dnssec-trigger + GNOME + NetworkManager integration

Michael Catanzaro mcatanzaro at gnome.org
Thu Jul 2 15:56:46 UTC 2015

On Thu, 2015-07-02 at 16:38 +0200, Reindl Harald wrote:
> this type of attitude?
> everybody who reads IT news over the past years about CA's issued 
> certificates even for Google knows that a CA signed certificate does 
> not 
> prove anything - the real problem is wehn this happens for Google 
> somebody takes notice and the press writes about it
> if the same happens for your domain nobody will recognize it

The situation is going to be getting a lot better in the near future,
though. We're getting to the point where we can start enforcing
Google's certificate transparency: if your certificate isn't on the
public audit list, we can simply reject it. That allows individual web
sites to get an immediate heads-up whenever any fraudulent certificate
is issued for their site. (And researchers will be looking after the
most important sites, of course.) That's not going to fix TLS in
itself, because most sites probably don't care, but if the site does
care, it will be impossible to issue a browser-trusted certificate for
the site without that site knowing. (At least, that's my understanding
of the technology; I haven't researched it thoroughly.)

You're right that OCSP is worthless. GNOME applications don't currently
perform any certificate revocation; I'm not willing to implement OCSP
unless Firefox is willing to enforce it, and they aren't. We should
implement OneCRL, which solves the revocation problem for intermediate
certificates, but there doesn't seem to be any reasonable solution for
individual sites yet. OCSP must-staple seems promising.

Of course, we can't have any of these nice features in GNOME unless
somebody wants to pay for their implementation. (If so, get in touch


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