12:52 p.m.
Simo Sorce wrote:
On Fri, 2018-05-11 at 15:47 +1000, Fraser Tweedale via FreeIPA-devel
wrote:
> Hi all,
>
> Ticket https://pagure.io/freeipa/issue/7482 made me think about the
> current revocation behaviour in `ipa cert-request`. For hosts and
> services, all old certificates get revoked.
>
> I wrote a blog post[1] outlining the problems with the current
> behaviour, and some suggested changes. I'd like to know others'
> thoughts. If we go ahead it would be something for a major release,
> not a bugfix release. The actual amount of work is pretty small.
>
> [1]
https://frasertweedale.github.io/blog-redhat/posts/2018-05-11-renewal-and...
I'd prefer no revocation by default, if people need two+ certs with the
same name they should be able to do so easily (for example for
clustered services that need to answer as a single machine).
Multiple certs is fine but the convention to date has been one cert per
service so that usage can be more easily tracked. If they want that can
have a single cert and share it everywhere but then things are more
opaque and the systems harder to manage. You can't easily answer the
question "What TLS services are we running on bob?"
I can't quite get my head around Fraser's scenario Certificate for new
purpose (non-renewal). New purpose for the same service? Do you have any
examples of that?
Beyond the fact that we'll have to come up with some other scheme to
sift the database looking for expired certs to remove from usercertificate.
Remember that storing usercertificate in host/service entries provides
really no value whatsoever except to pin the fact that the service has a
certificate at all. So being able to store 0, 1 or more doesn't really
buy you a lot unless you are using these services to bind as clients.
Even now when you display a service it provides the details for only ONE
certificate.
user certs are another story altogether and not covered here.
It also fills a CRL list for no good reasons, we should be
conservative
on CRL size, and if someone has a dynamic environment where hosts are
created and destroyed frequently the CRL could become enormous.
Sure, assuming they actually use the CRL or OCSP.
I'd be ok making it a config option.
I think I'd rather not extend the cert-request API for the revocation
case and use post-command scripts to do it instead. This is an IPA
policy so it should live within IPA.
rob