9:31 a.m.
WG meeting will be at 12:00 UTC, 14:00 Central Europe, 8:00 Boston, 5:00
San Francisco, 21:00 Tokyo in #fedora-meeting on Freenode.
I hope time make sense. Otherwise please comment the thread about
meeting time.
== Topic ==
* Automatically approve topics, which weren't refused on mailing list:
* Open Questions - Playground: Signing
* Open Questions - Playground: Provenpackagers
* Approve on list or irc:
* Open Questions - distinguish packages
* Does my proposal passed or not?
* Proposal: Do not try to distinguish them. Rpmfusion packages also
don't have different dist tag. You can find out if really want to by rpm
-something or check key, which will be also different.
* Open Questions - Playground: reviews
* Are conflicts inside Playground repository allowed?
* How many other checks do we want to have?
* 1 Big repo vs multiple small ones - finally decide which one to pick
* finish change proposal
https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Env_and_Stacks/Changes_Drafts/Playground_r...
Marcela
8:39 a.m.
New subject: Meeting minutes from Env-and-Stacks WG meeting (2014-04-01)
============================================
#fedora-meeting: Env and Stacks (2014-04-01)
============================================
Meeting started by mmaslano at 12:02:21 UTC. The full logs are available
at
http://meetbot.fedoraproject.org/fedora-meeting/2014-04-01/env-and-stacks...
.
Meeting summary
---------------
* init process (mmaslano, 12:02:38)
* Open Questions - Playground: Signing (mmaslano, 12:04:12)
* Open Questions - Playground: Provenpackagers (mmaslano, 12:06:52)
* AGREED: let's have comaintainers and provenpackagers in Playground
repo (+5,-0,0) (mmaslano, 12:15:43)
* Open Questions - distinguish packages (mmaslano, 12:16:12)
* AGREED: don't distinguish packages from Fedora and Playground
(+5,-0,0) (mmaslano, 12:20:21)
* Open Questions - Playground: reviews (mmaslano, 12:20:52)
* subtopic Are conflicts inside Playground repository allowed?
(mmaslano, 12:21:08)
* 1 Big repo vs multiple small ones (mmaslano, 12:26:53)
* AGREED: We will provide a kind of "non-blocking review service" and
later we will talk about whether we should make it mandatory or not.
Coprs won't be blocked by reviews results in the beginning.
(+5,-0,0) (hhorak, 13:24:04)
* AGREED: Playground will be a collection of selected COPRs. (+5,-0,0)
(hhorak, 13:24:56)
*
https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Env_and_Stacks/Changes_Drafts/Playground_r...
(mmaslano, 13:25:11)
* ACTION: review Change proposal - Playground repository (mmaslano,
13:28:33)
* https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Env_and_Stacks/Changes_Drafts/SCL
(mmaslano, 13:29:07)
Meeting ended at 13:38:41 UTC.
Action Items
------------
* review Change proposal - Playground repository
Action Items, by person
-----------------------
* **UNASSIGNED**
* review Change proposal - Playground repository
People Present (lines said)
---------------------------
* mmaslano (90)
* juhp_ (74)
* tjanez (73)
* hhorak (28)
* jreznik (27)
* bkabrda1 (25)
* zodbot (4)
* bkabrda (3)
* drieden (2)
* samkottler (1)
* abadger1999 (0)
* juhp (0)
* pkovar (0)
Generated by `MeetBot`_ 0.1.4
.. _`MeetBot`: http://wiki.debian.org/MeetBot
8:46 p.m.
New subject: Meeting minutes from Env-and-Stacks WG meeting (2014-04-01)
On Tue, Apr 1, 2014 at 6:39 AM, Marcela Mašláňová <mmaslano(a)redhat.com> wrote:
* Open Questions - Playground: Signing (mmaslano, 12:04:12)
I saw that this got voted on in the meeting even though it didn't get
recorded as such for the meeting minutes. The proposal seemed to be:
use obs-sign to sign packages. That's not actually a proposal that we
can approve here. The proposal here should probably be: "is signing
of packages a blocker for making the playground repo, nice to have, or
optional?"
In terms of how to get the packages signed, that's something that the
infrastructure team has to decide. IIRC past conversations correctly,
adding another signing server (meaning a different code base) to
infrastructure is at the bottom of their list of ways to sign packages
in copr (and by extension in the playground repo).
When I saw the vote in the meeting logs I mentioned it to nirik. In
turn he told me that he hadn't heard anything about this and had only
glanced briefly at obs-sign (mentioning that it wasn't even packaged
for Fedora yet). As I related to tjanez on IRC today, I think lack of
packaging probably slows down infra's ability to deploy it but is only
a foottnote to the real problems. Compromising signing servers and
gaining access to the private keys on them is a very high value target
for an attacker. The more signing servers we have the greater the
attack surface infrastructure has to protect. probably in the ideal
scenario infra would run a single signing server and everything
needing signing would be sent to that. (Jesse Kating had that use in
mind when he designed sigul but I don't know if that design goal
actually became part of the software that we are currently running).
A step down from there might be running multiple instances of the same
signing software to handle the various needs as infra would then have
to protect the keys on these multiple hosts. At the bottom of the
list is running separate signing software as that places the
additional burden of auditing and protecting the software stack of the
multiple signing servers.
For whoever is going to approach infra about signing the packages in
copr it probably makes more sense to either talk about enhancing sigul
to work with copr or getting obs-sign to be able to sign packages from
koji. We'd probably also want to ask bressers or someone else from
the security team to do some sort of evaluation of the code bases that
we're looking at.
-Toshio
7:29 a.m.
New subject: Meeting minutes from Env-and-Stacks WG meeting (2014-04-01)
On 04/03/2014 03:46 AM, Toshio Kuratomi wrote:
I saw that this got voted on in the meeting even though it didn't
get
recorded as such for the meeting minutes. The proposal seemed to be:
use obs-sign to sign packages. That's not actually a proposal that we
can approve here. The proposal here should probably be: "is signing
of packages a blocker for making the playground repo, nice to have, or
optional?"
In terms of how to get the packages signed, that's something that the
infrastructure team has to decide. IIRC past conversations correctly,
adding another signing server (meaning a different code base) to
infrastructure is at the bottom of their list of ways to sign packages
in copr (and by extension in the playground repo).
When I saw the vote in the meeting logs I mentioned it to nirik. In
turn he told me that he hadn't heard anything about this and had only
glanced briefly at obs-sign (mentioning that it wasn't even packaged
for Fedora yet). As I related to tjanez on IRC today, I think lack of
packaging probably slows down infra's ability to deploy it but is only
a foottnote to the real problems. Compromising signing servers and
gaining access to the private keys on them is a very high value target
for an attacker. The more signing servers we have the greater the
attack surface infrastructure has to protect. probably in the ideal
scenario infra would run a single signing server and everything
needing signing would be sent to that. (Jesse Kating had that use in
mind when he designed sigul but I don't know if that design goal
actually became part of the software that we are currently running).
A step down from there might be running multiple instances of the same
signing software to handle the various needs as infra would then have
to protect the keys on these multiple hosts. At the bottom of the
list is running separate signing software as that places the
additional burden of auditing and protecting the software stack of the
multiple signing servers.
For whoever is going to approach infra about signing the packages in
copr it probably makes more sense to either talk about enhancing sigul
to work with copr or getting obs-sign to be able to sign packages from
koji. We'd probably also want to ask bressers or someone else from
the security team to do some sort of evaluation of the code bases that
we're looking at.
That would be probably me. I mean the guy who will be implementing signing of packages in
Copr.
I investigated several possibilities and talked to several people. But you are correct
that I did not send conclusion to
mailing list yet. Maybe it is right time to do it now.
One of the guy to who I talked to is Miroslav Trmac, who is current maintainer and main
author of Sigul since 2009.
The conclusion from discussion with him is that:
* we would need need different instance, because to use the same instance for main
distribution and for relaxed ring
(Copr, Playground...) is not best idea. Neither from security POV nor for technical
implementation. (*)
* we would need to do some development of Sigul before deploying new instance
* and we would likely should migrate to gpg2 (from gpg1)
* Sigul have very restricted network setup, which is probably not needed for Copr
On the other hand obs-sign:
* is actively maintained
* is more simple
* used in OBS as well (which mean community and so on)
* have security model and network setup good enough for Copr (I arranged meeting of Adrian
Shröter from OBS and Mirek
Trmač during DevConf.cz where they discussed technical details and none of them seen any
blocker).
Yes, obs-sign is not packaged for Fedora (yet), but the spec exists and I can get it in
Fedora withing week. I do not
see that as problem.
If I sum it up, then obs-sign is clear winner to me. Therefore this is the way I would
like to go in Copr.
But it still does not bubble up in my TODO list. So we have plenty of time for discussion
:)
(*) You suggested that having one signing server is better as "The more signing
servers we have the greater the
attack surface infrastructure has to protect." I disagree.
First: it is not technical possible. Because Koji and current Sigul is in different
networks and I'm not sure if we want
to change it. Likely not.
Second: if you compromise Copr signing server then you have compromised main distribution.
Therefore even from security
POV is better to have different signing server for main distribution and for Copr.
--
Miroslav Suchy, RHCE, RHCDS
Red Hat, Senior Software Engineer, #brno, #devexp, #fedora-buildsys
8:18 a.m.
New subject: Meeting minutes from Env-and-Stacks WG meeting (2014-04-01)
On 04/03/2014 02:29 PM, Miroslav Suchý wrote:
On 04/03/2014 03:46 AM, Toshio Kuratomi wrote:
> I saw that this got voted on in the meeting even though it didn't get
> recorded as such for the meeting minutes. The proposal seemed to be:
> use obs-sign to sign packages. That's not actually a proposal that we
> can approve here. The proposal here should probably be: "is signing
> of packages a blocker for making the playground repo, nice to have, or
> optional?"
>
> In terms of how to get the packages signed, that's something that the
> infrastructure team has to decide. IIRC past conversations correctly,
> adding another signing server (meaning a different code base) to
> infrastructure is at the bottom of their list of ways to sign packages
> in copr (and by extension in the playground repo).
>
> When I saw the vote in the meeting logs I mentioned it to nirik. In
> turn he told me that he hadn't heard anything about this and had only
> glanced briefly at obs-sign (mentioning that it wasn't even packaged
> for Fedora yet). As I related to tjanez on IRC today, I think lack of
> packaging probably slows down infra's ability to deploy it but is only
> a foottnote to the real problems. Compromising signing servers and
> gaining access to the private keys on them is a very high value target
> for an attacker. The more signing servers we have the greater the
> attack surface infrastructure has to protect. probably in the ideal
> scenario infra would run a single signing server and everything
> needing signing would be sent to that. (Jesse Kating had that use in
> mind when he designed sigul but I don't know if that design goal
> actually became part of the software that we are currently running).
> A step down from there might be running multiple instances of the same
> signing software to handle the various needs as infra would then have
> to protect the keys on these multiple hosts. At the bottom of the
> list is running separate signing software as that places the
> additional burden of auditing and protecting the software stack of the
> multiple signing servers.
>
> For whoever is going to approach infra about signing the packages in
> copr it probably makes more sense to either talk about enhancing sigul
> to work with copr or getting obs-sign to be able to sign packages from
> koji. We'd probably also want to ask bressers or someone else from
> the security team to do some sort of evaluation of the code bases that
> we're looking at.
That would be probably me. I mean the guy who will be implementing
signing of packages in Copr.
I investigated several possibilities and talked to several people. But
you are correct that I did not send conclusion to mailing list yet.
Maybe it is right time to do it now.
One of the guy to who I talked to is Miroslav Trmac, who is current
maintainer and main author of Sigul since 2009.
The conclusion from discussion with him is that:
* we would need need different instance, because to use the same
instance for main distribution and for relaxed ring (Copr,
Playground...) is not best idea. Neither from security POV nor for
technical implementation. (*)
* we would need to do some development of Sigul before deploying new
instance
* and we would likely should migrate to gpg2 (from gpg1)
* Sigul have very restricted network setup, which is probably not needed
for Copr
On the other hand obs-sign:
* is actively maintained
* is more simple
* used in OBS as well (which mean community and so on)
* have security model and network setup good enough for Copr (I arranged
meeting of Adrian Shröter from OBS and Mirek Trmač during DevConf.cz
where they discussed technical details and none of them seen any blocker).
Yes, obs-sign is not packaged for Fedora (yet), but the spec exists and
I can get it in Fedora withing week. I do not see that as problem.
If I sum it up, then obs-sign is clear winner to me. Therefore this is
the way I would like to go in Copr.
But it still does not bubble up in my TODO list. So we have plenty of
time for discussion :)
(*) You suggested that having one signing server is better as "The more
signing servers we have the greater the
> attack surface infrastructure has to protect." I disagree.
First: it is not technical possible. Because Koji and current Sigul is
in different networks and I'm not sure if we want to change it. Likely not.
Second: if you compromise Copr signing server then you have compromised
main distribution. Therefore even from security POV is better to have
different signing server for main distribution and for Copr.
The summary of Mirek's notes was for a long time in Open Questions
section [1]. I removed it yesterday, because it was voted for obs-signd.
Mirek is member of infra, so I leave the discussion up to him.
[1]
https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Env_and_Stacks/Playground_repository_%28dr...
Marcela
1:21 p.m.
New subject: Meeting minutes from Env-and-Stacks WG meeting (2014-04-01)
On Thu, 03 Apr 2014 14:29:16 +0200
Miroslav Suchý <msuchy(a)redhat.com> wrote:
On 04/03/2014 03:46 AM, Toshio Kuratomi wrote:
...snip...
> For whoever is going to approach infra about signing the
packages in
> copr it probably makes more sense to either talk about enhancing
> sigul to work with copr or getting obs-sign to be able to sign
> packages from koji. We'd probably also want to ask bressers or
> someone else from the security team to do some sort of evaluation
> of the code bases that we're looking at.
That would be probably me. I mean the guy who will be implementing
signing of packages in Copr.
I investigated several possibilities and talked to several people.
But you are correct that I did not send conclusion to mailing list
yet. Maybe it is right time to do it now.
One of the guy to who I talked to is Miroslav Trmac, who is current
maintainer and main author of Sigul since 2009. The conclusion from
discussion with him is that:
* we would need need different instance, because to use the same
instance for main distribution and for relaxed ring (Copr,
Playground...) is not best idea. Neither from security POV nor for
technical implementation. (*)
* we would need to do some development of Sigul before deploying new
instance
* and we would likely should migrate to gpg2 (from gpg1)
* Sigul have very restricted network setup, which is probably not
needed for Copr
On the other hand obs-sign:
* is actively maintained
* is more simple
* used in OBS as well (which mean community and so on)
* have security model and network setup good enough for Copr (I
arranged meeting of Adrian Shröter from OBS and Mirek Trmač during
DevConf.cz where they discussed technical details and none of them
seen any blocker).
So, one consideration here is that we also are looking at trying to
sign rawhide packages and perhaps scratch builds and/or official
builds. It would be very nice to not duplicate a bunch in solutions for
signing copr and for the above too. It would be nice to reuse things
that make sense there.
Yes, obs-sign is not packaged for Fedora (yet), but the spec exists
and I can get it in Fedora withing week. I do not see that as problem.
If I sum it up, then obs-sign is clear winner to me. Therefore this
is the way I would like to go in Copr.
But it still does not bubble up in my TODO list. So we have plenty of
time for discussion :)
Sure. obs-sign could perhaps work for the other use cases with a koji
plugin to talk to it as desired. See
https://fedorahosted.org/rel-eng/ticket/5870 for more discussion.
(*) You suggested that having one signing server is better as
"The
more signing servers we have the greater the
> attack surface infrastructure has to protect." I disagree.
Well, it means two things to update, two things to protect.
obs-signd also stores private key and passphrase on local disk right?
First: it is not technical possible. Because Koji and current Sigul
is in different networks and I'm not sure if we want to change it.
Sure, but thats not a problem. We could have a server listening to
fedmsg do the signing. That won't work for copr tho, because the sigul
server doesn't have access to the copr packages to write out a
signature.
Likely not. Second: if you compromise Copr signing server then you
have compromised main distribution. Therefore even from security POV
is better to have different signing server for main distribution and
for Copr.
Well, it's not that black and white. To compromise sigul you need both
access to the keystore and passphrase(s) to each key to unlock the
private key. If you just have access to the keystore you can't still
get access to the private key. If you just have a passphrase for a key
you can't do anything without access to the server or the keystore.
kevin
2:47 a.m.
New subject: Meeting minutes from Env-and-Stacks WG meeting (2014-04-01)
On 04/06/2014 08:21 PM, Kevin Fenzi wrote:
obs-signd also stores private key and passphrase on local disk right?
IIRC yes.
--
Miroslav Suchy, RHCE, RHCDS
Red Hat, Senior Software Engineer, #brno, #devexp, #fedora-buildsys
3665
days inactive
3672
days old
6 comments
4 participants
participants (4)
-
Kevin Fenzi -
Marcela Mašláňová -
Miroslav Suchý -
Toshio Kuratomi