RE: Proposed F19 Feature: OpenAttestation

[Wei, Gang]

Bill Nottingham wrote on 2013-01-29:
>  Jaroslav Reznik (jreznik(a)redhat.com) said:
> > = Features/OpenAttestation =
> > https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Features/OpenAttestation
> >
> > Feature owner(s): Gang Wei <gang.wei(a)intel.com&gt;
> >
> > Provide fedora packages for OpenAttestation to support Trusted Compute
> > Pools(TCP) feature in OpenStack since Folsom release & in future oVirt
> > releases.
>
>  Wow, TCP is a horribly unfortunate acronym collision.
>
> > == Detailed description ==
> > This feature would include mostly packaging OpenAttestation project for
> > fedora.
> >
> > * the source package will be named oat
> > * the binary packages will include oat-appraiser & oat-client
>
>  If you're attempting to create a framework that attests the integrity
>  of systems for use by 'trusted' software, it would (in theory) only be as
>  secure as its weakest link. Given that... PHP? 
I am not sure whether PHP is the weakest link, but the integrity checking done 
by OpenAttestation is to ensure the system is running the expected software 
like BIOS/OS/etc. As to whether the expected software is secure enough it is 
another story.

>  How does it intend to attest the OS in a rapidly updating Fedora
>  environment? Just the kernel + initramfs? An image-based checksum such
>  as what is used in ChromeOS? 
By far, just kernel + initramfs. Every time the kernel/initramfs got updated, 
the Know Good Value in OpenAttestation Server should be updated to take new 
kernel/initramfs as "trusted" one.

Jimmy