prelink should not mess with running executables

[Tomas Mraz]

On Wed, 2012-07-18 at 07:06 -0400, Sam Varshavchik wrote: 
> Andrew Haley writes:
> 
> > On 07/18/2012 02:25 AM, Sam Varshavchik wrote:
> >>
> > Not exactly.  You said:
> >
> > > Can you explain, then, the "correctly" approach by which an
> > > executable can affirm whether another pid is either running the same
> > > executable, or the post-prelinked version of the same
> > > executable. Anyone who suggests readlinking /proc/self/exe, then
> > > the other /proc/pid/exe, and comparing them sans any hardcoded "
> > > (deleted)" suffix is going to get only howls of laughter, in
> > > response.
> >
> > But that's not a use case.  There's no way to know why you want to do
> > this: why you care that another process is running the exact same
> > executable.
> 
> Because that's the only process I want to talk to. A form of authentication,  
> which I already explained. More than once.

This is by no means a form of authentication exactly for the reasons
others told you already. Maybe it is some form of "security by
unusability"? I am now really wondering whether you regularly use
similar methods of "improving security" as that really makes my decision
to use courier-imapd on one of my servers questionable.

-- 
Tomas Mraz
No matter how far down the wrong road you've gone, turn back.
                                              Turkish proverb