exec-shield=2

Ingo Molnar mingo at elte.hu
Thu Jul 8 06:52:03 UTC 2010


* Roland McGrath <roland at redhat.com> wrote:

> I hope to manage to cajole Ingo into either upstreaming or punting that one 
> thing, the different arch_get_unmapped_area algorithm used for PROT_EXEC 
> mappings.  I can't tell if it's actually of any use when we're not using the 
> segmentation hack or not.  If it is, some version of it belongs upstream.

Even not considering the segmentation based protection, it's useful (on 
32-bit) because it compresses executable mappings into an address space region 
where all 32-bit addresses have a zero byte in them.

This adds one more complication to exploits - for example ASCII string 
overflow based exploits (which cannot have a end-of-string zero byte in them) 
will have to work harder to generate an address into that address range. (Some 
may even be prevented altogether - although it's usually rather hard to 
disprove the exploitability of overflow bugs.)

But upstream mm/ maintainers expressed a thundering disinterest in these kinds 
of changes, and the segmentation based trick was explicitly nak-ed IIRC.

Thanks,

	Ingo


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