fedmsg for voting?

[Björn Persson]

Bill Nottingham wrote:
>Ralf Corsepius (rc040203 at freenet.de) said: 
>> >- a record of who voted for what has been kept since this feature
>> >was implemented: fedorahosted.org/elections/ticket/30
>> ><http://fedorahosted.org/elections/ticket/30> in 2009.  All election
>> >software that recorded this information has kept the information
>> >private.
>>
>> You'd go to jail in Germany, if this SW was used for official
>> elections.
>
>The laws prevent a voter-verifiable trail that their vote was recorded
>and cast for who they intended to cast it for, in case of recounts or
>similar occurences?
>
>I can see requiring it be purged after results are certified, but
>there are systems that have required this level of verification be
>available to voters.
>
>What certainly might be required is a mechanism to decouple the vote
>itself from the account, so only the voter knows which record id is
>theirs, etc.

Since this discussion is now about national elections, which must be
taken much more seriously than polls on release names: Can you propose
a mechanism that allows the voter to verify his vote at a later time,
but does not allow the voter to prove to someone else that he voted for
the candidate he was paid to vote for, and does not allow a dominant
father to verify that the family members voted like he ordered them to
vote? This is not a trivial problem to solve.

-- 
Björn Persson

Sent from my computer.
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