BIND less restrictive modes and policy

[Andrew Farris]

Enrico Scholz wrote:
> Andrew Farris <lordmorgul at gmail.com> writes:
> 
>>> pz/ and the other parts of the chroot filesystem must be read-only
>>> for named.
>> And why exactly is that?
> 
> To give only the required rights is a common and working practice for
> years to secure daemons.  Fedora should not forget classical ways
> (own uid, chroot environments, restrictive permissions) just to give
> something like "easier configuration" (where I can not see how mixing
> all and everything into a single dir can ease configuration).

I understand the idea behind minimum access restrictions; my reply/question was 
in regard to the use of the word 'must' which I assumed to be more than 
suggestion based on best practice (i.e. it won't work unless..).  Manuel 
Wolfshant said much the same that you (Enrico) did above in his reply that I 
replied to... (btw.. to Manuel, sorry I did misread and reply 'to you' when 
'you' and 'Enrico' were not one in the same, been a long day).  Anyway, that 
common practice is certainly not something that should be ignored lightly, but 
lets not confuse whether it is suggestion or necessity. (that is all I was asking)

If anyone has reason to believe real *breakage* occurs due to the change Adam 
Tkac was suggesting I hope they speak up.

-- 
Andrew Farris <lordmorgul at gmail.com> <ajfarris at gmail.com>
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No one now has, and no one will ever again get, the big picture. - Daniel Geer
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