Dne 04. 05. 22 v 9:32 Alexander Sosedkin napsal(a):
On Wed, May 4, 2022 at 12:43 AM David Woodhouse
<dwmw2(a)infradead.org> wrote:
> On Mon, 2022-05-02 at 19:33 +0200, Clemens Lang wrote:
>> This is the reason why the proposal contains extensive methods to test
>> whether things are going to break by modifying the crypto-policy or using
>> bpftrace. Unfortunately there are hundreds of packages that depend on
>> cryptographic libraries, and millions of different configurations out there.
>> We can’t know ahead of time which ones of them are going to break, but the
>> proposal provides tools and a long transition period to identify and fix
>> them.
> When changes like this broke things for users in the past, we talked
> about a way to present the "insufficient crypto/digest/protocol" as
> just another failure like server certificate validation failures, so
> the application/user can *choose* to accept and proceed, in real time.
>
> I'd like to see that as a *condition* of acceptance of further
> restrictions in the policy.
>
> I really don't want us continuing to break things for Fedora users and
> driving them back to the proprietary VPN clients.
>
> I am pleased to see some progress on this front with
>
https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/GnutlsAllowlisting but it isn't
> clear to me that this gives us what we need. We *want* to warn users
> that their VPN server doesn't meet modern crypto standards. We don't
> want to just blindly re-enable ancient crap and have it silently work.
> But we also do *need* it to work, after we've warned the user about it.
If the error returned from GnuTLS isn't enough to infer
While I don't know much about GnuTLS, I have yet to see single OpenSSL
error message which would help user to understand the issue.
Vít
that you should make the user opt-in into a legacy algorithm
and then counter the restriction on the next attempt with
a priority string extension or gnutls_protocol_mark_enabled,
please file a bug with GnuTLS and describe your case.
Your continued input would be appreciated.
Same with the other libraries if you meant other libraries.
If you don't want to spend a connection on just probing,
but instead prefer to connect no matter what
and then query what has been negotiated
to make the warn/abort decisions on the application layer
that should also be possible.
> Which is why handling it like a certificate validation failure seems to
> be the right answer, but I'm happy to explore other solutions... but
> preferably *not* solutions like "manually set
> GNUTLS_SYSTEM_PRIORTY_FILE=/dev/null in your Fedora package to
> explicitly override all the Fedora crypto policies". That suggestion
> made me sad... :)
+1, this is not the way
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