ca-certificates 2014.2.1 will remove several still valid CA certificates with weak keys
vondruch at redhat.com
Wed Oct 15 10:28:06 UTC 2014
Dne 17.9.2014 v 14:05 Kai Engert napsal(a):
> On Mon, 2014-09-08 at 12:53 +0200, Vít Ondruch wrote:
>>> I believe that we must contact Amazon and Symantec about this issue.
>>> Amazon should remove the second intermediate, ending the path with the
>>> G5 intermediate. This will allow openssl to find the trusted root CA.
>>> Also, Symantec should reach out to all of their customers and tell them
>>> you update their configuration.
>>> I will contact them.
>> Great! Thanks. Should I open ticket against ca-certificates to keep
>> track about this issue?
> There was a short discussion here:
> In this particular case, because it works with NSS/Firefox, the admins
> don't think it's necessary to reconfigure?
> I think it doesn't help to track the issue with this particular web
> site. I've been told this is a default configuration, which had been
> recommended by the CA to the customers for a long time, in order to
> achieve maximum compatibility with clients. So it's unlikely to get all
> sites changed, for two reasons, worry of site admins to break
> compatibility, and the fact that it's unrealistic to reach and convince
> all site admins.
> This means, we'll either have to find a software solution (such as
> getting gnutls/openssl enhanced to construct alternative chains), or
> wait with weak 1024-bit removals by default, until all involved server
> certificates have expired, which would be very unfortunate (and which
> might take several years, because of the transitioning trick, that
> causes recently issued certificates to appear to have been issued by
> both the weak legacy and stronger replacement root ca cert).
I am in favor of the former solution, but the later is good as well.
Nevertheless, I am still unsure how to proceed with RubyGems. Should I
ship the bundled certificates again? Or should I wait until somebody
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