Fedora 31 Self-Contained Change proposal: Include several modules in the EFI build of Grub2 for security use-cases

[Ben Cotton]

https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/Include_security_modules_in_efi_Grub2

== Summary ==
Include Grub's "verify," "cryptodisk" and "luks" modules
in
grubx64.efi of the 'grub2-efi-x64' package.

Note: Although the build process will automatically include explicit
dependencies ("mpi," "gcry_sha1," "procfs" and
"archelp"), the
following implicit ones must also be included: "gcry_sha256,"
"gcry_rsa," "gcry_rijndael," "gcry_serpent,"
gcry_twofish" and
"gcry_whirlpool"

== Owner ==
* Name: [[User:benjamind|Benjamin Doron]]
* Email: benjamin.doron00(a)gmail.com
* Name: [[User:pjones|Peter Jones]]
* Email: pjones(a)redhat.com
* Name: [[User:javierm|Javier Martinez Canillas]]
* Email: fmartine(a)redhat.com

== Detailed Description ==
Users utilising secure boot functionality on the UEFI platform cannot
insert grub modules. Paradoxically, this means that security-conscious
users cannot use grub's verify module for signature verification, or
employ (near) full disk encryption using cryptodisk and luks.

The security benefits of signature verification would reach more users
if Fedora automated it by incorporating the process into
`grub2-mkconfig`. Similarly, it would be easier to use cryptodisk
functionality if it were configurable by anaconda. This can be
considered for future releases, after allowing time to straighten out
the details of the implementation and analyse the benefits/costs.

For the long-term, to grant flexibility with grub2 modules on secure
boot instances in general, it may be advisable to consider signing the
.mod files in the 'grub2-efi-x64-modules' package, allow inserting of
signed modules in secure boot instances and then modify
`grub2-mkconfig` to copy the necessary modules into the EFI partition
when required by the user's configuration.

== Benefit to Fedora ==
This change will allow users to gain trust in the integrity of
early-launch code either through verification of signatures
(particularly useful for the initramfs, which is particularly
vulnerable to possible offline modification) or encryption of the boot
partition.

== Scope ==
* Proposal owners: Modify grub.macros file to include the
above-mentioned modules in the GRUB_MODULES variable.
* Other developers: N/A (not a System Wide Change)
* Policies and guidelines: N/A (not a System Wide Change)
* Trademark approval: N/A (not needed for this Change)

== Upgrade/compatibility impact ==
Change only adds modules, so existing users should have no problems.

== How To Test ==
<b>Disclaimer: Commands assume that tester is root. Secure Boot must
be disabled for testing purposes (`insmod` is forbidden under Secure
Boot, for now. The description details a tentative plan to get us to a
place where that can be changed). Ensure that the package
'grub2-efi-x64-modules' is installed, and for testing purposes, copy
the contents to the EFI partition with `cp -r
/usr/lib/grub/x86_64-efi/ /boot/efi/EFI/fedora/`</b>

<b>For "verify":</b>

1. Generate an RSA signing key with `gpg --full-generate-key` (option
4), then export it with `gpg --export > pubkey` and move it to the EFI
partition with `mv pubkey /boot/efi/EFI/fedora`. You can also export
the private key (`gpg --export-secret-keys > seckey`), but the signing
process doesn't require it as gpg will get the key from its own
directory.

2. Add "insmod verify," "insmod gcry_sha256," "insmod
gcry_rsa,"
"trust (hd0,gpt1)/efi/fedora/pubkey" (change this based on your
environment) and "set check_signatures=enforce" to
/etc/grub.d/40_custom

3. Run `grub2-mkconfig -o /boot/efi/EFI/fedora/grub.cfg`

4. Run `export GPG_TTY=$(tty)`. Don't ask, apparently something
changed in gpg with a recent update.

4. Create a file, /dev/shm/pass, with the key's password and execute:
`for x in $(find /boot -name "*.cfg" -or -name "*.lst" -or -name
"*.mod" -or -name "vmlinuz*" -or -name "initramfs*" -or
-name
"grubenv"); do gpg --batch --pinentry-mode loopback --detach-sign
--passphrase-fd 0 $x < /dev/shm/pass; done`. Then, `shred
/dev/shm/pass`

5. Reboot. If the system starts, backup and remove .sig files. If the
system does not start this time, change is successful

(To recover from a now non-booting system, open the grub terminal and
execute `set check_signatures=no`. The system should then boot, and
.sig files can be replaced or regenerated.)


<b>For cryptodisk functionality:</b>

1. Backup the files in your boot partition

2. Run `cryptsetup luksFormat /dev/sda2 --type luks1` (change this
based on your environment to /boot's block device)

Note: If filesystem root is also encrypted, it is recommended that the
same password be used for boot as for root to decrease the amount of
engagement required at start-up. Consider using --iter-time with low
time in milliseconds (default is 2000ms)

3. Open luks container with `cryptsetup luksOpen /dev/sda2 --type
luks1 crypt_boot` (change this to match your environment) and run
`mkfs.ext4 /dev/mapper/crypt_boot`, then mount and restore backup

4. Add "GRUB_ENABLE_CRYPTODISK=y" to /etc/default/grub

5. Correct /etc/fstab to the correct UUID for /boot

6. Add an entry for the boot container to /etc/crypttab (i.e.
"luks-<your luks UUID> UUID=<your luks UUID> none discard"), then
run
`dracut -vf --regenerate-all`

7. Run `grub2-mkconfig -o /boot/efi/EFI/fedora/grub.cfg`

8. Reboot. Grub should ask for the password created in step 2. If the
system then starts, change is successful

(If filesystem root is also encrypted, the user will be asked for a
password twice. This can be mitigated with a keyfile for filesystem
root, or use of the clevis package and likely, a tpm.)

== User Experience ==
Users may optionally elect to guarantee the integrity of boot code
either through verification of digital signatures or encryption of the
boot partition.

== Dependencies ==
'Grub2-efi-x64-modules' and 'grub2-tools-*' depend upon/are a part of
this package, but require no change.

== Contingency Plan ==
* Contingency mechanism: Revert the shipped configuration
* Contingency deadline: Beta freeze
* Blocks release? N/A (not a System Wide Change)
* Blocks product? No

== Documentation ==
https://www.gnu.org/software/grub/manual/grub/html_node/Using-digital-sig...

https://wiki.archlinux.org/index.php/Dm-crypt/Encrypting_an_entire_system...

== Release Notes ==
Fedora now supports Grub's detached verify and cryptodisk
functionality natively, even on secure boot systems.

--
Ben Cotton
He / Him / His
Fedora Program Manager
Red Hat
TZ=America/Indiana/Indianapolis

[Benjamin Doron]

Hi all,
I've written some scripts to help with the signature verification aspect of this
change. I've attempted to have them seamlessly handle different environments, but
please let me know if you observe any misbehaviour. I'd particularly like to get input
on the second script. The first can setup a system for signature verification only if the
relevant modules are made available separately. Also, compare the steps the script takes
with the wiki page. The script assumes that the modules are loaded by default (they are
once they're included in the build) too. Check steps 2 and 3 in the "verify"
portion of the How To Test section for what is missing (So, this is definitely useful
after F31's release, but can be convenient now too).

Thanks.



grub2-switch-to-verify:
#!/bin/bash

## This, for now, is a holistic script. It assumes that we've either configured
signature verification, or not.
## This will need to be changed. Individual scripts should check for their files, and call
on a central script (or
## function therein) to configure things otherwise.

if [[ $(id -u) != 0 ]]; then
    echo "You must run this script as root"
    exit 1
fi

sata_or_nvme=$(if [[ $(mount | grep "/boot/efi" | cut -d " " -f 1) =~
(/dev/nvme*|/dev/mmcblk*) ]]; then echo 3; else echo 2; fi)
drive_num=$(lsblk | grep /boot/efi | cut -d " " -f 1 | cut -c 3- | rev | cut -c
$sata_or_nvme- | rev)
part_type=$(fdisk /dev/$drive_num -l | grep "Disklabel type" | cut -d "
" -f 3)
ESP_partnum=$(lsblk | grep /boot/efi | cut -c 6)
#export GPG_TTY=$(tty)

function firstrun {
    touch /var/tmp/grub_verify-pgp_pass
    chmod 600 /var/tmp/grub_verify-pgp_pass
    gpg --gen-random --armor 0 24 > /var/tmp/grub_verify-pgp_pass
    gpg --pinentry-mode loopback --batch --quick-generate-key --passphrase-file
/var/tmp/grub_verify-pgp_pass "Grub_verify testing key" rsa sign never
    gpg --export "Grub_verify testing key" > /boot/efi/EFI/fedora/pubkey
    echo "
    trust (hd0,$part_type$ESP_partnum)/efi/fedora/pubkey --skip-sig
    set check_signatures=enforce" >> /etc/grub.d/40_custom
    grub2-mkconfig -o /boot/efi/EFI/fedora/grub.cfg
    resign
}

function resign {
    for x in $(find /boot -name "*.cfg.sig" -or -name "*.lst.sig" -or
-name "*.mod.sig" -or -name "vmlinuz*.sig" -or -name
"initramfs*.sig" -or -name "grubenv.sig"); do rm -f "$x";
done
    for x in $(find /boot -name "*.cfg" -or -name "*.lst" -or -name
"*.mod" -or -name "vmlinuz*" -or -name "initramfs*" -or
-name "grubenv"); do gpg --batch --detach-sign -u "Grub_verify testing
key" --pinentry-mode loopback --passphrase-fd 0 "$x" <
/var/tmp/grub_verify-pgp_pass; done
}

if [ ! -f /boot/efi/EFI/fedora/grub.cfg.sig ]; then
    firstrun
    exit 0
else
    resign
    exit 0
fi


grub_verify-kern-postinst:
#!/bin/bash

## This is only going to address the kernel and initramfs (we're tacking on grubenv,
as it is edited concurrently with
## kernel upgrades. However, "savedentry" might only change after a reboot. This
requires further testing). While these
## are the most frequently modified, those with certain configurations will need to keep
an eye on things.
##
## Thankfully, the new BootLoaderSpec format ensures that grub.cfg is rarely modified. The
large majority of users don't
## use custom.cfg and user.cfg is generally on written once. An initial round of signing
should cover all of this.
## grubenv will be resigned by this version of the script, but requires further testing.
## The default configuration doesn't allow for inserting modules, so we don't need
to resign any of them. While this can
## hopefully be changed with Grub's 2.04 release, by that time additional module
loading can be automated
## per-environment with patches to grub2-mkconfig.
##
## Once/if we turn on signature verification by default, all of the above will be handled
with patches to the relevant
## scripts.

## It's unlikely that we'll hit this, but we need to be sure in case we're run
directly.
if [[ $(id -u) != 0 ]]; then
    echo "You must run this script as root"
    exit 1
fi

old_sigs=$(for x in $(find /boot -name "vmlinuz*.sig" -or -name
"initramfs*.sig" | grep -v rescue | sed 's/.sig//'); do if [[
"$x" != "$(rpm -ql kernel-core | grep -e /boot/vmlinuz -e /boot/initramfs |
grep "$x")" ]]; then echo "$x"; fi; done)
new_uname_r=$(rpm -qa --last kernel | head -n 1 | cut -d " " -f 1 | sed
's/kernel-//')

for x in $old_sigs; do rm -f "$x.sig"; done
for x in $(find /boot -name "grubenv.sig"); do rm -f "$x"; done
for x in $(find /boot -name "vmlinuz-$new_uname_r" -or -name
"initramfs-$new_uname_r.img" -or -name "grubenv"); do gpg --batch
--detach-sign -u "Grub_verify testing key" --pinentry-mode loopback
--passphrase-fd 0 "$x" < /var/tmp/grub_verify-pgp_pass; done
exit 0