Local users get to play root?

[Ricky Zhou]

On 2009-11-19 10:23:53 AM, Till Maas wrote:
> So at least one major security protection measure is not in place and
> attackers can create their own repositories with signed packages that
> have well known security flaws, e.g. a package with a bad setuid root
> binary, and install it, if it is not already installed in a newer
> version.
I might be wrong on this, but wouldn't the attacker need to trick 
yum/packagekit into using the malicious repo first?  I didn't think that 
was allowed for non-root users.

Note that even if the repomd.xml files were signed, it'd be easy for an 
attacker to just take an old one with a valid signature and host a repo 
with outdated packages.  I thought metalink 
(https://mirrors.fedoraproject.org/metalink?repo=updates-released-f12&arch=x86_64) 
over https was supposed to address the problem of outdated repos though.

Thanks,
Ricky
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