Mozilla plugins packaging [Re: SELinuxDenyPtrace: Write, compile, run, but don't debug applications?]

["Jóhann B. Guðmundsson"]

On 04/09/2012 02:06 PM, Jan Kratochvil wrote:
> Wouldn't it be better to package Mozilla plugins in Fedora so that they are
> trusted?  And then disable Firefox plugins downloads the same way as there is
> Firefox updater disabled (--disable-updater) as it would conflict/duplicate
> the rpm packaging of Firefox anyway.
>
> (I have here some undebugged packaging of mozilla-remember-passwords so that
> I already tried to participate.)

Is not upstream, Mozilla in this case, Gnome for shell extensions, 
Google for Androids apps. etc responsible for conducting security 
auditing on extensions/addons they host/provide upstream?

And another thing why do we want to package something that works out of 
the box for the end user like Mozilla and Gnome shell extensions/addons 
do as opposed to just simply direct users upstream which they would have 
go anyway for anything we might not ship?

JBG