[Fedora-directory-users] Proposed new features for 1.3
Rich Megginson
rmeggins at redhat.com
Fri Apr 10 18:07:55 UTC 2009
David Partridge wrote:
> David M. Partridge
> Tangible Software Inc.
> Sr. Security Engineer
> 2010 Corporate Ridge
> Suite 620
> McLean, Virginia 22102
> Office 800-913-9901 x 3001
> Mobile 571-286-9628
> Fax 703-288-1226
> dpartridge at tangiblesoftware.com
>
>
>
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: Rich Megginson [mailto:rmeggins at redhat.com]
>> Sent: Friday, April 10, 2009 10:40 AM
>> To: General discussion list for the Fedora Directory server project.
>> Subject: Re: [Fedora-directory-users] Proposed new features for 1.3
>>
>> David Partridge wrote:
>>
>>> Use case example for certmap.conf for end user:
>>>
>>> Customer has desire to share Enterprise Directory information across
>>>
> WAN
>
>>> for contact information sharing, but has requirement for strong
>>> authentication using PKI. PKI trust is a PKI Mesh utilizing cross
>>> certification. Users information in Directory Server One (DS1) are
>>> associated with users issued certificates from PKI One (PKI1).
>>>
> Users
>
>>> information in Directory Server Two (DS2) are associated with users
>>> issued certificates from PKI Two (PKI2).
>>>
>>> DS1 has no awareness or cross population of entries with DS2, but
>>>
> PKI1
>
>>> is cross certified with PKI2 and trusted by both populations. Users
>>> associated with PKI1 have a business requirement to strongly
>>> authenticate with DS2 to locate and collaborate with population of
>>>
> users
>
>>> in DS2, but have no entry in DS2 and vice versa. By removing
>>>
> current
>
>>> capability to strongly authenticate based on TLS configuration but
>>>
> have
>
>>> NO DN in DS you are removing capability to use SASL External in a
>>>
> cross
>
>>> certified PKI environment. User of the product will be forced to
>>>
> use
>
>>> SASL GSSAPI that causes other security issues or requirements to
>>>
> setup
>
>>> all of these Kerberos trust and ticketing handling that should not
>>>
> be
>
>>> required, difficult to sustain and place external dependencies on
>>>
> usage
>
>>> of the DS product in a federated environment as described.
>>>
>>> If directory is utilized as something OTHER than repository for
>>>
> people
>
>>> similar challenges will present themselves when certificates are
>>>
> issued
>
>>> for devices, roles, and groups. Examples include but are not
>>>
> limited to
>
>>> VOIP device address book capabilities such as CISCO VOIP phones or
>>>
> call
>
>>> managers, Potentially for extending security capability in hosts
>>>
> that
>
>>> have host based certificates that may require use of the directory
>>>
> for
>
>>> backend business processes were Certificate trust and regular
>>>
> expression
>
>>> checks of DN utilized for the TLS session may be sufficient to
>>>
> utilize
>
>>> for ACI binding rules.
>>>
>>>
>> So you want to allow a user from DS1 to authenticate to DS2, without
>> having a user entry in DS2. Then use access control, bind resource
>> limits, groups, roles, CoS, etc. without having a real user entry. I
>> think that would be useful for auth in general, not just cert based
>> auth. It comes up often in SASL/GSSAPI auth (wanting to use Kerberos
>> auth without having to have a user entry), and is necessary to support
>> the types of devices you mention.
>>
>
> [David Partridge]
> DS1 and DS2 for clarity are only containers of information for users to
> consume. A user may have data in neither, one or both DS, but has PKI
> credentials that are trusted by neither, one or both DS. If trusted the
> user should be authenticated via TLS using mutual authentication using
> PKI. If not trusted user is turned away by TLS mutual authentication.
>
Ok. So just in general allow authentication if user doesn't exist.
> Authentication and access control are two separate and distinct
> processes.
>
> If user is not authenticated why should I allow them to get to the point
> of exposing internal directory resources to evaluate access control,
> bind resource limits, groups, roles, CoS, etc. Believe I had this
> conversation with Bob Lord long time ago when we discovered a previous
> security issue.
>
Sure. Unauthenticated users should not be allowed to consume resources
or discover information. We have some roadmap items to disallow and
lockdown anonymous users even more than we do today.
> If user is authenticated capabilities of DN mapping with sophisticated
> access control, bind resource limits, groups, roles, CoS, etc. continue
> to be valuable for providing different privileges and capabilities. But
> the ability should not be absolute to requiring a DN in the directory
> NOR would I want to try to build rules based on every PKI end user DN
> that may have a chain of trust that is acceptable based on adding to NSS
> Truststore. There will be some cases that the fact that they
> authenticated regardless of SASL mechanism should be able to provide
> 'SOME' access.
>
Ok. Right - I want to allow those capabilities without requiring a DN
in the directory.
>
>> One of the things that cert based auth does now is to retrieve the
>> userCertificate from the user's entry and compare it against the cert
>> presented in the auth request. But that (verifyCert) can be turned
>>
> off
>
>> now. Would you want the ability to compare the cert presented for
>>
> auth
>
>> against the known cert for that identity?
>>
>
> [David Partridge] Depends - For our use cases identity certificates [
> digital signature, nonrepudiation key usage] are NEVER published or
> stored outside of PKI CA infrastructure (will let the Dogtag team
> explain reasons). Therefore the certificate used for SSL will NEVER be
> a match to the certificate attribute in the directory which is merely
> one or more email encryption certificates [key encipherment key usage]
> that corresponds to mail attribute in directory.
>
> If directory was for PKI CA infrastructure matching the certificate
> binary value may be useful, but unnecessary if implementation of PKI
> done correctly. Matching binary contradicts why the PKI exists in the
> first place. In most cases PKI exists so you do not need prior
> knowledge of the end user of the certificate to know that the
> individual/system met identity vetting requirements and is the only
> individual/system that possessed private key to make it do what it does.
>
Ok.
>
>
>>> David M. Partridge
>>> Tangible Software Inc.
>>> dpartridge at tangiblesoftware.com
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>> -----Original Message-----
>>>> From: Rich Megginson [mailto:rmeggins at redhat.com]
>>>> Sent: Thursday, April 09, 2009 11:47 PM
>>>> To: General discussion list for the Fedora Directory server
>>>>
> project.
>
>>>> Subject: Re: [Fedora-directory-users] Proposed new features for 1.3
>>>>
>>>> David Partridge wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>> Would like to see additional monitoring flexibility for snmp -
>>>>>
> when
>
>>>> configuring multiple ds instances with same port on single
>>>>
> multihomed
>
>>> host
>>>
>>>
>>>> monitoring information is agregated by port in the monitoring not
>>>>
> by
>
>>>> instance and port.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>> Please provide more information on deprecation of certmap.conf.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>> We would instead use the SASL mapping functionality to map the
>>>>
>>>>
>>> subjectDN
>>>
>>>
>>>> in the cert to a DN that the DS knows about. The SASL mapping code
>>>>
> is
>
>>>> much more powerful and flexible than the certmap.conf code.
>>>> *http://tinyurl.com/cqe42v
>>>> *
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>> Need flexibility to not rely on dn in cert mapping to anything in
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>> directory and rely on successful tls mutual authentication and
>>>>
>>>>
>>> truststore
>>>
>>>
>>>> configuration.
>>>>
>>>> I'm not sure I understand - do you want the ability to do cert auth
>>>> without having to have a real entry in the directory server that
>>>> corresponds to the subjectDN?
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>> Script to provide index analysis based on data in the directory
>>>>>
> to
>
>>>> provide the following info:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>> Search performance efficiency of index and index type based on
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>> return
>>>
>>>
>>>> limits, and scanidslistlimit.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>> Compressed ldif(gzip) capability for export, import, and
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>> initialization
>>>
>>>
>>>> usage.
>>>>
>>>> Ok - Thanks - this is all good stuff.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>> Dave Partridge
>>>>> Sent from my Windows Mobile(r) phone.
>>>>>
>>>>> -----Original Message-----
>>>>> From: Rich Megginson <rmeggins at redhat.com>
>>>>> Sent: Thursday, April 09, 2009 7:23 PM
>>>>> To: General discussion list for the Fedora Directory server
>>>>>
> project.
>
>>>> <fedora-directory-users at redhat.com>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>> Subject: Re: [Fedora-directory-users] Proposed new features for
>>>>>
> 1.3
>
>>>>> Andrey Ivanov wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>> I continue with my list
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>> Thanks - I've added many of these to the list - questions below.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>> * the server should be able to return the members of dynamic
>>>>>>
> groups
>
>>>>>> "on the fly" as if it were real members, the membership attribute
>>>>>> should be configurable - uniqueMember, member or another
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>> I put this on the Future list:
>>>>> Dynamic group expansion
>>>>>
>>>>> * Define a dynamic group, and have the member/uniqueMember
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>> attribute
>>>
>>>
>>>>> of this group automatically be populated by the server
>>>>> * clients can then just search for member like with a regular
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>> static
>>>
>>>
>>>>> posix group
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>> * support of other virtual attributes generated "on the fly"
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>> Can you explain this a little more?
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>> * pam passthrough plug-in should take into account at least the
>>>>>> account activation/desactivation (bug *470684*
>>>>>> <https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=470684> ). There is
>>>>>>
> a
>
>>>>>> comment about some additional useful features it in th README
>>>>>>
> file
>
>>> of
>>>
>>>
>>>>>> this plug-in :
>>>>>> We need to worry about account expiration or lockout e.g. the
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>> user's
>>>
>>>
>>>>>> credentials are valid but the user has been locked out of his/her
>>>>>> account, or the password has expired, or something like that.
>>>>>>
> Some
>
>>> of
>>>
>>>
>>>>>> this can be handled by LDAP e.g. returning password policy
>>>>>>
> control
>
>>>>>> values when the password has expired.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> * a way to synchronise the configuration of indexes (each time we
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>> add
>>>
>>>
>>>>>> an index on one of the replicated servers we need to make it
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>> manually
>>>
>>>
>>>>>> on all the others) and some other parameters in "cn=config"
>>>>>>
> between
>
>>>>>> the replicated servers (a little like the "configuration"
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>> partition
>>>
>>>
>>>>>> in active directory), the schema changes are already replicated
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>> which
>>>
>>>
>>>>>> is very good
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>> I'm calling this feature "Configuration replication" - I think it
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>> could
>>>
>>>
>>>>> be useful for other sorts of configuration.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>> * enforced attribute syntax validation
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>> Already on the list - Syntax validation checking
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>> * re-verify and validate conformance of the syntaxes, case
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>> sensitivity
>>>
>>>
>>>>>> and their matching rules to RFC
>>>>>> (https://www.redhat.com/archives/fedora-directory-users/2008-
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>> July/msg00041.html)
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>> Already on the list
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>> * unix socket autobind still does not seem to work (ldapi) -
>>>>>> https://www.redhat.com/archives/fedora-directory-users/2009-
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>> February/msg00112.html.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>>> It could be very useful for various maintenance scripts running
>>>>>>
> on
>
>>> the
>>>
>>>
>>>>>> server.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>> We tested this with 1.2.0 and it seems to work. You tested a
>>>>>
> build
>
>>> from
>>>
>>>
>>>>> source? Did you use --enable-autobind with configure? Did you
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>> restart
>>>
>>>
>>>>> the server after configuring your autobind and sasl mapping?
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>> * verification of the server from the viewpoint of memory leaks.
>>>>>>
> Th
>
>>>>>> size of the memory used by the server grows with time (normally
>>>>>>
> we
>
>>>>>> don't restart the sevrr during several months, so i can follow
>>>>>>
> the
>
>>>> stats)
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>> We regularly run the server test suite with valgrind enabled. I'm
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>> not
>>>
>>>
>>>>> aware of any per connection or per operation leaks. What exactly
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>> are
>>>
>>>
>>>>> you seeing?
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>> * logconv.pl - very useful script, add some more options/
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>> adjustments
>>>
>>>
>>>>>> (for example, a switch to hide unindexed searches in verbose
>>>>>>
> mode).
>
>>> We
>>>
>>>
>>>>>> use it as logwatch.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> * a perl script to show the replication statistics (there is one
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>> for
>>>
>>>
>>>>>> the we page generation statistics, something more basic,
>>>>>>
> text-only
>
>>>>>> would be very welcome) in text mode - to receiveth reports by
>>>>>>
> mail
>
>>>>>> once per day like logwatch for example
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>> What sort of information are you looking for? ldapsearch can
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>> provide
>>>
>>>
>>>>> most of the useful information.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>> * regular expressions in ACIs (i know, it is very difficult to
>>>>>>
> do,
>
>>> so
>>>
>>>
>>>>>> maybe somewhere in the timescale of the version 10.0 ? :)) - for
>>>>>> example, allow a user to add or modify a value just in case the
>>>>>>
> new
>
>>>>>> value mathes the regex. Or the group or dn of the user matches
>>>>>>
> the
>
>>>>>> regex...
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>> You can do some of that currently with targetattrfilters - see
>>>>> *http://tinyurl.com/3yo88r
>>>>>
>>>>> We added support in 1.2.0 to allow you to specify group membership
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>> with
>>>
>>>
>>>>> LDAP search specifications, which does allow some wildcarding, so
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>> that
>>>
>>>
>>>>> might help too.
>>>>> *
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>> * simplify the creation of new syntaxes and their validation/
>>>>>> enforcement (version 11.0? :))
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>> Can you elaborate?
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>> * virtual views allowing to map not only the trees but also the
>>>>>> attributes ('cn' instead of 'uid' in a subtree, for example)
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>> Can you elaborate?
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>> * enable regex in certmap.conf for mapping the CNs of the
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>> certificates
>>>
>>>
>>>>>> during the certificate authentification of users
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>> This is on the list as
>>>>> Get rid of certmap.conf - use SASL mapping (cert auth is really
>>>>>
> just
>
>>>>> SASL/EXTERNAL)
>>>>> The sasl mapping code uses regular expressions
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>> Other than that i just want to emphasize the great job you are
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>> doing
>>>
>>>
>>>>>> adding new features and especially the fantastic reactivity in
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>> fixing
>>>
>>>
>>>>>> some critical server bugs (usually it takes only one or two days
>>>>>>
> to
>
>>>>>> have the necessary diff in bugzilla!)
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Thank you and please continue the development of this directory
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>> server!
>>>
>>>
>>>>> And thank you for your suggestions.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Thanks - I've added these notes to
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
> http://directory.fedoraproject.org/wiki/Roadmap#Version_1.3
>
>>>>>> Anyone else? C'mon - surely you have an opinion about a
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>> new
>>>
>>>
>>>>>> feature.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Thanks for all your hard work on this!
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
> -----------------------------------------------------------------------
>
>>>> -
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>>> --
>>>>>> Fedora-directory-users mailing list
>>>>>> Fedora-directory-users at redhat.com
>>>>>> https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/fedora-directory-users
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> This e-mail and any attachment is intended for the above name
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>> recipient(s) only and may contain confidential or privileged
>>>>
>>>>
>>> information.
>>>
>>>
>>>> If you are not an intended recipient, please notify the sender and
>>>>
>>>>
>>> delete
>>>
>>>
>>>> the message. Failure to maintain the confidentiality of this
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>
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>>>
>>>
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>>>>
>>>>
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>>>> confidential and privileged information or otherwise be protected
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>
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>>>>
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>>>
>>>
>>>> you are not the intended recipient, please contact the sender by
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>
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>>>
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>>>>> --
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>>>>> Fedora-directory-users at redhat.com
>>>>> https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/fedora-directory-users
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
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>>
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>
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>>> Fedora-directory-users at redhat.com
>>> https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/fedora-directory-users
>>>
>>>
>
>
>
>
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>
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