One of RHEL7 bugzillas [1] shows an interesting discrepancy between our content and STIG:
* We feature [2] a rule "Use Only FIPS 140-2 Validated Ciphers" * STIG has its own [3] "A FIPS 140-2 approved cryptographic algorithm must be used for SSH communications."
There is a discrepancy between the two - while we claim that the following ciphers are FIPS 140-2 certified on Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7, only three of them are recognized as such by the STIG:
* aes128-ctr(STIG) * aes192-ctr(STIG) * aes256-ctr(STIG) * aes128-cb * aes192-cbc * aes256-cbc * 3des-cbc * rijndael-cbc@lysator.liu.se
I have confirmed correctness of our description with our FIPS SME Tomas Mraz (in CC), so this issue looks as a bug in STIG - either the requirement is too strict, so it is incorrect, or it is supposed to be strict, and it should therefore be reworded, and we need to create a new rule in our content.
What is the procedure in cases like this?
References:
[1]: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1781244 [2]: https://static.open-scap.org/ssg-guides/ssg-rhel7-guide-stig.html#xccdf_org.... [3]: https://www.stigviewer.com/stig/red_hat_enterprise_linux_7/2017-12-14/findin...
On Wednesday, March 11, 2020 11:36:38 AM EDT Matěj Týč wrote:
One of RHEL7 bugzillas [1] shows an interesting discrepancy between our content and STIG:
- We feature [2] a rule "Use Only FIPS 140-2 Validated Ciphers"
- STIG has its own [3] "A FIPS 140-2 approved cryptographic algorithm must be used for SSH communications."
There is a discrepancy between the two - while we claim that the following ciphers are FIPS 140-2 certified on Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7, only three of them are recognized as such by the STIG:
- aes128-ctr(STIG)
- aes192-ctr(STIG)
- aes256-ctr(STIG)
- aes128-cb
- aes192-cbc
- aes256-cbc
- 3des-cbc
- rijndael-cbc@lysator.liu.se
I have confirmed correctness of our description with our FIPS SME Tomas Mraz (in CC), so this issue looks as a bug in STIG - either the requirement is too strict, so it is incorrect, or it is supposed to be strict, and it should therefore be reworded, and we need to create a new rule in our content.
What is the procedure in cases like this?
Common Criteria allows the cbc mode (but not the 192 variants). So, that is another data point to consider that the STIG may be off on that one. However, 3des is consider deprecated in the 800-131a. It is not disallowed and can still be used. But maybe its deprecation is the rationale for that one.
-Steve
References:
[1]: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1781244 [2]:https://static.open-scap.org/ssg-guides/ssg-rhel7-guide-stig.html#xccdf_or g.ssgproject.content_rule_sshd_use_approved_ciphers [3]:
https://www.stigviewer.com/stig/red_hat_enterprise_linux_7/2017-12-14/find ing/V-72221
On Wed, Mar 11, 2020, at 11:36 AM, Matěj Týč wrote:
One of RHEL7 bugzillas [1] shows an interesting discrepancy between our content and STIG:
- We feature [2] a rule "Use Only FIPS 140-2 Validated Ciphers"
- STIG has its own [3] "A FIPS 140-2 approved cryptographic algorithm
must be used for SSH communications." There is a discrepancy between the two - while we claim that the following ciphers are FIPS 140-2 certified on Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7, only three of them are recognized as such by the STIG:
- aes128-ctr(STIG)
- aes192-ctr(STIG)
- aes256-ctr(STIG)
- aes128-cb
- aes192-cbc
- aes256-cbc
- 3des-cbc
- rijndael-cbc@lysator.liu.se
I have confirmed correctness of our description with our FIPS SME Tomas Mraz (in CC), so this issue looks as a bug in STIG - either the requirement is too strict, so it is incorrect, or it is supposed to be strict, and it should therefore be reworded, and we need to create a new rule in our content.
Indeed, the STIG allows fewer ciphers than FIPS allows; the STIG currently says "If any ciphers other than "aes128-ctr", "aes192-ctr", or "aes256-ctr" are listed, the "Ciphers" keyword is missing, or the returned line is commented out, this is a finding." [4]
Similarly, for the MACs allowed, "If any ciphers other than "hmac-sha2-256" or "hmac-sha2-512" are listed or the returned line is commented out, this is a finding." [5]
More are permitted by FIPS than by SSH, but the STIG is FIPS compliant as-is, using a subset of the FIPS ciphers. From the Security Policy document for the certification [6],
Only the following ciphers are allowed: - aes128-ctr - aes192-ctr - aes256-ctr - aes128-cbc - aes192-cbc - aes256-cbc - 3des-cbc - rijndael-cbc@lysator.liu.se Only the following message authentication codes are allowed: - hmac-sha1 - hmac-sha2-256 - hmac-sha2-512 - hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com - hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com - hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com
What is the procedure in cases like this?
I'd just configure the STIG subset of FIPS, and maybe ask DISA to add a clarification note to the STIG. Many folks are concerned about the FIPS-permitted 3DES algorithm [7], "3DES is deprecated for all new applications and usage is disallowed after 2023"
V/r, James Cassell
[4] https://vaulted.io/library/disa-stigs-srgs/red_hat_enterprise_linux_7_securi...
[5] https://vaulted.io/library/disa-stigs-srgs/red_hat_enterprise_linux_7_securi...
[6] https://csrc.nist.gov/CSRC/media/projects/cryptographic-module-validation-pr...
[7] https://www.cryptomathic.com/news-events/blog/3des-is-officially-being-retir...
References:
[3]:
https://www.stigviewer.com/stig/red_hat_enterprise_linux_7/2017-12-14/findin...
If memory serves, there is/was DOD/DISA guidance prohibiting use of all CBC mode ciphers. I couldn't tell you where to find it, but I recall having to make those adjustments several years ago when I did that sort of thing.
Anyone running on an accredited network with continuous monitoring and reporting is going to get dinged by ACAS (aka nessus) if CBC modes are in use: https://www.tenable.com/plugins/nessus/70658
--Sean
On Wed, Mar 11, 2020 at 12:11 PM James Cassell fedoraproject@cyberpear.com wrote:
On Wed, Mar 11, 2020, at 11:36 AM, Matěj Týč wrote:
One of RHEL7 bugzillas [1] shows an interesting discrepancy between our content and STIG:
- We feature [2] a rule "Use Only FIPS 140-2 Validated Ciphers"
- STIG has its own [3] "A FIPS 140-2 approved cryptographic algorithm
must be used for SSH communications." There is a discrepancy between the two - while we claim that the following ciphers are FIPS 140-2 certified on Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7, only three of them are recognized as such by the STIG:
- aes128-ctr(STIG)
- aes192-ctr(STIG)
- aes256-ctr(STIG)
- aes128-cb
- aes192-cbc
- aes256-cbc
- 3des-cbc
- rijndael-cbc@lysator.liu.se
I have confirmed correctness of our description with our FIPS SME Tomas Mraz (in CC), so this issue looks as a bug in STIG - either the requirement is too strict, so it is incorrect, or it is supposed to be strict, and it should therefore be reworded, and we need to create a new rule in our content.
Indeed, the STIG allows fewer ciphers than FIPS allows; the STIG currently says "If any ciphers other than "aes128-ctr", "aes192-ctr", or "aes256-ctr" are listed, the "Ciphers" keyword is missing, or the returned line is commented out, this is a finding." [4]
Similarly, for the MACs allowed, "If any ciphers other than "hmac-sha2-256" or "hmac-sha2-512" are listed or the returned line is commented out, this is a finding." [5]
More are permitted by FIPS than by SSH, but the STIG is FIPS compliant as-is, using a subset of the FIPS ciphers. From the Security Policy document for the certification [6],
Only the following ciphers are allowed:
- aes128-ctr
- aes192-ctr
- aes256-ctr
- aes128-cbc
- aes192-cbc
- aes256-cbc
- 3des-cbc
- rijndael-cbc@lysator.liu.se
Only the following message authentication codes are allowed:
- hmac-sha1
- hmac-sha2-256
- hmac-sha2-512
- hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com
- hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com
- hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com
What is the procedure in cases like this?
I'd just configure the STIG subset of FIPS, and maybe ask DISA to add a clarification note to the STIG. Many folks are concerned about the FIPS-permitted 3DES algorithm [7], "3DES is deprecated for all new applications and usage is disallowed after 2023"
V/r, James Cassell
[4] https://vaulted.io/library/disa-stigs-srgs/red_hat_enterprise_linux_7_securi...
[5] https://vaulted.io/library/disa-stigs-srgs/red_hat_enterprise_linux_7_securi...
[6] https://csrc.nist.gov/CSRC/media/projects/cryptographic-module-validation-pr...
[7] https://www.cryptomathic.com/news-events/blog/3des-is-officially-being-retir...
References:
[2]:
https://static.open-scap.org/ssg-guides/ssg-rhel7-guide-stig.html#xccdf_org....
[3]:
https://www.stigviewer.com/stig/red_hat_enterprise_linux_7/2017-12-14/findin...
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