[kernel/f14] Fix CVE-2011-3188
Josh Boyer
jwboyer at fedoraproject.org
Fri Sep 16 22:50:08 UTC 2011
commit c0d43b7963939b6160f5ad854b0719332f217c69
Author: Josh Boyer <jwboyer at redhat.com>
Date: Fri Sep 16 17:16:38 2011 -0400
Fix CVE-2011-3188
crypto-Move-md5_transform-to-lib-md5.c.patch | 258 +++++++
kernel.spec | 9 +
...-protocol-sequence-numbers-and-fragment-I.patch | 781 ++++++++++++++++++++
3 files changed, 1048 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
---
diff --git a/crypto-Move-md5_transform-to-lib-md5.c.patch b/crypto-Move-md5_transform-to-lib-md5.c.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ef12c3b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto-Move-md5_transform-to-lib-md5.c.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,258 @@
+From 44c943562c2e204cddf46db131c53c326b47bd47 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "David S. Miller" <davem at davemloft.net>
+Date: Fri, 16 Sep 2011 17:10:29 -0400
+Subject: [PATCH 1/2] crypto: Move md5_transform to lib/md5.c
+
+We are going to use this for TCP/IP sequence number and fragment ID
+generation.
+
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem at davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh at suse.de>
+
+Backported to 2.6.25.14 by Josh Boyer <jwboyer at redhat.com>
+---
+ crypto/md5.c | 92 +------------------------------------------
+ include/linux/cryptohash.h | 5 ++
+ lib/Makefile | 2 +-
+ lib/md5.c | 95 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 4 files changed, 102 insertions(+), 92 deletions(-)
+ create mode 100644 lib/md5.c
+
+diff --git a/crypto/md5.c b/crypto/md5.c
+index 30efc7d..7febeaa 100644
+--- a/crypto/md5.c
++++ b/crypto/md5.c
+@@ -21,99 +21,9 @@
+ #include <linux/module.h>
+ #include <linux/string.h>
+ #include <linux/types.h>
++#include <linux/cryptohash.h>
+ #include <asm/byteorder.h>
+
+-#define F1(x, y, z) (z ^ (x & (y ^ z)))
+-#define F2(x, y, z) F1(z, x, y)
+-#define F3(x, y, z) (x ^ y ^ z)
+-#define F4(x, y, z) (y ^ (x | ~z))
+-
+-#define MD5STEP(f, w, x, y, z, in, s) \
+- (w += f(x, y, z) + in, w = (w<<s | w>>(32-s)) + x)
+-
+-static void md5_transform(u32 *hash, u32 const *in)
+-{
+- u32 a, b, c, d;
+-
+- a = hash[0];
+- b = hash[1];
+- c = hash[2];
+- d = hash[3];
+-
+- MD5STEP(F1, a, b, c, d, in[0] + 0xd76aa478, 7);
+- MD5STEP(F1, d, a, b, c, in[1] + 0xe8c7b756, 12);
+- MD5STEP(F1, c, d, a, b, in[2] + 0x242070db, 17);
+- MD5STEP(F1, b, c, d, a, in[3] + 0xc1bdceee, 22);
+- MD5STEP(F1, a, b, c, d, in[4] + 0xf57c0faf, 7);
+- MD5STEP(F1, d, a, b, c, in[5] + 0x4787c62a, 12);
+- MD5STEP(F1, c, d, a, b, in[6] + 0xa8304613, 17);
+- MD5STEP(F1, b, c, d, a, in[7] + 0xfd469501, 22);
+- MD5STEP(F1, a, b, c, d, in[8] + 0x698098d8, 7);
+- MD5STEP(F1, d, a, b, c, in[9] + 0x8b44f7af, 12);
+- MD5STEP(F1, c, d, a, b, in[10] + 0xffff5bb1, 17);
+- MD5STEP(F1, b, c, d, a, in[11] + 0x895cd7be, 22);
+- MD5STEP(F1, a, b, c, d, in[12] + 0x6b901122, 7);
+- MD5STEP(F1, d, a, b, c, in[13] + 0xfd987193, 12);
+- MD5STEP(F1, c, d, a, b, in[14] + 0xa679438e, 17);
+- MD5STEP(F1, b, c, d, a, in[15] + 0x49b40821, 22);
+-
+- MD5STEP(F2, a, b, c, d, in[1] + 0xf61e2562, 5);
+- MD5STEP(F2, d, a, b, c, in[6] + 0xc040b340, 9);
+- MD5STEP(F2, c, d, a, b, in[11] + 0x265e5a51, 14);
+- MD5STEP(F2, b, c, d, a, in[0] + 0xe9b6c7aa, 20);
+- MD5STEP(F2, a, b, c, d, in[5] + 0xd62f105d, 5);
+- MD5STEP(F2, d, a, b, c, in[10] + 0x02441453, 9);
+- MD5STEP(F2, c, d, a, b, in[15] + 0xd8a1e681, 14);
+- MD5STEP(F2, b, c, d, a, in[4] + 0xe7d3fbc8, 20);
+- MD5STEP(F2, a, b, c, d, in[9] + 0x21e1cde6, 5);
+- MD5STEP(F2, d, a, b, c, in[14] + 0xc33707d6, 9);
+- MD5STEP(F2, c, d, a, b, in[3] + 0xf4d50d87, 14);
+- MD5STEP(F2, b, c, d, a, in[8] + 0x455a14ed, 20);
+- MD5STEP(F2, a, b, c, d, in[13] + 0xa9e3e905, 5);
+- MD5STEP(F2, d, a, b, c, in[2] + 0xfcefa3f8, 9);
+- MD5STEP(F2, c, d, a, b, in[7] + 0x676f02d9, 14);
+- MD5STEP(F2, b, c, d, a, in[12] + 0x8d2a4c8a, 20);
+-
+- MD5STEP(F3, a, b, c, d, in[5] + 0xfffa3942, 4);
+- MD5STEP(F3, d, a, b, c, in[8] + 0x8771f681, 11);
+- MD5STEP(F3, c, d, a, b, in[11] + 0x6d9d6122, 16);
+- MD5STEP(F3, b, c, d, a, in[14] + 0xfde5380c, 23);
+- MD5STEP(F3, a, b, c, d, in[1] + 0xa4beea44, 4);
+- MD5STEP(F3, d, a, b, c, in[4] + 0x4bdecfa9, 11);
+- MD5STEP(F3, c, d, a, b, in[7] + 0xf6bb4b60, 16);
+- MD5STEP(F3, b, c, d, a, in[10] + 0xbebfbc70, 23);
+- MD5STEP(F3, a, b, c, d, in[13] + 0x289b7ec6, 4);
+- MD5STEP(F3, d, a, b, c, in[0] + 0xeaa127fa, 11);
+- MD5STEP(F3, c, d, a, b, in[3] + 0xd4ef3085, 16);
+- MD5STEP(F3, b, c, d, a, in[6] + 0x04881d05, 23);
+- MD5STEP(F3, a, b, c, d, in[9] + 0xd9d4d039, 4);
+- MD5STEP(F3, d, a, b, c, in[12] + 0xe6db99e5, 11);
+- MD5STEP(F3, c, d, a, b, in[15] + 0x1fa27cf8, 16);
+- MD5STEP(F3, b, c, d, a, in[2] + 0xc4ac5665, 23);
+-
+- MD5STEP(F4, a, b, c, d, in[0] + 0xf4292244, 6);
+- MD5STEP(F4, d, a, b, c, in[7] + 0x432aff97, 10);
+- MD5STEP(F4, c, d, a, b, in[14] + 0xab9423a7, 15);
+- MD5STEP(F4, b, c, d, a, in[5] + 0xfc93a039, 21);
+- MD5STEP(F4, a, b, c, d, in[12] + 0x655b59c3, 6);
+- MD5STEP(F4, d, a, b, c, in[3] + 0x8f0ccc92, 10);
+- MD5STEP(F4, c, d, a, b, in[10] + 0xffeff47d, 15);
+- MD5STEP(F4, b, c, d, a, in[1] + 0x85845dd1, 21);
+- MD5STEP(F4, a, b, c, d, in[8] + 0x6fa87e4f, 6);
+- MD5STEP(F4, d, a, b, c, in[15] + 0xfe2ce6e0, 10);
+- MD5STEP(F4, c, d, a, b, in[6] + 0xa3014314, 15);
+- MD5STEP(F4, b, c, d, a, in[13] + 0x4e0811a1, 21);
+- MD5STEP(F4, a, b, c, d, in[4] + 0xf7537e82, 6);
+- MD5STEP(F4, d, a, b, c, in[11] + 0xbd3af235, 10);
+- MD5STEP(F4, c, d, a, b, in[2] + 0x2ad7d2bb, 15);
+- MD5STEP(F4, b, c, d, a, in[9] + 0xeb86d391, 21);
+-
+- hash[0] += a;
+- hash[1] += b;
+- hash[2] += c;
+- hash[3] += d;
+-}
+-
+ /* XXX: this stuff can be optimized */
+ static inline void le32_to_cpu_array(u32 *buf, unsigned int words)
+ {
+diff --git a/include/linux/cryptohash.h b/include/linux/cryptohash.h
+index ec78a4b..d2984fb 100644
+--- a/include/linux/cryptohash.h
++++ b/include/linux/cryptohash.h
+@@ -8,6 +8,11 @@
+ void sha_init(__u32 *buf);
+ void sha_transform(__u32 *digest, const char *data, __u32 *W);
+
++#define MD5_DIGEST_WORDS 4
++#define MD5_MESSAGE_BYTES 64
++
++void md5_transform(__u32 *hash, __u32 const *in);
++
+ __u32 half_md4_transform(__u32 buf[4], __u32 const in[8]);
+
+ #endif
+diff --git a/lib/Makefile b/lib/Makefile
+index 0bfabba..d07eef3 100644
+--- a/lib/Makefile
++++ b/lib/Makefile
+@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ endif
+ lib-y := ctype.o string.o vsprintf.o cmdline.o \
+ rbtree.o radix-tree.o dump_stack.o \
+ idr.o int_sqrt.o extable.o prio_tree.o \
+- sha1.o irq_regs.o reciprocal_div.o argv_split.o \
++ sha1.o md5.o irq_regs.o reciprocal_div.o argv_split.o \
+ proportions.o prio_heap.o ratelimit.o show_mem.o \
+ is_single_threaded.o plist.o decompress.o flex_array.o
+
+diff --git a/lib/md5.c b/lib/md5.c
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..c777180
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/lib/md5.c
+@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
++#include <linux/kernel.h>
++#include <linux/module.h>
++#include <linux/cryptohash.h>
++
++#define F1(x, y, z) (z ^ (x & (y ^ z)))
++#define F2(x, y, z) F1(z, x, y)
++#define F3(x, y, z) (x ^ y ^ z)
++#define F4(x, y, z) (y ^ (x | ~z))
++
++#define MD5STEP(f, w, x, y, z, in, s) \
++ (w += f(x, y, z) + in, w = (w<<s | w>>(32-s)) + x)
++
++void md5_transform(__u32 *hash, __u32 const *in)
++{
++ u32 a, b, c, d;
++
++ a = hash[0];
++ b = hash[1];
++ c = hash[2];
++ d = hash[3];
++
++ MD5STEP(F1, a, b, c, d, in[0] + 0xd76aa478, 7);
++ MD5STEP(F1, d, a, b, c, in[1] + 0xe8c7b756, 12);
++ MD5STEP(F1, c, d, a, b, in[2] + 0x242070db, 17);
++ MD5STEP(F1, b, c, d, a, in[3] + 0xc1bdceee, 22);
++ MD5STEP(F1, a, b, c, d, in[4] + 0xf57c0faf, 7);
++ MD5STEP(F1, d, a, b, c, in[5] + 0x4787c62a, 12);
++ MD5STEP(F1, c, d, a, b, in[6] + 0xa8304613, 17);
++ MD5STEP(F1, b, c, d, a, in[7] + 0xfd469501, 22);
++ MD5STEP(F1, a, b, c, d, in[8] + 0x698098d8, 7);
++ MD5STEP(F1, d, a, b, c, in[9] + 0x8b44f7af, 12);
++ MD5STEP(F1, c, d, a, b, in[10] + 0xffff5bb1, 17);
++ MD5STEP(F1, b, c, d, a, in[11] + 0x895cd7be, 22);
++ MD5STEP(F1, a, b, c, d, in[12] + 0x6b901122, 7);
++ MD5STEP(F1, d, a, b, c, in[13] + 0xfd987193, 12);
++ MD5STEP(F1, c, d, a, b, in[14] + 0xa679438e, 17);
++ MD5STEP(F1, b, c, d, a, in[15] + 0x49b40821, 22);
++
++ MD5STEP(F2, a, b, c, d, in[1] + 0xf61e2562, 5);
++ MD5STEP(F2, d, a, b, c, in[6] + 0xc040b340, 9);
++ MD5STEP(F2, c, d, a, b, in[11] + 0x265e5a51, 14);
++ MD5STEP(F2, b, c, d, a, in[0] + 0xe9b6c7aa, 20);
++ MD5STEP(F2, a, b, c, d, in[5] + 0xd62f105d, 5);
++ MD5STEP(F2, d, a, b, c, in[10] + 0x02441453, 9);
++ MD5STEP(F2, c, d, a, b, in[15] + 0xd8a1e681, 14);
++ MD5STEP(F2, b, c, d, a, in[4] + 0xe7d3fbc8, 20);
++ MD5STEP(F2, a, b, c, d, in[9] + 0x21e1cde6, 5);
++ MD5STEP(F2, d, a, b, c, in[14] + 0xc33707d6, 9);
++ MD5STEP(F2, c, d, a, b, in[3] + 0xf4d50d87, 14);
++ MD5STEP(F2, b, c, d, a, in[8] + 0x455a14ed, 20);
++ MD5STEP(F2, a, b, c, d, in[13] + 0xa9e3e905, 5);
++ MD5STEP(F2, d, a, b, c, in[2] + 0xfcefa3f8, 9);
++ MD5STEP(F2, c, d, a, b, in[7] + 0x676f02d9, 14);
++ MD5STEP(F2, b, c, d, a, in[12] + 0x8d2a4c8a, 20);
++
++ MD5STEP(F3, a, b, c, d, in[5] + 0xfffa3942, 4);
++ MD5STEP(F3, d, a, b, c, in[8] + 0x8771f681, 11);
++ MD5STEP(F3, c, d, a, b, in[11] + 0x6d9d6122, 16);
++ MD5STEP(F3, b, c, d, a, in[14] + 0xfde5380c, 23);
++ MD5STEP(F3, a, b, c, d, in[1] + 0xa4beea44, 4);
++ MD5STEP(F3, d, a, b, c, in[4] + 0x4bdecfa9, 11);
++ MD5STEP(F3, c, d, a, b, in[7] + 0xf6bb4b60, 16);
++ MD5STEP(F3, b, c, d, a, in[10] + 0xbebfbc70, 23);
++ MD5STEP(F3, a, b, c, d, in[13] + 0x289b7ec6, 4);
++ MD5STEP(F3, d, a, b, c, in[0] + 0xeaa127fa, 11);
++ MD5STEP(F3, c, d, a, b, in[3] + 0xd4ef3085, 16);
++ MD5STEP(F3, b, c, d, a, in[6] + 0x04881d05, 23);
++ MD5STEP(F3, a, b, c, d, in[9] + 0xd9d4d039, 4);
++ MD5STEP(F3, d, a, b, c, in[12] + 0xe6db99e5, 11);
++ MD5STEP(F3, c, d, a, b, in[15] + 0x1fa27cf8, 16);
++ MD5STEP(F3, b, c, d, a, in[2] + 0xc4ac5665, 23);
++
++ MD5STEP(F4, a, b, c, d, in[0] + 0xf4292244, 6);
++ MD5STEP(F4, d, a, b, c, in[7] + 0x432aff97, 10);
++ MD5STEP(F4, c, d, a, b, in[14] + 0xab9423a7, 15);
++ MD5STEP(F4, b, c, d, a, in[5] + 0xfc93a039, 21);
++ MD5STEP(F4, a, b, c, d, in[12] + 0x655b59c3, 6);
++ MD5STEP(F4, d, a, b, c, in[3] + 0x8f0ccc92, 10);
++ MD5STEP(F4, c, d, a, b, in[10] + 0xffeff47d, 15);
++ MD5STEP(F4, b, c, d, a, in[1] + 0x85845dd1, 21);
++ MD5STEP(F4, a, b, c, d, in[8] + 0x6fa87e4f, 6);
++ MD5STEP(F4, d, a, b, c, in[15] + 0xfe2ce6e0, 10);
++ MD5STEP(F4, c, d, a, b, in[6] + 0xa3014314, 15);
++ MD5STEP(F4, b, c, d, a, in[13] + 0x4e0811a1, 21);
++ MD5STEP(F4, a, b, c, d, in[4] + 0xf7537e82, 6);
++ MD5STEP(F4, d, a, b, c, in[11] + 0xbd3af235, 10);
++ MD5STEP(F4, c, d, a, b, in[2] + 0x2ad7d2bb, 15);
++ MD5STEP(F4, b, c, d, a, in[9] + 0xeb86d391, 21);
++
++ hash[0] += a;
++ hash[1] += b;
++ hash[2] += c;
++ hash[3] += d;
++}
++EXPORT_SYMBOL(md5_transform);
+--
+1.7.6
+
diff --git a/kernel.spec b/kernel.spec
index 7470e1c..d3a547e 100644
--- a/kernel.spec
+++ b/kernel.spec
@@ -879,6 +879,10 @@ Patch14055: Ecryptfs-Add-mount-option-to-check-uid-of-device-bei.patch
# CVE-2011-2918
Patch14056: perf-Fix-software-event-overflow.patch
+# CVE-2011-3188
+Patch14057: crypto-Move-md5_transform-to-lib-md5.c.patch
+Patch14058: net-Compute-protocol-sequence-numbers-and-fragment-I.patch
+
%endif
BuildRoot: %{_tmppath}/kernel-%{KVERREL}-root
@@ -1657,6 +1661,10 @@ ApplyPatch Ecryptfs-Add-mount-option-to-check-uid-of-device-bei.patch
# CVE-2011-2918
ApplyPatch perf-Fix-software-event-overflow.patch
+# CVE-2011-3188
+ApplyPatch crypto-Move-md5_transform-to-lib-md5.c.patch
+ApplyPatch net-Compute-protocol-sequence-numbers-and-fragment-I.patch
+
# END OF PATCH APPLICATIONS
%endif
@@ -2245,6 +2253,7 @@ fi
%changelog
* Fri Sep 16 2011 Josh Boyer <jwboyer at redhat.com>
- CVE-2011-2918: perf: Fix software event overflow
+- CVE-2011-3188: net: improve sequence number generation
* Thu Sep 15 2011 Josh Boyer <jwboyer at redhat.com>
- CVE-2011-2723: gro: Only reset frag0 when skb can be pulled
diff --git a/net-Compute-protocol-sequence-numbers-and-fragment-I.patch b/net-Compute-protocol-sequence-numbers-and-fragment-I.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..35271d2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net-Compute-protocol-sequence-numbers-and-fragment-I.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,781 @@
+From 23d90cc07ae73b8d9e2bdc4cde4e8c3642ada804 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "David S. Miller" <davem at davemloft.net>
+Date: Fri, 16 Sep 2011 17:13:05 -0400
+Subject: [PATCH 2/2] net: Compute protocol sequence numbers and fragment IDs
+ using MD5.
+
+Computers have become a lot faster since we compromised on the
+partial MD4 hash which we use currently for performance reasons.
+
+MD5 is a much safer choice, and is inline with both RFC1948 and
+other ISS generators (OpenBSD, Solaris, etc.)
+
+Furthermore, only having 24-bits of the sequence number be truly
+unpredictable is a very serious limitation. So the periodic
+regeneration and 8-bit counter have been removed. We compute and
+use a full 32-bit sequence number.
+
+For ipv6, DCCP was found to use a 32-bit truncated initial sequence
+number (it needs 43-bits) and that is fixed here as well.
+
+Reported-by: Dan Kaminsky <dan at doxpara.com>
+Tested-by: Willy Tarreau <w at 1wt.eu>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem at davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh at suse.de>
+---
+ drivers/char/random.c | 334 +-----------------------------
+ include/linux/random.h | 11 -
+ include/net/secure_seq.h | 20 ++
+ net/core/Makefile | 2 +-
+ net/core/secure_seq.c | 184 ++++++++++++++++
+ net/dccp/ipv4.c | 1 +
+ net/dccp/ipv6.c | 9 +-
+ net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c | 1 +
+ net/ipv4/inetpeer.c | 1 +
+ net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_nat_proto_common.c | 1 +
+ net/ipv4/route.c | 1 +
+ net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c | 1 +
+ net/ipv6/inet6_hashtables.c | 1 +
+ net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c | 1 +
+ 14 files changed, 223 insertions(+), 345 deletions(-)
+ create mode 100644 include/net/secure_seq.h
+ create mode 100644 net/core/secure_seq.c
+
+diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c
+index 8d85587..1e07bbe 100644
+--- a/drivers/char/random.c
++++ b/drivers/char/random.c
+@@ -1291,330 +1291,14 @@ ctl_table random_table[] = {
+ };
+ #endif /* CONFIG_SYSCTL */
+
+-/********************************************************************
+- *
+- * Random functions for networking
+- *
+- ********************************************************************/
+-
+-/*
+- * TCP initial sequence number picking. This uses the random number
+- * generator to pick an initial secret value. This value is hashed
+- * along with the TCP endpoint information to provide a unique
+- * starting point for each pair of TCP endpoints. This defeats
+- * attacks which rely on guessing the initial TCP sequence number.
+- * This algorithm was suggested by Steve Bellovin.
+- *
+- * Using a very strong hash was taking an appreciable amount of the total
+- * TCP connection establishment time, so this is a weaker hash,
+- * compensated for by changing the secret periodically.
+- */
+-
+-/* F, G and H are basic MD4 functions: selection, majority, parity */
+-#define F(x, y, z) ((z) ^ ((x) & ((y) ^ (z))))
+-#define G(x, y, z) (((x) & (y)) + (((x) ^ (y)) & (z)))
+-#define H(x, y, z) ((x) ^ (y) ^ (z))
+-
+-/*
+- * The generic round function. The application is so specific that
+- * we don't bother protecting all the arguments with parens, as is generally
+- * good macro practice, in favor of extra legibility.
+- * Rotation is separate from addition to prevent recomputation
+- */
+-#define ROUND(f, a, b, c, d, x, s) \
+- (a += f(b, c, d) + x, a = (a << s) | (a >> (32 - s)))
+-#define K1 0
+-#define K2 013240474631UL
+-#define K3 015666365641UL
++static u32 random_int_secret[MD5_MESSAGE_BYTES / 4] ____cacheline_aligned;
+
+-#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
+-
+-static __u32 twothirdsMD4Transform(__u32 const buf[4], __u32 const in[12])
++static int __init random_int_secret_init(void)
+ {
+- __u32 a = buf[0], b = buf[1], c = buf[2], d = buf[3];
+-
+- /* Round 1 */
+- ROUND(F, a, b, c, d, in[ 0] + K1, 3);
+- ROUND(F, d, a, b, c, in[ 1] + K1, 7);
+- ROUND(F, c, d, a, b, in[ 2] + K1, 11);
+- ROUND(F, b, c, d, a, in[ 3] + K1, 19);
+- ROUND(F, a, b, c, d, in[ 4] + K1, 3);
+- ROUND(F, d, a, b, c, in[ 5] + K1, 7);
+- ROUND(F, c, d, a, b, in[ 6] + K1, 11);
+- ROUND(F, b, c, d, a, in[ 7] + K1, 19);
+- ROUND(F, a, b, c, d, in[ 8] + K1, 3);
+- ROUND(F, d, a, b, c, in[ 9] + K1, 7);
+- ROUND(F, c, d, a, b, in[10] + K1, 11);
+- ROUND(F, b, c, d, a, in[11] + K1, 19);
+-
+- /* Round 2 */
+- ROUND(G, a, b, c, d, in[ 1] + K2, 3);
+- ROUND(G, d, a, b, c, in[ 3] + K2, 5);
+- ROUND(G, c, d, a, b, in[ 5] + K2, 9);
+- ROUND(G, b, c, d, a, in[ 7] + K2, 13);
+- ROUND(G, a, b, c, d, in[ 9] + K2, 3);
+- ROUND(G, d, a, b, c, in[11] + K2, 5);
+- ROUND(G, c, d, a, b, in[ 0] + K2, 9);
+- ROUND(G, b, c, d, a, in[ 2] + K2, 13);
+- ROUND(G, a, b, c, d, in[ 4] + K2, 3);
+- ROUND(G, d, a, b, c, in[ 6] + K2, 5);
+- ROUND(G, c, d, a, b, in[ 8] + K2, 9);
+- ROUND(G, b, c, d, a, in[10] + K2, 13);
+-
+- /* Round 3 */
+- ROUND(H, a, b, c, d, in[ 3] + K3, 3);
+- ROUND(H, d, a, b, c, in[ 7] + K3, 9);
+- ROUND(H, c, d, a, b, in[11] + K3, 11);
+- ROUND(H, b, c, d, a, in[ 2] + K3, 15);
+- ROUND(H, a, b, c, d, in[ 6] + K3, 3);
+- ROUND(H, d, a, b, c, in[10] + K3, 9);
+- ROUND(H, c, d, a, b, in[ 1] + K3, 11);
+- ROUND(H, b, c, d, a, in[ 5] + K3, 15);
+- ROUND(H, a, b, c, d, in[ 9] + K3, 3);
+- ROUND(H, d, a, b, c, in[ 0] + K3, 9);
+- ROUND(H, c, d, a, b, in[ 4] + K3, 11);
+- ROUND(H, b, c, d, a, in[ 8] + K3, 15);
+-
+- return buf[1] + b; /* "most hashed" word */
+- /* Alternative: return sum of all words? */
+-}
+-#endif
+-
+-#undef ROUND
+-#undef F
+-#undef G
+-#undef H
+-#undef K1
+-#undef K2
+-#undef K3
+-
+-/* This should not be decreased so low that ISNs wrap too fast. */
+-#define REKEY_INTERVAL (300 * HZ)
+-/*
+- * Bit layout of the tcp sequence numbers (before adding current time):
+- * bit 24-31: increased after every key exchange
+- * bit 0-23: hash(source,dest)
+- *
+- * The implementation is similar to the algorithm described
+- * in the Appendix of RFC 1185, except that
+- * - it uses a 1 MHz clock instead of a 250 kHz clock
+- * - it performs a rekey every 5 minutes, which is equivalent
+- * to a (source,dest) tulple dependent forward jump of the
+- * clock by 0..2^(HASH_BITS+1)
+- *
+- * Thus the average ISN wraparound time is 68 minutes instead of
+- * 4.55 hours.
+- *
+- * SMP cleanup and lock avoidance with poor man's RCU.
+- * Manfred Spraul <manfred at colorfullife.com>
+- *
+- */
+-#define COUNT_BITS 8
+-#define COUNT_MASK ((1 << COUNT_BITS) - 1)
+-#define HASH_BITS 24
+-#define HASH_MASK ((1 << HASH_BITS) - 1)
+-
+-static struct keydata {
+- __u32 count; /* already shifted to the final position */
+- __u32 secret[12];
+-} ____cacheline_aligned ip_keydata[2];
+-
+-static unsigned int ip_cnt;
+-
+-static void rekey_seq_generator(struct work_struct *work);
+-
+-static DECLARE_DELAYED_WORK(rekey_work, rekey_seq_generator);
+-
+-/*
+- * Lock avoidance:
+- * The ISN generation runs lockless - it's just a hash over random data.
+- * State changes happen every 5 minutes when the random key is replaced.
+- * Synchronization is performed by having two copies of the hash function
+- * state and rekey_seq_generator always updates the inactive copy.
+- * The copy is then activated by updating ip_cnt.
+- * The implementation breaks down if someone blocks the thread
+- * that processes SYN requests for more than 5 minutes. Should never
+- * happen, and even if that happens only a not perfectly compliant
+- * ISN is generated, nothing fatal.
+- */
+-static void rekey_seq_generator(struct work_struct *work)
+-{
+- struct keydata *keyptr = &ip_keydata[1 ^ (ip_cnt & 1)];
+-
+- get_random_bytes(keyptr->secret, sizeof(keyptr->secret));
+- keyptr->count = (ip_cnt & COUNT_MASK) << HASH_BITS;
+- smp_wmb();
+- ip_cnt++;
+- schedule_delayed_work(&rekey_work,
+- round_jiffies_relative(REKEY_INTERVAL));
+-}
+-
+-static inline struct keydata *get_keyptr(void)
+-{
+- struct keydata *keyptr = &ip_keydata[ip_cnt & 1];
+-
+- smp_rmb();
+-
+- return keyptr;
+-}
+-
+-static __init int seqgen_init(void)
+-{
+- rekey_seq_generator(NULL);
++ get_random_bytes(random_int_secret, sizeof(random_int_secret));
+ return 0;
+ }
+-late_initcall(seqgen_init);
+-
+-#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
+-__u32 secure_tcpv6_sequence_number(__be32 *saddr, __be32 *daddr,
+- __be16 sport, __be16 dport)
+-{
+- __u32 seq;
+- __u32 hash[12];
+- struct keydata *keyptr = get_keyptr();
+-
+- /* The procedure is the same as for IPv4, but addresses are longer.
+- * Thus we must use twothirdsMD4Transform.
+- */
+-
+- memcpy(hash, saddr, 16);
+- hash[4] = ((__force u16)sport << 16) + (__force u16)dport;
+- memcpy(&hash[5], keyptr->secret, sizeof(__u32) * 7);
+-
+- seq = twothirdsMD4Transform((const __u32 *)daddr, hash) & HASH_MASK;
+- seq += keyptr->count;
+-
+- seq += ktime_to_ns(ktime_get_real());
+-
+- return seq;
+-}
+-EXPORT_SYMBOL(secure_tcpv6_sequence_number);
+-#endif
+-
+-/* The code below is shamelessly stolen from secure_tcp_sequence_number().
+- * All blames to Andrey V. Savochkin <saw at msu.ru>.
+- */
+-__u32 secure_ip_id(__be32 daddr)
+-{
+- struct keydata *keyptr;
+- __u32 hash[4];
+-
+- keyptr = get_keyptr();
+-
+- /*
+- * Pick a unique starting offset for each IP destination.
+- * The dest ip address is placed in the starting vector,
+- * which is then hashed with random data.
+- */
+- hash[0] = (__force __u32)daddr;
+- hash[1] = keyptr->secret[9];
+- hash[2] = keyptr->secret[10];
+- hash[3] = keyptr->secret[11];
+-
+- return half_md4_transform(hash, keyptr->secret);
+-}
+-
+-#ifdef CONFIG_INET
+-
+-__u32 secure_tcp_sequence_number(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr,
+- __be16 sport, __be16 dport)
+-{
+- __u32 seq;
+- __u32 hash[4];
+- struct keydata *keyptr = get_keyptr();
+-
+- /*
+- * Pick a unique starting offset for each TCP connection endpoints
+- * (saddr, daddr, sport, dport).
+- * Note that the words are placed into the starting vector, which is
+- * then mixed with a partial MD4 over random data.
+- */
+- hash[0] = (__force u32)saddr;
+- hash[1] = (__force u32)daddr;
+- hash[2] = ((__force u16)sport << 16) + (__force u16)dport;
+- hash[3] = keyptr->secret[11];
+-
+- seq = half_md4_transform(hash, keyptr->secret) & HASH_MASK;
+- seq += keyptr->count;
+- /*
+- * As close as possible to RFC 793, which
+- * suggests using a 250 kHz clock.
+- * Further reading shows this assumes 2 Mb/s networks.
+- * For 10 Mb/s Ethernet, a 1 MHz clock is appropriate.
+- * For 10 Gb/s Ethernet, a 1 GHz clock should be ok, but
+- * we also need to limit the resolution so that the u32 seq
+- * overlaps less than one time per MSL (2 minutes).
+- * Choosing a clock of 64 ns period is OK. (period of 274 s)
+- */
+- seq += ktime_to_ns(ktime_get_real()) >> 6;
+-
+- return seq;
+-}
+-
+-/* Generate secure starting point for ephemeral IPV4 transport port search */
+-u32 secure_ipv4_port_ephemeral(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr, __be16 dport)
+-{
+- struct keydata *keyptr = get_keyptr();
+- u32 hash[4];
+-
+- /*
+- * Pick a unique starting offset for each ephemeral port search
+- * (saddr, daddr, dport) and 48bits of random data.
+- */
+- hash[0] = (__force u32)saddr;
+- hash[1] = (__force u32)daddr;
+- hash[2] = (__force u32)dport ^ keyptr->secret[10];
+- hash[3] = keyptr->secret[11];
+-
+- return half_md4_transform(hash, keyptr->secret);
+-}
+-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(secure_ipv4_port_ephemeral);
+-
+-#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
+-u32 secure_ipv6_port_ephemeral(const __be32 *saddr, const __be32 *daddr,
+- __be16 dport)
+-{
+- struct keydata *keyptr = get_keyptr();
+- u32 hash[12];
+-
+- memcpy(hash, saddr, 16);
+- hash[4] = (__force u32)dport;
+- memcpy(&hash[5], keyptr->secret, sizeof(__u32) * 7);
+-
+- return twothirdsMD4Transform((const __u32 *)daddr, hash);
+-}
+-#endif
+-
+-#if defined(CONFIG_IP_DCCP) || defined(CONFIG_IP_DCCP_MODULE)
+-/* Similar to secure_tcp_sequence_number but generate a 48 bit value
+- * bit's 32-47 increase every key exchange
+- * 0-31 hash(source, dest)
+- */
+-u64 secure_dccp_sequence_number(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr,
+- __be16 sport, __be16 dport)
+-{
+- u64 seq;
+- __u32 hash[4];
+- struct keydata *keyptr = get_keyptr();
+-
+- hash[0] = (__force u32)saddr;
+- hash[1] = (__force u32)daddr;
+- hash[2] = ((__force u16)sport << 16) + (__force u16)dport;
+- hash[3] = keyptr->secret[11];
+-
+- seq = half_md4_transform(hash, keyptr->secret);
+- seq |= ((u64)keyptr->count) << (32 - HASH_BITS);
+-
+- seq += ktime_to_ns(ktime_get_real());
+- seq &= (1ull << 48) - 1;
+-
+- return seq;
+-}
+-EXPORT_SYMBOL(secure_dccp_sequence_number);
+-#endif
+-
+-#endif /* CONFIG_INET */
+-
++late_initcall(random_int_secret_init);
+
+ /*
+ * Get a random word for internal kernel use only. Similar to urandom but
+@@ -1622,17 +1306,15 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(secure_dccp_sequence_number);
+ * value is not cryptographically secure but for several uses the cost of
+ * depleting entropy is too high
+ */
+-DEFINE_PER_CPU(__u32 [4], get_random_int_hash);
++DEFINE_PER_CPU(__u32 [MD5_DIGEST_WORDS], get_random_int_hash);
+ unsigned int get_random_int(void)
+ {
+- struct keydata *keyptr;
+ __u32 *hash = get_cpu_var(get_random_int_hash);
+- int ret;
++ unsigned int ret;
+
+- keyptr = get_keyptr();
+ hash[0] += current->pid + jiffies + get_cycles();
+-
+- ret = half_md4_transform(hash, keyptr->secret);
++ md5_transform(hash, random_int_secret);
++ ret = hash[0];
+ put_cpu_var(get_random_int_hash);
+
+ return ret;
+diff --git a/include/linux/random.h b/include/linux/random.h
+index fb7ab9d..d13059f 100644
+--- a/include/linux/random.h
++++ b/include/linux/random.h
+@@ -57,17 +57,6 @@ extern void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq);
+ extern void get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes);
+ void generate_random_uuid(unsigned char uuid_out[16]);
+
+-extern __u32 secure_ip_id(__be32 daddr);
+-extern u32 secure_ipv4_port_ephemeral(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr, __be16 dport);
+-extern u32 secure_ipv6_port_ephemeral(const __be32 *saddr, const __be32 *daddr,
+- __be16 dport);
+-extern __u32 secure_tcp_sequence_number(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr,
+- __be16 sport, __be16 dport);
+-extern __u32 secure_tcpv6_sequence_number(__be32 *saddr, __be32 *daddr,
+- __be16 sport, __be16 dport);
+-extern u64 secure_dccp_sequence_number(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr,
+- __be16 sport, __be16 dport);
+-
+ #ifndef MODULE
+ extern const struct file_operations random_fops, urandom_fops;
+ #endif
+diff --git a/include/net/secure_seq.h b/include/net/secure_seq.h
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..d97f689
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/include/net/secure_seq.h
+@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
++#ifndef _NET_SECURE_SEQ
++#define _NET_SECURE_SEQ
++
++#include <linux/types.h>
++
++extern __u32 secure_ip_id(__be32 daddr);
++extern __u32 secure_ipv6_id(const __be32 daddr[4]);
++extern u32 secure_ipv4_port_ephemeral(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr, __be16 dport);
++extern u32 secure_ipv6_port_ephemeral(const __be32 *saddr, const __be32 *daddr,
++ __be16 dport);
++extern __u32 secure_tcp_sequence_number(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr,
++ __be16 sport, __be16 dport);
++extern __u32 secure_tcpv6_sequence_number(__be32 *saddr, __be32 *daddr,
++ __be16 sport, __be16 dport);
++extern u64 secure_dccp_sequence_number(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr,
++ __be16 sport, __be16 dport);
++extern u64 secure_dccpv6_sequence_number(__be32 *saddr, __be32 *daddr,
++ __be16 sport, __be16 dport);
++
++#endif /* _NET_SECURE_SEQ */
+diff --git a/net/core/Makefile b/net/core/Makefile
+index 51c3eec..d64933a 100644
+--- a/net/core/Makefile
++++ b/net/core/Makefile
+@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
+ #
+
+ obj-y := sock.o request_sock.o skbuff.o iovec.o datagram.o stream.o scm.o \
+- gen_stats.o gen_estimator.o net_namespace.o
++ gen_stats.o gen_estimator.o net_namespace.o secure_seq.o
+
+ obj-$(CONFIG_SYSCTL) += sysctl_net_core.o
+
+diff --git a/net/core/secure_seq.c b/net/core/secure_seq.c
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..45329d7
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/net/core/secure_seq.c
+@@ -0,0 +1,184 @@
++#include <linux/kernel.h>
++#include <linux/init.h>
++#include <linux/cryptohash.h>
++#include <linux/module.h>
++#include <linux/cache.h>
++#include <linux/random.h>
++#include <linux/hrtimer.h>
++#include <linux/ktime.h>
++#include <linux/string.h>
++
++#include <net/secure_seq.h>
++
++static u32 net_secret[MD5_MESSAGE_BYTES / 4] ____cacheline_aligned;
++
++static int __init net_secret_init(void)
++{
++ get_random_bytes(net_secret, sizeof(net_secret));
++ return 0;
++}
++late_initcall(net_secret_init);
++
++static u32 seq_scale(u32 seq)
++{
++ /*
++ * As close as possible to RFC 793, which
++ * suggests using a 250 kHz clock.
++ * Further reading shows this assumes 2 Mb/s networks.
++ * For 10 Mb/s Ethernet, a 1 MHz clock is appropriate.
++ * For 10 Gb/s Ethernet, a 1 GHz clock should be ok, but
++ * we also need to limit the resolution so that the u32 seq
++ * overlaps less than one time per MSL (2 minutes).
++ * Choosing a clock of 64 ns period is OK. (period of 274 s)
++ */
++ return seq + (ktime_to_ns(ktime_get_real()) >> 6);
++}
++
++#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
++__u32 secure_tcpv6_sequence_number(__be32 *saddr, __be32 *daddr,
++ __be16 sport, __be16 dport)
++{
++ u32 secret[MD5_MESSAGE_BYTES / 4];
++ u32 hash[MD5_DIGEST_WORDS];
++ u32 i;
++
++ memcpy(hash, saddr, 16);
++ for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
++ secret[i] = net_secret[i] + daddr[i];
++ secret[4] = net_secret[4] +
++ (((__force u16)sport << 16) + (__force u16)dport);
++ for (i = 5; i < MD5_MESSAGE_BYTES / 4; i++)
++ secret[i] = net_secret[i];
++
++ md5_transform(hash, secret);
++
++ return seq_scale(hash[0]);
++}
++EXPORT_SYMBOL(secure_tcpv6_sequence_number);
++
++u32 secure_ipv6_port_ephemeral(const __be32 *saddr, const __be32 *daddr,
++ __be16 dport)
++{
++ u32 secret[MD5_MESSAGE_BYTES / 4];
++ u32 hash[MD5_DIGEST_WORDS];
++ u32 i;
++
++ memcpy(hash, saddr, 16);
++ for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
++ secret[i] = net_secret[i] + (__force u32) daddr[i];
++ secret[4] = net_secret[4] + (__force u32)dport;
++ for (i = 5; i < MD5_MESSAGE_BYTES / 4; i++)
++ secret[i] = net_secret[i];
++
++ md5_transform(hash, secret);
++
++ return hash[0];
++}
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_INET
++__u32 secure_ip_id(__be32 daddr)
++{
++ u32 hash[MD5_DIGEST_WORDS];
++
++ hash[0] = (__force __u32) daddr;
++ hash[1] = net_secret[13];
++ hash[2] = net_secret[14];
++ hash[3] = net_secret[15];
++
++ md5_transform(hash, net_secret);
++
++ return hash[0];
++}
++
++__u32 secure_ipv6_id(const __be32 daddr[4])
++{
++ __u32 hash[4];
++
++ memcpy(hash, daddr, 16);
++ md5_transform(hash, net_secret);
++
++ return hash[0];
++}
++
++__u32 secure_tcp_sequence_number(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr,
++ __be16 sport, __be16 dport)
++{
++ u32 hash[MD5_DIGEST_WORDS];
++
++ hash[0] = (__force u32)saddr;
++ hash[1] = (__force u32)daddr;
++ hash[2] = ((__force u16)sport << 16) + (__force u16)dport;
++ hash[3] = net_secret[15];
++
++ md5_transform(hash, net_secret);
++
++ return seq_scale(hash[0]);
++}
++
++u32 secure_ipv4_port_ephemeral(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr, __be16 dport)
++{
++ u32 hash[MD5_DIGEST_WORDS];
++
++ hash[0] = (__force u32)saddr;
++ hash[1] = (__force u32)daddr;
++ hash[2] = (__force u32)dport ^ net_secret[14];
++ hash[3] = net_secret[15];
++
++ md5_transform(hash, net_secret);
++
++ return hash[0];
++}
++EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(secure_ipv4_port_ephemeral);
++#endif
++
++#if defined(CONFIG_IP_DCCP) || defined(CONFIG_IP_DCCP_MODULE)
++u64 secure_dccp_sequence_number(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr,
++ __be16 sport, __be16 dport)
++{
++ u32 hash[MD5_DIGEST_WORDS];
++ u64 seq;
++
++ hash[0] = (__force u32)saddr;
++ hash[1] = (__force u32)daddr;
++ hash[2] = ((__force u16)sport << 16) + (__force u16)dport;
++ hash[3] = net_secret[15];
++
++ md5_transform(hash, net_secret);
++
++ seq = hash[0] | (((u64)hash[1]) << 32);
++ seq += ktime_to_ns(ktime_get_real());
++ seq &= (1ull << 48) - 1;
++
++ return seq;
++}
++EXPORT_SYMBOL(secure_dccp_sequence_number);
++
++#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
++u64 secure_dccpv6_sequence_number(__be32 *saddr, __be32 *daddr,
++ __be16 sport, __be16 dport)
++{
++ u32 secret[MD5_MESSAGE_BYTES / 4];
++ u32 hash[MD5_DIGEST_WORDS];
++ u64 seq;
++ u32 i;
++
++ memcpy(hash, saddr, 16);
++ for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
++ secret[i] = net_secret[i] + daddr[i];
++ secret[4] = net_secret[4] +
++ (((__force u16)sport << 16) + (__force u16)dport);
++ for (i = 5; i < MD5_MESSAGE_BYTES / 4; i++)
++ secret[i] = net_secret[i];
++
++ md5_transform(hash, secret);
++
++ seq = hash[0] | (((u64)hash[1]) << 32);
++ seq += ktime_to_ns(ktime_get_real());
++ seq &= (1ull << 48) - 1;
++
++ return seq;
++}
++EXPORT_SYMBOL(secure_dccpv6_sequence_number);
++#endif
++#endif
+diff --git a/net/dccp/ipv4.c b/net/dccp/ipv4.c
+index d9b11ef..3ff9fd9 100644
+--- a/net/dccp/ipv4.c
++++ b/net/dccp/ipv4.c
+@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@
+ #include <net/timewait_sock.h>
+ #include <net/tcp_states.h>
+ #include <net/xfrm.h>
++#include <net/secure_seq.h>
+
+ #include "ackvec.h"
+ #include "ccid.h"
+diff --git a/net/dccp/ipv6.c b/net/dccp/ipv6.c
+index 0916988..e256940 100644
+--- a/net/dccp/ipv6.c
++++ b/net/dccp/ipv6.c
+@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@
+ #include <net/transp_v6.h>
+ #include <net/ip6_checksum.h>
+ #include <net/xfrm.h>
++#include <net/secure_seq.h>
+
+ #include "dccp.h"
+ #include "ipv6.h"
+@@ -69,13 +70,7 @@ static inline void dccp_v6_send_check(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
+ dh->dccph_checksum = dccp_v6_csum_finish(skb, &np->saddr, &np->daddr);
+ }
+
+-static inline __u32 secure_dccpv6_sequence_number(__be32 *saddr, __be32 *daddr,
+- __be16 sport, __be16 dport )
+-{
+- return secure_tcpv6_sequence_number(saddr, daddr, sport, dport);
+-}
+-
+-static inline __u32 dccp_v6_init_sequence(struct sk_buff *skb)
++static inline __u64 dccp_v6_init_sequence(struct sk_buff *skb)
+ {
+ return secure_dccpv6_sequence_number(ipv6_hdr(skb)->daddr.s6_addr32,
+ ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr.s6_addr32,
+diff --git a/net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c b/net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c
+index d3e160a..ff67e46 100644
+--- a/net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c
++++ b/net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c
+@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@
+
+ #include <net/inet_connection_sock.h>
+ #include <net/inet_hashtables.h>
++#include <net/secure_seq.h>
+ #include <net/ip.h>
+
+ /*
+diff --git a/net/ipv4/inetpeer.c b/net/ipv4/inetpeer.c
+index 6bcfe52..5639e05 100644
+--- a/net/ipv4/inetpeer.c
++++ b/net/ipv4/inetpeer.c
+@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
+ #include <linux/net.h>
+ #include <net/ip.h>
+ #include <net/inetpeer.h>
++#include <net/secure_seq.h>
+
+ /*
+ * Theory of operations.
+diff --git a/net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_nat_proto_common.c b/net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_nat_proto_common.c
+index 6c4f11f..2d5073a 100644
+--- a/net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_nat_proto_common.c
++++ b/net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_nat_proto_common.c
+@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
+ #include <linux/ip.h>
+
+ #include <linux/netfilter.h>
++#include <net/secure_seq.h>
+ #include <net/netfilter/nf_nat.h>
+ #include <net/netfilter/nf_nat_core.h>
+ #include <net/netfilter/nf_nat_rule.h>
+diff --git a/net/ipv4/route.c b/net/ipv4/route.c
+index 0189deb..b7a8e1a 100644
+--- a/net/ipv4/route.c
++++ b/net/ipv4/route.c
+@@ -108,6 +108,7 @@
+ #ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
+ #include <linux/sysctl.h>
+ #endif
++#include <net/secure_seq.h>
+
+ #define RT_FL_TOS(oldflp) \
+ ((u32)(oldflp->fl4_tos & (IPTOS_RT_MASK | RTO_ONLINK)))
+diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
+index 163a5c1..08a7695 100644
+--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
++++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
+@@ -72,6 +72,7 @@
+ #include <net/timewait_sock.h>
+ #include <net/xfrm.h>
+ #include <net/netdma.h>
++#include <net/secure_seq.h>
+
+ #include <linux/inet.h>
+ #include <linux/ipv6.h>
+diff --git a/net/ipv6/inet6_hashtables.c b/net/ipv6/inet6_hashtables.c
+index 633a6c2..b7c125f 100644
+--- a/net/ipv6/inet6_hashtables.c
++++ b/net/ipv6/inet6_hashtables.c
+@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
+ #include <net/inet_connection_sock.h>
+ #include <net/inet_hashtables.h>
+ #include <net/inet6_hashtables.h>
++#include <net/secure_seq.h>
+ #include <net/ip.h>
+
+ int __inet6_hash(struct sock *sk, struct inet_timewait_sock *tw)
+diff --git a/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c b/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c
+index 2b7c3a1..e468a79 100644
+--- a/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c
++++ b/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c
+@@ -61,6 +61,7 @@
+ #include <net/timewait_sock.h>
+ #include <net/netdma.h>
+ #include <net/inet_common.h>
++#include <net/secure_seq.h>
+
+ #include <asm/uaccess.h>
+
+--
+1.7.6
+
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