Trusted Boot in Fedora
Daniel J Walsh
dwalsh at redhat.com
Wed Jun 22 21:32:50 UTC 2011
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On 06/22/2011 04:57 PM, Camilo Mesias wrote:
> I'm curious to know the use case(s) for this technology.
> Does it enable certain types of behaviour that aren't possible currently?
> Would it enable a system running Fedora to interact with other systems
> with a greater guarantee about its behaviour or function?
> Is it just something that system integrators would see as a feature
> enabling them to make a secured system (ie something useful for RHEL)?
> If it just allows you to optionally run a signed kernel, I don't
> understand the point if it can be circumvented by choosing to run an
> unsigned one. So I think there must be some benefit that isn't
> obvious. What's the benefit?
The idea is to allow certain tools/machines to make judgments on how
"trusted" a machine is. For example you could set up a VPN server that
says I will only allow a machine that passes the "Trusted" test to join
my network. Another potential example would be to not allow a guest
machine to run on your host if its OS is not "Trusted" Or to have a
guest OS check to see if the Host Server is Trusted or stop running.
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