On Wed, 2011-05-18 at 16:28 +0000, "Jóhann B. Guðmundsson" wrote:
On 05/18/2011 03:57 PM, Adam Williamson wrote:
> Feedback please! Thanks:)
Given that we ship selinux on by default should this proposal only be
applicable to exploits/vulnerability that selinux cant catch and prevent
which leaves us with <insert type of exploits here )?
I kinda considered that to be implicit in the criterion as written, but
as two people have asked about it, obviously we should clarify that :)
Don't we need individual(s) from the security team that will be
doing
actively security audit during the development cycle and reporting back
to QA?
Well, 'enforcing' the criteria is a separate issue from determining
them, and we don't really need to discuss it here. Having an explicit
criterion adds value even if we don't set up a formal validation system,
because it gives us solid ground to review any security issues which get
proposed as release blockers on an ad hoc basis.
Would not applying this security release proposal to final only
suffice?
Well, I mean, it depends what you mean by 'suffice' :). I worked on the
basis that we probably don't want to ship any widely-distributed
'release' with a major security issue, but as I wrote, it's certainly up
for debate.
--
Adam Williamson
Fedora QA Community Monkey
IRC: adamw | Fedora Talk: adamwill AT fedoraproject DOT org
http://www.happyassassin.net