UsrMove feature (was Re: FESCo meeting minutes for 2011-10-24)
mbroz at redhat.com
Wed Oct 26 06:14:11 UTC 2011
On 10/25/2011 07:23 PM, Till Maas wrote:
> Yet as long as it is not done, encrypting /usr is no improvement. And
> even if it is done, you would also need to verify that nobody installed
> a keyboard logger on your device if your fear attackers that have easily
> physical access to the device in question.
Well, if the target is user (and not only data on disk), even the list
of installed applications, style of administration (not updated system?)
of machine or any forensic analysis obtained from not encrypted /usr
from stolen laptop can help attacker to move forward and focus better.
(Note I mentioned stolen laptop - if attacker can repeatedly access
hw it is game over always - you cannot prevent tampering of standard hw.)
You have to say what are you trying to secure before saying that
encryption of /usr is no improvement.
Also if you have part of disk not encrypted, user (with admin rights)
can move some sensitive data to unencrypted area, either by mistake
or intentionally (hm, no space in /home? well I have some free space on /usr...)
Encryption of everything solves this problem and does not give user chance
to do such mistake.
But that's far OT for this /usr thread, sorry:-)
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