11:16 p.m.
Hi Dan,
In the last email you suggested that we beed to change the mapping from
unconfined_u selinux user to sysadm_u selinux user for root login.
Why should this not be root selinux user instead of sysadm_u.
On RHEL5 system which has strict policies loaded we see the following..
[root@vos-cm127 ~]# semanage login -l
root root SystemLow-SystemHigh
Root is mapped to root selinux user. Can we keep it that way in the RHEL6
systems as well
Thanks,
Anamitra
On 1/16/13 12:33 PM, "Daniel J Walsh" <dwalsh(a)redhat.com> wrote:
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On 01/16/2013 01:28 PM, Anamitra Dutta Majumdar (anmajumd) wrote:
> Hi Dan,
>
> I have a couple of more follow up questions.
>
> 1. What we have seen on our systems is just running restorecon -R does
>not
> fix the issue. We need to run restore -R -F to force the pick of file
> contexts. So it seems that the -F options does more things that just
>-R. Is
> that a correct understanding.
>
Yes -F will fix the User/role/mls fields as well as the type field,
without
the -F, restorecon only fixes the type field.
> 2. After removing the unconfined types and users and doing restorecon
>we
> see that root still is mapped to unconfined_u
>
> root unconfined_u s0-s0:c0.c1023
>
> Do we need to change this mapping as well. And if we do would it have
>any
> adverse effect on the system..
>
No this should be changed to sysadm_u. Which will cause your root
account to
login as sysadm_t.
You might have to turn on a couple of booleans to allow sysadm_t to login
directly
ssh_sysadm_login --> off
xdm_sysadm_login --> off
> Thanks, Anamitra
>
>
>
> On 1/15/13 3:15 PM, "Daniel J Walsh" <dwalsh(a)redhat.com> wrote:
>
> On 01/15/2013 06:07 PM, Anamitra Dutta Majumdar (anmajumd) wrote:
>>>> Hi Dan,
>>>>
>>>> We have removed the unconfined_u user type .We do not see it when we
>>>> do a semanage user -l
>>>>
>>>> [root@vos-cm148 home]# semanage user -l
>>>>
>>>> Labeling MLS/ MLS/ SELinux User Prefix MCS Level MCS
>>>> Range SELinux Roles
>>>>
>>>> admin_u user s0 s0-s0:c0.c1023 sysadm_r
>>>> system_r git_shell_u user s0 s0 git_shell_r
>>>> guest_u user s0 s0 guest_r root user s0
>>>> s0-s0:c0.c1023 sysadm_r system_r specialuser_u user s0
>>>> s0 sysadm_r system_r staff_u user s0
>>>> s0-s0:c0.c1023 staff_r sysadm_r system_r unconfined_r sysadm_u
>>>> user s0 s0-s0:c0.c1023 sysadm_r system_u user s0
>>>> s0-s0:c0.c1023 system_r unconfined_r user_u user s0 s0
>>>> user_r xguest_u user s0 s0 xguest_r
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> But some file security contexts still have unconfined_u
>>>>
>>>> drwxr-xr-x. root root system_u:object_r:home_root_t:s0
>>>> . dr-xr-xr-x. root root system_u:object_r:root_t:s0 ..
>>>> drwx------. admin administrator
>>>> user_u:object_r:user_home_dir_t:s0 admin drwxr-x---. ccmservice
>>>> ccmbase unconfined_u:object_r:user_home_dir_t:s0 ccmservice
>>>> drwx------. drfkeys drfkeys unconfined_u:object_r:user_home_dir_t:s0
>>>> drfkeys drwxr-x---. drfuser platform
>>>> unconfined_u:object_r:user_home_dir_t:s0 drfuser drwxr-xr-x. informix
>>>> informix system_u:object_r:user_home_dir_t:s0 informix drwx------.
>>>> pwrecovery platform unconfined_u:object_r:user_home_dir_t:s0
>>>> pwrecovery drwxr-x---. sftpuser sftpuser
>>>> unconfined_u:object_r:user_home_dir_t:s0 sftpuser drwxr-x---. tomcat
>>>> tomcat unconfined_u:object_r:tomcat_t:s0 tomcat
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> What would be the reason for that?
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Thanks, Anamitra
>>>>
>>>> On 1/15/13 9:22 AM, "Daniel J Walsh" <dwalsh(a)redhat.com>
wrote:
>>>>
>>>> On 01/15/2013 12:19 PM, Anamitra Dutta Majumdar (anmajumd) wrote:
>>>>>>> Hi Dan,
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Thanks for the prompt response.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> The reason I brought this thread alive is because I see a
lot
>>>>>>> of denials after removing the unconfined type and doing a
>>>>>>> fixfiles && reboot and as you indicated They are many
resources
>>>>>>> that have acquired unlabeled_t and hence we see a lot of
>>>>>>> denials. So based on this I would like to ask when exactly
>>>>>>> should we have the reboot after executing fixfiles. Should
the
>>>>>>> reboot be immediate after we have removed the unconfined
type
>>>>>>> or can it wait for a later time.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Thanks, Anamitra
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On 1/15/13 9:08 AM, "Daniel J Walsh"
<dwalsh(a)redhat.com>
>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On 01/15/2013 11:48 AM, Anamitra Dutta Majumdar (anmajumd)
>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>> Hi Dominick,
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Can you help me understand why step 5 is needed.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Thanks, Anamitra
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> On 10/30/12 1:03 PM, "Dominick Grift"
>>>>>>>>>> <dominick.grift(a)gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> On Tue, 2012-10-30 at 19:45 +0000, Anamitra
Dutta
>>>>>>>>>>> Majumdar (anmajumd) wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>> We are on RHEL6 and we need to remove the
unconfined
>>>>>>>>>>>> type from our targeted Selinux policies
so that no
>>>>>>>>>>>> process runs in the unconfined domain.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> In order to achieve that we have removed
the
>>>>>>>>>>>> unconfined module .Is there anything Else
we need to
>>>>>>>>>>>> do.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Thanks, Anamitra
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> You can also disable the unconfineduser
module to make
>>>>>>>>>>> it even more strict
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> but if you do make sure that no users are
mapped to
>>>>>>>>>>> unconfined_u and relabel the file system
because
>>>>>>>>>>> selinux will change contexts that have
unconfined_u in
>>>>>>>>>>> them to unlabeled_t is unconfined_u no longer
exists
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> so in theory:
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> 1. setenforce 0 2. change you logging
mappings to
>>>>>>>>>>> exclude unconfined_u 3. purge /tmp and
/var/tmp 4.
>>>>>>>>>>> semodule unconfineduser 5. fixfiles onboot
&& reboot
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> I think that should take care of it
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Not though that even then there will be some
>>>>>>>>>>> unconfined domains left
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> There is no way to get them out without
manually
>>>>>>>>>>> editing and rebuilding the policy
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> But if you disabled the unconfined and
unconfineduser
>>>>>>>>>>> modules then you are running pretty strict
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> -- selinux mailing list
>>>>>>>>>>>> selinux(a)lists.fedoraproject.org
>>>>>>>>>>>>
https://admin.fedoraproject.org/mailman/listinfo/selinux
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
- -- selinux mailing list selinux(a)lists.fedoraproject.org
>>>>>>>>>>>
https://admin.fedoraproject.org/mailman/listinfo/selinux
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
- -- selinux mailing list selinux(a)lists.fedoraproject.org
>>>>>>>>>>
https://admin.fedoraproject.org/mailman/listinfo/selinux
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> If you have any files that are owned by unconfined_u they
will
>>>>>>> become unlabeled_t and not able to be used by confined
domains,
>>>>>>> which is why the relabel is required.
>>>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> If you have any processes running on your system that are
>>>> unconfined_t then they will become unlabled_t and start generating
>>>> AVC's. Any confined apps that are trying to read unlabeled_u files
>>>> will start to fail also.
>>>>
>>>> It is probably best to do this at Single User mode/permissive and
>>>> then cleanup the disk.
>>>>
>>>> -- selinux mailing list selinux(a)lists.fedoraproject.org
>>>> https://admin.fedoraproject.org/mailman/listinfo/selinux
>>>>
>
> Because you have not relabeled them.
>
> restorecon -R -F -v .
>
>
> -- selinux mailing list selinux(a)lists.fedoraproject.org
> https://admin.fedoraproject.org/mailman/listinfo/selinux
>
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