More PATH fallout. Who decided this was a good idea?

[Steve Grubb]

On Saturday 06 December 2008 13:28:44 Callum Lerwick wrote:
> Furthermore, we're supposedly gaining security by preventing
> *unprivileged* user accounts from executing usermod, yet an ACTUAL
> compromised scenario, like oh say breaking into root with a privilege
> escalation vulnerability and modifying passwd and shadow directly with
> kernel syscalls, goes unaudited?

No one ever said that.


> Am I the only one who thinks this security model is mindbogglingly
> broken and nothing more than security masturbation?

I think you aren't looking at all the pieces to see how it fits together.


> If you're not auditing at a lower level than executing /bin/usermod, you
> are DOING IT WRONG period.

That is being audited at a lower level, too.

-Steve