The new Update Acceptance Criteria are broken (was: Re: Heads Up - New Firefox update)
mitr at volny.cz
Mon Nov 1 18:01:30 UTC 2010
Adam Williamson píše v Po 01. 11. 2010 v 10:55 -0700:
> On Mon, 2010-11-01 at 18:51 +0100, Miloslav Trmač wrote:
> > > Sorry, but characterizing it as a 'known problem' is misleading. It's
> > > easy to forecast failure, and you'll likely always be correct in *some*
> > > cases if you forecast enough failures. Only if you precisely forecast
> > > only the failures that actually happen, and do not forecast any failures
> > > that don't happen, can your forecast be considered truly reliable.
> > The accuracy of prediction, and especially accuracy of the timing, is
> > not at all relevant. In fact, it is _preciselly_ the unknown nature of
> > risks that requires thinking about them in advance.
> Which rather contradicts your description of it as a 'known problem',
No; the existence of the problem was known, only the timing and precise
extent was not.
> If you want to continue with the analogy, what you seem to be saying is
> that we should never have implemented the policy in the first place,
That is one option; another would be adding a "I'm the maintainer and I
really mean it" checkbox for security updates (with FESCo/Fedora
QA/somebody else reviewing the cases retrospectively, if they feel like
it); yeat another is not enforcing the policy on security updates at
all, as I seem to remember was proposed (or even implemented?) at one
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