OK,

That particular candidate seems like a very unusual end corner case.  Where someone cloned an existing VM, renamed it, re-IP'd and (incorrectly) re-joined it to AD.

I saw "incorrectly", because they did not clear the existing /etc/krb5.keytab file prior to the re-join.  Hence, the old bogus entries in /etc/krb5.keytab with the original hostname -- which confused adcli.

BTW, Sumit -- I completely understand what you're saying about AD and TGTs.  You can request TGT tickets only off your UPN.  So our UPN is always 'host/fqdn@REALM'.  in AD, you cannot request TGT tickets off your SPNs.  In other Kerberos implementations, they allow you to request TGT tickets off SPNs -- but not AD.  AD does not allow that.   So I completely get the difference between kinit -k and adcli.  

I think a better command-line test for us to troubleshoot sssd would be request a Kerberos service ticket, not a Kerberos TGT ticket.    But I don't know how to do that on the command line (kinit only requests TGT tickets and renews tickets).   We use 'adcli testjoin' to simulate sssd Kerberos initialization.

Anyway, back to our research.  We have now found 8 candidates that has AD attribute 'passwordLastSet' between 31 days and 40 days.  (Actually, two are at 40 days, so probably AD has locked those machine accounts.)

On this first candidate, we think it's another one-off for that particular server.  CPU pegged at 100% since Aug 9.  We rebooted, set debug_level 9 and it appears to have renewed this first attempt (based on timestamps).  We see this output in the sssd_amer.company.com.log

(2021-09-01 14:44:36): [be[amer.company.com]] [ad_machine_account_password_renewal_done] (0x1000):  --- adcli output start---
---adcli output end---
(2021-09-01 14:44:36): [be[amer.company.com]] [be_ptask_done] (0x0400): Task [AD machine account password renewal]: finished successfully
(2021-09-01 14:44:36): [be[amer.company.com]] [be_ptask_schedule] (0x0400): Task [AD machine account password renewal]: scheduling task 86400 seconds from last execution time [1630608275]

We saw a second update attempt later (today?) with a lot of  adcli output, but it said:

...--- adcli output start---
...
 * Password not too old, no change needed
...
---adcli output end---

So we suspect this candidate is yet another edge-corner case (CPU at 100% -- not able to adcli update).  

Looking at the next couple of candidates, these are a more interesting (& seemingly more common) case.  They updated their entry in AD, but the local /etc/krb5.keytab file was not updated.  These happen to be OL7 servers (but we have a RHEL7 candidate at 40 days non-check-in).    Because these are *L7, it's not the Kerberos UDP kpasswd problem (that's only on RHEL6/OL6).  

Let's take the first one.  casnlrritpgm206. According to AD,  it has a 'passwordLastSet' of 7/28/2021.  

 PS C:\Users\spike_white> get-adcomputer casnlrritpgm206  -properties 'passwordLastSet'

DistinguishedName : CN=CASNLRRITPGM206,OU=Servers,OU=UNIX,DC=amer,DC=company,DC=com
DNSHostName       : casnlrritpgm206.us.company.com
Enabled           : True
Name              : CASNLRRITPGM206
ObjectClass       : computer
ObjectGUID        : f9fa2b5b-75b6-434b-8e94-477599d1afca
PasswordLastSet   : 7/28/2021 10:04:49 PM
SamAccountName    : CASNLRRITPGM206$
SID               : S-1-5-21-1802859667-647903414-1863928812-3091065
UserPrincipalName : host/casnlrritpgm206.us.company.com@AMER.COMPANY.COM

It has a 'msDS-KeyVersionNumber' of 7.  

but in the local /etc/krb5.keytab file, it has a last KVNO of 6 with a timestamp of 6/28:

Keytab name: FILE:/etc/krb5.keytab

KVNO Timestamp           Principal

---- ------------------- ------------------------------------------------------

   6 06/28/2021 06:53:30 CASNLRRITPGM206$@AMER.COMPANY.COM (arcfour-hmac)

   6 06/28/2021 06:53:30 CASNLRRITPGM206$@AMER.COMPANY.COM (aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96)

   6 06/28/2021 06:53:30 CASNLRRITPGM206$@AMER.COMPANY.COM (aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96)

   6 06/28/2021 06:53:30 host/casnlrritpgm206.us.company.com@AMER.COMPANY.COM (arcfour-hmac)

   6 06/28/2021 06:53:30 host/casnlrritpgm206.us.company.com@AMER.COMPANY.COM (aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96)

   6 06/28/2021 06:53:30 host/casnlrritpgm206.us.company.com@AMER.COMPANY.COM (aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96)

   6 06/28/2021 06:53:30 host/CASNLRRITPGM206@AMER.COMPANY.COM (arcfour-hmac)

   6 06/28/2021 06:53:30 host/CASNLRRITPGM206@AMER.COMPANY.COM (aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96)

   6 06/28/2021 06:53:30 host/CASNLRRITPGM206@AMER.COMPANY.COM (aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96)

   6 06/28/2021 06:53:30 RestrictedKrbHost/CASNLRRITPGM206@AMER.COMPANY.COM (arcfour-hmac)

   6 06/28/2021 06:53:31 RestrictedKrbHost/CASNLRRITPGM206@AMER.COMPANY.COM (aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96)

   6 06/28/2021 06:53:31 RestrictedKrbHost/CASNLRRITPGM206@AMER.COMPANY.COM (aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96)

   6 06/28/2021 06:53:31 RestrictedKrbHost/casnlrritpgm206.us.company.com@AMER.COMPANY.COM (arcfour-hmac)

   6 06/28/2021 06:53:31 RestrictedKrbHost/casnlrritpgm206.us.company.com@AMER.COMPANY.COM (aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96)

   6 06/28/2021 06:53:31 RestrictedKrbHost/casnlrritpgm206.us.company.com@AMER.COMPANY.COM (aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96)

   5 05/29/2021 02:08:37 CASNLRRITPGM206$@AMER.COMPANY.COM (arcfour-hmac)

   5 05/29/2021 02:08:37 CASNLRRITPGM206$@AMER.COMPANY.COM (aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96)

   5 05/29/2021 02:08:37 CASNLRRITPGM206$@AMER.COMPANY.COM (aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96)


So 7/28 is 30 days after 6/28.    It appears on 7/28 that sssd invoked adcli update to update the machine account password in AD.  adcli update updated it in AD, but not in the local /etc/krb5.keytab file.  


The next candidate is similar.  It has a KVNO in AD one more than in /etc/krb5.keytab file with a timestamp 30 days past the timestamp of the latest entry in /etc/krb5.keytab file.  


This sure seems similar to the Kerberos kpasswd UDP problem.  But it's not -- krb5-libs quit using UDP for kpasswd after RHEL6/OL6.  


We know how to remediate when we hit such a candidate.  adcli update with the valid user principal and valid login ccache of a principal that have AD privs to update these machine accounts.


So -- this is the ultimate question?  *Why* is this happening?  Why is the adcli update (called by sssd) updating the passwd in AD and the msDS-KeyVersionNumber, but not updating /etc/krb5.keytab?


I think this is the common case that we're seeing -- that these other cases (plus one other) are the unusual end-corner cases.


Spike


On Thu, Sep 2, 2021 at 12:49 AM Sumit Bose <sbose@redhat.com> wrote:
Am Wed, Sep 01, 2021 at 11:39:30AM -0500 schrieb Spike White:
> So to respond to my own email, but a co-worker did finally find some
> references to that bizarre name ZZZKBTDURBOL8.
>
> [root@nwpllv8bu100 post_install]# klist -kte
> Keytab name: FILE:/etc/krb5.keytab
> KVNO Timestamp           Principal
> ---- -------------------
> ------------------------------------------------------
>    2 07/13/2021 16:42:17 ZZZKBTDURBOL8$@AMER.COMPANY.COM
> (aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96)
>    2 07/13/2021 16:42:17 ZZZKBTDURBOL8$@AMER.COMPANY.COM
> (aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96)
>    2 07/13/2021 16:42:17 host/
> zzzkbtdurbol8.amer.company.com@AMER.COMPANY.COM (aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96)
>    2 07/13/2021 16:42:17 host/
> zzzkbtdurbol8.amer.company.com@AMER.COMPANY.COM (aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96)
>    2 07/13/2021 16:42:17 host/ZZZKBTDURBOL8@AMER.COMPANY.COM
> (aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96)
>    2 07/13/2021 16:42:17 host/ZZZKBTDURBOL8@AMER.COMPANY.COM
> (aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96)
>    2 07/13/2021 16:42:17 RestrictedKrbHost/ZZZKBTDURBOL8@AMER.COMPANY.COM
> (aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96)
>    2 07/13/2021 16:42:17 RestrictedKrbHost/ZZZKBTDURBOL8@AMER.COMPANY.COM
> (aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96)
>    2 07/13/2021 16:42:17 RestrictedKrbHost/
> zzzkbtdurbol8.amer.company.com@AMER.COMPANY.COM (aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96)
>    2 07/13/2021 16:42:17 RestrictedKrbHost/
> zzzkbtdurbol8.amer.company.com@AMER.COMPANY.COM (aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96)
>    3 07/29/2021 13:38:27 NWPLLV8BU100$@AMER.COMPANY.COM
> (DEPRECATED:arcfour-hmac)
>    3 07/29/2021 13:38:27 NWPLLV8BU100$@AMER.COMPANY.COM
> (aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96)
>    3 07/29/2021 13:38:27 NWPLLV8BU100$@AMER.COMPANY.COM
> (aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96)
>    3 07/29/2021 13:38:27 host/nwpllv8bu100.amer.company.com@AMER.COMPANY.COM
> (DEPRECATED:arcfour-hmac)
>    3 07/29/2021 13:38:27 host/nwpllv8bu100.amer.company.com@AMER.COMPANY.COM
> (aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96)
>    3 07/29/2021 13:38:27 host/nwpllv8bu100.amer.company.com@AMER.COMPANY.COM
> (aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96)
>    3 07/29/2021 13:38:27 host/NWPLLV8BU100@AMER.COMPANY.COM
> (DEPRECATED:arcfour-hmac)
>    3 07/29/2021 13:38:27 host/NWPLLV8BU100@AMER.COMPANY.COM
> (aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96)
>    3 07/29/2021 13:38:27 host/NWPLLV8BU100@AMER.COMPANY.COM
> (aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96)
>    3 07/29/2021 13:38:27 RestrictedKrbHost/NWPLLV8BU100@AMER.COMPANY.COM
> (DEPRECATED:arcfour-hmac)
>    3 07/29/2021 13:38:27 RestrictedKrbHost/NWPLLV8BU100@AMER.COMPANY.COM
> (aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96)
>    3 07/29/2021 13:38:27 RestrictedKrbHost/NWPLLV8BU100@AMER.COMPANY.COM
> (aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96)
>    3 07/29/2021 13:38:27 RestrictedKrbHost/
> nwpllv8bu100.amer.company.com@AMER.COMPANY.COM (DEPRECATED:arcfour-hmac)
>    3 07/29/2021 13:38:27 RestrictedKrbHost/
> nwpllv8bu100.amer.company.com@AMER.COMPANY.COM (aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96)
>    3 07/29/2021 13:38:27 RestrictedKrbHost/
> nwpllv8bu100.amer.company.com@AMER.COMPANY.COM (aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96)
>
> I realize this is reflecting the literal entries in the /etc/krb5.keytab
> file.  So it appears that when this VM was born (on July 13th), it was
> named zzzkbtdurbo18.amer.company.com.   (I see other supporting evidence
> for this).  On or before July 29th, it was renamed to final FQDN
> nwpllv8bu100.amer.company.com.  /etc/hostname, /etc/hosts,
> /etc/sysconfig/network etc were all updated and it was rejoined to AD.
>
> kinit -k works fine.  It picks up the current hostname and apparently uses
> host/nwpllv8bu100.amer.company.com@AMER.COMPANY.COM as its service
> principal.  Since there's a valid entry in /etc/krb5.keytab file for this,
> it uses this and all is good.  (I'm guessing it uses the 14th or 15th
> /etc/krb5.keytab file entry above.)
>
> sssd works, because it has this line:
>
> ldap_sasl_authid = host/nwpllv8bu100.amer.company.com@AMER.COMPANY.COM
>
> But when sssd invokes adcli update to refresh the machine account password,
> adcli update fails.
>
> Also, I see that adcli testjoin fails.
>
> [root@nwpllv8bu100 tmp]# adcli testjoin -D AMER.COMPANY.COM
> adcli: couldn't connect to AMER.COMPANY.COM domain: Couldn't authenticate
> as machine account: ZZZKBTDURBOL8: Preauthentication failed
> [root@nwpllv8bu100 tmp]#
>
> From a strace of this adcli testjoin, it appears that adcli is opening the
> /etc/krb5.keytab file to determine the default service principal to use and
> is pulling the old server name.  (instead of using the correct service
> principal, as kinit -k somehow does.)

Hi,

it looks like your environment is a bit special. I guess you have added
'host/nwpllv8bu100.amer.company.com@AMER.COMPANY.COM' to the
'userPrincipalName' LDAP attribute in the AD computer object for this
host.

# klist -k
Keytab name: FILE:/etc/krb5.keytab
KVNO Principal
----
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
   2 MASTER$@CHILD.AD.VM
   2 MASTER$@CHILD.AD.VM
   2 host/MASTER@CHILD.AD.VM
   2 host/MASTER@CHILD.AD.VM
   2 host/master.client.vm@CHILD.AD.VM
   2 host/master.client.vm@CHILD.AD.VM
   2 RestrictedKrbHost/MASTER@CHILD.AD.VM
   2 RestrictedKrbHost/MASTER@CHILD.AD.VM
   2 RestrictedKrbHost/master.client.vm@CHILD.AD.VM
   2 RestrictedKrbHost/master.client.vm@CHILD.AD.VM
# kdestroy -A
#
#
# kinit -k
kinit: Client 'host/master.client.vm@CHILD.AD.VM' not found in Kerberos database while getting initial credentials
# kinit -k 'MASTER$@CHILD.AD.VM'


The reason is that 'kinit -k' constructs the principal by calling
gethostname() or similar, adding the 'host/' prefix and the realm. But
by default this principal in AD is only a service principal can cannot
be used to request a TGT as kinit does. AD only allows user principals
for request a TGT and this is by default 'SHORT$@AD.REALM'. If the
userPrincipalName attribute is set, this principal given here is allowed
as well.

That's why adcli is checking the keytab for a principal with a '$'
character and by default it uses the first it finds because it is
expected there is only one. Adding some heuristics in case there are
more '$' principals in the keytab like highest KVNO might help in some
cases but would fail in other cases so I think just using the first is
good enough.


>
> Maybe when sssd constructs this adcli update invocation, it's not passing
> the ldap_sasl_authid, so the adcli update is doing the above logic to pull
> the old server name?

Adding a new option to adcli and using the value from ldap_sasl_authid
might be a solution, I will think about it.

HTH

bye,
Sumit

>
> Sounds like an adcli problem.  Adcli should do as 'kinit -k' does when it's
> passed no explicit service principal.  Should dive into /etc/krb5.keytab
> file and use the most recent set of entries (KVNO = 3 in above example).
> Maybe derive the default service principal off the current FQDN and
> Kerberos realm?
>
> Spike
> PS As a general policy, we are not supposed to clone a VM and rename it to
> another FQDN/IP address.  I'll be trying to track down who did this and for
> what reason.
>
> On Wed, Sep 1, 2021 at 10:08 AM Spike White <spikewhitetx@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > Ok, this is *very* illuminating!
> >
> > I see this in sssd_amer.company.com.log"
> >
> > (2021-09-01  3:44:46): [be[amer.company.com]]
> > [ad_machine_account_password_renewal_done] (0x1000): --- adcli output
> > start---
> > adcli: couldn't connect to amer.company.com domain: Couldn't authenticate
> > as machine account: ZZZKBTDURBOL8: Preauthentication failed
> > ---adcli output end---
> >
> > However, I don't find that host name ZZZKBTDURBOL8 anywhere on the
> > system.  (By company convention, servers named ZZZ* are test servers that
> > linux SEs spin up themselves).
> >
> > This server that's not renewing its creds is named:
> > nwpllv8bu100.amer.company.com.  it's a std dev server.  in
> > /etc/sssd/sssd.conf file, it has that as its sasl auth ID:
> >
> > [root@nwpllv8bu100 sssd]# grep sasl /etc/sssd/sssd.conf
> > ldap_sasl_authid = host/nwpllv8bu100.amer.dell.com@AMER.COMPANY.COM
> > [root@nwpllv8bu100 sssd]#
> >
> > If I do 'kinit -k',  the /etc/krb5.keytab file has that name as well:
> >
> > [root@nwpllv8bu100 sssd]# kinit -k
> > [root@nwpllv8bu100 sssd]# klist
> > Ticket cache: KCM:0
> > Default principal: host/nwpllv8bu100.amer.dell.com@AMER.COMPANY.COM
> >
> > Valid starting       Expires              Service principal
> > 09/01/2021 11:04:16  09/01/2021 21:04:16  krbtgt/
> > AMER.DELL.COM@AMER.COMPANY.COM
> >         renew until 09/08/2021 11:04:16
> > [root@nwpllv8bu100 sssd]#
> >
> > I searched /etc/sssd/sssd.conf -- no "zzz" or "ZZZ" string is anywhere in
> > there.   So where is sssd picking up this name ZZZKBTDURBOL8 and passing it
> > to adcli update?
> >
> > Spike
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > On Wed, Sep 1, 2021 at 2:46 AM Sumit Bose <sbose@redhat.com> wrote:
> >
> >> Am Tue, Aug 31, 2021 at 09:53:01PM +0200 schrieb Alexey Tikhonov:
> >> > On Tue, Aug 31, 2021 at 6:47 PM Spike White <spikewhitetx@gmail.com>
> >> wrote:
> >> >
> >> > > All,
> >> > >
> >> > > OK we have a query we run in AD for machine account passwords for a
> >> > > certain age.  In today's run, 31 - 32 days.  Then we verify it's
> >> pingable.
> >> > >
> >> > > We have found such one such suspicious candidate today (two actually,
> >> but
> >> > > the other Linux server is quite sick).  So one good research
> >> candidate.
> >> > > According to both AD and /etc/krb5.keytab file, the machine account
> >> > > password was last set on 7/29.  Today is 8/31, so that would be 32
> >> days.
> >> > > This 'automatic machine account keytab renewal'  background task
> >> should
> >> > > trigger again today.
> >> > >
> >> > > sssd service was last started 2 weeks ago and, by all appearances,
> >> appears
> >> > > healthy.  sssctl domain-status <domain> shows online, connected to AD
> >> > > servers (both domain and GC servers)..  All logins and group
> >> enumerations
> >> > > working as expected.
> >> > >
> >> > > Just now, we dynamically set the debug level to 9 with 'sssctl
> >> debug-level
> >> > > 9'.  This particular server is Oracle Linux 8.4,
> >> > > running sssd-*-2.4.0-9.0.1.el8_4.1.x86_64.   Installed July 13th,
> >> 2021.  So
> >> > > -- very recent sssd version.  (This problem occurs with both RHEL & OL
> >> > > 6/7/8, it's just today's candidate happens to be OL8.)
> >> > >
> >> > > We can't keep debug level 9 up for a great many days;  it swamps the
> >> > > /var/log filesystem.  But we can leave up for a few days.  We
> >> purposely did
> >> > > not restart sssd server as we know that would trigger a machine
> >> account
> >> > > renewal.
> >> > >
> >> > > Speaking of that -- from Sumit's sssd source code in
> >> > > ad_provider/ad_machine_pw_renewal.c, it appears that sssd is creating
> >> a
> >> > > back-end task to call external program /usr/sbin/adcli with certain
> >> args.
> >> > >  What string can I look for in which sssd log file (now that I have
> >> debug
> >> > > level 9 enabled) to tell me when this 'adcli update' task (aka
> >> 'automatic
> >> > > machine account keytab renewal')  is triggered?
> >> > >
> >> >
> >> > It seems SSSD itself only logs in case of errors. I didn't find any
> >> > explicit logs around `ad_machine_account_password_renewal_send()`.
> >> > But perhaps there will be something like "[be_ptask_execute] (0x0400):
> >> Task
> >> > [AD machine account password renewal]: executing task" from generic
> >> > be_ptask_* helpers in the sssd_$domain.log (I'm not sure).
> >> >
> >> > Also at this verbosity level `--verbose` should be supplied to adcli
> >> itself
> >> > and I guess output should be captured in sssd_$domain.log as well. I'm
> >> not
> >> > familiar with `adcli` internals, you can take a glance at
> >> > https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/realmd/adcli to find its log messages.
> >>
> >> Hi,
> >>
> >> if SSSD's debug_level is 7 or higher the '--verbose' option is set
> >> when calling adcli and the output is added to the backend logs. It will
> >> start with log message "--- adcli output start---".
> >>
> >> HTH
> >>
> >> bye,
> >> Sumit
> >>
> >> >
> >> >
> >> > >
> >> > > I'm less certain now that we've surveyed our env that this background
> >> > > 'adcli update' task is the reason behind 70 - 80 servers / month
> >> dropping
> >> > > off the domain.  It might be a slight contributor, but I find only a
> >> very
> >> > > few pingable servers with machine account last renewal date between
> >> 30 and
> >> > > 40 days.
> >> > >
> >> > > Yes, I can disable this default 30 day automatic update and roll my
> >> own
> >> > > 'adcli update' cron.  But that's a mass deployment, to fix what might
> >> not
> >> > > be the problem.   I want to verify this is the actual culprit before
> >> I take
> >> > > those drastic steps.
> >> > >
> >> > > Spike
> >> > >
> >> > >
> >>
> >> > _______________________________________________
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