your clients to roll out the new CA so they accept CA1 and CA2. Once you have done this, then you can change over one DS instance out of A and B, to have the new certificate signed by the new CA. Most clients will work, any that you have missed will have a 50% of throwning a problem at this point.
Clients that throw an issue, you can point at B in the interim so they work, then you can update thier ldap CA store to include the new CA, and put them back as connecting to A and B.
Then you can change over B to the new CA, and repeat the process.
There is really no way around it, but there is a risk when changing CA provider that you will mess something up.
Finally, if you don't want to mess around that much, you could set TLS_REQCERT=Never, but I really, really, really don't advise that. Use it as a work around until you can update the CA bundle.
When I managed a certificate roll over in my past environments, this is what I did, coordinating with other business units, getting the new CA out, lots of testing in a stage environment with application etc. Took about 3 months to do all the testing and due diligence, and pre- loading the new CA, but on the day of the cut over there were no issues at all.
I hope this helps.
-- Sincerely,
William Brown Software Engineer Red Hat, Brisbane
On Thu, 2016-01-07 at 22:49 +0000, Mayberry, Alexander wrote:
Thanks, William. I had missed this reply last week.
We will be switched from 389DS to RHDS sometime in the next few months, and our audits will start failing us in March if we are still using sslv3.
I'd like to address these gaps pro-actively, and minimize the amount of impact on my client base by allowing a gradual migration of client systems. This is why I was asking about adding "secured" systems to the replication pools, and gradually cutting over the clients.
If the new RHDS replicas "pass" these tests and are in the replication pool with the 389ds systems that fail, and I could have our ops teams schedule batches of client systems to reconfigure, we could process through this gradually.
Here's where I'm falling down:
You should read:
http://www.port389.org/docs/389ds/design/nss-cipher-design.html
--> Testing protocols (via sockets except TLS 1.2 and SPDY/NPN)
SSLv2 not offered (OK) SSLv3 offered (NOT ok) TLS 1 offered TLS 1.1 not offered TLS 1.2 not offered (NOT ok) SPDY/NPN not offered
These are controlled in:
cn=encryption,cn=config
You will likely want to match:
nsSSL2: off nsSSL3: off nsTLS1: on
Which should give you the output you desire.
--> Testing ~standard cipher lists
Null Ciphers offered (NOT ok) Anonymous NULL Ciphers not offered (OK) Anonymous DH Ciphers not offered (OK) 40 Bit encryption offered (NOT ok) 56 Bit encryption Local problem: No 56 Bit encryption configured in /usr/bin/openssl Export Ciphers (general) offered (NOT ok) Low (<=64 Bit) offered (NOT ok) DES Ciphers offered (NOT ok) Medium grade encryption offered (NOT ok) Triple DES Ciphers offered (NOT ok) High grade encryption offered (OK)
Here you probably want to look at:
nsSSL3Ciphers: default allowWeakCipher: off
Specfically, you may actually want to customise this list such as:
nsSSL3Ciphers: +tls_dhe_rsa_aes_128_gcm_sha,+tls_dhe_rsa_aes_128_sha,+tls_dhe_rsa_aes_ 256_sha,+tls_rsa_aes_128_gcm_sha,+tls_rsa_aes_128_sha,+tls_rsa_aes_256_ sha
You may need to adapt this list with the new NSS cipher suite names rather than the hardcoded directory values.
However, reading that document it states that if you have 389-ds-base 1.3.3 or greater, setting "nsSSL3Ciphers: default", will give you a very strong cipher list by default.
--> Testing (perfect) forward secrecy, (P)FS -- omitting 3DES, RC4 and Null Encryption here
Not OK: No ciphers supporting Forward Secrecy offered
--> Testing server preferences
Has server cipher order? yes (OK) Negotiated protocol TLSv1 Negotiated cipher AES256-SHA Cipher order SSLv3: AES256-SHA RC4-MD5 RC4-SHA AES128-SHA DES-CBC3-SHA DES-CBC-SHA EXP-RC4-MD5 EXP-RC2-CBC-MD5 TLSv1: AES256-SHA RC4-MD5 RC4-SHA AES128-SHA DES-CBC3-SHA DES-CBC-SHA EXP-RC4-MD5 EXP-RC2-CBC-MD5
See above,
May I ask what version of RHDS you plan to deploy, and on what version of RHEL?
I hope this helps you resolve your issue.
William, we plan to have RH Engineers come on site to help with the planning/deployment of RHDS. I'm planning to use RHEL7 and whatever the latest RHDS version is, unless someone tells me of some reason why an older version would be better suited.
I need to get my head around what actually needs to happen before they arrive, and hopefully minimize the time it takes for them to explain things to me. If it makes sense to wait for this event, and ensure the new RHDS systems are up to spec, and leave the existing systems alone until they are decommissioned, that's a very clean and manageable way to proceed in my view.
Thanks for your insight, and info, I appreciate it.
Alexander Mayberry Enterprise Systems Engineer SD Group: EIT Infrastructure – OMA Enterprise.Systems Engineering.Infrastructure
-----Original Message----- From: William Brown [mailto:wibrown@redhat.com] Sent: Thursday, January 07, 2016 5:09 PM To: General discussion list for the 389 Directory server project. Subject: [389-users] Re: PCI SSL TLS certificate requirements change
On Thu, 2016-01-07 at 22:49 +0000, Mayberry, Alexander wrote:
Thanks, William. I had missed this reply last week.
We will be switched from 389DS to RHDS sometime in the next few months, and our audits will start failing us in March if we are still using sslv3.
I'd like to address these gaps pro-actively, and minimize the amount of impact on my client base by allowing a gradual migration of client systems. This is why I was asking about adding "secured" systems to the replication pools, and gradually cutting over the clients.
If the new RHDS replicas "pass" these tests and are in the replication pool with the 389ds systems that fail, and I could have our ops teams schedule batches of client systems to reconfigure, we could process through this gradually.
Here's where I'm falling down:
You should read:
http://www.port389.org/docs/389ds/design/nss-cipher-design.html
--> Testing protocols (via sockets except TLS 1.2 and SPDY/NPN)
SSLv2 not offered (OK) SSLv3 offered (NOT ok) TLS 1 offered TLS 1.1 not offered TLS 1.2 not offered (NOT ok) SPDY/NPN not offered
These are controlled in:
cn=encryption,cn=config
You will likely want to match:
nsSSL2: off nsSSL3: off nsTLS1: on
Which should give you the output you desire.
--> Testing ~standard cipher lists
Null Ciphers offered (NOT ok) Anonymous NULL Ciphers not offered (OK) Anonymous DH Ciphers not offered (OK) 40 Bit encryption offered (NOT ok) 56 Bit encryption Local problem: No 56 Bit encryption configured in /usr/bin/openssl Export Ciphers (general) offered (NOT ok) Low (<=64 Bit) offered (NOT ok) DES Ciphers offered (NOT ok) Medium grade encryption offered (NOT ok) Triple DES Ciphers offered (NOT ok) High grade encryption offered (OK)
Here you probably want to look at:
nsSSL3Ciphers: default allowWeakCipher: off
Specfically, you may actually want to customise this list such as:
nsSSL3Ciphers: +tls_dhe_rsa_aes_128_gcm_sha,+tls_dhe_rsa_aes_128_sha,+tls_dhe_rsa_aes_ 256_sha,+tls_rsa_aes_128_gcm_sha,+tls_rsa_aes_128_sha,+tls_rsa_aes_256_ sha
You may need to adapt this list with the new NSS cipher suite names rather than the hardcoded directory values.
However, reading that document it states that if you have 389-ds-base 1.3.3 or greater, setting "nsSSL3Ciphers: default", will give you a very strong cipher list by default.
--> Testing (perfect) forward secrecy, (P)FS -- omitting 3DES, RC4 and Null Encryption here
Not OK: No ciphers supporting Forward Secrecy offered
--> Testing server preferences
Has server cipher order? yes (OK) Negotiated protocol TLSv1 Negotiated cipher AES256-SHA Cipher order SSLv3: AES256-SHA RC4-MD5 RC4-SHA AES128-SHA DES-CBC3-SHA DES-CBC-SHA EXP-RC4-MD5 EXP-RC2-CBC-MD5 TLSv1: AES256-SHA RC4-MD5 RC4-SHA AES128-SHA DES-CBC3-SHA DES-CBC-SHA EXP-RC4-MD5 EXP-RC2-CBC-MD5
See above,
May I ask what version of RHDS you plan to deploy, and on what version of RHEL?
I hope this helps you resolve your issue.
-- Sincerely,
William Brown Software Engineer Red Hat, Brisbane
On Fri, 2016-01-08 at 15:40 +0000, Mayberry, Alexander wrote:
William, we plan to have RH Engineers come on site to help with the planning/deployment of RHDS. I'm planning to use RHEL7 and whatever the latest RHDS version is, unless someone tells me of some reason why an older version would be better suited.
Actually, I wanted to ensure you were planning to move to RHEL7 : The version of 389-ds in RHEL7 should support the SSL features I discussed that are key to your concerns.
I need to get my head around what actually needs to happen before they arrive, and hopefully minimize the time it takes for them to explain things to me.
If it makes sense to wait for this event, and ensure the new RHDS systems are up to spec, and leave the existing systems alone until they are decommissioned, that's a very clean and manageable way to proceed in my view.
I'll let the RH engineers / consultants advise you on this, but I would assume (and hope) the upgrade path they suggest is:
You have you existing Masters A and B.
You create new Masters C and D.
You put all 4 into replication group.
Apply the SSL settings discussed here to C and D.
Then you would put C and D into production alongside A and B.
Wait and test.
Then remove A and B from production for a period of time before you decommision them.
Thanks for your insight, and info, I appreciate it.
Any time!
389-users@lists.fedoraproject.org
-
Mayberry, Alexander -
William Brown