prelink should not mess with running executables

[Sam Varshavchik]

Chris Adams writes:

> Once upon a time, Sam Varshavchik <mrsam at courier-mta.com> said:
> > Well, SCM_RIGHTS/SCM_CREDENTIALS is how you get the peer's pid in the first
> > place.
> >
> > This would be an additional check, on top of that.
>
> Is there any value in this "additional check" (that nobody else
> apparently does)?  Do you not trust the kernel's credential handling?

I certainly trust it. But just because I trust it, it doesn't mean that any  
additional checks have no value.
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