Fixes https://fedorahosted.org/sssd/ticket/1457
The permissions are later set with chmod() to the final values after it's moved to the real filename, so this is safe.
On Mon, 2012-08-06 at 09:47 -0400, Stephen Gallagher wrote:
Fixes https://fedorahosted.org/sssd/ticket/1457
The permissions are later set with chmod() to the final values after it's moved to the real filename, so this is safe.
What't the point ?
The default umask is already ok (strict), I asked Jakub to not set/unset the umask in his last patch exactly because we are going to do a chmod later anyway.
Simo.
On Mon, 2012-08-06 at 09:56 -0400, Simo Sorce wrote:
On Mon, 2012-08-06 at 09:47 -0400, Stephen Gallagher wrote:
Fixes https://fedorahosted.org/sssd/ticket/1457
The permissions are later set with chmod() to the final values after it's moved to the real filename, so this is safe.
What't the point ?
The default umask is already ok (strict), I asked Jakub to not set/unset the umask in his last patch exactly because we are going to do a chmod later anyway.
The default umask is 022, that's not okay for a root process, IMHO.
Furthermore, Coverity is complaining about this. And lastly, what harm is there in being overcautious?
On Mon, Aug 06, 2012 at 09:59:44AM -0400, Stephen Gallagher wrote:
On Mon, 2012-08-06 at 09:56 -0400, Simo Sorce wrote:
On Mon, 2012-08-06 at 09:47 -0400, Stephen Gallagher wrote:
Fixes https://fedorahosted.org/sssd/ticket/1457
The permissions are later set with chmod() to the final values after it's moved to the real filename, so this is safe.
What't the point ?
The default umask is already ok (strict), I asked Jakub to not set/unset the umask in his last patch exactly because we are going to do a chmod later anyway.
The default umask is 022, that's not okay for a root process, IMHO.
Furthermore, Coverity is complaining about this. And lastly, what harm is there in being overcautious?
I agree, this would also cover very old (or very broken) systems that didn't set the default umask in msktemp.
Ack.
On Mon, Aug 06, 2012 at 06:15:25PM +0200, Jakub Hrozek wrote:
On Mon, Aug 06, 2012 at 09:59:44AM -0400, Stephen Gallagher wrote:
On Mon, 2012-08-06 at 09:56 -0400, Simo Sorce wrote:
On Mon, 2012-08-06 at 09:47 -0400, Stephen Gallagher wrote:
Fixes https://fedorahosted.org/sssd/ticket/1457
The permissions are later set with chmod() to the final values after it's moved to the real filename, so this is safe.
What't the point ?
The default umask is already ok (strict), I asked Jakub to not set/unset the umask in his last patch exactly because we are going to do a chmod later anyway.
The default umask is 022, that's not okay for a root process, IMHO.
Furthermore, Coverity is complaining about this. And lastly, what harm is there in being overcautious?
I agree, this would also cover very old (or very broken) systems that didn't set the default umask in msktemp.
Ack.
Pushed to master.
sssd-devel@lists.fedorahosted.org
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Jakub Hrozek -
Simo Sorce -
Stephen Gallagher