On 11/18/2009 02:44 PM, Konstantin Ryabitsev wrote:
2009/11/18 Casey Dahlin <cdahlin(a)redhat.com>:
>>> I may be wrong, but I understand that this behaviour of PackageKit
>>> only applies to users with direct console access (i.e. not remote
>>> shells). So, only users that are logged in via GDM or TTY would be
>>> able to perform such tasks.
>>>
>>
>> That's a silly thing to imply we can control. Just because firefox is running
on a local console doesn't mean that a vulnerability therein has not allowed it to be
ultimately controlled from elsewhere.
Okay, so someone managed to get local shell via firefox. How does
installing trusted packages further their nefarious purposes?
> Addendum: Why do you think sudo would ask an already-logged-in user for his
password?
Because sudo doesn't use policykit? Because sudo gives you full root
access -- not just ability to install trusted software from trusted
repositories? Moreover, even sudo doesn't ask me again if I invoke it
within 5 minutes of using it (or however long it is).
Regards,
But why is it neccesary? That was more my point.
The answer is: because being associated with a login on the local console doesn't
verify that it is a /user/ in control.
--CJD