[selinux-policy] Make rawhide == f18
Miroslav Grepl
mgrepl at fedoraproject.org
Mon Dec 17 16:22:52 UTC 2012
commit a270091f195ba840bc9e8d1119b7d04dd537b0ef
Author: Miroslav Grepl <mgrepl at redhat.com>
Date: Mon Dec 17 17:21:00 2012 +0100
Make rawhide == f18
booleans-mls.conf | 235 +-
booleans-targeted.conf | 316 +-
booleans.subs_dist | 5 +
config.tgz | Bin 3399 -> 3189 bytes
customizable_types | 4 +-
file_contexts.subs_dist | 7 +-
permissivedomains.pp | Bin 94994 -> 88282 bytes
permissivedomains.te | 118 +
policy-rawhide.patch |124938 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------
policy_contrib-rawhide.patch |19301 +++++--
selinux-policy.spec | 744 +-
sources | 2 +-
12 files changed, 103800 insertions(+), 41870 deletions(-)
---
diff --git a/booleans-mls.conf b/booleans-mls.conf
index 2a24df1..65ccfa4 100644
--- a/booleans-mls.conf
+++ b/booleans-mls.conf
@@ -1,233 +1,6 @@
-# Allow making anonymous memory executable, e.g.for runtime-code generation or executable stack.
-#
-allow_execmem = false
-
-# Allow making a modified private filemapping executable (text relocation).
-#
-allow_execmod = false
-
-# Allow making the stack executable via mprotect.Also requires allow_execmem.
-#
-allow_execstack = false
-
-# Allow ftp servers to modify public filesused for public file transfer services.
-#
-allow_ftpd_anon_write = false
-
-# Allow gssd to read temp directory.
-#
-allow_gssd_read_tmp = false
-
-# Allow Apache to modify public filesused for public file transfer services.
-#
-allow_httpd_anon_write = false
-
-# Allow system to run with kerberos
-#
-allow_kerberos = true
-
-# Allow rsync to modify public filesused for public file transfer services.
-#
-allow_rsync_anon_write = false
-
-# Allow sasl to read shadow
-#
-allow_saslauthd_read_shadow = false
-
-# Allow samba to modify public filesused for public file transfer services.
-#
-allow_smbd_anon_write = false
-
-# Deny all processes the ability to ptrace other processes
-#
-deny_ptrace = true
-
-# Allow system to run with NIS
-#
-allow_ypbind = false
-
-# Enable extra rules in the cron domainto support fcron.
-#
-fcron_crond = false
-
-# Allow ftp to read and write files in the user home directories
-#
-ftp_home_dir = false
-
-# Allow ftpd to run directly without inetd
-#
+kerberos_enabled = true
+mount_anyfile = true
+polyinstantiation_enabled = true
ftpd_is_daemon = true
-
-# Allow httpd to use built in scripting (usually php)
-#
-httpd_builtin_scripting = false
-
-# Allow http daemon to tcp connect
-#
-httpd_can_network_connect = false
-
-# Allow httpd cgi support
-#
-httpd_enable_cgi = false
-
-# Allow httpd to act as a FTP server bylistening on the ftp port.
-#
-httpd_enable_ftp_server = false
-
-# Allow httpd to read home directories
-#
-httpd_enable_homedirs = false
-
-# Run SSI execs in system CGI script domain.
-#
-httpd_ssi_exec = false
-
-# Allow http daemon to communicate with the TTY
-#
-httpd_tty_comm = false
-
-# Run CGI in the main httpd domain
-#
-httpd_unified = false
-
-# Allow BIND to write the master zone files.Generally this is used for dynamic DNS.
-#
-named_write_master_zones = false
-
-# Allow nfs to be exported read/write.
-#
-nfs_export_all_rw = false
-
-# Allow nfs to be exported read only
-#
-nfs_export_all_ro = false
-
-# Allow pppd to load kernel modules for certain modems
-#
-pppd_can_insmod = false
-
-# Allow reading of default_t files.
-#
-read_default_t = false
-
-# Allow ssh to run from inetd instead of as a daemon.
-#
-run_ssh_inetd = false
-
-# Allow samba to export user home directories.
-#
-samba_enable_home_dirs = false
-
-# Allow squid to connect to all ports, not justHTTP, FTP, and Gopher ports.
-#
-squid_connect_any = false
-
-# Allow ssh logins as sysadm_r:sysadm_t
-#
-ssh_sysadm_login = false
-
-# Configure stunnel to be a standalone daemon orinetd service.
-#
-stunnel_is_daemon = false
-
-# Support NFS home directories
-#
-use_nfs_home_dirs = false
-
-# Support SAMBA home directories
-#
-use_samba_home_dirs = false
-
-# Control users use of ping and traceroute
-#
-user_ping = true
-
-# Allow gpg executable stack
-#
-allow_gpg_execstack = false
-
-# allow host key based authentication
-#
-allow_ssh_keysign = false
-
-# Allow users to connect to mysql
-#
-allow_user_mysql_connect = false
-
-# Allow system cron jobs to relabel filesystemfor restoring file contexts.
-#
-cron_can_relabel = false
-
-# Allow pppd to be run for a regular user
-#
-pppd_for_user = false
-
-# Allow applications to read untrusted contentIf this is disallowed, Internet content hasto be manually relabeled for read access to be granted
-#
-read_untrusted_content = false
-
-# Allow user spamassassin clients to use the network.
-#
-spamassassin_can_network = false
-
-# Allow staff_r users to search the sysadm homedir and read files (such as ~/.bashrc)
-#
-staff_read_sysadm_file = false
-
-# Allow regular users direct mouse access
-#
-user_direct_mouse = false
-
-# Allow users to read system messages.
-#
-user_dmesg = false
-
-# Allow users to control network interfaces(also needs USERCTL=true)
-#
-user_net_control = false
-
-# Allow user to r/w files on filesystemsthat do not have extended attributes (FAT, CDROM, FLOPPY)
-#
-user_rw_noexattrfile = false
-
-# Allow users to rw usb devices
-#
-user_rw_usb = false
-
-# Allow users to run TCP servers (bind to ports and accept connection fromthe same domain and outside users) disabling this forces FTP passive modeand may change other protocols.
-#
-user_tcp_server = false
-
-# Allow w to display everyone
-#
-user_ttyfile_stat = false
-
-# Allow applications to write untrusted contentIf this is disallowed, no Internet contentwill be stored.
-#
-write_untrusted_content = false
-
-spamd_enable_home_dirs = false
-
-# Allow login domains to polyinstatiate directories
-#
-allow_polyinstantiation = true
-
-# Allow mount command to mounton any directory
-#
-allow_mounton_anydir = true
-
-# Allow unlabeled packets to flow
-#
-allow_unlabeled_packets = true
-
-# Allow samba to act as the domain controller
-#
-samba_domain_controller = false
-
-# Run the xserver as an object manager
-#
+selinuxuser_ping = true
xserver_object_manager = true
-
-# System uses init upstart program
-#
-init_upstart = true
diff --git a/booleans-targeted.conf b/booleans-targeted.conf
index e43deca..3b1151f 100644
--- a/booleans-targeted.conf
+++ b/booleans-targeted.conf
@@ -1,306 +1,24 @@
-# Turn off the ability for one process to read/modify another processes memory
-deny_ptrace = false
-
-# Allow making anonymous memory executable, e.g.for runtime-code generation or executable stack.
-deny_execmem = false
-allow_execmem = true
-
-# Allow making a modified private filemapping executable (text relocation).
-#
-allow_execmod = true
-
-# Allow making the stack executable via mprotect.Also requires allow_execmem.
-#
-allow_execstack = true
-
-# Allow ftpd to read cifs directories.
-#
-allow_ftpd_use_cifs = false
-
-# Allow ftpd to read nfs directories.
-#
-allow_ftpd_use_nfs = false
-
-# Allow ftp servers to modify public filesused for public file transfer services.
-#
-allow_ftpd_anon_write = false
-
-# Allow gssd to read temp directory.
-#
-allow_gssd_read_tmp = true
-
-# Allow Apache to modify public filesused for public file transfer services.
-#
-allow_httpd_anon_write = false
-
-# Allow Apache to connect to port 80 for graceful shutdown
-#
-httpd_graceful_shutdown = true
-
-# Allow Apache to use mod_auth_pam module
-#
-allow_httpd_mod_auth_pam = false
-
-# Allow system to run with kerberos
-#
-allow_kerberos = true
-
-# Allow rsync to modify public filesused for public file transfer services.
-#
-allow_rsync_anon_write = false
-
-# Allow sasl to read shadow
-#
-allow_saslauthd_read_shadow = false
-
-# Allow samba to modify public filesused for public file transfer services.
-#
-allow_smbd_anon_write = false
-
-# Allow system to run with NIS
-#
-allow_ypbind = false
-
-# Allow zebra to write it own configuration files
-#
-allow_zebra_write_config = false
-
-# Enable extra rules in the cron domainto support fcron.
-#
-fcron_crond = false
-
-# Allow ftp to read and write files in the user home directories
-#
-ftp_home_dir = false
-
-#
-# allow httpd to connect to mysql/posgresql
-httpd_can_network_connect_db = false
-
-#
-# allow httpd to send dbus messages to avahi
-httpd_dbus_avahi = false
-
-#
-# allow httpd to network relay
-httpd_can_network_relay = false
-
-# Allow httpd to use built in scripting (usually php)
-#
+gssd_read_tmp = true
httpd_builtin_scripting = true
-
-# Allow http daemon to tcp connect
-#
-httpd_can_network_connect = false
-
-# Allow httpd cgi support
-#
httpd_enable_cgi = true
-
-# Allow httpd to act as a FTP server bylistening on the ftp port.
-#
-httpd_enable_ftp_server = false
-
-# Allow httpd to read home directories
-#
-httpd_enable_homedirs = false
-
-# Run SSI execs in system CGI script domain.
-#
-httpd_ssi_exec = false
-
-# Allow http daemon to communicate with the TTY
-#
-httpd_tty_comm = false
-
-# Run CGI in the main httpd domain
-#
-httpd_unified = false
-
-# Allow BIND to write the master zone files.Generally this is used for dynamic DNS.
-#
-named_write_master_zones = false
-
-# Allow nfs to be exported read/write.
-#
-nfs_export_all_rw = true
-
-# Allow nfs to be exported read only
-#
+httpd_graceful_shutdown = true
+kerberos_enabled = true
+mount_anyfile = true
nfs_export_all_ro = true
-
-## Allow openvpn to read home directories
-##
+nfs_export_all_rw = true
+nscd_use_shm = true
openvpn_enable_homedirs = true
-
-# Allow pppd to load kernel modules for certain modems
-#
+postfix_local_write_mail_spool=true
pppd_can_insmod = false
-
-# Allow reading of default_t files.
-#
-read_default_t = false
-
-# Allow samba to export user home directories.
-#
-samba_enable_home_dirs = false
-
-# Allow squid to connect to all ports, not justHTTP, FTP, and Gopher ports.
-#
-squid_connect_any = true
-
-# Allow privoxy to connect to all ports, not justHTTP, FTP, and Gopher ports.
-#
privoxy_connect_any = true
-
-# Support NFS home directories
-#
-use_nfs_home_dirs = false
-
-# Support SAMBA home directories
-#
-use_samba_home_dirs = false
-
-# Control users use of ping and traceroute
-#
-user_ping = false
-
-# allow host key based authentication
-#
-allow_ssh_keysign = false
-
-# Allow pppd to be run for a regular user
-#
-pppd_for_user = false
-
-# Allow applications to read untrusted contentIf this is disallowed, Internet content hasto be manually relabeled for read access to be granted
-#
-read_untrusted_content = false
-
-# Allow spamd to write to users homedirs
-#
-spamd_enable_home_dirs = false
-
-# Allow regular users direct mouse access
-#
-user_direct_mouse = false
-
-# Allow all X apps to use /dev/dri
-#
-user_direct_dri = true
-
-# Allow users to read system messages.
-#
-user_dmesg = false
-
-# Allow user to r/w files on filesystemsthat do not have extended attributes (FAT, CDROM, FLOPPY)
-#
-user_rw_noexattrfile = false
-
-# Allow users to run TCP servers (bind to ports and accept connection fromthe same domain and outside users) disabling this forces FTP passive modeand may change other protocols.
-#
-user_tcp_server = false
-
-# Allow w to display everyone
-#
-user_ttyfile_stat = false
-
-# Allow applications to write untrusted contentIf this is disallowed, no Internet contentwill be stored.
-#
-write_untrusted_content = false
-
-# Allow all domains to talk to ttys
-#
-allow_daemons_use_tty = false
-
-# Allow login domains to polyinstatiate directories
-#
-allow_polyinstantiation = false
-
-# Allow all domains to dump core
-#
-allow_daemons_dump_core = true
-
-# Allow samba to act as the domain controller
-#
-samba_domain_controller = false
-
-# Allow samba to export user home directories.
-#
-samba_run_unconfined = false
-
-# Allows XServer to execute writable memory
-#
-allow_xserver_execmem = false
-
-# disallow guest accounts to execute files that they can create
-#
-allow_guest_exec_content = false
-
-# xguest now requires to execute content in homedir to allow gnome-shell to work# properly.
-allow_xguest_exec_content = true
-
-# Only allow browser to use the web
-#
-browser_confine_xguest=false
-
-# Allow postfix locat to write to mail spool
-#
-allow_postfix_local_write_mail_spool=true
-
-# Allow common users to read/write noexattrfile systems
-#
-user_rw_noexattrfile=true
-
-# Allow qemu to connect fully to the network
-#
-qemu_full_network=true
-
-# Allow nsplugin execmem/execstack for bad plugins
-#
-allow_nsplugin_execmem=true
-
-# Allow unconfined domain to transition to confined domain
-#
-allow_unconfined_nsplugin_transition=true
-
-# Allow unconfined domain to transition to confined domain
-#
-unconfined_mozilla_plugin_transition=true
-
-# Allow unconfined domain to transition to confined domain
-#
-unconfined_telepathy_transition=false
-
-# Allow unconfined domain to transition to chrome_sandbox confined domain
-#
-unconfined_chrome_sandbox_transition=true
-
-# Allow telepathy domains to connect to all network ports
-#
+selinuxuser_direct_dri_enabled = true
+selinuxuser_execmem = true
+selinuxuser_execmod = true
+selinuxuser_execstack = true
+selinuxuser_rw_noexattrfile=true
+selinuxuser_ping = true
+squid_connect_any = true
telepathy_tcp_connect_generic_network_ports=true
-
-# System uses init upstart program
-#
-init_upstart = true
-init_systemd = true
-
-# Allow mount to mount any file/dir
-#
-allow_mount_anyfile = true
-
-# Allow confined domains to communicate with ncsd via shared memory
-#
-nscd_use_shm = true
-
-# Allow fenced domain to connect to the network using TCP.
-#
-fenced_can_network_connect=false
-
-## allow sshd to forward port connections
-#
-sshd_forward_ports=true
-
-## On upgrades we want this true, Want it false on fresh installs
-#
-authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap=false
+unconfined_chrome_sandbox_transition=true
+unconfined_mozilla_plugin_transition=true
+xguest_exec_content = true
diff --git a/booleans.subs_dist b/booleans.subs_dist
index 314ef25..631bb84 100644
--- a/booleans.subs_dist
+++ b/booleans.subs_dist
@@ -42,3 +42,8 @@ allow_zebra_write_config zebra_write_config
user_direct_dri selinuxuser_direct_dri_enabled
user_ping selinuxuser_ping
user_share_music selinuxuser_share_music
+user_tcp_server selinuxuser_tcp_server
+sepgsql_enable_pitr_implementation postgresql_can_rsync
+sepgsql_enable_users_ddl postgresql_selinux_users_ddl
+sepgsql_transmit_client_label postgresql_selinux_transmit_client_label
+sepgsql_unconfined_dbadm postgresql_selinux_unconfined_dbadm
diff --git a/config.tgz b/config.tgz
index 67c4690..c4a79da 100644
Binary files a/config.tgz and b/config.tgz differ
diff --git a/customizable_types b/customizable_types
index 5f723c2..7c71c38 100644
--- a/customizable_types
+++ b/customizable_types
@@ -5,8 +5,8 @@ svirt_lxc_file_t
virt_content_t
httpd_user_htaccess_t
httpd_user_script_exec_t
-httpd_user_content_ra_t
-httpd_user_content_rw_t
+httpd_user_rw_content_t
+httpd_user_ra_content_t
httpd_user_content_t
git_session_content_t
home_bin_t
diff --git a/file_contexts.subs_dist b/file_contexts.subs_dist
index 3661260..41a6b52 100644
--- a/file_contexts.subs_dist
+++ b/file_contexts.subs_dist
@@ -1,10 +1,13 @@
/run /var/run
/run/lock /var/lock
/var/run/lock /var/lock
-/lib64 /lib
+/lib /usr/lib
+/lib64 /usr/lib
/usr/lib64 /usr/lib
/usr/local /usr
/usr/local/lib64 /usr/lib
/usr/local/lib32 /usr/lib
-/etc/systemd/system /lib/systemd/system
+/etc/systemd/system /usr/lib/systemd/system
+/run/systemd/system /usr/lib/systemd/system
+/run/systemd/generator /usr/lib/systemd/system
/var/lib/xguest/home /home
diff --git a/permissivedomains.pp b/permissivedomains.pp
index 6f9e1d2..f12210a 100644
Binary files a/permissivedomains.pp and b/permissivedomains.pp differ
diff --git a/permissivedomains.te b/permissivedomains.te
index 46ccb27..2776f46 100644
--- a/permissivedomains.te
+++ b/permissivedomains.te
@@ -1,2 +1,120 @@
policy_module(permissivedomains,18)
+optional_policy(`
+ gen_require(`
+ type openvswitch_t;
+ ')
+
+ permissive openvswitch_t;
+')
+
+optional_policy(`
+ gen_require(`
+ type isnsd_t;
+ ')
+
+ permissive isnsd_t;
+')
+
+optional_policy(`
+ gen_require(`
+ type rngd_t;
+ ')
+
+ permissive rngd_t;
+')
+
+optional_policy(`
+ gen_require(`
+ type mandb_t;
+ ')
+
+ permissive mandb_t;
+')
+
+optional_policy(`
+ gen_require(`
+ type sensord_t;
+ ')
+
+ permissive sensord_t;
+')
+
+
+optional_policy(`
+ gen_require(`
+ type slpd_t;
+ ')
+
+ permissive slpd_t;
+')
+
+optional_policy(`
+ gen_require(`
+ type pkcsslotd_t;
+ ')
+
+ permissive pkcsslotd_t;
+')
+
+optional_policy(`
+ gen_require(`
+ type realmd_t;
+ ')
+
+ permissive realmd_t;
+')
+
+optional_policy(`
+ gen_require(`
+ type stapserver_t;
+ ')
+
+ permissive stapserver_t;
+')
+
+optional_policy(`
+ gen_require(`
+ type glusterd_t;
+ ')
+
+ permissive glusterd_t;
+')
+
+optional_policy(`
+ gen_require(`
+ type mandb_t;
+ ')
+
+ permissive mandb_t;
+')
+
+optional_policy(`
+ gen_require(`
+ type sensord_t;
+ ')
+
+ permissive sensord_t;
+')
+
+optional_policy(`
+ gen_require(`
+ type slpd_t;
+ ')
+
+ permissive slpd_t;
+')
+
+optional_policy(`
+ gen_require(`
+ type virt_qemu_ga_t;
+ ')
+ permissive virt_qemu_ga_t;
+')
+
+optional_policy(`
+ gen_require(`
+ type smsd_t;
+ ')
+ permissive smsd_t;
+')
diff --git a/policy-rawhide.patch b/policy-rawhide.patch
index 29ce9f6..2f29e17 100644
--- a/policy-rawhide.patch
+++ b/policy-rawhide.patch
@@ -58,62 +58,86 @@ index 313d837..ef3c532 100644
@echo "Success."
########################################
+diff --git a/config/appconfig-mcs/virtual_domain_context b/config/appconfig-mcs/virtual_domain_context
+index d387b42..150f281 100644
+--- a/config/appconfig-mcs/virtual_domain_context
++++ b/config/appconfig-mcs/virtual_domain_context
+@@ -1 +1,2 @@
+ system_u:system_r:svirt_t:s0
++system_u:system_r:svirt_tcg_t:s0
+diff --git a/config/appconfig-standard/virtual_domain_context b/config/appconfig-standard/virtual_domain_context
+index c049e10..150f281 100644
+--- a/config/appconfig-standard/virtual_domain_context
++++ b/config/appconfig-standard/virtual_domain_context
+@@ -1 +1,2 @@
+-system_u:system_r:svirt_t
++system_u:system_r:svirt_t:s0
++system_u:system_r:svirt_tcg_t:s0
diff --git a/man/man8/NetworkManager_selinux.8 b/man/man8/NetworkManager_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..51564ee
+index 0000000..62a48d7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/man/man8/NetworkManager_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,175 @@
-+.TH "NetworkManager_selinux" "8" "NetworkManager" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "NetworkManager SELinux Policy documentation"
+@@ -0,0 +1,292 @@
++.TH "NetworkManager_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "NetworkManager" "SELinux Policy documentation for NetworkManager"
+.SH "NAME"
+NetworkManager_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the NetworkManager processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the NetworkManager processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the NetworkManager processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The NetworkManager processes execute with the NetworkManager_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the NetworkManager_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep NetworkManager_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The NetworkManager_t SELinux type can be entered via the "NetworkManager_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the NetworkManager_t domain are the following:"
+
++/usr/s?bin/NetworkManager, /usr/s?bin/wpa_supplicant, /usr/sbin/wicd, /sbin/wpa_supplicant, /usr/sbin/wpa_supplicant, /usr/sbin/nm-system-settings, /usr/sbin/NetworkManagerDispatcher
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the NetworkManager_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux NetworkManager policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their NetworkManager processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for NetworkManager:
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B NetworkManager_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
+SELinux NetworkManager policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their NetworkManager processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
++.PP
+The following file types are defined for NetworkManager:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B NetworkManager_etc_rw_t
++.B NetworkManager_etc_rw_t
+.EE
+
+- Set files with the NetworkManager_etc_rw_t type, if you want to treat the files as NetworkManager etc read/write content.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/etc/NetworkManager/system-connections(/.*)?, /etc/NetworkManager/NetworkManager\.conf
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B NetworkManager_etc_t
++.B NetworkManager_etc_t
+.EE
+
+- Set files with the NetworkManager_etc_t type, if you want to store NetworkManager files in the /etc directories.
@@ -121,43 +145,31 @@ index 0000000..51564ee
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B NetworkManager_exec_t
++.B NetworkManager_exec_t
+.EE
+
+- Set files with the NetworkManager_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the NetworkManager_t domain.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/s?bin/wpa_supplicant, /usr/sbin/wpa_supplicant, /sbin/wpa_supplicant, /usr/sbin/nm-system-settings, /usr/sbin/wicd, /usr/s?bin/NetworkManager, /usr/sbin/NetworkManagerDispatcher
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B NetworkManager_initrc_exec_t
++.B NetworkManager_initrc_exec_t
+.EE
+
+- Set files with the NetworkManager_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the NetworkManager_initrc_t domain.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/etc/rc\.d/init\.d/wicd, /etc/NetworkManager/dispatcher\.d(/.*)?, /usr/libexec/nm-dispatcher.action
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B NetworkManager_log_t
++.B NetworkManager_log_t
+.EE
+
+- Set files with the NetworkManager_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as NetworkManager log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/log/wpa_supplicant.*, /var/log/wicd.*
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B NetworkManager_tmp_t
++.B NetworkManager_tmp_t
+.EE
+
+- Set files with the NetworkManager_tmp_t type, if you want to store NetworkManager temporary files in the /tmp directories.
@@ -165,7 +177,7 @@ index 0000000..51564ee
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B NetworkManager_unit_file_t
++.B NetworkManager_unit_file_t
+.EE
+
+- Set files with the NetworkManager_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as NetworkManager unit content.
@@ -173,52 +185,170 @@ index 0000000..51564ee
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B NetworkManager_var_lib_t
++.B NetworkManager_var_lib_t
+.EE
+
+- Set files with the NetworkManager_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the NetworkManager files under the /var/lib directory.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/etc/wicd/wired-settings.conf, /var/lib/wicd(/.*)?, /etc/dhcp/wired-settings.conf, /etc/dhcp/wireless-settings.conf, /etc/wicd/manager-settings.conf, /etc/dhcp/manager-settings.conf, /etc/wicd/wireless-settings.conf, /var/lib/NetworkManager(/.*)?
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B NetworkManager_var_run_t
++.B NetworkManager_var_run_t
+.EE
+
+- Set files with the NetworkManager_var_run_t type, if you want to store the NetworkManager files under the /run directory.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/run/nm-dhclient.*, /var/run/wpa_supplicant(/.*)?, /var/run/NetworkManager\.pid, /var/run/wpa_supplicant-global, /var/run/nm-dns-dnsmasq\.conf, /var/run/NetworkManager(/.*)?
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type NetworkManager_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B NetworkManager_etc_rw_t
++
++ /etc/NetworkManager/system-connections(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/NetworkManager/NetworkManager\.conf
++.br
++
++.br
++.B NetworkManager_log_t
++
++ /var/log/wicd.*
++.br
++ /var/log/wpa_supplicant.*
++.br
++
++.br
++.B NetworkManager_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B NetworkManager_var_lib_t
++
++ /var/lib/wicd(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/NetworkManager(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/dhcp/wired-settings.conf
++.br
++ /etc/wicd/wired-settings.conf
++.br
++ /etc/dhcp/manager-settings.conf
++.br
++ /etc/wicd/manager-settings.conf
++.br
++ /etc/dhcp/wireless-settings.conf
++.br
++ /etc/wicd/wireless-settings.conf
++.br
++
++.br
++.B NetworkManager_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/nm-dhclient.*
++.br
++ /var/run/NetworkManager(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/wpa_supplicant(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/NetworkManager\.pid
++.br
++ /var/run/nm-dns-dnsmasq\.conf
++.br
++ /var/run/wpa_supplicant-global
++.br
++
++.br
++.B named_cache_t
++
++ /var/named/data(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/named/slaves(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/named/dynamic(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/named/chroot/var/tmp(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/named/chroot/var/named/data(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/named/chroot/var/named/slaves(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/named/chroot/var/named/dynamic(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B net_conf_t
++
++ /etc/ntpd?\.conf.*
++.br
++ /etc/hosts[^/]*
++.br
++ /etc/yp\.conf.*
++.br
++ /etc/denyhosts.*
++.br
++ /etc/hosts\.deny.*
++.br
++ /etc/resolv\.conf.*
++.br
++ /etc/ntp/step-tickers.*
++.br
++ /etc/sysconfig/networking(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/sysconfig/network-scripts(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/sysconfig/network-scripts/.*resolv\.conf
++.br
++ /etc/ethers
++.br
++
++.br
++.B pppd_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/(i)?ppp.*pid[^/]*
++.br
++ /var/run/ppp(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/pppd[0-9]*\.tdb
++.br
++
++.br
++.B sysfs_t
++
++ /sys(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B systemd_passwd_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/systemd/ask-password(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/systemd/ask-password-block(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux NetworkManager policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their NetworkManager processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for NetworkManager:
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the NetworkManager_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B NetworkManager_t
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
++
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the NetworkManager_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -231,268 +361,212 @@ index 0000000..51564ee
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), NetworkManager(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/abrt_selinux.8 b/man/man8/abrt_selinux.8
++selinux(8), NetworkManager(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/abrt_dump_oops_selinux.8 b/man/man8/abrt_dump_oops_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..867cd65
+index 0000000..c365bc5
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/abrt_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,272 @@
-+.TH "abrt_selinux" "8" "abrt" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "abrt SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/abrt_dump_oops_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
++.TH "abrt_dump_oops_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "abrt_dump_oops" "SELinux Policy documentation for abrt_dump_oops"
+.SH "NAME"
-+abrt_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the abrt processes
++abrt_dump_oops_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the abrt_dump_oops processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the abrt processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
-+
-+.SH BOOLEANS
-+SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. abrt policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run abrt with the tightest access possible.
-+
-+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow ABRT to run in abrt_handle_event_t domain to handle ABRT event scripts, you must turn on the abrt_handle_event boolean.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the abrt_dump_oops processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P abrt_handle_event 1
-+.EE
++The abrt_dump_oops processes execute with the abrt_dump_oops_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++For example:
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the abrt_helper_t, abrt_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++.B ps -eZ | grep abrt_dump_oops_t
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the abrt_helper_t, abrt_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
-+.EE
++The abrt_dump_oops_t SELinux type can be entered via the "abrt_dump_oops_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the abrt_dump_oops_t domain are the following:"
+
-+.SH SHARING FILES
-+If you want to share files with multiple domains (Apache, FTP, rsync, Samba), you can set a file context of public_content_t and public_content_rw_t. These context allow any of the above domains to read the content. If you want a particular domain to write to the public_content_rw_t domain, you must set the appropriate boolean.
-+.TP
-+Allow abrt servers to read the /var/abrt directory by adding the public_content_t file type to the directory and by restoring the file type.
++/usr/bin/abrt-dump-oops
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+.B
-+semanage fcontext -a -t public_content_t "/var/abrt(/.*)?"
-+.br
-+.B restorecon -F -R -v /var/abrt
-+.pp
-+.TP
-+Allow abrt servers to read and write /var/tmp/incoming by adding the public_content_rw_t type to the directory and by restoring the file type. This also requires the allow_abrtd_anon_write boolean to be set.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+.B
-+semanage fcontext -a -t public_content_rw_t "/var/abrt/incoming(/.*)?"
-+.br
-+.B restorecon -F -R -v /var/abrt/incoming
-+
-+
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux abrt_dump_oops policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their abrt_dump_oops processes in as secure a method as possible.
+.PP
-+If you want to allow ABRT to modify public files used for public file transfer services., you must turn on the abrt_anon_write boolean.
++The following process types are defined for abrt_dump_oops:
+
+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P abrt_anon_write 1
++.B abrt_dump_oops_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux abrt policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their abrt processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for abrt:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux abrt_dump_oops policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their abrt_dump_oops processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for abrt_dump_oops:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B abrt_dump_oops_exec_t
++.B abrt_dump_oops_exec_t
+.EE
+
+- Set files with the abrt_dump_oops_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the abrt_dump_oops_t domain.
+
+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B abrt_etc_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the abrt_etc_t type, if you want to store abrt files in the /etc directories.
-+
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B abrt_exec_t
-+.EE
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+- Set files with the abrt_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the abrt_t domain.
++The SELinux process type abrt_dump_oops_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/sbin/abrtd, /usr/sbin/abrt-dbus
-+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B abrt_handle_event_exec_t
-+.EE
++.B abrt_var_cache_t
+
-+- Set files with the abrt_handle_event_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the abrt_handle_event_t domain.
++ /var/cache/abrt(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/spool/abrt(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/cache/abrt-di(/.*)?
++.br
+
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
-+.EX
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
+.PP
-+.B abrt_helper_exec_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the abrt_helper_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the abrt_helper_t domain.
-+
-+
-+.EX
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
+.PP
-+.B abrt_initrc_exec_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the abrt_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the abrt_initrc_t domain.
-+
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B abrt_retrace_cache_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the abrt_retrace_cache_t type, if you want to store the files under the /var/cache directory.
-+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/cache/retrace-server(/.*)?, /var/cache/abrt-retrace(/.*)?
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B abrt_retrace_coredump_exec_t
-+.EE
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
-+- Set files with the abrt_retrace_coredump_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the abrt_retrace_coredump_t domain.
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), abrt_dump_oops(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, abrt_selinux(8), abrt_selinux(8), abrt_handle_event_selinux(8), abrt_helper_selinux(8), abrt_retrace_coredump_selinux(8), abrt_retrace_worker_selinux(8), abrt_watch_log_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/abrt_handle_event_selinux.8 b/man/man8/abrt_handle_event_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..9cd4e4f
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/abrt_handle_event_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
++.TH "abrt_handle_event_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "abrt_handle_event" "SELinux Policy documentation for abrt_handle_event"
++.SH "NAME"
++abrt_handle_event_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the abrt_handle_event processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the abrt_handle_event processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B abrt_retrace_spool_t
-+.EE
++The abrt_handle_event processes execute with the abrt_handle_event_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+- Set files with the abrt_retrace_spool_t type, if you want to store the abrt retrace files under the /var/spool directory.
++For example:
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/spool/retrace-server(/.*)?, /var/spool/abrt-retrace(/.*)?
++.B ps -eZ | grep abrt_handle_event_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B abrt_retrace_worker_exec_t
-+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the abrt_retrace_worker_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the abrt_retrace_worker_t domain.
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/bin/retrace-server-worker, /usr/bin/abrt-retrace-worker
++The abrt_handle_event_t SELinux type can be entered via the "abrt_handle_event_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the abrt_handle_event_t domain are the following:"
+
-+.EX
++/usr/libexec/abrt-handle-event
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+.B abrt_tmp_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the abrt_tmp_t type, if you want to store abrt temporary files in the /tmp directories.
-+
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux abrt_handle_event policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their abrt_handle_event processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for abrt_handle_event:
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B abrt_unit_file_t
++.B abrt_handle_event_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
-+- Set files with the abrt_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as abrt unit content.
++.SH BOOLEANS
++SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. abrt_handle_event policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run abrt_handle_event with the tightest access possible.
+
+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B abrt_var_cache_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the abrt_var_cache_t type, if you want to store the files under the /var/cache directory.
-+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/cache/abrt(/.*)?, /var/spool/abrt(/.*)?, /var/cache/abrt-di(/.*)?
++If you want to allow ABRT to run in abrt_handle_event_t domain to handle ABRT event scripts, you must turn on the abrt_handle_event boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B abrt_var_log_t
++.B setsebool -P abrt_handle_event 1
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the abrt_var_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as abrt var log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
-+
++.PP
++If you want to allow ABRT to run in abrt_handle_event_t domain to handle ABRT event scripts, you must turn on the abrt_handle_event boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B abrt_var_run_t
++.B setsebool -P abrt_handle_event 1
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the abrt_var_run_t type, if you want to store the abrt files under the /run directory.
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux abrt_handle_event policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their abrt_handle_event processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for abrt_handle_event:
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/run/abrtd?\.socket, /var/run/abrtd?\.lock, /var/run/abrt(/.*)?, /var/run/abrt\.pid
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B abrt_watch_log_exec_t
++.B abrt_handle_event_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the abrt_watch_log_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the abrt_watch_log_t domain.
++- Set files with the abrt_handle_event_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the abrt_handle_event_t domain.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux abrt policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their abrt processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for abrt:
-+
-+.EX
-+.B abrt_handle_event_t, abrt_helper_t, abrt_retrace_coredump_t, abrt_t, abrt_retrace_worker_t, abrt_dump_oops_t, abrt_watch_log_t
-+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -508,105 +582,116 @@ index 0000000..867cd65
+can also be used to manipulate the booleans
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), abrt(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-+, setsebool(8)
++selinux(8), abrt_handle_event(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, setsebool(8), abrt_selinux(8), abrt_selinux(8), abrt_dump_oops_selinux(8), abrt_helper_selinux(8), abrt_retrace_coredump_selinux(8), abrt_retrace_worker_selinux(8), abrt_watch_log_selinux(8)
\ No newline at end of file
-diff --git a/man/man8/accountsd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/accountsd_selinux.8
+diff --git a/man/man8/abrt_helper_selinux.8 b/man/man8/abrt_helper_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..55527ac
+index 0000000..ffc4a82
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/accountsd_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
-+.TH "accountsd_selinux" "8" "accountsd" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "accountsd SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/abrt_helper_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,115 @@
++.TH "abrt_helper_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "abrt_helper" "SELinux Policy documentation for abrt_helper"
+.SH "NAME"
-+accountsd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the accountsd processes
++abrt_helper_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the abrt_helper processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the accountsd processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the abrt_helper processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The abrt_helper processes execute with the abrt_helper_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the accountsd_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep abrt_helper_t
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
+
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The abrt_helper_t SELinux type can be entered via the "abrt_helper_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the abrt_helper_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/bin/abrt-pyhook-helper
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the accountsd_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux abrt_helper policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their abrt_helper processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for abrt_helper:
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B abrt_helper_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux accountsd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their accountsd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for accountsd:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux abrt_helper policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their abrt_helper processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for abrt_helper:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B accountsd_exec_t
++.B abrt_helper_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the accountsd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the accountsd_t domain.
++- Set files with the abrt_helper_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the abrt_helper_t domain.
+
+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B accountsd_unit_file_t
-+.EE
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
+
-+- Set files with the accountsd_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as accountsd unit content.
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
++The SELinux process type abrt_helper_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B accountsd_var_lib_t
-+.EE
++.br
++.B abrt_var_cache_t
+
-+- Set files with the accountsd_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the accountsd files under the /var/lib directory.
++ /var/cache/abrt(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/spool/abrt(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/cache/abrt-di(/.*)?
++.br
+
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the abrt_helper_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux accountsd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their accountsd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for accountsd:
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the abrt_helper_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B accountsd_t
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -619,103 +704,116 @@ index 0000000..55527ac
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), accountsd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/acct_selinux.8 b/man/man8/acct_selinux.8
++selinux(8), abrt_helper(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, abrt_selinux(8), abrt_selinux(8), abrt_dump_oops_selinux(8), abrt_handle_event_selinux(8), abrt_retrace_coredump_selinux(8), abrt_retrace_worker_selinux(8), abrt_watch_log_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/abrt_retrace_coredump_selinux.8 b/man/man8/abrt_retrace_coredump_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..c9969dc
+index 0000000..95c7f7f
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/acct_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
-+.TH "acct_selinux" "8" "acct" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "acct SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/abrt_retrace_coredump_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,115 @@
++.TH "abrt_retrace_coredump_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "abrt_retrace_coredump" "SELinux Policy documentation for abrt_retrace_coredump"
+.SH "NAME"
-+acct_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the acct processes
++abrt_retrace_coredump_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the abrt_retrace_coredump processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the acct processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the abrt_retrace_coredump processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The abrt_retrace_coredump processes execute with the abrt_retrace_coredump_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the acct_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep abrt_retrace_coredump_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
++The abrt_retrace_coredump_t SELinux type can be entered via the "abrt_retrace_coredump_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the abrt_retrace_coredump_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/bin/coredump2packages
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the acct_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux abrt_retrace_coredump policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their abrt_retrace_coredump processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for abrt_retrace_coredump:
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B abrt_retrace_coredump_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux acct policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their acct processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for acct:
-+
-+
-+.EX
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux abrt_retrace_coredump policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their abrt_retrace_coredump processes in as secure a method as possible.
+.PP
-+.B acct_data_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the acct_data_t type, if you want to treat the files as acct content.
++The following file types are defined for abrt_retrace_coredump:
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/log/account(/.*)?, /var/account(/.*)?
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B acct_exec_t
++.B abrt_retrace_coredump_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the acct_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the acct_t domain.
++- Set files with the abrt_retrace_coredump_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the abrt_retrace_coredump_t domain.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/sbin/accton, /sbin/accton, /etc/cron\.(daily|monthly)/acct
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux acct policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their acct processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for acct:
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+.EX
-+.B acct_t
-+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++The SELinux process type abrt_retrace_coredump_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B rpm_log_t
++
++ /var/log/yum\.log.*
++.br
++
++.br
++.B rpm_var_cache_t
++
++ /var/cache/yum(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/spool/up2date(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/cache/PackageKit(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B rpm_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/yum.*
++.br
++ /var/run/PackageKit(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -728,289 +826,451 @@ index 0000000..c9969dc
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), acct(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/afs_selinux.8 b/man/man8/afs_selinux.8
++selinux(8), abrt_retrace_coredump(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, abrt_selinux(8), abrt_selinux(8), abrt_dump_oops_selinux(8), abrt_handle_event_selinux(8), abrt_helper_selinux(8), abrt_retrace_worker_selinux(8), abrt_watch_log_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/abrt_retrace_worker_selinux.8 b/man/man8/abrt_retrace_worker_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..8532575
+index 0000000..c0c182f
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/afs_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,292 @@
-+.TH "afs_selinux" "8" "afs" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "afs SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/abrt_retrace_worker_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
++.TH "abrt_retrace_worker_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "abrt_retrace_worker" "SELinux Policy documentation for abrt_retrace_worker"
+.SH "NAME"
-+afs_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the afs processes
++abrt_retrace_worker_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the abrt_retrace_worker processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the afs processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the abrt_retrace_worker processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The abrt_retrace_worker processes execute with the abrt_retrace_worker_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux afs policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their afs processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for afs:
++For example:
+
++.B ps -eZ | grep abrt_retrace_worker_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B afs_bosserver_exec_t
-+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the afs_bosserver_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the afs_bosserver_t domain.
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
++The abrt_retrace_worker_t SELinux type can be entered via the "abrt_retrace_worker_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the abrt_retrace_worker_t domain are the following:"
+
-+.EX
++/usr/bin/abrt-retrace-worker, /usr/bin/retrace-server-worker
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+.B afs_cache_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the afs_cache_t type, if you want to store the files under the /var/cache directory.
-+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/cache/afs(/.*)?, /usr/vice/cache(/.*)?
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux abrt_retrace_worker policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their abrt_retrace_worker processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for abrt_retrace_worker:
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B afs_config_t
++.B abrt_retrace_worker_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
-+- Set files with the afs_config_t type, if you want to treat the files as afs configuration data, usually stored under the /etc directory.
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux abrt_retrace_worker policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their abrt_retrace_worker processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for abrt_retrace_worker:
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/afs/local(/.*)?, /usr/afs/etc(/.*)?
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B afs_dbdir_t
++.B abrt_retrace_worker_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the afs_dbdir_t type, if you want to treat the files as afs dbdir data.
++- Set files with the abrt_retrace_worker_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the abrt_retrace_worker_t domain.
+
+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B afs_exec_t
-+.EE
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
+
-+- Set files with the afs_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the afs_t domain.
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type abrt_retrace_worker_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/vice/etc/afsd, /usr/sbin/afsd
++.B abrt_retrace_spool_t
++
++ /var/spool/abrt-retrace(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/spool/retrace-server(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), abrt_retrace_worker(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, abrt_selinux(8), abrt_selinux(8), abrt_dump_oops_selinux(8), abrt_handle_event_selinux(8), abrt_helper_selinux(8), abrt_retrace_coredump_selinux(8), abrt_watch_log_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/abrt_selinux.8 b/man/man8/abrt_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..25121c1
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/abrt_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,347 @@
++.TH "abrt_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "abrt" "SELinux Policy documentation for abrt"
++.SH "NAME"
++abrt_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the abrt processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the abrt processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The abrt processes execute with the abrt_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep abrt_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The abrt_t SELinux type can be entered via the "abrt_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the abrt_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/sbin/abrtd, /usr/sbin/abrt-dbus
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux abrt policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their abrt processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for abrt:
+
+.EX
++.B abrt_handle_event_t, abrt_helper_t, abrt_retrace_coredump_t, abrt_t, abrt_retrace_worker_t, abrt_dump_oops_t, abrt_watch_log_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH BOOLEANS
++SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. abrt policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run abrt with the tightest access possible.
++
++
+.PP
-+.B afs_files_t
++If you want to allow ABRT to run in abrt_handle_event_t domain to handle ABRT event scripts, you must turn on the abrt_handle_event boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P abrt_handle_event 1
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the afs_files_t type, if you want to treat the files as afs content.
++.PP
++If you want to allow ABRT to run in abrt_handle_event_t domain to handle ABRT event scripts, you must turn on the abrt_handle_event boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P abrt_handle_event 1
++.EE
+
++.SH SHARING FILES
++If you want to share files with multiple domains (Apache, FTP, rsync, Samba), you can set a file context of public_content_t and public_content_rw_t. These context allow any of the above domains to read the content. If you want a particular domain to write to the public_content_rw_t domain, you must set the appropriate boolean.
++.TP
++Allow abrt servers to read the /var/abrt directory by adding the public_content_t file type to the directory and by restoring the file type.
++.PP
++.B
++semanage fcontext -a -t public_content_t "/var/abrt(/.*)?"
+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/vicepc, /vicepb, /vicepa
++.B restorecon -F -R -v /var/abrt
++.pp
++.TP
++Allow abrt servers to read and write /var/tmp/incoming by adding the public_content_rw_t type to the directory and by restoring the file type. This also requires the allow_abrtd_anon_write boolean to be set.
++.PP
++.B
++semanage fcontext -a -t public_content_rw_t "/var/abrt/incoming(/.*)?"
++.br
++.B restorecon -F -R -v /var/abrt/incoming
++
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow ABRT to modify public files used for public file transfer services., you must turn on the abrt_anon_write boolean.
+
+.EX
++.B setsebool -P abrt_anon_write 1
++.EE
++
+.PP
-+.B afs_fsserver_exec_t
++If you want to allow ABRT to modify public files used for public file transfer services., you must turn on the abrt_anon_write boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P abrt_anon_write 1
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the afs_fsserver_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the afs_fsserver_t domain.
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux abrt policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their abrt processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for abrt:
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/afs/bin/volserver, /usr/afs/bin/fileserver, /usr/afs/bin/salvager
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B afs_initrc_exec_t
++.B abrt_dump_oops_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the afs_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the afs_initrc_t domain.
++- Set files with the abrt_dump_oops_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the abrt_dump_oops_t domain.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/etc/rc\.d/init\.d/afs, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/openafs-client
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B afs_ka_db_t
++.B abrt_etc_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the afs_ka_db_t type, if you want to treat the files as afs ka database content.
++- Set files with the abrt_etc_t type, if you want to store abrt files in the /etc directories.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B afs_kaserver_exec_t
++.B abrt_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the afs_kaserver_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the afs_kaserver_t domain.
++- Set files with the abrt_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the abrt_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B afs_logfile_t
++.B abrt_handle_event_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the afs_logfile_t type, if you want to treat the files as afs logfile data.
++- Set files with the abrt_handle_event_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the abrt_handle_event_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B afs_pt_db_t
++.B abrt_helper_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the afs_pt_db_t type, if you want to treat the files as afs pt database content.
++- Set files with the abrt_helper_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the abrt_helper_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B afs_ptserver_exec_t
++.B abrt_initrc_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the afs_ptserver_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the afs_ptserver_t domain.
++- Set files with the abrt_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the abrt_initrc_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B afs_vl_db_t
++.B abrt_retrace_cache_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the afs_vl_db_t type, if you want to treat the files as afs vl database content.
++- Set files with the abrt_retrace_cache_t type, if you want to store the files under the /var/cache directory.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B afs_vlserver_exec_t
++.B abrt_retrace_coredump_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the afs_vlserver_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the afs_vlserver_t domain.
++- Set files with the abrt_retrace_coredump_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the abrt_retrace_coredump_t domain.
+
+
++.EX
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
++.B abrt_retrace_spool_t
++.EE
+
-+.SH PORT TYPES
-+SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
-+.PP
-+You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
++- Set files with the abrt_retrace_spool_t type, if you want to store the abrt retrace files under the /var/spool directory.
+
-+.B semanage port -l
+
++.EX
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
-+SELinux afs policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their afs processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following port types are defined for afs:
++.B abrt_retrace_worker_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the abrt_retrace_worker_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the abrt_retrace_worker_t domain.
++
+
+.EX
-+.TP 5
-+.B afs_bos_port_t
-+.TP 10
++.PP
++.B abrt_tmp_t
+.EE
+
++- Set files with the abrt_tmp_t type, if you want to store abrt temporary files in the /tmp directories.
+
-+Default Defined Ports:
-+udp 7007
-+.EE
+
+.EX
-+.TP 5
-+.B afs_client_port_t
-+.TP 10
++.PP
++.B abrt_unit_file_t
+.EE
+
++- Set files with the abrt_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as abrt unit content.
+
-+Default Defined Ports:
-+udp 7001
-+.EE
+
+.EX
-+.TP 5
-+.B afs_fs_port_t
-+.TP 10
++.PP
++.B abrt_var_cache_t
+.EE
+
++- Set files with the abrt_var_cache_t type, if you want to store the files under the /var/cache directory.
+
-+Default Defined Ports:
-+tcp 2040
-+.EE
-+udp 7000,7005
-+.EE
+
+.EX
-+.TP 5
-+.B afs_ka_port_t
-+.TP 10
++.PP
++.B abrt_var_log_t
+.EE
+
++- Set files with the abrt_var_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as abrt var log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
+
-+Default Defined Ports:
-+udp 7004
-+.EE
+
+.EX
-+.TP 5
-+.B afs_pt_port_t
-+.TP 10
++.PP
++.B abrt_var_run_t
+.EE
+
++- Set files with the abrt_var_run_t type, if you want to store the abrt files under the /run directory.
+
-+Default Defined Ports:
-+udp 7002
-+.EE
+
+.EX
-+.TP 5
-+.B afs_vl_port_t
-+.TP 10
++.PP
++.B abrt_watch_log_exec_t
+.EE
+
++- Set files with the abrt_watch_log_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the abrt_watch_log_t domain.
++
+
-+Default Defined Ports:
-+udp 7003
-+.EE
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type abrt_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B abrt_etc_t
++
++ /etc/abrt(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B abrt_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B abrt_var_cache_t
++
++ /var/cache/abrt(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/spool/abrt(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/cache/abrt-di(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B abrt_var_log_t
++
++ /var/log/abrt-logger
++.br
++
++.br
++.B abrt_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/abrt(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/abrtd?\.lock
++.br
++ /var/run/abrtd?\.socket
++.br
++ /var/run/abrt\.pid
++.br
++
++.br
++.B rpm_log_t
++
++ /var/log/yum\.log.*
++.br
++
++.br
++.B rpm_var_cache_t
++
++ /var/cache/yum(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/spool/up2date(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/cache/PackageKit(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B rpm_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/yum.*
++.br
++ /var/run/PackageKit(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B sysfs_t
++
++ /sys(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux afs policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their afs processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for afs:
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the abrt_helper_t, abrt_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B afs_kaserver_t, afs_t, afs_fsserver_t, afs_bosserver_t, afs_vlserver_t, afs_ptserver_t
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
++
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the abrt_helper_t, abrt_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -1022,101 +1282,92 @@ index 0000000..8532575
+.B semanage module
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
-+.B semanage port
-+can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
++.B semanage boolean
++can also be used to manipulate the booleans
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), afs(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/aiccu_selinux.8 b/man/man8/aiccu_selinux.8
++selinux(8), abrt(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, setsebool(8), abrt_dump_oops_selinux(8), abrt_handle_event_selinux(8), abrt_helper_selinux(8), abrt_retrace_coredump_selinux(8), abrt_retrace_worker_selinux(8), abrt_watch_log_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/abrt_watch_log_selinux.8 b/man/man8/abrt_watch_log_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..22de53e
+index 0000000..e8ab68b
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/aiccu_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
-+.TH "aiccu_selinux" "8" "aiccu" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "aiccu SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/abrt_watch_log_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
++.TH "abrt_watch_log_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "abrt_watch_log" "SELinux Policy documentation for abrt_watch_log"
+.SH "NAME"
-+aiccu_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the aiccu processes
++abrt_watch_log_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the abrt_watch_log processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the aiccu processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the abrt_watch_log processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The abrt_watch_log processes execute with the abrt_watch_log_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux aiccu policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their aiccu processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for aiccu:
++For example:
+
++.B ps -eZ | grep abrt_watch_log_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B aiccu_etc_t
-+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the aiccu_etc_t type, if you want to store aiccu files in the /etc directories.
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
++The abrt_watch_log_t SELinux type can be entered via the "abrt_watch_log_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the abrt_watch_log_t domain are the following:"
+
-+.EX
++/usr/bin/abrt-watch-log
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+.B aiccu_exec_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the aiccu_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the aiccu_t domain.
-+
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux abrt_watch_log policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their abrt_watch_log processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for abrt_watch_log:
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B aiccu_initrc_exec_t
++.B abrt_watch_log_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
-+- Set files with the aiccu_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the aiccu_initrc_t domain.
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux abrt_watch_log policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their abrt_watch_log processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for abrt_watch_log:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B aiccu_var_run_t
++.B abrt_watch_log_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the aiccu_var_run_t type, if you want to store the aiccu files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the abrt_watch_log_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the abrt_watch_log_t domain.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux aiccu policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their aiccu processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for aiccu:
-+
-+.EX
-+.B aiccu_t
-+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -1129,93 +1380,134 @@ index 0000000..22de53e
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), aiccu(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/aide_selinux.8 b/man/man8/aide_selinux.8
++selinux(8), abrt_watch_log(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, abrt_selinux(8), abrt_selinux(8), abrt_dump_oops_selinux(8), abrt_handle_event_selinux(8), abrt_helper_selinux(8), abrt_retrace_coredump_selinux(8), abrt_retrace_worker_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/accountsd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/accountsd_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..a19000b
+index 0000000..0471351
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/aide_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,93 @@
-+.TH "aide_selinux" "8" "aide" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "aide SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/accountsd_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,132 @@
++.TH "accountsd_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "accountsd" "SELinux Policy documentation for accountsd"
+.SH "NAME"
-+aide_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the aide processes
++accountsd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the accountsd processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the aide processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the accountsd processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The accountsd processes execute with the accountsd_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep accountsd_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The accountsd_t SELinux type can be entered via the "accountsd_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the accountsd_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/libexec/accounts-daemon
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux accountsd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their accountsd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for accountsd:
++
++.EX
++.B accountsd_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux aide policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their aide processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for aide:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux accountsd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their accountsd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for accountsd:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B aide_db_t
++.B accountsd_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the aide_db_t type, if you want to treat the files as aide database content.
++- Set files with the accountsd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the accountsd_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B aide_exec_t
++.B accountsd_unit_file_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the aide_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the aide_t domain.
++- Set files with the accountsd_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as accountsd unit content.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B aide_log_t
++.B accountsd_var_lib_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the aide_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as aide log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++- Set files with the accountsd_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the accountsd files under the /var/lib directory.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/log/aide\.log.*, /var/log/aide(/.*)?
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type accountsd_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B accountsd_var_lib_t
++
++ /var/lib/AccountsService(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B xdm_etc_t
++
++ /etc/[mg]dm(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux aide policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their aide processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for aide:
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the accountsd_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B aide_t
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
++
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the accountsd_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -1228,135 +1520,126 @@ index 0000000..a19000b
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), aide(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/aisexec_selinux.8 b/man/man8/aisexec_selinux.8
++selinux(8), accountsd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/acct_selinux.8 b/man/man8/acct_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..486bfb7
+index 0000000..88dbb11
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/aisexec_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,135 @@
-+.TH "aisexec_selinux" "8" "aisexec" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "aisexec SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/acct_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,126 @@
++.TH "acct_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "acct" "SELinux Policy documentation for acct"
+.SH "NAME"
-+aisexec_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the aisexec processes
++acct_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the acct processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the aisexec processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the acct processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The acct processes execute with the acct_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the aisexec_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep acct_t
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
+
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The acct_t SELinux type can be entered via the "acct_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the acct_t domain are the following:"
++
++/etc/cron\.(daily|monthly)/acct, /sbin/accton, /usr/sbin/accton
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the aisexec_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux acct policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their acct processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for acct:
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B acct_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux aisexec policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their aisexec processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for aisexec:
-+
-+
-+.EX
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux acct policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their acct processes in as secure a method as possible.
+.PP
-+.B aisexec_exec_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the aisexec_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the aisexec_t domain.
++The following file types are defined for acct:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B aisexec_initrc_exec_t
++.B acct_data_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the aisexec_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the aisexec_initrc_t domain.
++- Set files with the acct_data_t type, if you want to treat the files as acct content.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B aisexec_tmp_t
++.B acct_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the aisexec_tmp_t type, if you want to store aisexec temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++- Set files with the acct_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the acct_t domain.
+
+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B aisexec_tmpfs_t
-+.EE
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
+
-+- Set files with the aisexec_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store aisexec files on a tmpfs file system.
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
++The SELinux process type acct_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B aisexec_var_lib_t
-+.EE
++.br
++.B acct_data_t
+
-+- Set files with the aisexec_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the aisexec files under the /var/lib directory.
++ /var/account(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/log/account(/.*)?
++.br
+
++.br
++.B wtmp_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B aisexec_var_log_t
-+.EE
++ /var/log/wtmp.*
++.br
+
-+- Set files with the aisexec_var_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as aisexec var log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the acct_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B aisexec_var_run_t
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the aisexec_var_run_t type, if you want to store the aisexec files under the /run directory.
-+
-+
-+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
-+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux aisexec policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their aisexec processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for aisexec:
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the acct_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B aisexec_t
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -1369,126 +1652,104 @@ index 0000000..486bfb7
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), aisexec(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/ajaxterm_selinux.8 b/man/man8/ajaxterm_selinux.8
++selinux(8), acct(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/afs_bosserver_selinux.8 b/man/man8/afs_bosserver_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..3cc4a68
+index 0000000..4502080
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/ajaxterm_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,129 @@
-+.TH "ajaxterm_selinux" "8" "ajaxterm" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "ajaxterm SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/afs_bosserver_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,105 @@
++.TH "afs_bosserver_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "afs_bosserver" "SELinux Policy documentation for afs_bosserver"
+.SH "NAME"
-+ajaxterm_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the ajaxterm processes
++afs_bosserver_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the afs_bosserver processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the ajaxterm processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the afs_bosserver processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The afs_bosserver processes execute with the afs_bosserver_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the ajaxterm_ssh_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep afs_bosserver_t
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
+
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The afs_bosserver_t SELinux type can be entered via the "afs_bosserver_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the afs_bosserver_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/afs/bin/bosserver
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the ajaxterm_ssh_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux afs_bosserver policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their afs_bosserver processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for afs_bosserver:
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B afs_bosserver_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux ajaxterm policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ajaxterm processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for ajaxterm:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux afs_bosserver policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their afs_bosserver processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for afs_bosserver:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B ajaxterm_exec_t
++.B afs_bosserver_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the ajaxterm_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ajaxterm_t domain.
-+
-+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B ajaxterm_initrc_exec_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the ajaxterm_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ajaxterm_initrc_t domain.
-+
-+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B ajaxterm_var_run_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the ajaxterm_var_run_t type, if you want to store the ajaxterm files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the afs_bosserver_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the afs_bosserver_t domain.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PORT TYPES
-+SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
-+.PP
-+You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+.B semanage port -l
++The SELinux process type afs_bosserver_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
-+SELinux ajaxterm policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ajaxterm processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following port types are defined for ajaxterm:
++.br
++.B afs_config_t
+
-+.EX
-+.TP 5
-+.B ajaxterm_port_t
-+.TP 10
-+.EE
++ /usr/afs/etc(/.*)?
++.br
++ /usr/afs/local(/.*)?
++.br
+
++.br
++.B afs_logfile_t
+
-+Default Defined Ports:
-+tcp 8022
-+.EE
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux ajaxterm policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ajaxterm processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for ajaxterm:
++ /usr/afs/logs(/.*)?
++.br
+
-+.EX
-+.B ajaxterm_ssh_t, ajaxterm_t
-+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -1500,139 +1761,117 @@ index 0000000..3cc4a68
+.B semanage module
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
-+.B semanage port
-+can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
-+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), ajaxterm(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/alsa_selinux.8 b/man/man8/alsa_selinux.8
++selinux(8), afs_bosserver(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, afs_selinux(8), afs_selinux(8), afs_fsserver_selinux(8), afs_kaserver_selinux(8), afs_ptserver_selinux(8), afs_vlserver_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/afs_fsserver_selinux.8 b/man/man8/afs_fsserver_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..f44b609
+index 0000000..3881562
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/alsa_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,135 @@
-+.TH "alsa_selinux" "8" "alsa" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "alsa SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/afs_fsserver_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,115 @@
++.TH "afs_fsserver_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "afs_fsserver" "SELinux Policy documentation for afs_fsserver"
+.SH "NAME"
-+alsa_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the alsa processes
++afs_fsserver_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the afs_fsserver processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the alsa processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the afs_fsserver processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The afs_fsserver processes execute with the afs_fsserver_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the alsa_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep afs_fsserver_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The afs_fsserver_t SELinux type can be entered via the "afs_fsserver_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the afs_fsserver_t domain are the following:"
+
++/usr/afs/bin/salvager, /usr/afs/bin/volserver, /usr/afs/bin/fileserver
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the alsa_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux afs_fsserver policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their afs_fsserver processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for afs_fsserver:
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B afs_fsserver_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux alsa policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their alsa processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for alsa:
-+
-+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B alsa_etc_rw_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the alsa_etc_rw_t type, if you want to treat the files as alsa etc read/write content.
-+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/etc/alsa/pcm(/.*)?, /etc/alsa/asound\.state, /usr/share/alsa/pcm(/.*)?, /etc/asound\.state, /etc/asound(/.*)?, /usr/share/alsa/alsa\.conf
-+
-+.EX
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux afs_fsserver policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their afs_fsserver processes in as secure a method as possible.
+.PP
-+.B alsa_exec_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the alsa_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the alsa_t domain.
++The following file types are defined for afs_fsserver:
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/sbin/salsa, /sbin/alsactl, /usr/bin/ainit, /usr/bin/alsaunmute, /sbin/salsa, /usr/sbin/alsactl, /bin/alsaunmute
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B alsa_home_t
++.B afs_fsserver_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the alsa_home_t type, if you want to store alsa files in the users home directory.
++- Set files with the afs_fsserver_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the afs_fsserver_t domain.
+
+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B alsa_tmp_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the alsa_tmp_t type, if you want to store alsa temporary files in the /tmp directories.
-+
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B alsa_unit_file_t
-+.EE
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+- Set files with the alsa_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as alsa unit content.
++The SELinux process type afs_fsserver_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
++.br
++.B afs_config_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B alsa_var_lib_t
-+.EE
++ /usr/afs/etc(/.*)?
++.br
++ /usr/afs/local(/.*)?
++.br
+
-+- Set files with the alsa_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the alsa files under the /var/lib directory.
++.br
++.B afs_files_t
+
++ /vicepa
++.br
++ /vicepb
++.br
++ /vicepc
++.br
+
-+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
++.br
++.B afs_logfile_t
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux alsa policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their alsa processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for alsa:
++ /usr/afs/logs(/.*)?
++.br
+
-+.EX
-+.B alsa_t
-+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -1645,228 +1884,222 @@ index 0000000..f44b609
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), alsa(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/amanda_selinux.8 b/man/man8/amanda_selinux.8
++selinux(8), afs_fsserver(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, afs_selinux(8), afs_selinux(8), afs_bosserver_selinux(8), afs_kaserver_selinux(8), afs_ptserver_selinux(8), afs_vlserver_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/afs_kaserver_selinux.8 b/man/man8/afs_kaserver_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..8a4105d
+index 0000000..248aaef
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/amanda_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,231 @@
-+.TH "amanda_selinux" "8" "amanda" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "amanda SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/afs_kaserver_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
++.TH "afs_kaserver_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "afs_kaserver" "SELinux Policy documentation for afs_kaserver"
+.SH "NAME"
-+amanda_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the amanda processes
++afs_kaserver_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the afs_kaserver processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the amanda processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the afs_kaserver processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The afs_kaserver processes execute with the afs_kaserver_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the amanda_recover_t, amanda_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep afs_kaserver_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
++The afs_kaserver_t SELinux type can be entered via the "afs_kaserver_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the afs_kaserver_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/afs/bin/kaserver
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the amanda_recover_t, amanda_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux afs_kaserver policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their afs_kaserver processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for afs_kaserver:
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B afs_kaserver_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux amanda policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their amanda processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for amanda:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux afs_kaserver policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their afs_kaserver processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for afs_kaserver:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B amanda_amandates_t
++.B afs_kaserver_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the amanda_amandates_t type, if you want to treat the files as amanda amandates data.
++- Set files with the afs_kaserver_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the afs_kaserver_t domain.
+
+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B amanda_config_t
-+.EE
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
+
-+- Set files with the amanda_config_t type, if you want to treat the files as amanda configuration data, usually stored under the /etc directory.
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type afs_kaserver_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/etc/amanda(/.*)?, /var/lib/amanda/\.amandahosts
++.B afs_config_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B amanda_data_t
-+.EE
++ /usr/afs/etc(/.*)?
++.br
++ /usr/afs/local(/.*)?
++.br
+
-+- Set files with the amanda_data_t type, if you want to treat the files as amanda content.
++.br
++.B afs_ka_db_t
+
++ /usr/afs/db/ka.*
+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/lib/amanda/[^/]+(/.*)?, /etc/amanda/.*/tapelist(/.*)?, /etc/amanda/.*/index(/.*)?
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B amanda_dumpdates_t
-+.EE
++.br
++.B afs_logfile_t
+
-+- Set files with the amanda_dumpdates_t type, if you want to treat the files as amanda dumpdates data.
++ /usr/afs/logs(/.*)?
++.br
+
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
-+.EX
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
+.PP
-+.B amanda_exec_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the amanda_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the amanda_t domain.
-+
-+
-+.EX
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
+.PP
-+.B amanda_gnutarlists_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the amanda_gnutarlists_t type, if you want to treat the files as amanda gnutarlists data.
-+
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B amanda_inetd_exec_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the amanda_inetd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the amanda_inetd_t domain.
-+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/lib/amanda/amindexd, /usr/lib/amanda/amidxtaped, /usr/lib/amanda/amandad
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B amanda_log_t
-+.EE
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
-+- Set files with the amanda_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as amanda log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), afs_kaserver(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, afs_selinux(8), afs_selinux(8), afs_bosserver_selinux(8), afs_fsserver_selinux(8), afs_ptserver_selinux(8), afs_vlserver_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/afs_ptserver_selinux.8 b/man/man8/afs_ptserver_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..dfd8d86
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/afs_ptserver_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
++.TH "afs_ptserver_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "afs_ptserver" "SELinux Policy documentation for afs_ptserver"
++.SH "NAME"
++afs_ptserver_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the afs_ptserver processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/log/amanda(/.*)?, /var/lib/amanda/[^/]*/log(/.*)?
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the afs_ptserver processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B amanda_recover_dir_t
-+.EE
++The afs_ptserver processes execute with the afs_ptserver_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+- Set files with the amanda_recover_dir_t type, if you want to treat the files as amanda recover dir data.
++For example:
+
++.B ps -eZ | grep afs_ptserver_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B amanda_recover_exec_t
-+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the amanda_recover_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the amanda_recover_t domain.
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
++The afs_ptserver_t SELinux type can be entered via the "afs_ptserver_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the afs_ptserver_t domain are the following:"
+
-+.EX
++/usr/afs/bin/ptserver
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+.B amanda_tmp_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the amanda_tmp_t type, if you want to store amanda temporary files in the /tmp directories.
-+
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux afs_ptserver policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their afs_ptserver processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for afs_ptserver:
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B amanda_usr_lib_t
++.B afs_ptserver_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
-+- Set files with the amanda_usr_lib_t type, if you want to treat the files as amanda usr lib data.
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux afs_ptserver policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their afs_ptserver processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for afs_ptserver:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B amanda_var_lib_t
++.B afs_ptserver_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the amanda_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the amanda files under the /var/lib directory.
++- Set files with the afs_ptserver_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the afs_ptserver_t domain.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/lib/amanda/[^/]+/index(/.*)?, /var/lib/amanda
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PORT TYPES
-+SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
-+.PP
-+You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+.B semanage port -l
++The SELinux process type afs_ptserver_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
-+SELinux amanda policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their amanda processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following port types are defined for amanda:
++.br
++.B afs_logfile_t
+
-+.EX
-+.TP 5
-+.B amanda_port_t
-+.TP 10
-+.EE
++ /usr/afs/logs(/.*)?
++.br
+
++.br
++.B afs_pt_db_t
+
-+Default Defined Ports:
-+tcp 10080-10083
-+.EE
-+udp 10080-10082
-+.EE
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux amanda policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their amanda processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for amanda:
++ /usr/afs/db/pr.*
++.br
+
-+.EX
-+.B amanda_t, amanda_recover_t
-+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -1878,287 +2111,351 @@ index 0000000..8a4105d
+.B semanage module
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
-+.B semanage port
-+can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
-+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), amanda(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/amavis_selinux.8 b/man/man8/amavis_selinux.8
++selinux(8), afs_ptserver(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, afs_selinux(8), afs_selinux(8), afs_bosserver_selinux(8), afs_fsserver_selinux(8), afs_kaserver_selinux(8), afs_vlserver_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/afs_selinux.8 b/man/man8/afs_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..a860e6a
+index 0000000..3d27b08
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/amavis_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,204 @@
-+.TH "amavis_selinux" "8" "amavis" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "amavis SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/afs_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,352 @@
++.TH "afs_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "afs" "SELinux Policy documentation for afs"
+.SH "NAME"
-+amavis_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the amavis processes
++afs_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the afs processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the amavis processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the afs processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The afs processes execute with the afs_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep afs_t
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The afs_t SELinux type can be entered via the "afs_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the afs_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/sbin/afsd, /usr/vice/etc/afsd
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the amavis_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux afs policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their afs processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for afs:
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.B afs_kaserver_t, afs_t, afs_fsserver_t, afs_bosserver_t, afs_vlserver_t, afs_ptserver_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the amavis_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux afs policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their afs processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for afs:
++
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.PP
++.B afs_bosserver_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++- Set files with the afs_bosserver_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the afs_bosserver_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.B afs_cache_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the afs_cache_t type, if you want to store the files under the /var/cache directory.
++
++
++.EX
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux amavis policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their amavis processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for amavis:
++.B afs_config_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the afs_config_t type, if you want to treat the files as afs configuration data, usually stored under the /etc directory.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B amavis_etc_t
++.B afs_dbdir_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the amavis_etc_t type, if you want to store amavis files in the /etc directories.
++- Set files with the afs_dbdir_t type, if you want to treat the files as afs dbdir data.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/etc/amavisd(/.*)?, /etc/amavis(d)?\.conf
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B amavis_exec_t
++.B afs_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the amavis_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the amavis_t domain.
++- Set files with the afs_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the afs_t domain.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/sbin/amavisd.*, /usr/lib/AntiVir/antivir
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B amavis_initrc_exec_t
++.B afs_files_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the amavis_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the amavis_initrc_t domain.
++- Set files with the afs_files_t type, if you want to treat the files as afs content.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/etc/rc\.d/init\.d/amavis, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/amavisd-snmp
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B amavis_quarantine_t
++.B afs_fsserver_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the amavis_quarantine_t type, if you want to treat the files as amavis quarantine data.
++- Set files with the afs_fsserver_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the afs_fsserver_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B amavis_spool_t
++.B afs_initrc_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the amavis_spool_t type, if you want to store the amavis files under the /var/spool directory.
++- Set files with the afs_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the afs_initrc_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B amavis_tmp_t
++.B afs_ka_db_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the amavis_tmp_t type, if you want to store amavis temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++- Set files with the afs_ka_db_t type, if you want to treat the files as afs ka database content.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B amavis_var_lib_t
++.B afs_kaserver_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the amavis_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the amavis files under the /var/lib directory.
++- Set files with the afs_kaserver_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the afs_kaserver_t domain.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/lib/amavis(/.*)?, /var/opt/f-secure(/.*)?, /var/amavis(/.*)?
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B amavis_var_log_t
++.B afs_logfile_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the amavis_var_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as amavis var log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++- Set files with the afs_logfile_t type, if you want to treat the files as afs logfile data.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B amavis_var_run_t
++.B afs_pt_db_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the amavis_var_run_t type, if you want to store the amavis files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the afs_pt_db_t type, if you want to treat the files as afs pt database content.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B afs_ptserver_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the afs_ptserver_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the afs_ptserver_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B afs_vl_db_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the afs_vl_db_t type, if you want to treat the files as afs vl database content.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B afs_vlserver_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the afs_vlserver_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the afs_vlserver_t domain.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
+.SH PORT TYPES
-+SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
++SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
+.PP
-+You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
++You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
+
+.B semanage port -l
+
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
-+SELinux amavis policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their amavis processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following port types are defined for amavis:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
++SELinux afs policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their afs processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following port types are defined for afs:
+
+.EX
+.TP 5
-+.B amavisd_recv_port_t
++.B afs_bos_port_t
+.TP 10
+.EE
+
+
+Default Defined Ports:
-+tcp 10024
++udp 7007
+.EE
+
+.EX
+.TP 5
-+.B amavisd_send_port_t
++.B afs_client_port_t
+.TP 10
+.EE
+
+
+Default Defined Ports:
-+tcp 10025
++udp 7001
+.EE
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux amavis policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their amavis processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for amavis:
+
+.EX
-+.B amavis_t
++.TP 5
++.B afs_fs_port_t
++.TP 10
+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
-+
-+.SH "COMMANDS"
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
-+.PP
-+.B semanage permissive
-+can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
-+.PP
-+.B semanage module
-+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
-+.B semanage port
-+can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
+
-+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
-+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++Default Defined Ports:
++tcp 2040
++.EE
++udp 7000,7005
++.EE
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.EX
++.TP 5
++.B afs_ka_port_t
++.TP 10
++.EE
+
-+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), amavis(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/amtu_selinux.8 b/man/man8/amtu_selinux.8
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..2f99a72
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/amtu_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
-+.TH "amtu_selinux" "8" "amtu" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "amtu SELinux Policy documentation"
-+.SH "NAME"
-+amtu_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the amtu processes
-+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the amtu processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Default Defined Ports:
++udp 7004
++.EE
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++.EX
++.TP 5
++.B afs_pt_port_t
++.TP 10
++.EE
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux amtu policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their amtu processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for amtu:
+
++Default Defined Ports:
++udp 7002
++.EE
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B amtu_exec_t
++.TP 5
++.B afs_vl_port_t
++.TP 10
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the amtu_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the amtu_t domain.
+
++Default Defined Ports:
++udp 7003
++.EE
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
++The SELinux process type afs_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux amtu policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their amtu processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for amtu:
++.br
++.B afs_cache_t
+
-+.EX
-+.B amtu_t
-+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++ /var/cache/afs(/.*)?
++.br
++ /usr/vice/cache(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B etc_runtime_t
++
++ /[^/]+
++.br
++ /etc/mtab.*
++.br
++ /etc/blkid(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/nologin.*
++.br
++ /etc/\.fstab\.hal\..+
++.br
++ /halt
++.br
++ /fastboot
++.br
++ /poweroff
++.br
++ /etc/cmtab
++.br
++ /\.autofsck
++.br
++ /forcefsck
++.br
++ /\.suspended
++.br
++ /fsckoptions
++.br
++ /\.autorelabel
++.br
++ /etc/securetty
++.br
++ /etc/killpower
++.br
++ /etc/nohotplug
++.br
++ /etc/ioctl\.save
++.br
++ /etc/fstab\.REVOKE
++.br
++ /etc/network/ifstate
++.br
++ /etc/sysconfig/hwconf
++.br
++ /etc/ptal/ptal-printd-like
++.br
++ /etc/sysconfig/iptables\.save
++.br
++ /etc/xorg\.conf\.d/00-system-setup-keyboard\.conf
++.br
++ /etc/X11/xorg\.conf\.d/00-system-setup-keyboard\.conf
++.br
++
++.br
++.B unlabeled_t
++
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -2170,155 +2467,108 @@ index 0000000..2f99a72
+.B semanage module
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
++.B semanage port
++can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
++
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), amtu(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/apcupsd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/apcupsd_selinux.8
++selinux(8), afs(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, afs_bosserver_selinux(8), afs_fsserver_selinux(8), afs_kaserver_selinux(8), afs_ptserver_selinux(8), afs_vlserver_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/afs_vlserver_selinux.8 b/man/man8/afs_vlserver_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..6c86648
+index 0000000..fae8285
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/apcupsd_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,157 @@
-+.TH "apcupsd_selinux" "8" "apcupsd" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "apcupsd SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/afs_vlserver_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
++.TH "afs_vlserver_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "afs_vlserver" "SELinux Policy documentation for afs_vlserver"
+.SH "NAME"
-+apcupsd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the apcupsd processes
++afs_vlserver_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the afs_vlserver processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the apcupsd processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the afs_vlserver processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The afs_vlserver processes execute with the afs_vlserver_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux apcupsd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their apcupsd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for apcupsd:
++For example:
+
++.B ps -eZ | grep afs_vlserver_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B apcupsd_exec_t
-+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the apcupsd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the apcupsd_t domain.
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/sbin/apcupsd, /usr/sbin/apcupsd
++The afs_vlserver_t SELinux type can be entered via the "afs_vlserver_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the afs_vlserver_t domain are the following:"
+
-+.EX
++/usr/afs/bin/vlserver
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+.B apcupsd_initrc_exec_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the apcupsd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the apcupsd_initrc_t domain.
-+
-+
-+.EX
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+.B apcupsd_lock_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the apcupsd_lock_t type, if you want to treat the files as apcupsd lock data, stored under the /var/lock directory
-+
-+
-+.EX
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux afs_vlserver policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their afs_vlserver processes in as secure a method as possible.
+.PP
-+.B apcupsd_log_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the apcupsd_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as apcupsd log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
-+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/log/apcupsd\.status.*, /var/log/apcupsd\.events.*
++The following process types are defined for afs_vlserver:
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B apcupsd_tmp_t
++.B afs_vlserver_t
+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the apcupsd_tmp_t type, if you want to store apcupsd temporary files in the /tmp directories.
-+
-+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B apcupsd_unit_file_t
-+.EE
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
-+- Set files with the apcupsd_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as apcupsd unit content.
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux afs_vlserver policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their afs_vlserver processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for afs_vlserver:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B apcupsd_var_run_t
++.B afs_vlserver_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the apcupsd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the apcupsd files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the afs_vlserver_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the afs_vlserver_t domain.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PORT TYPES
-+SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
-+.PP
-+You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+.B semanage port -l
++The SELinux process type afs_vlserver_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
-+SELinux apcupsd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their apcupsd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following port types are defined for apcupsd:
++.br
++.B afs_logfile_t
+
-+.EX
-+.TP 5
-+.B apcupsd_port_t
-+.TP 10
-+.EE
++ /usr/afs/logs(/.*)?
++.br
+
++.br
++.B afs_vl_db_t
+
-+Default Defined Ports:
-+tcp 3551
-+.EE
-+udp 3551
-+.EE
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux apcupsd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their apcupsd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for apcupsd:
++ /usr/afs/db/vl.*
++.br
+
-+.EX
-+.B apcupsd_t
-+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -2330,147 +2580,123 @@ index 0000000..6c86648
+.B semanage module
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
-+.B semanage port
-+can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
-+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), apcupsd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/apm_selinux.8 b/man/man8/apm_selinux.8
++selinux(8), afs_vlserver(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, afs_selinux(8), afs_selinux(8), afs_bosserver_selinux(8), afs_fsserver_selinux(8), afs_kaserver_selinux(8), afs_ptserver_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/aiccu_selinux.8 b/man/man8/aiccu_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..d6b5395
+index 0000000..1c447a0
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/apm_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,143 @@
-+.TH "apm_selinux" "8" "apm" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "apm SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/aiccu_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,120 @@
++.TH "aiccu_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "aiccu" "SELinux Policy documentation for aiccu"
+.SH "NAME"
-+apm_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the apm processes
++aiccu_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the aiccu processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the apm processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the aiccu processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The aiccu processes execute with the aiccu_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the apmd_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep aiccu_t
+
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The aiccu_t SELinux type can be entered via the "aiccu_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the aiccu_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/sbin/aiccu
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the apmd_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux aiccu policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their aiccu processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for aiccu:
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B aiccu_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux apm policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their apm processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for apm:
-+
-+
-+.EX
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux aiccu policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their aiccu processes in as secure a method as possible.
+.PP
-+.B apm_exec_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the apm_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the apm_t domain.
++The following file types are defined for aiccu:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B apmd_exec_t
++.B aiccu_etc_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the apmd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the apmd_t domain.
++- Set files with the aiccu_etc_t type, if you want to store aiccu files in the /etc directories.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/sbin/powersaved, /usr/sbin/acpid, /usr/sbin/apmd
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B apmd_lock_t
++.B aiccu_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the apmd_lock_t type, if you want to treat the files as apmd lock data, stored under the /var/lock directory
++- Set files with the aiccu_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the aiccu_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B apmd_log_t
++.B aiccu_initrc_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the apmd_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as apmd log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++- Set files with the aiccu_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the aiccu_initrc_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B apmd_tmp_t
++.B aiccu_var_run_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the apmd_tmp_t type, if you want to store apmd temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++- Set files with the aiccu_var_run_t type, if you want to store the aiccu files under the /run directory.
+
+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B apmd_unit_file_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the apmd_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as apmd unit content.
-+
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B apmd_var_run_t
-+.EE
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+- Set files with the apmd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the apmd files under the /run directory.
++The SELinux process type aiccu_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/run/\.?acpid\.socket, /var/run/apmd\.pid, /var/run/powersaved\.pid, /var/run/powersave_socket
-+
-+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
++.B aiccu_var_run_t
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux apm policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their apm processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for apm:
++ /var/run/aiccu\.pid
++.br
+
-+.EX
-+.B apm_t, apmd_t
-+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -2483,135 +2709,120 @@ index 0000000..d6b5395
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), apm(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/apmd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/apmd_selinux.8
++selinux(8), aiccu(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/aide_selinux.8 b/man/man8/aide_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..ce243b5
+index 0000000..183ad6a
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/apmd_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,135 @@
-+.TH "apmd_selinux" "8" "apmd" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "apmd SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/aide_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,120 @@
++.TH "aide_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "aide" "SELinux Policy documentation for aide"
+.SH "NAME"
-+apmd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the apmd processes
++aide_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the aide processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the apmd processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the aide processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The aide processes execute with the aide_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the apmd_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep aide_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
++The aide_t SELinux type can be entered via the "aide_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the aide_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/sbin/aide
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the apmd_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux aide policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their aide processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for aide:
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B aide_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux apmd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their apmd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for apmd:
-+
-+
-+.EX
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux aide policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their aide processes in as secure a method as possible.
+.PP
-+.B apmd_exec_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the apmd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the apmd_t domain.
++The following file types are defined for aide:
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/sbin/powersaved, /usr/sbin/acpid, /usr/sbin/apmd
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B apmd_lock_t
++.B aide_db_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the apmd_lock_t type, if you want to treat the files as apmd lock data, stored under the /var/lock directory
++- Set files with the aide_db_t type, if you want to treat the files as aide database content.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B apmd_log_t
++.B aide_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the apmd_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as apmd log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++- Set files with the aide_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the aide_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B apmd_tmp_t
++.B aide_log_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the apmd_tmp_t type, if you want to store apmd temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++- Set files with the aide_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as aide log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
+
+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B apmd_unit_file_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the apmd_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as apmd unit content.
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
+
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B apmd_var_run_t
-+.EE
++The SELinux process type aide_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
-+- Set files with the apmd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the apmd files under the /run directory.
++.br
++.B aide_db_t
+
++ /var/lib/aide(/.*)
+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/run/\.?acpid\.socket, /var/run/apmd\.pid, /var/run/powersaved\.pid, /var/run/powersave_socket
+
-+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
++.br
++.B aide_log_t
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux apmd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their apmd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for apmd:
++ /var/log/aide(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/log/aide\.log.*
++.br
+
-+.EX
-+.B apm_t, apmd_t
-+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -2624,131 +2835,206 @@ index 0000000..ce243b5
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), apmd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/arpwatch_selinux.8 b/man/man8/arpwatch_selinux.8
++selinux(8), aide(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/aisexec_selinux.8 b/man/man8/aisexec_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..7a26123
+index 0000000..ced319f
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/arpwatch_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
-+.TH "arpwatch_selinux" "8" "arpwatch" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "arpwatch SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/aisexec_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,206 @@
++.TH "aisexec_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "aisexec" "SELinux Policy documentation for aisexec"
+.SH "NAME"
-+arpwatch_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the arpwatch processes
++aisexec_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the aisexec processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the arpwatch processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the aisexec processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The aisexec processes execute with the aisexec_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the arpwatch_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep aisexec_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
++The aisexec_t SELinux type can be entered via the "aisexec_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the aisexec_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/sbin/aisexec
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the arpwatch_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux aisexec policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their aisexec processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for aisexec:
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B aisexec_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux arpwatch policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their arpwatch processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for arpwatch:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux aisexec policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their aisexec processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for aisexec:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B arpwatch_data_t
++.B aisexec_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the arpwatch_data_t type, if you want to treat the files as arpwatch content.
++- Set files with the aisexec_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the aisexec_t domain.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/arpwatch(/.*)?, /var/lib/arpwatch(/.*)?
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B arpwatch_exec_t
++.B aisexec_initrc_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the arpwatch_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the arpwatch_t domain.
++- Set files with the aisexec_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the aisexec_initrc_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B arpwatch_initrc_exec_t
++.B aisexec_tmp_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the arpwatch_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the arpwatch_initrc_t domain.
++- Set files with the aisexec_tmp_t type, if you want to store aisexec temporary files in the /tmp directories.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B arpwatch_tmp_t
++.B aisexec_tmpfs_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the arpwatch_tmp_t type, if you want to store arpwatch temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++- Set files with the aisexec_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store aisexec files on a tmpfs file system.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B arpwatch_unit_file_t
++.B aisexec_var_lib_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the arpwatch_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as arpwatch unit content.
++- Set files with the aisexec_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the aisexec files under the /var/lib directory.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B arpwatch_var_run_t
++.B aisexec_var_log_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the arpwatch_var_run_t type, if you want to store the arpwatch files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the aisexec_var_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as aisexec var log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B aisexec_var_run_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the aisexec_var_run_t type, if you want to store the aisexec files under the /run directory.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type aisexec_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B aisexec_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B aisexec_tmpfs_t
++
++
++.br
++.B aisexec_var_lib_t
++
++ /var/lib/openais(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B aisexec_var_log_t
++
++ /var/log/cluster/aisexec\.log.*
++.br
++
++.br
++.B aisexec_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/aisexec\.pid
++.br
++
++.br
++.B dlm_controld_tmpfs_t
++
++
++.br
++.B fenced_tmpfs_t
++
++
++.br
++.B gfs_controld_tmpfs_t
++
++
++.br
++.B groupd_tmpfs_t
++
++
++.br
++.B initrc_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B var_lib_t
++
++ /opt/(.*/)?var/lib(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux arpwatch policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their arpwatch processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for arpwatch:
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the aisexec_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B arpwatch_t
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
++
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the aisexec_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -2761,176 +3047,181 @@ index 0000000..7a26123
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), arpwatch(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/asterisk_selinux.8 b/man/man8/asterisk_selinux.8
++selinux(8), aisexec(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/ajaxterm_selinux.8 b/man/man8/ajaxterm_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..7cf9e0a
+index 0000000..2423a73
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/asterisk_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,179 @@
-+.TH "asterisk_selinux" "8" "asterisk" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "asterisk SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/ajaxterm_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,184 @@
++.TH "ajaxterm_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "ajaxterm" "SELinux Policy documentation for ajaxterm"
+.SH "NAME"
-+asterisk_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the asterisk processes
++ajaxterm_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the ajaxterm processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the asterisk processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the ajaxterm processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The ajaxterm processes execute with the ajaxterm_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the asterisk_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep ajaxterm_t
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
+
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The ajaxterm_t SELinux type can be entered via the "ajaxterm_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the ajaxterm_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/share/ajaxterm/ajaxterm\.py
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the asterisk_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux ajaxterm policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ajaxterm processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for ajaxterm:
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B ajaxterm_ssh_t, ajaxterm_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux asterisk policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their asterisk processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for asterisk:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux ajaxterm policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ajaxterm processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for ajaxterm:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B asterisk_etc_t
++.B ajaxterm_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the asterisk_etc_t type, if you want to store asterisk files in the /etc directories.
++- Set files with the ajaxterm_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ajaxterm_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B asterisk_exec_t
++.B ajaxterm_initrc_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the asterisk_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the asterisk_t domain.
++- Set files with the ajaxterm_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ajaxterm_initrc_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B asterisk_initrc_exec_t
++.B ajaxterm_var_run_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the asterisk_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the asterisk_initrc_t domain.
++- Set files with the ajaxterm_var_run_t type, if you want to store the ajaxterm files under the /run directory.
+
+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B asterisk_log_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the asterisk_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as asterisk log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
-+
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
+
-+.EX
++.SH PORT TYPES
++SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
+.PP
-+.B asterisk_spool_t
-+.EE
++You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
+
-+- Set files with the asterisk_spool_t type, if you want to store the asterisk files under the /var/spool directory.
++.B semanage port -l
+
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
++SELinux ajaxterm policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ajaxterm processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following port types are defined for ajaxterm:
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B asterisk_tmp_t
++.TP 5
++.B ajaxterm_port_t
++.TP 10
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the asterisk_tmp_t type, if you want to store asterisk temporary files in the /tmp directories.
-+
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B asterisk_tmpfs_t
++Default Defined Ports:
++tcp 8022
+.EE
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+- Set files with the asterisk_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store asterisk files on a tmpfs file system.
-+
++The SELinux process type ajaxterm_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B asterisk_var_lib_t
-+.EE
++.br
++.B ajaxterm_var_run_t
+
-+- Set files with the asterisk_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the asterisk files under the /var/lib directory.
++ /var/run/ajaxterm\.pid
++.br
+
++.br
++.B ssh_home_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B asterisk_var_run_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the asterisk_var_run_t type, if you want to store the asterisk files under the /run directory.
-+
-+
-+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
-+
-+.SH PORT TYPES
-+SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
-+.PP
-+You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
++ /root/\.ssh(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/openshift/[^/]+/\.ssh(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/amanda/\.ssh(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/stickshift/[^/]+/\.ssh(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/gitolite/\.ssh(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/nocpulse/\.ssh(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/gitolite3/\.ssh(/.*)?
++.br
++ /root/\.shosts
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.ssh(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.shosts
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.ssh(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.shosts
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.ssh(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.shosts
++.br
+
-+.B semanage port -l
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
-+SELinux asterisk policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their asterisk processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following port types are defined for asterisk:
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the ajaxterm_ssh_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.TP 5
-+.B asterisk_port_t
-+.TP 10
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
+
-+
-+Default Defined Ports:
-+tcp 1720
-+.EE
-+udp 2427,2727,4569
-+.EE
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux asterisk policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their asterisk processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for asterisk:
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the ajaxterm_ssh_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B asterisk_t
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -2946,111 +3237,170 @@ index 0000000..7cf9e0a
+can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), asterisk(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/audisp_selinux.8 b/man/man8/audisp_selinux.8
++selinux(8), ajaxterm(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/alsa_selinux.8 b/man/man8/alsa_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..3ad89dc
+index 0000000..75888ee
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/audisp_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
-+.TH "audisp_selinux" "8" "audisp" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "audisp SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/alsa_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,170 @@
++.TH "alsa_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "alsa" "SELinux Policy documentation for alsa"
+.SH "NAME"
-+audisp_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the audisp processes
++alsa_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the alsa processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the audisp processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the alsa processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The alsa processes execute with the alsa_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep alsa_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
++The alsa_t SELinux type can be entered via the "alsa_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the alsa_t domain are the following:"
++
++/sbin/salsa, /sbin/alsactl, /usr/bin/ainit, /bin/alsaunmute, /usr/sbin/salsa, /usr/sbin/alsactl, /usr/bin/alsaunmute
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the audisp_t, audisp_remote_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux alsa policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their alsa processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for alsa:
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.B alsa_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the audisp_t, audisp_remote_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux alsa policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their alsa processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for alsa:
++
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.PP
++.B alsa_etc_rw_t
+.EE
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++- Set files with the alsa_etc_rw_t type, if you want to treat the files as alsa etc read/write content.
++
++
++.EX
+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.B alsa_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the alsa_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the alsa_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux audisp policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their audisp processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for audisp:
++.B alsa_home_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the alsa_home_t type, if you want to store alsa files in the users home directory.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B audisp_exec_t
++.B alsa_tmp_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the audisp_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the audisp_t domain.
++- Set files with the alsa_tmp_t type, if you want to store alsa temporary files in the /tmp directories.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/sbin/audispd, /usr/sbin/audispd
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B audisp_remote_exec_t
++.B alsa_unit_file_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the audisp_remote_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the audisp_remote_t domain.
++- Set files with the alsa_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as alsa unit content.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/sbin/audisp-remote, /sbin/audisp-remote
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B audisp_var_run_t
++.B alsa_var_lib_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the audisp_var_run_t type, if you want to store the audisp files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the alsa_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the alsa files under the /var/lib directory.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type alsa_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B alsa_etc_rw_t
++
++ /etc/asound(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/alsa/pcm(/.*)?
++.br
++ /usr/share/alsa/pcm(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/asound\.state
++.br
++ /etc/alsa/asound\.state
++.br
++ /usr/share/alsa/alsa\.conf
++.br
++
++.br
++.B alsa_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B alsa_var_lib_t
++
++ /var/lib/alsa(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux audisp policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their audisp processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for audisp:
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the alsa_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B audisp_remote_t, audisp_t
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
++
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the alsa_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -3063,148 +3413,130 @@ index 0000000..3ad89dc
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), audisp(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/auditadm_selinux.8 b/man/man8/auditadm_selinux.8
++selinux(8), alsa(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/amanda_recover_selinux.8 b/man/man8/amanda_recover_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..cba947e
+index 0000000..680559a
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/auditadm_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
-+.TH "auditadm_selinux" "8" "auditadm" "mgrepl at redhat.com" "auditadm SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/amanda_recover_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
++.TH "amanda_recover_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "amanda_recover" "SELinux Policy documentation for amanda_recover"
+.SH "NAME"
-+auditadm_r \- \fBAudit administrator role\fP - Security Enhanced Linux Policy
-+
-+.SH DESCRIPTION
-+
-+SELinux supports Roles Based Access Control, some Linux roles are login roles, while other roles need to be transition to.
++amanda_recover_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the amanda_recover processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Note: The examples in the man page will user the staff_u user.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the amanda_recover processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+Non login roles are usually used for administrative tasks.
++The amanda_recover processes execute with the amanda_recover_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+Roles usually have default types assigned to them.
++For example:
+
-+The default type for the auditadm_r role is auditadm_t.
++.B ps -eZ | grep amanda_recover_t
+
-+You can use the
-+.B newrole
-+program to transition directly to this role.
+
-+.B newrole -r auditadm_r -t auditadm_t
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
-+.B sudo
-+can also be setup to transition to this role using the visudo command.
++The amanda_recover_t SELinux type can be entered via the "amanda_recover_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the amanda_recover_t domain are the following:"
+
-+USERNAME ALL=(ALL) ROLE=auditadm_r TYPE=auditadm_t COMMAND
-+.br
-+sudo will run COMMAND as staff_u:auditadm_r:auditadm_t:LEVEL
++/usr/sbin/amrecover
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux amanda_recover policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their amanda_recover processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for amanda_recover:
+
-+If you want to use a non login role, you need to make sure the SELinux user you are using can reach this role.
++.EX
++.B amanda_recover_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
-+You can see all of the assigned SELinux roles using the following
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux amanda_recover policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their amanda_recover processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for amanda_recover:
+
-+.B semanage user -l
+
-+If you wanted to add auditadm_r to the staff_u user, you would execute:
++.EX
++.PP
++.B amanda_recover_dir_t
++.EE
+
-+.B $ semanage user -m -R 'staff_r auditadm_r' staff_u
++- Set files with the amanda_recover_dir_t type, if you want to treat the files as amanda recover dir data.
+
+
++.EX
++.PP
++.B amanda_recover_exec_t
++.EE
+
-+SELinux policy also controls which roles can transition to a different role.
-+You can list these rules using the following command.
++- Set files with the amanda_recover_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the amanda_recover_t domain.
+
-+.B sesearch --role_allow
+
-+SELinux policy allows the sysadm_r, secadm_r, staff_r roles can transition to the auditadm_r role.
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
+
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+.SH "COMMANDS"
++The SELinux process type amanda_recover_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
-+.B semanage login
-+can also be used to manipulate the Linux User to SELinux User mappings
++.br
++.B amanda_log_t
+
-+.B semanage user
-+can also be used to manipulate SELinux user definitions.
++ /var/log/amanda(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/amanda/[^/]*/log(/.*)?
++.br
+
-+.B system-config-selinux
-+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++.br
++.B amanda_recover_dir_t
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genuserman.py.
++ /root/restore
++.br
+
-+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), semanage(8).
-diff --git a/man/man8/auditctl_selinux.8 b/man/man8/auditctl_selinux.8
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..3b2ace8
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/auditctl_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
-+.TH "auditctl_selinux" "8" "auditctl" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "auditctl SELinux Policy documentation"
-+.SH "NAME"
-+auditctl_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the auditctl processes
-+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++.br
++.B amanda_tmp_t
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the auditctl processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
+
+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux auditctl policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their auditctl processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for auditctl:
-+
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the amanda_recover_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B auditctl_exec_t
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the auditctl_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the auditctl_t domain.
-+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/sbin/auditctl, /usr/sbin/auditctl
-+
-+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
-+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux auditctl policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their auditctl processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for auditctl:
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the amanda_recover_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B auditctl_t
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -3217,162 +3549,275 @@ index 0000000..3b2ace8
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), auditctl(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/auditd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/auditd_selinux.8
++selinux(8), amanda_recover(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, amanda_selinux(8), amanda_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/amanda_selinux.8 b/man/man8/amanda_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..d3f0e92
+index 0000000..6bdbec5
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/auditd_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,165 @@
-+.TH "auditd_selinux" "8" "auditd" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "auditd SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/amanda_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,277 @@
++.TH "amanda_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "amanda" "SELinux Policy documentation for amanda"
+.SH "NAME"
-+auditd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the auditd processes
++amanda_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the amanda processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the auditd processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the amanda processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The amanda processes execute with the amanda_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep amanda_t
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The amanda_t SELinux type can be entered via the "amanda_exec_t,amanda_inetd_exec_t" file types. The default entrypoint paths for the amanda_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/lib/amanda/.+, /usr/lib/amanda/amandad, /usr/lib/amanda/amindexd, /usr/lib/amanda/amidxtaped
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the auditadm_t, auditadm_gkeyringd_t, auditadm_su_t, auditd_t, auditadm_sudo_t, auditadm_screen_t, auditadm_wine_t, auditadm_seunshare_t, auditadm_dbusd_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux amanda policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their amanda processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for amanda:
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.B amanda_t, amanda_recover_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the auditadm_t, auditadm_gkeyringd_t, auditadm_su_t, auditd_t, auditadm_sudo_t, auditadm_screen_t, auditadm_wine_t, auditadm_seunshare_t, auditadm_dbusd_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux amanda policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their amanda processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for amanda:
++
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.PP
++.B amanda_amandates_t
+.EE
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++- Set files with the amanda_amandates_t type, if you want to treat the files as amanda amandates data.
++
++
++.EX
+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.B amanda_config_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the amanda_config_t type, if you want to treat the files as amanda configuration data, usually stored under the /etc directory.
++
++
++.EX
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux auditd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their auditd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for auditd:
++.B amanda_data_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the amanda_data_t type, if you want to treat the files as amanda content.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B auditd_etc_t
++.B amanda_dumpdates_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the auditd_etc_t type, if you want to store auditd files in the /etc directories.
++- Set files with the amanda_dumpdates_t type, if you want to treat the files as amanda dumpdates data.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B auditd_exec_t
++.B amanda_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the auditd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the auditd_t domain.
++- Set files with the amanda_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the amanda_t domain.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/sbin/auditd, /usr/sbin/auditd
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B auditd_initrc_exec_t
++.B amanda_gnutarlists_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the auditd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the auditd_initrc_t domain.
++- Set files with the amanda_gnutarlists_t type, if you want to treat the files as amanda gnutarlists data.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B auditd_log_t
++.B amanda_inetd_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the auditd_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as auditd log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++- Set files with the amanda_inetd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the amanda_inetd_t domain.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/log/audit(/.*)?, /var/log/audit\.log
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B auditd_unit_file_t
++.B amanda_log_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the auditd_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as auditd unit content.
++- Set files with the amanda_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as amanda log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B auditd_var_run_t
++.B amanda_recover_dir_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the auditd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the auditd files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the amanda_recover_dir_t type, if you want to treat the files as amanda recover dir data.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B amanda_recover_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the amanda_recover_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the amanda_recover_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B amanda_tmp_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the amanda_tmp_t type, if you want to store amanda temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B amanda_usr_lib_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the amanda_usr_lib_t type, if you want to treat the files as amanda usr lib data.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B amanda_var_lib_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the amanda_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the amanda files under the /var/lib directory.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/run/audit_events, /var/run/auditd_sock, /var/run/auditd\.pid
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
+.SH PORT TYPES
-+SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
++SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
+.PP
-+You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
++You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
+
+.B semanage port -l
+
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
-+SELinux auditd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their auditd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following port types are defined for auditd:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
++SELinux amanda policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their amanda processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following port types are defined for amanda:
+
+.EX
+.TP 5
-+.B audit_port_t
++.B amanda_port_t
+.TP 10
+.EE
+
+
+Default Defined Ports:
-+tcp 60
++tcp 10080-10083
+.EE
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++udp 10080-10082
++.EE
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type amanda_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B amanda_amandates_t
++
++ /etc/amandates
++.br
++
++.br
++.B amanda_data_t
++
++ /etc/amanda/.*/index(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/amanda/.*/tapelist(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/amanda/[^/]+(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B amanda_dumpdates_t
++
++ /etc/dumpdates
++.br
++
++.br
++.B amanda_gnutarlists_t
++
++ /var/lib/amanda/gnutar-lists(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B amanda_log_t
++
++ /var/log/amanda(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/amanda/[^/]*/log(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B amanda_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B amanda_var_lib_t
++
++ /var/lib/amanda/[^/]+/index(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/amanda
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux auditd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their auditd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for auditd:
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the amanda_recover_t, amanda_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B auditadm_su_t, auditadm_seunshare_t, auditadm_dbusd_t, auditadm_t, auditadm_sudo_t, auditadm_wine_t, auditadm_screen_t, auditadm_gkeyringd_t, auditd_t, auditctl_t
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
++
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the amanda_recover_t, amanda_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -3388,279 +3833,278 @@ index 0000000..d3f0e92
+can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), auditd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/automount_selinux.8 b/man/man8/automount_selinux.8
++selinux(8), amanda(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, amanda_recover_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/amavis_selinux.8 b/man/man8/amavis_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..df152ca
+index 0000000..28b1547
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/automount_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,139 @@
-+.TH "automount_selinux" "8" "automount" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "automount SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/amavis_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,283 @@
++.TH "amavis_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "amavis" "SELinux Policy documentation for amavis"
+.SH "NAME"
-+automount_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the automount processes
++amavis_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the amavis processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the automount processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the amavis processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The amavis processes execute with the amavis_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep amavis_t
+
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The amavis_t SELinux type can be entered via the "amavis_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the amavis_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/sbin/amavisd.*, /usr/lib/AntiVir/antivir
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the automount_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux amavis policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their amavis processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for amavis:
++
++.EX
++.B amavis_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH BOOLEANS
++SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. amavis policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run amavis with the tightest access possible.
++
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow amavis to use JIT compiler, you must turn on the amavis_use_jit boolean.
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.B setsebool -P amavis_use_jit 1
+.EE
+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the automount_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++If you want to allow amavis to use JIT compiler, you must turn on the amavis_use_jit boolean.
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B setsebool -P amavis_use_jit 1
+.EE
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux automount policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their automount processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for automount:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux amavis policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their amavis processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for amavis:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B automount_exec_t
++.B amavis_etc_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the automount_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the automount_t domain.
++- Set files with the amavis_etc_t type, if you want to store amavis files in the /etc directories.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/sbin/automount, /etc/apm/event\.d/autofs
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B automount_initrc_exec_t
++.B amavis_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the automount_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the automount_initrc_t domain.
++- Set files with the amavis_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the amavis_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B automount_keytab_t
++.B amavis_initrc_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the automount_keytab_t type, if you want to treat the files as kerberos keytab files.
++- Set files with the amavis_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the amavis_initrc_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B automount_lock_t
++.B amavis_quarantine_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the automount_lock_t type, if you want to treat the files as automount lock data, stored under the /var/lock directory
++- Set files with the amavis_quarantine_t type, if you want to treat the files as amavis quarantine data.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B automount_tmp_t
++.B amavis_spool_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the automount_tmp_t type, if you want to store automount temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++- Set files with the amavis_spool_t type, if you want to store the amavis files under the /var/spool directory.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B automount_unit_file_t
++.B amavis_tmp_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the automount_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as automount unit content.
++- Set files with the amavis_tmp_t type, if you want to store amavis temporary files in the /tmp directories.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B automount_var_run_t
++.B amavis_var_lib_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the automount_var_run_t type, if you want to store the automount files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the amavis_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the amavis files under the /var/lib directory.
+
+
++.EX
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
++.B amavis_var_log_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the amavis_var_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as amavis var log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux automount policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their automount processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for automount:
+
+.EX
-+.B automount_t
-+.EE
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++.B amavis_var_run_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the amavis_var_run_t type, if you want to store the amavis files under the /run directory.
++
+
-+.SH "COMMANDS"
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
-+.PP
-+.B semanage permissive
-+can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
+.PP
-+.B semanage module
-+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
+
++.SH PORT TYPES
++SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
-+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
-+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
-+
-+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), automount(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/avahi_selinux.8 b/man/man8/avahi_selinux.8
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..ea58fab
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/avahi_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,138 @@
-+.TH "avahi_selinux" "8" "avahi" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "avahi SELinux Policy documentation"
-+.SH "NAME"
-+avahi_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the avahi processes
-+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
-+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the avahi processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
-+
-+.SH BOOLEANS
-+SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. avahi policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run avahi with the tightest access possible.
++You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
+
++.B semanage port -l
+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow Apache to communicate with avahi service via dbus, you must turn on the httpd_dbus_avahi boolean.
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
++SELinux amavis policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their amavis processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following port types are defined for amavis:
+
+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P httpd_dbus_avahi 1
++.TP 5
++.B amavisd_recv_port_t
++.TP 10
+.EE
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the avahi_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++Default Defined Ports:
++tcp 10024
++.EE
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.TP 5
++.B amavisd_send_port_t
++.TP 10
+.EE
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the avahi_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++Default Defined Ports:
++tcp 10025
+.EE
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux avahi policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their avahi processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for avahi:
++The SELinux process type amavis_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
++.br
++.B amavis_quarantine_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B avahi_exec_t
-+.EE
++ /var/virusmails(/.*)?
++.br
+
-+- Set files with the avahi_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the avahi_t domain.
++.br
++.B amavis_spool_t
+
++ /var/spool/amavisd(/.*)?
+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/sbin/avahi-dnsconfd, /usr/sbin/avahi-autoipd, /usr/sbin/avahi-daemon
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B avahi_initrc_exec_t
-+.EE
++.br
++.B amavis_tmp_t
+
-+- Set files with the avahi_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the avahi_initrc_t domain.
+
++.br
++.B amavis_var_lib_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B avahi_unit_file_t
-+.EE
++ /var/amavis(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/amavis(/.*)?
++.br
+
-+- Set files with the avahi_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as avahi unit content.
++.br
++.B amavis_var_log_t
+
++ /var/log/amavisd\.log.*
++.br
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B avahi_var_lib_t
-+.EE
++.br
++.B amavis_var_run_t
+
-+- Set files with the avahi_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the avahi files under the /var/lib directory.
++ /var/run/amavis(d)?(/.*)?
++.br
+
++.br
++.B antivirus_db_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B avahi_var_run_t
-+.EE
++ /var/opt/f-secure(/.*)?
++.br
+
-+- Set files with the avahi_var_run_t type, if you want to store the avahi files under the /run directory.
++.br
++.B snmpd_var_lib_t
+
++ /var/agentx(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/snmp(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/net-snmp(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/net-snmp(/.*)?
++.br
++ /usr/share/snmp/mibs/\.index
++.br
+
-+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux avahi policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their avahi processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for avahi:
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the amavis_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B avahi_t
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
++
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the amavis_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -3672,95 +4116,111 @@ index 0000000..ea58fab
+.B semanage module
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
++.B semanage port
++can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
++
+.B semanage boolean
+can also be used to manipulate the booleans
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), avahi(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
++selinux(8), amavis(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+, setsebool(8)
\ No newline at end of file
-diff --git a/man/man8/awstats_selinux.8 b/man/man8/awstats_selinux.8
+diff --git a/man/man8/amtu_selinux.8 b/man/man8/amtu_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..a8d07a7
+index 0000000..96416ac
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/awstats_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
-+.TH "awstats_selinux" "8" "awstats" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "awstats SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/amtu_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,102 @@
++.TH "amtu_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "amtu" "SELinux Policy documentation for amtu"
+.SH "NAME"
-+awstats_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the awstats processes
++amtu_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the amtu processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the awstats processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the amtu processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The amtu processes execute with the amtu_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux awstats policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their awstats processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for awstats:
++For example:
+
++.B ps -eZ | grep amtu_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B awstats_exec_t
-+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the awstats_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the awstats_t domain.
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
++The amtu_t SELinux type can be entered via the "amtu_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the amtu_t domain are the following:"
+
-+.EX
++/usr/bin/amtu
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+.B awstats_tmp_t
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux amtu policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their amtu processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for amtu:
++
++.EX
++.B amtu_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
-+- Set files with the awstats_tmp_t type, if you want to store awstats temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux amtu policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their amtu processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for amtu:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B awstats_var_lib_t
++.B amtu_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the awstats_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the awstats files under the /var/lib directory.
++- Set files with the amtu_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the amtu_t domain.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux awstats policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their awstats processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for awstats:
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+.EX
-+.B awstats_t
-+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++The SELinux process type amtu_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B boot_t
++
++ /boot/.*
++.br
++ /vmlinuz.*
++.br
++ /initrd\.img.*
++.br
++ /boot
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -3773,119 +4233,269 @@ index 0000000..a8d07a7
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), awstats(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/bcfg2_selinux.8 b/man/man8/bcfg2_selinux.8
++selinux(8), amtu(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/apache_selinux.8 b/man/man8/apache_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..d1b1086
+index 0000000..1ff959f
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/bcfg2_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,119 @@
-+.TH "bcfg2_selinux" "8" "bcfg2" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "bcfg2 SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/apache_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1 @@
++.so man8/httpd_selinux.8
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/apcupsd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/apcupsd_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..5c83a01
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/apcupsd_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,264 @@
++.TH "apcupsd_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "apcupsd" "SELinux Policy documentation for apcupsd"
+.SH "NAME"
-+bcfg2_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the bcfg2 processes
++apcupsd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the apcupsd processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the bcfg2 processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the apcupsd processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The apcupsd processes execute with the apcupsd_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the bcfg2_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep apcupsd_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
++The apcupsd_t SELinux type can be entered via the "apcupsd_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the apcupsd_t domain are the following:"
++
++/sbin/apcupsd, /usr/sbin/apcupsd
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the bcfg2_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux apcupsd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their apcupsd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for apcupsd:
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B apcupsd_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux bcfg2 policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their bcfg2 processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for bcfg2:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux apcupsd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their apcupsd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for apcupsd:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B bcfg2_exec_t
++.B apcupsd_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the bcfg2_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the bcfg2_t domain.
++- Set files with the apcupsd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the apcupsd_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B bcfg2_initrc_exec_t
++.B apcupsd_initrc_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the bcfg2_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the bcfg2_initrc_t domain.
++- Set files with the apcupsd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the apcupsd_initrc_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B bcfg2_unit_file_t
++.B apcupsd_lock_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the bcfg2_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as bcfg2 unit content.
++- Set files with the apcupsd_lock_t type, if you want to treat the files as apcupsd lock data, stored under the /var/lock directory
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B bcfg2_var_lib_t
++.B apcupsd_log_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the bcfg2_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the bcfg2 files under the /var/lib directory.
++- Set files with the apcupsd_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as apcupsd log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B bcfg2_var_run_t
++.B apcupsd_tmp_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the bcfg2_var_run_t type, if you want to store the bcfg2 files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the apcupsd_tmp_t type, if you want to store apcupsd temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B apcupsd_unit_file_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the apcupsd_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as apcupsd unit content.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B apcupsd_var_run_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the apcupsd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the apcupsd files under the /run directory.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.SH PORT TYPES
++SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
++
++.B semanage port -l
++
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux bcfg2 policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their bcfg2 processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for bcfg2:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
++SELinux apcupsd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their apcupsd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following port types are defined for apcupsd:
+
+.EX
-+.B bcfg2_t
++.TP 5
++.B apcupsd_port_t
++.TP 10
+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++
++Default Defined Ports:
++tcp 3551
++.EE
++udp 3551
++.EE
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type apcupsd_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B apcupsd_lock_t
++
++ /var/lock/subsys/apcupsd
++.br
++
++.br
++.B apcupsd_log_t
++
++ /var/log/apcupsd\.events.*
++.br
++ /var/log/apcupsd\.status.*
++.br
++
++.br
++.B apcupsd_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B apcupsd_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/apcupsd\.pid
++.br
++
++.br
++.B etc_runtime_t
++
++ /[^/]+
++.br
++ /etc/mtab.*
++.br
++ /etc/blkid(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/nologin.*
++.br
++ /etc/\.fstab\.hal\..+
++.br
++ /halt
++.br
++ /fastboot
++.br
++ /poweroff
++.br
++ /etc/cmtab
++.br
++ /\.autofsck
++.br
++ /forcefsck
++.br
++ /\.suspended
++.br
++ /fsckoptions
++.br
++ /\.autorelabel
++.br
++ /etc/securetty
++.br
++ /etc/killpower
++.br
++ /etc/nohotplug
++.br
++ /etc/ioctl\.save
++.br
++ /etc/fstab\.REVOKE
++.br
++ /etc/network/ifstate
++.br
++ /etc/sysconfig/hwconf
++.br
++ /etc/ptal/ptal-printd-like
++.br
++ /etc/sysconfig/iptables\.save
++.br
++ /etc/xorg\.conf\.d/00-system-setup-keyboard\.conf
++.br
++ /etc/X11/xorg\.conf\.d/00-system-setup-keyboard\.conf
++.br
++
++.br
++.B initrc_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/utmp
++.br
++ /var/run/random-seed
++.br
++ /var/run/runlevel\.dir
++.br
++ /var/run/setmixer_flag
++.br
++
++.br
++.B systemd_passwd_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/systemd/ask-password(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/systemd/ask-password-block(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -3897,144 +4507,152 @@ index 0000000..d1b1086
+.B semanage module
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
++.B semanage port
++can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
++
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), bcfg2(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/bitlbee_selinux.8 b/man/man8/bitlbee_selinux.8
++selinux(8), apcupsd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/apm_selinux.8 b/man/man8/apm_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..48184bf
+index 0000000..2791aca
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/bitlbee_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,143 @@
-+.TH "bitlbee_selinux" "8" "bitlbee" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "bitlbee SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/apm_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,149 @@
++.TH "apm_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "apm" "SELinux Policy documentation for apm"
+.SH "NAME"
-+bitlbee_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the bitlbee processes
++apm_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the apm processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the bitlbee processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the apm processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The apm processes execute with the apm_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the bitlbee_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep apm_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
++The apm_t SELinux type can be entered via the "apm_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the apm_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/bin/apm
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the bitlbee_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux apm policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their apm processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for apm:
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B apm_t, apmd_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux bitlbee policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their bitlbee processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for bitlbee:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux apm policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their apm processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for apm:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B bitlbee_conf_t
++.B apm_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the bitlbee_conf_t type, if you want to treat the files as bitlbee configuration data, usually stored under the /etc directory.
++- Set files with the apm_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the apm_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B bitlbee_exec_t
++.B apmd_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the bitlbee_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the bitlbee_t domain.
++- Set files with the apmd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the apmd_t domain.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/sbin/bitlbee, /usr/bin/bip
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B bitlbee_initrc_exec_t
++.B apmd_lock_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the bitlbee_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the bitlbee_initrc_t domain.
++- Set files with the apmd_lock_t type, if you want to treat the files as apmd lock data, stored under the /var/lock directory
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B bitlbee_log_t
++.B apmd_log_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the bitlbee_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as bitlbee log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++- Set files with the apmd_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as apmd log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B bitlbee_tmp_t
++.B apmd_tmp_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the bitlbee_tmp_t type, if you want to store bitlbee temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++- Set files with the apmd_tmp_t type, if you want to store apmd temporary files in the /tmp directories.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B bitlbee_var_run_t
++.B apmd_unit_file_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the bitlbee_var_run_t type, if you want to store the bitlbee files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the apmd_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as apmd unit content.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/run/bitlbee\.pid, /var/run/bip(/.*)?, /var/run/bitlbee\.sock
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B bitlbee_var_t
++.B apmd_var_run_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the bitlbee_var_t type, if you want to store the bit files under the /var directory.
++- Set files with the apmd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the apmd files under the /run directory.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux bitlbee policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their bitlbee processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for bitlbee:
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the apmd_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B bitlbee_t
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
++
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the apmd_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -4047,202 +4665,230 @@ index 0000000..48184bf
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), bitlbee(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/blktap_selinux.8 b/man/man8/blktap_selinux.8
++selinux(8), apm(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, apmd_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/apmd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/apmd_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..e108b84
+index 0000000..071cf38
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/blktap_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
-+.TH "blktap_selinux" "8" "blktap" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "blktap SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/apmd_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,229 @@
++.TH "apmd_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "apmd" "SELinux Policy documentation for apmd"
+.SH "NAME"
-+blktap_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the blktap processes
++apmd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the apmd processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the blktap processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
-+
-+.SH BOOLEANS
-+SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. blktap policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run blktap with the tightest access possible.
-+
-+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow xend to run blktapctrl/tapdisk. Not required if using dedicated logical volumes for disk images, you must turn on the xend_run_blktap boolean.
-+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P xend_run_blktap 1
-+.EE
-+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
-+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux blktap policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their blktap processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for blktap:
-+
-+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B blktap_exec_t
-+.EE
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the apmd processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+- Set files with the blktap_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the blktap_t domain.
++The apmd processes execute with the apmd_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/sbin/blktapctrl, /usr/sbin/tapdisk
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B blktap_var_run_t
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep apmd_t
+
-+- Set files with the blktap_var_run_t type, if you want to store the blktap files under the /run directory.
+
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
-+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
++The apmd_t SELinux type can be entered via the "apmd_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the apmd_t domain are the following:"
+
++/usr/sbin/apmd, /usr/sbin/acpid, /usr/sbin/powersaved
+.SH PROCESS TYPES
+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux blktap policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their blktap processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for blktap:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux apmd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their apmd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for apmd:
+
+.EX
-+.B blktap_t
++.B apm_t, apmd_t
+.EE
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
-+.SH "COMMANDS"
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
-+.B semanage permissive
-+can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+.B semanage module
-+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux apmd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their apmd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for apmd:
+
-+.B semanage boolean
-+can also be used to manipulate the booleans
+
++.EX
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
-+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++.B apmd_exec_t
++.EE
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++- Set files with the apmd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the apmd_t domain.
+
-+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), blktap(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-+, setsebool(8)
-\ No newline at end of file
-diff --git a/man/man8/blueman_selinux.8 b/man/man8/blueman_selinux.8
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..959caf2
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/blueman_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
-+.TH "blueman_selinux" "8" "blueman" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "blueman SELinux Policy documentation"
-+.SH "NAME"
-+blueman_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the blueman processes
-+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the blueman processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++.EX
++.PP
++.B apmd_lock_t
++.EE
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++- Set files with the apmd_lock_t type, if you want to treat the files as apmd lock data, stored under the /var/lock directory
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the blueman_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.PP
++.B apmd_log_t
+.EE
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the blueman_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++- Set files with the apmd_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as apmd log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.PP
++.B apmd_tmp_t
+.EE
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux blueman policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their blueman processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for blueman:
++- Set files with the apmd_tmp_t type, if you want to store apmd temporary files in the /tmp directories.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B blueman_exec_t
++.B apmd_unit_file_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the blueman_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the blueman_t domain.
++- Set files with the apmd_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as apmd unit content.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B blueman_var_lib_t
++.B apmd_var_run_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the blueman_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the blueman files under the /var/lib directory.
++- Set files with the apmd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the apmd files under the /run directory.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type apmd_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B adjtime_t
++
++ /etc/adjtime
++.br
++
++.br
++.B apmd_lock_t
++
++
++.br
++.B apmd_log_t
++
++ /var/log/acpid.*
++.br
++
++.br
++.B apmd_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B apmd_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/\.?acpid\.socket
++.br
++ /var/run/apmd\.pid
++.br
++ /var/run/powersaved\.pid
++.br
++ /var/run/powersave_socket
++.br
++
++.br
++.B devicekit_var_log_t
++
++ /var/log/pm-suspend\.log.*
++.br
++ /var/log/pm-powersave\.log.*
++.br
++
++.br
++.B devicekit_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/udisks.*
++.br
++ /var/run/devkit(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/upower(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/pm-utils(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/DeviceKit-disks(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B initrc_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/utmp
++.br
++ /var/run/random-seed
++.br
++ /var/run/runlevel\.dir
++.br
++ /var/run/setmixer_flag
++.br
++
++.br
++.B sysctl_type
++
++
++.br
++.B sysfs_t
++
++ /sys(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B systemd_passwd_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/systemd/ask-password(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/systemd/ask-password-block(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux blueman policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their blueman processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for blueman:
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the apmd_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B blueman_t
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
++
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the apmd_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -4255,198 +4901,162 @@ index 0000000..959caf2
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), blueman(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/bluetooth_selinux.8 b/man/man8/bluetooth_selinux.8
++selinux(8), apmd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, apm_selinux(8), apm_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/arpwatch_selinux.8 b/man/man8/arpwatch_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..bf19998
+index 0000000..d869564
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/bluetooth_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,202 @@
-+.TH "bluetooth_selinux" "8" "bluetooth" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "bluetooth SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/arpwatch_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,160 @@
++.TH "arpwatch_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "arpwatch" "SELinux Policy documentation for arpwatch"
+.SH "NAME"
-+bluetooth_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the bluetooth processes
++arpwatch_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the arpwatch processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the bluetooth processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
-+
-+.SH BOOLEANS
-+SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. bluetooth policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run bluetooth with the tightest access possible.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the arpwatch processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
++The arpwatch processes execute with the arpwatch_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow xguest to use blue tooth devices, you must turn on the xguest_use_bluetooth boolean.
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P xguest_use_bluetooth 1
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep arpwatch_t
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the bluetooth_t, bluetooth_helper_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
++The arpwatch_t SELinux type can be entered via the "arpwatch_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the arpwatch_t domain are the following:"
+
++/usr/sbin/arpwatch
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the bluetooth_t, bluetooth_helper_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux arpwatch policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their arpwatch processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for arpwatch:
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B arpwatch_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux bluetooth policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their bluetooth processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for bluetooth:
-+
-+
-+.EX
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux arpwatch policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their arpwatch processes in as secure a method as possible.
+.PP
-+.B bluetooth_conf_rw_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the bluetooth_conf_rw_t type, if you want to treat the files as bluetooth conf read/write content.
++The following file types are defined for arpwatch:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B bluetooth_conf_t
++.B arpwatch_data_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the bluetooth_conf_t type, if you want to treat the files as bluetooth configuration data, usually stored under the /etc directory.
++- Set files with the arpwatch_data_t type, if you want to treat the files as arpwatch content.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B bluetooth_exec_t
++.B arpwatch_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the bluetooth_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the bluetooth_t domain.
++- Set files with the arpwatch_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the arpwatch_t domain.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/sbin/hcid, /usr/bin/rfcomm, /usr/sbin/sdpd, /usr/bin/hidd, /usr/sbin/bluetoothd, /usr/sbin/hid2hci, /usr/bin/dund, /usr/sbin/hciattach
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B bluetooth_helper_exec_t
++.B arpwatch_initrc_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the bluetooth_helper_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the bluetooth_helper_t domain.
++- Set files with the arpwatch_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the arpwatch_initrc_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B bluetooth_helper_tmp_t
++.B arpwatch_tmp_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the bluetooth_helper_tmp_t type, if you want to store bluetooth helper temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++- Set files with the arpwatch_tmp_t type, if you want to store arpwatch temporary files in the /tmp directories.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B bluetooth_helper_tmpfs_t
++.B arpwatch_unit_file_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the bluetooth_helper_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store bluetooth helper files on a tmpfs file system.
++- Set files with the arpwatch_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as arpwatch unit content.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B bluetooth_initrc_exec_t
++.B arpwatch_var_run_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the bluetooth_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the bluetooth_initrc_t domain.
++- Set files with the arpwatch_var_run_t type, if you want to store the arpwatch files under the /run directory.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/etc/rc\.d/init\.d/dund, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/bluetooth, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/pand
+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B bluetooth_lock_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the bluetooth_lock_t type, if you want to treat the files as bluetooth lock data, stored under the /var/lock directory
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
+
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B bluetooth_tmp_t
-+.EE
++The SELinux process type arpwatch_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
-+- Set files with the bluetooth_tmp_t type, if you want to store bluetooth temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++.br
++.B arpwatch_data_t
+
++ /var/arpwatch(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/arpwatch(/.*)?
++.br
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B bluetooth_unit_file_t
-+.EE
++.br
++.B arpwatch_tmp_t
+
-+- Set files with the bluetooth_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as bluetooth unit content.
+
++.br
++.B arpwatch_var_run_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B bluetooth_var_lib_t
-+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the bluetooth_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the bluetooth files under the /var/lib directory.
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the arpwatch_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B bluetooth_var_run_t
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the bluetooth_var_run_t type, if you want to store the bluetooth files under the /run directory.
-+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/run/bluetoothd_address, /var/run/sdp
-+
-+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
-+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux bluetooth policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their bluetooth processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for bluetooth:
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the arpwatch_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B bluetooth_helper_t, bluetooth_t
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -4458,181 +5068,226 @@ index 0000000..bf19998
+.B semanage module
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
-+.B semanage boolean
-+can also be used to manipulate the booleans
-+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), bluetooth(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-+, setsebool(8)
-\ No newline at end of file
-diff --git a/man/man8/boinc_selinux.8 b/man/man8/boinc_selinux.8
++selinux(8), arpwatch(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/asterisk_selinux.8 b/man/man8/asterisk_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..a5fad86
+index 0000000..070e49b
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/boinc_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,178 @@
-+.TH "boinc_selinux" "8" "boinc" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "boinc SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/asterisk_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,228 @@
++.TH "asterisk_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "asterisk" "SELinux Policy documentation for asterisk"
+.SH "NAME"
-+boinc_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the boinc processes
++asterisk_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the asterisk processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the boinc processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the asterisk processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The asterisk processes execute with the asterisk_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep asterisk_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The asterisk_t SELinux type can be entered via the "asterisk_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the asterisk_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/sbin/asterisk
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux asterisk policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their asterisk processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for asterisk:
++
++.EX
++.B asterisk_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux boinc policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their boinc processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for boinc:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux asterisk policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their asterisk processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for asterisk:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B boinc_exec_t
++.B asterisk_etc_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the boinc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the boinc_t domain.
++- Set files with the asterisk_etc_t type, if you want to store asterisk files in the /etc directories.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B boinc_initrc_exec_t
++.B asterisk_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the boinc_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the boinc_initrc_t domain.
++- Set files with the asterisk_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the asterisk_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B boinc_log_t
++.B asterisk_initrc_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the boinc_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as boinc log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++- Set files with the asterisk_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the asterisk_initrc_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B boinc_project_tmp_t
++.B asterisk_log_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the boinc_project_tmp_t type, if you want to store boinc project temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++- Set files with the asterisk_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as asterisk log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B boinc_project_var_lib_t
++.B asterisk_spool_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the boinc_project_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the boinc project files under the /var/lib directory.
++- Set files with the asterisk_spool_t type, if you want to store the asterisk files under the /var/spool directory.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/lib/boinc/projects(/.*)?, /var/lib/boinc/slots(/.*)?
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B boinc_tmp_t
++.B asterisk_tmp_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the boinc_tmp_t type, if you want to store boinc temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++- Set files with the asterisk_tmp_t type, if you want to store asterisk temporary files in the /tmp directories.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B boinc_tmpfs_t
++.B asterisk_tmpfs_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the boinc_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store boinc files on a tmpfs file system.
++- Set files with the asterisk_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store asterisk files on a tmpfs file system.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B boinc_unit_file_t
++.B asterisk_var_lib_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the boinc_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as boinc unit content.
++- Set files with the asterisk_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the asterisk files under the /var/lib directory.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B boinc_var_lib_t
++.B asterisk_var_run_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the boinc_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the boinc files under the /var/lib directory.
++- Set files with the asterisk_var_run_t type, if you want to store the asterisk files under the /run directory.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
+.SH PORT TYPES
-+SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
++SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
+.PP
-+You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
++You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
+
+.B semanage port -l
+
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
-+SELinux boinc policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their boinc processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following port types are defined for boinc:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
++SELinux asterisk policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their asterisk processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following port types are defined for asterisk:
+
+.EX
+.TP 5
-+.B boinc_client_ctrl_port_t
++.B asterisk_port_t
+.TP 10
+.EE
+
+
+Default Defined Ports:
-+tcp 1043
++tcp 1720
+.EE
-+
-+.EX
-+.TP 5
-+.B boinc_port_t
-+.TP 10
++udp 2427,2727,4569
+.EE
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
++The SELinux process type asterisk_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B asterisk_log_t
++
++ /var/log/asterisk(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B asterisk_spool_t
++
++ /var/spool/asterisk(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B asterisk_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B asterisk_tmpfs_t
++
++
++.br
++.B asterisk_var_lib_t
++
++ /var/lib/asterisk(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B asterisk_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/asterisk(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
-+Default Defined Ports:
-+tcp 31416
-+.EE
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux boinc policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their boinc processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for boinc:
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the asterisk_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B boinc_t, boinc_project_t
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
++
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the asterisk_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -4648,130 +5303,118 @@ index 0000000..a5fad86
+can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), boinc(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/bootloader_selinux.8 b/man/man8/bootloader_selinux.8
++selinux(8), asterisk(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/audisp_remote_selinux.8 b/man/man8/audisp_remote_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..6a3deb4
+index 0000000..e4c6d66
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/bootloader_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,134 @@
-+.TH "bootloader_selinux" "8" "bootloader" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "bootloader SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/audisp_remote_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,119 @@
++.TH "audisp_remote_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "audisp_remote" "SELinux Policy documentation for audisp_remote"
+.SH "NAME"
-+bootloader_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the bootloader processes
++audisp_remote_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the audisp_remote processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the bootloader processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
-+
-+.SH BOOLEANS
-+SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. bootloader policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run bootloader with the tightest access possible.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the audisp_remote processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
++The audisp_remote processes execute with the audisp_remote_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow the graphical login program to execute bootloader, you must turn on the xdm_exec_bootloader boolean.
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P xdm_exec_bootloader 1
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep audisp_remote_t
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the bootloader_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
++The audisp_remote_t SELinux type can be entered via the "audisp_remote_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the audisp_remote_t domain are the following:"
+
++/sbin/audisp-remote, /usr/sbin/audisp-remote
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the bootloader_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux audisp_remote policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their audisp_remote processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for audisp_remote:
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B audisp_remote_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux bootloader policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their bootloader processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for bootloader:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux audisp_remote policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their audisp_remote processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for audisp_remote:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B bootloader_etc_t
++.B audisp_remote_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the bootloader_etc_t type, if you want to store bootloader files in the /etc directories.
++- Set files with the audisp_remote_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the audisp_remote_t domain.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/etc/zipl\.conf.*, /etc/yaboot\.conf.*, /etc/default/grub, /etc/lilo\.conf.*
+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B bootloader_exec_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the bootloader_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the bootloader_t domain.
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/sbin/ybin.*, /usr/sbin/zipl, /sbin/lilo.*, /sbin/ybin.*, /usr/sbin/lilo.*, /sbin/grub.*, /sbin/zipl, /usr/sbin/grub.*
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B bootloader_tmp_t
-+.EE
++The SELinux process type audisp_remote_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
-+- Set files with the bootloader_tmp_t type, if you want to store bootloader temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++.br
++.B audit_spool_t
+
++ /var/spool/audit(/.*)?
++.br
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B bootloader_var_run_t
-+.EE
++.br
++.B systemd_passwd_var_run_t
+
-+- Set files with the bootloader_var_run_t type, if you want to store the bootloader files under the /run directory.
++ /var/run/systemd/ask-password(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/systemd/ask-password-block(/.*)?
++.br
+
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the audisp_remote_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux bootloader policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their bootloader processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for bootloader:
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the audisp_remote_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B bootloader_t
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -4783,170 +5426,119 @@ index 0000000..6a3deb4
+.B semanage module
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
-+.B semanage boolean
-+can also be used to manipulate the booleans
-+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), bootloader(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-+, setsebool(8)
++selinux(8), audisp_remote(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, audisp_selinux(8), audisp_selinux(8)
\ No newline at end of file
-diff --git a/man/man8/brctl_selinux.8 b/man/man8/brctl_selinux.8
+diff --git a/man/man8/audisp_selinux.8 b/man/man8/audisp_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..dbbebfb
+index 0000000..b50bbfe
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/brctl_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
-+.TH "brctl_selinux" "8" "brctl" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "brctl SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/audisp_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,117 @@
++.TH "audisp_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "audisp" "SELinux Policy documentation for audisp"
+.SH "NAME"
-+brctl_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the brctl processes
++audisp_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the audisp processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the brctl processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
-+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the audisp processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux brctl policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their brctl processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for brctl:
++The audisp processes execute with the audisp_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B brctl_exec_t
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep audisp_t
+
-+- Set files with the brctl_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the brctl_t domain.
+
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
-+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
++The audisp_t SELinux type can be entered via the "audisp_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the audisp_t domain are the following:"
+
++/sbin/audispd, /usr/sbin/audispd
+.SH PROCESS TYPES
+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux brctl policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their brctl processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for brctl:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux audisp policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their audisp processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for audisp:
+
+.EX
-+.B brctl_t
++.B audisp_remote_t, audisp_t
+.EE
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
-+.SH "COMMANDS"
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
-+.B semanage permissive
-+can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+.B semanage module
-+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
-+
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux audisp policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their audisp processes in as secure a method as possible.
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
-+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
-+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
-+
-+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), brctl(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/cachefilesd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/cachefilesd_selinux.8
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..9043116
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/cachefilesd_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
-+.TH "cachefilesd_selinux" "8" "cachefilesd" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "cachefilesd SELinux Policy documentation"
-+.SH "NAME"
-+cachefilesd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the cachefilesd processes
-+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
-+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the cachefilesd processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++The following file types are defined for audisp:
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.EX
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux cachefilesd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their cachefilesd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for cachefilesd:
++.B audisp_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the audisp_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the audisp_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B cachefilesd_exec_t
++.B audisp_remote_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the cachefilesd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the cachefilesd_t domain.
++- Set files with the audisp_remote_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the audisp_remote_t domain.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/sbin/cachefilesd, /usr/sbin/cachefilesd
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B cachefilesd_var_run_t
++.B audisp_var_run_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the cachefilesd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the cachefilesd files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the audisp_var_run_t type, if you want to store the audisp files under the /run directory.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux cachefilesd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their cachefilesd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for cachefilesd:
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the audisp_t, audisp_remote_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B cachefilesd_t, cachefiles_kernel_t
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
++
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the audisp_t, audisp_remote_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -4959,236 +5551,244 @@ index 0000000..9043116
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), cachefilesd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/calamaris_selinux.8 b/man/man8/calamaris_selinux.8
++selinux(8), audisp(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, audisp_remote_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/auditadm_selinux.8 b/man/man8/auditadm_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..61353ef
+index 0000000..42e7075
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/calamaris_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
-+.TH "calamaris_selinux" "8" "calamaris" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "calamaris SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/auditadm_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,242 @@
++.TH "auditadm_selinux" "8" "auditadm" "mgrepl at redhat.com" "auditadm SELinux Policy documentation"
+.SH "NAME"
-+calamaris_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the calamaris processes
-+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++auditadm_r \- \fBAudit administrator role\fP - Security Enhanced Linux Policy
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the calamaris processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++.SH DESCRIPTION
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++SELinux supports Roles Based Access Control (RBAC), some Linux roles are login roles, while other roles need to be transition into.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the calamaris_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++.I Note:
++Examples in this man page will use the
++.B staff_u
++SELinux user.
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
++Non login roles are usually used for administrative tasks. For example, tasks that require root privileges. Roles control which types a user can run processes with. Roles often have default types assigned to them.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the calamaris_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++The default type for the auditadm_r role is auditadm_t.
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
-+.EE
++The
++.B newrole
++program to transition directly to this role.
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux calamaris policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their calamaris processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for calamaris:
++.B newrole -r auditadm_r -t auditadm_t
+
++.B sudo
++is the preferred method to do transition from one role to another. You setup sudo to transition to auditadm_r by adding a similar line to the /etc/sudoers file.
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B calamaris_exec_t
-+.EE
++USERNAME ALL=(ALL) ROLE=auditadm_r TYPE=auditadm_t COMMAND
+
-+- Set files with the calamaris_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the calamaris_t domain.
++.br
++sudo will run COMMAND as staff_u:auditadm_r:auditadm_t:LEVEL
+
++When using a a non login role, you need to setup SELinux so that your SELinux user can reach auditadm_r role.
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B calamaris_log_t
-+.EE
++Execute the following to see all of the assigned SELinux roles:
+
-+- Set files with the calamaris_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as calamaris log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++.B semanage user -l
+
++You need to add auditadm_r to the staff_u user. You could setup the staff_u user to be able to use the auditadm_r role with a command like:
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B calamaris_www_t
-+.EE
++.B $ semanage user -m -R 'staff_r system_r auditadm_r' staff_u
+
-+- Set files with the calamaris_www_t type, if you want to treat the files as calamaris www data.
+
+
-+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
++SELinux policy also controls which roles can transition to a different role.
++You can list these rules using the following command.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux calamaris policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their calamaris processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for calamaris:
++.B search --role_allow
+
-+.EX
-+.B calamaris_t
-+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++SELinux policy allows the sysadm_r, secadm_r, staff_r roles can transition to the auditadm_r role.
+
-+.SH "COMMANDS"
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
-+.PP
-+.B semanage permissive
-+can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
-+.PP
-+.B semanage module
-+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
-+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
-+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++The SELinux process type auditadm_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
-+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), calamaris(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/callweaver_selinux.8 b/man/man8/callweaver_selinux.8
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..5966166
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/callweaver_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,127 @@
-+.TH "callweaver_selinux" "8" "callweaver" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "callweaver SELinux Policy documentation"
-+.SH "NAME"
-+callweaver_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the callweaver processes
-+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++.br
++.B anon_inodefs_t
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the callweaver processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++.br
++.B auditd_etc_t
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the callweaver_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++ /etc/audit(/.*)?
++.br
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
++.br
++.B auditd_log_t
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the callweaver_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++ /var/log/audit(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/log/audit\.log
++.br
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
-+.EE
++.br
++.B auth_cache_t
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux callweaver policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their callweaver processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for callweaver:
++ /var/cache/coolkey(/.*)?
++.br
+
++.br
++.B cgroup_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B callweaver_exec_t
-+.EE
++ /cgroup
++.br
++ /sys/fs/cgroup
++.br
+
-+- Set files with the callweaver_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the callweaver_t domain.
++.br
++.B chrome_sandbox_tmpfs_t
+
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B callweaver_initrc_exec_t
-+.EE
++.br
++.B games_data_t
+
-+- Set files with the callweaver_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the callweaver_initrc_t domain.
++ /var/games(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/games(/.*)?
++.br
+
++.br
++.B gpg_agent_tmp_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B callweaver_log_t
-+.EE
++ /home/[^/]*/\.gnupg/log-socket
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.gnupg/log-socket
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.gnupg/log-socket
++.br
+
-+- Set files with the callweaver_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as callweaver log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++.br
++.B mail_spool_t
+
++ /var/mail(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/spool/imap(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/spool/mail(/.*)?
++.br
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B callweaver_spool_t
-+.EE
++.br
++.B mqueue_spool_t
+
-+- Set files with the callweaver_spool_t type, if you want to store the callweaver files under the /var/spool directory.
++ /var/spool/(client)?mqueue(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/spool/mqueue\.in(/.*)?
++.br
+
++.br
++.B nfsd_rw_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B callweaver_var_lib_t
-+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the callweaver_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the callweaver files under the /var/lib directory.
++.br
++.B noxattrfs
+
++ all files on file systems which do not support extended attributes
++.br
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B callweaver_var_run_t
-+.EE
++.br
++.B screen_home_t
+
-+- Set files with the callweaver_var_run_t type, if you want to store the callweaver files under the /run directory.
++ /root/\.screen(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.screen(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.screenrc
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.screen(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.screenrc
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.screen(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.screenrc
++.br
+
++.br
++.B security_t
+
-+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
++ /selinux
++.br
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux callweaver policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their callweaver processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for callweaver:
++.br
++.B usbfs_t
+
-+.EX
-+.B callweaver_t
-+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.br
++.B user_fonts_cache_t
++
++ /root/\.fontconfig(/.*)?
++.br
++ /root/\.fonts/auto(/.*)?
++.br
++ /root/\.fonts\.cache-.*
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.fontconfig(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.fonts/auto(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.fonts\.cache-.*
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.fontconfig(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.fonts/auto(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.fonts\.cache-.*
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.fontconfig(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.fonts/auto(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.fonts\.cache-.*
++.br
++
++.br
++.B user_home_type
++
++ all user home files
++.br
++
++.br
++.B user_tmp_type
++
++ all user tmp files
++.br
++
++.br
++.B user_tmpfs_type
++
++ all user content in tmpfs file systems
++.br
++
++.br
++.B xdm_tmp_t
++
++ /tmp/\.X11-unix(/.*)?
++.br
++ /tmp/\.ICE-unix(/.*)?
++.br
++ /tmp/\.X0-lock
++.br
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -5201,121 +5801,86 @@ index 0000000..5966166
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), callweaver(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/canna_selinux.8 b/man/man8/canna_selinux.8
++selinux(8), auditadm(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/auditctl_selinux.8 b/man/man8/auditctl_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..b6eda1f
+index 0000000..5fea87e
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/canna_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,121 @@
-+.TH "canna_selinux" "8" "canna" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "canna SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/auditctl_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
++.TH "auditctl_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "auditctl" "SELinux Policy documentation for auditctl"
+.SH "NAME"
-+canna_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the canna processes
++auditctl_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the auditctl processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the canna processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the auditctl processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The auditctl processes execute with the auditctl_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux canna policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their canna processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for canna:
++For example:
+
++.B ps -eZ | grep auditctl_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B canna_exec_t
-+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the canna_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the canna_t domain.
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/bin/catdic, /usr/bin/cannaping, /usr/sbin/jserver, /usr/sbin/cannaserver
++The auditctl_t SELinux type can be entered via the "auditctl_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the auditctl_t domain are the following:"
+
-+.EX
++/sbin/auditctl, /usr/sbin/auditctl
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+.B canna_initrc_exec_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the canna_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the canna_initrc_t domain.
-+
-+
-+.EX
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+.B canna_log_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the canna_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as canna log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
-+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/log/wnn(/.*)?, /var/log/canna(/.*)?
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux auditctl policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their auditctl processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for auditctl:
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B canna_var_lib_t
++.B auditctl_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
-+- Set files with the canna_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the canna files under the /var/lib directory.
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux auditctl policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their auditctl processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for auditctl:
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/lib/wnn/dic(/.*)?, /var/lib/canna/dic(/.*)?
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B canna_var_run_t
++.B auditctl_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the canna_var_run_t type, if you want to store the canna files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the auditctl_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the auditctl_t domain.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/run/\.iroha_unix/.*, /var/run/wnn-unix(/.*)?, /var/run/\.iroha_unix
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux canna policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their canna processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for canna:
-+
-+.EX
-+.B canna_t
-+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -5328,240 +5893,197 @@ index 0000000..b6eda1f
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), canna(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/cardmgr_selinux.8 b/man/man8/cardmgr_selinux.8
++selinux(8), auditctl(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/auditd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/auditd_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..d3e6992
+index 0000000..d1a4a01
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/cardmgr_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
-+.TH "cardmgr_selinux" "8" "cardmgr" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "cardmgr SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/auditd_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,201 @@
++.TH "auditd_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "auditd" "SELinux Policy documentation for auditd"
+.SH "NAME"
-+cardmgr_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the cardmgr processes
++auditd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the auditd processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the cardmgr processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the auditd processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The auditd processes execute with the auditd_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep auditd_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The auditd_t SELinux type can be entered via the "auditd_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the auditd_t domain are the following:"
++
++/sbin/auditd, /usr/sbin/auditd
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux auditd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their auditd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for auditd:
++
++.EX
++.B auditadm_su_t, auditadm_seunshare_t, auditadm_dbusd_t, auditadm_t, auditadm_sudo_t, auditadm_wine_t, auditadm_screen_t, auditadm_gkeyringd_t, auditd_t, auditctl_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux cardmgr policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their cardmgr processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for cardmgr:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux auditd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their auditd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for auditd:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B cardmgr_dev_t
++.B auditd_etc_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the cardmgr_dev_t type, if you want to treat the files as cardmgr dev data.
++- Set files with the auditd_etc_t type, if you want to store auditd files in the /etc directories.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B cardmgr_exec_t
++.B auditd_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the cardmgr_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the cardmgr_t domain.
++- Set files with the auditd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the auditd_t domain.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/sbin/cardmgr, /etc/apm/event\.d/pcmcia, /usr/sbin/cardmgr
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B cardmgr_lnk_t
++.B auditd_initrc_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the cardmgr_lnk_t type, if you want to treat the files as cardmgr lnk data.
++- Set files with the auditd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the auditd_initrc_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B cardmgr_var_lib_t
++.B auditd_log_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the cardmgr_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the cardmgr files under the /var/lib directory.
++- Set files with the auditd_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as auditd log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B cardmgr_var_run_t
++.B auditd_unit_file_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the cardmgr_var_run_t type, if you want to store the cardmgr files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the auditd_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as auditd unit content.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/run/cardmgr\.pid, /var/run/stab, /var/lib/pcmcia(/.*)?
+
++.EX
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
++.B auditd_var_run_t
++.EE
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux cardmgr policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their cardmgr processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for cardmgr:
++- Set files with the auditd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the auditd files under the /run directory.
+
-+.EX
-+.B cardmgr_t
-+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
-+.SH "COMMANDS"
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
-+.PP
-+.B semanage permissive
-+can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
+.PP
-+.B semanage module
-+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
+
++.SH PORT TYPES
++SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
-+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
-+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
-+
-+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), cardmgr(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/ccs_selinux.8 b/man/man8/ccs_selinux.8
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..3eb68f4
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/ccs_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,121 @@
-+.TH "ccs_selinux" "8" "ccs" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "ccs SELinux Policy documentation"
-+.SH "NAME"
-+ccs_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the ccs processes
-+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
-+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the ccs processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++.B semanage port -l
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
++SELinux auditd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their auditd processes in as secure a method as possible.
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux ccs policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ccs processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for ccs:
-+
++The following port types are defined for auditd:
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B ccs_exec_t
++.TP 5
++.B audit_port_t
++.TP 10
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the ccs_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ccs_t domain.
-+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/sbin/ccsd, /sbin/ccsd
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B ccs_tmp_t
++Default Defined Ports:
++tcp 60
+.EE
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+- Set files with the ccs_tmp_t type, if you want to store ccs temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++The SELinux process type auditd_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
++.br
++.B anon_inodefs_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B ccs_tmpfs_t
-+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the ccs_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store ccs files on a tmpfs file system.
++.br
++.B auditd_log_t
+
++ /var/log/audit(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/log/audit\.log
++.br
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B ccs_var_lib_t
-+.EE
++.br
++.B auditd_var_run_t
+
-+- Set files with the ccs_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the ccs files under the /var/lib directory.
++ /var/run/auditd\.pid
++.br
++ /var/run/auditd_sock
++.br
++ /var/run/audit_events
++.br
+
++.br
++.B systemd_passwd_var_run_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B ccs_var_log_t
-+.EE
++ /var/run/systemd/ask-password(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/systemd/ask-password-block(/.*)?
++.br
+
-+- Set files with the ccs_var_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as ccs var log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the auditadm_t, auditadm_gkeyringd_t, auditadm_su_t, auditd_t, auditadm_sudo_t, auditadm_screen_t, auditadm_wine_t, auditadm_seunshare_t, auditadm_dbusd_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B ccs_var_run_t
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the ccs_var_run_t type, if you want to store the ccs files under the /run directory.
-+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/run/cluster/ccsd\.pid, /var/run/cluster/ccsd\.sock
-+
-+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
-+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux ccs policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ccs processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for ccs:
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the auditadm_t, auditadm_gkeyringd_t, auditadm_su_t, auditd_t, auditadm_sudo_t, auditadm_screen_t, auditadm_wine_t, auditadm_seunshare_t, auditadm_dbusd_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B ccs_t
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -5573,96 +6095,110 @@ index 0000000..3eb68f4
+.B semanage module
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
++.B semanage port
++can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
++
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), ccs(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/cdcc_selinux.8 b/man/man8/cdcc_selinux.8
++selinux(8), auditd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, auditadm_selinux(8), auditctl_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/authconfig_selinux.8 b/man/man8/authconfig_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..9cf6042
+index 0000000..18ad01b
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/cdcc_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
-+.TH "cdcc_selinux" "8" "cdcc" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "cdcc SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/authconfig_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
++.TH "authconfig_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "authconfig" "SELinux Policy documentation for authconfig"
+.SH "NAME"
-+cdcc_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the cdcc processes
++authconfig_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the authconfig processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the cdcc processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the authconfig processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The authconfig processes execute with the authconfig_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the cdcc_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep authconfig_t
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
+
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The authconfig_t SELinux type can be entered via the "filesystem_type,authconfig_exec_t,unlabeled_t,proc_type,mtrr_device_t,sysctl_type,file_type" file types. The default entrypoint paths for the authconfig_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/share/authconfig/authconfig.py, /dev/cpu/mtrr, all files on the system
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the cdcc_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux authconfig policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their authconfig processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for authconfig:
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B authconfig_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux cdcc policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their cdcc processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for cdcc:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux authconfig policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their authconfig processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for authconfig:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B cdcc_exec_t
++.B authconfig_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the cdcc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the cdcc_t domain.
++- Set files with the authconfig_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the authconfig_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B cdcc_tmp_t
++.B authconfig_var_lib_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the cdcc_tmp_t type, if you want to store cdcc temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++- Set files with the authconfig_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the authconfig files under the /var/lib directory.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux cdcc policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their cdcc processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for cdcc:
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+.EX
-+.B cdcc_t
-+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++The SELinux process type authconfig_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B file_type
++
++ all files on the system
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -5675,249 +6211,176 @@ index 0000000..9cf6042
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), cdcc(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/cdrecord_selinux.8 b/man/man8/cdrecord_selinux.8
++selinux(8), authconfig(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/automount_selinux.8 b/man/man8/automount_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..48d9d17
+index 0000000..c7bbc5a
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/cdrecord_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
-+.TH "cdrecord_selinux" "8" "cdrecord" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "cdrecord SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/automount_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,176 @@
++.TH "automount_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "automount" "SELinux Policy documentation for automount"
+.SH "NAME"
-+cdrecord_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the cdrecord processes
++automount_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the automount processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the cdrecord processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the automount processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH BOOLEANS
-+SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. cdrecord policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run cdrecord with the tightest access possible.
++The automount processes execute with the automount_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
++For example:
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow cdrecord to read various content. nfs, samba, removable devices, user temp and untrusted content files, you must turn on the cdrecord_read_content boolean.
++.B ps -eZ | grep automount_t
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P cdrecord_read_content 1
-+.EE
-+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
-+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux cdrecord policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their cdrecord processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for cdrecord:
-+
-+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B cdrecord_exec_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the cdrecord_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the cdrecord_t domain.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/bin/cdrecord, /usr/bin/wodim, /usr/bin/growisofs
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
-+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
++The automount_t SELinux type can be entered via the "automount_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the automount_t domain are the following:"
+
++/usr/sbin/automount, /etc/apm/event\.d/autofs
+.SH PROCESS TYPES
+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux cdrecord policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their cdrecord processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for cdrecord:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux automount policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their automount processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for automount:
+
+.EX
-+.B cdrecord_t
++.B automount_t
+.EE
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
-+.SH "COMMANDS"
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
-+.B semanage permissive
-+can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+.B semanage module
-+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
-+
-+.B semanage boolean
-+can also be used to manipulate the booleans
-+
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux automount policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their automount processes in as secure a method as possible.
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
-+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
-+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
-+
-+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), cdrecord(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-+, setsebool(8)
-\ No newline at end of file
-diff --git a/man/man8/certmaster_selinux.8 b/man/man8/certmaster_selinux.8
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..ad180e1
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/certmaster_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,153 @@
-+.TH "certmaster_selinux" "8" "certmaster" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "certmaster SELinux Policy documentation"
-+.SH "NAME"
-+certmaster_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the certmaster processes
-+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
-+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the certmaster processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
-+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The following file types are defined for automount:
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the certmaster_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
-+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the certmaster_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
-+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B automount_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux certmaster policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their certmaster processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for certmaster:
++- Set files with the automount_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the automount_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B certmaster_etc_rw_t
++.B automount_initrc_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the certmaster_etc_rw_t type, if you want to treat the files as certmaster etc read/write content.
++- Set files with the automount_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the automount_initrc_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B certmaster_exec_t
++.B automount_keytab_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the certmaster_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the certmaster_t domain.
++- Set files with the automount_keytab_t type, if you want to treat the files as kerberos keytab files.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B certmaster_initrc_exec_t
++.B automount_lock_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the certmaster_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the certmaster_initrc_t domain.
++- Set files with the automount_lock_t type, if you want to treat the files as automount lock data, stored under the /var/lock directory
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B certmaster_var_lib_t
++.B automount_tmp_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the certmaster_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the certmaster files under the /var/lib directory.
++- Set files with the automount_tmp_t type, if you want to store automount temporary files in the /tmp directories.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B certmaster_var_log_t
++.B automount_unit_file_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the certmaster_var_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as certmaster var log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++- Set files with the automount_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as automount unit content.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B certmaster_var_run_t
++.B automount_var_run_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the certmaster_var_run_t type, if you want to store the certmaster files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the automount_var_run_t type, if you want to store the automount files under the /run directory.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PORT TYPES
-+SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
-+.PP
-+You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+.B semanage port -l
++The SELinux process type automount_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B automount_lock_t
++
++
++.br
++.B automount_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B automount_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/autofs.*
++.br
++
++.br
++.B samba_var_t
++
++ /var/lib/samba(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/cache/samba(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/spool/samba(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
-+SELinux certmaster policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their certmaster processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following port types are defined for certmaster:
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the automount_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.TP 5
-+.B certmaster_port_t
-+.TP 10
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
+
-+
-+Default Defined Ports:
-+tcp 51235
-+.EE
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux certmaster policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their certmaster processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for certmaster:
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the automount_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B certmaster_t
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -5929,123 +6392,193 @@ index 0000000..ad180e1
+.B semanage module
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
-+.B semanage port
-+can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
-+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), certmaster(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/certmonger_selinux.8 b/man/man8/certmonger_selinux.8
++selinux(8), automount(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/avahi_selinux.8 b/man/man8/avahi_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..a40b2c3
+index 0000000..e4baa1f
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/certmonger_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,119 @@
-+.TH "certmonger_selinux" "8" "certmonger" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "certmonger SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/avahi_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,196 @@
++.TH "avahi_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "avahi" "SELinux Policy documentation for avahi"
+.SH "NAME"
-+certmonger_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the certmonger processes
++avahi_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the avahi processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the certmonger processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the avahi processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The avahi processes execute with the avahi_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep avahi_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The avahi_t SELinux type can be entered via the "avahi_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the avahi_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/sbin/avahi-daemon, /usr/sbin/avahi-autoipd, /usr/sbin/avahi-dnsconfd
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the certmonger_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux avahi policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their avahi processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for avahi:
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.B avahi_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH BOOLEANS
++SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. avahi policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run avahi with the tightest access possible.
++
+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the certmonger_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++If you want to allow Apache to communicate with avahi service via dbus, you must turn on the httpd_dbus_avahi boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P httpd_dbus_avahi 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow Apache to communicate with avahi service via dbus, you must turn on the httpd_dbus_avahi boolean.
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B setsebool -P httpd_dbus_avahi 1
+.EE
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux certmonger policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their certmonger processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for certmonger:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux avahi policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their avahi processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for avahi:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B certmonger_exec_t
++.B avahi_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the certmonger_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the certmonger_t domain.
++- Set files with the avahi_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the avahi_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B certmonger_initrc_exec_t
++.B avahi_initrc_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the certmonger_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the certmonger_initrc_t domain.
++- Set files with the avahi_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the avahi_initrc_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B certmonger_unconfined_exec_t
++.B avahi_unit_file_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the certmonger_unconfined_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the certmonger_unconfined_t domain.
++- Set files with the avahi_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as avahi unit content.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B certmonger_var_lib_t
++.B avahi_var_lib_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the certmonger_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the certmonger files under the /var/lib directory.
++- Set files with the avahi_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the avahi files under the /var/lib directory.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B certmonger_var_run_t
++.B avahi_var_run_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the certmonger_var_run_t type, if you want to store the certmonger files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the avahi_var_run_t type, if you want to store the avahi files under the /run directory.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type avahi_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B avahi_var_lib_t
++
++ /var/lib/avahi-autoipd(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B avahi_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/avahi-daemon(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B net_conf_t
++
++ /etc/ntpd?\.conf.*
++.br
++ /etc/hosts[^/]*
++.br
++ /etc/yp\.conf.*
++.br
++ /etc/denyhosts.*
++.br
++ /etc/hosts\.deny.*
++.br
++ /etc/resolv\.conf.*
++.br
++ /etc/ntp/step-tickers.*
++.br
++ /etc/sysconfig/networking(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/sysconfig/network-scripts(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/sysconfig/network-scripts/.*resolv\.conf
++.br
++ /etc/ethers
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux certmonger policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their certmonger processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for certmonger:
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the avahi_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B certmonger_t
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
++
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the avahi_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -6057,74 +6590,122 @@ index 0000000..a40b2c3
+.B semanage module
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
++.B semanage boolean
++can also be used to manipulate the booleans
++
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), certmonger(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/certwatch_selinux.8 b/man/man8/certwatch_selinux.8
++selinux(8), avahi(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, setsebool(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/awstats_selinux.8 b/man/man8/awstats_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..1926b29
+index 0000000..cffff58
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/certwatch_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
-+.TH "certwatch_selinux" "8" "certwatch" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "certwatch SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/awstats_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,116 @@
++.TH "awstats_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "awstats" "SELinux Policy documentation for awstats"
+.SH "NAME"
-+certwatch_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the certwatch processes
++awstats_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the awstats processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the certwatch processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the awstats processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The awstats processes execute with the awstats_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep awstats_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The awstats_t SELinux type can be entered via the "awstats_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the awstats_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/share/awstats/tools/.+\.pl
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux awstats policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their awstats processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for awstats:
++
++.EX
++.B awstats_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux certwatch policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their certwatch processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for certwatch:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux awstats policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their awstats processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for awstats:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B certwatch_exec_t
++.B awstats_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the certwatch_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the certwatch_t domain.
++- Set files with the awstats_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the awstats_t domain.
+
+
++.EX
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
++.B awstats_tmp_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the awstats_tmp_t type, if you want to store awstats temporary files in the /tmp directories.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux certwatch policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their certwatch processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for certwatch:
+
+.EX
-+.B certwatch_t
++.PP
++.B awstats_var_lib_t
+.EE
++
++- Set files with the awstats_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the awstats files under the /var/lib directory.
++
++
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type awstats_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B awstats_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B awstats_var_lib_t
++
++ /var/lib/awstats(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -6137,131 +6718,148 @@ index 0000000..1926b29
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), certwatch(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/cfengine_selinux.8 b/man/man8/cfengine_selinux.8
++selinux(8), awstats(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/bcfg2_selinux.8 b/man/man8/bcfg2_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..2a9ebfe
+index 0000000..792558d
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/cfengine_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
-+.TH "cfengine_selinux" "8" "cfengine" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "cfengine SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/bcfg2_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,148 @@
++.TH "bcfg2_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "bcfg2" "SELinux Policy documentation for bcfg2"
+.SH "NAME"
-+cfengine_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the cfengine processes
++bcfg2_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the bcfg2 processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the cfengine processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the bcfg2 processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The bcfg2 processes execute with the bcfg2_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the cfengine_execd_t, cfengine_monitord_t, cfengine_serverd_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep bcfg2_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The bcfg2_t SELinux type can be entered via the "bcfg2_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the bcfg2_t domain are the following:"
+
++/usr/sbin/bcfg2-server
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the cfengine_execd_t, cfengine_monitord_t, cfengine_serverd_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux bcfg2 policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their bcfg2 processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for bcfg2:
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B bcfg2_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux cfengine policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their cfengine processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for cfengine:
-+
-+
-+.EX
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux bcfg2 policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their bcfg2 processes in as secure a method as possible.
+.PP
-+.B cfengine_execd_exec_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the cfengine_execd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the cfengine_execd_t domain.
++The following file types are defined for bcfg2:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B cfengine_initrc_exec_t
++.B bcfg2_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the cfengine_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the cfengine_initrc_t domain.
++- Set files with the bcfg2_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the bcfg2_t domain.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/etc/rc\.d/init\.d/cf-serverd, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/cf-execd, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/cf-monitord
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B cfengine_monitord_exec_t
++.B bcfg2_initrc_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the cfengine_monitord_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the cfengine_monitord_t domain.
++- Set files with the bcfg2_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the bcfg2_initrc_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B cfengine_serverd_exec_t
++.B bcfg2_unit_file_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the cfengine_serverd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the cfengine_serverd_t domain.
++- Set files with the bcfg2_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as bcfg2 unit content.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B cfengine_var_lib_t
++.B bcfg2_var_lib_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the cfengine_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the cfengine files under the /var/lib directory.
++- Set files with the bcfg2_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the bcfg2 files under the /var/lib directory.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B cfengine_var_log_t
++.B bcfg2_var_run_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the cfengine_var_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as cfengine var log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++- Set files with the bcfg2_var_run_t type, if you want to store the bcfg2 files under the /run directory.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type bcfg2_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B bcfg2_var_lib_t
++
++ /var/lib/bcfg2(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B bcfg2_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/bcfg2-server\.pid
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux cfengine policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their cfengine processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for cfengine:
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the bcfg2_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B cfengine_execd_t, cfengine_monitord_t, cfengine_serverd_t
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
++
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the bcfg2_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -6274,315 +6872,296 @@ index 0000000..2a9ebfe
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), cfengine(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/cgclear_selinux.8 b/man/man8/cgclear_selinux.8
++selinux(8), bcfg2(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/bitlbee_selinux.8 b/man/man8/bitlbee_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..5d9b403
+index 0000000..26fda6e
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/cgclear_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
-+.TH "cgclear_selinux" "8" "cgclear" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "cgclear SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/bitlbee_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,178 @@
++.TH "bitlbee_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "bitlbee" "SELinux Policy documentation for bitlbee"
+.SH "NAME"
-+cgclear_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the cgclear processes
++bitlbee_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the bitlbee processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the cgclear processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
-+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the bitlbee processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux cgclear policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their cgclear processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for cgclear:
++The bitlbee processes execute with the bitlbee_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B cgclear_exec_t
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep bitlbee_t
+
-+- Set files with the cgclear_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the cgclear_t domain.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/sbin/cgclear, /usr/sbin/cgclear
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
-+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
++The bitlbee_t SELinux type can be entered via the "bitlbee_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the bitlbee_t domain are the following:"
+
++/usr/bin/bip, /usr/sbin/bitlbee
+.SH PROCESS TYPES
+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux cgclear policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their cgclear processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for cgclear:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux bitlbee policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their bitlbee processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for bitlbee:
+
+.EX
-+.B cgclear_t
++.B bitlbee_t
+.EE
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
-+.SH "COMMANDS"
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
-+.B semanage permissive
-+can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+.B semanage module
-+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
-+
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux bitlbee policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their bitlbee processes in as secure a method as possible.
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
-+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++The following file types are defined for bitlbee:
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
+
-+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), cgclear(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/cgconfig_selinux.8 b/man/man8/cgconfig_selinux.8
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..1b58511
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/cgconfig_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
-+.TH "cgconfig_selinux" "8" "cgconfig" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "cgconfig SELinux Policy documentation"
-+.SH "NAME"
-+cgconfig_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the cgconfig processes
-+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++.EX
++.PP
++.B bitlbee_conf_t
++.EE
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the cgconfig processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++- Set files with the bitlbee_conf_t type, if you want to treat the files as bitlbee configuration data, usually stored under the /etc directory.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
++.EX
+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the cgconfig_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++.B bitlbee_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the bitlbee_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the bitlbee_t domain.
++
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.PP
++.B bitlbee_initrc_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the cgconfig_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++- Set files with the bitlbee_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the bitlbee_initrc_t domain.
++
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.PP
++.B bitlbee_log_t
+.EE
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux cgconfig policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their cgconfig processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for cgconfig:
++- Set files with the bitlbee_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as bitlbee log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B cgconfig_etc_t
++.B bitlbee_tmp_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the cgconfig_etc_t type, if you want to store cgconfig files in the /etc directories.
++- Set files with the bitlbee_tmp_t type, if you want to store bitlbee temporary files in the /tmp directories.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/etc/sysconfig/cgconfig, /etc/cgconfig.conf
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B cgconfig_exec_t
++.B bitlbee_var_run_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the cgconfig_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the cgconfig_t domain.
++- Set files with the bitlbee_var_run_t type, if you want to store the bitlbee files under the /run directory.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/sbin/cgconfigparser, /sbin/cgconfigparser
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B cgconfig_initrc_exec_t
++.B bitlbee_var_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the cgconfig_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the cgconfig_initrc_t domain.
++- Set files with the bitlbee_var_t type, if you want to store the bit files under the /var directory.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux cgconfig policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their cgconfig processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for cgconfig:
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+.EX
-+.B cgconfig_t
-+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++The SELinux process type bitlbee_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
-+.SH "COMMANDS"
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
-+.PP
-+.B semanage permissive
-+can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
-+.PP
-+.B semanage module
-+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++.br
++.B bitlbee_log_t
+
-+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
-+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++ /var/log/bip(/.*)?
++.br
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.br
++.B bitlbee_tmp_t
+
-+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), cgconfig(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/cgred_selinux.8 b/man/man8/cgred_selinux.8
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..07be690
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/cgred_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,115 @@
-+.TH "cgred_selinux" "8" "cgred" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "cgred SELinux Policy documentation"
-+.SH "NAME"
-+cgred_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the cgred processes
-+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the cgred processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++.br
++.B bitlbee_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/bip(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/bitlbee\.pid
++.br
++ /var/run/bitlbee\.sock
++.br
++
++.br
++.B bitlbee_var_t
++
++ /var/lib/bitlbee(/.*)?
++.br
+
+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the cgred_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the bitlbee_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the cgred_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the bitlbee_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
+.EE
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux cgred policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their cgred processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for cgred:
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.EX
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), bitlbee(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/blktap_selinux.8 b/man/man8/blktap_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..8a96343
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/blktap_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,116 @@
++.TH "blktap_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "blktap" "SELinux Policy documentation for blktap"
++.SH "NAME"
++blktap_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the blktap processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the blktap processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The blktap processes execute with the blktap_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep blktap_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The blktap_t SELinux type can be entered via the "blktap_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the blktap_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/sbin/tapdisk, /usr/sbin/blktapctrl
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+.B cgred_exec_t
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux blktap policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their blktap processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for blktap:
++
++.EX
++.B blktap_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
-+- Set files with the cgred_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the cgred_t domain.
++.SH BOOLEANS
++SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. blktap policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run blktap with the tightest access possible.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/sbin/cgrulesengd, /usr/sbin/cgrulesengd
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow xend to run blktapctrl/tapdisk. Not required if using dedicated logical volumes for disk images, you must turn on the xend_run_blktap boolean.
+
+.EX
++.B setsebool -P xend_run_blktap 1
++.EE
++
+.PP
-+.B cgred_initrc_exec_t
++If you want to allow xend to run blktapctrl/tapdisk. Not required if using dedicated logical volumes for disk images, you must turn on the xend_run_blktap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P xend_run_blktap 1
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the cgred_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the cgred_initrc_t domain.
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux blktap policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their blktap processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for blktap:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B cgred_log_t
++.B blktap_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the cgred_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as cgred log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++- Set files with the blktap_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the blktap_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B cgred_var_run_t
++.B blktap_var_run_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the cgred_var_run_t type, if you want to store the cgred files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the blktap_var_run_t type, if you want to store the blktap files under the /run directory.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux cgred policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their cgred processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for cgred:
-+
-+.EX
-+.B cgred_t
-+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -6594,82 +7173,124 @@ index 0000000..07be690
+.B semanage module
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
++.B semanage boolean
++can also be used to manipulate the booleans
++
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), cgred(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/checkpc_selinux.8 b/man/man8/checkpc_selinux.8
++selinux(8), blktap(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, setsebool(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/blueman_selinux.8 b/man/man8/blueman_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..32fd09a
+index 0000000..4098061
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/checkpc_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
-+.TH "checkpc_selinux" "8" "checkpc" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "checkpc SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/blueman_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,118 @@
++.TH "blueman_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "blueman" "SELinux Policy documentation for blueman"
+.SH "NAME"
-+checkpc_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the checkpc processes
++blueman_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the blueman processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the checkpc processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the blueman processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The blueman processes execute with the blueman_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep blueman_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The blueman_t SELinux type can be entered via the "blueman_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the blueman_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/libexec/blueman-mechanism
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux blueman policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their blueman processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for blueman:
++
++.EX
++.B blueman_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux checkpc policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their checkpc processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for checkpc:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux blueman policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their blueman processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for blueman:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B checkpc_exec_t
++.B blueman_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the checkpc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the checkpc_t domain.
++- Set files with the blueman_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the blueman_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B checkpc_log_t
++.B blueman_var_lib_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the checkpc_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as checkpc log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++- Set files with the blueman_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the blueman files under the /var/lib directory.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type blueman_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B blueman_var_lib_t
++
++ /var/lib/blueman(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux checkpc policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their checkpc processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for checkpc:
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the blueman_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B checkpc_t
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
++
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the blueman_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -6682,170 +7303,156 @@ index 0000000..32fd09a
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), checkpc(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/checkpolicy_selinux.8 b/man/man8/checkpolicy_selinux.8
++selinux(8), blueman(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/bluetooth_helper_selinux.8 b/man/man8/bluetooth_helper_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..ba66ff0
+index 0000000..2fa6a79
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/checkpolicy_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
-+.TH "checkpolicy_selinux" "8" "checkpolicy" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "checkpolicy SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/bluetooth_helper_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,157 @@
++.TH "bluetooth_helper_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "bluetooth_helper" "SELinux Policy documentation for bluetooth_helper"
+.SH "NAME"
-+checkpolicy_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the checkpolicy processes
++bluetooth_helper_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the bluetooth_helper processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the checkpolicy processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
-+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the bluetooth_helper processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux checkpolicy policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their checkpolicy processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for checkpolicy:
++The bluetooth_helper processes execute with the bluetooth_helper_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B checkpolicy_exec_t
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep bluetooth_helper_t
+
-+- Set files with the checkpolicy_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the checkpolicy_t domain.
+
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
-+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
++The bluetooth_helper_t SELinux type can be entered via the "bluetooth_helper_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the bluetooth_helper_t domain are the following:"
+
++/usr/bin/blue.*pin
+.SH PROCESS TYPES
+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux checkpolicy policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their checkpolicy processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for checkpolicy:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux bluetooth_helper policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their bluetooth_helper processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for bluetooth_helper:
+
+.EX
-+.B checkpolicy_t
++.B bluetooth_helper_t
+.EE
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
-+.SH "COMMANDS"
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
-+.B semanage permissive
-+can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+.B semanage module
-+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
-+
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux bluetooth_helper policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their bluetooth_helper processes in as secure a method as possible.
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
-+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++The following file types are defined for bluetooth_helper:
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
-+
-+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), checkpolicy(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/chfn_selinux.8 b/man/man8/chfn_selinux.8
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..e8621ca
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/chfn_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
-+.TH "chfn_selinux" "8" "chfn" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "chfn SELinux Policy documentation"
-+.SH "NAME"
-+chfn_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the chfn processes
-+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
-+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the chfn processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
-+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
-+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the chfn_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.PP
++.B bluetooth_helper_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the chfn_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++- Set files with the bluetooth_helper_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the bluetooth_helper_t domain.
++
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.PP
++.B bluetooth_helper_tmp_t
+.EE
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux chfn policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their chfn processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for chfn:
++- Set files with the bluetooth_helper_tmp_t type, if you want to store bluetooth helper temporary files in the /tmp directories.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B chfn_exec_t
++.B bluetooth_helper_tmpfs_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the chfn_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the chfn_t domain.
++- Set files with the bluetooth_helper_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store bluetooth helper files on a tmpfs file system.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/bin/chfn, /usr/bin/chsh
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type bluetooth_helper_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B bluetooth_helper_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B bluetooth_helper_tmpfs_t
++
++
++.br
++.B user_fonts_cache_t
++
++ /root/\.fontconfig(/.*)?
++.br
++ /root/\.fonts/auto(/.*)?
++.br
++ /root/\.fonts\.cache-.*
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.fontconfig(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.fonts/auto(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.fonts\.cache-.*
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.fontconfig(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.fonts/auto(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.fonts\.cache-.*
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.fontconfig(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.fonts/auto(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.fonts\.cache-.*
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux chfn policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their chfn processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for chfn:
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the bluetooth_helper_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B chfn_t
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
++
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the bluetooth_helper_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -6858,213 +7465,244 @@ index 0000000..e8621ca
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), chfn(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/chkpwd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/chkpwd_selinux.8
++selinux(8), bluetooth_helper(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, bluetooth_selinux(8), bluetooth_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/bluetooth_selinux.8 b/man/man8/bluetooth_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..6d70e8c
+index 0000000..3432420
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/chkpwd_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
-+.TH "chkpwd_selinux" "8" "chkpwd" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "chkpwd SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/bluetooth_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,246 @@
++.TH "bluetooth_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "bluetooth" "SELinux Policy documentation for bluetooth"
+.SH "NAME"
-+chkpwd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the chkpwd processes
++bluetooth_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the bluetooth processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the chkpwd processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the bluetooth processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The bluetooth processes execute with the bluetooth_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep bluetooth_t
+
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The bluetooth_t SELinux type can be entered via the "bluetooth_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the bluetooth_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/bin/dund, /usr/bin/hidd, /usr/sbin/hcid, /usr/sbin/sdpd, /usr/bin/rfcomm, /usr/sbin/hid2hci, /usr/sbin/hciattach, /usr/sbin/bluetoothd
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the chkpwd_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux bluetooth policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their bluetooth processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for bluetooth:
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.B bluetooth_helper_t, bluetooth_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH BOOLEANS
++SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. bluetooth policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run bluetooth with the tightest access possible.
++
+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the chkpwd_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++If you want to allow xguest to use blue tooth devices, you must turn on the xguest_use_bluetooth boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P xguest_use_bluetooth 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow xguest to use blue tooth devices, you must turn on the xguest_use_bluetooth boolean.
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B setsebool -P xguest_use_bluetooth 1
+.EE
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux chkpwd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their chkpwd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for chkpwd:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux bluetooth policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their bluetooth processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for bluetooth:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B chkpwd_exec_t
++.B bluetooth_conf_rw_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the chkpwd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the chkpwd_t domain.
++- Set files with the bluetooth_conf_rw_t type, if you want to treat the files as bluetooth conf read/write content.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/sbin/unix_chkpwd, /usr/sbin/unix_verify, /usr/sbin/validate, /sbin/unix_verify, /usr/sbin/unix_chkpwd
+
++.EX
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
++.B bluetooth_conf_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the bluetooth_conf_t type, if you want to treat the files as bluetooth configuration data, usually stored under the /etc directory.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux chkpwd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their chkpwd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for chkpwd:
+
+.EX
-+.B chkpwd_t
-+.EE
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++.B bluetooth_exec_t
++.EE
+
-+.SH "COMMANDS"
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
-+.PP
-+.B semanage permissive
-+can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
-+.PP
-+.B semanage module
-+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++- Set files with the bluetooth_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the bluetooth_t domain.
+
++
++.EX
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
-+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++.B bluetooth_helper_exec_t
++.EE
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++- Set files with the bluetooth_helper_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the bluetooth_helper_t domain.
+
-+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), chkpwd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/chrome_selinux.8 b/man/man8/chrome_selinux.8
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..7fb8441
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/chrome_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,120 @@
-+.TH "chrome_selinux" "8" "chrome" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "chrome SELinux Policy documentation"
-+.SH "NAME"
-+chrome_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the chrome processes
-+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the chrome processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++.EX
++.PP
++.B bluetooth_helper_tmp_t
++.EE
+
-+.SH BOOLEANS
-+SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. chrome policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run chrome with the tightest access possible.
++- Set files with the bluetooth_helper_tmp_t type, if you want to store bluetooth helper temporary files in the /tmp directories.
+
+
++.EX
+.PP
-+If you want to allow unconfined users to transition to the chrome sandbox domains when running chrome-sandbox, you must turn on the unconfined_chrome_sandbox_transition boolean.
++.B bluetooth_helper_tmpfs_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the bluetooth_helper_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store bluetooth helper files on a tmpfs file system.
++
+
+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P unconfined_chrome_sandbox_transition 1
++.PP
++.B bluetooth_initrc_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++- Set files with the bluetooth_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the bluetooth_initrc_t domain.
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++
++.EX
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux chrome policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their chrome processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for chrome:
++.B bluetooth_lock_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the bluetooth_lock_t type, if you want to treat the files as bluetooth lock data, stored under the /var/lock directory
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B chrome_sandbox_exec_t
++.B bluetooth_tmp_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the chrome_sandbox_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the chrome_sandbox_t domain.
++- Set files with the bluetooth_tmp_t type, if you want to store bluetooth temporary files in the /tmp directories.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/lib/chromium-browser/chrome-sandbox, /opt/google/chrome/chrome-sandbox
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B chrome_sandbox_nacl_exec_t
++.B bluetooth_unit_file_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the chrome_sandbox_nacl_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the chrome_sandbox_nacl_t domain.
++- Set files with the bluetooth_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as bluetooth unit content.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/lib/chromium-browser/nacl_helper_bootstrap, /opt/google/chrome/nacl_helper_bootstrap
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B chrome_sandbox_tmp_t
++.B bluetooth_var_lib_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the chrome_sandbox_tmp_t type, if you want to store chrome sandbox temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++- Set files with the bluetooth_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the bluetooth files under the /var/lib directory.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B chrome_sandbox_tmpfs_t
++.B bluetooth_var_run_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the chrome_sandbox_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store chrome sandbox files on a tmpfs file system.
++- Set files with the bluetooth_var_run_t type, if you want to store the bluetooth files under the /run directory.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type bluetooth_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B bluetooth_conf_rw_t
++
++ /etc/bluetooth/link_key
++.br
++
++.br
++.B bluetooth_lock_t
++
++
++.br
++.B bluetooth_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B bluetooth_var_lib_t
++
++ /var/lib/bluetooth(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B bluetooth_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/sdp
++.br
++ /var/run/bluetoothd_address
++.br
++
++.br
++.B usbfs_t
++
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux chrome policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their chrome processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for chrome:
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the bluetooth_t, bluetooth_helper_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B chrome_sandbox_t, chrome_sandbox_nacl_t
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
++
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the bluetooth_t, bluetooth_helper_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -7080,254 +7718,218 @@ index 0000000..7fb8441
+can also be used to manipulate the booleans
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), chrome(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-+, setsebool(8)
++selinux(8), bluetooth(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, setsebool(8), bluetooth_helper_selinux(8)
\ No newline at end of file
-diff --git a/man/man8/chronyd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/chronyd_selinux.8
+diff --git a/man/man8/boinc_selinux.8 b/man/man8/boinc_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..1a4b417
+index 0000000..138247a
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/chronyd_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,173 @@
-+.TH "chronyd_selinux" "8" "chronyd" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "chronyd SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/boinc_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,219 @@
++.TH "boinc_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "boinc" "SELinux Policy documentation for boinc"
+.SH "NAME"
-+chronyd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the chronyd processes
++boinc_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the boinc processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the chronyd processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the boinc processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The boinc processes execute with the boinc_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the chronyd_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep boinc_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
++The boinc_t SELinux type can be entered via the "boinc_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the boinc_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/bin/boinc_client
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the chronyd_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux boinc policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their boinc processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for boinc:
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B boinc_t, boinc_project_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux chronyd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their chronyd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for chronyd:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux boinc policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their boinc processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for boinc:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B chronyd_exec_t
++.B boinc_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the chronyd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the chronyd_t domain.
++- Set files with the boinc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the boinc_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B chronyd_initrc_exec_t
++.B boinc_initrc_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the chronyd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the chronyd_initrc_t domain.
++- Set files with the boinc_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the boinc_initrc_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B chronyd_keys_t
++.B boinc_log_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the chronyd_keys_t type, if you want to treat the files as chronyd keys data.
++- Set files with the boinc_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as boinc log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B chronyd_tmpfs_t
++.B boinc_project_tmp_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the chronyd_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store chronyd files on a tmpfs file system.
++- Set files with the boinc_project_tmp_t type, if you want to store boinc project temporary files in the /tmp directories.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B chronyd_unit_file_t
++.B boinc_project_var_lib_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the chronyd_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as chronyd unit content.
++- Set files with the boinc_project_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the boinc project files under the /var/lib directory.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B chronyd_var_lib_t
++.B boinc_tmp_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the chronyd_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the chronyd files under the /var/lib directory.
++- Set files with the boinc_tmp_t type, if you want to store boinc temporary files in the /tmp directories.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B chronyd_var_log_t
++.B boinc_tmpfs_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the chronyd_var_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as chronyd var log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++- Set files with the boinc_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store boinc files on a tmpfs file system.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B chronyd_var_run_t
++.B boinc_unit_file_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the chronyd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the chronyd files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the boinc_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as boinc unit content.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B boinc_var_lib_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the boinc_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the boinc files under the /var/lib directory.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/run/chronyd(/.*), /var/run/chronyd\.sock, /var/run/chronyd\.pid
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
+.SH PORT TYPES
-+SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
++SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
+.PP
-+You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
++You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
+
+.B semanage port -l
+
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
-+SELinux chronyd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their chronyd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following port types are defined for chronyd:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
++SELinux boinc policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their boinc processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following port types are defined for boinc:
+
+.EX
+.TP 5
-+.B chronyd_port_t
++.B boinc_client_ctrl_port_t
+.TP 10
+.EE
+
+
+Default Defined Ports:
-+udp 323
++tcp 1043
+.EE
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux chronyd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their chronyd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for chronyd:
+
+.EX
-+.B chronyd_t
++.TP 5
++.B boinc_port_t
++.TP 10
+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
-+
-+.SH "COMMANDS"
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
-+.PP
-+.B semanage permissive
-+can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
-+.PP
-+.B semanage module
-+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
-+.B semanage port
-+can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
+
-+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
-+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++Default Defined Ports:
++tcp 31416
++.EE
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++The SELinux process type boinc_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
-+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), chronyd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/ciped_selinux.8 b/man/man8/ciped_selinux.8
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..c4fed0a
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/ciped_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
-+.TH "ciped_selinux" "8" "ciped" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "ciped SELinux Policy documentation"
-+.SH "NAME"
-+ciped_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the ciped processes
-+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++.br
++.B boinc_log_t
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the ciped processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++ /var/log/boinc\.log.*
++.br
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++.br
++.B boinc_project_var_lib_t
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux ciped policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ciped processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for ciped:
++ /var/lib/boinc/slots(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/boinc/projects(/.*)?
++.br
+
++.br
++.B boinc_tmp_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B ciped_exec_t
-+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the ciped_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ciped_t domain.
++.br
++.B boinc_tmpfs_t
+
+
-+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
++.br
++.B boinc_var_lib_t
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux ciped policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ciped processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for ciped:
++ /var/lib/boinc(/.*)?
++.br
+
-+.EX
-+.B ciped_t
-+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -7339,208 +7941,306 @@ index 0000000..c4fed0a
+.B semanage module
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
++.B semanage port
++can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
++
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), ciped(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/clamd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/clamd_selinux.8
++selinux(8), boinc(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/bootloader_selinux.8 b/man/man8/bootloader_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..ee012c5
+index 0000000..0e127fd
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/clamd_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,214 @@
-+.TH "clamd_selinux" "8" "clamd" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "clamd SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/bootloader_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,306 @@
++.TH "bootloader_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "bootloader" "SELinux Policy documentation for bootloader"
+.SH "NAME"
-+clamd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the clamd processes
++bootloader_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the bootloader processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the clamd processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the bootloader processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH BOOLEANS
-+SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. clamd policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run clamd with the tightest access possible.
++The bootloader processes execute with the bootloader_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
++For example:
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow clamscan to read user content, you must turn on the clamscan_read_user_content boolean.
++.B ps -eZ | grep bootloader_t
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P clamscan_read_user_content 1
-+.EE
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow clamscan to non security files on a system, you must turn on the clamscan_can_scan_system boolean.
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P clamscan_can_scan_system 1
-+.EE
++The bootloader_t SELinux type can be entered via the "bootloader_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the bootloader_t domain are the following:"
+
++/sbin/grub.*, /sbin/lilo.*, /sbin/ybin.*, /usr/sbin/grub.*, /usr/sbin/lilo.*, /usr/sbin/ybin.*, /sbin/zipl, /usr/sbin/zipl
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow clamd to use JIT compiler, you must turn on the clamd_use_jit boolean.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux bootloader policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their bootloader processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for bootloader:
+
+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P clamd_use_jit 1
++.B bootloader_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH BOOLEANS
++SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. bootloader policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run bootloader with the tightest access possible.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the clamd_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++If you want to allow the graphical login program to execute bootloader, you must turn on the xdm_exec_bootloader boolean.
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.B setsebool -P xdm_exec_bootloader 1
+.EE
+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the clamd_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++If you want to allow the graphical login program to execute bootloader, you must turn on the xdm_exec_bootloader boolean.
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B setsebool -P xdm_exec_bootloader 1
+.EE
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux clamd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their clamd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for clamd:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux bootloader policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their bootloader processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for bootloader:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B clamd_etc_t
++.B bootloader_etc_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the clamd_etc_t type, if you want to store clamd files in the /etc directories.
++- Set files with the bootloader_etc_t type, if you want to store bootloader files in the /etc directories.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B clamd_exec_t
++.B bootloader_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the clamd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the clamd_t domain.
++- Set files with the bootloader_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the bootloader_t domain.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/sbin/clamd, /usr/sbin/clamav-milter
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B clamd_initrc_exec_t
++.B bootloader_tmp_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the clamd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the clamd_initrc_t domain.
++- Set files with the bootloader_tmp_t type, if you want to store bootloader temporary files in the /tmp directories.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B clamd_tmp_t
++.B bootloader_var_lib_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the clamd_tmp_t type, if you want to store clamd temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++- Set files with the bootloader_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the bootloader files under the /var/lib directory.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B clamd_unit_file_t
++.B bootloader_var_run_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the clamd_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as clamd unit content.
++- Set files with the bootloader_var_run_t type, if you want to store the bootloader files under the /run directory.
+
+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B clamd_var_lib_t
-+.EE
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
+
-+- Set files with the clamd_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the clamd files under the /var/lib directory.
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type bootloader_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/lib/clamd.*, /var/clamav(/.*)?, /var/lib/clamav(/.*)?
++.B boot_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B clamd_var_log_t
-+.EE
++ /boot/.*
++.br
++ /vmlinuz.*
++.br
++ /initrd\.img.*
++.br
++ /boot
++.br
++
++.br
++.B bootloader_tmp_t
+
-+- Set files with the clamd_var_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as clamd var log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
+
+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/log/clamav.*, /var/log/clamd.*
++.B bootloader_var_lib_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B clamd_var_run_t
-+.EE
++ /var/lib/os-prober(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B bootloader_var_run_t
+
-+- Set files with the clamd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the clamd files under the /run directory.
+
+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/run/amavis(d)?/clamd\.pid, /var/run/clamd.*, /var/run/clamav.*, /var/spool/MailScanner(/.*)?, /var/spool/amavisd/clamd\.sock
++.B dosfs_t
+
-+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PORT TYPES
-+SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
-+.PP
-+You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
++.br
++.B etc_runtime_t
+
-+.B semanage port -l
++ /[^/]+
++.br
++ /etc/mtab.*
++.br
++ /etc/blkid(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/nologin.*
++.br
++ /etc/\.fstab\.hal\..+
++.br
++ /halt
++.br
++ /fastboot
++.br
++ /poweroff
++.br
++ /etc/cmtab
++.br
++ /\.autofsck
++.br
++ /forcefsck
++.br
++ /\.suspended
++.br
++ /fsckoptions
++.br
++ /\.autorelabel
++.br
++ /etc/securetty
++.br
++ /etc/killpower
++.br
++ /etc/nohotplug
++.br
++ /etc/ioctl\.save
++.br
++ /etc/fstab\.REVOKE
++.br
++ /etc/network/ifstate
++.br
++ /etc/sysconfig/hwconf
++.br
++ /etc/ptal/ptal-printd-like
++.br
++ /etc/sysconfig/iptables\.save
++.br
++ /etc/xorg\.conf\.d/00-system-setup-keyboard\.conf
++.br
++ /etc/X11/xorg\.conf\.d/00-system-setup-keyboard\.conf
++.br
++
++.br
++.B file_t
++
++
++.br
++.B fsadm_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/blkid(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B modules_object_t
++
++ /lib/modules(/.*)?
++.br
++ /usr/lib/modules(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B var_log_t
++
++ /var/log/.*
++.br
++ /nsr/logs(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/webmin(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/log/cron[^/]*
++.br
++ /var/log/secure[^/]*
++.br
++ /opt/zimbra/log(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/log/maillog[^/]*
++.br
++ /var/log/spooler[^/]*
++.br
++ /var/log/messages[^/]*
++.br
++ /usr/centreon/log(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/spool/rsyslog(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/axfrdns/log/main(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/spool/bacula/log(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/tinydns/log/main(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/dnscache/log/main(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/stockmaniac/templates_cache(/.*)?
++.br
++ /opt/Symantec/scspagent/IDS/system(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/log
++.br
++ /var/log/dmesg
++.br
++ /var/log/syslog
++.br
++ /var/named/chroot/var/log
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
-+SELinux clamd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their clamd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following port types are defined for clamd:
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the bootloader_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.TP 5
-+.B clamd_port_t
-+.TP 10
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
+
-+
-+Default Defined Ports:
-+tcp 3310
-+.EE
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux clamd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their clamd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for clamd:
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the bootloader_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B clamd_t, clamscan_t
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -7552,112 +8252,102 @@ index 0000000..ee012c5
+.B semanage module
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
-+.B semanage port
-+can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
-+
+.B semanage boolean
+can also be used to manipulate the booleans
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), clamd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
++selinux(8), bootloader(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+, setsebool(8)
\ No newline at end of file
-diff --git a/man/man8/clamscan_selinux.8 b/man/man8/clamscan_selinux.8
+diff --git a/man/man8/brctl_selinux.8 b/man/man8/brctl_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..f7e5328
+index 0000000..454e06c
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/clamscan_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,107 @@
-+.TH "clamscan_selinux" "8" "clamscan" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "clamscan SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/brctl_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
++.TH "brctl_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "brctl" "SELinux Policy documentation for brctl"
+.SH "NAME"
-+clamscan_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the clamscan processes
++brctl_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the brctl processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the clamscan processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the brctl processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH BOOLEANS
-+SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. clamscan policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run clamscan with the tightest access possible.
++The brctl processes execute with the brctl_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
++For example:
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow clamscan to read user content, you must turn on the clamscan_read_user_content boolean.
++.B ps -eZ | grep brctl_t
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P clamscan_read_user_content 1
-+.EE
+
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The brctl_t SELinux type can be entered via the "brctl_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the brctl_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/sbin/brctl
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow clamscan to non security files on a system, you must turn on the clamscan_can_scan_system boolean.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux brctl policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their brctl processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for brctl:
+
+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P clamscan_can_scan_system 1
++.B brctl_t
+.EE
-+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux clamscan policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their clamscan processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for clamscan:
-+
-+
-+.EX
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux brctl policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their brctl processes in as secure a method as possible.
+.PP
-+.B clamscan_exec_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the clamscan_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the clamscan_t domain.
++The following file types are defined for brctl:
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/bin/clamdscan, /usr/bin/clamscan
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B clamscan_tmp_t
++.B brctl_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the clamscan_tmp_t type, if you want to store clamscan temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++- Set files with the brctl_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the brctl_t domain.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux clamscan policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their clamscan processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for clamscan:
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+.EX
-+.B clamscan_t
-+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++The SELinux process type brctl_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B sysfs_t
++
++ /sys(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -7669,95 +8359,113 @@ index 0000000..f7e5328
+.B semanage module
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
-+.B semanage boolean
-+can also be used to manipulate the booleans
-+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), clamscan(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-+, setsebool(8)
-\ No newline at end of file
-diff --git a/man/man8/clogd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/clogd_selinux.8
++selinux(8), brctl(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/cachefilesd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/cachefilesd_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..903b2bf
+index 0000000..f337f15
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/clogd_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
-+.TH "clogd_selinux" "8" "clogd" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "clogd SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/cachefilesd_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,112 @@
++.TH "cachefilesd_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "cachefilesd" "SELinux Policy documentation for cachefilesd"
+.SH "NAME"
-+clogd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the clogd processes
++cachefilesd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the cachefilesd processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the clogd processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the cachefilesd processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The cachefilesd processes execute with the cachefilesd_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep cachefilesd_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The cachefilesd_t SELinux type can be entered via the "cachefilesd_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the cachefilesd_t domain are the following:"
++
++/sbin/cachefilesd, /usr/sbin/cachefilesd
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux clogd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their clogd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for clogd:
-+
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux cachefilesd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their cachefilesd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for cachefilesd:
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B clogd_exec_t
++.B cachefilesd_t, cachefiles_kernel_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
-+- Set files with the clogd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the clogd_t domain.
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux cachefilesd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their cachefilesd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for cachefilesd:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B clogd_tmpfs_t
++.B cachefilesd_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the clogd_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store clogd files on a tmpfs file system.
++- Set files with the cachefilesd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the cachefilesd_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B clogd_var_run_t
++.B cachefilesd_var_run_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the clogd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the clogd files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the cachefilesd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the cachefilesd files under the /run directory.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux clogd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their clogd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for clogd:
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+.EX
-+.B clogd_t
-+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++The SELinux process type cachefilesd_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B cachefiles_var_t
++
++ /var/fscache(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/cache/fscache(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B cachefilesd_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/cachefilesd\.pid
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -7770,113 +8478,134 @@ index 0000000..903b2bf
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), clogd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/clvmd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/clvmd_selinux.8
++selinux(8), cachefilesd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/calamaris_selinux.8 b/man/man8/calamaris_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..b862840
+index 0000000..e3eb81f
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/clvmd_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
-+.TH "clvmd_selinux" "8" "clvmd" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "clvmd SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/calamaris_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,132 @@
++.TH "calamaris_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "calamaris" "SELinux Policy documentation for calamaris"
+.SH "NAME"
-+clvmd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the clvmd processes
++calamaris_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the calamaris processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the clvmd processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the calamaris processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The calamaris processes execute with the calamaris_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the clvmd_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep calamaris_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
++The calamaris_t SELinux type can be entered via the "calamaris_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the calamaris_t domain are the following:"
++
++/etc/cron\.daily/calamaris
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the clvmd_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux calamaris policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their calamaris processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for calamaris:
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B calamaris_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux clvmd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their clvmd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for clvmd:
-+
-+
-+.EX
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux calamaris policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their calamaris processes in as secure a method as possible.
+.PP
-+.B clvmd_exec_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the clvmd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the clvmd_t domain.
++The following file types are defined for calamaris:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B clvmd_initrc_exec_t
++.B calamaris_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the clvmd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the clvmd_initrc_t domain.
++- Set files with the calamaris_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the calamaris_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B clvmd_tmpfs_t
++.B calamaris_log_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the clvmd_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store clvmd files on a tmpfs file system.
++- Set files with the calamaris_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as calamaris log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B clvmd_var_run_t
++.B calamaris_www_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the clvmd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the clvmd files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the calamaris_www_t type, if you want to treat the files as calamaris www data.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type calamaris_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B calamaris_log_t
++
++ /var/log/calamaris(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B calamaris_www_t
++
++ /var/www/calamaris(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux clvmd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their clvmd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for clvmd:
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the calamaris_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B clvmd_t
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
++
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the calamaris_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
+
-+.SH "COMMANDS"
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
+can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
+.PP
@@ -7887,97 +8616,168 @@ index 0000000..b862840
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), clvmd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/cmirrord_selinux.8 b/man/man8/cmirrord_selinux.8
++selinux(8), calamaris(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/callweaver_selinux.8 b/man/man8/callweaver_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..5f46712
+index 0000000..b1ebf14
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/cmirrord_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
-+.TH "cmirrord_selinux" "8" "cmirrord" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "cmirrord SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/callweaver_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,168 @@
++.TH "callweaver_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "callweaver" "SELinux Policy documentation for callweaver"
+.SH "NAME"
-+cmirrord_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the cmirrord processes
++callweaver_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the callweaver processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the cmirrord processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the callweaver processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The callweaver processes execute with the callweaver_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep callweaver_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The callweaver_t SELinux type can be entered via the "callweaver_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the callweaver_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/sbin/callweaver
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux callweaver policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their callweaver processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for callweaver:
++
++.EX
++.B callweaver_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux cmirrord policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their cmirrord processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for cmirrord:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux callweaver policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their callweaver processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for callweaver:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B cmirrord_exec_t
++.B callweaver_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the cmirrord_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the cmirrord_t domain.
++- Set files with the callweaver_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the callweaver_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B cmirrord_initrc_exec_t
++.B callweaver_initrc_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the cmirrord_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the cmirrord_initrc_t domain.
++- Set files with the callweaver_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the callweaver_initrc_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B cmirrord_tmpfs_t
++.B callweaver_log_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the cmirrord_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store cmirrord files on a tmpfs file system.
++- Set files with the callweaver_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as callweaver log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B cmirrord_var_run_t
++.B callweaver_spool_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the cmirrord_var_run_t type, if you want to store the cmirrord files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the callweaver_spool_t type, if you want to store the callweaver files under the /var/spool directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B callweaver_var_lib_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the callweaver_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the callweaver files under the /var/lib directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B callweaver_var_run_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the callweaver_var_run_t type, if you want to store the callweaver files under the /run directory.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type callweaver_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B callweaver_log_t
++
++ /var/log/callweaver(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B callweaver_spool_t
++
++ /var/spool/callweaver(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B callweaver_var_lib_t
++
++ /var/lib/callweaver(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B callweaver_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/callweaver(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux cmirrord policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their cmirrord processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for cmirrord:
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the callweaver_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B cmirrord_t
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
++
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the callweaver_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -7990,170 +8790,148 @@ index 0000000..5f46712
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), cmirrord(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/cobblerd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/cobblerd_selinux.8
++selinux(8), callweaver(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/canna_selinux.8 b/man/man8/canna_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..97f4a43
+index 0000000..73d7f2a
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/cobblerd_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,177 @@
-+.TH "cobblerd_selinux" "8" "cobblerd" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "cobblerd SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/canna_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,148 @@
++.TH "canna_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "canna" "SELinux Policy documentation for canna"
+.SH "NAME"
-+cobblerd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the cobblerd processes
++canna_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the canna processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the cobblerd processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the canna processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH BOOLEANS
-+SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. cobblerd policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run cobblerd with the tightest access possible.
++The canna processes execute with the canna_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
++For example:
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow Cobbler to connect to the network using TCP, you must turn on the cobbler_can_network_connect boolean.
++.B ps -eZ | grep canna_t
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P cobbler_can_network_connect 1
-+.EE
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow Cobbler to access nfs file systems, you must turn on the cobbler_use_nfs boolean.
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P cobbler_use_nfs 1
-+.EE
++The canna_t SELinux type can be entered via the "canna_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the canna_t domain are the following:"
+
++/usr/bin/catdic, /usr/sbin/jserver, /usr/bin/cannaping, /usr/sbin/cannaserver
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow HTTPD scripts and modules to connect to cobbler over the network, you must turn on the httpd_can_network_connect_cobbler boolean.
-+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P httpd_can_network_connect_cobbler 1
-+.EE
-+
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+If you want to allow Cobbler to access cifs file systems, you must turn on the cobbler_use_cifs boolean.
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux canna policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their canna processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for canna:
+
+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P cobbler_use_cifs 1
++.B canna_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
-+
-+.SH SHARING FILES
-+If you want to share files with multiple domains (Apache, FTP, rsync, Samba), you can set a file context of public_content_t and public_content_rw_t. These context allow any of the above domains to read the content. If you want a particular domain to write to the public_content_rw_t domain, you must set the appropriate boolean.
-+.TP
-+Allow cobblerd servers to read the /var/cobblerd directory by adding the public_content_t file type to the directory and by restoring the file type.
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
-+.B
-+semanage fcontext -a -t public_content_t "/var/cobblerd(/.*)?"
-+.br
-+.B restorecon -F -R -v /var/cobblerd
-+.pp
-+.TP
-+Allow cobblerd servers to read and write /var/tmp/incoming by adding the public_content_rw_t type to the directory and by restoring the file type. This also requires the allow_cobblerdd_anon_write boolean to be set.
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+.B
-+semanage fcontext -a -t public_content_rw_t "/var/cobblerd/incoming(/.*)?"
-+.br
-+.B restorecon -F -R -v /var/cobblerd/incoming
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux canna policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their canna processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for canna:
+
+
++.EX
+.PP
-+If you want to allow Cobbler to modify public files used for public file transfer services., you must turn on the cobbler_anon_write boolean.
++.B canna_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the canna_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the canna_t domain.
++
+
+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P cobbler_anon_write 1
++.PP
++.B canna_initrc_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux cobblerd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their cobblerd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for cobblerd:
++- Set files with the canna_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the canna_initrc_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B cobblerd_exec_t
++.B canna_log_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the cobblerd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the cobblerd_t domain.
++- Set files with the canna_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as canna log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B cobblerd_initrc_exec_t
++.B canna_var_lib_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the cobblerd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the cobblerd_initrc_t domain.
++- Set files with the canna_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the canna files under the /var/lib directory.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B cobblerd_unit_file_t
++.B canna_var_run_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the cobblerd_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as cobblerd unit content.
++- Set files with the canna_var_run_t type, if you want to store the canna files under the /run directory.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PORT TYPES
-+SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
-+.PP
-+You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+.B semanage port -l
++The SELinux process type canna_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
-+SELinux cobblerd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their cobblerd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following port types are defined for cobblerd:
++.br
++.B canna_log_t
+
-+.EX
-+.TP 5
-+.B cobbler_port_t
-+.TP 10
-+.EE
++ /var/log/wnn(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/log/canna(/.*)?
++.br
+
++.br
++.B canna_var_lib_t
+
-+Default Defined Ports:
-+tcp 25151
-+.EE
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux cobblerd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their cobblerd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for cobblerd:
++ /var/lib/wnn/dic(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/canna/dic(/.*)?
++.br
+
-+.EX
-+.B cobblerd_t
-+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++.br
++.B canna_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/wnn-unix(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/\.iroha_unix/.*
++.br
++ /var/run/\.iroha_unix
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -8165,125 +8943,163 @@ index 0000000..97f4a43
+.B semanage module
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
-+.B semanage port
-+can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
-+
-+.B semanage boolean
-+can also be used to manipulate the booleans
-+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), cobblerd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-+, setsebool(8)
-\ No newline at end of file
-diff --git a/man/man8/collectd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/collectd_selinux.8
++selinux(8), canna(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/cardmgr_selinux.8 b/man/man8/cardmgr_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..8c62b84
+index 0000000..8fccf2f
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/collectd_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,120 @@
-+.TH "collectd_selinux" "8" "collectd" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "collectd SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/cardmgr_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,162 @@
++.TH "cardmgr_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "cardmgr" "SELinux Policy documentation for cardmgr"
+.SH "NAME"
-+collectd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the collectd processes
++cardmgr_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the cardmgr processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the collectd processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the cardmgr processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The cardmgr processes execute with the cardmgr_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep cardmgr_t
+
-+.SH BOOLEANS
-+SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. collectd policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run collectd with the tightest access possible.
+
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
++The cardmgr_t SELinux type can be entered via the "cardctl_exec_t,cardmgr_exec_t" file types. The default entrypoint paths for the cardmgr_t domain are the following:"
++
++/sbin/cardctl, /usr/sbin/cardctl, /sbin/cardmgr, /usr/sbin/cardmgr, /etc/apm/event\.d/pcmcia
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow collectd to connect to the network using TCP, you must turn on the collectd_can_network_connect boolean.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux cardmgr policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their cardmgr processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for cardmgr:
+
+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P collectd_can_network_connect 1
++.B cardmgr_t
+.EE
-+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux collectd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their collectd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for collectd:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux cardmgr policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their cardmgr processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for cardmgr:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B collectd_exec_t
++.B cardmgr_dev_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the collectd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the collectd_t domain.
++- Set files with the cardmgr_dev_t type, if you want to treat the files as cardmgr dev data.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B collectd_initrc_exec_t
++.B cardmgr_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the collectd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the collectd_initrc_t domain.
++- Set files with the cardmgr_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the cardmgr_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B collectd_unit_file_t
++.B cardmgr_lnk_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the collectd_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as collectd unit content.
++- Set files with the cardmgr_lnk_t type, if you want to treat the files as cardmgr lnk data.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B collectd_var_lib_t
++.B cardmgr_var_lib_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the collectd_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the collectd files under the /var/lib directory.
++- Set files with the cardmgr_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the cardmgr files under the /var/lib directory.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B collectd_var_run_t
++.B cardmgr_var_run_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the collectd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the collectd files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the cardmgr_var_run_t type, if you want to store the cardmgr files under the /run directory.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux collectd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their collectd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for collectd:
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+.EX
-+.B collectd_t
-+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++The SELinux process type cardmgr_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B cardmgr_var_lib_t
++
++
++.br
++.B cardmgr_var_run_t
++
++ /var/lib/pcmcia(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/stab
++.br
++ /var/run/cardmgr\.pid
++.br
++
++.br
++.B net_conf_t
++
++ /etc/ntpd?\.conf.*
++.br
++ /etc/hosts[^/]*
++.br
++ /etc/yp\.conf.*
++.br
++ /etc/denyhosts.*
++.br
++ /etc/hosts\.deny.*
++.br
++ /etc/resolv\.conf.*
++.br
++ /etc/ntp/step-tickers.*
++.br
++ /etc/sysconfig/networking(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/sysconfig/network-scripts(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/sysconfig/network-scripts/.*resolv\.conf
++.br
++ /etc/ethers
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -8295,133 +9111,173 @@ index 0000000..8c62b84
+.B semanage module
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
-+.B semanage boolean
-+can also be used to manipulate the booleans
-+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), collectd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-+, setsebool(8)
-\ No newline at end of file
-diff --git a/man/man8/colord_selinux.8 b/man/man8/colord_selinux.8
++selinux(8), cardmgr(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/ccs_selinux.8 b/man/man8/ccs_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..2030937
+index 0000000..4859e26
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/colord_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,127 @@
-+.TH "colord_selinux" "8" "colord" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "colord SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/ccs_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,172 @@
++.TH "ccs_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "ccs" "SELinux Policy documentation for ccs"
+.SH "NAME"
-+colord_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the colord processes
++ccs_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the ccs processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the colord processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the ccs processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The ccs processes execute with the ccs_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the colord_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep ccs_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
++The ccs_t SELinux type can be entered via the "ccs_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the ccs_t domain are the following:"
++
++/sbin/ccsd, /usr/sbin/ccsd
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the colord_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux ccs policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ccs processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for ccs:
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B ccs_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux colord policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their colord processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for colord:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux ccs policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ccs processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for ccs:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B colord_exec_t
++.B ccs_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the colord_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the colord_t domain.
++- Set files with the ccs_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ccs_t domain.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/libexec/colord-sane, /usr/libexec/colord
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B colord_tmp_t
++.B ccs_tmp_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the colord_tmp_t type, if you want to store colord temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++- Set files with the ccs_tmp_t type, if you want to store ccs temporary files in the /tmp directories.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B colord_tmpfs_t
++.B ccs_tmpfs_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the colord_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store colord files on a tmpfs file system.
++- Set files with the ccs_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store ccs files on a tmpfs file system.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B colord_unit_file_t
++.B ccs_var_lib_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the colord_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as colord unit content.
++- Set files with the ccs_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the ccs files under the /var/lib directory.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B colord_var_lib_t
++.B ccs_var_log_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the colord_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the colord files under the /var/lib directory.
++- Set files with the ccs_var_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as ccs var log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B ccs_var_run_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the ccs_var_run_t type, if you want to store the ccs files under the /run directory.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/lib/color(/.*)?, /var/lib/colord(/.*)?
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux colord policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their colord processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for colord:
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type ccs_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B ccs_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B ccs_tmpfs_t
++
++
++.br
++.B ccs_var_lib_t
++
++
++.br
++.B ccs_var_log_t
++
++
++.br
++.B ccs_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/cluster/ccsd\.pid
++.br
++ /var/run/cluster/ccsd\.sock
++.br
++
++.br
++.B cluster_conf_t
++
++ /etc/cluster(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B file_t
+
-+.EX
-+.B colord_t
-+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.br
++.B initrc_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B qpidd_tmpfs_t
++
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -8434,126 +9290,128 @@ index 0000000..2030937
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), colord(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/comsat_selinux.8 b/man/man8/comsat_selinux.8
++selinux(8), ccs(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/cdcc_selinux.8 b/man/man8/cdcc_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..97f145e
+index 0000000..06454f9
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/comsat_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,129 @@
-+.TH "comsat_selinux" "8" "comsat" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "comsat SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/cdcc_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,128 @@
++.TH "cdcc_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "cdcc" "SELinux Policy documentation for cdcc"
+.SH "NAME"
-+comsat_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the comsat processes
++cdcc_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the cdcc processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the comsat processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the cdcc processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The cdcc processes execute with the cdcc_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the comsat_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep cdcc_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The cdcc_t SELinux type can be entered via the "cdcc_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the cdcc_t domain are the following:"
+
++/usr/bin/cdcc
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the comsat_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux cdcc policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their cdcc processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for cdcc:
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B cdcc_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux comsat policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their comsat processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for comsat:
-+
-+
-+.EX
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux cdcc policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their cdcc processes in as secure a method as possible.
+.PP
-+.B comsat_exec_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the comsat_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the comsat_t domain.
++The following file types are defined for cdcc:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B comsat_tmp_t
++.B cdcc_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the comsat_tmp_t type, if you want to store comsat temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++- Set files with the cdcc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the cdcc_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B comsat_var_run_t
++.B cdcc_tmp_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the comsat_var_run_t type, if you want to store the comsat files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the cdcc_tmp_t type, if you want to store cdcc temporary files in the /tmp directories.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PORT TYPES
-+SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
-+.PP
-+You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+.B semanage port -l
++The SELinux process type cdcc_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B cdcc_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B dcc_client_map_t
++
++ /etc/dcc/map
++.br
++ /var/dcc/map
++.br
++ /var/lib/dcc/map
++.br
++ /var/run/dcc/map
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
-+SELinux comsat policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their comsat processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following port types are defined for comsat:
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the cdcc_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.TP 5
-+.B comsat_port_t
-+.TP 10
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
+
-+
-+Default Defined Ports:
-+udp 512
-+.EE
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux comsat policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their comsat processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for comsat:
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the cdcc_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B comsat_t
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -8565,239 +9423,321 @@ index 0000000..97f145e
+.B semanage module
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
-+.B semanage port
-+can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
-+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), comsat(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/condor_selinux.8 b/man/man8/condor_selinux.8
++selinux(8), cdcc(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/cdrecord_selinux.8 b/man/man8/cdrecord_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..b4838c3
+index 0000000..f808c03
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/condor_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,242 @@
-+.TH "condor_selinux" "8" "condor" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "condor SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/cdrecord_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
++.TH "cdrecord_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "cdrecord" "SELinux Policy documentation for cdrecord"
+.SH "NAME"
-+condor_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the condor processes
++cdrecord_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the cdrecord processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the condor processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the cdrecord processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH BOOLEANS
-+SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. condor policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run condor with the tightest access possible.
++The cdrecord processes execute with the cdrecord_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep cdrecord_t
+
+
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The cdrecord_t SELinux type can be entered via the "cdrecord_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the cdrecord_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/bin/wodim, /usr/bin/cdrecord, /usr/bin/growisofs
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow codnor domain to connect to the network using TCP, you must turn on the condor_domain_can_network_connect boolean.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux cdrecord policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their cdrecord processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for cdrecord:
+
+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P condor_domain_can_network_connect 1
++.B cdrecord_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH BOOLEANS
++SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. cdrecord policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run cdrecord with the tightest access possible.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the condor_startd_t, condor_master_t, condor_startd_ssh_t, condor_negotiator_t, condor_collector_t, condor_schedd_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++If you want to allow cdrecord to read various content. nfs, samba, removable devices, user temp and untrusted content files, you must turn on the cdrecord_read_content boolean.
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.B setsebool -P cdrecord_read_content 1
+.EE
+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the condor_startd_t, condor_master_t, condor_startd_ssh_t, condor_negotiator_t, condor_collector_t, condor_schedd_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++If you want to allow cdrecord to read various content. nfs, samba, removable devices, user temp and untrusted content files, you must turn on the cdrecord_read_content boolean.
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B setsebool -P cdrecord_read_content 1
+.EE
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux condor policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their condor processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for condor:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux cdrecord policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their cdrecord processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for cdrecord:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B condor_collector_exec_t
++.B cdrecord_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the condor_collector_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the condor_collector_t domain.
++- Set files with the cdrecord_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the cdrecord_t domain.
+
+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B condor_log_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the condor_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as condor log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
+
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
-+.EX
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
+.PP
-+.B condor_master_exec_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the condor_master_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the condor_master_t domain.
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
++.B semanage boolean
++can also be used to manipulate the booleans
+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B condor_negotiator_exec_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the condor_negotiator_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the condor_negotiator_t domain.
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B condor_procd_exec_t
-+.EE
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), cdrecord(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, setsebool(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/certmaster_selinux.8 b/man/man8/certmaster_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..90729bf
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/certmaster_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,208 @@
++.TH "certmaster_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "certmaster" "SELinux Policy documentation for certmaster"
++.SH "NAME"
++certmaster_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the certmaster processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+- Set files with the condor_procd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the condor_procd_t domain.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the certmaster processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
++The certmaster processes execute with the certmaster_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B condor_schedd_exec_t
-+.EE
++For example:
+
-+- Set files with the condor_schedd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the condor_schedd_t domain.
++.B ps -eZ | grep certmaster_t
+
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B condor_schedd_tmp_t
-+.EE
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
-+- Set files with the condor_schedd_tmp_t type, if you want to store condor schedd temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++The certmaster_t SELinux type can be entered via the "certmaster_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the certmaster_t domain are the following:"
+
++/usr/bin/certmaster
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux certmaster policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their certmaster processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for certmaster:
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B condor_startd_exec_t
++.B certmaster_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
-+- Set files with the condor_startd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the condor_startd_t domain.
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux certmaster policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their certmaster processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for certmaster:
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/sbin/condor_starter, /usr/sbin/condor_startd
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B condor_startd_tmp_t
++.B certmaster_etc_rw_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the condor_startd_tmp_t type, if you want to store condor startd temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++- Set files with the certmaster_etc_rw_t type, if you want to treat the files as certmaster etc read/write content.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B condor_startd_tmpfs_t
++.B certmaster_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the condor_startd_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store condor startd files on a tmpfs file system.
++- Set files with the certmaster_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the certmaster_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B condor_unit_file_t
++.B certmaster_initrc_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the condor_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as condor unit content.
++- Set files with the certmaster_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the certmaster_initrc_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B condor_var_lib_t
++.B certmaster_var_lib_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the condor_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the condor files under the /var/lib directory.
++- Set files with the certmaster_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the certmaster files under the /var/lib directory.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/lib/condor(/.*)?, /var/lib/condor/execute(/.*)?, /var/lib/condor/spool(/.*)?
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B condor_var_lock_t
++.B certmaster_var_log_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the condor_var_lock_t type, if you want to treat the files as condor var lock data, stored under the /var/lock directory
++- Set files with the certmaster_var_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as certmaster var log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B condor_var_run_t
++.B certmaster_var_run_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the condor_var_run_t type, if you want to store the condor files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the certmaster_var_run_t type, if you want to store the certmaster files under the /run directory.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
+.SH PORT TYPES
-+SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
++SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
+.PP
-+You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
++You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
+
+.B semanage port -l
+
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
-+SELinux condor policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their condor processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following port types are defined for condor:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
++SELinux certmaster policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their certmaster processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following port types are defined for certmaster:
+
+.EX
+.TP 5
-+.B condor_port_t
++.B certmaster_port_t
+.TP 10
+.EE
+
+
+Default Defined Ports:
-+tcp 9618
-+.EE
-+udp 9618
++tcp 51235
+.EE
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type certmaster_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B cert_t
++
++ /etc/pki(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/httpd/alias(/.*)?
++.br
++ /usr/share/ssl/certs(/.*)?
++.br
++ /usr/share/ssl/private(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/named/chroot/etc/pki(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B certmaster_etc_rw_t
++
++ /etc/certmaster(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B certmaster_var_lib_t
++
++ /var/lib/certmaster(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B certmaster_var_log_t
++
++ /var/log/certmaster(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B certmaster_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/certmaster.*
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux condor policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their condor processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for condor:
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the certmaster_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B condor_collector_t, condor_startd_ssh_t, condor_procd_t, condor_negotiator_t, condor_schedd_t, condor_startd_t, condor_master_t
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
++
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the certmaster_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -8812,129 +9752,197 @@ index 0000000..b4838c3
+.B semanage port
+can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
+
-+.B semanage boolean
-+can also be used to manipulate the booleans
-+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), condor(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-+, setsebool(8)
-\ No newline at end of file
-diff --git a/man/man8/consolekit_selinux.8 b/man/man8/consolekit_selinux.8
++selinux(8), certmaster(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/certmonger_selinux.8 b/man/man8/certmonger_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..8efe64c
+index 0000000..17c7336
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/consolekit_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,123 @@
-+.TH "consolekit_selinux" "8" "consolekit" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "consolekit SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/certmonger_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,196 @@
++.TH "certmonger_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "certmonger" "SELinux Policy documentation for certmonger"
+.SH "NAME"
-+consolekit_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the consolekit processes
++certmonger_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the certmonger processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the consolekit processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the certmonger processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The certmonger processes execute with the certmonger_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the consolekit_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep certmonger_t
+
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The certmonger_t SELinux type can be entered via the "certmonger_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the certmonger_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/sbin/certmonger
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the consolekit_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux certmonger policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their certmonger processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for certmonger:
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B certmonger_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux consolekit policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their consolekit processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for consolekit:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux certmonger policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their certmonger processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for certmonger:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B consolekit_exec_t
++.B certmonger_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the consolekit_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the consolekit_t domain.
++- Set files with the certmonger_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the certmonger_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B consolekit_log_t
++.B certmonger_initrc_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the consolekit_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as consolekit log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++- Set files with the certmonger_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the certmonger_initrc_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B consolekit_tmpfs_t
++.B certmonger_unconfined_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the consolekit_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store consolekit files on a tmpfs file system.
++- Set files with the certmonger_unconfined_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the certmonger_unconfined_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B consolekit_unit_file_t
++.B certmonger_var_lib_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the consolekit_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as consolekit unit content.
++- Set files with the certmonger_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the certmonger files under the /var/lib directory.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B consolekit_var_run_t
++.B certmonger_var_run_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the consolekit_var_run_t type, if you want to store the consolekit files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the certmonger_var_run_t type, if you want to store the certmonger files under the /run directory.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/run/console-kit-daemon\.pid, /var/run/ConsoleKit(/.*)?, /var/run/consolekit\.pid
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type certmonger_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B auth_cache_t
++
++ /var/cache/coolkey(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B cert_t
++
++ /etc/pki(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/httpd/alias(/.*)?
++.br
++ /usr/share/ssl/certs(/.*)?
++.br
++ /usr/share/ssl/private(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/named/chroot/etc/pki(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B certmonger_var_lib_t
++
++ /var/lib/certmonger(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B certmonger_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/certmonger.pid
++.br
++
++.br
++.B dirsrv_config_t
++
++ /etc/dirsrv(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B pki_tomcat_cert_t
++
++ /var/lib/pki-ca/alias(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/pki-kra/alias(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/pki-tks/alias(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/pki-ocsp/alias(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/pki/pki-tomcat/alias(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B systemd_passwd_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/systemd/ask-password(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/systemd/ask-password-block(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux consolekit policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their consolekit processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for consolekit:
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the certmonger_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B consolekit_t
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
++
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the certmonger_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -8947,77 +9955,96 @@ index 0000000..8efe64c
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), consolekit(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/consoletype_selinux.8 b/man/man8/consoletype_selinux.8
++selinux(8), certmonger(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/certwatch_selinux.8 b/man/man8/certwatch_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..9dc6c09
+index 0000000..7655104
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/consoletype_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
-+.TH "consoletype_selinux" "8" "consoletype" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "consoletype SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/certwatch_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
++.TH "certwatch_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "certwatch" "SELinux Policy documentation for certwatch"
+.SH "NAME"
-+consoletype_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the consoletype processes
++certwatch_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the certwatch processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the consoletype processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the certwatch processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The certwatch processes execute with the certwatch_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep certwatch_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The certwatch_t SELinux type can be entered via the "certwatch_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the certwatch_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/bin/certwatch
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux certwatch policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their certwatch processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for certwatch:
++
++.EX
++.B certwatch_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux consoletype policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their consoletype processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for consoletype:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux certwatch policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their certwatch processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for certwatch:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B consoletype_exec_t
++.B certwatch_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the consoletype_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the consoletype_t domain.
++- Set files with the certwatch_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the certwatch_t domain.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/sbin/consoletype, /sbin/consoletype
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux consoletype policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their consoletype processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for consoletype:
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+.EX
-+.B consoletype_t
-+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++The SELinux process type certwatch_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B auth_cache_t
++
++ /var/cache/coolkey(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -9030,159 +10057,240 @@ index 0000000..9dc6c09
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), consoletype(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/corosync_selinux.8 b/man/man8/corosync_selinux.8
++selinux(8), certwatch(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/cfengine_execd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/cfengine_execd_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..d3c5ce4
+index 0000000..12fcf8b
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/corosync_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,159 @@
-+.TH "corosync_selinux" "8" "corosync" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "corosync SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/cfengine_execd_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,117 @@
++.TH "cfengine_execd_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "cfengine_execd" "SELinux Policy documentation for cfengine_execd"
+.SH "NAME"
-+corosync_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the corosync processes
++cfengine_execd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the cfengine_execd processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the corosync processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the cfengine_execd processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The cfengine_execd processes execute with the cfengine_execd_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the corosync_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep cfengine_execd_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
++The cfengine_execd_t SELinux type can be entered via the "cfengine_execd_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the cfengine_execd_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/sbin/cf-execd
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the corosync_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux cfengine_execd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their cfengine_execd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for cfengine_execd:
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B cfengine_execd_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux corosync policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their corosync processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for corosync:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux cfengine_execd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their cfengine_execd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for cfengine_execd:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B corosync_exec_t
++.B cfengine_execd_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the corosync_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the corosync_t domain.
++- Set files with the cfengine_execd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the cfengine_execd_t domain.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/sbin/ccs_tool, /usr/sbin/corosync, /usr/sbin/corosync-notifyd, /usr/lib(64)?/heartbeat/heartbeat, /usr/sbin/cman_tool
+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B corosync_initrc_exec_t
-+.EE
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
+
-+- Set files with the corosync_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the corosync_initrc_t domain.
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type cfengine_execd_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/etc/rc\.d/init\.d/heartbeat, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/corosync
++.B cfengine_var_lib_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B corosync_tmp_t
-+.EE
++ /var/cfengine(/.*)?
++.br
+
-+- Set files with the corosync_tmp_t type, if you want to store corosync temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++.br
++.B cfengine_var_log_t
+
++ /var/cfengine/outputs(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B corosync_tmpfs_t
-+.EE
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the cfengine_execd_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
-+- Set files with the corosync_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store corosync files on a tmpfs file system.
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
+
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the cfengine_execd_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B corosync_unit_file_t
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the corosync_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as corosync unit content.
-+
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B corosync_var_lib_t
-+.EE
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+- Set files with the corosync_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the corosync files under the /var/lib directory.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/lib/heartbeat(/.*)?, /var/lib/corosync(/.*)?
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), cfengine_execd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, cfengine_monitord_selinux(8), cfengine_serverd_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/cfengine_monitord_selinux.8 b/man/man8/cfengine_monitord_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..e4289e1
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/cfengine_monitord_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,117 @@
++.TH "cfengine_monitord_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "cfengine_monitord" "SELinux Policy documentation for cfengine_monitord"
++.SH "NAME"
++cfengine_monitord_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the cfengine_monitord processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+.EX
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the cfengine_monitord processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The cfengine_monitord processes execute with the cfengine_monitord_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep cfengine_monitord_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The cfengine_monitord_t SELinux type can be entered via the "cfengine_monitord_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the cfengine_monitord_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/sbin/cf-monitord
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+.B corosync_var_log_t
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux cfengine_monitord policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their cfengine_monitord processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for cfengine_monitord:
++
++.EX
++.B cfengine_monitord_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
-+- Set files with the corosync_var_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as corosync var log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux cfengine_monitord policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their cfengine_monitord processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for cfengine_monitord:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B corosync_var_run_t
++.B cfengine_monitord_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the corosync_var_run_t type, if you want to store the corosync files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the cfengine_monitord_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the cfengine_monitord_t domain.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/run/rsctmp(/.*)?, /var/run/corosync\.pid, /var/run/cman_.*, /var/run/heartbeat(/.*)?
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type cfengine_monitord_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B cfengine_var_lib_t
++
++ /var/cfengine(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B cfengine_var_log_t
++
++ /var/cfengine/outputs(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux corosync policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their corosync processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for corosync:
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the cfengine_monitord_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B corosync_t
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
++
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the cfengine_monitord_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -9195,160 +10303,238 @@ index 0000000..d3c5ce4
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), corosync(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/couchdb_selinux.8 b/man/man8/couchdb_selinux.8
++selinux(8), cfengine_monitord(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, cfengine_execd_selinux(8), cfengine_serverd_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/cfengine_serverd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/cfengine_serverd_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..fe8af46
+index 0000000..55e7b52
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/couchdb_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,163 @@
-+.TH "couchdb_selinux" "8" "couchdb" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "couchdb SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/cfengine_serverd_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,117 @@
++.TH "cfengine_serverd_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "cfengine_serverd" "SELinux Policy documentation for cfengine_serverd"
+.SH "NAME"
-+couchdb_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the couchdb processes
++cfengine_serverd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the cfengine_serverd processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the couchdb processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the cfengine_serverd processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The cfengine_serverd processes execute with the cfengine_serverd_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the couchdb_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep cfengine_serverd_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
++The cfengine_serverd_t SELinux type can be entered via the "cfengine_serverd_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the cfengine_serverd_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/sbin/cf-serverd
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the couchdb_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux cfengine_serverd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their cfengine_serverd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for cfengine_serverd:
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B cfengine_serverd_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux couchdb policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their couchdb processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for couchdb:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux cfengine_serverd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their cfengine_serverd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for cfengine_serverd:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B couchdb_etc_t
++.B cfengine_serverd_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the couchdb_etc_t type, if you want to store couchdb files in the /etc directories.
++- Set files with the cfengine_serverd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the cfengine_serverd_t domain.
+
+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B couchdb_exec_t
-+.EE
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
+
-+- Set files with the couchdb_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the couchdb_t domain.
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
++The SELinux process type cfengine_serverd_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B couchdb_log_t
-+.EE
++.br
++.B cfengine_var_lib_t
+
-+- Set files with the couchdb_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as couchdb log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++ /var/cfengine(/.*)?
++.br
+
++.br
++.B cfengine_var_log_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B couchdb_tmp_t
-+.EE
++ /var/cfengine/outputs(/.*)?
++.br
+
-+- Set files with the couchdb_tmp_t type, if you want to store couchdb temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the cfengine_serverd_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
++
+.PP
-+.B couchdb_unit_file_t
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the cfengine_serverd_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the couchdb_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as couchdb unit content.
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.EX
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), cfengine_serverd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, cfengine_execd_selinux(8), cfengine_monitord_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/cgclear_selinux.8 b/man/man8/cgclear_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..e92daea
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/cgclear_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,112 @@
++.TH "cgclear_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "cgclear" "SELinux Policy documentation for cgclear"
++.SH "NAME"
++cgclear_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the cgclear processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the cgclear processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The cgclear processes execute with the cgclear_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep cgclear_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The cgclear_t SELinux type can be entered via the "cgclear_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the cgclear_t domain are the following:"
++
++/sbin/cgclear, /usr/sbin/cgclear
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux cgclear policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their cgclear processes in as secure a method as possible.
+.PP
-+.B couchdb_var_lib_t
++The following process types are defined for cgclear:
++
++.EX
++.B cgclear_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
-+- Set files with the couchdb_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the couchdb files under the /var/lib directory.
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux cgclear policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their cgclear processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for cgclear:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B couchdb_var_run_t
++.B cgclear_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the couchdb_var_run_t type, if you want to store the couchdb files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the cgclear_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the cgclear_t domain.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PORT TYPES
-+SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
-+.PP
-+You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+.B semanage port -l
++The SELinux process type cgclear_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B cgroup_t
++
++ /cgroup
++.br
++ /sys/fs/cgroup
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
-+SELinux couchdb policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their couchdb processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following port types are defined for couchdb:
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the cgclear_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.TP 5
-+.B couchdb_port_t
-+.TP 10
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
+
-+
-+Default Defined Ports:
-+tcp 5984
-+.EE
-+udp 5984
-+.EE
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux couchdb policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their couchdb processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for couchdb:
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the cgclear_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B couchdb_t
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -9360,278 +10546,283 @@ index 0000000..fe8af46
+.B semanage module
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
-+.B semanage port
-+can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
-+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), couchdb(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/courier_selinux.8 b/man/man8/courier_selinux.8
++selinux(8), cgclear(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/cgconfig_selinux.8 b/man/man8/cgconfig_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..89e7fe7
+index 0000000..8e5f96c
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/courier_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,183 @@
-+.TH "courier_selinux" "8" "courier" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "courier SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/cgconfig_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,128 @@
++.TH "cgconfig_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "cgconfig" "SELinux Policy documentation for cgconfig"
+.SH "NAME"
-+courier_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the courier processes
++cgconfig_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the cgconfig processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the courier processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the cgconfig processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The cgconfig processes execute with the cgconfig_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the courier_authdaemon_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep cgconfig_t
+
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The cgconfig_t SELinux type can be entered via the "cgconfig_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the cgconfig_t domain are the following:"
++
++/sbin/cgconfigparser, /usr/sbin/cgconfigparser
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the courier_authdaemon_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux cgconfig policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their cgconfig processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for cgconfig:
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B cgconfig_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux courier policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their courier processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for courier:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux cgconfig policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their cgconfig processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for cgconfig:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B courier_authdaemon_exec_t
++.B cgconfig_etc_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the courier_authdaemon_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the courier_authdaemon_t domain.
++- Set files with the cgconfig_etc_t type, if you want to store cgconfig files in the /etc directories.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/sbin/authdaemond, /usr/lib/courier/authlib/.*
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B courier_etc_t
++.B cgconfig_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the courier_etc_t type, if you want to store courier files in the /etc directories.
++- Set files with the cgconfig_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the cgconfig_t domain.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/lib/courier/rootcerts(/.*)?, /etc/courier(/.*)?, /etc/courier-imap(/.*)?
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B courier_exec_t
++.B cgconfig_initrc_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the courier_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the courier_t domain.
++- Set files with the cgconfig_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the cgconfig_initrc_t domain.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/sbin/courierlogger, /usr/lib/courier/courier/.*, /usr/sbin/courierldapaliasd
+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B courier_pcp_exec_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the courier_pcp_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the courier_pcp_t domain.
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
+
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B courier_pop_exec_t
-+.EE
++The SELinux process type cgconfig_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
-+- Set files with the courier_pop_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the courier_pop_t domain.
++.br
++.B cgroup_t
+
++ /cgroup
++.br
++ /sys/fs/cgroup
+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/lib/courier/imapd, /usr/lib/courier/courier/courierpop.*, /usr/lib/courier/pop3d, /usr/lib/courier/courier/imaplogin, /usr/bin/imapd
+
-+.EX
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
+.PP
-+.B courier_spool_t
-+.EE
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the cgconfig_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
-+- Set files with the courier_spool_t type, if you want to store the courier files under the /var/spool directory.
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/spool/authdaemon(/.*)?, /var/spool/courier(/.*)?
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the cgconfig_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B courier_sqwebmail_exec_t
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the courier_sqwebmail_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the courier_sqwebmail_t domain.
-+
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B courier_tcpd_exec_t
-+.EE
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+- Set files with the courier_tcpd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the courier_tcpd_t domain.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), cgconfig(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/cgred_selinux.8 b/man/man8/cgred_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..dfaff3f
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/cgred_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,148 @@
++.TH "cgred_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "cgred" "SELinux Policy documentation for cgred"
++.SH "NAME"
++cgred_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the cgred processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B courier_var_lib_t
-+.EE
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the cgred processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+- Set files with the courier_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the courier files under the /var/lib directory.
++The cgred processes execute with the cgred_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/lib/courier(/.*)?, /var/lib/courier-imap(/.*)?
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B courier_var_run_t
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep cgred_t
+
-+- Set files with the courier_var_run_t type, if you want to store the courier files under the /run directory.
+
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
-+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
++The cgred_t SELinux type can be entered via the "cgred_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the cgred_t domain are the following:"
+
++/sbin/cgrulesengd, /usr/sbin/cgrulesengd
+.SH PROCESS TYPES
+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux courier policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their courier processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for courier:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux cgred policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their cgred processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for cgred:
+
+.EX
-+.B courier_sqwebmail_t, courier_tcpd_t, courier_authdaemon_t, courier_pcp_t, courier_pop_t
++.B cgred_t
+.EE
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
-+.SH "COMMANDS"
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
-+.B semanage permissive
-+can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+.B semanage module
-+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
-+
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux cgred policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their cgred processes in as secure a method as possible.
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
-+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++The following file types are defined for cgred:
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
+
-+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), courier(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/cpucontrol_selinux.8 b/man/man8/cpucontrol_selinux.8
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..9145f2b
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/cpucontrol_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
-+.TH "cpucontrol_selinux" "8" "cpucontrol" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "cpucontrol SELinux Policy documentation"
-+.SH "NAME"
-+cpucontrol_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the cpucontrol processes
-+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++.EX
++.PP
++.B cgred_exec_t
++.EE
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the cpucontrol processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++- Set files with the cgred_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the cgred_t domain.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.EX
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux cpucontrol policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their cpucontrol processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for cpucontrol:
++.B cgred_initrc_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the cgred_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the cgred_initrc_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B cpucontrol_conf_t
++.B cgred_log_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the cpucontrol_conf_t type, if you want to treat the files as cpucontrol configuration data, usually stored under the /etc directory.
++- Set files with the cgred_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as cgred log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B cpucontrol_exec_t
++.B cgred_var_run_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the cpucontrol_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the cpucontrol_t domain.
++- Set files with the cgred_var_run_t type, if you want to store the cgred files under the /run directory.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/sbin/microcode_ctl, /usr/sbin/microcode_ctl
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type cgred_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B cgred_log_t
++
++ /var/log/cgrulesengd\.log.*
++.br
++
++.br
++.B cgred_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/cgred.*
++.br
++
++.br
++.B cgroup_t
++
++ /cgroup
++.br
++ /sys/fs/cgroup
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux cpucontrol policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their cpucontrol processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for cpucontrol:
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the cgred_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B cpucontrol_t
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
++
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the cgred_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -9644,164 +10835,112 @@ index 0000000..9145f2b
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), cpucontrol(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/cpufreqselector_selinux.8 b/man/man8/cpufreqselector_selinux.8
++selinux(8), cgred(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/checkpc_selinux.8 b/man/man8/checkpc_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..be066ae
+index 0000000..72abe95
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/cpufreqselector_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
-+.TH "cpufreqselector_selinux" "8" "cpufreqselector" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "cpufreqselector SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/checkpc_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,112 @@
++.TH "checkpc_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "checkpc" "SELinux Policy documentation for checkpc"
+.SH "NAME"
-+cpufreqselector_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the cpufreqselector processes
++checkpc_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the checkpc processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the cpufreqselector processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
-+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the checkpc processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux cpufreqselector policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their cpufreqselector processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for cpufreqselector:
++The checkpc processes execute with the checkpc_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B cpufreqselector_exec_t
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep checkpc_t
+
-+- Set files with the cpufreqselector_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the cpufreqselector_t domain.
+
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
-+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
++The checkpc_t SELinux type can be entered via the "checkpc_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the checkpc_t domain are the following:"
+
++/usr/sbin/checkpc
+.SH PROCESS TYPES
+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux cpufreqselector policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their cpufreqselector processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for cpufreqselector:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux checkpc policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their checkpc processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for checkpc:
+
+.EX
-+.B cpufreqselector_t
++.B checkpc_t
+.EE
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
-+.SH "COMMANDS"
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
-+.PP
-+.B semanage permissive
-+can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
-+.PP
-+.B semanage module
-+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
-+
-+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
-+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
-+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
-+
-+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), cpufreqselector(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/cpuspeed_selinux.8 b/man/man8/cpuspeed_selinux.8
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..3948ea7
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/cpuspeed_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
-+.TH "cpuspeed_selinux" "8" "cpuspeed" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "cpuspeed SELinux Policy documentation"
-+.SH "NAME"
-+cpuspeed_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the cpuspeed processes
-+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
-+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the cpuspeed processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
-+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
-+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux cpuspeed policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their cpuspeed processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for cpuspeed:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux checkpc policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their checkpc processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for checkpc:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B cpuspeed_exec_t
++.B checkpc_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the cpuspeed_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the cpuspeed_t domain.
++- Set files with the checkpc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the checkpc_t domain.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/sbin/cpuspeed, /usr/sbin/powernowd, /usr/sbin/cpufreqd
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B cpuspeed_var_run_t
++.B checkpc_log_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the cpuspeed_var_run_t type, if you want to store the cpuspeed files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the checkpc_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as checkpc log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux cpuspeed policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their cpuspeed processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for cpuspeed:
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+.EX
-+.B cpuspeed_t
-+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++The SELinux process type checkpc_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B checkpc_log_t
++
++
++.br
++.B print_spool_t
++
++ /var/spool/lpd(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/spool/cups(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/spool/cups-pdf(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -9814,97 +10953,102 @@ index 0000000..3948ea7
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), cpuspeed(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/crack_selinux.8 b/man/man8/crack_selinux.8
++selinux(8), checkpc(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/checkpolicy_selinux.8 b/man/man8/checkpolicy_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..02402d3
+index 0000000..b3bbf2c
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/crack_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
-+.TH "crack_selinux" "8" "crack" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "crack SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/checkpolicy_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,102 @@
++.TH "checkpolicy_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "checkpolicy" "SELinux Policy documentation for checkpolicy"
+.SH "NAME"
-+crack_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the crack processes
++checkpolicy_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the checkpolicy processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the crack processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the checkpolicy processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The checkpolicy processes execute with the checkpolicy_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux crack policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their crack processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for crack:
++For example:
+
++.B ps -eZ | grep checkpolicy_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B crack_db_t
-+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the crack_db_t type, if you want to treat the files as crack database content.
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/cache/cracklib(/.*)?, /usr/share/cracklib(/.*)?, /usr/lib/cracklib_dict.*
++The checkpolicy_t SELinux type can be entered via the "checkpolicy_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the checkpolicy_t domain are the following:"
+
-+.EX
++/usr/bin/checkpolicy
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+.B crack_exec_t
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux checkpolicy policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their checkpolicy processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for checkpolicy:
++
++.EX
++.B checkpolicy_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
-+- Set files with the crack_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the crack_t domain.
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux checkpolicy policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their checkpolicy processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for checkpolicy:
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/sbin/cracklib-[a-z]*, /usr/sbin/crack_[a-z]*
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B crack_tmp_t
++.B checkpolicy_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the crack_tmp_t type, if you want to store crack temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++- Set files with the checkpolicy_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the checkpolicy_t domain.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux crack policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their crack processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for crack:
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+.EX
-+.B crack_t
-+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++The SELinux process type checkpolicy_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B semanage_store_t
++
++ /etc/selinux/([^/]*/)?policy(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/selinux/([^/]*/)?modules/(active|tmp|previous)(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/share/selinux/mls(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/share/selinux/targeted(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -9917,149 +11061,198 @@ index 0000000..02402d3
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), crack(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/crond_selinux.8 b/man/man8/crond_selinux.8
++selinux(8), checkpolicy(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/chfn_selinux.8 b/man/man8/chfn_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..64e8674
+index 0000000..9a08bac
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/crond_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,153 @@
-+.TH "crond_selinux" "8" "crond" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "crond SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/chfn_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,198 @@
++.TH "chfn_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "chfn" "SELinux Policy documentation for chfn"
+.SH "NAME"
-+crond_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the crond processes
++chfn_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the chfn processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the crond processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
-+
-+.SH BOOLEANS
-+SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. crond policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run crond with the tightest access possible.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the chfn processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
++The chfn processes execute with the chfn_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to enable extra rules in the cron domain to support fcron, you must turn on the fcron_crond boolean.
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P fcron_crond 1
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep chfn_t
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow system cron jobs to relabel filesystem for restoring file contexts, you must turn on the cron_can_relabel boolean.
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P cron_can_relabel 1
-+.EE
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The chfn_t SELinux type can be entered via the "chfn_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the chfn_t domain are the following:"
+
++/usr/bin/chfn, /usr/bin/chsh
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the crontab_t, crond_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
-+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
-+
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the crontab_t, crond_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux chfn policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their chfn processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for chfn:
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B chfn_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux crond policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their crond processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for crond:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux chfn policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their chfn processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for chfn:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B crond_exec_t
++.B chfn_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the crond_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the crond_t domain.
++- Set files with the chfn_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the chfn_t domain.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/sbin/atd, /usr/sbin/fcron, /usr/sbin/cron(d)?
+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B crond_initrc_exec_t
-+.EE
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
+
-+- Set files with the crond_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the crond_initrc_t domain.
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
++The SELinux process type chfn_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B crond_tmp_t
-+.EE
++.br
++.B faillog_t
+
-+- Set files with the crond_tmp_t type, if you want to store crond temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++ /var/log/btmp.*
++.br
++ /var/run/faillock(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/log/faillog
++.br
++ /var/log/tallylog
++.br
+
++.br
++.B krb5_host_rcache_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B crond_unit_file_t
-+.EE
++ /var/cache/krb5rcache(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/tmp/nfs_0
++.br
++ /var/tmp/DNS_25
++.br
++ /var/tmp/host_0
++.br
++ /var/tmp/imap_0
++.br
++ /var/tmp/HTTP_23
++.br
++ /var/tmp/HTTP_48
++.br
++ /var/tmp/ldap_55
++.br
++ /var/tmp/ldap_487
++.br
++ /var/tmp/ldapmap1_0
++.br
+
-+- Set files with the crond_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as crond unit content.
++.br
++.B lastlog_t
+
++ /var/log/lastlog
+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/lib/systemd/system/crond.*, /usr/lib/systemd/system/atd.*
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B crond_var_run_t
-+.EE
++.br
++.B passwd_file_t
+
-+- Set files with the crond_var_run_t type, if you want to store the crond files under the /run directory.
++ /etc/group[-\+]?
++.br
++ /etc/passwd[-\+]?
++.br
++ /etc/passwd\.adjunct.*
++.br
++ /etc/ptmptmp
++.br
++ /etc/\.pwd\.lock
++.br
++ /etc/group\.lock
++.br
++ /etc/passwd\.OLD
++.br
++ /etc/passwd\.lock
++.br
+
+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/run/crond?\.pid, /var/run/.*cron.*, /var/run/fcron\.pid, /var/run/crond?\.reboot, /var/run/fcron\.fifo, /var/run/atd\.pid, /var/run/anacron\.pid
++.B pcscd_var_run_t
+
-+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
++ /var/run/pcscd(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/pcscd\.events(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/pcscd\.pid
++.br
++ /var/run/pcscd\.pub
++.br
++ /var/run/pcscd\.comm
++.br
++
++.br
++.B security_t
++
++ /selinux
++.br
++
++.br
++.B user_tmp_t
++
++ /var/run/user(/.*)?
++.br
++ /tmp/gconfd-.*
++.br
++ /tmp/gconfd-dwalsh
++.br
++ /tmp/gconfd-xguest
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux crond policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their crond processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for crond:
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the chfn_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B crond_t, cronjob_t, crontab_t
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
++
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the chfn_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -10071,105 +11264,101 @@ index 0000000..64e8674
+.B semanage module
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
-+.B semanage boolean
-+can also be used to manipulate the booleans
-+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), crond(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-+, setsebool(8)
-\ No newline at end of file
-diff --git a/man/man8/crontab_selinux.8 b/man/man8/crontab_selinux.8
++selinux(8), chfn(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/chkpwd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/chkpwd_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..43963c6
+index 0000000..fa2035e
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/crontab_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
-+.TH "crontab_selinux" "8" "crontab" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "crontab SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/chkpwd_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
++.TH "chkpwd_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "chkpwd" "SELinux Policy documentation for chkpwd"
+.SH "NAME"
-+crontab_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the crontab processes
++chkpwd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the chkpwd processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the crontab processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the chkpwd processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The chkpwd processes execute with the chkpwd_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the crontab_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep chkpwd_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
++The chkpwd_t SELinux type can be entered via the "chkpwd_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the chkpwd_t domain are the following:"
++
++/sbin/unix_chkpwd, /sbin/unix_verify, /usr/sbin/validate, /usr/sbin/unix_chkpwd, /usr/sbin/unix_verify
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the crontab_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux chkpwd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their chkpwd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for chkpwd:
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B chkpwd_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux crontab policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their crontab processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for crontab:
-+
-+
-+.EX
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux chkpwd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their chkpwd processes in as secure a method as possible.
+.PP
-+.B crontab_exec_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the crontab_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the crontab_t domain.
++The following file types are defined for chkpwd:
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/bin/(f)?crontab, /usr/sbin/fcronsighup, /usr/bin/at
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B crontab_tmp_t
++.B chkpwd_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the crontab_tmp_t type, if you want to store crontab temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++- Set files with the chkpwd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the chkpwd_t domain.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux crontab policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their crontab processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for crontab:
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the chkpwd_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B crontab_t
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
++
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the chkpwd_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -10182,150 +11371,94 @@ index 0000000..43963c6
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), crontab(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/ctdbd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/ctdbd_selinux.8
++selinux(8), chkpwd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/chrome_sandbox_nacl_selinux.8 b/man/man8/chrome_sandbox_nacl_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..d02c37a
+index 0000000..9f1594b
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/ctdbd_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,153 @@
-+.TH "ctdbd_selinux" "8" "ctdbd" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "ctdbd SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/chrome_sandbox_nacl_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
++.TH "chrome_sandbox_nacl_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "chrome_sandbox_nacl" "SELinux Policy documentation for chrome_sandbox_nacl"
+.SH "NAME"
-+ctdbd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the ctdbd processes
++chrome_sandbox_nacl_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the chrome_sandbox_nacl processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the ctdbd processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the chrome_sandbox_nacl processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The chrome_sandbox_nacl processes execute with the chrome_sandbox_nacl_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux ctdbd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ctdbd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for ctdbd:
++For example:
+
++.B ps -eZ | grep chrome_sandbox_nacl_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B ctdbd_exec_t
-+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the ctdbd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ctdbd_t domain.
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
++The chrome_sandbox_nacl_t SELinux type can be entered via the "bin_t,chrome_sandbox_nacl_exec_t" file types. The default entrypoint paths for the chrome_sandbox_nacl_t domain are the following:"
+
-+.EX
++/bin/.*, /opt/(.*/)?bin(/.*)?, /usr/(.*/)?Bin(/.*)?, /usr/(.*/)?bin(/.*)?, /usr/(.*/)?sbin(/.*)?, /opt/(.*/)?sbin(/.*)?, /opt/(.*/)?libexec(/.*)?, /sbin/.*, /usr/lib(.*/)?bin(/.*)?, /usr/lib(.*/)?sbin(/.*)?, /etc/gdm/[^/]+, /root/bin(/.*)?, /etc/gdm/[^/]+/.*, /etc/cron.daily(/.*)?, /etc/cron.weekly(/.*)?, /etc/cron.hourly(/.*)?, /etc/cron.monthly(/.*)?, /usr/lib/.*/program(/.*)?, /usr/lib/.*/scripts(/.*)?, /usr/lib/[^/]*/run-mozilla\.sh, /usr/lib/[^/]*/mozilla-xremote-client, /usr/lib/[^/]*thunderbird[^/]*/thunderbird, /usr/lib/[^/]*thunderbird[^/]*/open-browser\.sh, /usr/lib/[^/]*thunderbird[^/]*/thunderbird-bin, /lib/udev/[^/]*, /etc/auto\.[^/]*, /etc/avahi/.*\.action, /usr/lib/qt.*/bin(/.*)?, /usr/lib/yp/.+, /var/ftp/bin(/.*)?, /usr/Brother(/.*)?, /usr/Printer(/.*)?, /usr/libexec(/.*)?, /lib/upstart(/.*)?, /etc/kde/env(/.*)?, /etc/profile.d(/.*)?, /var/mailman.*/bin(/.*)?, /etc/lxdm/Pre.*, /etc/hotplug/.*rc, /usr/lib/cups(/.*)?, /etc/hotplug/.*agent, /usr/Brother/(.*/)?i
nf/setup.*, /usr/Brother/(.*/)?inf/brprintconf.*, /usr/lib/dpkg/.+, /etc/lxdm/Post.*, /usr/lib/udev/[^/]*, /var/qmail/bin(/.*)?, /usr/lib/xfce4(/.*)?, /usr/lib/fence(/.*)?, /etc/X11/xinit(/.*)?, /lib/readahead(/.*)?, /etc/netplug\.d(/.*)?, /usr/lib/gimp/.*/plug-ins(/.*)?, /usr/lib/ipsec/.*, /etc/ppp/ip-up\..*, /usr/bin/pingus.*, /etc/cipe/ip-up.*, /usr/lib/dracut(/.*)?, /etc/pm/power\.d(/.*)?, /etc/pm/sleep\.d(/.*)?, /etc/redhat-lsb(/.*)?, /usr/lib/tuned/.*/.*\.sh, /usr/lib/xen/bin(/.*)?, /usr/lib/upstart(/.*)?, /usr/lib/courier(/.*)?, /etc/xen/scripts(/.*)?, /usr/share/tucan.*/tucan.py, /usr/lib/mailman.*/bin(/.*)?, /usr/lib/mailman.*/mail(/.*)?, /etc/ppp/ipv6-up\..*, /etc/ppp/ip-down\..*, /etc/cipe/ip-down.*, /usr/share/hplip/[^/]*, /usr/lib/news/bin(/.*)?, /usr/lib/pm-utils(/.*)?, /etc/vmware-tools(/.*)?, /etc/kde/shutdown(/.*)?, /etc/acpi/actions(/.*)?, /etc/pki/tls/misc(/.*)?, /usr/lib/jvm/java(.*/)bin(/.*), /usr/lib/tumbler-[^/]*/tumblerd, /usr/lib/readahead(/.*)?, /op
t/google/chrome(/.*)?, /etc/munin/plugins(/.*)?, /usr/lib/bluetooth(/.*)?, /usr/lib/debug/bin(/.*)?, /usr/lib/xulrunner[^/]*/updater, /usr/lib/xulrunner[^/]*/crashreporter, /usr/lib/xulrunner[^/]*/xulrunner[^/]*, /usr/lib/ruby/gems(/.*)?/helper-scripts(/.*)?, /usr/share/debconf/.+, /etc/ppp/ipv6-down\..*, /usr/share/cluster/.*\.sh, /usr/share/sectool/.*\.py, /usr/share/ssl/misc(/.*)?, /usr/share/e16/misc(/.*)?, /usr/lib/ccache/bin(/.*)?, /etc/racoon/scripts(/.*)?, /usr/lib/debug/sbin(/.*)?, /usr/lib/ruby/gems/.*/agents(/.*)?, /usr/share/mc/extfs/.*, /usr/lib/apt/methods.+, /usr/lib/portage/bin(/.*)?, /usr/lib/MailScanner(/.*)?, /etc/mcelog/triggers(/.*)?, /etc/dhcp/dhclient\.d(/.*)?, /emul/ia32-linux/bin(/.*)?, /usr/lib/libreoffice(/.*)?/bin(/.*)?, /emul/ia32-linux/usr(/.*)?/bin(/.*)?, /emul/ia32-linux/usr(/.*)?/Bin(/.*)?, /emul/ia32-linux/usr(/.*)?/sbin(/.*)?, /usr/lib/thunderbird.*/mozilla-xremote-client, /usr/lib/cyrus-imapd/.*, /usr/share/createrepo(/.*)?, /emul/ia32-lin
ux/sbin(/.*)?, /usr/share/virtualbox/.*\.sh, /usr/share/wicd/daemon(/.*)?, /usr/share/hal/scripts(/.*)?, /lib/security/pam_krb5(/.*)?, /opt/google/talkplugin(/.*)?, /etc/PackageKit/events(/.*)?, /usr/lib/debug/usr/bin(/.*)?, /usr/lib/vmware-tools/(s)?bin64(/.*)?, /usr/lib/vmware-tools/(s)?bin32(/.*)?, /etc/gdm/XKeepsCrashing[^/]*, /usr/lib/oracle/xe/apps(/.*)?, /usr/share/Modules/init(/.*)?, /usr/share/smolt/client(/.*)?, /usr/lib/nagios/plugins(/.*)?, /usr/lib/debug/usr/sbin(/.*)?, /usr/share/apr-0/build/[^/]+\.sh, /usr/lib/emacsen-common/.*, /usr/share/ajaxterm/qweb.py.*, /var/lib/asterisk/agi-bin(/.*)?, /usr/share/shorewall-perl(/.*)?, /usr/share/shorewall-lite(/.*)?, /usr/linuxprinter/filters(/.*)?, /usr/lib/netsaint/plugins(/.*)?, /usr/lib/chromium-browser(/.*)?, /usr/share/turboprint/lib(/.*)?, /usr/lib/nfs-utils/scripts(/.*)?, /usr/share/shorewall6-lite(/.*)?, /usr/share/shorewall-shell(/.*)?, /usr/share/vhostmd/scripts(/.*)?, /usr/lib/debug/usr/libexec(/.*)?, /etc/Co
nsoleKit/run-seat\.d(/.*)?, /usr/lib/nspluginwrapper/np.*, /usr/share/sandbox/sandboxX.sh, /usr/lib/ConsoleKit/scripts(/.*)?, /usr/share/ajaxterm/ajaxterm.py.*, /usr/lib/pgsql/test/regress/.*\.sh, /usr/share/denyhosts/scripts(/.*)?, /usr/share/denyhosts/plugins(/.*)?, /emul/ia32-linux/usr/libexec(/.*)?, /usr/lib/mediawiki/math/texvc.*, /usr/share/PackageKit/helpers(/.*)?, /etc/ConsoleKit/run-session\.d(/.*)?, /etc/hotplug\.d/default/default.*, /usr/lib/systemd/system-sleep/(.*)?, /opt/gutenprint/cups/lib/filter(/.*)?, /usr/share/system-config-network(/netconfig)?/[^/]+\.py, /usr/lib/ConsoleKit/run-session\.d(/.*)?, /etc/sysconfig/network-scripts/net.*, /etc/sysconfig/network-scripts/ifup.*, /etc/sysconfig/network-scripts/init.*, /usr/share/kde4/apps/kajongg/kajongg.py, /etc/sysconfig/network-scripts/ifdown.*, /opt/OpenPrinting-Gutenprint/cups/lib/filter(/.*)?, /usr/share/gedit-2/plugins/externaltools/tools(/.*)?, /bin, /sbin, /usr/bin, /dev/MAKEDEV, /var/qmail/rc, /var/qmail
/bin, /etc/mail/make, /bin/mountpoint, /usr/lib/rpm/rpmq, /usr/lib/rpm/rpmv, /usr/lib/rpm/rpmd, /usr/lib/rpm/rpmk, /lib/udev/scsi_id, /sbin/mkfs\.cramfs, /etc/xen/qemu-ifup, /etc/lxdm/Xsession, /etc/sysconfig/init, /usr/bin/mountpoint, /etc/apcupsd/commok, /usr/lib/sftp-server, /etc/sysconfig/crond, /etc/lxdm/LoginReady, /usr/sbin/mkfs\.cramfs, /usr/lib/udev/scsi_id, /etc/X11/xdm/Xsetup_0, /etc/init\.d/functions, /etc/apcupsd/changeme, /usr/lib/iscan/network, /etc/apcupsd/onbattery, /usr/lib/yaboot/addnote, /etc/sysconfig/libvirtd, /etc/apcupsd/apccontrol, /etc/apcupsd/offbattery, /usr/lib/wicd/monitor\.py, /etc/X11/xdm/TakeConsole, /etc/X11/xdm/GiveConsole, /etc/apcupsd/commfailure, /usr/lib/misc/sftp-server, /etc/sysconfig/netconsole, /lib/udev/devices/MAKEDEV, /var/lib/iscan/interpreter, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/functions, /etc/apcupsd/masterconnect, /etc/apcupsd/mastertimeout, /usr/share/pydict/pydict\.py, /usr/share/clamav/clamd-gen, /sbin/insmod_ksymoops_clean, /etc/mgetty\+
sendfax/new_fax, /usr/lib/xfce4/panel/migrate, /usr/lib/xfce4/panel/wrapper, /etc/sysconfig/readonly-root, /usr/lib/vte/gnome-pty-helper, /usr/lib/udev/devices/MAKEDEV, /usr/lib/xfce4/xfconf/xfconfd, /usr/share/cvs/contrib/rcs2log, /usr/share/hwbrowser/hwbrowser, /usr/X11R6/lib/X11/xkb/xkbcomp, /usr/lib/virtualbox/VBoxManage, /usr/share/cluster/SAPInstance, /usr/share/cluster/checkquorum, /usr/share/shorewall/getparams, /usr/share/apr-0/build/libtool, /usr/share/cluster/SAPDatabase, /etc/hotplug/hotplug\.functions, /usr/share/texmf/web2c/mktexdir, /usr/share/texmf/web2c/mktexnam, /usr/share/texmf/web2c/mktexupd, /usr/share/shorewall/configpath, /usr/sbin/insmod_ksymoops_clean, /etc/mcelog/cache-error-trigger, /usr/share/shorewall/compiler\.pl, /usr/share/dayplanner/dayplanner, /usr/libexec/openssh/sftp-server, /usr/share/texmf/texconfig/tcfmgr, /usr/share/clamav/freshclam-sleep, /usr/share/cluster/svclib_nfslock, /usr/share/cluster/ocf-shellfuncs, /usr/lib/xfce4/exo-1/exo-he
lper-1, /usr/share/pwlib/make/ptlib-config, /usr/share/fedora-usermgmt/wrapper, /usr/share/printconf/util/print\.py, /usr/lib/xfce4/xfwm4/helper-dialog, /etc/pki/tls/certs/make-dummy-cert, /usr/share/rhn/rhn_applet/applet\.py, /usr/share/authconfig/authconfig\.py, /usr/share/spamassassin/sa-update\.cron, /usr/share/gnucash/finance-quote-check, /usr/share/cluster/fence_scsi_check\.pl, /usr/share/selinux/devel/policygentool, /usr/share/switchdesk/switchdesk-gui\.py, /usr/share/authconfig/authconfig-tui\.py, /usr/share/authconfig/authconfig-gtk\.py, /usr/share/gnucash/finance-quote-helper, /usr/share/gitolite/hooks/common/update, /usr/lib/xfce4/exo-1/exo-compose-mail-1, /usr/share/system-config-services/gui\.py, /lib/security/pam_krb5/pam_krb5_storetmp, /usr/share/system-config-netboot/pxeos\.py, /usr/lib/xfce4/session/balou-export-theme, /usr/share/system-config-selinux/polgen\.py, /usr/share/system-config-nfs/nfs-export\.py, /usr/share/system-config-printer/applet\.py, /usr/s
hare/PackageKit/pk-upgrade-distro\.sh, /usr/lib/xfce4/session/balou-install-theme, /usr/share/system-config-netboot/pxeboot\.py, /usr/lib/xfce4/session/xfsm-shutdown-helper, /usr/share/rhn/rhn_applet/needed-packages\.py, /usr/lib/security/pam_krb5/pam_krb5_storetmp, /usr/share/system-logviewer/system-logviewer\.py, /usr/share/system-config-network/neat-control\.py, /usr/share/system-config-services/serviceconf\.py, /usr/share/hal/device-manager/hal-device-manager, /usr/share/system-config-lvm/system-config-lvm\.py, /usr/share/system-config-nfs/system-config-nfs\.py, /usr/share/system-config-mouse/system-config-mouse, /usr/share/system-config-httpd/system-config-httpd, /usr/share/system-config-users/system-config-users, /usr/share/system-config-date/system-config-date\.py, /usr/share/doc/ghc/html/libraries/gen_contents_index, /usr/share/gitolite/hooks/gitolite-admin/post-update, /usr/share/system-config-samba/system-config-samba\.py, /usr/share/system-config-display/system-co
nfig-display, /usr/share/system-config-keyboard/system-config-keyboard, /usr/share/system-config-language/system-config-language, /usr/share/system-config-services/system-config-services, /usr/share/system-config-selinux/system-config-selinux\.py, /usr/share/system-config-netboot/system-config-netboot\.py, /usr/share/system-config-soundcard/system-config-soundcard, /usr/share/system-config-rootpassword/system-config-rootpassword, /usr/share/system-config-securitylevel/system-config-securitylevel\.py, /opt/google/chrome/nacl_helper_bootstrap, /usr/lib/chromium-browser/nacl_helper_bootstrap
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+.B ctdbd_initrc_exec_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the ctdbd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ctdbd_initrc_t domain.
-+
-+
-+.EX
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+.B ctdbd_log_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the ctdbd_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as ctdbd log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
-+
-+
-+.EX
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux chrome_sandbox_nacl policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their chrome_sandbox_nacl processes in as secure a method as possible.
+.PP
-+.B ctdbd_spool_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the ctdbd_spool_t type, if you want to store the ctdbd files under the /var/spool directory.
-+
++The following process types are defined for chrome_sandbox_nacl:
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B ctdbd_tmp_t
++.B chrome_sandbox_nacl_t
+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the ctdbd_tmp_t type, if you want to store ctdbd temporary files in the /tmp directories.
-+
-+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B ctdbd_var_lib_t
-+.EE
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
-+- Set files with the ctdbd_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the ctdbd files under the /var/lib directory.
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux chrome_sandbox_nacl policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their chrome_sandbox_nacl processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for chrome_sandbox_nacl:
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/ctdb(/.*)?, /var/lib/ctdbd(/.*)?, /etc/ctdb(/.*)?, /var/ctdbd(/.*)?
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B ctdbd_var_run_t
++.B chrome_sandbox_nacl_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the ctdbd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the ctdbd files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the chrome_sandbox_nacl_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the chrome_sandbox_nacl_t domain.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PORT TYPES
-+SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
-+.PP
-+You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
-+
-+.B semanage port -l
-+
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
-+SELinux ctdbd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ctdbd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following port types are defined for ctdbd:
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+.EX
-+.TP 5
-+.B ctdb_port_t
-+.TP 10
-+.EE
++The SELinux process type chrome_sandbox_nacl_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
++.br
++.B chrome_sandbox_tmpfs_t
+
-+Default Defined Ports:
-+tcp 4379
-+.EE
-+udp 4379
-+.EE
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux ctdbd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ctdbd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for ctdbd:
+
-+.EX
-+.B ctdbd_t
-+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -10337,239 +11470,205 @@ index 0000000..d02c37a
+.B semanage module
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
-+.B semanage port
-+can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
-+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), ctdbd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/cups_selinux.8 b/man/man8/cups_selinux.8
++selinux(8), chrome_sandbox_nacl(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, chrome_sandbox_selinux(8), chrome_sandbox_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/chrome_sandbox_selinux.8 b/man/man8/chrome_sandbox_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..3534e79
+index 0000000..42c38de
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/cups_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,235 @@
-+.TH "cups_selinux" "8" "cups" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "cups SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/chrome_sandbox_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,206 @@
++.TH "chrome_sandbox_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "chrome_sandbox" "SELinux Policy documentation for chrome_sandbox"
+.SH "NAME"
-+cups_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the cups processes
++chrome_sandbox_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the chrome_sandbox processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the cups processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the chrome_sandbox processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The chrome_sandbox processes execute with the chrome_sandbox_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the cups_pdf_t, cupsd_config_t, cupsd_lpd_t, cupsd_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep chrome_sandbox_t
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the cups_pdf_t, cupsd_config_t, cupsd_lpd_t, cupsd_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
-+.EE
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++The chrome_sandbox_t SELinux type can be entered via the "chrome_sandbox_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the chrome_sandbox_t domain are the following:"
++
++/opt/google/chrome/chrome-sandbox, /usr/lib/chromium-browser/chrome-sandbox
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux cups policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their cups processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for cups:
-+
-+
-+.EX
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux chrome_sandbox policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their chrome_sandbox processes in as secure a method as possible.
+.PP
-+.B cups_pdf_exec_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the cups_pdf_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the cups_pdf_t domain.
-+
++The following process types are defined for chrome_sandbox:
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B cups_pdf_tmp_t
++.B chrome_sandbox_t, chrome_sandbox_nacl_t
+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the cups_pdf_tmp_t type, if you want to store cups pdf temporary files in the /tmp directories.
-+
-+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B cupsd_config_exec_t
-+.EE
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
-+- Set files with the cupsd_config_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the cupsd_config_t domain.
++.SH BOOLEANS
++SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. chrome_sandbox policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run chrome_sandbox with the tightest access possible.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/sbin/printconf-backend, /usr/sbin/hal_lpadmin, /usr/lib/udev/udev-configure-printer, /usr/bin/cups-config-daemon, /usr/libexec/cups-pk-helper-mechanism, /usr/libexec/hal_lpadmin, /lib/udev/udev-configure-printer
+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B cupsd_config_var_run_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the cupsd_config_var_run_t type, if you want to store the cupsd config files under the /run directory.
-+
++If you want to allow unconfined users to transition to the chrome sandbox domains when running chrome-sandbox, you must turn on the unconfined_chrome_sandbox_transition boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B cupsd_etc_t
++.B setsebool -P unconfined_chrome_sandbox_transition 1
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the cupsd_etc_t type, if you want to store cupsd files in the /etc directories.
-+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/share/cups(/.*)?, /etc/cups(/.*)?
-+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B cupsd_exec_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the cupsd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the cupsd_t domain.
-+
++If you want to allow unconfined users to transition to the chrome sandbox domains when running chrome-sandbox, you must turn on the unconfined_chrome_sandbox_transition boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B cupsd_initrc_exec_t
++.B setsebool -P unconfined_chrome_sandbox_transition 1
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the cupsd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the cupsd_initrc_t domain.
-+
-+
-+.EX
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
-+.B cupsd_interface_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the cupsd_interface_t type, if you want to treat the files as cupsd interface data.
-+
-+
-+.EX
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+.B cupsd_lock_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the cupsd_lock_t type, if you want to treat the files as cupsd lock data, stored under the /var/lock directory
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux chrome_sandbox policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their chrome_sandbox processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for chrome_sandbox:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B cupsd_log_t
++.B chrome_sandbox_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the cupsd_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as cupsd log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++- Set files with the chrome_sandbox_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the chrome_sandbox_t domain.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/local/Brother/fax/.*\.log.*, /var/log/cups(/.*)?, /var/log/turboprint.*
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B cupsd_lpd_exec_t
++.B chrome_sandbox_nacl_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the cupsd_lpd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the cupsd_lpd_t domain.
++- Set files with the chrome_sandbox_nacl_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the chrome_sandbox_nacl_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B cupsd_lpd_tmp_t
++.B chrome_sandbox_tmp_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the cupsd_lpd_tmp_t type, if you want to store cupsd lpd temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++- Set files with the chrome_sandbox_tmp_t type, if you want to store chrome sandbox temporary files in the /tmp directories.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B cupsd_lpd_var_run_t
++.B chrome_sandbox_tmpfs_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the cupsd_lpd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the cupsd lpd files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the chrome_sandbox_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store chrome sandbox files on a tmpfs file system.
+
+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B cupsd_rw_etc_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the cupsd_rw_etc_t type, if you want to store cupsd rw files in the /etc directories.
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/etc/cups/lpoptions.*, /usr/local/linuxprinter/ppd(/.*)?, /etc/cups/subscriptions.*, /opt/brother/Printers(.*/)?inf(/.*)?, /usr/local/Brother/(.*/)?inf(/.*)?, /etc/cups/classes\.conf.*, /usr/lib/bjlib(/.*)?, /etc/cups/ppd(/.*)?, /opt/gutenprint/ppds(/.*)?, /etc/printcap.*, /etc/alchemist/namespace/printconf(/.*)?, /usr/local/Printer/(.*/)?inf(/.*)?, /var/lib/cups/certs, /etc/cups/ppds\.dat, /etc/cups/certs, /etc/cups/certs/.*, /etc/cups/printers\.conf.*, /var/lib/cups/certs/.*, /var/cache/foomatic(/.*)?, /var/cache/alchemist/printconf.*, /etc/cups/cupsd\.conf.*, /var/cache/cups(/.*)?, /usr/share/foomatic/db/oldprinterids
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B cupsd_tmp_t
-+.EE
++The SELinux process type chrome_sandbox_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
-+- Set files with the cupsd_tmp_t type, if you want to store cupsd temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++.br
++.B cgroup_t
+
++ /cgroup
++.br
++ /sys/fs/cgroup
++.br
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B cupsd_unit_file_t
-+.EE
++.br
++.B chrome_sandbox_tmp_t
+
-+- Set files with the cupsd_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as cupsd unit content.
+
++.br
++.B chrome_sandbox_tmpfs_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B cupsd_var_run_t
-+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the cupsd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the cupsd files under the /run directory.
++.br
++.B home_cert_t
+
++ /root/\.pki(/.*)?
++.br
++ /root/\.cert(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/.kde/share/apps/networkmanagement/certificates(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.pki(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.cert(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/.kde/share/apps/networkmanagement/certificates(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.pki(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.cert(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/.kde/share/apps/networkmanagement/certificates(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.pki(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.cert(/.*)?
+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/ccpd(/.*)?, /var/ekpd(/.*)?, /var/turboprint(/.*)?, /var/run/cups(/.*)?
+
-+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
++.br
++.B user_fonts_cache_t
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux cups policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their cups processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for cups:
++ /root/\.fontconfig(/.*)?
++.br
++ /root/\.fonts/auto(/.*)?
++.br
++ /root/\.fonts\.cache-.*
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.fontconfig(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.fonts/auto(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.fonts\.cache-.*
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.fontconfig(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.fonts/auto(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.fonts\.cache-.*
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.fontconfig(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.fonts/auto(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.fonts\.cache-.*
++.br
+
-+.EX
-+.B cupsd_t, cupsd_config_t, cupsd_lpd_t, cups_pdf_t
-+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -10581,221 +11680,315 @@ index 0000000..3534e79
+.B semanage module
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
++.B semanage boolean
++can also be used to manipulate the booleans
++
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), cups(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/cupsd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/cupsd_selinux.8
++selinux(8), chrome_sandbox(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, setsebool(8), chrome_sandbox_nacl_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/chronyd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/chronyd_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..5df9c63
+index 0000000..2e165b5
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/cupsd_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,219 @@
-+.TH "cupsd_selinux" "8" "cupsd" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "cupsd SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/chronyd_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,216 @@
++.TH "chronyd_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "chronyd" "SELinux Policy documentation for chronyd"
+.SH "NAME"
-+cupsd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the cupsd processes
++chronyd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the chronyd processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the cupsd processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the chronyd processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The chronyd processes execute with the chronyd_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the cups_pdf_t, cupsd_config_t, cupsd_lpd_t, cupsd_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep chronyd_t
+
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The chronyd_t SELinux type can be entered via the "chronyd_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the chronyd_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/sbin/chronyd
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the cups_pdf_t, cupsd_config_t, cupsd_lpd_t, cupsd_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux chronyd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their chronyd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for chronyd:
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B chronyd_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux cupsd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their cupsd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for cupsd:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux chronyd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their chronyd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for chronyd:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B cupsd_config_exec_t
++.B chronyd_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the cupsd_config_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the cupsd_config_t domain.
++- Set files with the chronyd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the chronyd_t domain.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/sbin/printconf-backend, /usr/sbin/hal_lpadmin, /usr/lib/udev/udev-configure-printer, /usr/bin/cups-config-daemon, /usr/libexec/cups-pk-helper-mechanism, /usr/libexec/hal_lpadmin, /lib/udev/udev-configure-printer
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B cupsd_config_var_run_t
++.B chronyd_initrc_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the cupsd_config_var_run_t type, if you want to store the cupsd config files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the chronyd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the chronyd_initrc_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B cupsd_etc_t
++.B chronyd_keys_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the cupsd_etc_t type, if you want to store cupsd files in the /etc directories.
++- Set files with the chronyd_keys_t type, if you want to treat the files as chronyd keys data.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/share/cups(/.*)?, /etc/cups(/.*)?
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B cupsd_exec_t
++.B chronyd_tmpfs_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the cupsd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the cupsd_t domain.
++- Set files with the chronyd_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store chronyd files on a tmpfs file system.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B cupsd_initrc_exec_t
++.B chronyd_unit_file_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the cupsd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the cupsd_initrc_t domain.
++- Set files with the chronyd_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as chronyd unit content.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B cupsd_interface_t
++.B chronyd_var_lib_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the cupsd_interface_t type, if you want to treat the files as cupsd interface data.
++- Set files with the chronyd_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the chronyd files under the /var/lib directory.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B cupsd_lock_t
++.B chronyd_var_log_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the cupsd_lock_t type, if you want to treat the files as cupsd lock data, stored under the /var/lock directory
++- Set files with the chronyd_var_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as chronyd var log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B cupsd_log_t
++.B chronyd_var_run_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the cupsd_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as cupsd log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++- Set files with the chronyd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the chronyd files under the /run directory.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/local/Brother/fax/.*\.log.*, /var/log/cups(/.*)?, /var/log/turboprint.*
+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B cupsd_lpd_exec_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the cupsd_lpd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the cupsd_lpd_t domain.
-+
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
+
-+.EX
++.SH PORT TYPES
++SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
+.PP
-+.B cupsd_lpd_tmp_t
-+.EE
++You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
+
-+- Set files with the cupsd_lpd_tmp_t type, if you want to store cupsd lpd temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++.B semanage port -l
+
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
++SELinux chronyd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their chronyd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following port types are defined for chronyd:
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B cupsd_lpd_var_run_t
++.TP 5
++.B chronyd_port_t
++.TP 10
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the cupsd_lpd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the cupsd lpd files under the /run directory.
-+
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B cupsd_rw_etc_t
++Default Defined Ports:
++udp 323
+.EE
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+- Set files with the cupsd_rw_etc_t type, if you want to store cupsd rw files in the /etc directories.
++The SELinux process type chronyd_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/etc/cups/lpoptions.*, /usr/local/linuxprinter/ppd(/.*)?, /etc/cups/subscriptions.*, /opt/brother/Printers(.*/)?inf(/.*)?, /usr/local/Brother/(.*/)?inf(/.*)?, /etc/cups/classes\.conf.*, /usr/lib/bjlib(/.*)?, /etc/cups/ppd(/.*)?, /opt/gutenprint/ppds(/.*)?, /etc/printcap.*, /etc/alchemist/namespace/printconf(/.*)?, /usr/local/Printer/(.*/)?inf(/.*)?, /var/lib/cups/certs, /etc/cups/ppds\.dat, /etc/cups/certs, /etc/cups/certs/.*, /etc/cups/printers\.conf.*, /var/lib/cups/certs/.*, /var/cache/foomatic(/.*)?, /var/cache/alchemist/printconf.*, /etc/cups/cupsd\.conf.*, /var/cache/cups(/.*)?, /usr/share/foomatic/db/oldprinterids
++.B chronyd_tmpfs_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B cupsd_tmp_t
-+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the cupsd_tmp_t type, if you want to store cupsd temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++.br
++.B chronyd_var_lib_t
+
++ /var/lib/chrony(/.*)?
++.br
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B cupsd_unit_file_t
-+.EE
++.br
++.B chronyd_var_log_t
+
-+- Set files with the cupsd_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as cupsd unit content.
++ /var/log/chrony(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B chronyd_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/chronyd(/.*)
++.br
++ /var/run/chronyd\.pid
++.br
++ /var/run/chronyd\.sock
++.br
++
++.br
++.B gpsd_tmpfs_t
++
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the chronyd_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
++
+.PP
-+.B cupsd_var_run_t
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the chronyd_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the cupsd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the cupsd files under the /run directory.
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/ccpd(/.*)?, /var/ekpd(/.*)?, /var/turboprint(/.*)?, /var/run/cups(/.*)?
++.B semanage port
++can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), chronyd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/ciped_selinux.8 b/man/man8/ciped_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..7e19c9b
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/ciped_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
++.TH "ciped_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "ciped" "SELinux Policy documentation for ciped"
++.SH "NAME"
++ciped_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the ciped processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the ciped processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The ciped processes execute with the ciped_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep ciped_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The ciped_t SELinux type can be entered via the "ciped_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the ciped_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/sbin/ciped.*
+.SH PROCESS TYPES
+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux cupsd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their cupsd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for cupsd:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux ciped policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ciped processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for ciped:
+
+.EX
-+.B cupsd_t, cupsd_config_t, cupsd_lpd_t, cups_pdf_t
++.B ciped_t
+.EE
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux ciped policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ciped processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for ciped:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B ciped_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the ciped_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ciped_t domain.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
+can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
@@ -10807,167 +12000,277 @@ index 0000000..5df9c63
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), cupsd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/cvs_selinux.8 b/man/man8/cvs_selinux.8
++selinux(8), ciped(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/clamd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/clamd_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..bbec072
+index 0000000..26f026b
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/cvs_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,174 @@
-+.TH "cvs_selinux" "8" "cvs" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "cvs SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/clamd_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,284 @@
++.TH "clamd_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "clamd" "SELinux Policy documentation for clamd"
+.SH "NAME"
-+cvs_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the cvs processes
++clamd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the clamd processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the cvs processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the clamd processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The clamd processes execute with the clamd_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep clamd_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The clamd_t SELinux type can be entered via the "clamd_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the clamd_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/sbin/clamd, /usr/sbin/clamav-milter
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux clamd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their clamd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for clamd:
++
++.EX
++.B clamd_t, clamscan_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH BOOLEANS
-+SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. cvs policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run cvs with the tightest access possible.
++SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. clamd policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run clamd with the tightest access possible.
+
+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow cvs daemon to read shadow, you must turn on the cvs_read_shadow boolean.
++If you want to allow clamd to use JIT compiler, you must turn on the clamd_use_jit boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P cvs_read_shadow 1
++.B setsebool -P clamd_use_jit 1
+.EE
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++.PP
++If you want to allow clamscan to non security files on a system, you must turn on the clamscan_can_scan_system boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P clamscan_can_scan_system 1
++.EE
+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the cvs_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++If you want to allow clamscan to read user content, you must turn on the clamscan_read_user_content boolean.
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.B setsebool -P clamscan_read_user_content 1
+.EE
+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the cvs_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++If you want to allow clamd to use JIT compiler, you must turn on the clamd_use_jit boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P clamd_use_jit 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow clamscan to non security files on a system, you must turn on the clamscan_can_scan_system boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P clamscan_can_scan_system 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow clamscan to read user content, you must turn on the clamscan_read_user_content boolean.
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B setsebool -P clamscan_read_user_content 1
+.EE
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux cvs policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their cvs processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for cvs:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux clamd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their clamd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for clamd:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B cvs_data_t
++.B clamd_etc_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the cvs_data_t type, if you want to treat the files as cvs content.
++- Set files with the clamd_etc_t type, if you want to store clamd files in the /etc directories.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/opt/cvs(/.*)?, /var/cvs(/.*)?
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B cvs_exec_t
++.B clamd_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the cvs_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the cvs_t domain.
++- Set files with the clamd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the clamd_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B cvs_initrc_exec_t
++.B clamd_initrc_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the cvs_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the cvs_initrc_t domain.
++- Set files with the clamd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the clamd_initrc_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B cvs_keytab_t
++.B clamd_tmp_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the cvs_keytab_t type, if you want to treat the files as kerberos keytab files.
++- Set files with the clamd_tmp_t type, if you want to store clamd temporary files in the /tmp directories.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B cvs_tmp_t
++.B clamd_unit_file_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the cvs_tmp_t type, if you want to store cvs temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++- Set files with the clamd_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as clamd unit content.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B cvs_var_run_t
++.B clamd_var_lib_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the cvs_var_run_t type, if you want to store the cvs files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the clamd_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the clamd files under the /var/lib directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B clamd_var_log_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the clamd_var_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as clamd var log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B clamd_var_run_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the clamd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the clamd files under the /run directory.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
+.SH PORT TYPES
-+SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
++SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
+.PP
-+You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
++You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
+
+.B semanage port -l
+
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
-+SELinux cvs policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their cvs processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following port types are defined for cvs:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
++SELinux clamd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their clamd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following port types are defined for clamd:
+
+.EX
+.TP 5
-+.B cvs_port_t
++.B clamd_port_t
+.TP 10
+.EE
+
+
+Default Defined Ports:
-+tcp 2401
-+.EE
-+udp 2401
++tcp 3310
+.EE
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type clamd_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B amavis_spool_t
++
++ /var/spool/amavisd(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B antivirus_db_t
++
++ /var/opt/f-secure(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B clamd_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B clamd_var_lib_t
++
++ /var/clamav(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/clamd.*
++.br
++ /var/lib/clamav(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B clamd_var_log_t
++
++ /var/log/clamd.*
++.br
++ /var/log/clamav.*
++.br
++
++.br
++.B clamd_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/clamd.*
++.br
++ /var/run/clamav.*
++.br
++ /var/run/amavis(d)?/clamd\.pid
++.br
++ /var/spool/MailScanner(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/spool/amavisd/clamd\.sock
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux cvs policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their cvs processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for cvs:
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the clamd_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B cvs_t
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
++
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the clamd_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -10986,124 +12289,158 @@ index 0000000..bbec072
+can also be used to manipulate the booleans
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), cvs(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-+, setsebool(8)
++selinux(8), clamd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, setsebool(8), clamscan_selinux(8)
\ No newline at end of file
-diff --git a/man/man8/cyphesis_selinux.8 b/man/man8/cyphesis_selinux.8
+diff --git a/man/man8/clamscan_selinux.8 b/man/man8/clamscan_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..920e97f
+index 0000000..d29a7f2
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/cyphesis_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,125 @@
-+.TH "cyphesis_selinux" "8" "cyphesis" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "cyphesis SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/clamscan_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,160 @@
++.TH "clamscan_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "clamscan" "SELinux Policy documentation for clamscan"
+.SH "NAME"
-+cyphesis_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the cyphesis processes
++clamscan_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the clamscan processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the cyphesis processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the clamscan processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The clamscan processes execute with the clamscan_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep clamscan_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The clamscan_t SELinux type can be entered via the "clamscan_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the clamscan_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/bin/clamscan, /usr/bin/clamdscan
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux cyphesis policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their cyphesis processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for cyphesis:
-+
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux clamscan policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their clamscan processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for clamscan:
+
+.EX
++.B clamscan_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH BOOLEANS
++SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. clamscan policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run clamscan with the tightest access possible.
++
++
+.PP
-+.B cyphesis_exec_t
++If you want to allow clamscan to non security files on a system, you must turn on the clamscan_can_scan_system boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P clamscan_can_scan_system 1
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the cyphesis_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the cyphesis_t domain.
++.PP
++If you want to allow clamscan to read user content, you must turn on the clamscan_read_user_content boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P clamscan_read_user_content 1
++.EE
+
++.PP
++If you want to allow clamscan to non security files on a system, you must turn on the clamscan_can_scan_system boolean.
+
+.EX
++.B setsebool -P clamscan_can_scan_system 1
++.EE
++
+.PP
-+.B cyphesis_log_t
++If you want to allow clamscan to read user content, you must turn on the clamscan_read_user_content boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P clamscan_read_user_content 1
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the cyphesis_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as cyphesis log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux clamscan policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their clamscan processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for clamscan:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B cyphesis_tmp_t
++.B clamscan_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the cyphesis_tmp_t type, if you want to store cyphesis temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++- Set files with the clamscan_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the clamscan_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B cyphesis_var_run_t
++.B clamscan_tmp_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the cyphesis_var_run_t type, if you want to store the cyphesis files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the clamscan_tmp_t type, if you want to store clamscan temporary files in the /tmp directories.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PORT TYPES
-+SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
-+.PP
-+You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+.B semanage port -l
++The SELinux process type clamscan_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
-+SELinux cyphesis policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their cyphesis processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following port types are defined for cyphesis:
++.br
++.B amavis_spool_t
+
-+.EX
-+.TP 5
-+.B cyphesis_port_t
-+.TP 10
-+.EE
++ /var/spool/amavisd(/.*)?
++.br
+
++.br
++.B antivirus_db_t
+
-+Default Defined Ports:
-+tcp 6767,6769,6780-6799
-+.EE
-+udp 32771
-+.EE
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux cyphesis policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their cyphesis processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for cyphesis:
++ /var/opt/f-secure(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B clamd_var_lib_t
++
++ /var/clamav(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/clamd.*
++.br
++ /var/lib/clamav(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B clamscan_tmp_t
+
-+.EX
-+.B cyphesis_t
-+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -11115,139 +12452,122 @@ index 0000000..920e97f
+.B semanage module
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
-+.B semanage port
-+can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
++.B semanage boolean
++can also be used to manipulate the booleans
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), cyphesis(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/cyrus_selinux.8 b/man/man8/cyrus_selinux.8
++selinux(8), clamscan(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, setsebool(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/clogd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/clogd_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..d8334d2
+index 0000000..376c775
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/cyrus_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,135 @@
-+.TH "cyrus_selinux" "8" "cyrus" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "cyrus SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/clogd_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,116 @@
++.TH "clogd_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "clogd" "SELinux Policy documentation for clogd"
+.SH "NAME"
-+cyrus_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the cyrus processes
++clogd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the clogd processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the cyrus processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the clogd processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The clogd processes execute with the clogd_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the cyrus_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep clogd_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The clogd_t SELinux type can be entered via the "clogd_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the clogd_t domain are the following:"
+
++/usr/sbin/clogd
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the cyrus_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux clogd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their clogd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for clogd:
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B clogd_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux cyrus policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their cyrus processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for cyrus:
-+
-+
-+.EX
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux clogd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their clogd processes in as secure a method as possible.
+.PP
-+.B cyrus_exec_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the cyrus_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the cyrus_t domain.
++The following file types are defined for clogd:
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/lib/cyrus-imapd/cyrus-master, /usr/lib/cyrus/master
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B cyrus_initrc_exec_t
++.B clogd_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the cyrus_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the cyrus_initrc_t domain.
++- Set files with the clogd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the clogd_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B cyrus_keytab_t
++.B clogd_tmpfs_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the cyrus_keytab_t type, if you want to treat the files as kerberos keytab files.
++- Set files with the clogd_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store clogd files on a tmpfs file system.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B cyrus_tmp_t
++.B clogd_var_run_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the cyrus_tmp_t type, if you want to store cyrus temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++- Set files with the clogd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the clogd files under the /run directory.
+
+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B cyrus_var_lib_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the cyrus_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the cyrus files under the /var/lib directory.
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/imap(/.*)?, /var/lib/imap(/.*)?
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B cyrus_var_run_t
-+.EE
++The SELinux process type clogd_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
-+- Set files with the cyrus_var_run_t type, if you want to store the cyrus files under the /run directory.
++.br
++.B clogd_tmpfs_t
+
+
-+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
++.br
++.B clogd_var_run_t
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux cyrus policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their cyrus processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for cyrus:
++ /var/run/clogd\.pid
++.br
+
-+.EX
-+.B cyrus_t
-+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -11260,197 +12580,272 @@ index 0000000..d8334d2
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), cyrus(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/dbadm_selinux.8 b/man/man8/dbadm_selinux.8
++selinux(8), clogd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/clvmd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/clvmd_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..4bbec80
+index 0000000..6c83943
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/dbadm_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
-+.TH "dbadm_selinux" "8" "dbadm" "mgrepl at redhat.com" "dbadm SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/clvmd_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,142 @@
++.TH "clvmd_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "clvmd" "SELinux Policy documentation for clvmd"
+.SH "NAME"
-+dbadm_r \- \fBDatabase administrator role\fP - Security Enhanced Linux Policy
-+
-+.SH DESCRIPTION
-+
-+SELinux supports Roles Based Access Control, some Linux roles are login roles, while other roles need to be transition to.
++clvmd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the clvmd processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Note: The examples in the man page will user the staff_u user.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the clvmd processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+Non login roles are usually used for administrative tasks.
++The clvmd processes execute with the clvmd_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+Roles usually have default types assigned to them.
++For example:
+
-+The default type for the dbadm_r role is dbadm_t.
++.B ps -eZ | grep clvmd_t
+
-+You can use the
-+.B newrole
-+program to transition directly to this role.
+
-+.B newrole -r dbadm_r -t dbadm_t
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
-+.B sudo
-+can also be setup to transition to this role using the visudo command.
++The clvmd_t SELinux type can be entered via the "clvmd_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the clvmd_t domain are the following:"
+
-+USERNAME ALL=(ALL) ROLE=dbadm_r TYPE=dbadm_t COMMAND
-+.br
-+sudo will run COMMAND as staff_u:dbadm_r:dbadm_t:LEVEL
++/usr/sbin/clvmd
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux clvmd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their clvmd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for clvmd:
+
-+If you want to use a non login role, you need to make sure the SELinux user you are using can reach this role.
++.EX
++.B clvmd_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
-+You can see all of the assigned SELinux roles using the following
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux clvmd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their clvmd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for clvmd:
+
-+.B semanage user -l
+
-+If you wanted to add dbadm_r to the staff_u user, you would execute:
++.EX
++.PP
++.B clvmd_exec_t
++.EE
+
-+.B $ semanage user -m -R 'staff_r dbadm_r' staff_u
++- Set files with the clvmd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the clvmd_t domain.
+
+
++.EX
++.PP
++.B clvmd_initrc_exec_t
++.EE
+
-+SELinux policy also controls which roles can transition to a different role.
-+You can list these rules using the following command.
++- Set files with the clvmd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the clvmd_initrc_t domain.
+
-+.B sesearch --role_allow
+
-+SELinux policy allows the staff_r role can transition to the dbadm_r role.
++.EX
++.PP
++.B clvmd_tmpfs_t
++.EE
+
++- Set files with the clvmd_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store clvmd files on a tmpfs file system.
+
-+.SH "COMMANDS"
+
-+.B semanage login
-+can also be used to manipulate the Linux User to SELinux User mappings
++.EX
++.PP
++.B clvmd_var_run_t
++.EE
+
-+.B semanage user
-+can also be used to manipulate SELinux user definitions.
++- Set files with the clvmd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the clvmd files under the /run directory.
+
-+.B system-config-selinux
-+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genuserman.py.
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type clvmd_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B anon_inodefs_t
++
++
++.br
++.B clvmd_tmpfs_t
++
++
++.br
++.B clvmd_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/clvmd\.pid
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the clvmd_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the clvmd_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), semanage(8).
-diff --git a/man/man8/dbskkd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/dbskkd_selinux.8
++selinux(8), clvmd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/cmirrord_selinux.8 b/man/man8/cmirrord_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..e7106ae
+index 0000000..529b7f4
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/dbskkd_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,129 @@
-+.TH "dbskkd_selinux" "8" "dbskkd" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "dbskkd SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/cmirrord_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,124 @@
++.TH "cmirrord_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "cmirrord" "SELinux Policy documentation for cmirrord"
+.SH "NAME"
-+dbskkd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the dbskkd processes
++cmirrord_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the cmirrord processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the dbskkd processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the cmirrord processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The cmirrord processes execute with the cmirrord_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the dbskkd_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep cmirrord_t
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
+
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The cmirrord_t SELinux type can be entered via the "cmirrord_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the cmirrord_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/sbin/cmirrord
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the dbskkd_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux cmirrord policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their cmirrord processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for cmirrord:
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B cmirrord_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux dbskkd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their dbskkd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for dbskkd:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux cmirrord policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their cmirrord processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for cmirrord:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B dbskkd_exec_t
++.B cmirrord_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the dbskkd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the dbskkd_t domain.
++- Set files with the cmirrord_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the cmirrord_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B dbskkd_tmp_t
++.B cmirrord_initrc_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the dbskkd_tmp_t type, if you want to store dbskkd temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++- Set files with the cmirrord_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the cmirrord_initrc_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B dbskkd_var_run_t
++.B cmirrord_tmpfs_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the dbskkd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the dbskkd files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the cmirrord_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store cmirrord files on a tmpfs file system.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B cmirrord_var_run_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the cmirrord_var_run_t type, if you want to store the cmirrord files under the /run directory.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PORT TYPES
-+SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
-+.PP
-+You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+.B semanage port -l
++The SELinux process type cmirrord_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
-+SELinux dbskkd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their dbskkd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following port types are defined for dbskkd:
++.br
++.B cmirrord_tmpfs_t
+
-+.EX
-+.TP 5
-+.B dbskkd_port_t
-+.TP 10
-+.EE
+
++.br
++.B cmirrord_var_run_t
+
-+Default Defined Ports:
-+tcp 1178
-+.EE
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux dbskkd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their dbskkd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for dbskkd:
++ /var/run/cmirrord\.pid
++.br
+
-+.EX
-+.B dbskkd_t
-+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -11462,259 +12857,385 @@ index 0000000..e7106ae
+.B semanage module
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
-+.B semanage port
-+can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
-+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), dbskkd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/dcc_selinux.8 b/man/man8/dcc_selinux.8
++selinux(8), cmirrord(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/cobblerd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/cobblerd_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..eaba130
+index 0000000..d1680db
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/dcc_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,258 @@
-+.TH "dcc_selinux" "8" "dcc" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "dcc SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/cobblerd_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,391 @@
++.TH "cobblerd_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "cobblerd" "SELinux Policy documentation for cobblerd"
+.SH "NAME"
-+dcc_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the dcc processes
++cobblerd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the cobblerd processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the dcc processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the cobblerd processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The cobblerd processes execute with the cobblerd_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the dccifd_t, dccm_t, dcc_client_t, dcc_dbclean_t, dccd_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep cobblerd_t
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the dccifd_t, dccm_t, dcc_client_t, dcc_dbclean_t, dccd_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
-+.EE
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++The cobblerd_t SELinux type can be entered via the "cobblerd_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the cobblerd_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/bin/cobblerd
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux dcc policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their dcc processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for dcc:
-+
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux cobblerd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their cobblerd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for cobblerd:
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B dcc_client_exec_t
++.B cobblerd_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
-+- Set files with the dcc_client_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the dcc_client_t domain.
++.SH BOOLEANS
++SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. cobblerd policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run cobblerd with the tightest access possible.
+
+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B dcc_client_map_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the dcc_client_map_t type, if you want to treat the files as dcc client map data.
-+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/lib/dcc/map, /etc/dcc/map, /var/run/dcc/map, /var/dcc/map
++If you want to allow Cobbler to access nfs file systems, you must turn on the cobbler_use_nfs boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B dcc_client_tmp_t
++.B setsebool -P cobbler_use_nfs 1
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the dcc_client_tmp_t type, if you want to store dcc client temporary files in the /tmp directories.
-+
++.PP
++If you want to allow Cobbler to connect to the network using TCP, you must turn on the cobbler_can_network_connect boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B dcc_dbclean_exec_t
++.B setsebool -P cobbler_can_network_connect 1
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the dcc_dbclean_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the dcc_dbclean_t domain.
-+
++.PP
++If you want to allow HTTPD scripts and modules to connect to cobbler over the network, you must turn on the httpd_can_network_connect_cobbler boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B dcc_dbclean_tmp_t
++.B setsebool -P httpd_can_network_connect_cobbler 1
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the dcc_dbclean_tmp_t type, if you want to store dcc dbclean temporary files in the /tmp directories.
-+
++.PP
++If you want to allow Cobbler to access cifs file systems, you must turn on the cobbler_use_cifs boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B dcc_var_run_t
++.B setsebool -P cobbler_use_cifs 1
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the dcc_var_run_t type, if you want to store the dcc files under the /run directory.
-+
++.PP
++If you want to allow Cobbler to access nfs file systems, you must turn on the cobbler_use_nfs boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B dcc_var_t
++.B setsebool -P cobbler_use_nfs 1
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the dcc_var_t type, if you want to store the files under the /var directory.
-+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/etc/dcc(/.*)?, /var/dcc(/.*)?, /var/lib/dcc(/.*)?
++.PP
++If you want to allow Cobbler to connect to the network using TCP, you must turn on the cobbler_can_network_connect boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B dccd_exec_t
++.B setsebool -P cobbler_can_network_connect 1
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the dccd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the dccd_t domain.
-+
++.PP
++If you want to allow HTTPD scripts and modules to connect to cobbler over the network, you must turn on the httpd_can_network_connect_cobbler boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B dccd_tmp_t
++.B setsebool -P httpd_can_network_connect_cobbler 1
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the dccd_tmp_t type, if you want to store dccd temporary files in the /tmp directories.
-+
++.PP
++If you want to allow Cobbler to access cifs file systems, you must turn on the cobbler_use_cifs boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B dccd_var_run_t
++.B setsebool -P cobbler_use_cifs 1
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the dccd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the dccd files under the /run directory.
-+
-+
-+.EX
++.SH SHARING FILES
++If you want to share files with multiple domains (Apache, FTP, rsync, Samba), you can set a file context of public_content_t and public_content_rw_t. These context allow any of the above domains to read the content. If you want a particular domain to write to the public_content_rw_t domain, you must set the appropriate boolean.
++.TP
++Allow cobblerd servers to read the /var/cobblerd directory by adding the public_content_t file type to the directory and by restoring the file type.
+.PP
-+.B dccifd_exec_t
-+.EE
++.B
++semanage fcontext -a -t public_content_t "/var/cobblerd(/.*)?"
++.br
++.B restorecon -F -R -v /var/cobblerd
++.pp
++.TP
++Allow cobblerd servers to read and write /var/tmp/incoming by adding the public_content_rw_t type to the directory and by restoring the file type. This also requires the allow_cobblerdd_anon_write boolean to be set.
++.PP
++.B
++semanage fcontext -a -t public_content_rw_t "/var/cobblerd/incoming(/.*)?"
++.br
++.B restorecon -F -R -v /var/cobblerd/incoming
+
-+- Set files with the dccifd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the dccifd_t domain.
+
++.PP
++If you want to allow Cobbler to modify public files used for public file transfer services., you must turn on the cobbler_anon_write boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B dccifd_tmp_t
++.B setsebool -P cobbler_anon_write 1
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the dccifd_tmp_t type, if you want to store dccifd temporary files in the /tmp directories.
-+
++.PP
++If you want to allow Cobbler to modify public files used for public file transfer services., you must turn on the cobbler_anon_write boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B dccifd_var_run_t
++.B setsebool -P cobbler_anon_write 1
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the dccifd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the dccifd files under the /run directory.
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux cobblerd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their cobblerd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for cobblerd:
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/etc/dcc/dccifd, /var/run/dcc/dccifd
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B dccm_exec_t
++.B cobblerd_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the dccm_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the dccm_t domain.
++- Set files with the cobblerd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the cobblerd_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B dccm_tmp_t
++.B cobblerd_initrc_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the dccm_tmp_t type, if you want to store dccm temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++- Set files with the cobblerd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the cobblerd_initrc_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B dccm_var_run_t
++.B cobblerd_unit_file_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the dccm_var_run_t type, if you want to store the dccm files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the cobblerd_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as cobblerd unit content.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
+.SH PORT TYPES
-+SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
++SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
+.PP
-+You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
++You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
+
+.B semanage port -l
+
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
-+SELinux dcc policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their dcc processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following port types are defined for dcc:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
++SELinux cobblerd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their cobblerd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following port types are defined for cobblerd:
+
+.EX
+.TP 5
-+.B dcc_port_t
++.B cobbler_port_t
+.TP 10
+.EE
+
+
+Default Defined Ports:
-+udp 6276,6277
++tcp 25151
+.EE
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+.EX
-+.TP 5
-+.B dccm_port_t
-+.TP 10
-+.EE
++The SELinux process type cobblerd_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
++.br
++.B cobbler_tmp_t
+
-+Default Defined Ports:
-+tcp 5679
-+.EE
-+udp 5679
-+.EE
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux dcc policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their dcc processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for dcc:
+
-+.EX
-+.B dccm_t, dcc_client_t, dcc_dbclean_t, dccifd_t, dccd_t
-+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++.br
++.B cobbler_var_lib_t
++
++ /var/lib/cobbler(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/www/cobbler/pub(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/tftpboot/etc(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/tftpboot/ppc(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/tftpboot/grub(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/www/cobbler/links(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/tftpboot/s390x(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/www/cobbler/images(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/tftpboot/images(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/www/cobbler/rendered(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/www/cobbler/ks_mirror(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/www/cobbler/localmirror(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/www/cobbler/repo_mirror(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/tftpboot/pxelinux\.cfg(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/tftpboot/yaboot
++.br
++ /var/lib/tftpboot/memdisk
++.br
++ /var/lib/tftpboot/menu\.c32
++.br
++ /var/lib/tftpboot/pxelinux\.0
++.br
++
++.br
++.B cobbler_var_log_t
++
++ /var/log/cobbler(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B dhcp_etc_t
++
++ /etc/dhcpc.*
++.br
++ /etc/dhcp3(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/dhcpd(6)?\.conf
++.br
++ /etc/dhcp3?/dhclient.*
++.br
++ /etc/dhclient.*conf
++.br
++ /etc/dhcp/dhcpd(6)?\.conf
++.br
++ /etc/dhclient-script
++.br
++
++.br
++.B dnsmasq_etc_t
++
++ /etc/dnsmasq\.conf
++.br
++
++.br
++.B httpd_cobbler_rw_content_t
++
++
++.br
++.B named_conf_t
++
++ /etc/rndc.*
++.br
++ /etc/unbound(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/named/chroot(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/named\.rfc1912.zones
++.br
++ /var/named/chroot/etc/named\.rfc1912.zones
++.br
++ /etc/named\.conf
++.br
++ /var/named/named\.ca
++.br
++ /etc/named\.root\.hints
++.br
++ /var/named/chroot/etc/named\.conf
++.br
++ /etc/named\.caching-nameserver\.conf
++.br
++ /var/named/chroot/var/named/named\.ca
++.br
++ /var/named/chroot/etc/named\.root\.hints
++.br
++ /var/named/chroot/etc/named\.caching-nameserver\.conf
++.br
++
++.br
++.B named_zone_t
++
++ /var/named(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/named/chroot/var/named(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B net_conf_t
++
++ /etc/ntpd?\.conf.*
++.br
++ /etc/hosts[^/]*
++.br
++ /etc/yp\.conf.*
++.br
++ /etc/denyhosts.*
++.br
++ /etc/hosts\.deny.*
++.br
++ /etc/resolv\.conf.*
++.br
++ /etc/ntp/step-tickers.*
++.br
++ /etc/sysconfig/networking(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/sysconfig/network-scripts(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/sysconfig/network-scripts/.*resolv\.conf
++.br
++ /etc/ethers
++.br
++
++.br
++.B rsync_etc_t
++
++ /etc/rsyncd\.conf
++.br
++
++.br
++.B systemd_passwd_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/systemd/ask-password(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/systemd/ask-password-block(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B tftpd_etc_t
++
++ /etc/xinetd\.d/tftp
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -11729,140 +13250,158 @@ index 0000000..eaba130
+.B semanage port
+can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
+
++.B semanage boolean
++can also be used to manipulate the booleans
++
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), dcc(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/dccd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/dccd_selinux.8
++selinux(8), cobblerd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, setsebool(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/collectd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/collectd_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..37ca629
+index 0000000..8593a45
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/dccd_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,142 @@
-+.TH "dccd_selinux" "8" "dccd" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "dccd SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/collectd_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,156 @@
++.TH "collectd_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "collectd" "SELinux Policy documentation for collectd"
+.SH "NAME"
-+dccd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the dccd processes
++collectd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the collectd processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the dccd processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the collectd processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The collectd processes execute with the collectd_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep collectd_t
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The collectd_t SELinux type can be entered via the "collectd_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the collectd_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/sbin/collectd
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the dccifd_t, dccm_t, dcc_client_t, dcc_dbclean_t, dccd_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux collectd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their collectd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for collectd:
++
++.EX
++.B collectd_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH BOOLEANS
++SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. collectd policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run collectd with the tightest access possible.
++
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow collectd to connect to the network using TCP, you must turn on the collectd_can_network_connect boolean.
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.B setsebool -P collectd_can_network_connect 1
+.EE
+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the dccifd_t, dccm_t, dcc_client_t, dcc_dbclean_t, dccd_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++If you want to allow collectd to connect to the network using TCP, you must turn on the collectd_can_network_connect boolean.
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B setsebool -P collectd_can_network_connect 1
+.EE
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux dccd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their dccd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for dccd:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux collectd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their collectd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for collectd:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B dccd_exec_t
++.B collectd_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the dccd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the dccd_t domain.
++- Set files with the collectd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the collectd_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B dccd_tmp_t
++.B collectd_initrc_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the dccd_tmp_t type, if you want to store dccd temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++- Set files with the collectd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the collectd_initrc_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B dccd_var_run_t
++.B collectd_unit_file_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the dccd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the dccd files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the collectd_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as collectd unit content.
+
+
++.EX
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
++.B collectd_var_lib_t
++.EE
+
-+.SH PORT TYPES
-+SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
++- Set files with the collectd_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the collectd files under the /var/lib directory.
++
++
++.EX
+.PP
-+You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
++.B collectd_var_run_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the collectd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the collectd files under the /run directory.
+
-+.B semanage port -l
+
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
-+SELinux dccd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their dccd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following port types are defined for dccd:
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
+
-+.EX
-+.TP 5
-+.B dcc_port_t
-+.TP 10
-+.EE
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
++The SELinux process type collectd_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
-+Default Defined Ports:
-+udp 6276,6277
-+.EE
++.br
++.B collectd_var_lib_t
+
-+.EX
-+.TP 5
-+.B dccm_port_t
-+.TP 10
-+.EE
++ /var/lib/collectd(/.*)?
++.br
+
++.br
++.B collectd_var_run_t
+
-+Default Defined Ports:
-+tcp 5679
-+.EE
-+udp 5679
-+.EE
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux dccd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their dccd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for dccd:
++ /var/run/collectd\.pid
++.br
+
-+.EX
-+.B dccm_t, dcc_client_t, dcc_dbclean_t, dccifd_t, dccd_t
-+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -11874,111 +13413,170 @@ index 0000000..37ca629
+.B semanage module
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
-+.B semanage port
-+can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
++.B semanage boolean
++can also be used to manipulate the booleans
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), dccd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/dccifd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/dccifd_selinux.8
++selinux(8), collectd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, setsebool(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/colord_selinux.8 b/man/man8/colord_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..d1647bd
+index 0000000..5f598b7
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/dccifd_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,107 @@
-+.TH "dccifd_selinux" "8" "dccifd" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "dccifd SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/colord_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,164 @@
++.TH "colord_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "colord" "SELinux Policy documentation for colord"
+.SH "NAME"
-+dccifd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the dccifd processes
++colord_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the colord processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the dccifd processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the colord processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The colord processes execute with the colord_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the dccifd_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep colord_t
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
+
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The colord_t SELinux type can be entered via the "colord_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the colord_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/libexec/colord, /usr/libexec/colord-sane
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the dccifd_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux colord policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their colord processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for colord:
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B colord_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux dccifd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their dccifd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for dccifd:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux colord policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their colord processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for colord:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B dccifd_exec_t
++.B colord_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the dccifd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the dccifd_t domain.
++- Set files with the colord_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the colord_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B dccifd_tmp_t
++.B colord_tmp_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the dccifd_tmp_t type, if you want to store dccifd temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++- Set files with the colord_tmp_t type, if you want to store colord temporary files in the /tmp directories.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B dccifd_var_run_t
++.B colord_tmpfs_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the dccifd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the dccifd files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the colord_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store colord files on a tmpfs file system.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B colord_unit_file_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the colord_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as colord unit content.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B colord_var_lib_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the colord_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the colord files under the /var/lib directory.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/etc/dcc/dccifd, /var/run/dcc/dccifd
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type colord_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B colord_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B colord_tmpfs_t
++
++
++.br
++.B colord_var_lib_t
++
++ /var/lib/color(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/colord(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B user_tmpfs_t
++
++ /dev/shm/mono.*
++.br
++ /dev/shm/pulse-shm.*
++.br
++
++.br
++.B zoneminder_tmpfs_t
++
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux dccifd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their dccifd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for dccifd:
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the colord_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B dccifd_t
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
++
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the colord_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -11991,128 +13589,151 @@ index 0000000..d1647bd
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), dccifd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/dccm_selinux.8 b/man/man8/dccm_selinux.8
++selinux(8), colord(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/comsat_selinux.8 b/man/man8/comsat_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..f930d66
+index 0000000..1301fea
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/dccm_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
-+.TH "dccm_selinux" "8" "dccm" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "dccm SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/comsat_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,154 @@
++.TH "comsat_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "comsat" "SELinux Policy documentation for comsat"
+.SH "NAME"
-+dccm_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the dccm processes
++comsat_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the comsat processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the dccm processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the comsat processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The comsat processes execute with the comsat_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the dccm_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep comsat_t
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
+
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The comsat_t SELinux type can be entered via the "comsat_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the comsat_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/sbin/in\.comsat
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the dccm_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux comsat policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their comsat processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for comsat:
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B comsat_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux dccm policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their dccm processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for dccm:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux comsat policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their comsat processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for comsat:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B dccm_exec_t
++.B comsat_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the dccm_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the dccm_t domain.
++- Set files with the comsat_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the comsat_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B dccm_tmp_t
++.B comsat_tmp_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the dccm_tmp_t type, if you want to store dccm temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++- Set files with the comsat_tmp_t type, if you want to store comsat temporary files in the /tmp directories.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B dccm_var_run_t
++.B comsat_var_run_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the dccm_var_run_t type, if you want to store the dccm files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the comsat_var_run_t type, if you want to store the comsat files under the /run directory.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
+.SH PORT TYPES
-+SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
++SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
+.PP
-+You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
++You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
+
+.B semanage port -l
+
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
-+SELinux dccm policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their dccm processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following port types are defined for dccm:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
++SELinux comsat policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their comsat processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following port types are defined for comsat:
+
+.EX
+.TP 5
-+.B dccm_port_t
++.B comsat_port_t
+.TP 10
+.EE
+
+
+Default Defined Ports:
-+tcp 5679
-+.EE
-+udp 5679
++udp 512
+.EE
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type comsat_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B comsat_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B comsat_var_run_t
++
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux dccm policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their dccm processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for dccm:
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the comsat_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B dccm_t
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
++
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the comsat_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -12128,97 +13749,132 @@ index 0000000..f930d66
+can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), dccm(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/dcerpcd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/dcerpcd_selinux.8
++selinux(8), comsat(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/condor_collector_selinux.8 b/man/man8/condor_collector_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..10ac2d2
+index 0000000..7b32989
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/dcerpcd_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
-+.TH "dcerpcd_selinux" "8" "dcerpcd" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "dcerpcd SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/condor_collector_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,133 @@
++.TH "condor_collector_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "condor_collector" "SELinux Policy documentation for condor_collector"
+.SH "NAME"
-+dcerpcd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the dcerpcd processes
++condor_collector_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the condor_collector processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the dcerpcd processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the condor_collector processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The condor_collector processes execute with the condor_collector_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux dcerpcd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their dcerpcd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for dcerpcd:
++For example:
+
++.B ps -eZ | grep condor_collector_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B dcerpcd_exec_t
-+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the dcerpcd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the dcerpcd_t domain.
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
++The condor_collector_t SELinux type can be entered via the "condor_collector_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the condor_collector_t domain are the following:"
+
-+.EX
++/usr/sbin/condor_collector
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+.B dcerpcd_var_lib_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the dcerpcd_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the dcerpcd files under the /var/lib directory.
-+
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux condor_collector policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their condor_collector processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for condor_collector:
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B dcerpcd_var_run_t
++.B condor_collector_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
-+- Set files with the dcerpcd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the dcerpcd files under the /run directory.
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux condor_collector policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their condor_collector processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for condor_collector:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B dcerpcd_var_socket_t
++.B condor_collector_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the dcerpcd_var_socket_t type, if you want to treat the files as dcerpcd var socket data.
++- Set files with the condor_collector_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the condor_collector_t domain.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type condor_collector_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B condor_log_t
++
++ /var/log/condor(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B condor_var_lib_t
++
++ /var/lib/condor(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/condor/spool(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/condor/execute(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B condor_var_lock_t
++
++ /var/lock/condor(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B condor_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/condor(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux dcerpcd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their dcerpcd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for dcerpcd:
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the condor_collector_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B dcerpcd_t
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
++
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the condor_collector_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -12231,141 +13887,120 @@ index 0000000..10ac2d2
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), dcerpcd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/ddclient_selinux.8 b/man/man8/ddclient_selinux.8
++selinux(8), condor_collector(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, condor_master_selinux(8), condor_negotiator_selinux(8), condor_procd_selinux(8), condor_schedd_selinux(8), condor_startd_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/condor_master_selinux.8 b/man/man8/condor_master_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..15e7310
+index 0000000..fa4e2d5
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/ddclient_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,141 @@
-+.TH "ddclient_selinux" "8" "ddclient" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "ddclient SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/condor_master_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,119 @@
++.TH "condor_master_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "condor_master" "SELinux Policy documentation for condor_master"
+.SH "NAME"
-+ddclient_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the ddclient processes
++condor_master_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the condor_master processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the ddclient processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the condor_master processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The condor_master processes execute with the condor_master_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux ddclient policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ddclient processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for ddclient:
++For example:
+
++.B ps -eZ | grep condor_master_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B ddclient_etc_t
-+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the ddclient_etc_t type, if you want to store ddclient files in the /etc directories.
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/etc/ddclient\.conf, /etc/ddtcd\.conf
++The condor_master_t SELinux type can be entered via the "condor_master_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the condor_master_t domain are the following:"
+
-+.EX
++/usr/sbin/condor_master
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+.B ddclient_exec_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the ddclient_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ddclient_t domain.
-+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/sbin/ddclient, /usr/sbin/ddtcd
-+
-+.EX
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+.B ddclient_initrc_exec_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the ddclient_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ddclient_initrc_t domain.
-+
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux condor_master policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their condor_master processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for condor_master:
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B ddclient_log_t
++.B condor_master_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
-+- Set files with the ddclient_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as ddclient log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux condor_master policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their condor_master processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for condor_master:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B ddclient_tmp_t
++.B condor_master_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the ddclient_tmp_t type, if you want to store ddclient temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++- Set files with the condor_master_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the condor_master_t domain.
+
+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B ddclient_var_lib_t
-+.EE
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
+
-+- Set files with the ddclient_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the ddclient files under the /var/lib directory.
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
++The SELinux process type condor_master_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B ddclient_var_run_t
-+.EE
++.br
++.B condor_log_t
+
-+- Set files with the ddclient_var_run_t type, if you want to store the ddclient files under the /run directory.
++ /var/log/condor(/.*)?
++.br
+
+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/run/ddtcd\.pid, /var/run/ddclient\.pid
++.B condor_var_lib_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B ddclient_var_t
-+.EE
++ /var/lib/condor(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/condor/spool(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/condor/execute(/.*)?
++.br
+
-+- Set files with the ddclient_var_t type, if you want to store the ddcl files under the /var directory.
++.br
++.B condor_var_lock_t
+
++ /var/lock/condor(/.*)?
++.br
+
-+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
++.br
++.B condor_var_run_t
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux ddclient policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ddclient processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for ddclient:
++ /var/run/condor(/.*)?
++.br
+
-+.EX
-+.B ddclient_t
-+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -12378,111 +14013,134 @@ index 0000000..15e7310
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), ddclient(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/deltacloudd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/deltacloudd_selinux.8
++selinux(8), condor_master(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, condor_collector_selinux(8), condor_negotiator_selinux(8), condor_procd_selinux(8), condor_schedd_selinux(8), condor_startd_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/condor_negotiator_selinux.8 b/man/man8/condor_negotiator_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..1abae65
+index 0000000..9116018
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/deltacloudd_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
-+.TH "deltacloudd_selinux" "8" "deltacloudd" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "deltacloudd SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/condor_negotiator_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,133 @@
++.TH "condor_negotiator_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "condor_negotiator" "SELinux Policy documentation for condor_negotiator"
+.SH "NAME"
-+deltacloudd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the deltacloudd processes
++condor_negotiator_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the condor_negotiator processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the deltacloudd processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the condor_negotiator processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The condor_negotiator processes execute with the condor_negotiator_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the deltacloudd_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep condor_negotiator_t
+
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The condor_negotiator_t SELinux type can be entered via the "condor_negotiator_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the condor_negotiator_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/sbin/condor_negotiator
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the deltacloudd_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux condor_negotiator policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their condor_negotiator processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for condor_negotiator:
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B condor_negotiator_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux deltacloudd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their deltacloudd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for deltacloudd:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux condor_negotiator policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their condor_negotiator processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for condor_negotiator:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B deltacloudd_exec_t
++.B condor_negotiator_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the deltacloudd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the deltacloudd_t domain.
++- Set files with the condor_negotiator_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the condor_negotiator_t domain.
+
+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B deltacloudd_log_t
-+.EE
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
+
-+- Set files with the deltacloudd_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as deltacloudd log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
++The SELinux process type condor_negotiator_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B deltacloudd_tmp_t
-+.EE
++.br
++.B condor_log_t
+
-+- Set files with the deltacloudd_tmp_t type, if you want to store deltacloudd temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++ /var/log/condor(/.*)?
++.br
+
++.br
++.B condor_var_lib_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B deltacloudd_var_run_t
-+.EE
++ /var/lib/condor(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/condor/spool(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/condor/execute(/.*)?
++.br
+
-+- Set files with the deltacloudd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the deltacloudd files under the /run directory.
++.br
++.B condor_var_lock_t
+
++ /var/lock/condor(/.*)?
++.br
+
-+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
++.br
++.B condor_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/condor(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux deltacloudd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their deltacloudd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for deltacloudd:
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the condor_negotiator_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B deltacloudd_t
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
++
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the condor_negotiator_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -12495,119 +14153,134 @@ index 0000000..1abae65
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), deltacloudd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/denyhosts_selinux.8 b/man/man8/denyhosts_selinux.8
++selinux(8), condor_negotiator(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, condor_collector_selinux(8), condor_master_selinux(8), condor_procd_selinux(8), condor_schedd_selinux(8), condor_startd_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/condor_procd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/condor_procd_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..1ab2fa0
+index 0000000..d3e5176
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/denyhosts_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,119 @@
-+.TH "denyhosts_selinux" "8" "denyhosts" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "denyhosts SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/condor_procd_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,133 @@
++.TH "condor_procd_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "condor_procd" "SELinux Policy documentation for condor_procd"
+.SH "NAME"
-+denyhosts_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the denyhosts processes
++condor_procd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the condor_procd processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the denyhosts processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the condor_procd processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The condor_procd processes execute with the condor_procd_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the denyhosts_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep condor_procd_t
+
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The condor_procd_t SELinux type can be entered via the "condor_procd_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the condor_procd_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/sbin/condor_procd
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the denyhosts_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux condor_procd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their condor_procd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for condor_procd:
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B condor_procd_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux denyhosts policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their denyhosts processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for denyhosts:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux condor_procd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their condor_procd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for condor_procd:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B denyhosts_exec_t
++.B condor_procd_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the denyhosts_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the denyhosts_t domain.
++- Set files with the condor_procd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the condor_procd_t domain.
+
+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B denyhosts_initrc_exec_t
-+.EE
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
+
-+- Set files with the denyhosts_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the denyhosts_initrc_t domain.
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
++The SELinux process type condor_procd_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B denyhosts_var_lib_t
-+.EE
++.br
++.B condor_log_t
+
-+- Set files with the denyhosts_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the denyhosts files under the /var/lib directory.
++ /var/log/condor(/.*)?
++.br
+
++.br
++.B condor_var_lib_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B denyhosts_var_lock_t
-+.EE
++ /var/lib/condor(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/condor/spool(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/condor/execute(/.*)?
++.br
+
-+- Set files with the denyhosts_var_lock_t type, if you want to treat the files as denyhosts var lock data, stored under the /var/lock directory
++.br
++.B condor_var_lock_t
+
++ /var/lock/condor(/.*)?
++.br
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B denyhosts_var_log_t
-+.EE
++.br
++.B condor_var_run_t
+
-+- Set files with the denyhosts_var_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as denyhosts var log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++ /var/run/condor(/.*)?
++.br
+
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the condor_procd_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux denyhosts policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their denyhosts processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for denyhosts:
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the condor_procd_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B denyhosts_t
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -12620,238 +14293,146 @@ index 0000000..1ab2fa0
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), denyhosts(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/depmod_selinux.8 b/man/man8/depmod_selinux.8
++selinux(8), condor_procd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, condor_collector_selinux(8), condor_master_selinux(8), condor_negotiator_selinux(8), condor_schedd_selinux(8), condor_startd_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/condor_schedd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/condor_schedd_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..0db30f2
+index 0000000..4b28875
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/depmod_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
-+.TH "depmod_selinux" "8" "depmod" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "depmod SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/condor_schedd_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,145 @@
++.TH "condor_schedd_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "condor_schedd" "SELinux Policy documentation for condor_schedd"
+.SH "NAME"
-+depmod_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the depmod processes
++condor_schedd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the condor_schedd processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the depmod processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the condor_schedd processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The condor_schedd processes execute with the condor_schedd_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux depmod policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their depmod processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for depmod:
++For example:
+
++.B ps -eZ | grep condor_schedd_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B depmod_exec_t
-+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the depmod_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the depmod_t domain.
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/sbin/depmod.*, /usr/sbin/depmod.*
-+
-+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
++The condor_schedd_t SELinux type can be entered via the "condor_schedd_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the condor_schedd_t domain are the following:"
+
++/usr/sbin/condor_schedd
+.SH PROCESS TYPES
+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux depmod policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their depmod processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for depmod:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux condor_schedd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their condor_schedd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for condor_schedd:
+
+.EX
-+.B depmod_t
++.B condor_schedd_t
+.EE
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
-+.SH "COMMANDS"
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
-+.B semanage permissive
-+can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+.B semanage module
-+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
-+
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux condor_schedd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their condor_schedd processes in as secure a method as possible.
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
-+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
-+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
-+
-+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), depmod(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/devicekit_selinux.8 b/man/man8/devicekit_selinux.8
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..8f4dbf7
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/devicekit_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,155 @@
-+.TH "devicekit_selinux" "8" "devicekit" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "devicekit SELinux Policy documentation"
-+.SH "NAME"
-+devicekit_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the devicekit processes
-+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++The following file types are defined for condor_schedd:
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the devicekit processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
-+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
-+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the devicekit_disk_t, devicekit_power_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
-+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the devicekit_disk_t, devicekit_power_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
-+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B condor_schedd_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux devicekit policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their devicekit processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for devicekit:
++- Set files with the condor_schedd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the condor_schedd_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B devicekit_disk_exec_t
++.B condor_schedd_tmp_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the devicekit_disk_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the devicekit_disk_t domain.
++- Set files with the condor_schedd_tmp_t type, if you want to store condor schedd temporary files in the /tmp directories.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/lib/udisks/udisks-daemon, /usr/lib/udev/udisks-part-id, /usr/libexec/devkit-disks-daemon, /lib/udisks2/udisksd, /usr/lib/udisks2/udisksd, /lib/udev/udisks-part-id, /usr/libexec/udisks-daemon
+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B devicekit_exec_t
-+.EE
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
+
-+- Set files with the devicekit_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the devicekit_t domain.
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
++The SELinux process type condor_schedd_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B devicekit_power_exec_t
-+.EE
++.br
++.B condor_log_t
+
-+- Set files with the devicekit_power_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the devicekit_power_t domain.
++ /var/log/condor(/.*)?
++.br
+
+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/libexec/upowerd, /usr/libexec/devkit-power-daemon
++.B condor_schedd_tmp_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B devicekit_tmp_t
-+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the devicekit_tmp_t type, if you want to store devicekit temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++.br
++.B condor_var_lib_t
+
++ /var/lib/condor(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/condor/spool(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/condor/execute(/.*)?
++.br
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B devicekit_var_lib_t
-+.EE
++.br
++.B condor_var_lock_t
+
-+- Set files with the devicekit_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the devicekit files under the /var/lib directory.
++ /var/lock/condor(/.*)?
++.br
+
+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/lib/udisks.*, /var/lib/DeviceKit-.*, /var/lib/upower(/.*)?
++.B condor_var_run_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B devicekit_var_log_t
-+.EE
++ /var/run/condor(/.*)?
++.br
+
-+- Set files with the devicekit_var_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as devicekit var log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/log/pm-suspend\.log.*, /var/log/pm-powersave\.log.*
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the condor_schedd_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B devicekit_var_run_t
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the devicekit_var_run_t type, if you want to store the devicekit files under the /run directory.
-+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/run/upower(/.*)?, /var/run/udisks.*, /var/run/devkit(/.*)?, /var/run/DeviceKit-disks(/.*)?, /var/run/pm-utils(/.*)?
-+
-+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
-+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux devicekit policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their devicekit processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for devicekit:
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the condor_schedd_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B devicekit_power_t, devicekit_disk_t, devicekit_t
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -12864,167 +14445,190 @@ index 0000000..8f4dbf7
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), devicekit(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/dhcpc_selinux.8 b/man/man8/dhcpc_selinux.8
++selinux(8), condor_schedd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, condor_collector_selinux(8), condor_master_selinux(8), condor_negotiator_selinux(8), condor_procd_selinux(8), condor_startd_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/condor_startd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/condor_startd_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..7638a9c
+index 0000000..0413677
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/dhcpc_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,174 @@
-+.TH "dhcpc_selinux" "8" "dhcpc" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "dhcpc SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/condor_startd_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,189 @@
++.TH "condor_startd_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "condor_startd" "SELinux Policy documentation for condor_startd"
+.SH "NAME"
-+dhcpc_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the dhcpc processes
++condor_startd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the condor_startd processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the dhcpc processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
-+
-+.SH BOOLEANS
-+SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. dhcpc policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run dhcpc with the tightest access possible.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the condor_startd processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
++The condor_startd processes execute with the condor_startd_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow dhcpc client applications to execute iptables commands, you must turn on the dhcpc_exec_iptables boolean.
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P dhcpc_exec_iptables 1
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep condor_startd_t
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the dhcpc_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
++The condor_startd_t SELinux type can be entered via the "condor_startd_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the condor_startd_t domain are the following:"
+
++/usr/sbin/condor_startd, /usr/sbin/condor_starter
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the dhcpc_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux condor_startd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their condor_startd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for condor_startd:
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B condor_startd_ssh_t, condor_startd_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux dhcpc policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their dhcpc processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for dhcpc:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux condor_startd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their condor_startd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for condor_startd:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B dhcpc_exec_t
++.B condor_startd_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the dhcpc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the dhcpc_t domain.
++- Set files with the condor_startd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the condor_startd_t domain.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/sbin/dhcpcd, /sbin/dhcpcd, /usr/sbin/pump, /sbin/dhclient.*, /usr/sbin/dhclient.*, /sbin/pump, /usr/sbin/dhcdbd, /sbin/dhcdbd
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B dhcpc_helper_exec_t
++.B condor_startd_tmp_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the dhcpc_helper_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the dhcpc_helper_t domain.
++- Set files with the condor_startd_tmp_t type, if you want to store condor startd temporary files in the /tmp directories.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B dhcpc_state_t
++.B condor_startd_tmpfs_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the dhcpc_state_t type, if you want to treat the files as dhcpc state data.
++- Set files with the condor_startd_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store condor startd files on a tmpfs file system.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/lib/dhclient(/.*)?, /var/lib/dhcp3?/dhclient.*, /var/lib/wifiroamd(/.*)?, /var/lib/dhcpcd(/.*)?
+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B dhcpc_tmp_t
-+.EE
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
+
-+- Set files with the dhcpc_tmp_t type, if you want to store dhcpc temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
++The SELinux process type condor_startd_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B dhcpc_var_run_t
-+.EE
++.br
++.B condor_log_t
+
-+- Set files with the dhcpc_var_run_t type, if you want to store the dhcpc files under the /run directory.
++ /var/log/condor(/.*)?
++.br
+
+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/run/dhclient.*, /var/run/dhcpcd(/.*)?
++.B condor_startd_tmp_t
+
-+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PORT TYPES
-+SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
-+.PP
-+You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
++.br
++.B condor_startd_tmpfs_t
+
-+.B semanage port -l
++
++.br
++.B condor_var_lib_t
++
++ /var/lib/condor(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/condor/spool(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/condor/execute(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B condor_var_lock_t
++
++ /var/lock/condor(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B condor_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/condor(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B ssh_home_t
++
++ /root/\.ssh(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/openshift/[^/]+/\.ssh(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/amanda/\.ssh(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/stickshift/[^/]+/\.ssh(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/gitolite/\.ssh(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/nocpulse/\.ssh(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/gitolite3/\.ssh(/.*)?
++.br
++ /root/\.shosts
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.ssh(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.shosts
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.ssh(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.shosts
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.ssh(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.shosts
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
-+SELinux dhcpc policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their dhcpc processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following port types are defined for dhcpc:
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the condor_startd_t, condor_startd_ssh_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.TP 5
-+.B dhcpc_port_t
-+.TP 10
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
+
-+
-+Default Defined Ports:
-+tcp 68,546
-+.EE
-+udp 68,546
-+.EE
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux dhcpc policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their dhcpc processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for dhcpc:
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the condor_startd_t, condor_startd_ssh_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B dhcpc_t
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -13036,196 +14640,215 @@ index 0000000..7638a9c
+.B semanage module
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
-+.B semanage port
-+can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
-+
-+.B semanage boolean
-+can also be used to manipulate the booleans
-+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), dhcpc(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-+, setsebool(8)
++selinux(8), condor_startd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, condor_collector_selinux(8), condor_master_selinux(8), condor_negotiator_selinux(8), condor_procd_selinux(8), condor_schedd_selinux(8)
\ No newline at end of file
-diff --git a/man/man8/dhcpd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/dhcpd_selinux.8
+diff --git a/man/man8/consolekit_selinux.8 b/man/man8/consolekit_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..371086a
+index 0000000..5721e3a
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/dhcpd_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,194 @@
-+.TH "dhcpd_selinux" "8" "dhcpd" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "dhcpd SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/consolekit_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,212 @@
++.TH "consolekit_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "consolekit" "SELinux Policy documentation for consolekit"
+.SH "NAME"
-+dhcpd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the dhcpd processes
++consolekit_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the consolekit processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the dhcpd processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
-+
-+.SH BOOLEANS
-+SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. dhcpd policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run dhcpd with the tightest access possible.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the consolekit processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
++The consolekit processes execute with the consolekit_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow dhcpc client applications to execute iptables commands, you must turn on the dhcpc_exec_iptables boolean.
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P dhcpc_exec_iptables 1
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep consolekit_t
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow DHCP daemon to use LDAP backends, you must turn on the dhcpd_use_ldap boolean.
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P dhcpd_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The consolekit_t SELinux type can be entered via the "consolekit_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the consolekit_t domain are the following:"
+
++/usr/sbin/console-kit-daemon
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the dhcpd_t, dhcpc_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
-+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
-+
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the dhcpd_t, dhcpc_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux consolekit policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their consolekit processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for consolekit:
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B consolekit_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux dhcpd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their dhcpd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for dhcpd:
-+
-+
-+.EX
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux consolekit policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their consolekit processes in as secure a method as possible.
+.PP
-+.B dhcpd_exec_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the dhcpd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the dhcpd_t domain.
++The following file types are defined for consolekit:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B dhcpd_initrc_exec_t
++.B consolekit_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the dhcpd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the dhcpd_initrc_t domain.
++- Set files with the consolekit_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the consolekit_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B dhcpd_state_t
++.B consolekit_log_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the dhcpd_state_t type, if you want to treat the files as dhcpd state data.
++- Set files with the consolekit_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as consolekit log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/lib/dhcp(3)?/dhcpd\.leases.*, /var/lib/dhcpd(/.*)?
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B dhcpd_tmp_t
++.B consolekit_tmpfs_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the dhcpd_tmp_t type, if you want to store dhcpd temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++- Set files with the consolekit_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store consolekit files on a tmpfs file system.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B dhcpd_unit_file_t
++.B consolekit_unit_file_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the dhcpd_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as dhcpd unit content.
++- Set files with the consolekit_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as consolekit unit content.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B dhcpd_var_run_t
++.B consolekit_var_run_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the dhcpd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the dhcpd files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the consolekit_var_run_t type, if you want to store the consolekit files under the /run directory.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PORT TYPES
-+SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
-+.PP
-+You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+.B semanage port -l
++The SELinux process type consolekit_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
-+SELinux dhcpd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their dhcpd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following port types are defined for dhcpd:
++.br
++.B consolekit_log_t
+
-+.EX
-+.TP 5
-+.B dhcpc_port_t
-+.TP 10
-+.EE
++ /var/log/ConsoleKit(/.*)?
++.br
+
++.br
++.B consolekit_var_run_t
+
-+Default Defined Ports:
-+tcp 68,546
-+.EE
-+udp 68,546
-+.EE
++ /var/run/ConsoleKit(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/consolekit\.pid
++.br
++ /var/run/console-kit-daemon\.pid
++.br
+
-+.EX
-+.TP 5
-+.B dhcpd_port_t
-+.TP 10
-+.EE
++.br
++.B initrc_var_run_t
+
++ /var/run/utmp
++.br
++ /var/run/random-seed
++.br
++ /var/run/runlevel\.dir
++.br
++ /var/run/setmixer_flag
++.br
++
++.br
++.B pam_var_console_t
++
++ /var/run/console(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B systemd_passwd_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/systemd/ask-password(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/systemd/ask-password-block(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B user_fonts_cache_t
++
++ /root/\.fontconfig(/.*)?
++.br
++ /root/\.fonts/auto(/.*)?
++.br
++ /root/\.fonts\.cache-.*
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.fontconfig(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.fonts/auto(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.fonts\.cache-.*
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.fontconfig(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.fonts/auto(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.fonts\.cache-.*
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.fontconfig(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.fonts/auto(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.fonts\.cache-.*
++.br
++
++.br
++.B wtmp_t
++
++ /var/log/wtmp.*
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
-+Default Defined Ports:
-+tcp 547,548,647,847,7911
-+.EE
-+udp 67,547,548,647,847
-+.EE
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux dhcpd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their dhcpd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for dhcpd:
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the consolekit_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B dhcpc_t, dhcpd_t
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
++
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the consolekit_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -13237,151 +14860,95 @@ index 0000000..371086a
+.B semanage module
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
-+.B semanage port
-+can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
-+
-+.B semanage boolean
-+can also be used to manipulate the booleans
-+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), dhcpd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-+, setsebool(8)
-\ No newline at end of file
-diff --git a/man/man8/dictd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/dictd_selinux.8
++selinux(8), consolekit(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/consoletype_selinux.8 b/man/man8/consoletype_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..428bd7b
+index 0000000..aa2a4e4
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/dictd_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,145 @@
-+.TH "dictd_selinux" "8" "dictd" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "dictd SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/consoletype_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
++.TH "consoletype_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "consoletype" "SELinux Policy documentation for consoletype"
+.SH "NAME"
-+dictd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the dictd processes
++consoletype_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the consoletype processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the dictd processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the consoletype processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The consoletype processes execute with the consoletype_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the dictd_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep consoletype_t
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the dictd_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
-+.EE
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++The consoletype_t SELinux type can be entered via the "consoletype_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the consoletype_t domain are the following:"
++
++/sbin/consoletype, /usr/sbin/consoletype
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux dictd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their dictd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for dictd:
-+
-+
-+.EX
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux consoletype policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their consoletype processes in as secure a method as possible.
+.PP
-+.B dictd_etc_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the dictd_etc_t type, if you want to store dictd files in the /etc directories.
-+
++The following process types are defined for consoletype:
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B dictd_exec_t
++.B consoletype_t
+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the dictd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the dictd_t domain.
-+
-+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B dictd_initrc_exec_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the dictd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the dictd_initrc_t domain.
-+
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
-+.EX
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
-+.B dictd_var_lib_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the dictd_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the dictd files under the /var/lib directory.
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux consoletype policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their consoletype processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for consoletype:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B dictd_var_run_t
++.B consoletype_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the dictd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the dictd files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the consoletype_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the consoletype_t domain.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PORT TYPES
-+SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
-+.PP
-+You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
-+
-+.B semanage port -l
-+
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
-+SELinux dictd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their dictd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following port types are defined for dictd:
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+.EX
-+.TP 5
-+.B dict_port_t
-+.TP 10
-+.EE
++The SELinux process type consoletype_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
++.br
++.B nfs_t
+
-+Default Defined Ports:
-+tcp 2628
-+.EE
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux dictd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their dictd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for dictd:
+
-+.EX
-+.B dictd_t
-+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -13393,231 +14960,271 @@ index 0000000..428bd7b
+.B semanage module
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
-+.B semanage port
-+can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
-+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), dictd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/dirsrv_selinux.8 b/man/man8/dirsrv_selinux.8
++selinux(8), consoletype(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/corosync_selinux.8 b/man/man8/corosync_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..8264151
+index 0000000..9f327ae
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/dirsrv_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,227 @@
-+.TH "dirsrv_selinux" "8" "dirsrv" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "dirsrv SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/corosync_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,270 @@
++.TH "corosync_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "corosync" "SELinux Policy documentation for corosync"
+.SH "NAME"
-+dirsrv_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the dirsrv processes
++corosync_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the corosync processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the dirsrv processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the corosync processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The corosync processes execute with the corosync_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the dirsrv_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep corosync_t
+
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The corosync_t SELinux type can be entered via the "corosync_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the corosync_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/sbin/corosync, /usr/sbin/ccs_tool, /usr/sbin/cman_tool, /usr/sbin/corosync-notifyd
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the dirsrv_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux corosync policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their corosync processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for corosync:
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B corosync_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux dirsrv policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their dirsrv processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for dirsrv:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux corosync policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their corosync processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for corosync:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B dirsrv_config_t
++.B corosync_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the dirsrv_config_t type, if you want to treat the files as dirsrv configuration data, usually stored under the /etc directory.
++- Set files with the corosync_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the corosync_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B dirsrv_exec_t
++.B corosync_initrc_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the dirsrv_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the dirsrv_t domain.
++- Set files with the corosync_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the corosync_initrc_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B dirsrv_share_t
++.B corosync_tmp_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the dirsrv_share_t type, if you want to treat the files as dirsrv share data.
++- Set files with the corosync_tmp_t type, if you want to store corosync temporary files in the /tmp directories.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B dirsrv_snmp_exec_t
++.B corosync_tmpfs_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the dirsrv_snmp_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the dirsrv_snmp_t domain.
++- Set files with the corosync_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store corosync files on a tmpfs file system.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B dirsrv_snmp_var_log_t
++.B corosync_unit_file_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the dirsrv_snmp_var_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as dirsrv snmp var log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++- Set files with the corosync_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as corosync unit content.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B dirsrv_snmp_var_run_t
++.B corosync_var_lib_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the dirsrv_snmp_var_run_t type, if you want to store the dirsrv snmp files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the corosync_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the corosync files under the /var/lib directory.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B dirsrv_tmp_t
++.B corosync_var_log_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the dirsrv_tmp_t type, if you want to store dirsrv temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++- Set files with the corosync_var_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as corosync var log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B dirsrv_tmpfs_t
++.B corosync_var_run_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the dirsrv_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store dirsrv files on a tmpfs file system.
++- Set files with the corosync_var_run_t type, if you want to store the corosync files under the /run directory.
+
+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B dirsrv_var_lib_t
-+.EE
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
+
-+- Set files with the dirsrv_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the dirsrv files under the /var/lib directory.
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
++The SELinux process type corosync_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B dirsrv_var_lock_t
-+.EE
++.br
++.B cluster_tmpfs
+
-+- Set files with the dirsrv_var_lock_t type, if you want to treat the files as dirsrv var lock data, stored under the /var/lock directory
+
++.br
++.B cluster_var_lib_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B dirsrv_var_log_t
-+.EE
++ /var/lib/cluster(/.*)?
++.br
+
-+- Set files with the dirsrv_var_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as dirsrv var log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++.br
++.B clvmd_tmpfs_t
+
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B dirsrv_var_run_t
-+.EE
++.br
++.B cmirrord_tmpfs_t
+
-+- Set files with the dirsrv_var_run_t type, if you want to store the dirsrv files under the /run directory.
+
++.br
++.B corosync_tmp_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B dirsrvadmin_config_t
-+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the dirsrvadmin_config_t type, if you want to treat the files as dirsrvadmin configuration data, usually stored under the /etc directory.
++.br
++.B corosync_tmpfs_t
++
+
+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/etc/dirsrv/admin-serv(/.*)?, /etc/dirsrv/dsgw(/.*)?
++.B corosync_var_lib_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B dirsrvadmin_exec_t
-+.EE
++ /var/lib/corosync(/.*)?
++.br
+
-+- Set files with the dirsrvadmin_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the dirsrvadmin_t domain.
++.br
++.B corosync_var_log_t
+
++ /var/log/cluster/corosync\.log.*
+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/sbin/start-ds-admin, /usr/sbin/stop-ds-admin, /usr/sbin/restart-ds-admin
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B dirsrvadmin_lock_t
-+.EE
++.br
++.B corosync_var_run_t
+
-+- Set files with the dirsrvadmin_lock_t type, if you want to treat the files as dirsrvadmin lock data, stored under the /var/lock directory
++ /var/run/cman_.*
++.br
++ /var/run/rsctmp(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/corosync\.pid
++.br
+
++.br
++.B initrc_state_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B dirsrvadmin_tmp_t
-+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the dirsrvadmin_tmp_t type, if you want to store dirsrvadmin temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++.br
++.B initrc_tmp_t
+
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B dirsrvadmin_unconfined_script_exec_t
-+.EE
++.br
++.B qpidd_tmpfs_t
+
-+- Set files with the dirsrvadmin_unconfined_script_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the dirsrvadmin_unconfined_script_t domain.
+
+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/lib/dirsrv/cgi-bin/ds_remove, /usr/lib/dirsrv/cgi-bin/ds_create
++.B rgmanager_tmpfs_t
+
-+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.br
++.B rgmanager_var_lib_t
++
++ /usr/lib(64)?/heartbeat(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/heartbeat(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B rgmanager_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/heartbeat(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/cpglockd\.pid
++.br
++ /var/run/rgmanager\.pid
++.br
++ /var/run/cluster/rgmanager\.sk
++.br
++
++.br
++.B tmpfs_t
++
++ /dev/shm
++.br
++ /lib/udev/devices/shm
++.br
++ /usr/lib/udev/devices/shm
++.br
++
++.br
++.B user_tmpfs_t
++
++ /dev/shm/mono.*
++.br
++ /dev/shm/pulse-shm.*
++.br
++
++.br
++.B var_lib_t
++
++ /opt/(.*/)?var/lib(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux dirsrv policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their dirsrv processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for dirsrv:
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the corosync_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B dirsrvadmin_unconfined_script_t, dirsrv_snmp_t, dirsrvadmin_t, dirsrv_t
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
++
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the corosync_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -13630,208 +15237,199 @@ index 0000000..8264151
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), dirsrv(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/dirsrvadmin_selinux.8 b/man/man8/dirsrvadmin_selinux.8
++selinux(8), corosync(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/couchdb_selinux.8 b/man/man8/couchdb_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..8f4b784
+index 0000000..c703391
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/dirsrvadmin_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,117 @@
-+.TH "dirsrvadmin_selinux" "8" "dirsrvadmin" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "dirsrvadmin SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/couchdb_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,202 @@
++.TH "couchdb_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "couchdb" "SELinux Policy documentation for couchdb"
+.SH "NAME"
-+dirsrvadmin_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the dirsrvadmin processes
++couchdb_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the couchdb processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the dirsrvadmin processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the couchdb processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The couchdb processes execute with the couchdb_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep couchdb_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The couchdb_t SELinux type can be entered via the "couchdb_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the couchdb_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/bin/couchdb
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux couchdb policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their couchdb processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for couchdb:
++
++.EX
++.B couchdb_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux dirsrvadmin policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their dirsrvadmin processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for dirsrvadmin:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux couchdb policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their couchdb processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for couchdb:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B dirsrvadmin_config_t
++.B couchdb_etc_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the dirsrvadmin_config_t type, if you want to treat the files as dirsrvadmin configuration data, usually stored under the /etc directory.
++- Set files with the couchdb_etc_t type, if you want to store couchdb files in the /etc directories.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/etc/dirsrv/admin-serv(/.*)?, /etc/dirsrv/dsgw(/.*)?
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B dirsrvadmin_exec_t
++.B couchdb_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the dirsrvadmin_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the dirsrvadmin_t domain.
++- Set files with the couchdb_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the couchdb_t domain.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/sbin/start-ds-admin, /usr/sbin/stop-ds-admin, /usr/sbin/restart-ds-admin
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B dirsrvadmin_lock_t
++.B couchdb_log_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the dirsrvadmin_lock_t type, if you want to treat the files as dirsrvadmin lock data, stored under the /var/lock directory
++- Set files with the couchdb_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as couchdb log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B dirsrvadmin_tmp_t
++.B couchdb_tmp_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the dirsrvadmin_tmp_t type, if you want to store dirsrvadmin temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++- Set files with the couchdb_tmp_t type, if you want to store couchdb temporary files in the /tmp directories.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B dirsrvadmin_unconfined_script_exec_t
++.B couchdb_unit_file_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the dirsrvadmin_unconfined_script_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the dirsrvadmin_unconfined_script_t domain.
++- Set files with the couchdb_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as couchdb unit content.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B couchdb_var_lib_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the couchdb_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the couchdb files under the /var/lib directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B couchdb_var_run_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the couchdb_var_run_t type, if you want to store the couchdb files under the /run directory.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/lib/dirsrv/cgi-bin/ds_remove, /usr/lib/dirsrv/cgi-bin/ds_create
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.SH PORT TYPES
++SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux dirsrvadmin policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their dirsrvadmin processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for dirsrvadmin:
++You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
+
-+.EX
-+.B dirsrvadmin_unconfined_script_t, dirsrvadmin_t
-+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++.B semanage port -l
+
-+.SH "COMMANDS"
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
+.PP
-+.B semanage permissive
-+can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
++SELinux couchdb policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their couchdb processes in as secure a method as possible.
+.PP
-+.B semanage module
-+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++The following port types are defined for couchdb:
+
-+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
-+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++.EX
++.TP 5
++.B couchdb_port_t
++.TP 10
++.EE
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
+
-+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), dirsrvadmin(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/disk_selinux.8 b/man/man8/disk_selinux.8
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..fd60eaf
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/disk_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
-+.TH "disk_selinux" "8" "disk" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "disk SELinux Policy documentation"
-+.SH "NAME"
-+disk_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the disk processes
-+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++Default Defined Ports:
++tcp 5984
++.EE
++udp 5984
++.EE
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the disk processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++The SELinux process type couchdb_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++.br
++.B couchdb_log_t
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux disk policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their disk processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for disk:
++ /var/log/couchdb(/.*)?
++.br
+
++.br
++.B couchdb_tmp_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B disk_munin_plugin_exec_t
-+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the disk_munin_plugin_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the disk_munin_plugin_t domain.
++.br
++.B couchdb_var_lib_t
+
++ /var/lib/couchdb(/.*)?
+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/share/munin/plugins/diskstat.*, /usr/share/munin/plugins/hddtemp.*, /usr/share/munin/plugins/smart_.*, /usr/share/munin/plugins/df.*
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B disk_munin_plugin_tmp_t
-+.EE
++.br
++.B couchdb_var_run_t
+
-+- Set files with the disk_munin_plugin_tmp_t type, if you want to store disk munin plugin temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++ /var/run/couchdb(/.*)?
++.br
+
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the couchdb_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux disk policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their disk processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for disk:
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the couchdb_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B disk_munin_plugin_t
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -13843,108 +15441,140 @@ index 0000000..fd60eaf
+.B semanage module
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
++.B semanage port
++can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
++
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), disk(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/dkim_selinux.8 b/man/man8/dkim_selinux.8
++selinux(8), couchdb(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/courier_authdaemon_selinux.8 b/man/man8/courier_authdaemon_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..24d191c
+index 0000000..f5cc833
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/dkim_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,107 @@
-+.TH "dkim_selinux" "8" "dkim" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "dkim SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/courier_authdaemon_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,137 @@
++.TH "courier_authdaemon_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "courier_authdaemon" "SELinux Policy documentation for courier_authdaemon"
+.SH "NAME"
-+dkim_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the dkim processes
++courier_authdaemon_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the courier_authdaemon processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the dkim processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the courier_authdaemon processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The courier_authdaemon processes execute with the courier_authdaemon_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the dkim_milter_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep courier_authdaemon_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
++The courier_authdaemon_t SELinux type can be entered via the "courier_authdaemon_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the courier_authdaemon_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/lib/courier/authlib/.*, /usr/sbin/authdaemond
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the dkim_milter_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux courier_authdaemon policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their courier_authdaemon processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for courier_authdaemon:
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B courier_authdaemon_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux dkim policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their dkim processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for dkim:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux courier_authdaemon policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their courier_authdaemon processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for courier_authdaemon:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B dkim_milter_data_t
++.B courier_authdaemon_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the dkim_milter_data_t type, if you want to treat the files as dkim milter content.
++- Set files with the courier_authdaemon_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the courier_authdaemon_t domain.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/lib/dkim-milter(/.*)?, /var/run/dkim-milter(/.*)?
+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B dkim_milter_exec_t
-+.EE
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
+
-+- Set files with the dkim_milter_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the dkim_milter_t domain.
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
++The SELinux process type courier_authdaemon_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B dkim_milter_private_key_t
-+.EE
++.br
++.B courier_var_run_t
+
-+- Set files with the dkim_milter_private_key_t type, if you want to treat the files as dkim milter private key data.
++ /var/run/courier(/.*)?
++.br
+
++.br
++.B faillog_t
+
-+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
++ /var/log/btmp.*
++.br
++ /var/run/faillock(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/log/faillog
++.br
++ /var/log/tallylog
++.br
++
++.br
++.B pcscd_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/pcscd(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/pcscd\.events(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/pcscd\.pid
++.br
++ /var/run/pcscd\.pub
++.br
++ /var/run/pcscd\.comm
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux dkim policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their dkim processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for dkim:
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the courier_authdaemon_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B dkim_milter_t
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
++
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the courier_authdaemon_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -13957,97 +15587,98 @@ index 0000000..24d191c
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), dkim(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/dlm_selinux.8 b/man/man8/dlm_selinux.8
++selinux(8), courier_authdaemon(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, courier_pcp_selinux(8), courier_pop_selinux(8), courier_sqwebmail_selinux(8), courier_tcpd_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/courier_pcp_selinux.8 b/man/man8/courier_pcp_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..8937eb5
+index 0000000..526d096
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/dlm_selinux.8
++++ b/man/man8/courier_pcp_selinux.8
@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
-+.TH "dlm_selinux" "8" "dlm" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "dlm SELinux Policy documentation"
++.TH "courier_pcp_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "courier_pcp" "SELinux Policy documentation for courier_pcp"
+.SH "NAME"
-+dlm_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the dlm processes
++courier_pcp_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the courier_pcp processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the dlm processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the courier_pcp processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The courier_pcp processes execute with the courier_pcp_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux dlm policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their dlm processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for dlm:
++For example:
+
++.B ps -eZ | grep courier_pcp_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B dlm_controld_exec_t
-+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the dlm_controld_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the dlm_controld_t domain.
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
++The courier_pcp_t SELinux type can be entered via the "courier_pcp_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the courier_pcp_t domain are the following:"
+
-+.EX
++/usr/lib/courier/courier/pcpd
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+.B dlm_controld_tmpfs_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the dlm_controld_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store dlm controld files on a tmpfs file system.
-+
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux courier_pcp policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their courier_pcp processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for courier_pcp:
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B dlm_controld_var_log_t
++.B courier_pcp_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
-+- Set files with the dlm_controld_var_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as dlm controld var log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux courier_pcp policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their courier_pcp processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for courier_pcp:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B dlm_controld_var_run_t
++.B courier_pcp_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the dlm_controld_var_run_t type, if you want to store the dlm controld files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the courier_pcp_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the courier_pcp_t domain.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux dlm policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their dlm processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for dlm:
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+.EX
-+.B dlm_controld_t
-+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++The SELinux process type courier_pcp_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B courier_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/courier(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -14060,88 +15691,108 @@ index 0000000..8937eb5
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), dlm(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/dmesg_selinux.8 b/man/man8/dmesg_selinux.8
++selinux(8), courier_pcp(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, courier_authdaemon_selinux(8), courier_pop_selinux(8), courier_sqwebmail_selinux(8), courier_tcpd_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/courier_pop_selinux.8 b/man/man8/courier_pop_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..dfc5418
+index 0000000..5652da7
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/dmesg_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
-+.TH "dmesg_selinux" "8" "dmesg" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "dmesg SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/courier_pop_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,107 @@
++.TH "courier_pop_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "courier_pop" "SELinux Policy documentation for courier_pop"
+.SH "NAME"
-+dmesg_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the dmesg processes
++courier_pop_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the courier_pop processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the dmesg processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the courier_pop processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH BOOLEANS
-+SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. dmesg policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run dmesg with the tightest access possible.
++The courier_pop processes execute with the courier_pop_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
+
++.B ps -eZ | grep courier_pop_t
+
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The courier_pop_t SELinux type can be entered via the "courier_pop_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the courier_pop_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/lib/courier/courier/courierpop.*, /usr/bin/imapd, /usr/lib/courier/imapd, /usr/lib/courier/pop3d, /usr/lib/courier/courier/imaplogin
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux courier_pop policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their courier_pop processes in as secure a method as possible.
+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to read system messages, you must turn on the user_dmesg boolean.
++The following process types are defined for courier_pop:
+
+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P user_dmesg 1
++.B courier_pop_t
+.EE
-+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux dmesg policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their dmesg processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for dmesg:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux courier_pop policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their courier_pop processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for courier_pop:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B dmesg_exec_t
++.B courier_pop_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the dmesg_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the dmesg_t domain.
++- Set files with the courier_pop_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the courier_pop_t domain.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/bin/dmesg, /bin/dmesg
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux dmesg policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their dmesg processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for dmesg:
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+.EX
-+.B dmesg_t
-+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++The SELinux process type courier_pop_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B courier_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/courier(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B user_home_t
++
++ /home/[^/]*/.+
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/.+
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/.+
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -14153,84 +15804,100 @@ index 0000000..dfc5418
+.B semanage module
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
-+.B semanage boolean
-+can also be used to manipulate the booleans
-+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), dmesg(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-+, setsebool(8)
++selinux(8), courier_pop(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, courier_authdaemon_selinux(8), courier_pcp_selinux(8), courier_sqwebmail_selinux(8), courier_tcpd_selinux(8)
\ No newline at end of file
-diff --git a/man/man8/dmidecode_selinux.8 b/man/man8/dmidecode_selinux.8
+diff --git a/man/man8/courier_sqwebmail_selinux.8 b/man/man8/courier_sqwebmail_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..b3c9617
+index 0000000..6151335
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/dmidecode_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
-+.TH "dmidecode_selinux" "8" "dmidecode" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "dmidecode SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/courier_sqwebmail_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
++.TH "courier_sqwebmail_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "courier_sqwebmail" "SELinux Policy documentation for courier_sqwebmail"
+.SH "NAME"
-+dmidecode_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the dmidecode processes
++courier_sqwebmail_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the courier_sqwebmail processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the dmidecode processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the courier_sqwebmail processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The courier_sqwebmail processes execute with the courier_sqwebmail_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux dmidecode policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their dmidecode processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for dmidecode:
++For example:
+
++.B ps -eZ | grep courier_sqwebmail_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B dmidecode_exec_t
-+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the dmidecode_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the dmidecode_t domain.
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/sbin/dmidecode, /usr/sbin/vpddecode, /usr/sbin/ownership
++The courier_sqwebmail_t SELinux type can be entered via the "courier_sqwebmail_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the courier_sqwebmail_t domain are the following:"
+
-+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
+
+.SH PROCESS TYPES
+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux dmidecode policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their dmidecode processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for dmidecode:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux courier_sqwebmail policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their courier_sqwebmail processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for courier_sqwebmail:
+
+.EX
-+.B dmidecode_t
++.B courier_sqwebmail_t
+.EE
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux courier_sqwebmail policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their courier_sqwebmail processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for courier_sqwebmail:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B courier_sqwebmail_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the courier_sqwebmail_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the courier_sqwebmail_t domain.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type courier_sqwebmail_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B courier_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/courier(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
+can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
@@ -14242,143 +15909,208 @@ index 0000000..b3c9617
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), dmidecode(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/dnsmasq_selinux.8 b/man/man8/dnsmasq_selinux.8
++selinux(8), courier_sqwebmail(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, courier_authdaemon_selinux(8), courier_pcp_selinux(8), courier_pop_selinux(8), courier_tcpd_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/courier_tcpd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/courier_tcpd_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..2326218
+index 0000000..6794aff
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/dnsmasq_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,143 @@
-+.TH "dnsmasq_selinux" "8" "dnsmasq" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "dnsmasq SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/courier_tcpd_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,105 @@
++.TH "courier_tcpd_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "courier_tcpd" "SELinux Policy documentation for courier_tcpd"
+.SH "NAME"
-+dnsmasq_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the dnsmasq processes
++courier_tcpd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the courier_tcpd processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the dnsmasq processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the courier_tcpd processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The courier_tcpd processes execute with the courier_tcpd_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the dnsmasq_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep courier_tcpd_t
+
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The courier_tcpd_t SELinux type can be entered via the "courier_tcpd_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the courier_tcpd_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/sbin/couriertcpd
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the dnsmasq_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux courier_tcpd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their courier_tcpd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for courier_tcpd:
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B courier_tcpd_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux dnsmasq policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their dnsmasq processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for dnsmasq:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux courier_tcpd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their courier_tcpd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for courier_tcpd:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B dnsmasq_etc_t
++.B courier_tcpd_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the dnsmasq_etc_t type, if you want to store dnsmasq files in the /etc directories.
++- Set files with the courier_tcpd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the courier_tcpd_t domain.
+
+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B dnsmasq_exec_t
-+.EE
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
+
-+- Set files with the dnsmasq_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the dnsmasq_t domain.
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
++The SELinux process type courier_tcpd_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B dnsmasq_initrc_exec_t
-+.EE
++.br
++.B courier_var_lib_t
+
-+- Set files with the dnsmasq_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the dnsmasq_initrc_t domain.
++ /var/lib/courier(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/courier-imap(/.*)?
++.br
+
++.br
++.B courier_var_run_t
+
-+.EX
++ /var/run/courier(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
+.PP
-+.B dnsmasq_lease_t
-+.EE
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
-+- Set files with the dnsmasq_lease_t type, if you want to treat the files as dnsmasq lease data.
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/lib/dnsmasq(/.*)?, /var/lib/misc/dnsmasq\.leases
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
-+.EX
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), courier_tcpd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, courier_authdaemon_selinux(8), courier_pcp_selinux(8), courier_pop_selinux(8), courier_sqwebmail_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/cpucontrol_selinux.8 b/man/man8/cpucontrol_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..f81f173
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/cpucontrol_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
++.TH "cpucontrol_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "cpucontrol" "SELinux Policy documentation for cpucontrol"
++.SH "NAME"
++cpucontrol_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the cpucontrol processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the cpucontrol processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The cpucontrol processes execute with the cpucontrol_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep cpucontrol_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The cpucontrol_t SELinux type can be entered via the "cpucontrol_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the cpucontrol_t domain are the following:"
++
++/sbin/microcode_ctl, /usr/sbin/microcode_ctl
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux cpucontrol policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their cpucontrol processes in as secure a method as possible.
+.PP
-+.B dnsmasq_unit_file_t
++The following process types are defined for cpucontrol:
++
++.EX
++.B cpucontrol_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
-+- Set files with the dnsmasq_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as dnsmasq unit content.
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux cpucontrol policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their cpucontrol processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for cpucontrol:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B dnsmasq_var_log_t
++.B cpucontrol_conf_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the dnsmasq_var_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as dnsmasq var log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++- Set files with the cpucontrol_conf_t type, if you want to treat the files as cpucontrol configuration data, usually stored under the /etc directory.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B dnsmasq_var_run_t
++.B cpucontrol_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the dnsmasq_var_run_t type, if you want to store the dnsmasq files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the cpucontrol_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the cpucontrol_t domain.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/run/dnsmasq\.pid, /var/run/libvirt/network(/.*)?
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux dnsmasq policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their dnsmasq processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for dnsmasq:
-+
-+.EX
-+.B dnsmasq_t
-+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -14391,116 +16123,96 @@ index 0000000..2326218
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), dnsmasq(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/dnssec_selinux.8 b/man/man8/dnssec_selinux.8
++selinux(8), cpucontrol(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/cpufreqselector_selinux.8 b/man/man8/cpufreqselector_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..6289e0e
+index 0000000..764592d
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/dnssec_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,119 @@
-+.TH "dnssec_selinux" "8" "dnssec" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "dnssec SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/cpufreqselector_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
++.TH "cpufreqselector_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "cpufreqselector" "SELinux Policy documentation for cpufreqselector"
+.SH "NAME"
-+dnssec_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the dnssec processes
++cpufreqselector_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the cpufreqselector processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the dnssec processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the cpufreqselector processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The cpufreqselector processes execute with the cpufreqselector_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux dnssec policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their dnssec processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for dnssec:
++For example:
+
++.B ps -eZ | grep cpufreqselector_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B dnssec_t
-+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the dnssec_t type, if you want to treat the files as dnssec data.
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/etc/unbound/.*\.key, /var/named/chroot/etc/rndc\.key, /etc/dnssec-trigger/dnssec_trigger_server\.key, /etc/rndc\.key
++The cpufreqselector_t SELinux type can be entered via the "cpufreqselector_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the cpufreqselector_t domain are the following:"
+
-+.EX
++/usr/bin/cpufreq-selector
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+.B dnssec_trigger_exec_t
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux cpufreqselector policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their cpufreqselector processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for cpufreqselector:
++
++.EX
++.B cpufreqselector_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
-+- Set files with the dnssec_trigger_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the dnssec_trigger_t domain.
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux cpufreqselector policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their cpufreqselector processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for cpufreqselector:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B dnssec_trigger_var_run_t
++.B cpufreqselector_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the dnssec_trigger_var_run_t type, if you want to store the dnssec trigger files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the cpufreqselector_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the cpufreqselector_t domain.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PORT TYPES
-+SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
-+.PP
-+You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
-+
-+.B semanage port -l
-+
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
-+SELinux dnssec policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their dnssec processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following port types are defined for dnssec:
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+.EX
-+.TP 5
-+.B dnssec_port_t
-+.TP 10
-+.EE
++The SELinux process type cpufreqselector_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
++.br
++.B sysfs_t
+
-+Default Defined Ports:
-+tcp 8955
-+.EE
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux dnssec policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their dnssec processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for dnssec:
++ /sys(/.*)?
++.br
+
-+.EX
-+.B dnssec_trigger_t
-+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -14512,227 +16224,237 @@ index 0000000..6289e0e
+.B semanage module
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
-+.B semanage port
-+can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
-+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), dnssec(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/dovecot_selinux.8 b/man/man8/dovecot_selinux.8
++selinux(8), cpufreqselector(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/cpuspeed_selinux.8 b/man/man8/cpuspeed_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..dd2065a
+index 0000000..ec9dfce
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/dovecot_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,223 @@
-+.TH "dovecot_selinux" "8" "dovecot" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "dovecot SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/cpuspeed_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,110 @@
++.TH "cpuspeed_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "cpuspeed" "SELinux Policy documentation for cpuspeed"
+.SH "NAME"
-+dovecot_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the dovecot processes
++cpuspeed_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the cpuspeed processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the dovecot processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the cpuspeed processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The cpuspeed processes execute with the cpuspeed_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the dovecot_auth_t, dovecot_t, dovecot_deliver_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep cpuspeed_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
++The cpuspeed_t SELinux type can be entered via the "cpuspeed_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the cpuspeed_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/sbin/cpufreqd, /usr/sbin/cpuspeed, /usr/sbin/powernowd
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the dovecot_auth_t, dovecot_t, dovecot_deliver_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux cpuspeed policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their cpuspeed processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for cpuspeed:
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B cpuspeed_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux dovecot policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their dovecot processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for dovecot:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux cpuspeed policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their cpuspeed processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for cpuspeed:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B dovecot_auth_exec_t
++.B cpuspeed_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the dovecot_auth_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the dovecot_auth_t domain.
++- Set files with the cpuspeed_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the cpuspeed_t domain.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/libexec/dovecot/auth, /usr/libexec/dovecot/dovecot-auth
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B dovecot_auth_tmp_t
++.B cpuspeed_var_run_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the dovecot_auth_tmp_t type, if you want to store dovecot auth temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++- Set files with the cpuspeed_var_run_t type, if you want to store the cpuspeed files under the /run directory.
+
+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B dovecot_cert_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the dovecot_cert_t type, if you want to treat the files as dovecot certificate data.
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/share/ssl/certs/dovecot\.pem, /usr/share/ssl/private/dovecot\.pem, /etc/pki/dovecot(/.*)?
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B dovecot_deliver_exec_t
-+.EE
++The SELinux process type cpuspeed_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
-+- Set files with the dovecot_deliver_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the dovecot_deliver_t domain.
++.br
++.B cpuspeed_var_run_t
+
++ /var/run/cpufreqd\.pid
+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/libexec/dovecot/dovecot-lda, /usr/libexec/dovecot/deliver
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B dovecot_deliver_tmp_t
-+.EE
++.br
++.B sysfs_t
+
-+- Set files with the dovecot_deliver_tmp_t type, if you want to store dovecot deliver temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++ /sys(/.*)?
++.br
+
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
-+.EX
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
+.PP
-+.B dovecot_etc_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the dovecot_etc_t type, if you want to store dovecot files in the /etc directories.
-+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/etc/dovecot(/.*)?*, /etc/dovecot\.conf.*
-+
-+.EX
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
+.PP
-+.B dovecot_exec_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the dovecot_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the dovecot_t domain.
-+
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B dovecot_initrc_exec_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the dovecot_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the dovecot_initrc_t domain.
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B dovecot_keytab_t
-+.EE
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), cpuspeed(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/crack_selinux.8 b/man/man8/crack_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..49919a6
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/crack_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,120 @@
++.TH "crack_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "crack" "SELinux Policy documentation for crack"
++.SH "NAME"
++crack_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the crack processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+- Set files with the dovecot_keytab_t type, if you want to treat the files as kerberos keytab files.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the crack processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
++The crack processes execute with the crack_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B dovecot_passwd_t
-+.EE
++For example:
+
-+- Set files with the dovecot_passwd_t type, if you want to treat the files as dovecot passwd data.
++.B ps -eZ | grep crack_t
+
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B dovecot_spool_t
-+.EE
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
-+- Set files with the dovecot_spool_t type, if you want to store the dovecot files under the /var/spool directory.
++The crack_t SELinux type can be entered via the "crack_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the crack_t domain are the following:"
+
++/usr/sbin/crack_[a-z]*, /usr/sbin/cracklib-[a-z]*
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux crack policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their crack processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for crack:
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B dovecot_tmp_t
++.B crack_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
-+- Set files with the dovecot_tmp_t type, if you want to store dovecot temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux crack policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their crack processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for crack:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B dovecot_var_lib_t
++.B crack_db_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the dovecot_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the dovecot files under the /var/lib directory.
++- Set files with the crack_db_t type, if you want to treat the files as crack database content.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/run/dovecot/login/ssl-parameters.dat, /var/lib/dovecot(/.*)?
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B dovecot_var_log_t
++.B crack_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the dovecot_var_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as dovecot var log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++- Set files with the crack_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the crack_t domain.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/log/dovecot\.log.*, /var/log/dovecot(/.*)?
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B dovecot_var_run_t
++.B crack_tmp_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the dovecot_var_run_t type, if you want to store the dovecot files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the crack_tmp_t type, if you want to store crack temporary files in the /tmp directories.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux dovecot policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their dovecot processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for dovecot:
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+.EX
-+.B dovecot_deliver_t, dovecot_auth_t, dovecot_t
-+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++The SELinux process type crack_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B crack_db_t
++
++ /usr/share/cracklib(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/cache/cracklib(/.*)?
++.br
++ /usr/lib/cracklib_dict.*
++.br
++
++.br
++.B crack_tmp_t
++
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -14745,346 +16467,306 @@ index 0000000..dd2065a
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), dovecot(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/drbd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/drbd_selinux.8
++selinux(8), crack(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/crond_selinux.8 b/man/man8/crond_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..d38f112
+index 0000000..0f4955a
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/drbd_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,93 @@
-+.TH "drbd_selinux" "8" "drbd" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "drbd SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/crond_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,310 @@
++.TH "crond_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "crond" "SELinux Policy documentation for crond"
+.SH "NAME"
-+drbd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the drbd processes
++crond_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the crond processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the drbd processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
-+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
-+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux drbd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their drbd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for drbd:
-+
-+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B drbd_exec_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the drbd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the drbd_t domain.
-+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/sbin/drbdadm, /sbin/drbdadm, /usr/lib/ocf/resource.\d/linbit/drbd, /usr/sbin/drbdsetup, /sbin/drbdsetup
-+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B drbd_lock_t
-+.EE
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the crond processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+- Set files with the drbd_lock_t type, if you want to treat the files as drbd lock data, stored under the /var/lock directory
++The crond processes execute with the crond_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B drbd_var_lib_t
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep crond_t
+
-+- Set files with the drbd_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the drbd files under the /var/lib directory.
+
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
-+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
++The crond_t SELinux type can be entered via the "crond_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the crond_t domain are the following:"
+
++/usr/sbin/cron(d)?, /usr/sbin/atd, /usr/sbin/fcron
+.SH PROCESS TYPES
+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux drbd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their drbd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for drbd:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux crond policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their crond processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for crond:
+
+.EX
-+.B drbd_t
++.B crond_t, cronjob_t, crontab_t
+.EE
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
-+.SH "COMMANDS"
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
-+.PP
-+.B semanage permissive
-+can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
-+.PP
-+.B semanage module
-+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++.SH BOOLEANS
++SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. crond policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run crond with the tightest access possible.
+
-+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
-+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.PP
++If you want to enable extra rules in the cron domain to support fcron, you must turn on the fcron_crond boolean.
+
-+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), drbd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/dspam_selinux.8 b/man/man8/dspam_selinux.8
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..981857d
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/dspam_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,127 @@
-+.TH "dspam_selinux" "8" "dspam" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "dspam SELinux Policy documentation"
-+.SH "NAME"
-+dspam_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the dspam processes
-+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P fcron_crond 1
++.EE
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the dspam processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++.PP
++If you want to allow system cron jobs to relabel filesystem for restoring file contexts, you must turn on the cron_can_relabel boolean.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P cron_can_relabel 1
++.EE
+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the dspam_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++If you want to enable extra rules in the cron domain to support fcron, you must turn on the fcron_crond boolean.
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.B setsebool -P fcron_crond 1
+.EE
+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the dspam_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++If you want to allow system cron jobs to relabel filesystem for restoring file contexts, you must turn on the cron_can_relabel boolean.
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B setsebool -P cron_can_relabel 1
+.EE
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux dspam policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their dspam processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for dspam:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux crond policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their crond processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for crond:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B dspam_exec_t
++.B crond_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the dspam_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the dspam_t domain.
++- Set files with the crond_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the crond_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B dspam_initrc_exec_t
++.B crond_initrc_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the dspam_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the dspam_initrc_t domain.
++- Set files with the crond_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the crond_initrc_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B dspam_log_t
++.B crond_tmp_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the dspam_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as dspam log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++- Set files with the crond_tmp_t type, if you want to store crond temporary files in the /tmp directories.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B dspam_tmp_t
++.B crond_unit_file_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the dspam_tmp_t type, if you want to store dspam temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++- Set files with the crond_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as crond unit content.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B dspam_var_lib_t
++.B crond_var_run_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the dspam_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the dspam files under the /var/lib directory.
-+
-+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B dspam_var_run_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the dspam_var_run_t type, if you want to store the dspam files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the crond_var_run_t type, if you want to store the crond files under the /run directory.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux dspam policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their dspam processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for dspam:
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+.EX
-+.B dspam_t
-+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++The SELinux process type crond_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
-+.SH "COMMANDS"
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
-+.PP
-+.B semanage permissive
-+can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
-+.PP
-+.B semanage module
-+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++.br
++.B cgroup_t
+
-+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
-+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++ /cgroup
++.br
++ /sys/fs/cgroup
++.br
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.br
++.B cron_log_t
+
-+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), dspam(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/entropyd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/entropyd_selinux.8
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..0ce9c6d
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/entropyd_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,118 @@
-+.TH "entropyd_selinux" "8" "entropyd" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "entropyd SELinux Policy documentation"
-+.SH "NAME"
-+entropyd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the entropyd processes
-+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++ /var/log/rpmpkgs.*
++.br
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the entropyd processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++.br
++.B cron_spool_t
+
-+.SH BOOLEANS
-+SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. entropyd policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run entropyd with the tightest access possible.
++ /var/spool/fcron
++.br
++ /var/spool/cron/crontabs
++.br
+
++.br
++.B crond_tmp_t
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow the use of the audio devices as the source for the entropy feeds, you must turn on the entropyd_use_audio boolean.
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P entropyd_use_audio 1
-+.EE
++.br
++.B crond_var_run_t
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++ /var/run/.*cron.*
++.br
++ /var/run/crond?\.pid
++.br
++ /var/run/crond?\.reboot
++.br
++ /var/run/atd\.pid
++.br
++ /var/run/fcron\.pid
++.br
++ /var/run/fcron\.fifo
++.br
++ /var/run/anacron\.pid
++.br
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the entropyd_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++.br
++.B faillog_t
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
++ /var/log/btmp.*
++.br
++ /var/run/faillock(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/log/faillog
++.br
++ /var/log/tallylog
++.br
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the entropyd_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++.br
++.B initrc_var_run_t
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
-+.EE
++ /var/run/utmp
++.br
++ /var/run/random-seed
++.br
++ /var/run/runlevel\.dir
++.br
++ /var/run/setmixer_flag
++.br
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux entropyd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their entropyd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for entropyd:
++.br
++.B pcscd_var_run_t
+
++ /var/run/pcscd(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/pcscd\.events(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/pcscd\.pid
++.br
++ /var/run/pcscd\.pub
++.br
++ /var/run/pcscd\.comm
++.br
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B entropyd_exec_t
-+.EE
++.br
++.B rpm_log_t
+
-+- Set files with the entropyd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the entropyd_t domain.
++ /var/log/yum\.log.*
++.br
+
+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/sbin/audio-entropyd, /usr/sbin/haveged
++.B security_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B entropyd_var_run_t
-+.EE
++ /selinux
++.br
+
-+- Set files with the entropyd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the entropyd files under the /run directory.
++.br
++.B system_cron_spool_t
+
++ /etc/cron\.d(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/spool/anacron(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/crontab
++.br
++ /var/spool/fcron/systab
++.br
++ /var/spool/fcron/new\.systab
++.br
++ /var/spool/fcron/systab\.orig
+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/run/audio-entropyd\.pid, /var/run/haveged\.pid
+
-+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
++.br
++.B user_cron_spool_t
++
++ /var/spool/at(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/spool/cron
++.br
++
++.br
++.B var_auth_t
++
++ /var/ace(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/rsa(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/abl(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/rsa(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/pam_ssh(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/pam_ssh(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/pam_shield(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/google-authenticator(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux entropyd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their entropyd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for entropyd:
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the crontab_t, crond_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B entropyd_t
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
++
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the crontab_t, crond_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -15100,198 +16782,192 @@ index 0000000..0ce9c6d
+can also be used to manipulate the booleans
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), entropyd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-+, setsebool(8)
++selinux(8), crond(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, setsebool(8), crontab_selinux(8)
\ No newline at end of file
-diff --git a/man/man8/eventlogd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/eventlogd_selinux.8
+diff --git a/man/man8/crontab_selinux.8 b/man/man8/crontab_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..77d6098
+index 0000000..8d67b77
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/eventlogd_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
-+.TH "eventlogd_selinux" "8" "eventlogd" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "eventlogd SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/crontab_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,190 @@
++.TH "crontab_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "crontab" "SELinux Policy documentation for crontab"
+.SH "NAME"
-+eventlogd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the eventlogd processes
++crontab_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the crontab processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the eventlogd processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the crontab processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The crontab processes execute with the crontab_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux eventlogd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their eventlogd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for eventlogd:
++For example:
+
++.B ps -eZ | grep crontab_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B eventlogd_exec_t
-+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the eventlogd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the eventlogd_t domain.
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
++The crontab_t SELinux type can be entered via the "crontab_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the crontab_t domain are the following:"
+
-+.EX
++/usr/bin/(f)?crontab, /usr/bin/at, /usr/sbin/fcronsighup
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+.B eventlogd_var_lib_t
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux crontab policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their crontab processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for crontab:
++
++.EX
++.B crontab_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
-+- Set files with the eventlogd_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the eventlogd files under the /var/lib directory.
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux crontab policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their crontab processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for crontab:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B eventlogd_var_run_t
++.B crontab_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the eventlogd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the eventlogd files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the crontab_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the crontab_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B eventlogd_var_socket_t
++.B crontab_tmp_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the eventlogd_var_socket_t type, if you want to treat the files as eventlogd var socket data.
++- Set files with the crontab_tmp_t type, if you want to store crontab temporary files in the /tmp directories.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux eventlogd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their eventlogd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for eventlogd:
-+
-+.EX
-+.B eventlogd_t
-+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
-+
-+.SH "COMMANDS"
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
-+.PP
-+.B semanage permissive
-+can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
-+.PP
-+.B semanage module
-+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
-+
-+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
-+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++The SELinux process type crontab_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
-+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), eventlogd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/evtchnd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/evtchnd_selinux.8
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..28b3a31
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/evtchnd_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,93 @@
-+.TH "evtchnd_selinux" "8" "evtchnd" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "evtchnd SELinux Policy documentation"
-+.SH "NAME"
-+evtchnd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the evtchnd processes
-+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++.br
++.B cgroup_t
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the evtchnd processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++ /cgroup
++.br
++ /sys/fs/cgroup
++.br
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++.br
++.B crontab_tmp_t
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux evtchnd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their evtchnd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for evtchnd:
+
++.br
++.B faillog_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B evtchnd_exec_t
-+.EE
++ /var/log/btmp.*
++.br
++ /var/run/faillock(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/log/faillog
++.br
++ /var/log/tallylog
++.br
+
-+- Set files with the evtchnd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the evtchnd_t domain.
++.br
++.B pcscd_var_run_t
+
++ /var/run/pcscd(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/pcscd\.events(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/pcscd\.pid
++.br
++ /var/run/pcscd\.pub
++.br
++ /var/run/pcscd\.comm
++.br
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B evtchnd_var_log_t
-+.EE
++.br
++.B user_cron_spool_t
+
-+- Set files with the evtchnd_var_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as evtchnd var log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++ /var/spool/at(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/spool/cron
++.br
+
++.br
++.B user_tmp_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B evtchnd_var_run_t
-+.EE
++ /var/run/user(/.*)?
++.br
++ /tmp/gconfd-.*
++.br
++ /tmp/gconfd-dwalsh
++.br
++ /tmp/gconfd-xguest
++.br
+
-+- Set files with the evtchnd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the evtchnd files under the /run directory.
++.br
++.B var_auth_t
+
++ /var/ace(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/rsa(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/abl(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/rsa(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/pam_ssh(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/pam_ssh(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/pam_shield(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/google-authenticator(/.*)?
+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/run/evtchnd, /var/run/evtchnd\.pid
+
-+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux evtchnd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their evtchnd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for evtchnd:
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the crontab_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B evtchnd_t
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
++
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the crontab_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -15304,164 +16980,229 @@ index 0000000..28b3a31
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), evtchnd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/exim_selinux.8 b/man/man8/exim_selinux.8
++selinux(8), crontab(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/ctdbd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/ctdbd_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..4d6add4
+index 0000000..33d0469
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/exim_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,168 @@
-+.TH "exim_selinux" "8" "exim" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "exim SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/ctdbd_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,232 @@
++.TH "ctdbd_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "ctdbd" "SELinux Policy documentation for ctdbd"
+.SH "NAME"
-+exim_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the exim processes
++ctdbd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the ctdbd processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the exim processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the ctdbd processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH BOOLEANS
-+SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. exim policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run exim with the tightest access possible.
++The ctdbd processes execute with the ctdbd_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
++For example:
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow exim to read unprivileged user files, you must turn on the exim_read_user_files boolean.
++.B ps -eZ | grep ctdbd_t
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P exim_read_user_files 1
-+.EE
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow exim to connect to databases (postgres, mysql), you must turn on the exim_can_connect_db boolean.
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P exim_can_connect_db 1
-+.EE
++The ctdbd_t SELinux type can be entered via the "ctdbd_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the ctdbd_t domain are the following:"
+
++/usr/sbin/ctdbd
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow exim to create, read, write, and delete unprivileged user files, you must turn on the exim_manage_user_files boolean.
-+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P exim_manage_user_files 1
-+.EE
-+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
-+
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the exim_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
-+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
-+
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux ctdbd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ctdbd processes in as secure a method as possible.
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the exim_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++The following process types are defined for ctdbd:
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B ctdbd_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux exim policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their exim processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for exim:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux ctdbd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ctdbd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for ctdbd:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B exim_exec_t
++.B ctdbd_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the exim_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the exim_t domain.
++- Set files with the ctdbd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ctdbd_t domain.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/sbin/exim_tidydb, /usr/sbin/exim[0-9]?
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B exim_initrc_exec_t
++.B ctdbd_initrc_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the exim_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the exim_initrc_t domain.
++- Set files with the ctdbd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ctdbd_initrc_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B exim_keytab_t
++.B ctdbd_log_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the exim_keytab_t type, if you want to treat the files as kerberos keytab files.
++- Set files with the ctdbd_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as ctdbd log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B exim_log_t
++.B ctdbd_spool_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the exim_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as exim log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++- Set files with the ctdbd_spool_t type, if you want to store the ctdbd files under the /var/spool directory.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B exim_spool_t
++.B ctdbd_tmp_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the exim_spool_t type, if you want to store the exim files under the /var/spool directory.
++- Set files with the ctdbd_tmp_t type, if you want to store ctdbd temporary files in the /tmp directories.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B exim_tmp_t
++.B ctdbd_var_lib_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the exim_tmp_t type, if you want to store exim temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++- Set files with the ctdbd_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the ctdbd files under the /var/lib directory.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B exim_var_run_t
++.B ctdbd_var_run_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the exim_var_run_t type, if you want to store the exim files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the ctdbd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the ctdbd files under the /run directory.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.SH PORT TYPES
++SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
++
++.B semanage port -l
++
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux exim policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their exim processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for exim:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
++SELinux ctdbd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ctdbd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following port types are defined for ctdbd:
+
+.EX
-+.B exim_t
++.TP 5
++.B ctdb_port_t
++.TP 10
++.EE
++
++
++Default Defined Ports:
++tcp 4379
+.EE
++udp 4379
++.EE
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type ctdbd_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B ctdbd_log_t
++
++ /var/log/log\.ctdb
++.br
++
++.br
++.B ctdbd_spool_t
++
++ /var/spool/ctdb(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B ctdbd_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B ctdbd_var_lib_t
++
++ /etc/ctdb(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/ctdb(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/ctdbd(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/ctdbd(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B ctdbd_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/ctdbd(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B samba_var_t
++
++ /var/lib/samba(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/cache/samba(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/spool/samba(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B systemd_passwd_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/systemd/ask-password(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/systemd/ask-password-block(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the ctdbd_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the ctdbd_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -15473,145 +17214,154 @@ index 0000000..4d6add4
+.B semanage module
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
-+.B semanage boolean
-+can also be used to manipulate the booleans
++.B semanage port
++can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), exim(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-+, setsebool(8)
-\ No newline at end of file
-diff --git a/man/man8/fail2ban_selinux.8 b/man/man8/fail2ban_selinux.8
++selinux(8), ctdbd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/cups_pdf_selinux.8 b/man/man8/cups_pdf_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..c627231
+index 0000000..da4a09b
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/fail2ban_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,139 @@
-+.TH "fail2ban_selinux" "8" "fail2ban" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "fail2ban SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/cups_pdf_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,151 @@
++.TH "cups_pdf_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "cups_pdf" "SELinux Policy documentation for cups_pdf"
+.SH "NAME"
-+fail2ban_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the fail2ban processes
++cups_pdf_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the cups_pdf processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the fail2ban processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the cups_pdf processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The cups_pdf processes execute with the cups_pdf_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the fail2ban_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep cups_pdf_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The cups_pdf_t SELinux type can be entered via the "cups_pdf_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the cups_pdf_t domain are the following:"
+
++/usr/lib/cups/backend/cups-pdf
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the fail2ban_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux cups_pdf policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their cups_pdf processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for cups_pdf:
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B cups_pdf_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux fail2ban policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their fail2ban processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for fail2ban:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux cups_pdf policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their cups_pdf processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for cups_pdf:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B fail2ban_client_exec_t
++.B cups_pdf_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the fail2ban_client_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the fail2ban_client_t domain.
++- Set files with the cups_pdf_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the cups_pdf_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B fail2ban_exec_t
++.B cups_pdf_tmp_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the fail2ban_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the fail2ban_t domain.
++- Set files with the cups_pdf_tmp_t type, if you want to store cups pdf temporary files in the /tmp directories.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/bin/fail2ban-server, /usr/bin/fail2ban
+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B fail2ban_initrc_exec_t
-+.EE
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
+
-+- Set files with the fail2ban_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the fail2ban_initrc_t domain.
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
++The SELinux process type cups_pdf_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B fail2ban_log_t
-+.EE
++.br
++.B anon_inodefs_t
+
-+- Set files with the fail2ban_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as fail2ban log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
+
++.br
++.B cups_pdf_tmp_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B fail2ban_tmp_t
-+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the fail2ban_tmp_t type, if you want to store fail2ban temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++.br
++.B cupsd_log_t
+
++ /var/log/cups(/.*)?
++.br
++ /usr/Brother/fax/.*\.log.*
++.br
++ /var/log/turboprint.*
++.br
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B fail2ban_var_lib_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the fail2ban_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the fail2ban files under the /var/lib directory.
++.br
++.B print_spool_t
+
++ /var/spool/lpd(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/spool/cups(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/spool/cups-pdf(/.*)?
++.br
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B fail2ban_var_run_t
-+.EE
++.br
++.B user_home_t
+
-+- Set files with the fail2ban_var_run_t type, if you want to store the fail2ban files under the /run directory.
++ /home/[^/]*/.+
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/.+
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/.+
++.br
+
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the cups_pdf_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux fail2ban policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their fail2ban processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for fail2ban:
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the cups_pdf_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B fail2ban_client_t, fail2ban_t
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -15624,244 +17374,208 @@ index 0000000..c627231
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), fail2ban(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/fcoemon_selinux.8 b/man/man8/fcoemon_selinux.8
++selinux(8), cups_pdf(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, cupsd_selinux(8), cupsd_config_selinux(8), cupsd_lpd_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/cupsd_config_selinux.8 b/man/man8/cupsd_config_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..2fa85bd
+index 0000000..a3e48d3
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/fcoemon_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
-+.TH "fcoemon_selinux" "8" "fcoemon" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "fcoemon SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/cupsd_config_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,207 @@
++.TH "cupsd_config_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "cupsd_config" "SELinux Policy documentation for cupsd_config"
+.SH "NAME"
-+fcoemon_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the fcoemon processes
++cupsd_config_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the cupsd_config processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the fcoemon processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
-+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
-+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux fcoemon policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their fcoemon processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for fcoemon:
-+
-+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B fcoemon_exec_t
-+.EE
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the cupsd_config processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+- Set files with the fcoemon_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the fcoemon_t domain.
++The cupsd_config processes execute with the cupsd_config_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B fcoemon_var_run_t
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep cupsd_config_t
+
-+- Set files with the fcoemon_var_run_t type, if you want to store the fcoemon files under the /run directory.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/run/fcm(/.*)?, /var/run/fcoemon\.pid
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
-+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
++The cupsd_config_t SELinux type can be entered via the "cupsd_config_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the cupsd_config_t domain are the following:"
+
++/usr/sbin/hal_lpadmin, /usr/libexec/hal_lpadmin, /usr/bin/cups-config-daemon, /usr/sbin/printconf-backend, /lib/udev/udev-configure-printer, /usr/lib/udev/udev-configure-printer, /usr/libexec/cups-pk-helper-mechanism
+.SH PROCESS TYPES
+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux fcoemon policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their fcoemon processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for fcoemon:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux cupsd_config policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their cupsd_config processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for cupsd_config:
+
+.EX
-+.B fcoemon_t
++.B cupsd_config_t
+.EE
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
-+.SH "COMMANDS"
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
-+.B semanage permissive
-+can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+.B semanage module
-+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
-+
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux cupsd_config policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their cupsd_config processes in as secure a method as possible.
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
-+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
-+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
-+
-+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), fcoemon(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/fenced_selinux.8 b/man/man8/fenced_selinux.8
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..91c14a1
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/fenced_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,157 @@
-+.TH "fenced_selinux" "8" "fenced" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "fenced SELinux Policy documentation"
-+.SH "NAME"
-+fenced_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the fenced processes
-+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++The following file types are defined for cupsd_config:
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the fenced processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
-+
-+.SH BOOLEANS
-+SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. fenced policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run fenced with the tightest access possible.
-+
-+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow fenced domain to execute ssh, you must turn on the fenced_can_ssh boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P fenced_can_ssh 1
-+.EE
-+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow fenced domain to connect to the network using TCP, you must turn on the fenced_can_network_connect boolean.
-+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P fenced_can_network_connect 1
++.B cupsd_config_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++- Set files with the cupsd_config_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the cupsd_config_t domain.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the fenced_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.PP
++.B cupsd_config_var_run_t
+.EE
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the fenced_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++- Set files with the cupsd_config_var_run_t type, if you want to store the cupsd config files under the /run directory.
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
-+.EE
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux fenced policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their fenced processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for fenced:
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
+
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B fenced_exec_t
-+.EE
++The SELinux process type cupsd_config_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
-+- Set files with the fenced_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the fenced_t domain.
++.br
++.B cupsd_config_var_run_t
+
++ /var/run/udev-configure-printer(/.*)?
+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/sbin/fence_tool, /usr/sbin/fence_node, /usr/sbin/fenced
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B fenced_lock_t
-+.EE
++.br
++.B cupsd_etc_t
+
-+- Set files with the fenced_lock_t type, if you want to treat the files as fenced lock data, stored under the /var/lock directory
++ /etc/cups(/.*)?
++.br
++ /usr/share/cups(/.*)?
++.br
+
++.br
++.B cupsd_log_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B fenced_tmp_t
-+.EE
++ /var/log/cups(/.*)?
++.br
++ /usr/Brother/fax/.*\.log.*
++.br
++ /var/log/turboprint.*
++.br
+
-+- Set files with the fenced_tmp_t type, if you want to store fenced temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++.br
++.B cupsd_rw_etc_t
+
++ /etc/printcap.*
++.br
++ /etc/cups/ppd(/.*)?
++.br
++ /usr/Brother/(.*/)?inf(/.*)?
++.br
++ /usr/Printer/(.*/)?inf(/.*)?
++.br
++ /usr/lib/bjlib(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/iscan(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/cache/cups(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/cups/certs/.*
++.br
++ /etc/opt/Brother/(.*/)?inf(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/cups/lpoptions.*
++.br
++ /var/cache/foomatic(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/cups/cupsd\.conf.*
++.br
++ /var/lib/cups/certs/.*
++.br
++ /opt/gutenprint/ppds(/.*)?
++.br
++ /opt/brother/Printers(.*/)?inf(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/cups/classes\.conf.*
++.br
++ /etc/cups/printers\.conf.*
++.br
++ /etc/cups/subscriptions.*
++.br
++ /usr/local/linuxprinter/ppd(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/cache/alchemist/printconf.*
++.br
++ /etc/alchemist/namespace/printconf(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/cups/certs
++.br
++ /etc/cups/ppds\.dat
++.br
++ /var/lib/cups/certs
++.br
++ /usr/share/foomatic/db/oldprinterids
++.br
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B fenced_tmpfs_t
-+.EE
++.br
++.B cupsd_tmp_t
+
-+- Set files with the fenced_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store fenced files on a tmpfs file system.
+
++.br
++.B user_tmp_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B fenced_var_log_t
-+.EE
++ /var/run/user(/.*)?
++.br
++ /tmp/gconfd-.*
++.br
++ /tmp/gconfd-dwalsh
++.br
++ /tmp/gconfd-xguest
++.br
+
-+- Set files with the fenced_var_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as fenced var log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the cupsd_config_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B fenced_var_run_t
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the fenced_var_run_t type, if you want to store the fenced files under the /run directory.
-+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/run/cluster/fenced_override, /var/run/cluster/fence_scsi.*, /var/run/fenced\.pid
-+
-+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
-+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux fenced policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their fenced processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for fenced:
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the cupsd_config_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B fenced_t
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -15873,115 +17587,131 @@ index 0000000..91c14a1
+.B semanage module
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
-+.B semanage boolean
-+can also be used to manipulate the booleans
-+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), fenced(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-+, setsebool(8)
++selinux(8), cupsd_config(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, cupsd_selinux(8), cupsd_selinux(8), cupsd_lpd_selinux(8)
\ No newline at end of file
-diff --git a/man/man8/fetchmail_selinux.8 b/man/man8/fetchmail_selinux.8
+diff --git a/man/man8/cupsd_lpd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/cupsd_lpd_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..c5b118c
+index 0000000..73ded99
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/fetchmail_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
-+.TH "fetchmail_selinux" "8" "fetchmail" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "fetchmail SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/cupsd_lpd_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,129 @@
++.TH "cupsd_lpd_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "cupsd_lpd" "SELinux Policy documentation for cupsd_lpd"
+.SH "NAME"
-+fetchmail_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the fetchmail processes
++cupsd_lpd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the cupsd_lpd processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the fetchmail processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the cupsd_lpd processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The cupsd_lpd processes execute with the cupsd_lpd_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux fetchmail policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their fetchmail processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for fetchmail:
++For example:
+
++.B ps -eZ | grep cupsd_lpd_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B fetchmail_etc_t
-+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the fetchmail_etc_t type, if you want to store fetchmail files in the /etc directories.
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
++The cupsd_lpd_t SELinux type can be entered via the "cupsd_lpd_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the cupsd_lpd_t domain are the following:"
+
-+.EX
++/usr/lib/cups/daemon/cups-lpd
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+.B fetchmail_exec_t
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux cupsd_lpd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their cupsd_lpd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for cupsd_lpd:
++
++.EX
++.B cupsd_lpd_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
-+- Set files with the fetchmail_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the fetchmail_t domain.
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux cupsd_lpd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their cupsd_lpd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for cupsd_lpd:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B fetchmail_home_t
++.B cupsd_lpd_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the fetchmail_home_t type, if you want to store fetchmail files in the users home directory.
++- Set files with the cupsd_lpd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the cupsd_lpd_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B fetchmail_uidl_cache_t
++.B cupsd_lpd_tmp_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the fetchmail_uidl_cache_t type, if you want to store the files under the /var/cache directory.
++- Set files with the cupsd_lpd_tmp_t type, if you want to store cupsd lpd temporary files in the /tmp directories.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/lib/fetchmail(/.*)?, /var/mail/\.fetchmail-UIDL-cache
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B fetchmail_var_run_t
++.B cupsd_lpd_var_run_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the fetchmail_var_run_t type, if you want to store the fetchmail files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the cupsd_lpd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the cupsd lpd files under the /run directory.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type cupsd_lpd_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B cupsd_lpd_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B cupsd_lpd_var_run_t
++
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux fetchmail policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their fetchmail processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for fetchmail:
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the cupsd_lpd_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B fetchmail_t
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
++
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the cupsd_lpd_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -15994,379 +17724,388 @@ index 0000000..c5b118c
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), fetchmail(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/fingerd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/fingerd_selinux.8
++selinux(8), cupsd_lpd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, cupsd_selinux(8), cupsd_selinux(8), cupsd_config_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/cupsd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/cupsd_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..a2d9656
+index 0000000..89d22a6
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/fingerd_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,141 @@
-+.TH "fingerd_selinux" "8" "fingerd" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "fingerd SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/cupsd_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,387 @@
++.TH "cupsd_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "cupsd" "SELinux Policy documentation for cupsd"
+.SH "NAME"
-+fingerd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the fingerd processes
++cupsd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the cupsd processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the fingerd processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the cupsd processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The cupsd processes execute with the cupsd_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the fingerd_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep cupsd_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
++The cupsd_t SELinux type can be entered via the "cupsd_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the cupsd_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/sbin/cupsd
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the fingerd_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux cupsd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their cupsd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for cupsd:
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B cupsd_t, cupsd_config_t, cupsd_lpd_t, cups_pdf_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux fingerd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their fingerd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for fingerd:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux cupsd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their cupsd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for cupsd:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B fingerd_etc_t
++.B cupsd_config_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the fingerd_etc_t type, if you want to store fingerd files in the /etc directories.
++- Set files with the cupsd_config_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the cupsd_config_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B fingerd_exec_t
++.B cupsd_config_var_run_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the fingerd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the fingerd_t domain.
++- Set files with the cupsd_config_var_run_t type, if you want to store the cupsd config files under the /run directory.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/etc/cron\.weekly/(c)?fingerd, /usr/sbin/[cef]fingerd, /usr/sbin/in\.fingerd
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B fingerd_log_t
++.B cupsd_etc_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the fingerd_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as fingerd log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++- Set files with the cupsd_etc_t type, if you want to store cupsd files in the /etc directories.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B fingerd_var_run_t
++.B cupsd_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the fingerd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the fingerd files under the /run directory.
-+
++- Set files with the cupsd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the cupsd_t domain.
+
-+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PORT TYPES
-+SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
++.EX
+.PP
-+You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
++.B cupsd_initrc_exec_t
++.EE
+
-+.B semanage port -l
++- Set files with the cupsd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the cupsd_initrc_t domain.
+
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
-+SELinux fingerd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their fingerd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following port types are defined for fingerd:
+
+.EX
-+.TP 5
-+.B fingerd_port_t
-+.TP 10
++.PP
++.B cupsd_interface_t
+.EE
+
++- Set files with the cupsd_interface_t type, if you want to treat the files as cupsd interface data.
+
-+Default Defined Ports:
-+tcp 79
-+.EE
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux fingerd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their fingerd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for fingerd:
+
+.EX
-+.B fingerd_t
-+.EE
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++.B cupsd_lock_t
++.EE
+
-+.SH "COMMANDS"
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
-+.PP
-+.B semanage permissive
-+can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
-+.PP
-+.B semanage module
-+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++- Set files with the cupsd_lock_t type, if you want to treat the files as cupsd lock data, stored under the /var/lock directory
+
-+.B semanage port
-+can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
+
++.EX
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
-+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
-+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
-+
-+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), fingerd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/firewalld_selinux.8 b/man/man8/firewalld_selinux.8
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..e15374d
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/firewalld_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
-+.TH "firewalld_selinux" "8" "firewalld" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "firewalld SELinux Policy documentation"
-+.SH "NAME"
-+firewalld_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the firewalld processes
-+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
-+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the firewalld processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++.B cupsd_log_t
++.EE
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++- Set files with the cupsd_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as cupsd log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the firewallgui_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
-+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the firewallgui_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
-+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B cupsd_lpd_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux firewalld policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their firewalld processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for firewalld:
++- Set files with the cupsd_lpd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the cupsd_lpd_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B firewalld_etc_rw_t
++.B cupsd_lpd_tmp_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the firewalld_etc_rw_t type, if you want to treat the files as firewalld etc read/write content.
++- Set files with the cupsd_lpd_tmp_t type, if you want to store cupsd lpd temporary files in the /tmp directories.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B firewalld_exec_t
++.B cupsd_lpd_var_run_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the firewalld_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the firewalld_t domain.
++- Set files with the cupsd_lpd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the cupsd lpd files under the /run directory.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B firewalld_initrc_exec_t
++.B cupsd_rw_etc_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the firewalld_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the firewalld_initrc_t domain.
++- Set files with the cupsd_rw_etc_t type, if you want to store cupsd rw files in the /etc directories.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B firewalld_unit_file_t
++.B cupsd_tmp_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the firewalld_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as firewalld unit content.
++- Set files with the cupsd_tmp_t type, if you want to store cupsd temporary files in the /tmp directories.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B firewalld_var_log_t
++.B cupsd_unit_file_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the firewalld_var_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as firewalld var log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++- Set files with the cupsd_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as cupsd unit content.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B firewalld_var_run_t
++.B cupsd_var_run_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the firewalld_var_run_t type, if you want to store the firewalld files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the cupsd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the cupsd files under the /run directory.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/run/firewalld\.pid, /var/run/firewalld(/.*)?
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux firewalld policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their firewalld processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for firewalld:
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+.EX
-+.B firewallgui_t, firewalld_t
-+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++The SELinux process type cupsd_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
-+.SH "COMMANDS"
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
-+.PP
-+.B semanage permissive
-+can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
-+.PP
-+.B semanage module
-+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++.br
++.B cupsd_interface_t
+
-+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
-+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++ /etc/cups/interfaces(/.*)?
++.br
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.br
++.B cupsd_lock_t
+
-+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), firewalld(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/firewallgui_selinux.8 b/man/man8/firewallgui_selinux.8
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..38b6b12
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/firewallgui_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
-+.TH "firewallgui_selinux" "8" "firewallgui" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "firewallgui SELinux Policy documentation"
-+.SH "NAME"
-+firewallgui_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the firewallgui processes
-+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the firewallgui processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++.br
++.B cupsd_log_t
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++ /var/log/cups(/.*)?
++.br
++ /usr/Brother/fax/.*\.log.*
++.br
++ /var/log/turboprint.*
++.br
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the firewallgui_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++.br
++.B cupsd_rw_etc_t
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
++ /etc/printcap.*
++.br
++ /etc/cups/ppd(/.*)?
++.br
++ /usr/Brother/(.*/)?inf(/.*)?
++.br
++ /usr/Printer/(.*/)?inf(/.*)?
++.br
++ /usr/lib/bjlib(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/iscan(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/cache/cups(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/cups/certs/.*
++.br
++ /etc/opt/Brother/(.*/)?inf(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/cups/lpoptions.*
++.br
++ /var/cache/foomatic(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/cups/cupsd\.conf.*
++.br
++ /var/lib/cups/certs/.*
++.br
++ /opt/gutenprint/ppds(/.*)?
++.br
++ /opt/brother/Printers(.*/)?inf(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/cups/classes\.conf.*
++.br
++ /etc/cups/printers\.conf.*
++.br
++ /etc/cups/subscriptions.*
++.br
++ /usr/local/linuxprinter/ppd(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/cache/alchemist/printconf.*
++.br
++ /etc/alchemist/namespace/printconf(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/cups/certs
++.br
++ /etc/cups/ppds\.dat
++.br
++ /var/lib/cups/certs
++.br
++ /usr/share/foomatic/db/oldprinterids
++.br
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the firewallgui_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++.br
++.B cupsd_tmp_t
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
-+.EE
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux firewallgui policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their firewallgui processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for firewallgui:
++.br
++.B cupsd_var_run_t
+
++ /var/ccpd(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/ekpd(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/cups(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/turboprint(/.*)?
++.br
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B firewallgui_exec_t
-+.EE
++.br
++.B faillog_t
+
-+- Set files with the firewallgui_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the firewallgui_t domain.
++ /var/log/btmp.*
++.br
++ /var/run/faillock(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/log/faillog
++.br
++ /var/log/tallylog
++.br
+
++.br
++.B krb5_host_rcache_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B firewallgui_tmp_t
-+.EE
++ /var/cache/krb5rcache(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/tmp/nfs_0
++.br
++ /var/tmp/DNS_25
++.br
++ /var/tmp/host_0
++.br
++ /var/tmp/imap_0
++.br
++ /var/tmp/HTTP_23
++.br
++ /var/tmp/HTTP_48
++.br
++ /var/tmp/ldap_55
++.br
++ /var/tmp/ldap_487
++.br
++ /var/tmp/ldapmap1_0
++.br
+
-+- Set files with the firewallgui_tmp_t type, if you want to store firewallgui temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++.br
++.B pcscd_var_run_t
+
++ /var/run/pcscd(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/pcscd\.events(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/pcscd\.pid
++.br
++ /var/run/pcscd\.pub
++.br
++ /var/run/pcscd\.comm
++.br
+
-+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
++.br
++.B print_spool_t
++
++ /var/spool/lpd(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/spool/cups(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/spool/cups-pdf(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B samba_var_t
++
++ /var/lib/samba(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/cache/samba(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/spool/samba(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B security_t
++
++ /selinux
++.br
++
++.br
++.B usbfs_t
++
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux firewallgui policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their firewallgui processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for firewallgui:
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the cups_pdf_t, cupsd_config_t, cupsd_lpd_t, cupsd_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B firewallgui_t
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
++
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the cups_pdf_t, cupsd_config_t, cupsd_lpd_t, cupsd_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -16379,289 +18118,231 @@ index 0000000..38b6b12
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), firewallgui(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/firstboot_selinux.8 b/man/man8/firstboot_selinux.8
++selinux(8), cupsd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, cups_pdf_selinux(8), cupsd_config_selinux(8), cupsd_lpd_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/cvs_selinux.8 b/man/man8/cvs_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..264d99f
+index 0000000..c477853
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/firstboot_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
-+.TH "firstboot_selinux" "8" "firstboot" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "firstboot SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/cvs_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,236 @@
++.TH "cvs_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "cvs" "SELinux Policy documentation for cvs"
+.SH "NAME"
-+firstboot_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the firstboot processes
++cvs_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the cvs processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the firstboot processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
-+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
-+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux firstboot policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their firstboot processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for firstboot:
-+
-+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B firstboot_etc_t
-+.EE
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the cvs processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+- Set files with the firstboot_etc_t type, if you want to store firstboot files in the /etc directories.
++The cvs processes execute with the cvs_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B firstboot_exec_t
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep cvs_t
+
-+- Set files with the firstboot_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the firstboot_t domain.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/share/firstboot/firstboot\.py, /usr/sbin/firstboot
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
-+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
++The cvs_t SELinux type can be entered via the "cvs_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the cvs_t domain are the following:"
+
++/usr/bin/cvs
+.SH PROCESS TYPES
+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux firstboot policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their firstboot processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for firstboot:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux cvs policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their cvs processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for cvs:
+
+.EX
-+.B firstboot_t
++.B cvs_t
+.EE
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
-+.SH "COMMANDS"
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
-+.PP
-+.B semanage permissive
-+can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
-+.PP
-+.B semanage module
-+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++.SH BOOLEANS
++SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. cvs policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run cvs with the tightest access possible.
+
-+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
-+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.PP
++If you want to allow cvs daemon to read shadow, you must turn on the cvs_read_shadow boolean.
+
-+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), firstboot(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/foghorn_selinux.8 b/man/man8/foghorn_selinux.8
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..8b3fea3
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/foghorn_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
-+.TH "foghorn_selinux" "8" "foghorn" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "foghorn SELinux Policy documentation"
-+.SH "NAME"
-+foghorn_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the foghorn processes
-+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P cvs_read_shadow 1
++.EE
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the foghorn processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++.PP
++If you want to allow cvs daemon to read shadow, you must turn on the cvs_read_shadow boolean.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P cvs_read_shadow 1
++.EE
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux foghorn policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their foghorn processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for foghorn:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux cvs policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their cvs processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for cvs:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B foghorn_exec_t
++.B cvs_data_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the foghorn_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the foghorn_t domain.
++- Set files with the cvs_data_t type, if you want to treat the files as cvs content.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B foghorn_tmpfs_t
++.B cvs_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the foghorn_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store foghorn files on a tmpfs file system.
++- Set files with the cvs_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the cvs_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B foghorn_var_log_t
++.B cvs_initrc_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the foghorn_var_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as foghorn var log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++- Set files with the cvs_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the cvs_initrc_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B foghorn_var_run_t
++.B cvs_keytab_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the foghorn_var_run_t type, if you want to store the foghorn files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the cvs_keytab_t type, if you want to treat the files as kerberos keytab files.
+
+
++.EX
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
++.B cvs_tmp_t
++.EE
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux foghorn policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their foghorn processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for foghorn:
++- Set files with the cvs_tmp_t type, if you want to store cvs temporary files in the /tmp directories.
+
-+.EX
-+.B foghorn_t
-+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
-+.SH "COMMANDS"
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
-+.PP
-+.B semanage permissive
-+can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.EX
+.PP
-+.B semanage module
-+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++.B cvs_var_run_t
++.EE
+
-+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
-+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++- Set files with the cvs_var_run_t type, if you want to store the cvs files under the /run directory.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
+
-+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), foghorn(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/fprintd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/fprintd_selinux.8
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..182329d
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/fprintd_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
-+.TH "fprintd_selinux" "8" "fprintd" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "fprintd SELinux Policy documentation"
-+.SH "NAME"
-+fprintd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the fprintd processes
-+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the fprintd processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++.SH PORT TYPES
++SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
++.PP
++You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++.B semanage port -l
+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the fprintd_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
++SELinux cvs policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their cvs processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following port types are defined for cvs:
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.TP 5
++.B cvs_port_t
++.TP 10
+.EE
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the fprintd_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++Default Defined Ports:
++tcp 2401
++.EE
++udp 2401
+.EE
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux fprintd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their fprintd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for fprintd:
++The SELinux process type cvs_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
++.br
++.B cvs_data_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B fprintd_exec_t
-+.EE
++ /opt/cvs(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/cvs(/.*)?
++.br
+
-+- Set files with the fprintd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the fprintd_t domain.
++.br
++.B cvs_tmp_t
+
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B fprintd_var_lib_t
-+.EE
++.br
++.B cvs_var_run_t
+
-+- Set files with the fprintd_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the fprintd files under the /var/lib directory.
+
++.br
++.B faillog_t
+
-+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
++ /var/log/btmp.*
++.br
++ /var/run/faillock(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/log/faillog
++.br
++ /var/log/tallylog
++.br
++
++.br
++.B pcscd_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/pcscd(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/pcscd\.events(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/pcscd\.pid
++.br
++ /var/run/pcscd\.pub
++.br
++ /var/run/pcscd\.comm
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux fprintd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their fprintd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for fprintd:
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the cvs_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B fprintd_t
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
++
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the cvs_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -16673,100 +18354,160 @@ index 0000000..182329d
+.B semanage module
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
++.B semanage port
++can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
++
++.B semanage boolean
++can also be used to manipulate the booleans
++
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), fprintd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/freshclam_selinux.8 b/man/man8/freshclam_selinux.8
++selinux(8), cvs(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, setsebool(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/cyphesis_selinux.8 b/man/man8/cyphesis_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..53bd4b3
+index 0000000..247c016
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/freshclam_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
-+.TH "freshclam_selinux" "8" "freshclam" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "freshclam SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/cyphesis_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,154 @@
++.TH "cyphesis_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "cyphesis" "SELinux Policy documentation for cyphesis"
+.SH "NAME"
-+freshclam_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the freshclam processes
++cyphesis_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the cyphesis processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the freshclam processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the cyphesis processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The cyphesis processes execute with the cyphesis_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the freshclam_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep cyphesis_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The cyphesis_t SELinux type can be entered via the "cyphesis_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the cyphesis_t domain are the following:"
+
++/usr/bin/cyphesis
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the freshclam_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux cyphesis policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their cyphesis processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for cyphesis:
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B cyphesis_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux freshclam policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their freshclam processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for freshclam:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux cyphesis policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their cyphesis processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for cyphesis:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B freshclam_exec_t
++.B cyphesis_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the freshclam_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the freshclam_t domain.
++- Set files with the cyphesis_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the cyphesis_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B freshclam_var_log_t
++.B cyphesis_log_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the freshclam_var_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as freshclam var log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++- Set files with the cyphesis_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as cyphesis log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B cyphesis_tmp_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the cyphesis_tmp_t type, if you want to store cyphesis temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B cyphesis_var_run_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the cyphesis_var_run_t type, if you want to store the cyphesis files under the /run directory.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/log/clamav/freshclam.*, /var/log/freshclam.*
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.SH PORT TYPES
++SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
++
++.B semanage port -l
++
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux freshclam policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their freshclam processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for freshclam:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
++SELinux cyphesis policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their cyphesis processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following port types are defined for cyphesis:
+
+.EX
-+.B freshclam_t
++.TP 5
++.B cyphesis_port_t
++.TP 10
+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++
++Default Defined Ports:
++tcp 6767,6769,6780-6799
++.EE
++udp 32771
++.EE
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type cyphesis_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B cyphesis_log_t
++
++ /var/log/cyphesis(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B cyphesis_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/cyphesis(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -16778,585 +18519,563 @@ index 0000000..53bd4b3
+.B semanage module
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
++.B semanage port
++can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
++
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), freshclam(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/fsadm_selinux.8 b/man/man8/fsadm_selinux.8
++selinux(8), cyphesis(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/cyrus_selinux.8 b/man/man8/cyrus_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..52c7f19
+index 0000000..96f6359
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/fsadm_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,93 @@
-+.TH "fsadm_selinux" "8" "fsadm" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "fsadm SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/cyrus_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,170 @@
++.TH "cyrus_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "cyrus" "SELinux Policy documentation for cyrus"
+.SH "NAME"
-+fsadm_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the fsadm processes
++cyrus_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the cyrus processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the fsadm processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
-+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
-+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux fsadm policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their fsadm processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for fsadm:
-+
-+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B fsadm_exec_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the fsadm_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the fsadm_t domain.
-+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/sbin/partx, /usr/sbin/fdisk, /sbin/mkfs.*, /sbin/blockdev, /usr/sbin/sfdisk, /sbin/dumpe2fs, /sbin/mkdosfs, /usr/sbin/mke2fs, /sbin/mke2fs, /sbin/e4fsck, /usr/sbin/dosfsck, /usr/sbin/blockdev, /sbin/dosfsck, /usr/sbin/lsraid, /usr/bin/partition_uuid, /sbin/raidautorun, /usr/sbin/findfs, /usr/sbin/scsi_info, /sbin/resize.*fs, /usr/sbin/raidstart, /sbin/mkreiserfs, /sbin/sfdisk, /usr/sbin/raidautorun, /usr/sbin/make_reiser4, /usr/sbin/partx, /usr/sbin/resize.*fs, /usr/sbin/fsck.*, /usr/sbin/dumpe2fs, /sbin/tune2fs, /usr/sbin/mkdosfs, /sbin/blkid, /usr/sbin/hdparm, /sbin/make_reiser4, /sbin/dump, /sbin/swapon.*, /usr/sbin/jfs_.*, /usr/bin/scsi_unique_id, /sbin/findfs, /usr/sbin/smartctl, /usr/bin/syslinux, /usr/sbin/blkid, /sbin/losetup.*, /usr/sbin/tune2fs, /usr/lib/systemd/systemd-fsck, /sbin/parted, /sbin/partprobe, /usr/sbin/mkfs.*, /sbin/e2label, /usr/sbin/reiserfs(ck|tune), /sbin/mkraid, /sbin/install-mbr, /sbin/scsi_info, /sbin/fsck.*, /usr/sbin/install-mbr, /usr/sbin/
clubufflush, /sbin/jfs_.*, /usr/sbin/mke4fs, /sbin/raidstart, /sbin/lsraid, /usr/sbin/losetup.*, /usr/sbin/mkreiserfs, /usr/sbin/swapon.*, /usr/sbin/e2fsck, /sbin/reiserfs(ck|tune), /usr/sbin/e4fsck, /usr/sbin/dump, /usr/sbin/partprobe, /sbin/fdisk, /sbin/e2fsck, /usr/sbin/e2label, /usr/sbin/parted, /usr/bin/raw, /sbin/mke4fs, /usr/sbin/cfdisk, /sbin/cfdisk, /usr/sbin/mkraid, /sbin/hdparm
-+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B fsadm_log_t
-+.EE
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the cyrus processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+- Set files with the fsadm_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as fsadm log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++The cyrus processes execute with the cyrus_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B fsadm_tmp_t
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep cyrus_t
+
-+- Set files with the fsadm_tmp_t type, if you want to store fsadm temporary files in the /tmp directories.
+
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
-+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
++The cyrus_t SELinux type can be entered via the "cyrus_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the cyrus_t domain are the following:"
+
++/usr/lib/cyrus/master, /usr/lib/cyrus-imapd/cyrus-master
+.SH PROCESS TYPES
+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux fsadm policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their fsadm processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for fsadm:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux cyrus policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their cyrus processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for cyrus:
+
+.EX
-+.B fsadm_t
++.B cyrus_t
+.EE
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
-+.SH "COMMANDS"
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
-+.B semanage permissive
-+can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+.B semanage module
-+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
-+
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux cyrus policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their cyrus processes in as secure a method as possible.
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
-+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++The following file types are defined for cyrus:
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
+
-+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), fsadm(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/fsdaemon_selinux.8 b/man/man8/fsdaemon_selinux.8
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..ba27b25
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/fsdaemon_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
-+.TH "fsdaemon_selinux" "8" "fsdaemon" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "fsdaemon SELinux Policy documentation"
-+.SH "NAME"
-+fsdaemon_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the fsdaemon processes
-+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++.EX
++.PP
++.B cyrus_exec_t
++.EE
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the fsdaemon processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++- Set files with the cyrus_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the cyrus_t domain.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.EX
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux fsdaemon policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their fsdaemon processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for fsdaemon:
++.B cyrus_initrc_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the cyrus_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the cyrus_initrc_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B fsdaemon_exec_t
++.B cyrus_keytab_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the fsdaemon_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the fsdaemon_t domain.
++- Set files with the cyrus_keytab_t type, if you want to treat the files as kerberos keytab files.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B fsdaemon_initrc_exec_t
++.B cyrus_tmp_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the fsdaemon_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the fsdaemon_initrc_t domain.
++- Set files with the cyrus_tmp_t type, if you want to store cyrus temporary files in the /tmp directories.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B fsdaemon_tmp_t
++.B cyrus_var_lib_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the fsdaemon_tmp_t type, if you want to store fsdaemon temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++- Set files with the cyrus_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the cyrus files under the /var/lib directory.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B fsdaemon_var_run_t
++.B cyrus_var_run_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the fsdaemon_var_run_t type, if you want to store the fsdaemon files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the cyrus_var_run_t type, if you want to store the cyrus files under the /run directory.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux fsdaemon policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their fsdaemon processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for fsdaemon:
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+.EX
-+.B fsdaemon_t
-+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++The SELinux process type cyrus_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
-+.SH "COMMANDS"
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
-+.PP
-+.B semanage permissive
-+can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.br
++.B cyrus_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B cyrus_var_lib_t
++
++ /var/imap(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/imap(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B cyrus_var_run_t
++
++
++.br
++.B mail_spool_t
++
++ /var/mail(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/spool/imap(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/spool/mail(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the cyrus_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the cyrus_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
+.PP
+.B semanage module
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), fsdaemon(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/ftpd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/ftpd_selinux.8
-index 5bebd82..fd2036b 100644
---- a/man/man8/ftpd_selinux.8
-+++ b/man/man8/ftpd_selinux.8
-@@ -1,65 +1,346 @@
--.TH "ftpd_selinux" "8" "17 Jan 2005" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "ftpd SELinux policy documentation"
-+.TH "ftpd_selinux" "8" "ftpd" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "ftpd SELinux Policy documentation"
- .SH "NAME"
--.PP
--ftpd_selinux \- Security-Enhanced Linux policy for ftp daemons.
-+ftpd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the ftpd processes
- .SH "DESCRIPTION"
++selinux(8), cyrus(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/dbadm_selinux.8 b/man/man8/dbadm_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..db93ad7
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/dbadm_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,225 @@
++.TH "dbadm_selinux" "8" "dbadm" "mgrepl at redhat.com" "dbadm SELinux Policy documentation"
++.SH "NAME"
++dbadm_r \- \fBDatabase administrator role\fP - Security Enhanced Linux Policy
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the ftpd processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++.SH DESCRIPTION
+
-+.SH BOOLEANS
-+SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. ftpd policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run ftpd with the tightest access possible.
++SELinux supports Roles Based Access Control (RBAC), some Linux roles are login roles, while other roles need to be transition into.
+
++.I Note:
++Examples in this man page will use the
++.B staff_u
++SELinux user.
+
- .PP
--Security-Enhanced Linux provides security for ftp daemons via flexible mandatory access control.
--.SH FILE_CONTEXTS
-+If you want to allow ftp to read and write files in the user home directories, you must turn on the ftp_home_dir boolean.
++Non login roles are usually used for administrative tasks. For example, tasks that require root privileges. Roles control which types a user can run processes with. Roles often have default types assigned to them.
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P ftp_home_dir 1
-+.EE
++The default type for the dbadm_r role is dbadm_t.
+
- .PP
--SELinux requires files to have a file type. File types may be specified with semanage and are restored with restorecon. Policy governs the access that daemons have to files.
--.TP
--Allow ftp servers to read the /var/ftp directory by adding the public_content_t file type to the directory and by restoring the file type.
-+If you want to allow ftp servers to use cifs used for public file transfer services, you must turn on the ftpd_use_cifs boolean.
++The
++.B newrole
++program to transition directly to this role.
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P ftpd_use_cifs 1
-+.EE
++.B newrole -r dbadm_r -t dbadm_t
+
- .PP
--.B
--semanage fcontext -a -t public_content_t "/var/ftp(/.*)?"
--.TP
--.B
--restorecon -F -R -v /var/ftp
--.TP
--Allow ftp servers to read and write /var/tmp/incoming by adding the public_content_rw_t type to the directory and by restoring the file type. This also requires the allow_ftpd_anon_write boolean to be set.
-+If you want to allow internal-sftp to read and write files in the user ssh home directories, you must turn on the sftpd_write_ssh_home boolean.
++.B sudo
++is the preferred method to do transition from one role to another. You setup sudo to transition to dbadm_r by adding a similar line to the /etc/sudoers file.
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P sftpd_write_ssh_home 1
-+.EE
++USERNAME ALL=(ALL) ROLE=dbadm_r TYPE=dbadm_t COMMAND
+
- .PP
--.B
--semanage fcontext -a -t public_content_rw_t "/var/ftp/incoming(/.*)?"
--.TP
--.B
--restorecon -F -R -v /var/ftp/incoming
-+If you want to allow ftp servers to connect to mysql database ports, you must turn on the ftpd_connect_db boolean.
++.br
++sudo will run COMMAND as staff_u:dbadm_r:dbadm_t:LEVEL
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P ftpd_connect_db 1
-+.EE
-
--.SH BOOLEANS
- .PP
--SELinux policy is based on least privilege required and may also be customizable by setting a boolean with setsebool.
--.TP
--Allow ftp servers to read and write files with the public_content_rw_t file type.
-+If you want to allow ftp servers to login to local users and read/write all files on the system, governed by DAC, you must turn on the ftpd_full_access boolean.
++When using a a non login role, you need to setup SELinux so that your SELinux user can reach dbadm_r role.
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P ftpd_full_access 1
-+.EE
++Execute the following to see all of the assigned SELinux roles:
+
- .PP
--.B
--setsebool -P allow_ftpd_anon_write on
--.TP
--Allow ftp servers to read or write files in the user home directories.
-+If you want to allow sftp-internal to read and write files in the user home directories, you must turn on the sftpd_enable_homedirs boolean.
++.B semanage user -l
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P sftpd_enable_homedirs 1
-+.EE
++You need to add dbadm_r to the staff_u user. You could setup the staff_u user to be able to use the dbadm_r role with a command like:
+
- .PP
--.B
--setsebool -P ftp_home_dir on
--.TP
--Allow ftp servers to read or write all files on the system.
-+If you want to allow httpd to act as a FTP client connecting to the ftp port and ephemeral ports, you must turn on the httpd_can_connect_ftp boolean.
++.B $ semanage user -m -R 'staff_r system_r dbadm_r' staff_u
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P httpd_can_connect_ftp 1
-+.EE
+
- .PP
--.B
--setsebool -P allow_ftpd_full_access on
-+If you want to allow ftp servers to use bind to all unreserved ports for passive mode, you must turn on the ftpd_use_passive_mode boolean.
++.SH BOOLEANS
++SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. dbadm policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run dbadm with the tightest access possible.
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P ftpd_use_passive_mode 1
-+.EE
+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow ftp servers to use nfs used for public file transfer services, you must turn on the ftpd_use_nfs boolean.
++If you want to allow database admins to execute DML statement, you must turn on the postgresql_selinux_unconfined_dbadm boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P ftpd_use_nfs 1
++.B setsebool -P postgresql_selinux_unconfined_dbadm 1
+.EE
+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow sftp-internal to login to local users and read/write all files on the system, governed by DAC, you must turn on the sftpd_full_access boolean.
++If you want to allow dbadm to manage files in users home directories, you must turn on the dbadm_manage_user_files boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P sftpd_full_access 1
++.B setsebool -P dbadm_manage_user_files 1
+.EE
+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow ftp servers to connect to all ports > 1023, you must turn on the ftpd_connect_all_unreserved boolean.
++If you want to allow dbadm to read files in users home directories, you must turn on the dbadm_read_user_files boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P ftpd_connect_all_unreserved 1
++.B setsebool -P dbadm_read_user_files 1
+.EE
+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow httpd to act as a FTP server by listening on the ftp port, you must turn on the httpd_enable_ftp_server boolean.
++If you want to allow database admins to execute DML statement, you must turn on the postgresql_selinux_unconfined_dbadm boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P httpd_enable_ftp_server 1
++.B setsebool -P postgresql_selinux_unconfined_dbadm 1
+.EE
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
-+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the ftpd_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++If you want to allow dbadm to manage files in users home directories, you must turn on the dbadm_manage_user_files boolean.
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.B setsebool -P dbadm_manage_user_files 1
+.EE
+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the ftpd_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++If you want to allow dbadm to read files in users home directories, you must turn on the dbadm_read_user_files boolean.
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B setsebool -P dbadm_read_user_files 1
+.EE
+
-+.SH SHARING FILES
-+If you want to share files with multiple domains (Apache, FTP, rsync, Samba), you can set a file context of public_content_t and public_content_rw_t. These context allow any of the above domains to read the content. If you want a particular domain to write to the public_content_rw_t domain, you must set the appropriate boolean.
- .TP
--Allow ftp servers to use cifs for public file transfer services.
-+Allow ftpd servers to read the /var/ftpd directory by adding the public_content_t file type to the directory and by restoring the file type.
- .PP
- .B
--setsebool -P allow_ftpd_use_cifs on
-+semanage fcontext -a -t public_content_t "/var/ftpd(/.*)?"
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type dbadm_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
+.br
-+.B restorecon -F -R -v /var/ftpd
-+.pp
- .TP
--Allow ftp servers to use nfs for public file transfer services.
-+Allow ftpd servers to read and write /var/tmp/incoming by adding the public_content_rw_t type to the directory and by restoring the file type. This also requires the allow_ftpdd_anon_write boolean to be set.
- .PP
- .B
--setsebool -P allow_ftpd_use_nfs on
--.TP
--system-config-selinux is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
--.SH AUTHOR
-+semanage fcontext -a -t public_content_rw_t "/var/ftpd/incoming(/.*)?"
++.B mysqld_db_t
++
++ /var/lib/mysql(/.*)?
+.br
-+.B restorecon -F -R -v /var/ftpd/incoming
+
++.br
++.B mysqld_etc_t
+
- .PP
--This manual page was written by Dan Walsh <dwalsh at redhat.com>.
-+If you want to allow tftp to modify public files used for public file transfer services., you must turn on the tftp_anon_write boolean.
-
--.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P tftp_anon_write 1
-+.EE
++ /etc/mysql(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/my\.cnf
++.br
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow ftp servers to upload files, used for public file transfer services. Directories must be labeled public_content_rw_t., you must turn on the ftpd_anon_write boolean.
++.br
++.B mysqld_home_t
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P ftpd_anon_write 1
-+.EE
++ /root/\.my\.cnf
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.my\.cnf
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.my\.cnf
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.my\.cnf
++.br
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow anon internal-sftp to upload files, used for public file transfer services. Directories must be labeled public_content_rw_t., you must turn on the sftpd_anon_write boolean.
++.br
++.B mysqld_log_t
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P sftpd_anon_write 1
-+.EE
++ /var/log/mysql.*
++.br
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux ftpd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ftpd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for ftpd:
++.br
++.B mysqld_tmp_t
+
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B ftpd_etc_t
-+.EE
++.br
++.B mysqld_unit_file_t
+
-+- Set files with the ftpd_etc_t type, if you want to store ftpd files in the /etc directories.
++ /usr/lib/systemd/system/mysqld.*
++.br
+
++.br
++.B mysqld_var_run_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B ftpd_exec_t
-+.EE
++ /var/run/mysqld(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/mysql/mysql\.sock
++.br
+
-+- Set files with the ftpd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ftpd_t domain.
++.br
++.B postgresql_db_t
+
++ /var/lib/pgsql(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/sepgsql(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/postgres(ql)?(/.*)?
++.br
++ /usr/share/jonas/pgsql(/.*)?
++.br
++ /usr/lib/pgsql/test/regress(/.*)?
+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/sbin/ftpwho, /etc/cron\.monthly/proftpd, /usr/sbin/in\.ftpd, /usr/sbin/proftpd, /usr/kerberos/sbin/ftpd, /usr/sbin/muddleftpd, /usr/sbin/vsftpd
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B ftpd_initrc_exec_t
-+.EE
++.br
++.B postgresql_etc_t
+
-+- Set files with the ftpd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ftpd_initrc_t domain.
++ /etc/postgresql(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/sysconfig/pgsql(/.*)?
++.br
+
+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/etc/rc\.d/init\.d/proftpd, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/vsftpd
++.B postgresql_log_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B ftpd_keytab_t
-+.EE
++ /var/lib/pgsql/.*\.log
++.br
++ /var/log/rhdb/rhdb(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/log/postgresql(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/log/postgres\.log.*
++.br
++ /var/lib/pgsql/logfile(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/log/sepostgresql\.log.*
++.br
++ /var/lib/sepgsql/pgstartup\.log
++.br
+
-+- Set files with the ftpd_keytab_t type, if you want to treat the files as kerberos keytab files.
++.br
++.B postgresql_tmp_t
+
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B ftpd_lock_t
-+.EE
++.br
++.B postgresql_var_run_t
+
-+- Set files with the ftpd_lock_t type, if you want to treat the files as ftpd lock data, stored under the /var/lock directory
++ /var/run/postgresql(/.*)?
++.br
+
++.br
++.B systemd_passwd_var_run_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B ftpd_tmp_t
-+.EE
++ /var/run/systemd/ask-password(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/systemd/ask-password-block(/.*)?
++.br
+
-+- Set files with the ftpd_tmp_t type, if you want to store ftpd temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
++.B semanage boolean
++can also be used to manipulate the booleans
+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B ftpd_tmpfs_t
-+.EE
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+- Set files with the ftpd_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store ftpd files on a tmpfs file system.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), dbadm(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, setsebool(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/dbskkd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/dbskkd_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..be5dff8
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/dbskkd_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,154 @@
++.TH "dbskkd_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "dbskkd" "SELinux Policy documentation for dbskkd"
++.SH "NAME"
++dbskkd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the dbskkd processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the dbskkd processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.EX
++The dbskkd processes execute with the dbskkd_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep dbskkd_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The dbskkd_t SELinux type can be entered via the "dbskkd_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the dbskkd_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/sbin/dbskkd-cdb
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux dbskkd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their dbskkd processes in as secure a method as possible.
+.PP
-+.B ftpd_unit_file_t
++The following process types are defined for dbskkd:
++
++.EX
++.B dbskkd_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
-+- Set files with the ftpd_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as ftpd unit content.
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux dbskkd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their dbskkd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for dbskkd:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B ftpd_var_run_t
++.B dbskkd_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the ftpd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the ftpd files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the dbskkd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the dbskkd_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B ftpdctl_exec_t
++.B dbskkd_tmp_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the ftpdctl_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ftpdctl_t domain.
++- Set files with the dbskkd_tmp_t type, if you want to store dbskkd temporary files in the /tmp directories.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B ftpdctl_tmp_t
++.B dbskkd_var_run_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the ftpdctl_tmp_t type, if you want to store ftpdctl temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++- Set files with the dbskkd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the dbskkd files under the /run directory.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
+.SH PORT TYPES
-+SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
- .PP
-+You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
++SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
++.PP
++You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
+
+.B semanage port -l
+
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
-+SELinux ftpd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ftpd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following port types are defined for ftpd:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
++SELinux dbskkd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their dbskkd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following port types are defined for dbskkd:
+
+.EX
+.TP 5
-+.B ftp_data_port_t
++.B dbskkd_port_t
+.TP 10
+.EE
+
+
+Default Defined Ports:
-+tcp 20
-+.EE
-
--selinux(8), ftpd(8), setsebool(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8)
-+.EX
-+.TP 5
-+.B ftp_port_t
-+.TP 10
++tcp 1178
+.EE
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
++The SELinux process type dbskkd_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B dbskkd_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B dbskkd_var_run_t
++
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
-+Default Defined Ports:
-+tcp 21,990
-+.EE
-+udp 990
-+.EE
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux ftpd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ftpd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for ftpd:
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the dbskkd_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B ftpd_t, ftpdctl_t
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
++
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the dbskkd_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -17371,87 +19090,147 @@ index 5bebd82..fd2036b 100644
+.B semanage port
+can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
+
-+.B semanage boolean
-+can also be used to manipulate the booleans
-+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), ftpd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-+, setsebool(8)
-\ No newline at end of file
-diff --git a/man/man8/ftpdctl_selinux.8 b/man/man8/ftpdctl_selinux.8
++selinux(8), dbskkd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/dcc_client_selinux.8 b/man/man8/dcc_client_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..de1008c
+index 0000000..bba5677
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/ftpdctl_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
-+.TH "ftpdctl_selinux" "8" "ftpdctl" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "ftpdctl SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/dcc_client_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,147 @@
++.TH "dcc_client_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "dcc_client" "SELinux Policy documentation for dcc_client"
+.SH "NAME"
-+ftpdctl_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the ftpdctl processes
++dcc_client_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the dcc_client processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the ftpdctl processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the dcc_client processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The dcc_client processes execute with the dcc_client_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep dcc_client_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The dcc_client_t SELinux type can be entered via the "dcc_client_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the dcc_client_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/bin/dccproc
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux dcc_client policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their dcc_client processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for dcc_client:
++
++.EX
++.B dcc_client_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux ftpdctl policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ftpdctl processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for ftpdctl:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux dcc_client policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their dcc_client processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for dcc_client:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B ftpdctl_exec_t
++.B dcc_client_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the ftpdctl_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ftpdctl_t domain.
++- Set files with the dcc_client_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the dcc_client_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B ftpdctl_tmp_t
++.B dcc_client_map_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the ftpdctl_tmp_t type, if you want to store ftpdctl temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++- Set files with the dcc_client_map_t type, if you want to treat the files as dcc client map data.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B dcc_client_tmp_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the dcc_client_tmp_t type, if you want to store dcc client temporary files in the /tmp directories.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type dcc_client_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B dcc_client_map_t
++
++ /etc/dcc/map
++.br
++ /var/dcc/map
++.br
++ /var/lib/dcc/map
++.br
++ /var/run/dcc/map
++.br
++
++.br
++.B dcc_client_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B dcc_var_t
++
++ /etc/dcc(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/dcc(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/dcc(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux ftpdctl policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ftpdctl processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for ftpdctl:
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the dcc_client_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B ftpdctl_t
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
++
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the dcc_client_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -17464,113 +19243,140 @@ index 0000000..de1008c
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), ftpdctl(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/games_selinux.8 b/man/man8/games_selinux.8
++selinux(8), dcc_client(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, dcc_dbclean_selinux(8), dccd_selinux(8), dccifd_selinux(8), dccm_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/dcc_dbclean_selinux.8 b/man/man8/dcc_dbclean_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..30f96ce
+index 0000000..e4168aa
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/games_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
-+.TH "games_selinux" "8" "games" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "games SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/dcc_dbclean_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,139 @@
++.TH "dcc_dbclean_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "dcc_dbclean" "SELinux Policy documentation for dcc_dbclean"
+.SH "NAME"
-+games_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the games processes
++dcc_dbclean_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the dcc_dbclean processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the games processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the dcc_dbclean processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The dcc_dbclean processes execute with the dcc_dbclean_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux games policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their games processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for games:
++For example:
+
++.B ps -eZ | grep dcc_dbclean_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B games_data_t
-+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the games_data_t type, if you want to treat the files as games content.
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/games(/.*)?, /var/lib/games(/.*)?
++The dcc_dbclean_t SELinux type can be entered via the "dcc_dbclean_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the dcc_dbclean_t domain are the following:"
+
-+.EX
++/usr/libexec/dcc/dbclean
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+.B games_exec_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the games_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the games_t domain.
-+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/bin/sol, /usr/bin/blackjack, /usr/bin/micq, /usr/bin/gnotski, /usr/bin/kshisen, /usr/bin/klickety, /usr/bin/lskat, /usr/bin/atlantik, /usr/bin/ksame, /usr/bin/kgoldrunner, /usr/bin/lskatproc, /usr/bin/gataxx, /usr/bin/katomic, /usr/bin/Maelstrom, /usr/bin/ksmiletris, /usr/bin/gnotravex, /usr/bin/ksirtet, /usr/bin/kbattleship, /usr/bin/ktuberling, /usr/bin/kenolaba, /usr/bin/kmahjongg, /usr/bin/ksnake, /usr/games/.*, /usr/bin/gnobots2, /usr/bin/civserver.*, /usr/bin/civclient.*, /usr/bin/kbounce, /usr/bin/kwin4, /usr/bin/ktron, /usr/bin/mahjongg, /usr/bin/kbackgammon, /usr/bin/kblackbox, /usr/bin/kjumpingcube, /usr/bin/gnomine, /usr/bin/gnect, /usr/bin/same-gnome, /usr/bin/kasteroids, /usr/bin/ksokoban, /usr/bin/kolf, /usr/bin/konquest, /usr/bin/kreversi, /usr/bin/kpoker, /usr/lib/games(/.*)?, /usr/bin/glines, /usr/bin/kfouleggs, /usr/bin/kmines, /usr/bin/gnibbles, /usr/bin/kspaceduel, /usr/bin/kpat, /usr/bin/iagno, /usr/bin/gtali, /usr/bin/klines, /usr/bin/kwin4proc, /
usr/bin/gnome-stones
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux dcc_dbclean policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their dcc_dbclean processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for dcc_dbclean:
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B games_srv_var_run_t
++.B dcc_dbclean_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
-+- Set files with the games_srv_var_run_t type, if you want to store the games srv files under the /run directory.
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux dcc_dbclean policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their dcc_dbclean processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for dcc_dbclean:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B games_tmp_t
++.B dcc_dbclean_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the games_tmp_t type, if you want to store games temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++- Set files with the dcc_dbclean_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the dcc_dbclean_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B games_tmpfs_t
++.B dcc_dbclean_tmp_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the games_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store games files on a tmpfs file system.
++- Set files with the dcc_dbclean_tmp_t type, if you want to store dcc dbclean temporary files in the /tmp directories.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux games policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their games processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for games:
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+.EX
-+.B games_t, games_srv_t
-+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++The SELinux process type dcc_dbclean_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B dcc_client_map_t
++
++ /etc/dcc/map
++.br
++ /var/dcc/map
++.br
++ /var/lib/dcc/map
++.br
++ /var/run/dcc/map
++.br
++
++.br
++.B dcc_dbclean_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B dcc_var_t
++
++ /etc/dcc(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/dcc(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/dcc(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the dcc_dbclean_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the dcc_dbclean_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -17583,81 +19389,188 @@ index 0000000..30f96ce
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), games(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/gconfd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/gconfd_selinux.8
++selinux(8), dcc_dbclean(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, dcc_client_selinux(8), dccd_selinux(8), dccifd_selinux(8), dccm_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/dccd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/dccd_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..7162430
+index 0000000..ea14c8d
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/gconfd_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
-+.TH "gconfd_selinux" "8" "gconfd" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "gconfd SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/dccd_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,190 @@
++.TH "dccd_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "dccd" "SELinux Policy documentation for dccd"
+.SH "NAME"
-+gconfd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the gconfd processes
++dccd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the dccd processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the gconfd processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the dccd processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The dccd processes execute with the dccd_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep dccd_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The dccd_t SELinux type can be entered via the "dccd_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the dccd_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/libexec/dcc/dccd
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux dccd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their dccd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for dccd:
++
++.EX
++.B dccm_t, dcc_client_t, dcc_dbclean_t, dccifd_t, dccd_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux gconfd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their gconfd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for gconfd:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux dccd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their dccd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for dccd:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B gconfd_exec_t
++.B dccd_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the gconfd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the gconfd_t domain.
++- Set files with the dccd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the dccd_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B gconfdefaultsm_exec_t
++.B dccd_tmp_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the gconfdefaultsm_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the gconfdefaultsm_t domain.
++- Set files with the dccd_tmp_t type, if you want to store dccd temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B dccd_var_run_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the dccd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the dccd files under the /run directory.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.SH PORT TYPES
++SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
++
++.B semanage port -l
++
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux gconfd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their gconfd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for gconfd:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
++SELinux dccd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their dccd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following port types are defined for dccd:
++
++.EX
++.TP 5
++.B dcc_port_t
++.TP 10
++.EE
++
++
++Default Defined Ports:
++udp 6276,6277
++.EE
++
++.EX
++.TP 5
++.B dccm_port_t
++.TP 10
++.EE
++
++
++Default Defined Ports:
++tcp 5679
++.EE
++udp 5679
++.EE
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type dccd_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B dcc_client_map_t
++
++ /etc/dcc/map
++.br
++ /var/dcc/map
++.br
++ /var/lib/dcc/map
++.br
++ /var/run/dcc/map
++.br
++
++.br
++.B dcc_var_t
++
++ /etc/dcc(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/dcc(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/dcc(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B dccd_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B dccd_var_run_t
++
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the dccifd_t, dccm_t, dcc_client_t, dcc_dbclean_t, dccd_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B gconfdefaultsm_t, gconfd_t
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
++
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the dccifd_t, dccm_t, dcc_client_t, dcc_dbclean_t, dccd_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -17669,74 +19582,160 @@ index 0000000..7162430
+.B semanage module
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
++.B semanage port
++can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
++
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), gconfd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/gconfdefaultsm_selinux.8 b/man/man8/gconfdefaultsm_selinux.8
++selinux(8), dccd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, dcc_client_selinux(8), dcc_dbclean_selinux(8), dccifd_selinux(8), dccm_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/dccifd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/dccifd_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..64fecad
+index 0000000..3c8baf4
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/gconfdefaultsm_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
-+.TH "gconfdefaultsm_selinux" "8" "gconfdefaultsm" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "gconfdefaultsm SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/dccifd_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,154 @@
++.TH "dccifd_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "dccifd" "SELinux Policy documentation for dccifd"
+.SH "NAME"
-+gconfdefaultsm_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the gconfdefaultsm processes
++dccifd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the dccifd processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the gconfdefaultsm processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the dccifd processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The dccifd processes execute with the dccifd_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep dccifd_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The dccifd_t SELinux type can be entered via the "dccifd_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the dccifd_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/libexec/dcc/dccifd
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux dccifd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their dccifd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for dccifd:
++
++.EX
++.B dccifd_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux gconfdefaultsm policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their gconfdefaultsm processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for gconfdefaultsm:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux dccifd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their dccifd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for dccifd:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B gconfdefaultsm_exec_t
++.B dccifd_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the gconfdefaultsm_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the gconfdefaultsm_t domain.
++- Set files with the dccifd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the dccifd_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B dccifd_tmp_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the dccifd_tmp_t type, if you want to store dccifd temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B dccifd_var_run_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the dccifd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the dccifd files under the /run directory.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type dccifd_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B dcc_client_map_t
++
++ /etc/dcc/map
++.br
++ /var/dcc/map
++.br
++ /var/lib/dcc/map
++.br
++ /var/run/dcc/map
++.br
++
++.br
++.B dcc_var_t
++
++ /etc/dcc(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/dcc(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/dcc(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B dccifd_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B dccifd_var_run_t
++
++ /etc/dcc/dccifd
++.br
++ /var/run/dcc/dccifd
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux gconfdefaultsm policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their gconfdefaultsm processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for gconfdefaultsm:
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the dccifd_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B gconfdefaultsm_t
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
++
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the dccifd_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -17749,139 +19748,175 @@ index 0000000..64fecad
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), gconfdefaultsm(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/getty_selinux.8 b/man/man8/getty_selinux.8
++selinux(8), dccifd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/dccm_selinux.8 b/man/man8/dccm_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..26e8219
+index 0000000..58a004a
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/getty_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,139 @@
-+.TH "getty_selinux" "8" "getty" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "getty SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/dccm_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,178 @@
++.TH "dccm_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "dccm" "SELinux Policy documentation for dccm"
+.SH "NAME"
-+getty_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the getty processes
++dccm_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the dccm processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the getty processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the dccm processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The dccm processes execute with the dccm_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the getty_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep dccm_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The dccm_t SELinux type can be entered via the "dccm_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the dccm_t domain are the following:"
+
++/usr/libexec/dcc/dccm
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the getty_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux dccm policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their dccm processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for dccm:
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B dccm_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux getty policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their getty processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for getty:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux dccm policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their dccm processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for dccm:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B getty_etc_t
++.B dccm_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the getty_etc_t type, if you want to store getty files in the /etc directories.
++- Set files with the dccm_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the dccm_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B getty_exec_t
++.B dccm_tmp_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the getty_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the getty_t domain.
++- Set files with the dccm_tmp_t type, if you want to store dccm temporary files in the /tmp directories.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/sbin/.*getty, /sbin/.*getty
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B getty_lock_t
++.B dccm_var_run_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the getty_lock_t type, if you want to treat the files as getty lock data, stored under the /var/lock directory
++- Set files with the dccm_var_run_t type, if you want to store the dccm files under the /run directory.
+
+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B getty_log_t
-+.EE
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
+
-+- Set files with the getty_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as getty log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++.SH PORT TYPES
++SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
++.PP
++You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/log/mgetty\.log.*, /var/log/vgetty\.log\..*
++.B semanage port -l
+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B getty_tmp_t
-+.EE
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
++SELinux dccm policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their dccm processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following port types are defined for dccm:
+
-+- Set files with the getty_tmp_t type, if you want to store getty temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++.EX
++.TP 5
++.B dccm_port_t
++.TP 10
++.EE
+
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B getty_var_run_t
++Default Defined Ports:
++tcp 5679
++.EE
++udp 5679
+.EE
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+- Set files with the getty_var_run_t type, if you want to store the getty files under the /run directory.
++The SELinux process type dccm_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/spool/voice(/.*)?, /var/spool/fax(/.*)?, /var/run/mgetty\.pid.*
++.B dcc_client_map_t
+
-+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
++ /etc/dcc/map
++.br
++ /var/dcc/map
++.br
++ /var/lib/dcc/map
++.br
++ /var/run/dcc/map
++.br
++
++.br
++.B dcc_var_t
++
++ /etc/dcc(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/dcc(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/dcc(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B dccm_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B dccm_var_run_t
++
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux getty policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their getty processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for getty:
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the dccm_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B getty_t
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
++
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the dccm_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -17893,98 +19928,128 @@ index 0000000..26e8219
+.B semanage module
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
++.B semanage port
++can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
++
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), getty(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/gfs_selinux.8 b/man/man8/gfs_selinux.8
++selinux(8), dccm(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/dcerpcd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/dcerpcd_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..5987bae
+index 0000000..857f141
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/gfs_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
-+.TH "gfs_selinux" "8" "gfs" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "gfs SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/dcerpcd_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,124 @@
++.TH "dcerpcd_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "dcerpcd" "SELinux Policy documentation for dcerpcd"
+.SH "NAME"
-+gfs_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the gfs processes
++dcerpcd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the dcerpcd processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the gfs processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the dcerpcd processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The dcerpcd processes execute with the dcerpcd_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep dcerpcd_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The dcerpcd_t SELinux type can be entered via the "dcerpcd_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the dcerpcd_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/sbin/dcerpcd
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux dcerpcd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their dcerpcd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for dcerpcd:
++
++.EX
++.B dcerpcd_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux gfs policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their gfs processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for gfs:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux dcerpcd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their dcerpcd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for dcerpcd:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B gfs_controld_exec_t
++.B dcerpcd_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the gfs_controld_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the gfs_controld_t domain.
++- Set files with the dcerpcd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the dcerpcd_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B gfs_controld_tmpfs_t
++.B dcerpcd_var_lib_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the gfs_controld_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store gfs controld files on a tmpfs file system.
++- Set files with the dcerpcd_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the dcerpcd files under the /var/lib directory.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B gfs_controld_var_log_t
++.B dcerpcd_var_run_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the gfs_controld_var_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as gfs controld var log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++- Set files with the dcerpcd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the dcerpcd files under the /run directory.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B gfs_controld_var_run_t
++.B dcerpcd_var_socket_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the gfs_controld_var_run_t type, if you want to store the gfs controld files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the dcerpcd_var_socket_t type, if you want to treat the files as dcerpcd var socket data.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux gfs policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their gfs processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for gfs:
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+.EX
-+.B gfs_controld_t
-+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++The SELinux process type dcerpcd_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B dcerpcd_var_lib_t
++
++ /var/lib/likewise-open/run/rpcdep.dat
++.br
++
++.br
++.B dcerpcd_var_run_t
++
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -17997,289 +20062,324 @@ index 0000000..5987bae
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), gfs(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/git_shell_selinux.8 b/man/man8/git_shell_selinux.8
++selinux(8), dcerpcd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/ddclient_selinux.8 b/man/man8/ddclient_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..6031c31
+index 0000000..43a6aa0
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/git_shell_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,183 @@
-+.TH "git_shell_selinux" "8" "git_shell" "mgrepl at redhat.com" "git_shell SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/ddclient_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,176 @@
++.TH "ddclient_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "ddclient" "SELinux Policy documentation for ddclient"
+.SH "NAME"
-+git_shell_u \- \fBgit_shell user role\fP - Security Enhanced Linux Policy
-+
-+.SH DESCRIPTION
-+
-+\fBgit_shell_u\fP is an SELinux User defined in the SELinux
-+policy. SELinux users have default roles, \fBgit_shell_r\fP. The
-+default role has a default type, \fBgit_shell_t\fP, associated with it.
-+
-+The SELinux user will usually login to a system with a context that looks like:
++ddclient_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the ddclient processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+.B git_shell_u:git_shell_r:git_shell_u:s0-s0:c0.c1023
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the ddclient processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+Linux users are automatically assigned an SELinux users at login.
-+Login programs use the SELinux User to assign initial context to the user's shell.
++The ddclient processes execute with the ddclient_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+SELinux policy uses the context to control the user's access.
++For example:
+
-+By default all users are assigned to the SELinux user via the \fB__default__\fP flag
++.B ps -eZ | grep ddclient_t
+
-+On Targeted policy systems the \fB__default__\fP user is assigned to the \fBunconfined_u\fP SELinux user.
+
-+You can list all Linux User to SELinux user mapping using:
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
-+.B semanage login -l
++The ddclient_t SELinux type can be entered via the "ddclient_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the ddclient_t domain are the following:"
+
-+If you wanted to change the default user mapping to use the git_shell_u user, you would execute:
++/usr/sbin/ddtcd, /usr/sbin/ddclient
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux ddclient policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ddclient processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for ddclient:
+
-+.B semanage login -m -s git_shell_u __default__
++.EX
++.B ddclient_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux ddclient policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ddclient processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for ddclient:
+
-+.SH USER DESCRIPTION
+
-+The SELinux user git_shell_u is defined in policy as a unprivileged user. SELinux prevents unprivileged users from doing administration tasks without transitioning to a different role.
++.EX
++.PP
++.B ddclient_etc_t
++.EE
+
-+.SH SUDO
++- Set files with the ddclient_etc_t type, if you want to store ddclient files in the /etc directories.
+
-+The SELinux type git_shell_t is not allowed to execute sudo.
+
-+.SH X WINDOWS LOGIN
++.EX
++.PP
++.B ddclient_exec_t
++.EE
+
-+The SELinux user git_shell_u is not able to X Windows login.
++- Set files with the ddclient_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ddclient_t domain.
+
-+.SH TERMINAL LOGIN
+
-+The SELinux user git_shell_u is not able to terminal login.
++.EX
++.PP
++.B ddclient_initrc_exec_t
++.EE
+
-+.SH NETWORK
++- Set files with the ddclient_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ddclient_initrc_t domain.
+
-+.TP
-+The SELinux user git_shell_u is able to connect to the following tcp ports.
+
-+.B dns_port_t: 53
++.EX
++.PP
++.B ddclient_log_t
++.EE
+
-+.B ocsp_port_t: 9080
++- Set files with the ddclient_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as ddclient log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
+
-+.B kerberos_port_t: 88,750,4444
+
-+.SH BOOLEANS
-+SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. git_shell_t policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run git_shell_t with the tightest access possible.
++.EX
++.PP
++.B ddclient_tmp_t
++.EE
+
++- Set files with the ddclient_tmp_t type, if you want to store ddclient temporary files in the /tmp directories.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to connect to the local mysql server, you must turn on the allow_user_mysql_connect boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P allow_user_mysql_connect 1
++.PP
++.B ddclient_var_lib_t
+.EE
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to control users use of ping and traceroute, you must turn on the user_ping boolean.
++- Set files with the ddclient_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the ddclient files under the /var/lib directory.
++
+
+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P user_ping 1
++.PP
++.B ddclient_var_run_t
+.EE
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow w to display everyone, you must turn on the user_ttyfile_stat boolean.
++- Set files with the ddclient_var_run_t type, if you want to store the ddclient files under the /run directory.
++
+
+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P user_ttyfile_stat 1
++.PP
++.B ddclient_var_t
+.EE
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow user music sharing, you must turn on the user_share_music boolean.
++- Set files with the ddclient_var_t type, if you want to store the ddcl files under the /var directory.
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P user_share_music 1
-+.EE
+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow regular users direct dri device access, you must turn on the user_direct_dri boolean.
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P user_direct_dri 1
-+.EE
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow user to r/w files on filesystems that do not have extended attributes (FAT, CDROM, FLOPPY), you must turn on the user_rw_noexattrfile boolean.
++The SELinux process type ddclient_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P user_rw_noexattrfile 1
-+.EE
-+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to run TCP servers (bind to ports and accept connection from the same domain and outside users) disabling this forces FTP passive mode and may change other protocols, you must turn on the user_tcp_server boolean.
-+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P user_tcp_server 1
-+.EE
-+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow regular users direct mouse access, you must turn on the user_direct_mouse boolean.
-+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P user_direct_mouse 1
-+.EE
-+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow user processes to change their priority, you must turn on the user_setrlimit boolean.
-+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P user_setrlimit 1
-+.EE
-+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to connect to PostgreSQL, you must turn on the allow_user_postgresql_connect boolean.
-+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P allow_user_postgresql_connect 1
-+.EE
-+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to read system messages, you must turn on the user_dmesg boolean.
-+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P user_dmesg 1
-+.EE
-+
-+.SH HOME_EXEC
-+
-+The SELinux user git_shell_u is able execute home content files.
-+
-+.SH TRANSITIONS
-+
-+Three things can happen when git_shell_t attempts to execute a program.
++.br
++.B ddclient_log_t
+
-+\fB1.\fP SELinux Policy can deny git_shell_t from executing the program.
++ /var/log/ddtcd\.log.*
++.br
+
-+.TP
++.br
++.B ddclient_tmp_t
+
-+\fB2.\fP SELinux Policy can allow git_shell_t to execute the program in the current user type.
+
-+Execute the following to see the types that the SELinux user git_shell_t can execute without transitioning:
++.br
++.B ddclient_var_lib_t
+
-+.B sesearch -A -s git_shell_t -c file -p execute_no_trans
++ /var/lib/ddt-client(/.*)?
++.br
+
-+.TP
++.br
++.B ddclient_var_run_t
+
-+\fB3.\fP SELinux can allow git_shell_t to execute the program and transition to a new type.
++ /var/run/ddtcd\.pid
++.br
++ /var/run/ddclient\.pid
++.br
+
-+Execute the following to see the types that the SELinux user git_shell_t can execute and transition:
++.br
++.B ddclient_var_t
+
-+.B $ sesearch -A -s git_shell_t -c process -p transition
++ /var/cache/ddclient(/.*)?
++.br
+
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
-+.B semanage login
-+can also be used to manipulate the Linux User to SELinux User mappings
-+
-+.B semanage user
-+can also be used to manipulate SELinux user definitions.
-+
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genuserman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), semanage(8).
-diff --git a/man/man8/gitosis_selinux.8 b/man/man8/gitosis_selinux.8
++selinux(8), ddclient(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/deltacloudd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/deltacloudd_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..f5ebde4
+index 0000000..c0b2b2f
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/gitosis_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
-+.TH "gitosis_selinux" "8" "gitosis" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "gitosis SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/deltacloudd_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,142 @@
++.TH "deltacloudd_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "deltacloudd" "SELinux Policy documentation for deltacloudd"
+.SH "NAME"
-+gitosis_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the gitosis processes
++deltacloudd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the deltacloudd processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the gitosis processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the deltacloudd processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH BOOLEANS
-+SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. gitosis policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run gitosis with the tightest access possible.
++The deltacloudd processes execute with the deltacloudd_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
+
++.B ps -eZ | grep deltacloudd_t
+
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The deltacloudd_t SELinux type can be entered via the "deltacloudd_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the deltacloudd_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/bin/deltacloudd
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow gitisis daemon to send mail, you must turn on the gitosis_can_sendmail boolean.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux deltacloudd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their deltacloudd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for deltacloudd:
+
+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P gitosis_can_sendmail 1
++.B deltacloudd_t
+.EE
-+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux gitosis policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their gitosis processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for gitosis:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux deltacloudd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their deltacloudd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for deltacloudd:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B gitosis_exec_t
++.B deltacloudd_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the gitosis_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the gitosis_t domain.
++- Set files with the deltacloudd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the deltacloudd_t domain.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/bin/gitosis-serve, /usr/bin/gl-auth-command
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B gitosis_var_lib_t
++.B deltacloudd_log_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the gitosis_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the gitosis files under the /var/lib directory.
++- Set files with the deltacloudd_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as deltacloudd log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B deltacloudd_tmp_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the deltacloudd_tmp_t type, if you want to store deltacloudd temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B deltacloudd_var_run_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the deltacloudd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the deltacloudd files under the /run directory.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/lib/gitolite(/.*)?, /var/lib/gitosis(/.*)?
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type deltacloudd_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B deltacloudd_log_t
++
++ /var/log/deltacloud-core(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B deltacloudd_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B deltacloudd_var_run_t
++
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux gitosis policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their gitosis processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for gitosis:
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the deltacloudd_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B gitosis_t
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
++
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the deltacloudd_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -18291,181 +20391,175 @@ index 0000000..f5ebde4
+.B semanage module
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
-+.B semanage boolean
-+can also be used to manipulate the booleans
-+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), gitosis(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-+, setsebool(8)
-\ No newline at end of file
-diff --git a/man/man8/glance_selinux.8 b/man/man8/glance_selinux.8
++selinux(8), deltacloudd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/denyhosts_selinux.8 b/man/man8/denyhosts_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..284b994
+index 0000000..ec75026
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/glance_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,178 @@
-+.TH "glance_selinux" "8" "glance" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "glance SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/denyhosts_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,174 @@
++.TH "denyhosts_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "denyhosts" "SELinux Policy documentation for denyhosts"
+.SH "NAME"
-+glance_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the glance processes
++denyhosts_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the denyhosts processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the glance processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the denyhosts processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The denyhosts processes execute with the denyhosts_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux glance policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their glance processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for glance:
++For example:
+
++.B ps -eZ | grep denyhosts_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B glance_api_exec_t
-+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the glance_api_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the glance_api_t domain.
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
++The denyhosts_t SELinux type can be entered via the "denyhosts_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the denyhosts_t domain are the following:"
+
-+.EX
++/usr/bin/denyhosts\.py
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+.B glance_api_initrc_exec_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the glance_api_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the glance_api_initrc_t domain.
-+
-+
-+.EX
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+.B glance_log_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the glance_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as glance log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
-+
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux denyhosts policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their denyhosts processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for denyhosts:
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B glance_registry_exec_t
++.B denyhosts_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
-+- Set files with the glance_registry_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the glance_registry_t domain.
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux denyhosts policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their denyhosts processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for denyhosts:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B glance_registry_initrc_exec_t
++.B denyhosts_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the glance_registry_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the glance_registry_initrc_t domain.
++- Set files with the denyhosts_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the denyhosts_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B glance_registry_tmp_t
++.B denyhosts_initrc_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the glance_registry_tmp_t type, if you want to store glance registry temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++- Set files with the denyhosts_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the denyhosts_initrc_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B glance_tmp_t
++.B denyhosts_var_lib_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the glance_tmp_t type, if you want to store glance temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++- Set files with the denyhosts_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the denyhosts files under the /var/lib directory.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B glance_var_lib_t
++.B denyhosts_var_lock_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the glance_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the glance files under the /var/lib directory.
++- Set files with the denyhosts_var_lock_t type, if you want to treat the files as denyhosts var lock data, stored under the /var/lock directory
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B glance_var_run_t
++.B denyhosts_var_log_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the glance_var_run_t type, if you want to store the glance files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the denyhosts_var_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as denyhosts var log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PORT TYPES
-+SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
-+.PP
-+You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+.B semanage port -l
++The SELinux process type denyhosts_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
-+SELinux glance policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their glance processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following port types are defined for glance:
++.br
++.B denyhosts_var_lib_t
+
-+.EX
-+.TP 5
-+.B glance_port_t
-+.TP 10
-+.EE
++ /var/lib/denyhosts(/.*)?
++.br
+
++.br
++.B denyhosts_var_lock_t
+
-+Default Defined Ports:
-+tcp 9292
-+.EE
-+udp 9292
-+.EE
++ /var/lock/subsys/denyhosts
++.br
+
-+.EX
-+.TP 5
-+.B glance_registry_port_t
-+.TP 10
-+.EE
++.br
++.B net_conf_t
+
++ /etc/ntpd?\.conf.*
++.br
++ /etc/hosts[^/]*
++.br
++ /etc/yp\.conf.*
++.br
++ /etc/denyhosts.*
++.br
++ /etc/hosts\.deny.*
++.br
++ /etc/resolv\.conf.*
++.br
++ /etc/ntp/step-tickers.*
++.br
++ /etc/sysconfig/networking(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/sysconfig/network-scripts(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/sysconfig/network-scripts/.*resolv\.conf
++.br
++ /etc/ethers
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
-+Default Defined Ports:
-+tcp 9191
-+.EE
-+udp 9191
-+.EE
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux glance policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their glance processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for glance:
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the denyhosts_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B glance_registry_t, glance_api_t
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
++
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the denyhosts_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -18477,155 +20571,113 @@ index 0000000..284b994
+.B semanage module
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
-+.B semanage port
-+can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
-+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), glance(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/glusterd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/glusterd_selinux.8
++selinux(8), denyhosts(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/depmod_selinux.8 b/man/man8/depmod_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..1255b93
+index 0000000..86e670e
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/glusterd_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,151 @@
-+.TH "glusterd_selinux" "8" "glusterd" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "glusterd SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/depmod_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,112 @@
++.TH "depmod_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "depmod" "SELinux Policy documentation for depmod"
+.SH "NAME"
-+glusterd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the glusterd processes
++depmod_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the depmod processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the glusterd processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the depmod processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The depmod processes execute with the depmod_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the glusterd_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep depmod_t
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the glusterd_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
-+.EE
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++The depmod_t SELinux type can be entered via the "depmod_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the depmod_t domain are the following:"
++
++/sbin/depmod.*, /usr/sbin/depmod.*
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux glusterd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their glusterd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for glusterd:
-+
-+
-+.EX
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux depmod policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their depmod processes in as secure a method as possible.
+.PP
-+.B glusterd_etc_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the glusterd_etc_t type, if you want to store glusterd files in the /etc directories.
-+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/etc/glusterfs(/.*)?, /etc/glusterd(/.*)?
++The following process types are defined for depmod:
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B glusterd_exec_t
++.B depmod_t
+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the glusterd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the glusterd_t domain.
-+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/opt/glusterfs/[^/]+/sbin/glusterfsd, /usr/sbin/glusterfsd
-+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B glusterd_initrc_exec_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the glusterd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the glusterd_initrc_t domain.
-+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/sbin/glusterd, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/glusterd
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
-+.EX
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
-+.B glusterd_log_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the glusterd_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as glusterd log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux depmod policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their depmod processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for depmod:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B glusterd_tmp_t
++.B depmod_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the glusterd_tmp_t type, if you want to store glusterd temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++- Set files with the depmod_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the depmod_t domain.
+
+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B glusterd_var_lib_t
-+.EE
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
+
-+- Set files with the glusterd_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the glusterd files under the /var/lib directory.
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
++The SELinux process type depmod_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B glusterd_var_run_t
-+.EE
++.br
++.B modules_dep_t
+
-+- Set files with the glusterd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the glusterd files under the /run directory.
++ /lib/modules/[^/]+/modules\..+
++.br
+
+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/run/glusterd\.pid, /var/run/glusterd(/.*)?
++.B rpm_script_tmp_t
+
-+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux glusterd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their glusterd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for glusterd:
++.br
++.B user_tmp_t
+
-+.EX
-+.B glusterd_t
-+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++ /var/run/user(/.*)?
++.br
++ /tmp/gconfd-.*
++.br
++ /tmp/gconfd-dwalsh
++.br
++ /tmp/gconfd-xguest
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -18638,91 +20690,162 @@ index 0000000..1255b93
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), glusterd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/gnomeclock_selinux.8 b/man/man8/gnomeclock_selinux.8
++selinux(8), depmod(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/devicekit_disk_selinux.8 b/man/man8/devicekit_disk_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..57d1458
+index 0000000..cbce236
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/gnomeclock_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
-+.TH "gnomeclock_selinux" "8" "gnomeclock" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "gnomeclock SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/devicekit_disk_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,163 @@
++.TH "devicekit_disk_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "devicekit_disk" "SELinux Policy documentation for devicekit_disk"
+.SH "NAME"
-+gnomeclock_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the gnomeclock processes
++devicekit_disk_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the devicekit_disk processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the gnomeclock processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the devicekit_disk processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The devicekit_disk processes execute with the devicekit_disk_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the gnomeclock_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep devicekit_disk_t
+
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The devicekit_disk_t SELinux type can be entered via the "devicekit_disk_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the devicekit_disk_t domain are the following:"
++
++/lib/udisks2/udisksd, /lib/udev/udisks-part-id, /usr/lib/udisks2/udisksd, /usr/libexec/udisks-daemon, /usr/lib/udev/udisks-part-id, /usr/lib/udisks/udisks-daemon, /usr/libexec/devkit-disks-daemon
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the gnomeclock_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux devicekit_disk policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their devicekit_disk processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for devicekit_disk:
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B devicekit_disk_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux gnomeclock policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their gnomeclock processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for gnomeclock:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux devicekit_disk policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their devicekit_disk processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for devicekit_disk:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B gnomeclock_exec_t
++.B devicekit_disk_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the gnomeclock_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the gnomeclock_t domain.
++- Set files with the devicekit_disk_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the devicekit_disk_t domain.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/libexec/gsd-datetime-mechanism, /usr/libexec/kde(3|4)/kcmdatetimehelper, /usr/libexec/gnome-clock-applet-mechanism
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type devicekit_disk_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B device_t
++
++ /dev/.*
++.br
++ /lib/udev/devices(/.*)?
++.br
++ /usr/lib/udev/devices(/.*)?
++.br
++ /dev
++.br
++ /etc/udev/devices
++.br
++ /var/named/chroot/dev
++.br
++ /var/spool/postfix/dev
++.br
++
++.br
++.B devicekit_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B devicekit_var_lib_t
++
++ /var/lib/udisks.*
++.br
++ /var/lib/upower(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/DeviceKit-.*
++.br
++
++.br
++.B devicekit_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/udisks.*
++.br
++ /var/run/devkit(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/upower(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/pm-utils(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/DeviceKit-disks(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B sysfs_t
++
++ /sys(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B virt_image_type
++
++ all virtual image files
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux gnomeclock policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their gnomeclock processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for gnomeclock:
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the devicekit_disk_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B gnomeclock_t
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
++
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the devicekit_disk_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -18735,266 +20858,368 @@ index 0000000..57d1458
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), gnomeclock(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/gnomesystemmm_selinux.8 b/man/man8/gnomesystemmm_selinux.8
++selinux(8), devicekit_disk(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, devicekit_selinux(8), devicekit_selinux(8), devicekit_power_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/devicekit_power_selinux.8 b/man/man8/devicekit_power_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..ef13ae9
+index 0000000..ef9c4c3
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/gnomesystemmm_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
-+.TH "gnomesystemmm_selinux" "8" "gnomesystemmm" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "gnomesystemmm SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/devicekit_power_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,193 @@
++.TH "devicekit_power_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "devicekit_power" "SELinux Policy documentation for devicekit_power"
+.SH "NAME"
-+gnomesystemmm_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the gnomesystemmm processes
++devicekit_power_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the devicekit_power processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the gnomesystemmm processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
-+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the devicekit_power processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux gnomesystemmm policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their gnomesystemmm processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for gnomesystemmm:
++The devicekit_power processes execute with the devicekit_power_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B gnomesystemmm_exec_t
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep devicekit_power_t
+
-+- Set files with the gnomesystemmm_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the gnomesystemmm_t domain.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/libexec/kde(3|4)/ksysguardprocesslist_helper, /usr/libexec/gnome-system-monitor-mechanism
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
-+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
++The devicekit_power_t SELinux type can be entered via the "devicekit_power_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the devicekit_power_t domain are the following:"
+
++/usr/libexec/upowerd, /usr/libexec/devkit-power-daemon
+.SH PROCESS TYPES
+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux gnomesystemmm policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their gnomesystemmm processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for gnomesystemmm:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux devicekit_power policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their devicekit_power processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for devicekit_power:
+
+.EX
-+.B gnomesystemmm_t
++.B devicekit_power_t
+.EE
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
-+.SH "COMMANDS"
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
-+.B semanage permissive
-+can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+.B semanage module
-+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux devicekit_power policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their devicekit_power processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for devicekit_power:
++
+
++.EX
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
-+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++.B devicekit_power_exec_t
++.EE
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++- Set files with the devicekit_power_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the devicekit_power_t domain.
+
-+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), gnomesystemmm(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/gpg_selinux.8 b/man/man8/gpg_selinux.8
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..0baaa29
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/gpg_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,187 @@
-+.TH "gpg_selinux" "8" "gpg" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "gpg SELinux Policy documentation"
-+.SH "NAME"
-+gpg_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the gpg processes
-+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the gpg processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH BOOLEANS
-+SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. gpg policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run gpg with the tightest access possible.
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
++The SELinux process type devicekit_power_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow usage of the gpg-agent --write-env-file option. This also allows gpg-agent to manage user files, you must turn on the gpg_agent_env_file boolean.
++.br
++.B config_home_t
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P gpg_agent_env_file 1
-+.EE
++ /root/\.kde(/.*)?
++.br
++ /root/\.xine(/.*)?
++.br
++ /root/\.config(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/user/[^/]*/dconf(/.*)?
++.br
++ /root/\.Xdefaults
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.kde(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.xine(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.config(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.Xdefaults
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.kde(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.xine(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.config(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.Xdefaults
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.kde(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.xine(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.config(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.Xdefaults
++.br
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow httpd to run gpg, you must turn on the httpd_use_gpg boolean.
++.br
++.B devicekit_tmp_t
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P httpd_use_gpg 1
-+.EE
++
++.br
++.B devicekit_var_lib_t
++
++ /var/lib/udisks.*
++.br
++ /var/lib/upower(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/DeviceKit-.*
++.br
++
++.br
++.B devicekit_var_log_t
++
++ /var/log/pm-suspend\.log.*
++.br
++ /var/log/pm-powersave\.log.*
++.br
++
++.br
++.B devicekit_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/udisks.*
++.br
++ /var/run/devkit(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/upower(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/pm-utils(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/DeviceKit-disks(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B sysfs_t
++
++ /sys(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B systemd_passwd_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/systemd/ask-password(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/systemd/ask-password-block(/.*)?
++.br
+
+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the gpg_t, gpg_helper_t, gpg_pinentry_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the devicekit_power_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the gpg_t, gpg_helper_t, gpg_pinentry_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the devicekit_power_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
+.EE
+
-+.SH SHARING FILES
-+If you want to share files with multiple domains (Apache, FTP, rsync, Samba), you can set a file context of public_content_t and public_content_rw_t. These context allow any of the above domains to read the content. If you want a particular domain to write to the public_content_rw_t domain, you must set the appropriate boolean.
-+.TP
-+Allow gpg servers to read the /var/gpg directory by adding the public_content_t file type to the directory and by restoring the file type.
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
+.PP
-+.B
-+semanage fcontext -a -t public_content_t "/var/gpg(/.*)?"
-+.br
-+.B restorecon -F -R -v /var/gpg
-+.pp
-+.TP
-+Allow gpg servers to read and write /var/tmp/incoming by adding the public_content_rw_t type to the directory and by restoring the file type. This also requires the allow_gpgd_anon_write boolean to be set.
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
+.PP
-+.B
-+semanage fcontext -a -t public_content_rw_t "/var/gpg/incoming(/.*)?"
-+.br
-+.B restorecon -F -R -v /var/gpg/incoming
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), devicekit_power(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, devicekit_selinux(8), devicekit_selinux(8), devicekit_disk_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/devicekit_selinux.8 b/man/man8/devicekit_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..94f8331
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/devicekit_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,167 @@
++.TH "devicekit_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "devicekit" "SELinux Policy documentation for devicekit"
++.SH "NAME"
++devicekit_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the devicekit processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the devicekit processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The devicekit processes execute with the devicekit_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep devicekit_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
++The devicekit_t SELinux type can be entered via the "devicekit_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the devicekit_t domain are the following:"
+
++/usr/libexec/devkit-daemon
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow gpg web domain to modify public files used for public file transfer services., you must turn on the gpg_web_anon_write boolean.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux devicekit policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their devicekit processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for devicekit:
+
+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P gpg_web_anon_write 1
++.B devicekit_power_t, devicekit_disk_t, devicekit_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux gpg policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their gpg processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for gpg:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux devicekit policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their devicekit processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for devicekit:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B gpg_agent_exec_t
++.B devicekit_disk_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the gpg_agent_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the gpg_agent_t domain.
++- Set files with the devicekit_disk_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the devicekit_disk_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B gpg_agent_tmp_t
++.B devicekit_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the gpg_agent_tmp_t type, if you want to store gpg agent temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++- Set files with the devicekit_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the devicekit_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B gpg_exec_t
++.B devicekit_power_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the gpg_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the gpg_t domain.
++- Set files with the devicekit_power_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the devicekit_power_t domain.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/bin/gpgsm, /usr/bin/gpg(2)?, /usr/bin/kgpg, /usr/lib/gnupg/.*
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B gpg_helper_exec_t
++.B devicekit_tmp_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the gpg_helper_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the gpg_helper_t domain.
++- Set files with the devicekit_tmp_t type, if you want to store devicekit temporary files in the /tmp directories.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B gpg_pinentry_tmp_t
++.B devicekit_var_lib_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the gpg_pinentry_tmp_t type, if you want to store gpg pinentry temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++- Set files with the devicekit_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the devicekit files under the /var/lib directory.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B gpg_pinentry_tmpfs_t
++.B devicekit_var_log_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the gpg_pinentry_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store gpg pinentry files on a tmpfs file system.
++- Set files with the devicekit_var_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as devicekit var log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B gpg_secret_t
++.B devicekit_var_run_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the gpg_secret_t type, if you want to treat the files as gpg se secret data.
++- Set files with the devicekit_var_run_t type, if you want to store the devicekit files under the /run directory.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type devicekit_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B devicekit_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/udisks.*
++.br
++ /var/run/devkit(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/upower(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/pm-utils(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/DeviceKit-disks(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux gpg policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their gpg processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for gpg:
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the devicekit_disk_t, devicekit_power_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B gpg_t, gpg_pinentry_t, gpg_helper_t, gpg_web_t, gpg_agent_t
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
++
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the devicekit_disk_t, devicekit_power_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -19006,115 +21231,252 @@ index 0000000..0baaa29
+.B semanage module
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
-+.B semanage boolean
-+can also be used to manipulate the booleans
-+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), gpg(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-+, setsebool(8)
++selinux(8), devicekit(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, devicekit_disk_selinux(8), devicekit_power_selinux(8)
\ No newline at end of file
-diff --git a/man/man8/gpm_selinux.8 b/man/man8/gpm_selinux.8
+diff --git a/man/man8/dhcpc_selinux.8 b/man/man8/dhcpc_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..a399e8a
+index 0000000..b0c446f
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/gpm_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
-+.TH "gpm_selinux" "8" "gpm" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "gpm SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/dhcpc_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,256 @@
++.TH "dhcpc_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "dhcpc" "SELinux Policy documentation for dhcpc"
+.SH "NAME"
-+gpm_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the gpm processes
++dhcpc_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the dhcpc processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the gpm processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the dhcpc processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The dhcpc processes execute with the dhcpc_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep dhcpc_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The dhcpc_t SELinux type can be entered via the "dhcpc_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the dhcpc_t domain are the following:"
++
++/sbin/dhclient.*, /usr/sbin/dhclient.*, /sbin/pump, /sbin/dhcdbd, /sbin/dhcpcd, /usr/sbin/pump, /usr/sbin/dhcdbd, /usr/sbin/dhcpcd
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux dhcpc policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their dhcpc processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for dhcpc:
++
++.EX
++.B dhcpc_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH BOOLEANS
++SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. dhcpc policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run dhcpc with the tightest access possible.
++
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow dhcpc client applications to execute iptables commands, you must turn on the dhcpc_exec_iptables boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P dhcpc_exec_iptables 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow dhcpc client applications to execute iptables commands, you must turn on the dhcpc_exec_iptables boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P dhcpc_exec_iptables 1
++.EE
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux gpm policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their gpm processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for gpm:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux dhcpc policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their dhcpc processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for dhcpc:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B gpm_conf_t
++.B dhcpc_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the gpm_conf_t type, if you want to treat the files as gpm configuration data, usually stored under the /etc directory.
++- Set files with the dhcpc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the dhcpc_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B gpm_exec_t
++.B dhcpc_helper_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the gpm_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the gpm_t domain.
++- Set files with the dhcpc_helper_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the dhcpc_helper_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B gpm_tmp_t
++.B dhcpc_state_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the gpm_tmp_t type, if you want to store gpm temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++- Set files with the dhcpc_state_t type, if you want to treat the files as dhcpc state data.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B gpm_var_run_t
++.B dhcpc_tmp_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the gpm_var_run_t type, if you want to store the gpm files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the dhcpc_tmp_t type, if you want to store dhcpc temporary files in the /tmp directories.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B gpmctl_t
++.B dhcpc_var_run_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the gpmctl_t type, if you want to treat the files as gpmctl data.
++- Set files with the dhcpc_var_run_t type, if you want to store the dhcpc files under the /run directory.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/dev/gpmctl, /dev/gpmdata
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.SH PORT TYPES
++SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
++
++.B semanage port -l
++
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux gpm policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their gpm processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for gpm:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
++SELinux dhcpc policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their dhcpc processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following port types are defined for dhcpc:
++
++.EX
++.TP 5
++.B dhcpc_port_t
++.TP 10
++.EE
++
++
++Default Defined Ports:
++tcp 68,546
++.EE
++udp 68,546
++.EE
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type dhcpc_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B dhcpc_state_t
++
++ /var/lib/dhcp3?/dhclient.*
++.br
++ /var/lib/dhcpcd(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/dhclient(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/wifiroamd(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B dhcpc_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B dhcpc_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/dhcpcd(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/dhclient.*
++.br
++
++.br
++.B initrc_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/utmp
++.br
++ /var/run/random-seed
++.br
++ /var/run/runlevel\.dir
++.br
++ /var/run/setmixer_flag
++.br
++
++.br
++.B net_conf_t
++
++ /etc/ntpd?\.conf.*
++.br
++ /etc/hosts[^/]*
++.br
++ /etc/yp\.conf.*
++.br
++ /etc/denyhosts.*
++.br
++ /etc/hosts\.deny.*
++.br
++ /etc/resolv\.conf.*
++.br
++ /etc/ntp/step-tickers.*
++.br
++ /etc/sysconfig/networking(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/sysconfig/network-scripts(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/sysconfig/network-scripts/.*resolv\.conf
++.br
++ /etc/ethers
++.br
++
++.br
++.B systemd_passwd_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/systemd/ask-password(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/systemd/ask-password-block(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the dhcpc_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B gpm_t
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
++
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the dhcpc_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -19126,139 +21488,241 @@ index 0000000..a399e8a
+.B semanage module
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
++.B semanage port
++can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
++
++.B semanage boolean
++can also be used to manipulate the booleans
++
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), gpm(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/gpsd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/gpsd_selinux.8
++selinux(8), dhcpc(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, setsebool(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/dhcpd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/dhcpd_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..b1feb7f
+index 0000000..73cc04d
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/gpsd_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,141 @@
-+.TH "gpsd_selinux" "8" "gpsd" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "gpsd SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/dhcpd_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,239 @@
++.TH "dhcpd_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "dhcpd" "SELinux Policy documentation for dhcpd"
+.SH "NAME"
-+gpsd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the gpsd processes
++dhcpd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the dhcpd processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the gpsd processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the dhcpd processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The dhcpd processes execute with the dhcpd_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep dhcpd_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The dhcpd_t SELinux type can be entered via the "dhcpd_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the dhcpd_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/sbin/dhcpd.*
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the gpsd_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux dhcpd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their dhcpd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for dhcpd:
++
++.EX
++.B dhcpc_t, dhcpd_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH BOOLEANS
++SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. dhcpd policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run dhcpd with the tightest access possible.
++
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow DHCP daemon to use LDAP backends, you must turn on the dhcpd_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.B setsebool -P dhcpd_use_ldap 1
+.EE
+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the gpsd_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++If you want to allow dhcpc client applications to execute iptables commands, you must turn on the dhcpc_exec_iptables boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P dhcpc_exec_iptables 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow DHCP daemon to use LDAP backends, you must turn on the dhcpd_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P dhcpd_use_ldap 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow dhcpc client applications to execute iptables commands, you must turn on the dhcpc_exec_iptables boolean.
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B setsebool -P dhcpc_exec_iptables 1
+.EE
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux gpsd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their gpsd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for gpsd:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux dhcpd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their dhcpd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for dhcpd:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B gpsd_exec_t
++.B dhcpd_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the gpsd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the gpsd_t domain.
++- Set files with the dhcpd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the dhcpd_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B gpsd_initrc_exec_t
++.B dhcpd_initrc_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the gpsd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the gpsd_initrc_t domain.
++- Set files with the dhcpd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the dhcpd_initrc_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B gpsd_tmpfs_t
++.B dhcpd_state_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the gpsd_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store gpsd files on a tmpfs file system.
++- Set files with the dhcpd_state_t type, if you want to treat the files as dhcpd state data.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B gpsd_var_run_t
++.B dhcpd_tmp_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the gpsd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the gpsd files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the dhcpd_tmp_t type, if you want to store dhcpd temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B dhcpd_unit_file_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the dhcpd_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as dhcpd unit content.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B dhcpd_var_run_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the dhcpd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the dhcpd files under the /run directory.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/run/gpsd\.sock, /var/run/gpsd\.pid
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
+.SH PORT TYPES
-+SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
++SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
+.PP
-+You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
++You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
+
+.B semanage port -l
+
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
-+SELinux gpsd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their gpsd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following port types are defined for gpsd:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
++SELinux dhcpd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their dhcpd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following port types are defined for dhcpd:
+
+.EX
+.TP 5
-+.B gpsd_port_t
++.B dhcpc_port_t
+.TP 10
+.EE
+
+
+Default Defined Ports:
-+tcp 2947
++tcp 68,546
+.EE
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++udp 68,546
++.EE
++
++.EX
++.TP 5
++.B dhcpd_port_t
++.TP 10
++.EE
++
++
++Default Defined Ports:
++tcp 547,548,647,847,7911
++.EE
++udp 67,547,548,647,847
++.EE
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type dhcpd_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B dhcpd_state_t
++
++ /var/lib/dhcp(3)?/dhcpd\.leases.*
++.br
++ /var/lib/dhcpd(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B dhcpd_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B dhcpd_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/dhcpd(6)?\.pid
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux gpsd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their gpsd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for gpsd:
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the dhcpd_t, dhcpc_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B gpsd_t
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
++
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the dhcpd_t, dhcpc_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -19273,197 +21737,171 @@ index 0000000..b1feb7f
+.B semanage port
+can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
+
++.B semanage boolean
++can also be used to manipulate the booleans
++
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), gpsd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/greylist_selinux.8 b/man/man8/greylist_selinux.8
++selinux(8), dhcpd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, setsebool(8), dhcpc_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/dictd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/dictd_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..420c772
+index 0000000..cb1309a
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/greylist_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
-+.TH "greylist_selinux" "8" "greylist" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "greylist SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/dictd_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,168 @@
++.TH "dictd_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "dictd" "SELinux Policy documentation for dictd"
+.SH "NAME"
-+greylist_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the greylist processes
++dictd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the dictd processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the greylist processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the dictd processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The dictd processes execute with the dictd_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the greylist_milter_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep dictd_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The dictd_t SELinux type can be entered via the "dictd_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the dictd_t domain are the following:"
+
++/usr/sbin/dictd
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the greylist_milter_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux dictd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their dictd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for dictd:
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B dictd_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux greylist policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their greylist processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for greylist:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux dictd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their dictd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for dictd:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B greylist_milter_data_t
++.B dictd_etc_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the greylist_milter_data_t type, if you want to treat the files as greylist milter content.
++- Set files with the dictd_etc_t type, if you want to store dictd files in the /etc directories.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/run/milter-greylist\.pid, /var/run/milter-greylist(/.*)?, /var/lib/milter-greylist(/.*)?
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B greylist_milter_exec_t
++.B dictd_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the greylist_milter_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the greylist_milter_t domain.
++- Set files with the dictd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the dictd_t domain.
+
+
++.EX
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
++.B dictd_initrc_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the dictd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the dictd_initrc_t domain.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux greylist policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their greylist processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for greylist:
+
+.EX
-+.B greylist_milter_t
-+.EE
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++.B dictd_var_lib_t
++.EE
+
-+.SH "COMMANDS"
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
-+.PP
-+.B semanage permissive
-+can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
-+.PP
-+.B semanage module
-+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++- Set files with the dictd_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the dictd files under the /var/lib directory.
+
-+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
-+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.EX
++.PP
++.B dictd_var_run_t
++.EE
+
-+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), greylist(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/groupadd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/groupadd_selinux.8
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..05104f2
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/groupadd_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
-+.TH "groupadd_selinux" "8" "groupadd" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "groupadd SELinux Policy documentation"
-+.SH "NAME"
-+groupadd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the groupadd processes
-+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++- Set files with the dictd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the dictd files under the /run directory.
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the groupadd processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
+
++.SH PORT TYPES
++SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the groupadd_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
++.B semanage port -l
+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the groupadd_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
++SELinux dictd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their dictd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following port types are defined for dictd:
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.TP 5
++.B dict_port_t
++.TP 10
+.EE
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux groupadd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their groupadd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for groupadd:
-+
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B groupadd_exec_t
++Default Defined Ports:
++tcp 2628
+.EE
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+- Set files with the groupadd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the groupadd_t domain.
++The SELinux process type dictd_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/sbin/gpasswd, /usr/bin/gpasswd, /usr/sbin/groupdel, /usr/sbin/groupadd, /usr/sbin/groupmod
++.B dictd_var_run_t
+
-+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
++ /var/run/dictd\.pid
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux groupadd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their groupadd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for groupadd:
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the dictd_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B groupadd_t
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
++
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the dictd_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -19475,553 +21913,614 @@ index 0000000..05104f2
+.B semanage module
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
++.B semanage port
++can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
++
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), groupadd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/groupd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/groupd_selinux.8
++selinux(8), dictd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/dirsrv_selinux.8 b/man/man8/dirsrv_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..e934b66
+index 0000000..301dd74
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/groupd_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
-+.TH "groupd_selinux" "8" "groupd" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "groupd SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/dirsrv_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,333 @@
++.TH "dirsrv_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "dirsrv" "SELinux Policy documentation for dirsrv"
+.SH "NAME"
-+groupd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the groupd processes
++dirsrv_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the dirsrv processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the groupd processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the dirsrv processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The dirsrv processes execute with the dirsrv_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the groupadd_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep dirsrv_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The dirsrv_t SELinux type can be entered via the "dirsrv_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the dirsrv_t domain are the following:"
+
++/usr/sbin/ns-slapd
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the groupadd_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux dirsrv policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their dirsrv processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for dirsrv:
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B dirsrvadmin_unconfined_script_t, dirsrv_snmp_t, dirsrvadmin_t, dirsrv_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux groupd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their groupd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for groupd:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux dirsrv policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their dirsrv processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for dirsrv:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B groupd_exec_t
++.B dirsrv_config_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the groupd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the groupd_t domain.
++- Set files with the dirsrv_config_t type, if you want to treat the files as dirsrv configuration data, usually stored under the /etc directory.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B groupd_tmpfs_t
++.B dirsrv_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the groupd_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store groupd files on a tmpfs file system.
++- Set files with the dirsrv_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the dirsrv_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B groupd_var_log_t
++.B dirsrv_share_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the groupd_var_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as groupd var log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++- Set files with the dirsrv_share_t type, if you want to treat the files as dirsrv share data.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B groupd_var_run_t
++.B dirsrv_snmp_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the groupd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the groupd files under the /run directory.
-+
-+
-+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
++- Set files with the dirsrv_snmp_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the dirsrv_snmp_t domain.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux groupd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their groupd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for groupd:
+
+.EX
-+.B groupadd_t, groupd_t
-+.EE
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++.B dirsrv_snmp_var_log_t
++.EE
+
-+.SH "COMMANDS"
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
-+.PP
-+.B semanage permissive
-+can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
-+.PP
-+.B semanage module
-+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++- Set files with the dirsrv_snmp_var_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as dirsrv snmp var log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
+
-+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
-+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.EX
++.PP
++.B dirsrv_snmp_var_run_t
++.EE
+
-+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), groupd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/gssd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/gssd_selinux.8
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..559dae1
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/gssd_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,122 @@
-+.TH "gssd_selinux" "8" "gssd" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "gssd SELinux Policy documentation"
-+.SH "NAME"
-+gssd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the gssd processes
-+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++- Set files with the dirsrv_snmp_var_run_t type, if you want to store the dirsrv snmp files under the /run directory.
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the gssd processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
+
-+.SH BOOLEANS
-+SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. gssd policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run gssd with the tightest access possible.
++.EX
++.PP
++.B dirsrv_tmp_t
++.EE
+
++- Set files with the dirsrv_tmp_t type, if you want to store dirsrv temporary files in the /tmp directories.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow gssd to read temp directory. For access to kerberos tgt, you must turn on the gssd_read_tmp boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P gssd_read_tmp 1
++.PP
++.B dirsrv_tmpfs_t
+.EE
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++- Set files with the dirsrv_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store dirsrv files on a tmpfs file system.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the gssd_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.PP
++.B dirsrv_var_lib_t
+.EE
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the gssd_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++- Set files with the dirsrv_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the dirsrv files under the /var/lib directory.
++
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.PP
++.B dirsrv_var_lock_t
+.EE
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux gssd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their gssd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for gssd:
++- Set files with the dirsrv_var_lock_t type, if you want to treat the files as dirsrv var lock data, stored under the /var/lock directory
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B gssd_exec_t
++.B dirsrv_var_log_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the gssd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the gssd_t domain.
++- Set files with the dirsrv_var_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as dirsrv var log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/sbin/rpc\.gssd, /usr/sbin/rpc\.svcgssd
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B gssd_keytab_t
++.B dirsrv_var_run_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the gssd_keytab_t type, if you want to treat the files as kerberos keytab files.
++- Set files with the dirsrv_var_run_t type, if you want to store the dirsrv files under the /run directory.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B gssd_tmp_t
++.B dirsrvadmin_config_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the gssd_tmp_t type, if you want to store gssd temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++- Set files with the dirsrvadmin_config_t type, if you want to treat the files as dirsrvadmin configuration data, usually stored under the /etc directory.
+
+
++.EX
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
++.B dirsrvadmin_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the dirsrvadmin_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the dirsrvadmin_t domain.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux gssd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their gssd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for gssd:
+
+.EX
-+.B gssd_t
-+.EE
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++.B dirsrvadmin_lock_t
++.EE
+
-+.SH "COMMANDS"
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
-+.PP
-+.B semanage permissive
-+can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
-+.PP
-+.B semanage module
-+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++- Set files with the dirsrvadmin_lock_t type, if you want to treat the files as dirsrvadmin lock data, stored under the /var/lock directory
+
-+.B semanage boolean
-+can also be used to manipulate the booleans
+
++.EX
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
-+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++.B dirsrvadmin_tmp_t
++.EE
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++- Set files with the dirsrvadmin_tmp_t type, if you want to store dirsrvadmin temporary files in the /tmp directories.
+
-+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), gssd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-+, setsebool(8)
-\ No newline at end of file
-diff --git a/man/man8/guest_selinux.8 b/man/man8/guest_selinux.8
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..faeeaf7
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/guest_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,188 @@
-+.TH "guest_selinux" "8" "guest" "mgrepl at redhat.com" "guest SELinux Policy documentation"
-+.SH "NAME"
-+guest_u \- \fBLeast privledge terminal user role\fP - Security Enhanced Linux Policy
+
-+.SH DESCRIPTION
++.EX
++.PP
++.B dirsrvadmin_unconfined_script_exec_t
++.EE
+
-+\fBguest_u\fP is an SELinux User defined in the SELinux
-+policy. SELinux users have default roles, \fBguest_r\fP. The
-+default role has a default type, \fBguest_t\fP, associated with it.
++- Set files with the dirsrvadmin_unconfined_script_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the dirsrvadmin_unconfined_script_t domain.
+
-+The SELinux user will usually login to a system with a context that looks like:
+
-+.B guest_u:guest_r:guest_u:s0-s0:c0.c1023
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
+
-+Linux users are automatically assigned an SELinux users at login.
-+Login programs use the SELinux User to assign initial context to the user's shell.
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+SELinux policy uses the context to control the user's access.
++The SELinux process type dirsrv_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
-+By default all users are assigned to the SELinux user via the \fB__default__\fP flag
++.br
++.B dirsrv_config_t
+
-+On Targeted policy systems the \fB__default__\fP user is assigned to the \fBunconfined_u\fP SELinux user.
++ /etc/dirsrv(/.*)?
++.br
+
-+You can list all Linux User to SELinux user mapping using:
++.br
++.B dirsrv_tmp_t
+
-+.B semanage login -l
+
-+If you wanted to change the default user mapping to use the guest_u user, you would execute:
++.br
++.B dirsrv_tmpfs_t
+
-+.B semanage login -m -s guest_u __default__
+
++.br
++.B dirsrv_var_lib_t
+
-+If you want to map the one Linux user (joe) to the SELinux user guest, you would execute:
++ /var/lib/dirsrv(/.*)?
++.br
+
-+.B $ semanage login -a -s guest_u joe
++.br
++.B dirsrv_var_lock_t
+
++ /var/lock/dirsrv(/.*)?
++.br
+
-+.SH USER DESCRIPTION
++.br
++.B dirsrv_var_log_t
+
-+The SELinux user guest_u is defined in policy as a unprivileged user. SELinux prevents unprivileged users from doing administration tasks without transitioning to a different role.
++ /var/log/dirsrv(/.*)?
++.br
+
-+.SH SUDO
++.br
++.B dirsrv_var_run_t
+
-+The SELinux type guest_t is not allowed to execute sudo.
++ /var/run/dirsrv(/.*)?
++.br
+
-+.SH X WINDOWS LOGIN
++.br
++.B faillog_t
+
-+The SELinux user guest_u is not able to X Windows login.
++ /var/log/btmp.*
++.br
++ /var/run/faillock(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/log/faillog
++.br
++ /var/log/tallylog
++.br
+
-+.SH TERMINAL LOGIN
++.br
++.B krb5_host_rcache_t
+
-+The SELinux user guest_u is able to terminal login.
++ /var/cache/krb5rcache(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/tmp/nfs_0
++.br
++ /var/tmp/DNS_25
++.br
++ /var/tmp/host_0
++.br
++ /var/tmp/imap_0
++.br
++ /var/tmp/HTTP_23
++.br
++ /var/tmp/HTTP_48
++.br
++ /var/tmp/ldap_55
++.br
++ /var/tmp/ldap_487
++.br
++ /var/tmp/ldapmap1_0
++.br
+
-+.SH NETWORK
++.br
++.B lastlog_t
+
-+.TP
-+The SELinux user guest_u is able to connect to the following tcp ports.
++ /var/log/lastlog
++.br
+
-+.B dns_port_t: 53
++.br
++.B pcscd_var_run_t
+
-+.B ocsp_port_t: 9080
++ /var/run/pcscd(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/pcscd\.events(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/pcscd\.pid
++.br
++ /var/run/pcscd\.pub
++.br
++ /var/run/pcscd\.comm
++.br
+
-+.B kerberos_port_t: 88,750,4444
++.br
++.B security_t
+
-+.SH BOOLEANS
-+SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. guest_t policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run guest_t with the tightest access possible.
++ /selinux
++.br
+
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to connect to the local mysql server, you must turn on the allow_user_mysql_connect boolean.
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the dirsrv_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P allow_user_mysql_connect 1
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
+
+.PP
-+If you want to control users use of ping and traceroute, you must turn on the user_ping boolean.
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the dirsrv_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P user_ping 1
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
+.EE
+
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
+.PP
-+If you want to allow w to display everyone, you must turn on the user_ttyfile_stat boolean.
-+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P user_ttyfile_stat 1
-+.EE
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow user music sharing, you must turn on the user_share_music boolean.
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P user_share_music 1
-+.EE
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow regular users direct dri device access, you must turn on the user_direct_dri boolean.
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), dirsrv(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, dirsrv_snmp_selinux(8), dirsrvadmin_selinux(8), dirsrvadmin_unconfined_script_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/dirsrv_snmp_selinux.8 b/man/man8/dirsrv_snmp_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..658d718
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/dirsrv_snmp_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,137 @@
++.TH "dirsrv_snmp_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "dirsrv_snmp" "SELinux Policy documentation for dirsrv_snmp"
++.SH "NAME"
++dirsrv_snmp_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the dirsrv_snmp processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P user_direct_dri 1
-+.EE
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the dirsrv_snmp processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow user to r/w files on filesystems that do not have extended attributes (FAT, CDROM, FLOPPY), you must turn on the user_rw_noexattrfile boolean.
++The dirsrv_snmp processes execute with the dirsrv_snmp_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P user_rw_noexattrfile 1
-+.EE
++For example:
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to run TCP servers (bind to ports and accept connection from the same domain and outside users) disabling this forces FTP passive mode and may change other protocols, you must turn on the user_tcp_server boolean.
++.B ps -eZ | grep dirsrv_snmp_t
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P user_tcp_server 1
-+.EE
+
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The dirsrv_snmp_t SELinux type can be entered via the "dirsrv_snmp_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the dirsrv_snmp_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/sbin/ldap-agent-bin
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux dirsrv_snmp policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their dirsrv_snmp processes in as secure a method as possible.
+.PP
-+If you want to allow regular users direct mouse access, you must turn on the user_direct_mouse boolean.
++The following process types are defined for dirsrv_snmp:
+
+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P user_direct_mouse 1
++.B dirsrv_snmp_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux dirsrv_snmp policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their dirsrv_snmp processes in as secure a method as possible.
+.PP
-+If you want to allow user processes to change their priority, you must turn on the user_setrlimit boolean.
++The following file types are defined for dirsrv_snmp:
++
+
+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P user_setrlimit 1
++.PP
++.B dirsrv_snmp_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to connect to PostgreSQL, you must turn on the allow_user_postgresql_connect boolean.
++- Set files with the dirsrv_snmp_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the dirsrv_snmp_t domain.
++
+
+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P allow_user_postgresql_connect 1
++.PP
++.B dirsrv_snmp_var_log_t
+.EE
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to read system messages, you must turn on the user_dmesg boolean.
++- Set files with the dirsrv_snmp_var_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as dirsrv snmp var log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++
+
+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P user_dmesg 1
++.PP
++.B dirsrv_snmp_var_run_t
+.EE
+
-+.SH HOME_EXEC
++- Set files with the dirsrv_snmp_var_run_t type, if you want to store the dirsrv snmp files under the /run directory.
+
-+The SELinux user guest_u is able execute home content files.
+
-+.SH TRANSITIONS
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
+
-+Three things can happen when guest_t attempts to execute a program.
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+\fB1.\fP SELinux Policy can deny guest_t from executing the program.
++The SELinux process type dirsrv_snmp_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
-+.TP
++.br
++.B dirsrv_snmp_var_log_t
+
-+\fB2.\fP SELinux Policy can allow guest_t to execute the program in the current user type.
++ /var/log/dirsrv/ldap-agent.log.*
++.br
+
-+Execute the following to see the types that the SELinux user guest_t can execute without transitioning:
++.br
++.B dirsrv_snmp_var_run_t
+
-+.B sesearch -A -s guest_t -c file -p execute_no_trans
++ /var/run/ldap-agent\.pid
++.br
+
-+.TP
++.br
++.B dirsrv_tmpfs_t
+
-+\fB3.\fP SELinux can allow guest_t to execute the program and transition to a new type.
+
-+Execute the following to see the types that the SELinux user guest_t can execute and transition:
++.br
++.B snmpd_var_lib_t
+
-+.B $ sesearch -A -s guest_t -c process -p transition
++ /var/agentx(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/snmp(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/net-snmp(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/net-snmp(/.*)?
++.br
++ /usr/share/snmp/mibs/\.index
++.br
+
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
-+.B semanage login
-+can also be used to manipulate the Linux User to SELinux User mappings
-+
-+.B semanage user
-+can also be used to manipulate SELinux user definitions.
-+
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genuserman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), semanage(8).
-diff --git a/man/man8/hddtemp_selinux.8 b/man/man8/hddtemp_selinux.8
++selinux(8), dirsrv_snmp(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, dirsrv_selinux(8), dirsrv_selinux(8), dirsrvadmin_selinux(8), dirsrvadmin_unconfined_script_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/dirsrvadmin_selinux.8 b/man/man8/dirsrvadmin_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..9f14966
+index 0000000..02df63f
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/hddtemp_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,115 @@
-+.TH "hddtemp_selinux" "8" "hddtemp" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "hddtemp SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/dirsrvadmin_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,127 @@
++.TH "dirsrvadmin_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "dirsrvadmin" "SELinux Policy documentation for dirsrvadmin"
+.SH "NAME"
-+hddtemp_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the hddtemp processes
++dirsrvadmin_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the dirsrvadmin processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the hddtemp processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the dirsrvadmin processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The dirsrvadmin processes execute with the dirsrvadmin_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep dirsrvadmin_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The dirsrvadmin_t SELinux type can be entered via the "shell_exec_t,dirsrvadmin_exec_t" file types. The default entrypoint paths for the dirsrvadmin_t domain are the following:"
++
++/bin/d?ash, /bin/zsh.*, /bin/ksh.*, /usr/bin/d?ash, /usr/bin/ksh.*, /usr/bin/zsh.*, /bin/esh, /bin/mksh, /bin/sash, /bin/tcsh, /bin/yash, /bin/bash, /bin/fish, /bin/bash2, /usr/bin/esh, /usr/bin/mksh, /usr/bin/sash, /usr/bin/bash, /usr/bin/fish, /usr/bin/tcsh, /usr/bin/yash, /sbin/nologin, /usr/sbin/sesh, /usr/bin/bash2, /usr/sbin/smrsh, /usr/bin/scponly, /usr/sbin/nologin, /usr/libexec/sesh, /usr/sbin/scponlyc, /usr/bin/git-shell, /usr/libexec/git-core/git-shell, /usr/sbin/stop-ds-admin, /usr/sbin/start-ds-admin, /usr/sbin/restart-ds-admin
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux dirsrvadmin policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their dirsrvadmin processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for dirsrvadmin:
++
++.EX
++.B dirsrvadmin_unconfined_script_t, dirsrvadmin_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux hddtemp policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their hddtemp processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for hddtemp:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux dirsrvadmin policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their dirsrvadmin processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for dirsrvadmin:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B hddtemp_etc_t
++.B dirsrvadmin_config_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the hddtemp_etc_t type, if you want to store hddtemp files in the /etc directories.
++- Set files with the dirsrvadmin_config_t type, if you want to treat the files as dirsrvadmin configuration data, usually stored under the /etc directory.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B hddtemp_exec_t
++.B dirsrvadmin_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the hddtemp_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the hddtemp_t domain.
++- Set files with the dirsrvadmin_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the dirsrvadmin_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B hddtemp_initrc_exec_t
++.B dirsrvadmin_lock_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the hddtemp_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the hddtemp_initrc_t domain.
++- Set files with the dirsrvadmin_lock_t type, if you want to treat the files as dirsrvadmin lock data, stored under the /var/lock directory
+
+
++.EX
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
++.B dirsrvadmin_tmp_t
++.EE
+
-+.SH PORT TYPES
-+SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
-+.PP
-+You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
++- Set files with the dirsrvadmin_tmp_t type, if you want to store dirsrvadmin temporary files in the /tmp directories.
+
-+.B semanage port -l
+
++.EX
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
-+SELinux hddtemp policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their hddtemp processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following port types are defined for hddtemp:
++.B dirsrvadmin_unconfined_script_exec_t
++.EE
+
-+.EX
-+.TP 5
-+.B hddtemp_port_t
-+.TP 10
-+.EE
++- Set files with the dirsrvadmin_unconfined_script_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the dirsrvadmin_unconfined_script_t domain.
+
+
-+Default Defined Ports:
-+tcp 7634
-+.EE
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux hddtemp policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their hddtemp processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for hddtemp:
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
+
-+.EX
-+.B hddtemp_t
-+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type dirsrvadmin_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B dirsrvadmin_tmp_t
++
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -20033,81 +22532,129 @@ index 0000000..9f14966
+.B semanage module
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
-+.B semanage port
-+can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
-+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), hddtemp(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/hostname_selinux.8 b/man/man8/hostname_selinux.8
++selinux(8), dirsrvadmin(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, dirsrv_selinux(8), dirsrvadmin_unconfined_script_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/dirsrvadmin_unconfined_script_selinux.8 b/man/man8/dirsrvadmin_unconfined_script_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..6701415
+index 0000000..bd60dd5
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/hostname_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
-+.TH "hostname_selinux" "8" "hostname" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "hostname SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/dirsrvadmin_unconfined_script_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,127 @@
++.TH "dirsrvadmin_unconfined_script_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "dirsrvadmin_unconfined_script" "SELinux Policy documentation for dirsrvadmin_unconfined_script"
+.SH "NAME"
-+hostname_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the hostname processes
++dirsrvadmin_unconfined_script_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the dirsrvadmin_unconfined_script processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the hostname processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the dirsrvadmin_unconfined_script processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The dirsrvadmin_unconfined_script processes execute with the dirsrvadmin_unconfined_script_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep dirsrvadmin_unconfined_script_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The dirsrvadmin_unconfined_script_t SELinux type can be entered via the "dirsrvadmin_unconfined_script_exec_t,shell_exec_t" file types. The default entrypoint paths for the dirsrvadmin_unconfined_script_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/lib/dirsrv/cgi-bin/ds_create, /usr/lib/dirsrv/cgi-bin/ds_remove, /bin/d?ash, /bin/zsh.*, /bin/ksh.*, /usr/bin/d?ash, /usr/bin/ksh.*, /usr/bin/zsh.*, /bin/esh, /bin/mksh, /bin/sash, /bin/tcsh, /bin/yash, /bin/bash, /bin/fish, /bin/bash2, /usr/bin/esh, /usr/bin/mksh, /usr/bin/sash, /usr/bin/bash, /usr/bin/fish, /usr/bin/tcsh, /usr/bin/yash, /sbin/nologin, /usr/sbin/sesh, /usr/bin/bash2, /usr/sbin/smrsh, /usr/bin/scponly, /usr/sbin/nologin, /usr/libexec/sesh, /usr/sbin/scponlyc, /usr/bin/git-shell, /usr/libexec/git-core/git-shell
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux dirsrvadmin_unconfined_script policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their dirsrvadmin_unconfined_script processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for dirsrvadmin_unconfined_script:
++
++.EX
++.B dirsrvadmin_unconfined_script_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux hostname policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their hostname processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for hostname:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux dirsrvadmin_unconfined_script policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their dirsrvadmin_unconfined_script processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for dirsrvadmin_unconfined_script:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B hostname_exec_t
++.B dirsrvadmin_unconfined_script_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the hostname_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the hostname_t domain.
++- Set files with the dirsrvadmin_unconfined_script_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the dirsrvadmin_unconfined_script_t domain.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/bin/hostname, /usr/bin/hostname
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux hostname policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their hostname processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for hostname:
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+.EX
-+.B hostname_t
-+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++The SELinux process type dirsrvadmin_unconfined_script_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B dirsrv_config_t
++
++ /etc/dirsrv(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B dirsrv_var_lib_t
++
++ /var/lib/dirsrv(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B dirsrv_var_log_t
++
++ /var/log/dirsrv(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B dirsrv_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/dirsrv(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B dirsrvadmin_config_t
++
++ /etc/dirsrv/dsgw(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/dirsrv/admin-serv(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B dirsrvadmin_tmp_t
++
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -20120,136 +22667,116 @@ index 0000000..6701415
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), hostname(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/hplip_selinux.8 b/man/man8/hplip_selinux.8
++selinux(8), dirsrvadmin_unconfined_script(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, dirsrv_selinux(8), dirsrvadmin_selinux(8), dirsrvadmin_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/disk_munin_plugin_selinux.8 b/man/man8/disk_munin_plugin_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..fd1af3c
+index 0000000..1679709
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/hplip_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,139 @@
-+.TH "hplip_selinux" "8" "hplip" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "hplip SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/disk_munin_plugin_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,114 @@
++.TH "disk_munin_plugin_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "disk_munin_plugin" "SELinux Policy documentation for disk_munin_plugin"
+.SH "NAME"
-+hplip_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the hplip processes
++disk_munin_plugin_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the disk_munin_plugin processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the hplip processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the disk_munin_plugin processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The disk_munin_plugin processes execute with the disk_munin_plugin_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux hplip policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their hplip processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for hplip:
++For example:
+
++.B ps -eZ | grep disk_munin_plugin_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B hplip_etc_t
-+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the hplip_etc_t type, if you want to store hplip files in the /etc directories.
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
++The disk_munin_plugin_t SELinux type can be entered via the "disk_munin_plugin_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the disk_munin_plugin_t domain are the following:"
+
-+.EX
++/usr/share/munin/plugins/df.*, /usr/share/munin/plugins/smart_.*, /usr/share/munin/plugins/hddtemp.*, /usr/share/munin/plugins/diskstat.*
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+.B hplip_exec_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the hplip_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the hplip_t domain.
-+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/bin/hpijs, /usr/share/hplip/.*\.py, /usr/sbin/hp-[^/]+, /usr/lib/cups/backend/hp.*, /usr/sbin/hpiod
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux disk_munin_plugin policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their disk_munin_plugin processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for disk_munin_plugin:
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B hplip_tmp_t
++.B disk_munin_plugin_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
-+- Set files with the hplip_tmp_t type, if you want to store hplip temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux disk_munin_plugin policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their disk_munin_plugin processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for disk_munin_plugin:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B hplip_var_lib_t
++.B disk_munin_plugin_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the hplip_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the hplip files under the /var/lib directory.
++- Set files with the disk_munin_plugin_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the disk_munin_plugin_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B hplip_var_run_t
++.B disk_munin_plugin_tmp_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the hplip_var_run_t type, if you want to store the hplip files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the disk_munin_plugin_tmp_t type, if you want to store disk munin plugin temporary files in the /tmp directories.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/run/hp.*\.pid, /var/run/hp.*\.port
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PORT TYPES
-+SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
-+.PP
-+You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+.B semanage port -l
++The SELinux process type disk_munin_plugin_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
-+SELinux hplip policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their hplip processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following port types are defined for hplip:
++.br
++.B disk_munin_plugin_tmp_t
+
-+.EX
-+.TP 5
-+.B hplip_port_t
-+.TP 10
-+.EE
+
++.br
++.B munin_plugin_state_t
+
-+Default Defined Ports:
-+tcp 1782,2207,2208,8290,50000,50002,8292,9100,9101,9102,9220,9221,9222,9280,9281,9282,9290,9291
-+.EE
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux hplip policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their hplip processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for hplip:
++ /var/lib/munin/plugin-state(/.*)?
++.br
+
-+.EX
-+.B hplip_t
-+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++.br
++.B munin_var_lib_t
++
++ /var/lib/munin(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -20261,1670 +22788,1971 @@ index 0000000..fd1af3c
+.B semanage module
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
-+.B semanage port
-+can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
-+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), hplip(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/httpd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/httpd_selinux.8
-index 16e8b13..0f70c71 100644
---- a/man/man8/httpd_selinux.8
-+++ b/man/man8/httpd_selinux.8
-@@ -1,120 +1,1613 @@
--.TH "httpd_selinux" "8" "17 Jan 2005" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "httpd Selinux Policy documentation"
--.de EX
--.nf
--.ft CW
--..
--.de EE
--.ft R
--.fi
--..
-+.TH "httpd_selinux" "8" "httpd" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "httpd SELinux Policy documentation"
- .SH "NAME"
--httpd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the httpd daemon
-+httpd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the httpd processes
- .SH "DESCRIPTION"
-
--Security-Enhanced Linux secures the httpd server via flexible mandatory access
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the httpd processes via flexible mandatory access
- control.
--.SH FILE_CONTEXTS
--SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
--Policy governs the access daemons have to these files.
--SELinux httpd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their web services in as secure a method as possible.
--.PP
--The following file contexts types are defined for httpd:
++selinux(8), disk_munin_plugin(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/dkim_milter_selinux.8 b/man/man8/dkim_milter_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..813e538
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/dkim_milter_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,132 @@
++.TH "dkim_milter_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "dkim_milter" "SELinux Policy documentation for dkim_milter"
++.SH "NAME"
++dkim_milter_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the dkim_milter processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+.SH BOOLEANS
-+SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. httpd policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run httpd with the tightest access possible.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the dkim_milter processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
++The dkim_milter processes execute with the dkim_milter_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow httpd to act as a relay, you must turn on the httpd_can_network_relay boolean.
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P httpd_can_network_relay 1
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep dkim_milter_t
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow httpd to communicate with oddjob to start up a service, you must turn on the httpd_use_oddjob boolean.
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P httpd_use_oddjob 1
-+.EE
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
++The dkim_milter_t SELinux type can be entered via the "dkim_milter_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the dkim_milter_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/sbin/opendkim, /usr/sbin/dkim-filter
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow HTTPD scripts and modules to connect to databases over the network, you must turn on the httpd_can_network_connect_db boolean.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux dkim_milter policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their dkim_milter processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for dkim_milter:
+
+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P httpd_can_network_connect_db 1
++.B dkim_milter_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
-+If you want to allow httpd to run gpg, you must turn on the httpd_use_gpg boolean.
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux dkim_milter policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their dkim_milter processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for dkim_milter:
++
+
+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P httpd_use_gpg 1
++.PP
++.B dkim_milter_data_t
+.EE
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow httpd cgi support, you must turn on the httpd_enable_cgi boolean.
++- Set files with the dkim_milter_data_t type, if you want to treat the files as dkim milter content.
++
+
+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P httpd_enable_cgi 1
++.PP
++.B dkim_milter_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow httpd to access cifs file systems, you must turn on the httpd_use_cifs boolean.
++- Set files with the dkim_milter_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the dkim_milter_t domain.
++
+
+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P httpd_use_cifs 1
++.PP
++.B dkim_milter_private_key_t
+.EE
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow httpd processes to manage IPA content, you must turn on the httpd_manage_ipa boolean.
++- Set files with the dkim_milter_private_key_t type, if you want to treat the files as dkim milter private key data.
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P httpd_manage_ipa 1
-+.EE
+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow Apache to run in stickshift mode, not transition to passenger, you must turn on the httpd_run_stickshift boolean.
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P httpd_run_stickshift 1
-+.EE
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow httpd to read home directories, you must turn on the httpd_enable_homedirs boolean.
++The SELinux process type dkim_milter_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P httpd_enable_homedirs 1
-+.EE
++.br
++.B dkim_milter_data_t
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow Apache to communicate with avahi service via dbus, you must turn on the httpd_dbus_avahi boolean.
++ /var/run/opendkim(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/spool/opendkim(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/dkim-milter(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/dkim-milter(/.*)?
++.br
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P httpd_dbus_avahi 1
-+.EE
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.PP
-+If you want to unify HTTPD handling of all content files, you must turn on the httpd_unified boolean.
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the dkim_milter_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P httpd_unified 1
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow Apache to use mod_auth_pam, you must turn on the httpd_mod_auth_pam boolean.
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the dkim_milter_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P httpd_mod_auth_pam 1
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
+.EE
+
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
+.PP
-+If you want to allow HTTPD scripts and modules to connect to the network using TCP, you must turn on the httpd_can_network_connect boolean.
-+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P httpd_can_network_connect 1
-+.EE
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow httpd scripts and modules execmem/execstack, you must turn on the httpd_execmem boolean.
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P httpd_execmem 1
-+.EE
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow httpd to access FUSE file systems, you must turn on the httpd_use_fusefs boolean.
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), dkim_milter(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/dlm_controld_selinux.8 b/man/man8/dlm_controld_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..25e4869
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/dlm_controld_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,168 @@
++.TH "dlm_controld_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "dlm_controld" "SELinux Policy documentation for dlm_controld"
++.SH "NAME"
++dlm_controld_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the dlm_controld processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P httpd_use_fusefs 1
-+.EE
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the dlm_controld processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow Apache to use mod_auth_ntlm_winbind, you must turn on the httpd_mod_auth_ntlm_winbind boolean.
++The dlm_controld processes execute with the dlm_controld_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P httpd_mod_auth_ntlm_winbind 1
-+.EE
++For example:
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to unify HTTPD to communicate with the terminal. Needed for entering the passphrase for certificates at the terminal, you must turn on the httpd_tty_comm boolean.
++.B ps -eZ | grep dlm_controld_t
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P httpd_tty_comm 1
-+.EE
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow HTTPD to connect to port 80 for graceful shutdown, you must turn on the httpd_graceful_shutdown boolean.
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P httpd_graceful_shutdown 1
-+.EE
++The dlm_controld_t SELinux type can be entered via the "dlm_controld_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the dlm_controld_t domain are the following:"
+
++/usr/sbin/dlm_controld
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow httpd to act as a FTP client connecting to the ftp port and ephemeral ports, you must turn on the httpd_can_connect_ftp boolean.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux dlm_controld policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their dlm_controld processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for dlm_controld:
+
+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P httpd_can_connect_ftp 1
++.B dlm_controld_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
-+If you want to allow httpd to read user content, you must turn on the httpd_read_user_content boolean.
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux dlm_controld policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their dlm_controld processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for dlm_controld:
++
+
+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P httpd_read_user_content 1
++.PP
++.B dlm_controld_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow httpd to access nfs file systems, you must turn on the httpd_use_nfs boolean.
++- Set files with the dlm_controld_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the dlm_controld_t domain.
++
+
+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P httpd_use_nfs 1
++.PP
++.B dlm_controld_tmpfs_t
+.EE
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow Apache to execute tmp content, you must turn on the httpd_tmp_exec boolean.
++- Set files with the dlm_controld_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store dlm controld files on a tmpfs file system.
++
+
+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P httpd_tmp_exec 1
++.PP
++.B dlm_controld_var_log_t
+.EE
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow http daemon to send mail, you must turn on the httpd_can_sendmail boolean.
++- Set files with the dlm_controld_var_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as dlm controld var log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++
+
+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P httpd_can_sendmail 1
++.PP
++.B dlm_controld_var_run_t
+.EE
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow httpd to use built in scripting (usually php), you must turn on the httpd_builtin_scripting boolean.
++- Set files with the dlm_controld_var_run_t type, if you want to store the dlm controld files under the /run directory.
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P httpd_builtin_scripting 1
-+.EE
+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow httpd to connect to the ldap port, you must turn on the httpd_can_connect_ldap boolean.
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
+
- .EX
--httpd_sys_content_t
--.EE
--- Set files with httpd_sys_content_t if you want httpd_sys_script_exec_t scripts and the daemon to read the file, and disallow other non sys scripts from access.
-+.B setsebool -P httpd_can_connect_ldap 1
-+.EE
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow http daemon to check spam, you must turn on the httpd_can_check_spam boolean.
++The SELinux process type dlm_controld_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P httpd_can_check_spam 1
-+.EE
++.br
++.B cluster_var_lib_t
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow BIND to bind apache port, you must turn on the named_bind_http_port boolean.
++ /var/lib/cluster(/.*)?
++.br
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P named_bind_http_port 1
-+.EE
++.br
++.B configfs_t
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow httpd to connect to memcache server, you must turn on the httpd_can_network_memcache boolean.
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P httpd_can_network_memcache 1
-+.EE
++.br
++.B corosync_tmpfs_t
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow HTTPD scripts and modules to connect to cobbler over the network, you must turn on the httpd_can_network_connect_cobbler boolean.
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P httpd_can_network_connect_cobbler 1
-+.EE
++.br
++.B dlm_controld_tmpfs_t
++
++
++.br
++.B dlm_controld_var_log_t
++
++ /var/log/cluster/dlm_controld\.log.*
++.br
++
++.br
++.B dlm_controld_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/dlm_controld\.pid
++.br
++
++.br
++.B initrc_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B sysfs_t
++
++ /sys(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow HTTPD to run SSI executables in the same domain as system CGI scripts, you must turn on the httpd_ssi_exec boolean.
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the dlm_controld_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P httpd_ssi_exec 1
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow httpd to access openstack ports, you must turn on the httpd_use_openstack boolean.
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the dlm_controld_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P httpd_use_openstack 1
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
+.EE
+
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
+.PP
-+If you want to allow httpd to act as a FTP server by listening on the ftp port, you must turn on the httpd_enable_ftp_server boolean.
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
- .EX
--httpd_sys_script_exec_t
--.EE
--- Set cgi scripts with httpd_sys_script_exec_t to allow them to run with access to all sys types.
-+.B setsebool -P httpd_enable_ftp_server 1
-+.EE
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow http daemon to connect to zabbix, you must turn on the httpd_can_connect_zabbix boolean.
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), dlm_controld(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/dmesg_selinux.8 b/man/man8/dmesg_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..c7d7b6d
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/dmesg_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,136 @@
++.TH "dmesg_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "dmesg" "SELinux Policy documentation for dmesg"
++.SH "NAME"
++dmesg_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the dmesg processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
- .EX
--httpd_sys_content_rw_t
-+.B setsebool -P httpd_can_connect_zabbix 1
- .EE
--- Set files with httpd_sys_content_rw_t if you want httpd_sys_script_exec_t scripts and the daemon to read/write the data, and disallow other non sys scripts from access.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the dmesg processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow httpd daemon to change its resource limits, you must turn on the httpd_setrlimit boolean.
++The dmesg processes execute with the dmesg_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
- .EX
--httpd_sys_content_ra_t
-+.B setsebool -P httpd_setrlimit 1
- .EE
--- Set files with httpd_sys_content_ra_t if you want httpd_sys_script_exec_t scripts and the daemon to read/append to the file, and disallow other non sys scripts from access.
++For example:
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++.B ps -eZ | grep dmesg_t
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the httpd_prewikka_script_t, httpd_passwd_t, httpd_t, httpd_php_t, httpd_git_script_t, httpd_suexec_t, httpd_sys_script_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
- .EX
--httpd_unconfined_script_exec_t
--.EE
--- Set cgi scripts with httpd_unconfined_script_exec_t to allow them to run without any SELinux protection. This should only be used for a very complex httpd scripts, after exhausting all other options. It is better to use this script rather than turning off SELinux protection for httpd.
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The dmesg_t SELinux type can be entered via the "dmesg_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the dmesg_t domain are the following:"
+
++/bin/dmesg, /usr/bin/dmesg
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the httpd_prewikka_script_t, httpd_passwd_t, httpd_t, httpd_php_t, httpd_git_script_t, httpd_suexec_t, httpd_sys_script_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
-
--.SH NOTE
--With certain policies you can define additional file contexts based on roles like user or staff. httpd_user_script_exec_t can be defined where it would only have access to "user" contexts.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux dmesg policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their dmesg processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for dmesg:
++
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B dmesg_t
+.EE
-
- .SH SHARING FILES
--If you want to share files with multiple domains (Apache, FTP, rsync, Samba), you can set a file context of public_content_t and public_content_rw_t. These context allow any of the above domains to read the content. If you want a particular domain to write to the public_content_rw_t domain, you must set the appropriate boolean. allow_DOMAIN_anon_write. So for httpd you would execute:
-+If you want to share files with multiple domains (Apache, FTP, rsync, Samba), you can set a file context of public_content_t and public_content_rw_t. These context allow any of the above domains to read the content. If you want a particular domain to write to the public_content_rw_t domain, you must set the appropriate boolean.
-+.TP
-+Allow httpd servers to read the /var/httpd directory by adding the public_content_t file type to the directory and by restoring the file type.
-+.PP
-+.B
-+semanage fcontext -a -t public_content_t "/var/httpd(/.*)?"
-+.br
-+.B restorecon -F -R -v /var/httpd
-+.pp
-+.TP
-+Allow httpd servers to read and write /var/tmp/incoming by adding the public_content_rw_t type to the directory and by restoring the file type. This also requires the allow_httpdd_anon_write boolean to be set.
+.PP
-+.B
-+semanage fcontext -a -t public_content_rw_t "/var/httpd/incoming(/.*)?"
-+.br
-+.B restorecon -F -R -v /var/httpd/incoming
-+
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow apache scripts to write to public content, directories/files must be labeled public_rw_content_t., you must turn on the httpd_sys_script_anon_write boolean.
-
- .EX
--setsebool -P allow_httpd_anon_write=1
-+.B setsebool -P httpd_sys_script_anon_write 1
- .EE
-
--or
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow Apache to modify public files used for public file transfer services. Directories/Files must be labeled public_content_rw_t., you must turn on the httpd_anon_write boolean.
-
- .EX
--setsebool -P allow_httpd_sys_script_anon_write=1
-+.B setsebool -P httpd_anon_write 1
- .EE
-
--.SH BOOLEANS
--SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. SELinux can be setup to prevent certain http scripts from working. httpd policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run httpd with the tightest access possible.
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux httpd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their httpd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for httpd:
-+
-+
-+.EX
- .PP
--httpd can be setup to allow cgi scripts to be executed, set httpd_enable_cgi to allow this
-+.B httpd_apcupsd_cgi_content_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the httpd_apcupsd_cgi_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd apcupsd cgi content.
-+
-+
-+.EX
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux dmesg policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their dmesg processes in as secure a method as possible.
+.PP
-+.B httpd_apcupsd_cgi_htaccess_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the httpd_apcupsd_cgi_htaccess_t type, if you want to treat the file as a httpd apcupsd cgi access file.
++The following file types are defined for dmesg:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B httpd_apcupsd_cgi_ra_content_t
++.B dmesg_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the httpd_apcupsd_cgi_ra_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd apcupsd cgi read/append content.
++- Set files with the dmesg_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the dmesg_t domain.
+
-
- .EX
--setsebool -P httpd_enable_cgi 1
-+.PP
-+.B httpd_apcupsd_cgi_rw_content_t
- .EE
-
-+- Set files with the httpd_apcupsd_cgi_rw_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd apcupsd cgi read/write content.
+
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
+
-+.EX
- .PP
--SELinux policy for httpd can be setup to not allowed to access users home directories. If you want to allow access to users home directories you need to set the httpd_enable_homedirs boolean and change the context of the files that you want people to access off the home dir.
-+.B httpd_apcupsd_cgi_script_exec_t
-+.EE
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+- Set files with the httpd_apcupsd_cgi_script_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the httpd_apcupsd_cgi_script_t domain.
++The SELinux process type dmesg_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/www/apcupsd/upsfstats\.cgi, /var/www/apcupsd/multimon\.cgi, /var/www/apcupsd/upsstats\.cgi, /var/www/apcupsd/upsimage\.cgi, /var/www/cgi-bin/apcgui(/.*)?
-
- .EX
--setsebool -P httpd_enable_homedirs 1
--chcon -R -t httpd_sys_content_t ~user/public_html
-+.PP
-+.B httpd_awstats_content_t
- .EE
-
-+- Set files with the httpd_awstats_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd awstats content.
-+
++.B var_log_t
+
-+.EX
- .PP
--SELinux policy for httpd can be setup to not allow access to the controlling terminal. In most cases this is preferred, because an intruder might be able to use the access to the terminal to gain privileges. But in certain situations httpd needs to prompt for a password to open a certificate file, in these cases, terminal access is required. Set the httpd_tty_comm boolean to allow terminal access.
-+.B httpd_awstats_htaccess_t
-+.EE
++ /var/log/.*
++.br
++ /nsr/logs(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/webmin(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/log/cron[^/]*
++.br
++ /var/log/secure[^/]*
++.br
++ /opt/zimbra/log(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/log/maillog[^/]*
++.br
++ /var/log/spooler[^/]*
++.br
++ /var/log/messages[^/]*
++.br
++ /usr/centreon/log(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/spool/rsyslog(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/axfrdns/log/main(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/spool/bacula/log(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/tinydns/log/main(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/dnscache/log/main(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/stockmaniac/templates_cache(/.*)?
++.br
++ /opt/Symantec/scspagent/IDS/system(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/log
++.br
++ /var/log/dmesg
++.br
++ /var/log/syslog
++.br
++ /var/named/chroot/var/log
++.br
+
-+- Set files with the httpd_awstats_htaccess_t type, if you want to treat the file as a httpd awstats access file.
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
-
- .EX
--setsebool -P httpd_tty_comm 1
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
+.PP
-+.B httpd_awstats_ra_content_t
- .EE
-
-+- Set files with the httpd_awstats_ra_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd awstats read/append content.
-+
-+
-+.EX
- .PP
--httpd can be configured to not differentiate file controls based on context, i.e. all files labeled as httpd context can be read/write/execute. Setting this boolean to false allows you to setup the security policy such that one httpd service can not interfere with another.
-+.B httpd_awstats_rw_content_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the httpd_awstats_rw_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd awstats read/write content.
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
-
- .EX
--setsebool -P httpd_unified 0
+.PP
-+.B httpd_awstats_script_exec_t
- .EE
-
-+- Set files with the httpd_awstats_script_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the httpd_awstats_script_t domain.
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
-+.EX
- .PP
--SELinu policy for httpd can be configured to turn on sending email. This is a security feature, since it would prevent a vulnerabiltiy in http from causing a spam attack. I certain situations, you may want http modules to send mail. You can turn on the httpd_send_mail boolean.
-+.B httpd_bugzilla_content_t
-+.EE
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), dmesg(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/dmidecode_selinux.8 b/man/man8/dmidecode_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..e29cd1c
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/dmidecode_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
++.TH "dmidecode_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "dmidecode" "SELinux Policy documentation for dmidecode"
++.SH "NAME"
++dmidecode_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the dmidecode processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+- Set files with the httpd_bugzilla_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd bugzilla content.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the dmidecode processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-
- .EX
--setsebool -P httpd_can_sendmail 1
- .PP
--httpd can be configured to turn off internal scripting (PHP). PHP and other
--loadable modules run under the same context as httpd. Therefore several policy rules allow httpd greater access to the system then is needed if you only use external cgi scripts.
-+.B httpd_bugzilla_htaccess_t
-+.EE
++The dmidecode processes execute with the dmidecode_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+- Set files with the httpd_bugzilla_htaccess_t type, if you want to treat the file as a httpd bugzilla access file.
++For example:
+
-
- .EX
--setsebool -P httpd_builtin_scripting 0
-+.PP
-+.B httpd_bugzilla_ra_content_t
- .EE
-
-+- Set files with the httpd_bugzilla_ra_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd bugzilla read/append content.
++.B ps -eZ | grep dmidecode_t
+
+
-+.EX
- .PP
--SELinux policy can be setup such that httpd scripts are not allowed to connect out to the network.
--This would prevent a hacker from breaking into you httpd server and attacking
--other machines. If you need scripts to be able to connect you can set the httpd_can_network_connect boolean on.
-+.B httpd_bugzilla_rw_content_t
-+.EE
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
-+- Set files with the httpd_bugzilla_rw_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd bugzilla read/write content.
++The dmidecode_t SELinux type can be entered via the "dmidecode_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the dmidecode_t domain are the following:"
+
-
- .EX
--setsebool -P httpd_can_network_connect 1
++/usr/sbin/dmidecode, /usr/sbin/ownership, /usr/sbin/vpddecode
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+.B httpd_bugzilla_script_exec_t
- .EE
-
-+- Set files with the httpd_bugzilla_script_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the httpd_bugzilla_script_t domain.
-+
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux dmidecode policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their dmidecode processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for dmidecode:
+
+.EX
- .PP
--system-config-selinux is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
--.SH AUTHOR
--This manual page was written by Dan Walsh <dwalsh at redhat.com>.
-+.B httpd_bugzilla_tmp_t
++.B dmidecode_t
+.EE
-
--.SH "SEE ALSO"
--selinux(8), httpd(8), chcon(1), setsebool(8)
-+- Set files with the httpd_bugzilla_tmp_t type, if you want to store httpd bugzilla temporary files in the /tmp directories.
-
-
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B httpd_cache_t
-+.EE
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
-+- Set files with the httpd_cache_t type, if you want to store the files under the /var/cache directory.
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux dmidecode policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their dmidecode processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for dmidecode:
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/cache/php-.*, /var/cache/mediawiki(/.*)?, /var/cache/lighttpd(/.*)?, /var/cache/php-mmcache(/.*)?, /var/cache/mod_gnutls(/.*)?, /var/cache/mod_ssl(/.*)?, /var/cache/mod_.*, /var/cache/ssl.*\.sem, /var/cache/httpd(/.*)?, /var/cache/rt3(/.*)?, /var/cache/php-eaccelerator(/.*)?, /var/cache/mason(/.*)?, /var/cache/mod_proxy(/.*)?
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B httpd_cobbler_content_t
++.B dmidecode_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the httpd_cobbler_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd cobbler content.
++- Set files with the dmidecode_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the dmidecode_t domain.
+
+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B httpd_cobbler_htaccess_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the httpd_cobbler_htaccess_t type, if you want to treat the file as a httpd cobbler access file.
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
+
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
-+.EX
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
+.PP
-+.B httpd_cobbler_ra_content_t
-+.EE
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
-+- Set files with the httpd_cobbler_ra_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd cobbler read/append content.
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B httpd_cobbler_rw_content_t
-+.EE
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), dmidecode(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/dnsmasq_selinux.8 b/man/man8/dnsmasq_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..5a65f36
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/dnsmasq_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,200 @@
++.TH "dnsmasq_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "dnsmasq" "SELinux Policy documentation for dnsmasq"
++.SH "NAME"
++dnsmasq_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the dnsmasq processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+- Set files with the httpd_cobbler_rw_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd cobbler read/write content.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the dnsmasq processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
++The dnsmasq processes execute with the dnsmasq_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B httpd_cobbler_script_exec_t
-+.EE
++For example:
+
-+- Set files with the httpd_cobbler_script_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the httpd_cobbler_script_t domain.
++.B ps -eZ | grep dnsmasq_t
+
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B httpd_collectd_content_t
-+.EE
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
-+- Set files with the httpd_collectd_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd collectd content.
++The dnsmasq_t SELinux type can be entered via the "dnsmasq_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the dnsmasq_t domain are the following:"
+
++/usr/sbin/dnsmasq
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux dnsmasq policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their dnsmasq processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for dnsmasq:
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B httpd_collectd_htaccess_t
++.B dnsmasq_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
-+- Set files with the httpd_collectd_htaccess_t type, if you want to treat the file as a httpd collectd access file.
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux dnsmasq policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their dnsmasq processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for dnsmasq:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B httpd_collectd_ra_content_t
++.B dnsmasq_etc_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the httpd_collectd_ra_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd collectd read/append content.
++- Set files with the dnsmasq_etc_t type, if you want to store dnsmasq files in the /etc directories.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B httpd_collectd_rw_content_t
++.B dnsmasq_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the httpd_collectd_rw_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd collectd read/write content.
++- Set files with the dnsmasq_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the dnsmasq_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B httpd_collectd_script_exec_t
++.B dnsmasq_initrc_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the httpd_collectd_script_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the httpd_collectd_script_t domain.
++- Set files with the dnsmasq_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the dnsmasq_initrc_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B httpd_config_t
++.B dnsmasq_lease_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the httpd_config_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd configuration data, usually stored under the /etc directory.
++- Set files with the dnsmasq_lease_t type, if you want to treat the files as dnsmasq lease data.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/etc/vhosts, /etc/httpd(/.*)?, /etc/apache(2)?(/.*)?, /etc/apache-ssl(2)?(/.*)?, /etc/lighttpd(/.*)?, /var/lib/stickshift/.httpd.d(/.*)?, /etc/cherokee(/.*)?
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B httpd_cvs_content_t
++.B dnsmasq_unit_file_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the httpd_cvs_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd cvs content.
++- Set files with the dnsmasq_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as dnsmasq unit content.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B httpd_cvs_htaccess_t
++.B dnsmasq_var_log_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the httpd_cvs_htaccess_t type, if you want to treat the file as a httpd cvs access file.
++- Set files with the dnsmasq_var_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as dnsmasq var log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B httpd_cvs_ra_content_t
++.B dnsmasq_var_run_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the httpd_cvs_ra_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd cvs read/append content.
++- Set files with the dnsmasq_var_run_t type, if you want to store the dnsmasq files under the /run directory.
+
+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B httpd_cvs_rw_content_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the httpd_cvs_rw_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd cvs read/write content.
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
+
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B httpd_cvs_script_exec_t
-+.EE
++The SELinux process type dnsmasq_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
-+- Set files with the httpd_cvs_script_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the httpd_cvs_script_t domain.
++.br
++.B crond_var_run_t
+
++ /var/run/.*cron.*
++.br
++ /var/run/crond?\.pid
++.br
++ /var/run/crond?\.reboot
++.br
++ /var/run/atd\.pid
++.br
++ /var/run/fcron\.pid
++.br
++ /var/run/fcron\.fifo
++.br
++ /var/run/anacron\.pid
+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/share/cvsweb/cvsweb\.cgi, /var/www/cgi-bin/cvsweb\.cgi
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B httpd_dirsrvadmin_content_t
-+.EE
++.br
++.B dnsmasq_lease_t
+
-+- Set files with the httpd_dirsrvadmin_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd dirsrvadmin content.
++ /var/lib/dnsmasq(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/misc/dnsmasq\.leases
++.br
+
++.br
++.B dnsmasq_var_log_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B httpd_dirsrvadmin_htaccess_t
-+.EE
++ /var/log/dnsmasq.*
++.br
+
-+- Set files with the httpd_dirsrvadmin_htaccess_t type, if you want to treat the file as a httpd dirsrvadmin access file.
++.br
++.B dnsmasq_var_run_t
+
++ /var/run/libvirt/network(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/dnsmasq\.pid
++.br
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B httpd_dirsrvadmin_ra_content_t
-+.EE
++.br
++.B virt_var_lib_t
+
-+- Set files with the httpd_dirsrvadmin_ra_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd dirsrvadmin read/append content.
++ /var/lib/oz(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/libvirt(/.*)?
++.br
+
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B httpd_dirsrvadmin_rw_content_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the httpd_dirsrvadmin_rw_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd dirsrvadmin read/write content.
-+
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the dnsmasq_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B httpd_dirsrvadmin_script_exec_t
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the httpd_dirsrvadmin_script_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the httpd_dirsrvadmin_script_t domain.
-+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/lib/dirsrv/dsgw-cgi-bin(/.*)?, /usr/lib/dirsrv/cgi-bin(/.*)?
-+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B httpd_dspam_content_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the httpd_dspam_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd dspam content.
-+
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the dnsmasq_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B httpd_dspam_htaccess_t
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the httpd_dspam_htaccess_t type, if you want to treat the file as a httpd dspam access file.
-+
-+
-+.EX
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
+.PP
-+.B httpd_dspam_ra_content_t
-+.EE
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
-+- Set files with the httpd_dspam_ra_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd dspam read/append content.
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B httpd_dspam_rw_content_t
-+.EE
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), dnsmasq(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/dnssec_trigger_selinux.8 b/man/man8/dnssec_trigger_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..d5478bf
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/dnssec_trigger_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,130 @@
++.TH "dnssec_trigger_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "dnssec_trigger" "SELinux Policy documentation for dnssec_trigger"
++.SH "NAME"
++dnssec_trigger_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the dnssec_trigger processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+- Set files with the httpd_dspam_rw_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd dspam read/write content.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the dnssec_trigger processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
++The dnssec_trigger processes execute with the dnssec_trigger_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B httpd_dspam_script_exec_t
-+.EE
++For example:
+
-+- Set files with the httpd_dspam_script_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the httpd_dspam_script_t domain.
++.B ps -eZ | grep dnssec_trigger_t
+
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B httpd_exec_t
-+.EE
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
-+- Set files with the httpd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the httpd_t domain.
++The dnssec_trigger_t SELinux type can be entered via the "dnssec_trigger_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the dnssec_trigger_t domain are the following:"
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/sbin/apache(2)?, /usr/share/jetty/bin/jetty.sh, /usr/bin/mongrel_rails, /usr/lib/apache-ssl/.+, /usr/sbin/httpd\.event, /usr/sbin/httpd(\.worker)?, /usr/sbin/cherokee, /usr/sbin/apache-ssl(2)?, /usr/sbin/lighttpd
++/usr/sbin/dnssec-triggerd
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux dnssec_trigger policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their dnssec_trigger processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for dnssec_trigger:
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B httpd_git_content_t
++.B dnssec_trigger_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
-+- Set files with the httpd_git_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd git content.
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux dnssec_trigger policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their dnssec_trigger processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for dnssec_trigger:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B httpd_git_htaccess_t
++.B dnssec_trigger_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the httpd_git_htaccess_t type, if you want to treat the file as a httpd git access file.
++- Set files with the dnssec_trigger_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the dnssec_trigger_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B httpd_git_ra_content_t
++.B dnssec_trigger_var_run_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the httpd_git_ra_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd git read/append content.
++- Set files with the dnssec_trigger_var_run_t type, if you want to store the dnssec trigger files under the /run directory.
+
+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B httpd_git_rw_content_t
-+.EE
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
+
-+- Set files with the httpd_git_rw_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd git read/write content.
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type dnssec_trigger_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/cache/gitweb-caching(/.*)?, /var/cache/cgit(/.*)?
++.B dnssec_trigger_var_run_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B httpd_git_script_exec_t
-+.EE
++ /var/run/dnssec.*
++.br
+
-+- Set files with the httpd_git_script_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the httpd_git_script_t domain.
++.br
++.B net_conf_t
+
++ /etc/ntpd?\.conf.*
++.br
++ /etc/hosts[^/]*
++.br
++ /etc/yp\.conf.*
++.br
++ /etc/denyhosts.*
++.br
++ /etc/hosts\.deny.*
++.br
++ /etc/resolv\.conf.*
++.br
++ /etc/ntp/step-tickers.*
++.br
++ /etc/sysconfig/networking(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/sysconfig/network-scripts(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/sysconfig/network-scripts/.*resolv\.conf
++.br
++ /etc/ethers
+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/www/git/gitweb\.cgi, /var/www/cgi-bin/cgit, /var/www/gitweb-caching/gitweb\.cgi
+
-+.EX
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
+.PP
-+.B httpd_helper_exec_t
-+.EE
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
-+- Set files with the httpd_helper_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the httpd_helper_t domain.
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B httpd_initrc_exec_t
-+.EE
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), dnssec_trigger(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/dovecot_auth_selinux.8 b/man/man8/dovecot_auth_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..6411b0a
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/dovecot_auth_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,155 @@
++.TH "dovecot_auth_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "dovecot_auth" "SELinux Policy documentation for dovecot_auth"
++.SH "NAME"
++dovecot_auth_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the dovecot_auth processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+- Set files with the httpd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the httpd_initrc_t domain.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the dovecot_auth processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/etc/init\.d/cherokee, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/httpd, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/lighttpd
++The dovecot_auth processes execute with the dovecot_auth_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B httpd_keytab_t
-+.EE
++For example:
+
-+- Set files with the httpd_keytab_t type, if you want to treat the files as kerberos keytab files.
++.B ps -eZ | grep dovecot_auth_t
+
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B httpd_libra_content_t
-+.EE
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
-+- Set files with the httpd_libra_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd libra content.
++The dovecot_auth_t SELinux type can be entered via the "dovecot_auth_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the dovecot_auth_t domain are the following:"
+
++/usr/libexec/dovecot/auth, /usr/libexec/dovecot/dovecot-auth
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux dovecot_auth policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their dovecot_auth processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for dovecot_auth:
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B httpd_libra_htaccess_t
++.B dovecot_auth_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
-+- Set files with the httpd_libra_htaccess_t type, if you want to treat the file as a httpd libra access file.
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux dovecot_auth policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their dovecot_auth processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for dovecot_auth:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B httpd_libra_ra_content_t
++.B dovecot_auth_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the httpd_libra_ra_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd libra read/append content.
++- Set files with the dovecot_auth_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the dovecot_auth_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B httpd_libra_rw_content_t
++.B dovecot_auth_tmp_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the httpd_libra_rw_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd libra read/write content.
++- Set files with the dovecot_auth_tmp_t type, if you want to store dovecot auth temporary files in the /tmp directories.
+
+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B httpd_libra_script_exec_t
-+.EE
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
+
-+- Set files with the httpd_libra_script_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the httpd_libra_script_t domain.
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
++The SELinux process type dovecot_auth_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B httpd_lock_t
-+.EE
++.br
++.B dovecot_auth_tmp_t
+
-+- Set files with the httpd_lock_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd lock data, stored under the /var/lock directory
+
++.br
++.B faillog_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B httpd_log_t
-+.EE
++ /var/log/btmp.*
++.br
++ /var/run/faillock(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/log/faillog
++.br
++ /var/log/tallylog
++.br
+
-+- Set files with the httpd_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as httpd log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++.br
++.B initrc_var_run_t
+
++ /var/run/utmp
++.br
++ /var/run/random-seed
++.br
++ /var/run/runlevel\.dir
++.br
++ /var/run/setmixer_flag
+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/log/apache-ssl(2)?(/.*)?, /var/log/suphp\.log.*, /var/log/httpd(/.*)?, /var/log/apache(2)?(/.*)?, /var/log/cherokee(/.*)?, /var/log/roundcubemail(/.*)?, /var/log/cgiwrap\.log.*, /var/log/lighttpd(/.*)?, /var/www(/.*)?/logs(/.*)?, /var/log/cacti(/.*)?, /var/log/dirsrv/admin-serv(/.*)?, /etc/httpd/logs
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B httpd_man2html_content_t
-+.EE
++.br
++.B pcscd_var_run_t
+
-+- Set files with the httpd_man2html_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd man2html content.
++ /var/run/pcscd(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/pcscd\.events(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/pcscd\.pid
++.br
++ /var/run/pcscd\.pub
++.br
++ /var/run/pcscd\.comm
++.br
+
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B httpd_man2html_htaccess_t
-+.EE
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the dovecot_auth_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
-+- Set files with the httpd_man2html_htaccess_t type, if you want to treat the file as a httpd man2html access file.
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
+
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the dovecot_auth_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B httpd_man2html_ra_content_t
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the httpd_man2html_ra_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd man2html read/append content.
-+
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B httpd_man2html_rw_content_t
-+.EE
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+- Set files with the httpd_man2html_rw_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd man2html read/write content.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), dovecot_auth(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, dovecot_selinux(8), dovecot_selinux(8), dovecot_deliver_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/dovecot_deliver_selinux.8 b/man/man8/dovecot_deliver_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..fa12a80
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/dovecot_deliver_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,157 @@
++.TH "dovecot_deliver_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "dovecot_deliver" "SELinux Policy documentation for dovecot_deliver"
++.SH "NAME"
++dovecot_deliver_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the dovecot_deliver processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B httpd_man2html_script_cache_t
-+.EE
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the dovecot_deliver processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+- Set files with the httpd_man2html_script_cache_t type, if you want to store the files under the /var/cache directory.
++The dovecot_deliver processes execute with the dovecot_deliver_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B httpd_man2html_script_exec_t
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep dovecot_deliver_t
+
-+- Set files with the httpd_man2html_script_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the httpd_man2html_script_t domain.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/lib/man2html/cgi-bin/man/manwhatis, /usr/lib/man2html/cgi-bin/man/man2html, /usr/lib/man2html/cgi-bin/man/mansec
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
-+.EX
++The dovecot_deliver_t SELinux type can be entered via the "dovecot_deliver_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the dovecot_deliver_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/libexec/dovecot/deliver, /usr/libexec/dovecot/dovecot-lda
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+.B httpd_mediawiki_content_t
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux dovecot_deliver policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their dovecot_deliver processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for dovecot_deliver:
++
++.EX
++.B dovecot_deliver_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
-+- Set files with the httpd_mediawiki_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd mediawiki content.
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux dovecot_deliver policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their dovecot_deliver processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for dovecot_deliver:
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/www/wiki/.*\.php, /usr/share/mediawiki(/.*)?
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B httpd_mediawiki_htaccess_t
++.B dovecot_deliver_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the httpd_mediawiki_htaccess_t type, if you want to treat the file as a httpd mediawiki access file.
++- Set files with the dovecot_deliver_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the dovecot_deliver_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B httpd_mediawiki_ra_content_t
++.B dovecot_deliver_tmp_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the httpd_mediawiki_ra_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd mediawiki read/append content.
++- Set files with the dovecot_deliver_tmp_t type, if you want to store dovecot deliver temporary files in the /tmp directories.
+
+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B httpd_mediawiki_rw_content_t
-+.EE
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
+
-+- Set files with the httpd_mediawiki_rw_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd mediawiki read/write content.
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
++The SELinux process type dovecot_deliver_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B httpd_mediawiki_script_exec_t
-+.EE
++.br
++.B data_home_t
+
-+- Set files with the httpd_mediawiki_script_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the httpd_mediawiki_script_t domain.
++ /root/\.local/share(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.local/share(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.local/share(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.local/share(/.*)?
++.br
+
+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/lib/mediawiki/math/texvc, /usr/lib/mediawiki/math/texvc_tex, /usr/lib/mediawiki/math/texvc_tes
++.B dovecot_deliver_tmp_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B httpd_modules_t
-+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the httpd_modules_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd modules.
++.br
++.B dovecot_spool_t
+
++ /var/spool/dovecot(/.*)?
+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/lib/cherokee(/.*)?, /usr/lib/lighttpd(/.*)?, /usr/lib/apache(/.*)?, /etc/httpd/modules, /usr/lib/httpd(/.*)?, /usr/lib/apache2/modules(/.*)?
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B httpd_mojomojo_content_t
-+.EE
++.br
++.B mail_home_rw_t
+
-+- Set files with the httpd_mojomojo_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd mojomojo content.
++ /root/Maildir(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/Maildir(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/Maildir(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/Maildir(/.*)?
++.br
+
++.br
++.B user_home_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B httpd_mojomojo_htaccess_t
-+.EE
++ /home/[^/]*/.+
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/.+
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/.+
++.br
+
-+- Set files with the httpd_mojomojo_htaccess_t type, if you want to treat the file as a httpd mojomojo access file.
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the dovecot_deliver_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B httpd_mojomojo_ra_content_t
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the httpd_mojomojo_ra_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd mojomojo read/append content.
-+
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the dovecot_deliver_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B httpd_mojomojo_rw_content_t
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the httpd_mojomojo_rw_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd mojomojo read/write content.
-+
-+
-+.EX
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
+.PP
-+.B httpd_mojomojo_script_exec_t
-+.EE
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
-+- Set files with the httpd_mojomojo_script_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the httpd_mojomojo_script_t domain.
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B httpd_mojomojo_tmp_t
-+.EE
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), dovecot_deliver(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, dovecot_selinux(8), dovecot_selinux(8), dovecot_auth_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/dovecot_selinux.8 b/man/man8/dovecot_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..d61a836
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/dovecot_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,317 @@
++.TH "dovecot_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "dovecot" "SELinux Policy documentation for dovecot"
++.SH "NAME"
++dovecot_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the dovecot processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+- Set files with the httpd_mojomojo_tmp_t type, if you want to store httpd mojomojo temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the dovecot processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
++The dovecot processes execute with the dovecot_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B httpd_munin_content_t
-+.EE
++For example:
+
-+- Set files with the httpd_munin_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd munin content.
++.B ps -eZ | grep dovecot_t
+
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B httpd_munin_htaccess_t
-+.EE
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
-+- Set files with the httpd_munin_htaccess_t type, if you want to treat the file as a httpd munin access file.
++The dovecot_t SELinux type can be entered via the "dovecot_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the dovecot_t domain are the following:"
+
++/usr/sbin/dovecot
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux dovecot policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their dovecot processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for dovecot:
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B httpd_munin_ra_content_t
++.B dovecot_deliver_t, dovecot_auth_t, dovecot_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
-+- Set files with the httpd_munin_ra_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd munin read/append content.
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux dovecot policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their dovecot processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for dovecot:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B httpd_munin_rw_content_t
++.B dovecot_auth_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the httpd_munin_rw_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd munin read/write content.
++- Set files with the dovecot_auth_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the dovecot_auth_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B httpd_munin_script_exec_t
++.B dovecot_auth_tmp_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the httpd_munin_script_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the httpd_munin_script_t domain.
++- Set files with the dovecot_auth_tmp_t type, if you want to store dovecot auth temporary files in the /tmp directories.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B httpd_nagios_content_t
++.B dovecot_cert_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the httpd_nagios_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd nagios content.
++- Set files with the dovecot_cert_t type, if you want to treat the files as dovecot certificate data.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B httpd_nagios_htaccess_t
++.B dovecot_deliver_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the httpd_nagios_htaccess_t type, if you want to treat the file as a httpd nagios access file.
++- Set files with the dovecot_deliver_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the dovecot_deliver_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B httpd_nagios_ra_content_t
++.B dovecot_deliver_tmp_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the httpd_nagios_ra_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd nagios read/append content.
++- Set files with the dovecot_deliver_tmp_t type, if you want to store dovecot deliver temporary files in the /tmp directories.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B httpd_nagios_rw_content_t
++.B dovecot_etc_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the httpd_nagios_rw_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd nagios read/write content.
++- Set files with the dovecot_etc_t type, if you want to store dovecot files in the /etc directories.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B httpd_nagios_script_exec_t
++.B dovecot_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the httpd_nagios_script_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the httpd_nagios_script_t domain.
++- Set files with the dovecot_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the dovecot_t domain.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/lib/cgi-bin/nagios(/.+)?, /usr/lib/nagios/cgi-bin(/.*)?, /usr/lib/cgi-bin/netsaint(/.*)?, /usr/lib/nagios/cgi(/.*)?
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B httpd_nutups_cgi_content_t
++.B dovecot_initrc_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the httpd_nutups_cgi_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd nutups cgi content.
++- Set files with the dovecot_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the dovecot_initrc_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B httpd_nutups_cgi_htaccess_t
++.B dovecot_passwd_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the httpd_nutups_cgi_htaccess_t type, if you want to treat the file as a httpd nutups cgi access file.
++- Set files with the dovecot_passwd_t type, if you want to treat the files as dovecot passwd data.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B httpd_nutups_cgi_ra_content_t
++.B dovecot_spool_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the httpd_nutups_cgi_ra_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd nutups cgi read/append content.
++- Set files with the dovecot_spool_t type, if you want to store the dovecot files under the /var/spool directory.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B httpd_nutups_cgi_rw_content_t
++.B dovecot_t_keytab_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the httpd_nutups_cgi_rw_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd nutups cgi read/write content.
++- Set files with the dovecot_t_keytab_t type, if you want to treat the files as kerberos keytab files.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B httpd_nutups_cgi_script_exec_t
++.B dovecot_tmp_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the httpd_nutups_cgi_script_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the httpd_nutups_cgi_script_t domain.
++- Set files with the dovecot_tmp_t type, if you want to store dovecot temporary files in the /tmp directories.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/www/nut-cgi-bin/upsstats\.cgi, /var/www/nut-cgi-bin/upsimage\.cgi, /var/www/nut-cgi-bin/upsset\.cgi
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B httpd_passwd_exec_t
++.B dovecot_var_lib_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the httpd_passwd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the httpd_passwd_t domain.
++- Set files with the dovecot_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the dovecot files under the /var/lib directory.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B httpd_php_exec_t
++.B dovecot_var_log_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the httpd_php_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the httpd_php_t domain.
++- Set files with the dovecot_var_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as dovecot var log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B httpd_php_tmp_t
++.B dovecot_var_run_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the httpd_php_tmp_t type, if you want to store httpd php temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++- Set files with the dovecot_var_run_t type, if you want to store the dovecot files under the /run directory.
+
+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B httpd_prewikka_content_t
-+.EE
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
+
-+- Set files with the httpd_prewikka_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd prewikka content.
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
++The SELinux process type dovecot_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B httpd_prewikka_htaccess_t
-+.EE
++.br
++.B data_home_t
+
-+- Set files with the httpd_prewikka_htaccess_t type, if you want to treat the file as a httpd prewikka access file.
++ /root/\.local/share(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.local/share(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.local/share(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.local/share(/.*)?
++.br
+
++.br
++.B dovecot_spool_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B httpd_prewikka_ra_content_t
-+.EE
++ /var/spool/dovecot(/.*)?
++.br
+
-+- Set files with the httpd_prewikka_ra_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd prewikka read/append content.
++.br
++.B dovecot_tmp_t
+
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B httpd_prewikka_rw_content_t
-+.EE
++.br
++.B dovecot_var_lib_t
+
-+- Set files with the httpd_prewikka_rw_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd prewikka read/write content.
++ /var/lib/dovecot(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/dovecot/login/ssl-parameters.dat
++.br
+
++.br
++.B dovecot_var_log_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B httpd_prewikka_script_exec_t
-+.EE
++ /var/log/dovecot(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/log/dovecot\.log.*
++.br
+
-+- Set files with the httpd_prewikka_script_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the httpd_prewikka_script_t domain.
++.br
++.B dovecot_var_run_t
+
++ /var/run/dovecot(-login)?(/.*)?
++.br
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B httpd_rotatelogs_exec_t
-+.EE
++.br
++.B krb5_host_rcache_t
+
-+- Set files with the httpd_rotatelogs_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the httpd_rotatelogs_t domain.
++ /var/cache/krb5rcache(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/tmp/nfs_0
++.br
++ /var/tmp/DNS_25
++.br
++ /var/tmp/host_0
++.br
++ /var/tmp/imap_0
++.br
++ /var/tmp/HTTP_23
++.br
++ /var/tmp/HTTP_48
++.br
++ /var/tmp/ldap_55
++.br
++ /var/tmp/ldap_487
++.br
++ /var/tmp/ldapmap1_0
++.br
+
++.br
++.B mail_home_rw_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B httpd_smokeping_cgi_content_t
-+.EE
++ /root/Maildir(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/Maildir(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/Maildir(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/Maildir(/.*)?
++.br
+
-+- Set files with the httpd_smokeping_cgi_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd smokeping cgi content.
++.br
++.B mail_spool_t
+
++ /var/mail(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/spool/imap(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/spool/mail(/.*)?
++.br
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B httpd_smokeping_cgi_htaccess_t
-+.EE
++.br
++.B user_home_t
+
-+- Set files with the httpd_smokeping_cgi_htaccess_t type, if you want to treat the file as a httpd smokeping cgi access file.
++ /home/[^/]*/.+
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/.+
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/.+
++.br
+
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B httpd_smokeping_cgi_ra_content_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the httpd_smokeping_cgi_ra_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd smokeping cgi read/append content.
-+
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the dovecot_auth_t, dovecot_t, dovecot_deliver_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B httpd_smokeping_cgi_rw_content_t
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the httpd_smokeping_cgi_rw_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd smokeping cgi read/write content.
-+
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the dovecot_auth_t, dovecot_t, dovecot_deliver_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B httpd_smokeping_cgi_script_exec_t
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the httpd_smokeping_cgi_script_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the httpd_smokeping_cgi_script_t domain.
-+
-+
-+.EX
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
+.PP
-+.B httpd_squid_content_t
-+.EE
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
-+- Set files with the httpd_squid_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd squid content.
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B httpd_squid_htaccess_t
-+.EE
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), dovecot(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, dovecot_auth_selinux(8), dovecot_deliver_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/drbd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/drbd_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..0306d2e
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/drbd_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,116 @@
++.TH "drbd_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "drbd" "SELinux Policy documentation for drbd"
++.SH "NAME"
++drbd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the drbd processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+- Set files with the httpd_squid_htaccess_t type, if you want to treat the file as a httpd squid access file.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the drbd processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
++The drbd processes execute with the drbd_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B httpd_squid_ra_content_t
-+.EE
++For example:
+
-+- Set files with the httpd_squid_ra_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd squid read/append content.
++.B ps -eZ | grep drbd_t
+
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B httpd_squid_rw_content_t
-+.EE
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
-+- Set files with the httpd_squid_rw_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd squid read/write content.
++The drbd_t SELinux type can be entered via the "drbd_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the drbd_t domain are the following:"
+
++/usr/lib/ocf/resource.\d/linbit/drbd, /sbin/drbdadm, /sbin/drbdsetup, /usr/sbin/drbdadm, /usr/sbin/drbdsetup
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux drbd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their drbd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for drbd:
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B httpd_squid_script_exec_t
++.B drbd_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
-+- Set files with the httpd_squid_script_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the httpd_squid_script_t domain.
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux drbd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their drbd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for drbd:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B httpd_squirrelmail_t
++.B drbd_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the httpd_squirrelmail_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd squirrelmail data.
++- Set files with the drbd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the drbd_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B httpd_suexec_exec_t
++.B drbd_lock_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the httpd_suexec_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the httpd_suexec_t domain.
++- Set files with the drbd_lock_t type, if you want to treat the files as drbd lock data, stored under the /var/lock directory
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/lib/apache(2)?/suexec(2)?, /usr/sbin/suexec, /usr/lib/cgi-bin/(nph-)?cgiwrap(d)?
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B httpd_suexec_tmp_t
++.B drbd_var_lib_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the httpd_suexec_tmp_t type, if you want to store httpd suexec temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++- Set files with the drbd_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the drbd files under the /var/lib directory.
+
+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B httpd_sys_content_t
-+.EE
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
+
-+- Set files with the httpd_sys_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd sys content.
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type drbd_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/share/icecast(/.*)?, /usr/share/htdig(/.*)?, /etc/htdig(/.*)?, /var/www/svn/conf(/.*)?, /usr/share/doc/ghc/html(/.*)?, /usr/share/mythtv/data(/.*)?, /var/lib/htdig(/.*)?, /srv/gallery2(/.*)?, /srv/([^/]*/)?www(/.*)?, /usr/share/ntop/html(/.*)?, /usr/share/mythweb(/.*)?, /usr/share/openca/htdocs(/.*)?, /usr/share/selinux-policy[^/]*/html(/.*)?, /usr/share/drupal.*, /var/lib/cacti/rra(/.*)?, /var/lib/trac(/.*)?, /var/www(/.*)?, /var/www/icons(/.*)?
++.B drbd_lock_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B httpd_sys_htaccess_t
-+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the httpd_sys_htaccess_t type, if you want to treat the file as a httpd sys access file.
++.br
++.B drbd_var_lib_t
+
++ /var/lib/drbd(/.*)?
++.br
+
-+.EX
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
+.PP
-+.B httpd_sys_ra_content_t
-+.EE
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
-+- Set files with the httpd_sys_ra_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd sys read/append content.
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B httpd_sys_rw_content_t
-+.EE
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), drbd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/dspam_selinux.8 b/man/man8/dspam_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..64cf453
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/dspam_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,166 @@
++.TH "dspam_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "dspam" "SELinux Policy documentation for dspam"
++.SH "NAME"
++dspam_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the dspam processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+- Set files with the httpd_sys_rw_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd sys read/write content.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the dspam processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/www/html/[^/]*/sites/default/settings\.php, /var/spool/viewvc(/.*)?, /etc/WebCalendar(/.*)?, /etc/mock/koji(/.*)?, /var/lib/svn(/.*)?, /var/spool/gosa(/.*)?, /etc/zabbix/web(/.*)?, /var/lib/pootle/po(/.*)?, /etc/drupal.*, /var/www/gallery/albums(/.*)?, /usr/share/wordpress/wp-content/uploads(/.*)?, /var/www/html/configuration\.php, /usr/share/wordpress/wp-content/upgrade(/.*)?, /var/lib/drupal.*, /usr/share/wordpress-mu/wp-content(/.*)?, /var/lib/dokuwiki(/.*)?, /var/www/moodledata(/.*)?, /var/www/html/[^/]*/sites/default/files(/.*)?, /var/www/svn(/.*)?, /var/www/html/wp-content(/.*)?
++The dspam processes execute with the dspam_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B httpd_sys_script_exec_t
-+.EE
++For example:
+
-+- Set files with the httpd_sys_script_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the httpd_sys_script_t domain.
++.B ps -eZ | grep dspam_t
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/www/svn/hooks(/.*)?, /usr/share/mythweb/mythweb\.pl, /usr/share/wordpress/.*\.php, /usr/lib/cgi-bin(/.*)?, /var/www/perl(/.*)?, /usr/share/mythtv/mythweather/scripts(/.*)?, /usr/share/wordpress-mu/wp-config\.php, /var/www/html/[^/]*/cgi-bin(/.*)?, /var/www/[^/]*/cgi-bin(/.*)?, /var/www/cgi-bin(/.*)?, /usr/share/wordpress/wp-includes/.*\.php
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B httpd_tmp_t
-+.EE
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
-+- Set files with the httpd_tmp_t type, if you want to store httpd temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++The dspam_t SELinux type can be entered via the "dspam_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the dspam_t domain are the following:"
+
++/usr/bin/dspam
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux dspam policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their dspam processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for dspam:
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B httpd_tmpfs_t
++.B dspam_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
-+- Set files with the httpd_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store httpd files on a tmpfs file system.
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux dspam policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their dspam processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for dspam:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B httpd_unit_file_t
++.B dspam_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the httpd_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd unit content.
++- Set files with the dspam_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the dspam_t domain.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/lib/systemd/system/httpd.*, /usr/lib/systemd/system/jetty.*
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B httpd_user_content_t
++.B dspam_initrc_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the httpd_user_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd user content.
++- Set files with the dspam_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the dspam_initrc_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B httpd_user_htaccess_t
++.B dspam_log_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the httpd_user_htaccess_t type, if you want to treat the file as a httpd user access file.
++- Set files with the dspam_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as dspam log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B httpd_user_ra_content_t
++.B dspam_tmp_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the httpd_user_ra_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd user read/append content.
++- Set files with the dspam_tmp_t type, if you want to store dspam temporary files in the /tmp directories.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B httpd_user_rw_content_t
++.B dspam_var_lib_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the httpd_user_rw_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd user read/write content.
++- Set files with the dspam_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the dspam files under the /var/lib directory.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B httpd_user_script_exec_t
++.B dspam_var_run_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the httpd_user_script_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the httpd_user_script_t domain.
++- Set files with the dspam_var_run_t type, if you want to store the dspam files under the /run directory.
+
+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B httpd_var_lib_t
-+.EE
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
+
-+- Set files with the httpd_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the httpd files under the /var/lib directory.
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type dspam_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/lib/rt3/data/RT-Shredder(/.*)?, /var/lib/lighttpd(/.*)?, /var/lib/httpd(/.*)?, /var/lib/cherokee(/.*)?, /var/lib/dav(/.*)?
++.B dspam_log_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B httpd_var_run_t
-+.EE
++ /var/log/dspam(/.*)?
++.br
+
-+- Set files with the httpd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the httpd files under the /run directory.
++.br
++.B dspam_var_lib_t
+
++ /var/lib/dspam(/.*)?
+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/run/mod_.*, /var/run/wsgi.*, /var/run/apache.*, /var/run/cherokee\.pid, /var/run/gcache_port, /opt/dirsrv/var/run/dirsrv/dsgw/cookies(/.*)?, /var/run/httpd.*, /var/run/dirsrv/admin-serv.*, /var/lib/php/session(/.*)?, /var/run/lighttpd(/.*)?
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B httpd_w3c_validator_content_t
-+.EE
++.br
++.B dspam_var_run_t
+
-+- Set files with the httpd_w3c_validator_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd w3c validator content.
++ /var/run/dspam(/.*)?
++.br
+
++.br
++.B httpd_dspam_rw_content_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B httpd_w3c_validator_htaccess_t
-+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the httpd_w3c_validator_htaccess_t type, if you want to treat the file as a httpd w3c validator access file.
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the dspam_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B httpd_w3c_validator_ra_content_t
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the httpd_w3c_validator_ra_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd w3c validator read/append content.
-+
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the dspam_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B httpd_w3c_validator_rw_content_t
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the httpd_w3c_validator_rw_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd w3c validator read/write content.
-+
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B httpd_w3c_validator_script_exec_t
-+.EE
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+- Set files with the httpd_w3c_validator_script_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the httpd_w3c_validator_script_t domain.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/share/w3c-markup-validator/cgi-bin(/.*)?, /usr/lib/cgi-bin/check
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), dspam(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/entropyd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/entropyd_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..0035e75
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/entropyd_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,142 @@
++.TH "entropyd_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "entropyd" "SELinux Policy documentation for entropyd"
++.SH "NAME"
++entropyd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the entropyd processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B httpd_w3c_validator_tmp_t
-+.EE
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the entropyd processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+- Set files with the httpd_w3c_validator_tmp_t type, if you want to store httpd w3c validator temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++The entropyd processes execute with the entropyd_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B httpd_zoneminder_content_t
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep entropyd_t
+
-+- Set files with the httpd_zoneminder_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd zoneminder content.
+
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
-+.EX
++The entropyd_t SELinux type can be entered via the "entropyd_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the entropyd_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/sbin/haveged, /usr/sbin/audio-entropyd
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux entropyd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their entropyd processes in as secure a method as possible.
+.PP
-+.B httpd_zoneminder_htaccess_t
++The following process types are defined for entropyd:
++
++.EX
++.B entropyd_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
-+- Set files with the httpd_zoneminder_htaccess_t type, if you want to treat the file as a httpd zoneminder access file.
++.SH BOOLEANS
++SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. entropyd policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run entropyd with the tightest access possible.
+
+
++.PP
++If you want to allow the use of the audio devices as the source for the entropy feeds, you must turn on the entropyd_use_audio boolean.
++
+.EX
++.B setsebool -P entropyd_use_audio 1
++.EE
++
+.PP
-+.B httpd_zoneminder_ra_content_t
++If you want to allow the use of the audio devices as the source for the entropy feeds, you must turn on the entropyd_use_audio boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P entropyd_use_audio 1
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the httpd_zoneminder_ra_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd zoneminder read/append content.
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux entropyd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their entropyd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for entropyd:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B httpd_zoneminder_rw_content_t
++.B entropyd_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the httpd_zoneminder_rw_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd zoneminder read/write content.
++- Set files with the entropyd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the entropyd_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B httpd_zoneminder_script_exec_t
++.B entropyd_var_run_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the httpd_zoneminder_script_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the httpd_zoneminder_script_t domain.
++- Set files with the entropyd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the entropyd files under the /run directory.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PORT TYPES
-+SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
-+.PP
-+You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+.B semanage port -l
++The SELinux process type entropyd_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
-+SELinux httpd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their httpd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following port types are defined for httpd:
++.br
++.B entropyd_var_run_t
+
-+.EX
-+.TP 5
-+.B http_cache_port_t
-+.TP 10
-+.EE
++ /var/run/haveged\.pid
++.br
++ /var/run/audio-entropyd\.pid
++.br
+
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
-+Default Defined Ports:
-+tcp 8080,8118,10001-10010
-+.EE
-+udp 3130
-+.EE
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the entropyd_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.TP 5
-+.B http_port_t
-+.TP 10
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
+
-+
-+Default Defined Ports:
-+tcp 80,443,488,8008,8009,8443
-+.EE
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux httpd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their httpd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for httpd:
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the entropyd_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B httpd_collectd_script_t, httpd_cvs_script_t, httpd_rotatelogs_t, httpd_bugzilla_script_t, httpd_smokeping_cgi_script_t, httpd_nagios_script_t, httpd_dirsrvadmin_script_t, httpd_suexec_t, httpd_mojomojo_script_t, httpd_php_t, httpd_w3c_validator_script_t, httpd_user_script_t, httpd_awstats_script_t, httpd_libra_script_t, httpd_apcupsd_cgi_script_t, httpd_nutups_cgi_script_t, httpd_munin_script_t, httpd_zoneminder_script_t, httpd_sys_script_t, httpd_dspam_script_t, httpd_prewikka_script_t, httpd_git_script_t, httpd_t, httpd_man2html_script_t, httpd_passwd_t, httpd_helper_t, httpd_squid_script_t, httpd_cobbler_script_t, httpd_mediawiki_script_t
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -21936,100 +24764,132 @@ index 16e8b13..0f70c71 100644
+.B semanage module
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
-+.B semanage port
-+can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
-+
+.B semanage boolean
+can also be used to manipulate the booleans
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), httpd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
++selinux(8), entropyd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+, setsebool(8)
\ No newline at end of file
-diff --git a/man/man8/hwclock_selinux.8 b/man/man8/hwclock_selinux.8
+diff --git a/man/man8/eventlogd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/eventlogd_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..5e360b5
+index 0000000..755e81c
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/hwclock_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
-+.TH "hwclock_selinux" "8" "hwclock" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "hwclock SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/eventlogd_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,126 @@
++.TH "eventlogd_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "eventlogd" "SELinux Policy documentation for eventlogd"
+.SH "NAME"
-+hwclock_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the hwclock processes
++eventlogd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the eventlogd processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the hwclock processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the eventlogd processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The eventlogd processes execute with the eventlogd_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the hwclock_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep eventlogd_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The eventlogd_t SELinux type can be entered via the "eventlogd_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the eventlogd_t domain are the following:"
+
++/usr/sbin/eventlogd
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the hwclock_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux eventlogd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their eventlogd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for eventlogd:
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B eventlogd_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux hwclock policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their hwclock processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for hwclock:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux eventlogd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their eventlogd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for eventlogd:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B hwclock_exec_t
++.B eventlogd_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the hwclock_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the hwclock_t domain.
++- Set files with the eventlogd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the eventlogd_t domain.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/sbin/hwclock, /sbin/hwclock
+
++.EX
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
++.B eventlogd_var_lib_t
++.EE
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++- Set files with the eventlogd_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the eventlogd files under the /var/lib directory.
++
++
++.EX
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux hwclock policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their hwclock processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for hwclock:
++.B eventlogd_var_run_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the eventlogd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the eventlogd files under the /run directory.
++
+
+.EX
-+.B hwclock_t
++.PP
++.B eventlogd_var_socket_t
+.EE
++
++- Set files with the eventlogd_var_socket_t type, if you want to treat the files as eventlogd var socket data.
++
++
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type eventlogd_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B eventlogd_var_lib_t
++
++ /var/lib/likewise-open/db/lwi_events.db
++.br
++
++.br
++.B eventlogd_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/eventlogd.pid
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -22042,89 +24902,120 @@ index 0000000..5e360b5
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), hwclock(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/iceauth_selinux.8 b/man/man8/iceauth_selinux.8
++selinux(8), eventlogd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/evtchnd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/evtchnd_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..cdb61ed
+index 0000000..85b3690
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/iceauth_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
-+.TH "iceauth_selinux" "8" "iceauth" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "iceauth SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/evtchnd_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,120 @@
++.TH "evtchnd_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "evtchnd" "SELinux Policy documentation for evtchnd"
+.SH "NAME"
-+iceauth_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the iceauth processes
++evtchnd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the evtchnd processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the iceauth processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the evtchnd processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The evtchnd processes execute with the evtchnd_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep evtchnd_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The evtchnd_t SELinux type can be entered via the "evtchnd_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the evtchnd_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/sbin/evtchnd
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux evtchnd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their evtchnd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for evtchnd:
++
++.EX
++.B evtchnd_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux iceauth policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their iceauth processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for iceauth:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux evtchnd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their evtchnd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for evtchnd:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B iceauth_exec_t
++.B evtchnd_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the iceauth_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the iceauth_t domain.
++- Set files with the evtchnd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the evtchnd_t domain.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/bin/iceauth, /usr/X11R6/bin/iceauth
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B iceauth_home_t
++.B evtchnd_var_log_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the iceauth_home_t type, if you want to store iceauth files in the users home directory.
++- Set files with the evtchnd_var_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as evtchnd var log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B evtchnd_var_run_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the evtchnd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the evtchnd files under the /run directory.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/root/\.DCOP.*, /root/\.ICEauthority.*
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux iceauth policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their iceauth processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for iceauth:
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+.EX
-+.B iceauth_t
-+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++The SELinux process type evtchnd_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B evtchnd_var_log_t
++
++ /var/log/evtchnd\.log.*
++.br
++
++.br
++.B evtchnd_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/evtchnd
++.br
++ /var/run/evtchnd\.pid
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -22137,122 +25028,266 @@ index 0000000..cdb61ed
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), iceauth(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/icecast_selinux.8 b/man/man8/icecast_selinux.8
++selinux(8), evtchnd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/exim_selinux.8 b/man/man8/exim_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..09452ee
+index 0000000..f156767
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/icecast_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,126 @@
-+.TH "icecast_selinux" "8" "icecast" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "icecast SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/exim_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,270 @@
++.TH "exim_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "exim" "SELinux Policy documentation for exim"
+.SH "NAME"
-+icecast_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the icecast processes
++exim_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the exim processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the icecast processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the exim processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The exim processes execute with the exim_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep exim_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The exim_t SELinux type can be entered via the "exim_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the exim_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/sbin/exim[0-9]?, /usr/sbin/exim_tidydb
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux exim policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their exim processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for exim:
++
++.EX
++.B exim_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH BOOLEANS
-+SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. icecast policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run icecast with the tightest access possible.
++SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. exim policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run exim with the tightest access possible.
+
+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow icecast to connect to all ports, not just sound ports, you must turn on the icecast_connect_any boolean.
++If you want to allow exim to connect to databases (postgres, mysql), you must turn on the exim_can_connect_db boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P icecast_connect_any 1
++.B setsebool -P exim_can_connect_db 1
+.EE
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++.PP
++If you want to allow exim to create, read, write, and delete unprivileged user files, you must turn on the exim_manage_user_files boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P exim_manage_user_files 1
++.EE
+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the icecast_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++If you want to allow exim to read unprivileged user files, you must turn on the exim_read_user_files boolean.
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.B setsebool -P exim_read_user_files 1
+.EE
+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the icecast_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++If you want to allow exim to connect to databases (postgres, mysql), you must turn on the exim_can_connect_db boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P exim_can_connect_db 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow exim to create, read, write, and delete unprivileged user files, you must turn on the exim_manage_user_files boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P exim_manage_user_files 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow exim to read unprivileged user files, you must turn on the exim_read_user_files boolean.
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B setsebool -P exim_read_user_files 1
+.EE
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux icecast policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their icecast processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for icecast:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux exim policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their exim processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for exim:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B icecast_exec_t
++.B exim_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the icecast_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the icecast_t domain.
++- Set files with the exim_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the exim_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B icecast_initrc_exec_t
++.B exim_initrc_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the icecast_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the icecast_initrc_t domain.
++- Set files with the exim_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the exim_initrc_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B icecast_log_t
++.B exim_keytab_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the icecast_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as icecast log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++- Set files with the exim_keytab_t type, if you want to treat the files as kerberos keytab files.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B icecast_var_run_t
++.B exim_log_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the icecast_var_run_t type, if you want to store the icecast files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the exim_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as exim log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B exim_spool_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the exim_spool_t type, if you want to store the exim files under the /var/spool directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B exim_tmp_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the exim_tmp_t type, if you want to store exim temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B exim_var_run_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the exim_var_run_t type, if you want to store the exim files under the /run directory.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type exim_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B arpwatch_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B dovecot_spool_t
++
++ /var/spool/dovecot(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B exim_log_t
++
++ /var/log/exim[0-9]?(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B exim_spool_t
++
++ /var/spool/exim[0-9]?(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B exim_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B exim_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/exim[0-9]?\.pid
++.br
++
++.br
++.B mail_home_rw_t
++
++ /root/Maildir(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/Maildir(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/Maildir(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/Maildir(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B mail_spool_t
++
++ /var/mail(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/spool/imap(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/spool/mail(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B sendmail_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B user_home_t
++
++ /home/[^/]*/.+
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/.+
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/.+
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux icecast policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their icecast processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for icecast:
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the exim_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B icecast_t
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
++
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the exim_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -22268,93 +25303,88 @@ index 0000000..09452ee
+can also be used to manipulate the booleans
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), icecast(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
++selinux(8), exim(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+, setsebool(8)
\ No newline at end of file
-diff --git a/man/man8/ifconfig_selinux.8 b/man/man8/ifconfig_selinux.8
+diff --git a/man/man8/fail2ban_client_selinux.8 b/man/man8/fail2ban_client_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..3cb3078
+index 0000000..965514d
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/ifconfig_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
-+.TH "ifconfig_selinux" "8" "ifconfig" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "ifconfig SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/fail2ban_client_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
++.TH "fail2ban_client_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "fail2ban_client" "SELinux Policy documentation for fail2ban_client"
+.SH "NAME"
-+ifconfig_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the ifconfig processes
++fail2ban_client_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the fail2ban_client processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the ifconfig processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the fail2ban_client processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The fail2ban_client processes execute with the fail2ban_client_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the ifconfig_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep fail2ban_client_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The fail2ban_client_t SELinux type can be entered via the "fail2ban_client_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the fail2ban_client_t domain are the following:"
+
++
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the ifconfig_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux fail2ban_client policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their fail2ban_client processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for fail2ban_client:
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B fail2ban_client_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux ifconfig policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ifconfig processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for ifconfig:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux fail2ban_client policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their fail2ban_client processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for fail2ban_client:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B ifconfig_exec_t
++.B fail2ban_client_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the ifconfig_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ifconfig_t domain.
++- Set files with the fail2ban_client_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the fail2ban_client_t domain.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/sbin/ipx_internal_net, /sbin/ipx_configure, /sbin/tc, /usr/sbin/ipx_configure, /usr/sbin/iwconfig, /usr/sbin/ipx_interface, /usr/sbin/mii-tool, /usr/sbin/ethtool, /usr/sbin/ifconfig, /sbin/ipx_interface, /bin/ip, /usr/bin/ip, /usr/sbin/tc, /sbin/iwconfig, /sbin/ifconfig, /sbin/mii-tool, /sbin/ethtool, /usr/sbin/ip, /sbin/ip, /sbin/ipx_internal_net
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux ifconfig policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ifconfig processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for ifconfig:
-+
-+.EX
-+.B ifconfig_t
-+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -22367,169 +25397,317 @@ index 0000000..3cb3078
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), ifconfig(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/inetd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/inetd_selinux.8
++selinux(8), fail2ban_client(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, fail2ban_selinux(8), fail2ban_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/fail2ban_selinux.8 b/man/man8/fail2ban_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..dc4c84e
+index 0000000..d71d700
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/inetd_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,171 @@
-+.TH "inetd_selinux" "8" "inetd" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "inetd SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/fail2ban_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,201 @@
++.TH "fail2ban_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "fail2ban" "SELinux Policy documentation for fail2ban"
+.SH "NAME"
-+inetd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the inetd processes
++fail2ban_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the fail2ban processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the inetd processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the fail2ban processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The fail2ban processes execute with the fail2ban_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the inetd_t, inetd_child_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep fail2ban_t
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the inetd_t, inetd_child_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
-+.EE
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++The fail2ban_t SELinux type can be entered via the "fail2ban_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the fail2ban_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/bin/fail2ban, /usr/bin/fail2ban-server
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux fail2ban policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their fail2ban processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for fail2ban:
++
++.EX
++.B fail2ban_client_t, fail2ban_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux inetd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their inetd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for inetd:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux fail2ban policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their fail2ban processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for fail2ban:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B inetd_child_exec_t
++.B fail2ban_client_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the inetd_child_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the inetd_child_t domain.
++- Set files with the fail2ban_client_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the fail2ban_client_t domain.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/sbin/identd, /usr/local/lib/pysieved/pysieved.*\.py, /usr/sbin/in\..*d
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B inetd_child_tmp_t
++.B fail2ban_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the inetd_child_tmp_t type, if you want to store inetd child temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++- Set files with the fail2ban_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the fail2ban_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B inetd_child_var_run_t
++.B fail2ban_initrc_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the inetd_child_var_run_t type, if you want to store the inetd child files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the fail2ban_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the fail2ban_initrc_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B inetd_exec_t
++.B fail2ban_log_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the inetd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the inetd_t domain.
++- Set files with the fail2ban_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as fail2ban log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/sbin/inetd, /usr/sbin/xinetd, /usr/sbin/rlinetd
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B inetd_log_t
++.B fail2ban_tmp_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the inetd_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as inetd log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++- Set files with the fail2ban_tmp_t type, if you want to store fail2ban temporary files in the /tmp directories.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B inetd_tmp_t
++.B fail2ban_var_lib_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the inetd_tmp_t type, if you want to store inetd temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++- Set files with the fail2ban_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the fail2ban files under the /var/lib directory.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B inetd_var_run_t
++.B fail2ban_var_run_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the inetd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the inetd files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the fail2ban_var_run_t type, if you want to store the fail2ban files under the /run directory.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PORT TYPES
-+SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
-+.PP
-+You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+.B semanage port -l
++The SELinux process type fail2ban_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B fail2ban_log_t
++
++ /var/log/fail2ban\.log.*
++.br
++
++.br
++.B fail2ban_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B fail2ban_var_lib_t
++
++ /var/lib/fail2ban(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B fail2ban_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/fail2ban.*
++.br
++
++.br
++.B net_conf_t
++
++ /etc/ntpd?\.conf.*
++.br
++ /etc/hosts[^/]*
++.br
++ /etc/yp\.conf.*
++.br
++ /etc/denyhosts.*
++.br
++ /etc/hosts\.deny.*
++.br
++ /etc/resolv\.conf.*
++.br
++ /etc/ntp/step-tickers.*
++.br
++ /etc/sysconfig/networking(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/sysconfig/network-scripts(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/sysconfig/network-scripts/.*resolv\.conf
++.br
++ /etc/ethers
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
-+SELinux inetd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their inetd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following port types are defined for inetd:
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the fail2ban_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.TP 5
-+.B inetd_child_port_t
-+.TP 10
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
+
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the fail2ban_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
+
-+Default Defined Ports:
-+tcp 1,9,13,19,512,543,544,891,892,2105,5666
-+.EE
-+udp 1,9,13,19,891,892
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
+.EE
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), fail2ban(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, fail2ban_client_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/fcoemon_selinux.8 b/man/man8/fcoemon_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..f5a355c
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/fcoemon_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
++.TH "fcoemon_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "fcoemon" "SELinux Policy documentation for fcoemon"
++.SH "NAME"
++fcoemon_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the fcoemon processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the fcoemon processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The fcoemon processes execute with the fcoemon_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep fcoemon_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The fcoemon_t SELinux type can be entered via the "fcoemon_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the fcoemon_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/sbin/fcoemon
+.SH PROCESS TYPES
+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux inetd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their inetd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for inetd:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux fcoemon policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their fcoemon processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for fcoemon:
+
+.EX
-+.B inetd_t, inetd_child_t
++.B fcoemon_t
+.EE
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux fcoemon policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their fcoemon processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for fcoemon:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B fcoemon_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the fcoemon_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the fcoemon_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B fcoemon_var_run_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the fcoemon_var_run_t type, if you want to store the fcoemon files under the /run directory.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type fcoemon_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B fcoemon_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/fcm(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/fcoemon\.pid
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
+can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
@@ -22540,177 +25718,227 @@ index 0000000..dc4c84e
+.B semanage module
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
-+.B semanage port
-+can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
-+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), inetd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/init_selinux.8 b/man/man8/init_selinux.8
++selinux(8), fcoemon(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/fenced_selinux.8 b/man/man8/fenced_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..5e3e05e
+index 0000000..fa89bb1
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/init_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,177 @@
-+.TH "init_selinux" "8" "init" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "init SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/fenced_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,230 @@
++.TH "fenced_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "fenced" "SELinux Policy documentation for fenced"
+.SH "NAME"
-+init_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the init processes
++fenced_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the fenced processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the init processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the fenced processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH BOOLEANS
-+SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. init policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run init with the tightest access possible.
++The fenced processes execute with the fenced_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
++For example:
+
++.B ps -eZ | grep fenced_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The fenced_t SELinux type can be entered via the "fenced_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the fenced_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/sbin/fenced, /usr/sbin/fence_node, /usr/sbin/fence_tool, /usr/sbin/fence_virtd
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+If you want to enable support for upstart as the init program, you must turn on the init_upstart boolean.
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux fenced policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their fenced processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for fenced:
+
+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P init_upstart 1
++.B fenced_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH BOOLEANS
++SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. fenced policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run fenced with the tightest access possible.
++
+
+.PP
-+If you want to enable support for systemd as the init program, you must turn on the init_systemd boolean.
++If you want to allow fenced domain to connect to the network using TCP, you must turn on the fenced_can_network_connect boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P init_systemd 1
++.B setsebool -P fenced_can_network_connect 1
+.EE
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++.PP
++If you want to allow fenced domain to execute ssh, you must turn on the fenced_can_ssh boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P fenced_can_ssh 1
++.EE
+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the init_t, initrc_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++If you want to allow fenced domain to connect to the network using TCP, you must turn on the fenced_can_network_connect boolean.
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.B setsebool -P fenced_can_network_connect 1
+.EE
+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the init_t, initrc_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++If you want to allow fenced domain to execute ssh, you must turn on the fenced_can_ssh boolean.
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B setsebool -P fenced_can_ssh 1
+.EE
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux init policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their init processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for init:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux fenced policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their fenced processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for fenced:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B init_exec_t
++.B fenced_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the init_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the init_t domain.
++- Set files with the fenced_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the fenced_t domain.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/sbin/init(ng)?, /sbin/init(ng)?, /bin/systemd, /usr/lib/systemd/system-generators/[^/]*, /usr/bin/systemd, /sbin/upstart, /usr/sbin/upstart, /usr/lib/systemd/[^/]*
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B init_var_run_t
++.B fenced_lock_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the init_var_run_t type, if you want to store the init files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the fenced_lock_t type, if you want to treat the files as fenced lock data, stored under the /var/lock directory
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B initctl_t
++.B fenced_tmp_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the initctl_t type, if you want to treat the files as initctl data.
++- Set files with the fenced_tmp_t type, if you want to store fenced temporary files in the /tmp directories.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B initrc_devpts_t
++.B fenced_tmpfs_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the initrc_devpts_t type, if you want to treat the files as initrc devpts data.
++- Set files with the fenced_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store fenced files on a tmpfs file system.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B initrc_exec_t
++.B fenced_var_log_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the initrc_t domain.
++- Set files with the fenced_var_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as fenced var log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/sbin/startx, /etc/rc\.d/rc, /usr/libexec/dcc/stop-.*, /etc/sysconfig/network-scripts/ifup-ipsec, /usr/lib/systemd/fedora[^/]*, /usr/sbin/start-dirsrv, /usr/sbin/restart-dirsrv, /usr/sbin/open_init_pty, /usr/sbin/ldap-agent, /etc/X11/prefdm, /etc/rc\.d/rc\.[^/]+, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/.*, /usr/libexec/dcc/start-.*, /usr/share/system-config-services/system-config-services-mechanism\.py, /usr/sbin/apachectl, /etc/init\.d/.*, /usr/bin/sepg_ctl
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B initrc_state_t
++.B fenced_var_run_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the initrc_state_t type, if you want to treat the files as initrc state data.
++- Set files with the fenced_var_run_t type, if you want to store the fenced files under the /run directory.
+
+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B initrc_tmp_t
-+.EE
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
+
-+- Set files with the initrc_tmp_t type, if you want to store initrc temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
++The SELinux process type fenced_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B initrc_var_run_t
-+.EE
++.br
++.B cluster_var_lib_t
+
-+- Set files with the initrc_var_run_t type, if you want to store the initrc files under the /run directory.
++ /var/lib/cluster(/.*)?
++.br
+
+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/run/setmixer_flag, /var/run/runlevel\.dir, /var/run/random-seed, /var/run/utmp
++.B fenced_lock_t
+
-+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
++ /var/lock/fence_manual\.lock
++.br
++
++.br
++.B fenced_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B fenced_tmpfs_t
++
++
++.br
++.B fenced_var_log_t
++
++ /var/log/cluster/fenced\.log.*
++.br
++
++.br
++.B fenced_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/fence.*
++.br
++ /var/run/cluster/fence_scsi.*
++.br
++ /var/run/cluster/fenced_override
++.br
++
++.br
++.B snmpd_var_lib_t
++
++ /var/agentx(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/snmp(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/net-snmp(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/net-snmp(/.*)?
++.br
++ /usr/share/snmp/mibs/\.index
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux init policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their init processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for init:
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the fenced_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B initrc_t, init_t
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
++
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the fenced_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -22726,129 +25954,146 @@ index 0000000..5e3e05e
+can also be used to manipulate the booleans
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), init(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
++selinux(8), fenced(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+, setsebool(8)
\ No newline at end of file
-diff --git a/man/man8/initrc_selinux.8 b/man/man8/initrc_selinux.8
+diff --git a/man/man8/fetchmail_selinux.8 b/man/man8/fetchmail_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..a384c3a
+index 0000000..ae8394b
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/initrc_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,127 @@
-+.TH "initrc_selinux" "8" "initrc" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "initrc SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/fetchmail_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,144 @@
++.TH "fetchmail_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "fetchmail" "SELinux Policy documentation for fetchmail"
+.SH "NAME"
-+initrc_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the initrc processes
++fetchmail_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the fetchmail processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the initrc processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the fetchmail processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The fetchmail processes execute with the fetchmail_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the initrc_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep fetchmail_t
+
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The fetchmail_t SELinux type can be entered via the "fetchmail_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the fetchmail_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/bin/fetchmail
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the initrc_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux fetchmail policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their fetchmail processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for fetchmail:
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B fetchmail_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux initrc policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their initrc processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for initrc:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux fetchmail policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their fetchmail processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for fetchmail:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B initrc_devpts_t
++.B fetchmail_etc_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the initrc_devpts_t type, if you want to treat the files as initrc devpts data.
++- Set files with the fetchmail_etc_t type, if you want to store fetchmail files in the /etc directories.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B initrc_exec_t
++.B fetchmail_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the initrc_t domain.
++- Set files with the fetchmail_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the fetchmail_t domain.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/sbin/startx, /etc/rc\.d/rc, /usr/libexec/dcc/stop-.*, /etc/sysconfig/network-scripts/ifup-ipsec, /usr/lib/systemd/fedora[^/]*, /usr/sbin/start-dirsrv, /usr/sbin/restart-dirsrv, /usr/sbin/open_init_pty, /usr/sbin/ldap-agent, /etc/X11/prefdm, /etc/rc\.d/rc\.[^/]+, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/.*, /usr/libexec/dcc/start-.*, /usr/share/system-config-services/system-config-services-mechanism\.py, /usr/sbin/apachectl, /etc/init\.d/.*, /usr/bin/sepg_ctl
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B initrc_state_t
++.B fetchmail_home_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the initrc_state_t type, if you want to treat the files as initrc state data.
++- Set files with the fetchmail_home_t type, if you want to store fetchmail files in the users home directory.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B initrc_tmp_t
++.B fetchmail_uidl_cache_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the initrc_tmp_t type, if you want to store initrc temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++- Set files with the fetchmail_uidl_cache_t type, if you want to store the files under the /var/cache directory.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B initrc_var_run_t
++.B fetchmail_var_run_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the initrc_var_run_t type, if you want to store the initrc files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the fetchmail_var_run_t type, if you want to store the fetchmail files under the /run directory.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/run/setmixer_flag, /var/run/runlevel\.dir, /var/run/random-seed, /var/run/utmp
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux initrc policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their initrc processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for initrc:
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+.EX
-+.B initrc_t
-+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++The SELinux process type fetchmail_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B fetchmail_uidl_cache_t
++
++ /var/lib/fetchmail(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/mail/\.fetchmail-UIDL-cache
++.br
++
++.br
++.B fetchmail_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/fetchmail/.*
++.br
++
++.br
++.B sendmail_log_t
++
++ /var/log/mail(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/log/sendmail\.st
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -22861,144 +26106,161 @@ index 0000000..a384c3a
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), initrc(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/innd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/innd_selinux.8
++selinux(8), fetchmail(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/fingerd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/fingerd_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..b1b7c6c
+index 0000000..5dedb48
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/innd_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,147 @@
-+.TH "innd_selinux" "8" "innd" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "innd SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/fingerd_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,164 @@
++.TH "fingerd_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "fingerd" "SELinux Policy documentation for fingerd"
+.SH "NAME"
-+innd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the innd processes
++fingerd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the fingerd processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the innd processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the fingerd processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The fingerd processes execute with the fingerd_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux innd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their innd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for innd:
++For example:
+
++.B ps -eZ | grep fingerd_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B innd_etc_t
-+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the innd_etc_t type, if you want to store innd files in the /etc directories.
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
++The fingerd_t SELinux type can be entered via the "fingerd_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the fingerd_t domain are the following:"
+
-+.EX
++/usr/sbin/[cef]fingerd, /etc/cron\.weekly/(c)?fingerd, /usr/sbin/in\.fingerd
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux fingerd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their fingerd processes in as secure a method as possible.
+.PP
-+.B innd_exec_t
++The following process types are defined for fingerd:
++
++.EX
++.B fingerd_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
-+- Set files with the innd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the innd_t domain.
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux fingerd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their fingerd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for fingerd:
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/bin/suck, /usr/lib/news/bin/filechan, /usr/lib/news/bin/nntpget, /usr/sbin/in\.nnrpd, /usr/lib/news/bin/convdate, /usr/lib/news/bin/innfeed, /usr/lib/news/bin/shlock, /usr/lib/news/bin/archive, /usr/lib/news/bin/innconfval, /usr/lib/news/bin/actsync, /usr/lib/news/bin/innxbatch, /usr/bin/inews, /usr/lib/news/bin/batcher, /usr/sbin/innd.*, /usr/lib/news/bin/expire, /usr/lib/news/bin/nnrpd, /usr/lib/news/bin/inndstart, /usr/lib/news/bin/ctlinnd, /usr/bin/rpost, /usr/lib/news/bin/buffchan, /usr/lib/news/bin/ovdb_recover, /etc/news/boot, /usr/lib/news/bin/startinnfeed, /usr/lib/news/bin/makehistory, /usr/lib/news/bin/innd, /usr/lib/news/bin/makedbz, /usr/bin/rnews, /usr/lib/news/bin/innxmit, /usr/lib/news/bin/fastrm, /usr/lib/news/bin/getlist, /usr/lib/news/bin/sm, /usr/lib/news/bin/grephistory, /usr/lib/news/bin/rnews, /usr/lib/news/bin/newsrequeue, /usr/lib/news/bin/overchan, /usr/lib/news/bin/cvtbatch, /usr/lib/news/bin/prunehistory, /usr/lib/news/bin/inews, /usr/lib/ne
ws/bin/shrinkfile, /usr/lib/news/bin/expireover, /usr/lib/news/bin/inndf
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B innd_initrc_exec_t
++.B fingerd_etc_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the innd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the innd_initrc_t domain.
++- Set files with the fingerd_etc_t type, if you want to store fingerd files in the /etc directories.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B innd_log_t
++.B fingerd_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the innd_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as innd log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++- Set files with the fingerd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the fingerd_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B innd_var_lib_t
++.B fingerd_log_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the innd_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the innd files under the /var/lib directory.
++- Set files with the fingerd_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as fingerd log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B innd_var_run_t
++.B fingerd_var_run_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the innd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the innd files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the fingerd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the fingerd files under the /run directory.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/run/innd(/.*)?, /var/run/news(/.*)?
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
+.SH PORT TYPES
-+SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
++SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
+.PP
-+You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
++You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
+
+.B semanage port -l
+
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
-+SELinux innd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their innd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following port types are defined for innd:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
++SELinux fingerd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their fingerd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following port types are defined for fingerd:
+
+.EX
+.TP 5
-+.B innd_port_t
++.B fingerd_port_t
+.TP 10
+.EE
+
+
+Default Defined Ports:
-+tcp 119
++tcp 79
+.EE
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type fingerd_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B fingerd_log_t
++
++ /var/log/cfingerd\.log.*
++.br
++
++.br
++.B fingerd_var_run_t
++
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux innd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their innd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for innd:
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the fingerd_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B innd_t
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
++
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the fingerd_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -23014,117 +26276,158 @@ index 0000000..b1b7c6c
+can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), innd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/insmod_selinux.8 b/man/man8/insmod_selinux.8
++selinux(8), fingerd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/firewalld_selinux.8 b/man/man8/firewalld_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..2ccbe62
+index 0000000..fc13038
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/insmod_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,121 @@
-+.TH "insmod_selinux" "8" "insmod" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "insmod SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/firewalld_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,159 @@
++.TH "firewalld_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "firewalld" "SELinux Policy documentation for firewalld"
+.SH "NAME"
-+insmod_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the insmod processes
++firewalld_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the firewalld processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the insmod processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
-+
-+.SH BOOLEANS
-+SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. insmod policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run insmod with the tightest access possible.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the firewalld processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
++The firewalld processes execute with the firewalld_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to disable kernel module loading, you must turn on the secure_mode_insmod boolean.
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P secure_mode_insmod 1
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep firewalld_t
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow pppd to load kernel modules for certain modems, you must turn on the pppd_can_insmod boolean.
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P pppd_can_insmod 1
-+.EE
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The firewalld_t SELinux type can be entered via the "firewalld_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the firewalld_t domain are the following:"
+
++/usr/sbin/firewalld
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the insmod_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
-+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
-+
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the insmod_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux firewalld policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their firewalld processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for firewalld:
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B firewallgui_t, firewalld_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux insmod policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their insmod processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for insmod:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux firewalld policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their firewalld processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for firewalld:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B insmod_exec_t
++.B firewalld_etc_rw_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the insmod_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the insmod_t domain.
++- Set files with the firewalld_etc_rw_t type, if you want to treat the files as firewalld etc read/write content.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/sbin/rmmod.*, /sbin/modprobe.*, /sbin/insmod.*, /usr/sbin/modprobe.*, /usr/bin/kmod, /usr/sbin/insmod.*, /usr/sbin/rmmod.*
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B insmod_tmpfs_t
++.B firewalld_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the insmod_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store insmod files on a tmpfs file system.
++- Set files with the firewalld_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the firewalld_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B firewalld_initrc_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the firewalld_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the firewalld_initrc_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B firewalld_unit_file_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the firewalld_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as firewalld unit content.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B firewalld_var_log_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the firewalld_var_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as firewalld var log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B firewalld_var_run_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the firewalld_var_run_t type, if you want to store the firewalld files under the /run directory.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type firewalld_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B firewalld_etc_rw_t
++
++ /etc/firewalld(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B firewalld_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/firewalld(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/firewalld\.pid
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux insmod policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their insmod processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for insmod:
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the firewallgui_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B insmod_t
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
++
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the firewallgui_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -23136,214 +26439,141 @@ index 0000000..2ccbe62
+.B semanage module
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
-+.B semanage boolean
-+can also be used to manipulate the booleans
-+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), insmod(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-+, setsebool(8)
++selinux(8), firewalld(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, firewallgui_selinux(8)
\ No newline at end of file
-diff --git a/man/man8/ipsec_selinux.8 b/man/man8/ipsec_selinux.8
+diff --git a/man/man8/firewallgui_selinux.8 b/man/man8/firewallgui_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..267a622
+index 0000000..ab4f40b
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/ipsec_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,211 @@
-+.TH "ipsec_selinux" "8" "ipsec" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "ipsec SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/firewallgui_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,138 @@
++.TH "firewallgui_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "firewallgui" "SELinux Policy documentation for firewallgui"
+.SH "NAME"
-+ipsec_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the ipsec processes
++firewallgui_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the firewallgui processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the ipsec processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the firewallgui processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The firewallgui processes execute with the firewallgui_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the ipsec_t, ipsec_mgmt_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep firewallgui_t
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the ipsec_t, ipsec_mgmt_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
-+.EE
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++The firewallgui_t SELinux type can be entered via the "firewallgui_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the firewallgui_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/share/system-config-firewall/system-config-firewall-mechanism.py
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux ipsec policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ipsec processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for ipsec:
-+
-+
-+.EX
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux firewallgui policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their firewallgui processes in as secure a method as possible.
+.PP
-+.B ipsec_conf_file_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the ipsec_conf_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as ipsec conf content.
-+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/etc/ipsec\.conf, /etc/racoon(/.*)?
++The following process types are defined for firewallgui:
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B ipsec_exec_t
++.B firewallgui_t
+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the ipsec_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ipsec_t domain.
-+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/local/lib/ipsec/eroute, /usr/lib/ipsec/pluto, /usr/local/lib/ipsec/pluto, /usr/lib/ipsec/klipsdebug, /usr/libexec/ipsec/eroute, /usr/libexec/ipsec/pluto, /usr/lib/ipsec/spi, /usr/lib/ipsec/eroute, /usr/local/lib/ipsec/klipsdebug, /usr/local/lib/ipsec/spi, /usr/libexec/ipsec/spi, /usr/libexec/ipsec/klipsdebug
-+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B ipsec_initrc_exec_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the ipsec_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ipsec_initrc_t domain.
-+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/etc/rc\.d/init\.d/racoon, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/ipsec
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
-+.EX
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
-+.B ipsec_key_file_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the ipsec_key_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as ipsec key content.
-+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/etc/ipsec\.secrets, /etc/racoon/certs(/.*)?, /etc/racoon/psk\.txt, /etc/ipsec\.d(/.*)?
-+
-+.EX
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+.B ipsec_log_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the ipsec_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as ipsec log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
-+
-+
-+.EX
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux firewallgui policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their firewallgui processes in as secure a method as possible.
+.PP
-+.B ipsec_mgmt_exec_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the ipsec_mgmt_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ipsec_mgmt_t domain.
++The following file types are defined for firewallgui:
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/lib/ipsec/_plutorun, /usr/libexec/ipsec/_plutoload, /usr/libexec/nm-openswan-service, /usr/sbin/ipsec, /usr/lib/ipsec/_plutoload, /usr/libexec/ipsec/_plutorun
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B ipsec_mgmt_lock_t
++.B firewallgui_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the ipsec_mgmt_lock_t type, if you want to treat the files as ipsec mgmt lock data, stored under the /var/lock directory
++- Set files with the firewallgui_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the firewallgui_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B ipsec_mgmt_var_run_t
++.B firewallgui_tmp_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the ipsec_mgmt_var_run_t type, if you want to store the ipsec mgmt files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the firewallgui_tmp_t type, if you want to store firewallgui temporary files in the /tmp directories.
+
+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B ipsec_tmp_t
-+.EE
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
+
-+- Set files with the ipsec_tmp_t type, if you want to store ipsec temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
++The SELinux process type firewallgui_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B ipsec_var_run_t
-+.EE
++.br
++.B firewallgui_tmp_t
+
-+- Set files with the ipsec_var_run_t type, if you want to store the ipsec files under the /run directory.
+
+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/run/racoon\.pid, /var/run/pluto(/.*)?, /var/racoon(/.*)?
++.B system_conf_t
+
-+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
++ /etc/sysctl\.conf(\.old)?
++.br
++ /etc/sysconfig/ip6?tables.*
++.br
++ /etc/sysconfig/ipvsadm.*
++.br
++ /etc/sysconfig/ebtables.*
++.br
++ /etc/sysconfig/system-config-firewall.*
++.br
+
-+.SH PORT TYPES
-+SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
-+.PP
-+You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
++.br
++.B systemd_passwd_var_run_t
+
-+.B semanage port -l
++ /var/run/systemd/ask-password(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/systemd/ask-password-block(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
-+SELinux ipsec policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ipsec processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following port types are defined for ipsec:
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the firewallgui_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.TP 5
-+.B ipsecnat_port_t
-+.TP 10
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
+
-+
-+Default Defined Ports:
-+tcp 4500
-+.EE
-+udp 4500
-+.EE
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux ipsec policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ipsec processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for ipsec:
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the firewallgui_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B ipsec_t, ipsec_mgmt_t
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -23355,146 +26585,105 @@ index 0000000..267a622
+.B semanage module
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
-+.B semanage port
-+can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
-+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), ipsec(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/iptables_selinux.8 b/man/man8/iptables_selinux.8
++selinux(8), firewallgui(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/firstboot_selinux.8 b/man/man8/firstboot_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..3707b64
+index 0000000..53e6593
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/iptables_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,146 @@
-+.TH "iptables_selinux" "8" "iptables" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "iptables SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/firstboot_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
++.TH "firstboot_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "firstboot" "SELinux Policy documentation for firstboot"
+.SH "NAME"
-+iptables_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the iptables processes
++firstboot_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the firstboot processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the iptables processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
-+
-+.SH BOOLEANS
-+SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. iptables policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run iptables with the tightest access possible.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the firstboot processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
++The firstboot processes execute with the firstboot_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow dhcpc client applications to execute iptables commands, you must turn on the dhcpc_exec_iptables boolean.
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P dhcpc_exec_iptables 1
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep firstboot_t
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the iptables_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
++The firstboot_t SELinux type can be entered via the "firstboot_exec_t,filesystem_type,unlabeled_t,proc_type,mtrr_device_t,sysctl_type,file_type" file types. The default entrypoint paths for the firstboot_t domain are the following:"
+
++/usr/sbin/firstboot, /usr/share/firstboot/firstboot\.py, /dev/cpu/mtrr, all files on the system
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the iptables_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux firstboot policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their firstboot processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for firstboot:
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B firstboot_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux iptables policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their iptables processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for iptables:
-+
-+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B iptables_exec_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the iptables_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the iptables_t domain.
-+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/sbin/ipvsadm-restore, /usr/sbin/ipchains.*, /sbin/ebtables, /usr/sbin/ip6?tables, /usr/sbin/ip6?tables-restore, /sbin/ebtables-restore, /usr/sbin/xtables-multi, /sbin/ipchains.*, /sbin/ip6?tables, /usr/sbin/ebtables-restore, /usr/sbin/ebtables, /sbin/ipvsadm, /usr/sbin/ipvsadm-save, /sbin/xtables-multi, /sbin/ipvsadm-restore, /usr/sbin/ip6?tables-multi, /sbin/ip6?tables-multi, /usr/sbin/ipvsadm, /sbin/ipvsadm-save, /sbin/ip6?tables-restore
-+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B iptables_initrc_exec_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the iptables_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the iptables_initrc_t domain.
-+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/etc/rc\.d/init\.d/ebtables, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/ip6?tables
-+
-+.EX
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux firstboot policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their firstboot processes in as secure a method as possible.
+.PP
-+.B iptables_tmp_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the iptables_tmp_t type, if you want to store iptables temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++The following file types are defined for firstboot:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B iptables_unit_file_t
++.B firstboot_etc_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the iptables_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as iptables unit content.
++- Set files with the firstboot_etc_t type, if you want to store firstboot files in the /etc directories.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/lib/systemd/system/proftpd.*, /usr/lib/systemd/system/ip6tables.*, /usr/lib/systemd/system/vsftpd.*, /usr/lib/systemd/system/slapd.*, /usr/lib/systemd/system/ppp.*, /usr/lib/systemd/system/iptables.*
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B iptables_var_run_t
++.B firstboot_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the iptables_var_run_t type, if you want to store the iptables files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the firstboot_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the firstboot_t domain.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux iptables policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their iptables processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for iptables:
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+.EX
-+.B iptables_t
-+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++The SELinux process type firstboot_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B file_type
++
++ all files on the system
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -23506,122 +26695,147 @@ index 0000000..3707b64
+.B semanage module
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
-+.B semanage boolean
-+can also be used to manipulate the booleans
-+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), iptables(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-+, setsebool(8)
-\ No newline at end of file
-diff --git a/man/man8/irc_selinux.8 b/man/man8/irc_selinux.8
++selinux(8), firstboot(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/foghorn_selinux.8 b/man/man8/foghorn_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..c53c421
+index 0000000..f17a60b
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/irc_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,119 @@
-+.TH "irc_selinux" "8" "irc" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "irc SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/foghorn_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,146 @@
++.TH "foghorn_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "foghorn" "SELinux Policy documentation for foghorn"
+.SH "NAME"
-+irc_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the irc processes
++foghorn_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the foghorn processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the irc processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the foghorn processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The foghorn processes execute with the foghorn_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep foghorn_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The foghorn_t SELinux type can be entered via the "foghorn_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the foghorn_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/sbin/foghorn
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux foghorn policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their foghorn processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for foghorn:
++
++.EX
++.B foghorn_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux irc policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their irc processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for irc:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux foghorn policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their foghorn processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for foghorn:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B irc_exec_t
++.B foghorn_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the irc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the irc_t domain.
++- Set files with the foghorn_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the foghorn_t domain.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/bin/tinyirc, /usr/bin/[st]irc, /usr/bin/ircII
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B irc_home_t
++.B foghorn_tmpfs_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the irc_home_t type, if you want to store irc files in the users home directory.
++- Set files with the foghorn_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store foghorn files on a tmpfs file system.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B irc_tmp_t
++.B foghorn_var_log_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the irc_tmp_t type, if you want to store irc temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++- Set files with the foghorn_var_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as foghorn var log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B foghorn_var_run_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the foghorn_var_run_t type, if you want to store the foghorn files under the /run directory.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PORT TYPES
-+SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
-+.PP
-+You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+.B semanage port -l
++The SELinux process type foghorn_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B cluster_var_lib_t
++
++ /var/lib/cluster(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B foghorn_tmpfs_t
++
++
++.br
++.B foghorn_var_log_t
++
++
++.br
++.B foghorn_var_run_t
++
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
-+SELinux irc policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their irc processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following port types are defined for irc:
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the foghorn_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.TP 5
-+.B ircd_port_t
-+.TP 10
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
+
-+
-+Default Defined Ports:
-+tcp 6667
-+.EE
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux irc policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their irc processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for irc:
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the foghorn_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B irc_t
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -23633,85 +26847,119 @@ index 0000000..c53c421
+.B semanage module
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
-+.B semanage port
-+can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
-+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), irc(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/irqbalance_selinux.8 b/man/man8/irqbalance_selinux.8
++selinux(8), foghorn(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/fprintd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/fprintd_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..f66b248
+index 0000000..68cee10
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/irqbalance_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
-+.TH "irqbalance_selinux" "8" "irqbalance" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "irqbalance SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/fprintd_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,118 @@
++.TH "fprintd_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "fprintd" "SELinux Policy documentation for fprintd"
+.SH "NAME"
-+irqbalance_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the irqbalance processes
++fprintd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the fprintd processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the irqbalance processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the fprintd processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The fprintd processes execute with the fprintd_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep fprintd_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The fprintd_t SELinux type can be entered via the "fprintd_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the fprintd_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/libexec/fprintd
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux fprintd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their fprintd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for fprintd:
++
++.EX
++.B fprintd_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux irqbalance policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their irqbalance processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for irqbalance:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux fprintd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their fprintd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for fprintd:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B irqbalance_exec_t
++.B fprintd_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the irqbalance_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the irqbalance_t domain.
++- Set files with the fprintd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the fprintd_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B irqbalance_var_run_t
++.B fprintd_var_lib_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the irqbalance_var_run_t type, if you want to store the irqbalance files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the fprintd_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the fprintd files under the /var/lib directory.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type fprintd_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B fprintd_var_lib_t
++
++ /var/lib/fprint(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux irqbalance policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their irqbalance processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for irqbalance:
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the fprintd_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B irqbalance_t
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
++
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the fprintd_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -23724,239 +26972,164 @@ index 0000000..f66b248
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), irqbalance(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/irssi_selinux.8 b/man/man8/irssi_selinux.8
++selinux(8), fprintd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/freshclam_selinux.8 b/man/man8/freshclam_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..f0f7b71
+index 0000000..9ccf034
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/irssi_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,118 @@
-+.TH "irssi_selinux" "8" "irssi" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "irssi SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/freshclam_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,164 @@
++.TH "freshclam_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "freshclam" "SELinux Policy documentation for freshclam"
+.SH "NAME"
-+irssi_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the irssi processes
++freshclam_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the freshclam processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the irssi processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
-+
-+.SH BOOLEANS
-+SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. irssi policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run irssi with the tightest access possible.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the freshclam processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
++The freshclam processes execute with the freshclam_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow the Irssi IRC Client to connect to any port, and to bind to any unreserved port, you must turn on the irssi_use_full_network boolean.
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P irssi_use_full_network 1
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep freshclam_t
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the irssi_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
++The freshclam_t SELinux type can be entered via the "freshclam_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the freshclam_t domain are the following:"
+
++/usr/bin/freshclam
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the irssi_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux freshclam policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their freshclam processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for freshclam:
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B freshclam_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux irssi policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their irssi processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for irssi:
-+
-+
-+.EX
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux freshclam policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their freshclam processes in as secure a method as possible.
+.PP
-+.B irssi_etc_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the irssi_etc_t type, if you want to store irssi files in the /etc directories.
++The following file types are defined for freshclam:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B irssi_exec_t
++.B freshclam_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the irssi_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the irssi_t domain.
++- Set files with the freshclam_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the freshclam_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B irssi_home_t
++.B freshclam_var_log_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the irssi_home_t type, if you want to store irssi files in the users home directory.
++- Set files with the freshclam_var_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as freshclam var log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux irssi policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their irssi processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for irssi:
-+
-+.EX
-+.B irssi_t
-+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
-+
-+.SH "COMMANDS"
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
-+.PP
-+.B semanage permissive
-+can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
-+.PP
-+.B semanage module
-+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
-+
-+.B semanage boolean
-+can also be used to manipulate the booleans
-+
-+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
-+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
-+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
-+
-+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), irssi(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-+, setsebool(8)
-\ No newline at end of file
-diff --git a/man/man8/iscsid_selinux.8 b/man/man8/iscsid_selinux.8
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..6d11443
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/iscsid_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,117 @@
-+.TH "iscsid_selinux" "8" "iscsid" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "iscsid SELinux Policy documentation"
-+.SH "NAME"
-+iscsid_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the iscsid processes
-+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the iscsid processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++The SELinux process type freshclam_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++.br
++.B amavis_spool_t
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the iscsid_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++ /var/spool/amavisd(/.*)?
++.br
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
++.br
++.B antivirus_db_t
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the iscsid_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++ /var/opt/f-secure(/.*)?
++.br
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
-+.EE
++.br
++.B clamd_var_lib_t
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux iscsid policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their iscsid processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for iscsid:
++ /var/clamav(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/clamd.*
++.br
++ /var/lib/clamav(/.*)?
++.br
+
++.br
++.B clamd_var_run_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B iscsid_exec_t
-+.EE
++ /var/run/clamd.*
++.br
++ /var/run/clamav.*
++.br
++ /var/run/amavis(d)?/clamd\.pid
++.br
++ /var/spool/MailScanner(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/spool/amavisd/clamd\.sock
++.br
+
-+- Set files with the iscsid_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the iscsid_t domain.
++.br
++.B freshclam_var_log_t
+
++ /var/log/freshclam.*
++.br
++ /var/log/clamav/freshclam.*
+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/sbin/brcm_iscsiuio, /sbin/iscsiuio, /usr/sbin/iscsiuio, /usr/sbin/iscsid, /usr/sbin/brcm_iscsiuio, /sbin/iscsid
+
-+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
++.br
++.B systemd_passwd_var_run_t
+
-+.SH PORT TYPES
-+SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
-+.PP
-+You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
++ /var/run/systemd/ask-password(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/systemd/ask-password-block(/.*)?
++.br
+
-+.B semanage port -l
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
-+SELinux iscsid policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their iscsid processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following port types are defined for iscsid:
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the freshclam_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.TP 5
-+.B iscsi_port_t
-+.TP 10
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
+
-+
-+Default Defined Ports:
-+tcp 3260
-+.EE
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux iscsid policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their iscsid processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for iscsid:
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the freshclam_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B iscsid_t
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -23968,265 +27141,259 @@ index 0000000..6d11443
+.B semanage module
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
-+.B semanage port
-+can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
-+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), iscsid(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/iwhd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/iwhd_selinux.8
++selinux(8), freshclam(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/fsadm_selinux.8 b/man/man8/fsadm_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..570e109
+index 0000000..7bcfdaf
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/iwhd_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,105 @@
-+.TH "iwhd_selinux" "8" "iwhd" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "iwhd SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/fsadm_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,258 @@
++.TH "fsadm_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "fsadm" "SELinux Policy documentation for fsadm"
+.SH "NAME"
-+iwhd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the iwhd processes
++fsadm_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the fsadm processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the iwhd processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the fsadm processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The fsadm processes execute with the fsadm_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep fsadm_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The fsadm_t SELinux type can be entered via the "fsadm_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the fsadm_t domain are the following:"
++
++/sbin/fsck.*, /sbin/jfs_.*, /sbin/mkfs.*, /sbin/swapon.*, /sbin/resize.*fs, /sbin/losetup.*, /usr/sbin/fsck.*, /usr/sbin/jfs_.*, /usr/sbin/mkfs.*, /sbin/reiserfs(ck|tune), /usr/sbin/swapon.*, /usr/sbin/resize.*fs, /usr/sbin/losetup.*, /usr/sbin/reiserfs(ck|tune), /sbin/dump, /sbin/blkid, /sbin/fdisk, /sbin/partx, /sbin/cfdisk, /sbin/e2fsck, /sbin/e4fsck, /sbin/findfs, /sbin/hdparm, /sbin/lsraid, /sbin/mke2fs, /sbin/mke4fs, /sbin/mkraid, /sbin/parted, /sbin/sfdisk, /usr/bin/raw, /sbin/dosfsck, /sbin/e2label, /sbin/mkdosfs, /sbin/tune2fs, /sbin/blockdev, /sbin/dumpe2fs, /usr/sbin/dump, /sbin/partprobe, /sbin/raidstart, /sbin/scsi_info, /usr/sbin/blkid, /usr/sbin/fdisk, /usr/sbin/partx, /sbin/mkreiserfs, /usr/sbin/cfdisk, /usr/sbin/e2fsck, /usr/sbin/e4fsck, /usr/sbin/findfs, /usr/sbin/hdparm, /usr/sbin/lsraid, /usr/sbin/mke2fs, /usr/sbin/mke4fs, /usr/sbin/mkraid, /usr/sbin/parted, /usr/sbin/sfdisk, /sbin/install-mbr, /sbin/raidautorun, /usr/bin/syslinux, /usr/sbin/dosfsck, /us
r/sbin/e2label, /usr/sbin/mkdosfs, /usr/sbin/tune2fs, /sbin/make_reiser4, /usr/sbin/blockdev, /usr/sbin/dumpe2fs, /usr/sbin/smartctl, /usr/sbin/partprobe, /usr/sbin/raidstart, /usr/sbin/scsi_info, /usr/sbin/mkreiserfs, /usr/sbin/clubufflush, /usr/sbin/install-mbr, /usr/sbin/raidautorun, /usr/sbin/make_reiser4, /usr/bin/partition_uuid, /usr/bin/scsi_unique_id, /usr/lib/systemd/systemd-fsck
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux iwhd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their iwhd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for iwhd:
-+
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux fsadm policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their fsadm processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for fsadm:
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B iwhd_exec_t
++.B fsadm_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
-+- Set files with the iwhd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the iwhd_t domain.
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux fsadm policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their fsadm processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for fsadm:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B iwhd_initrc_exec_t
++.B fsadm_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the iwhd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the iwhd_initrc_t domain.
++- Set files with the fsadm_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the fsadm_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B iwhd_log_t
++.B fsadm_log_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the iwhd_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as iwhd log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++- Set files with the fsadm_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as fsadm log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B iwhd_var_lib_t
++.B fsadm_tmp_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the iwhd_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the iwhd files under the /var/lib directory.
++- Set files with the fsadm_tmp_t type, if you want to store fsadm temporary files in the /tmp directories.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B iwhd_var_run_t
++.B fsadm_var_run_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the iwhd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the iwhd files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the fsadm_var_run_t type, if you want to store the fsadm files under the /run directory.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux iwhd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their iwhd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for iwhd:
-+
-+.EX
-+.B iwhd_t
-+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
-+
-+.SH "COMMANDS"
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
-+.PP
-+.B semanage permissive
-+can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
-+.PP
-+.B semanage module
-+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
-+
-+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
-+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
-+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
-+
-+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), iwhd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/jabberd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/jabberd_selinux.8
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..51c4344
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/jabberd_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,153 @@
-+.TH "jabberd_selinux" "8" "jabberd" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "jabberd SELinux Policy documentation"
-+.SH "NAME"
-+jabberd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the jabberd processes
-+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the jabberd processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++The SELinux process type fsadm_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++.br
++.B amanda_dumpdates_t
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux jabberd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their jabberd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for jabberd:
++ /etc/dumpdates
++.br
+
++.br
++.B cifs_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B jabberd_exec_t
-+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the jabberd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the jabberd_t domain.
++.br
++.B etc_runtime_t
+
++ /[^/]+
++.br
++ /etc/mtab.*
++.br
++ /etc/blkid(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/nologin.*
++.br
++ /etc/\.fstab\.hal\..+
++.br
++ /halt
++.br
++ /fastboot
++.br
++ /poweroff
++.br
++ /etc/cmtab
++.br
++ /\.autofsck
++.br
++ /forcefsck
++.br
++ /\.suspended
++.br
++ /fsckoptions
++.br
++ /\.autorelabel
++.br
++ /etc/securetty
++.br
++ /etc/killpower
++.br
++ /etc/nohotplug
++.br
++ /etc/ioctl\.save
++.br
++ /etc/fstab\.REVOKE
++.br
++ /etc/network/ifstate
++.br
++ /etc/sysconfig/hwconf
++.br
++ /etc/ptal/ptal-printd-like
++.br
++ /etc/sysconfig/iptables\.save
++.br
++ /etc/xorg\.conf\.d/00-system-setup-keyboard\.conf
++.br
++ /etc/X11/xorg\.conf\.d/00-system-setup-keyboard\.conf
+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/bin/s2s, /usr/bin/sm
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B jabberd_initrc_exec_t
-+.EE
++.br
++.B fsadm_log_t
+
-+- Set files with the jabberd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the jabberd_initrc_t domain.
++ /var/log/fsck(/.*)?
++.br
+
++.br
++.B fsadm_tmp_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B jabberd_router_exec_t
-+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the jabberd_router_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the jabberd_router_t domain.
++.br
++.B fsadm_var_run_t
+
++ /var/run/blkid(/.*)?
+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/bin/c2s, /usr/bin/router
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B jabberd_var_lib_t
-+.EE
++.br
++.B hugetlbfs_t
+
-+- Set files with the jabberd_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the jabberd files under the /var/lib directory.
++ /dev/hugepages
++.br
++ /lib/udev/devices/hugepages
++.br
++ /usr/lib/udev/devices/hugepages
++.br
+
++.br
++.B livecd_tmp_t
+
-+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PORT TYPES
-+SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
-+.PP
-+You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
++.br
++.B lost_found_t
+
-+.B semanage port -l
++ /lost\+found
++.br
++ /var/lost\+found
++.br
++ /usr/lost\+found
++.br
++ /tmp/lost\+found
++.br
++ /boot/lost\+found
++.br
++ /var/tmp/lost\+found
++.br
++ /home/lost\+found
++.br
+
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
-+SELinux jabberd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their jabberd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following port types are defined for jabberd:
++.br
++.B nfs_t
+
-+.EX
-+.TP 5
-+.B jabber_client_port_t
-+.TP 10
-+.EE
+
++.br
++.B swapfile_t
+
-+Default Defined Ports:
-+tcp 5222,5223
-+.EE
+
-+.EX
-+.TP 5
-+.B jabber_interserver_port_t
-+.TP 10
-+.EE
++.br
++.B sysfs_t
+
++ /sys(/.*)?
++.br
+
-+Default Defined Ports:
-+tcp 5269
-+.EE
++.br
++.B tmpfs_t
+
-+.EX
-+.TP 5
-+.B jabber_router_port_t
-+.TP 10
-+.EE
++ /dev/shm
++.br
++ /lib/udev/devices/shm
++.br
++ /usr/lib/udev/devices/shm
++.br
+
++.br
++.B xen_image_t
+
-+Default Defined Ports:
-+tcp 5347
-+.EE
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux jabberd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their jabberd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for jabberd:
++ /xen(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xen/images(/.*)?
++.br
+
-+.EX
-+.B jabberd_router_t, jabberd_t
-+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -24238,204 +27405,125 @@ index 0000000..51c4344
+.B semanage module
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
-+.B semanage port
-+can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
-+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), jabberd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/jockey_selinux.8 b/man/man8/jockey_selinux.8
++selinux(8), fsadm(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/fsdaemon_selinux.8 b/man/man8/fsdaemon_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..9a6aaca
+index 0000000..d181d7d
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/jockey_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,93 @@
-+.TH "jockey_selinux" "8" "jockey" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "jockey SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/fsdaemon_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,124 @@
++.TH "fsdaemon_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "fsdaemon" "SELinux Policy documentation for fsdaemon"
+.SH "NAME"
-+jockey_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the jockey processes
++fsdaemon_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the fsdaemon processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the jockey processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
-+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
-+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux jockey policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their jockey processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for jockey:
-+
-+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B jockey_cache_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the jockey_cache_t type, if you want to store the files under the /var/cache directory.
-+
-+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B jockey_exec_t
-+.EE
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the fsdaemon processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+- Set files with the jockey_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the jockey_t domain.
++The fsdaemon processes execute with the fsdaemon_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B jockey_var_log_t
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep fsdaemon_t
+
-+- Set files with the jockey_var_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as jockey var log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/log/jockey\.log.*, /var/log/jockey(/.*)?
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
-+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
++The fsdaemon_t SELinux type can be entered via the "fsdaemon_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the fsdaemon_t domain are the following:"
+
++/usr/sbin/smartd
+.SH PROCESS TYPES
+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux jockey policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their jockey processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for jockey:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux fsdaemon policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their fsdaemon processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for fsdaemon:
+
+.EX
-+.B jockey_t
++.B fsdaemon_t
+.EE
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
-+.SH "COMMANDS"
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
-+.PP
-+.B semanage permissive
-+can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
-+.PP
-+.B semanage module
-+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
-+
-+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
-+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
-+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
-+
-+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), jockey(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/kadmind_selinux.8 b/man/man8/kadmind_selinux.8
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..24e83c0
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/kadmind_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
-+.TH "kadmind_selinux" "8" "kadmind" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "kadmind SELinux Policy documentation"
-+.SH "NAME"
-+kadmind_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the kadmind processes
-+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
-+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the kadmind processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
-+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
-+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux kadmind policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their kadmind processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for kadmind:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux fsdaemon policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their fsdaemon processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for fsdaemon:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B kadmind_exec_t
++.B fsdaemon_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the kadmind_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the kadmind_t domain.
++- Set files with the fsdaemon_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the fsdaemon_t domain.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/(local/)?(kerberos/)?sbin/kadmind, /usr/kerberos/sbin/kadmin\.local
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B kadmind_log_t
++.B fsdaemon_initrc_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the kadmind_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as kadmind log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++- Set files with the fsdaemon_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the fsdaemon_initrc_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B kadmind_tmp_t
++.B fsdaemon_tmp_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the kadmind_tmp_t type, if you want to store kadmind temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++- Set files with the fsdaemon_tmp_t type, if you want to store fsdaemon temporary files in the /tmp directories.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B kadmind_var_run_t
++.B fsdaemon_var_run_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the kadmind_var_run_t type, if you want to store the kadmind files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the fsdaemon_var_run_t type, if you want to store the fsdaemon files under the /run directory.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux kadmind policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their kadmind processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for kadmind:
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+.EX
-+.B kadmind_t
-+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++The SELinux process type fsdaemon_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B fsdaemon_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B fsdaemon_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/smartd\.pid
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -24448,956 +27536,647 @@ index 0000000..24e83c0
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), kadmind(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/kdump_selinux.8 b/man/man8/kdump_selinux.8
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..c6ca89e
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/kdump_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,155 @@
-+.TH "kdump_selinux" "8" "kdump" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "kdump SELinux Policy documentation"
-+.SH "NAME"
-+kdump_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the kdump processes
-+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
-+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the kdump processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
-+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++selinux(8), fsdaemon(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/ftpd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/ftpd_selinux.8
+index 5bebd82..8460714 100644
+--- a/man/man8/ftpd_selinux.8
++++ b/man/man8/ftpd_selinux.8
+@@ -1,65 +1,608 @@
+-.TH "ftpd_selinux" "8" "17 Jan 2005" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "ftpd SELinux policy documentation"
++.TH "ftpd_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "ftpd" "SELinux Policy documentation for ftpd"
+ .SH "NAME"
+-.PP
+-ftpd_selinux \- Security-Enhanced Linux policy for ftp daemons.
++ftpd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the ftpd processes
+ .SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the kdumpgui_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the ftpd processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
++The ftpd processes execute with the ftpd_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the kdumpgui_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep ftpd_t
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux kdump policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their kdump processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for kdump:
+
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B kdump_etc_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the kdump_etc_t type, if you want to store kdump files in the /etc directories.
++The ftpd_t SELinux type can be entered via the "ftpd_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the ftpd_t domain are the following:"
+
++/usr/sbin/ftpwho, /usr/sbin/vsftpd, /usr/sbin/in\.ftpd, /usr/sbin/proftpd, /usr/sbin/muddleftpd, /usr/kerberos/sbin/ftpd, /etc/cron\.monthly/proftpd
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+ .PP
+-Security-Enhanced Linux provides security for ftp daemons via flexible mandatory access control.
+-.SH FILE_CONTEXTS
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+ .PP
+-SELinux requires files to have a file type. File types may be specified with semanage and are restored with restorecon. Policy governs the access that daemons have to files.
+-.TP
+-Allow ftp servers to read the /var/ftp directory by adding the public_content_t file type to the directory and by restoring the file type.
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux ftpd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ftpd processes in as secure a method as possible.
+ .PP
+-.B
+-semanage fcontext -a -t public_content_t "/var/ftp(/.*)?"
+-.TP
+-.B
+-restorecon -F -R -v /var/ftp
+-.TP
+-Allow ftp servers to read and write /var/tmp/incoming by adding the public_content_rw_t type to the directory and by restoring the file type. This also requires the allow_ftpd_anon_write boolean to be set.
++The following process types are defined for ftpd:
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B kdump_exec_t
++.B ftpd_t, ftpdctl_t
+.EE
+ .PP
+-.B
+-semanage fcontext -a -t public_content_rw_t "/var/ftp/incoming(/.*)?"
+-.TP
+-.B
+-restorecon -F -R -v /var/ftp/incoming
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+ .SH BOOLEANS
++SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. ftpd policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run ftpd with the tightest access possible.
+
-+- Set files with the kdump_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the kdump_t domain.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/sbin/kdump, /usr/sbin/kexec, /sbin/kdump, /sbin/kexec
+ .PP
+-SELinux policy is based on least privilege required and may also be customizable by setting a boolean with setsebool.
+-.TP
+-Allow ftp servers to read and write files with the public_content_rw_t file type.
++If you want to allow ftp servers to use nfs used for public file transfer services, you must turn on the ftpd_use_nfs boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B kdump_initrc_exec_t
++.B setsebool -P ftpd_use_nfs 1
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the kdump_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the kdump_initrc_t domain.
-+
+ .PP
+-.B
+-setsebool -P allow_ftpd_anon_write on
+-.TP
+-Allow ftp servers to read or write files in the user home directories.
++If you want to allow httpd to act as a FTP server by listening on the ftp port, you must turn on the httpd_enable_ftp_server boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B kdump_unit_file_t
++.B setsebool -P httpd_enable_ftp_server 1
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the kdump_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as kdump unit content.
-+
+ .PP
+-.B
+-setsebool -P ftp_home_dir on
+-.TP
+-Allow ftp servers to read or write all files on the system.
++If you want to allow ftp servers to use bind to all unreserved ports for passive mode, you must turn on the ftpd_use_passive_mode boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B kdumpctl_exec_t
++.B setsebool -P ftpd_use_passive_mode 1
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the kdumpctl_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the kdumpctl_t domain.
-+
+ .PP
+-.B
+-setsebool -P allow_ftpd_full_access on
++If you want to allow httpd to act as a FTP client connecting to the ftp port and ephemeral ports, you must turn on the httpd_can_connect_ftp boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B kdumpctl_tmp_t
++.B setsebool -P httpd_can_connect_ftp 1
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the kdumpctl_tmp_t type, if you want to store kdumpctl temporary files in the /tmp directories.
-+
-+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B kdumpctl_unit_file_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the kdumpctl_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as kdumpctl unit content.
-+
++If you want to allow ftp to read and write files in the user home directories, you must turn on the ftp_home_dir boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B kdumpgui_exec_t
++.B setsebool -P ftp_home_dir 1
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the kdumpgui_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the kdumpgui_t domain.
-+
++.PP
++If you want to allow ftp servers to connect to mysql database ports, you must turn on the ftpd_connect_db boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B kdumpgui_tmp_t
++.B setsebool -P ftpd_connect_db 1
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the kdumpgui_tmp_t type, if you want to store kdumpgui temporary files in the /tmp directories.
-+
-+
-+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
-+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux kdump policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their kdump processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for kdump:
++If you want to allow ftp servers to use cifs used for public file transfer services, you must turn on the ftpd_use_cifs boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B kdumpgui_t, kdumpctl_t, kdump_t
++.B setsebool -P ftpd_use_cifs 1
+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
-+
-+.SH "COMMANDS"
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
-+.PP
-+.B semanage permissive
-+can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
-+.PP
-+.B semanage module
-+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
-+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
-+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
-+
-+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), kdump(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/kdumpctl_selinux.8 b/man/man8/kdumpctl_selinux.8
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..da151a2
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/kdumpctl_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
-+.TH "kdumpctl_selinux" "8" "kdumpctl" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "kdumpctl SELinux Policy documentation"
-+.SH "NAME"
-+kdumpctl_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the kdumpctl processes
-+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
-+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the kdumpctl processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++If you want to allow sftp-internal to read and write files in the user home directories, you must turn on the sftpd_enable_homedirs boolean.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P sftpd_enable_homedirs 1
++.EE
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux kdumpctl policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their kdumpctl processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for kdumpctl:
-+
++If you want to allow internal-sftp to read and write files in the user ssh home directories, you must turn on the sftpd_write_ssh_home boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B kdumpctl_exec_t
++.B setsebool -P sftpd_write_ssh_home 1
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the kdumpctl_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the kdumpctl_t domain.
-+
++.PP
++If you want to allow tftp to read and write files in the user home directories, you must turn on the tftp_home_dir boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B kdumpctl_tmp_t
++.B setsebool -P tftp_home_dir 1
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the kdumpctl_tmp_t type, if you want to store kdumpctl temporary files in the /tmp directories.
-+
++.PP
++If you want to allow sftp-internal to login to local users and read/write all files on the system, governed by DAC, you must turn on the sftpd_full_access boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B kdumpctl_unit_file_t
++.B setsebool -P sftpd_full_access 1
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the kdumpctl_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as kdumpctl unit content.
-+
-+
-+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
-+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux kdumpctl policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their kdumpctl processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for kdumpctl:
++If you want to allow ftp servers to connect to all ports > 1023, you must turn on the ftpd_connect_all_unreserved boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B kdumpctl_t
++.B setsebool -P ftpd_connect_all_unreserved 1
+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
-+
-+.SH "COMMANDS"
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
-+.PP
-+.B semanage permissive
-+can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
-+.PP
-+.B semanage module
-+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
-+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
-+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
-+
-+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), kdumpctl(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/kdumpgui_selinux.8 b/man/man8/kdumpgui_selinux.8
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..d20bf5e
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/kdumpgui_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
-+.TH "kdumpgui_selinux" "8" "kdumpgui" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "kdumpgui SELinux Policy documentation"
-+.SH "NAME"
-+kdumpgui_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the kdumpgui processes
-+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
-+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the kdumpgui processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++If you want to allow ftp servers to login to local users and read/write all files on the system, governed by DAC, you must turn on the ftpd_full_access boolean.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P ftpd_full_access 1
++.EE
+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the kdumpgui_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++If you want to allow ftp servers to use nfs used for public file transfer services, you must turn on the ftpd_use_nfs boolean.
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.B setsebool -P ftpd_use_nfs 1
+.EE
+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the kdumpgui_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++If you want to allow httpd to act as a FTP server by listening on the ftp port, you must turn on the httpd_enable_ftp_server boolean.
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B setsebool -P httpd_enable_ftp_server 1
+.EE
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux kdumpgui policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their kdumpgui processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for kdumpgui:
-+
++If you want to allow ftp servers to use bind to all unreserved ports for passive mode, you must turn on the ftpd_use_passive_mode boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B kdumpgui_exec_t
++.B setsebool -P ftpd_use_passive_mode 1
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the kdumpgui_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the kdumpgui_t domain.
-+
++.PP
++If you want to allow httpd to act as a FTP client connecting to the ftp port and ephemeral ports, you must turn on the httpd_can_connect_ftp boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B kdumpgui_tmp_t
++.B setsebool -P httpd_can_connect_ftp 1
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the kdumpgui_tmp_t type, if you want to store kdumpgui temporary files in the /tmp directories.
-+
-+
-+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
-+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux kdumpgui policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their kdumpgui processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for kdumpgui:
++If you want to allow ftp to read and write files in the user home directories, you must turn on the ftp_home_dir boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B kdumpgui_t
++.B setsebool -P ftp_home_dir 1
+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
-+
-+.SH "COMMANDS"
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
-+.PP
-+.B semanage permissive
-+can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
-+.PP
-+.B semanage module
-+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
-+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
-+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
-+
-+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), kdumpgui(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/keyboardd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/keyboardd_selinux.8
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..59fd0b3
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/keyboardd_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
-+.TH "keyboardd_selinux" "8" "keyboardd" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "keyboardd SELinux Policy documentation"
-+.SH "NAME"
-+keyboardd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the keyboardd processes
-+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
-+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the keyboardd processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++If you want to allow ftp servers to connect to mysql database ports, you must turn on the ftpd_connect_db boolean.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P ftpd_connect_db 1
++.EE
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux keyboardd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their keyboardd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for keyboardd:
-+
++If you want to allow ftp servers to use cifs used for public file transfer services, you must turn on the ftpd_use_cifs boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B keyboardd_exec_t
++.B setsebool -P ftpd_use_cifs 1
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the keyboardd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the keyboardd_t domain.
-+
-+
-+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
-+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux keyboardd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their keyboardd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for keyboardd:
++If you want to allow sftp-internal to read and write files in the user home directories, you must turn on the sftpd_enable_homedirs boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B keyboardd_t
++.B setsebool -P sftpd_enable_homedirs 1
+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
-+
-+.SH "COMMANDS"
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
-+.PP
-+.B semanage permissive
-+can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
-+.PP
-+.B semanage module
-+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
-+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
-+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
-+
-+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), keyboardd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/keystone_selinux.8 b/man/man8/keystone_selinux.8
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..b521f85
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/keystone_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,147 @@
-+.TH "keystone_selinux" "8" "keystone" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "keystone SELinux Policy documentation"
-+.SH "NAME"
-+keystone_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the keystone processes
-+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
-+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the keystone processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++If you want to allow internal-sftp to read and write files in the user ssh home directories, you must turn on the sftpd_write_ssh_home boolean.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P sftpd_write_ssh_home 1
++.EE
+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the keystone_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++If you want to allow tftp to read and write files in the user home directories, you must turn on the tftp_home_dir boolean.
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.B setsebool -P tftp_home_dir 1
+.EE
+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the keystone_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++If you want to allow sftp-internal to login to local users and read/write all files on the system, governed by DAC, you must turn on the sftpd_full_access boolean.
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B setsebool -P sftpd_full_access 1
+.EE
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux keystone policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their keystone processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for keystone:
-+
++If you want to allow ftp servers to connect to all ports > 1023, you must turn on the ftpd_connect_all_unreserved boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B keystone_exec_t
++.B setsebool -P ftpd_connect_all_unreserved 1
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the keystone_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the keystone_t domain.
-+
++.PP
++If you want to allow ftp servers to login to local users and read/write all files on the system, governed by DAC, you must turn on the ftpd_full_access boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B keystone_log_t
++.B setsebool -P ftpd_full_access 1
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the keystone_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as keystone log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++.SH SHARING FILES
++If you want to share files with multiple domains (Apache, FTP, rsync, Samba), you can set a file context of public_content_t and public_content_rw_t. These context allow any of the above domains to read the content. If you want a particular domain to write to the public_content_rw_t domain, you must set the appropriate boolean.
+ .TP
+-Allow ftp servers to use cifs for public file transfer services.
++Allow ftpd servers to read the /var/ftpd directory by adding the public_content_t file type to the directory and by restoring the file type.
+ .PP
+ .B
+-setsebool -P allow_ftpd_use_cifs on
++semanage fcontext -a -t public_content_t "/var/ftpd(/.*)?"
++.br
++.B restorecon -F -R -v /var/ftpd
++.pp
+ .TP
+-Allow ftp servers to use nfs for public file transfer services.
++Allow ftpd servers to read and write /var/tmp/incoming by adding the public_content_rw_t type to the directory and by restoring the file type. This also requires the allow_ftpdd_anon_write boolean to be set.
+ .PP
+ .B
+-setsebool -P allow_ftpd_use_nfs on
+-.TP
+-system-config-selinux is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+-.SH AUTHOR
++semanage fcontext -a -t public_content_rw_t "/var/ftpd/incoming(/.*)?"
++.br
++.B restorecon -F -R -v /var/ftpd/incoming
+
+
+ .PP
+-This manual page was written by Dan Walsh <dwalsh at redhat.com>.
++If you want to allow anon internal-sftp to upload files, used for public file transfer services. Directories must be labeled public_content_rw_t., you must turn on the sftpd_anon_write boolean.
+
+-.SH "SEE ALSO"
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B keystone_tmp_t
++.B setsebool -P sftpd_anon_write 1
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the keystone_tmp_t type, if you want to store keystone temporary files in the /tmp directories.
-+
++.PP
++If you want to allow ftp servers to upload files, used for public file transfer services. Directories must be labeled public_content_rw_t., you must turn on the ftpd_anon_write boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B keystone_unit_file_t
++.B setsebool -P ftpd_anon_write 1
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the keystone_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as keystone unit content.
-+
++.PP
++If you want to allow tftp to modify public files used for public file transfer services., you must turn on the tftp_anon_write boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B keystone_var_lib_t
++.B setsebool -P tftp_anon_write 1
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the keystone_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the keystone files under the /var/lib directory.
-+
-+
-+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
-+
-+.SH PORT TYPES
-+SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
+.PP
-+You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
++If you want to allow anon internal-sftp to upload files, used for public file transfer services. Directories must be labeled public_content_rw_t., you must turn on the sftpd_anon_write boolean.
+
-+.B semanage port -l
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P sftpd_anon_write 1
++.EE
+
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
-+SELinux keystone policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their keystone processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following port types are defined for keystone:
++If you want to allow ftp servers to upload files, used for public file transfer services. Directories must be labeled public_content_rw_t., you must turn on the ftpd_anon_write boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.TP 5
-+.B keystone_port_t
-+.TP 10
++.B setsebool -P ftpd_anon_write 1
+.EE
+
-+
-+Default Defined Ports:
-+tcp 5000
-+.EE
-+udp 5000
-+.EE
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux keystone policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their keystone processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for keystone:
++If you want to allow tftp to modify public files used for public file transfer services., you must turn on the tftp_anon_write boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B keystone_t
++.B setsebool -P tftp_anon_write 1
+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
-+.SH "COMMANDS"
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
-+.B semanage permissive
-+can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+.B semanage module
-+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux ftpd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ftpd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for ftpd:
+
-+.B semanage port
-+can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
+
++.EX
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
-+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++.B ftpd_etc_t
++.EE
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++- Set files with the ftpd_etc_t type, if you want to store ftpd files in the /etc directories.
+
-+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), keystone(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/kismet_selinux.8 b/man/man8/kismet_selinux.8
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..7edd41b
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/kismet_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,161 @@
-+.TH "kismet_selinux" "8" "kismet" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "kismet SELinux Policy documentation"
-+.SH "NAME"
-+kismet_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the kismet processes
-+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the kismet processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++.EX
++.PP
++.B ftpd_exec_t
++.EE
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++- Set files with the ftpd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ftpd_t domain.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the kismet_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.PP
++.B ftpd_initrc_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the kismet_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++- Set files with the ftpd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ftpd_initrc_t domain.
++
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.PP
++.B ftpd_keytab_t
+.EE
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux kismet policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their kismet processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for kismet:
++- Set files with the ftpd_keytab_t type, if you want to treat the files as kerberos keytab files.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B kismet_exec_t
++.B ftpd_lock_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the kismet_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the kismet_t domain.
++- Set files with the ftpd_lock_t type, if you want to treat the files as ftpd lock data, stored under the /var/lock directory
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B kismet_home_t
++.B ftpd_tmp_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the kismet_home_t type, if you want to store kismet files in the users home directory.
++- Set files with the ftpd_tmp_t type, if you want to store ftpd temporary files in the /tmp directories.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B kismet_log_t
++.B ftpd_tmpfs_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the kismet_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as kismet log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++- Set files with the ftpd_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store ftpd files on a tmpfs file system.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B kismet_tmp_t
++.B ftpd_unit_file_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the kismet_tmp_t type, if you want to store kismet temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++- Set files with the ftpd_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as ftpd unit content.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B kismet_tmpfs_t
++.B ftpd_var_run_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the kismet_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store kismet files on a tmpfs file system.
++- Set files with the ftpd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the ftpd files under the /run directory.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B kismet_var_lib_t
++.B ftpdctl_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the kismet_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the kismet files under the /var/lib directory.
++- Set files with the ftpdctl_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ftpdctl_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B kismet_var_run_t
++.B ftpdctl_tmp_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the kismet_var_run_t type, if you want to store the kismet files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the ftpdctl_tmp_t type, if you want to store ftpdctl temporary files in the /tmp directories.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
+.SH PORT TYPES
-+SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
++SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
+.PP
-+You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
++You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
+
+.B semanage port -l
+
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
-+SELinux kismet policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their kismet processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following port types are defined for kismet:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
++SELinux ftpd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ftpd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following port types are defined for ftpd:
+
+.EX
+.TP 5
-+.B kismet_port_t
++.B ftp_data_port_t
+.TP 10
+.EE
+
+
+Default Defined Ports:
-+tcp 2501
++tcp 20
+.EE
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux kismet policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their kismet processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for kismet:
+
+.EX
-+.B kismet_t
++.TP 5
++.B ftp_port_t
++.TP 10
+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
-+
-+.SH "COMMANDS"
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
-+.PP
-+.B semanage permissive
-+can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
-+.PP
-+.B semanage module
-+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
-+
-+.B semanage port
-+can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
-+
-+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
-+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
-+
-+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), kismet(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/klogd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/klogd_selinux.8
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..5dbcedd
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/klogd_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,93 @@
-+.TH "klogd_selinux" "8" "klogd" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "klogd SELinux Policy documentation"
-+.SH "NAME"
-+klogd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the klogd processes
-+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the klogd processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Default Defined Ports:
++tcp 21,990
++.EE
++udp 990
++.EE
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The SELinux process type ftpd_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux klogd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their klogd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for klogd:
++.br
++.B faillog_t
+
++ /var/log/btmp.*
++.br
++ /var/run/faillock(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/log/faillog
++.br
++ /var/log/tallylog
++.br
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B klogd_exec_t
-+.EE
++.br
++.B ftpd_lock_t
+
-+- Set files with the klogd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the klogd_t domain.
+
+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/sbin/rklogd, /usr/sbin/klogd, /sbin/klogd, /sbin/rklogd
-+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B klogd_tmp_t
-+.EE
++.B ftpd_tmp_t
+
-+- Set files with the klogd_tmp_t type, if you want to store klogd temporary files in the /tmp directories.
+
++.br
++.B ftpd_tmpfs_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B klogd_var_run_t
-+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the klogd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the klogd files under the /run directory.
++.br
++.B ftpd_var_run_t
+
++ /var/run/proftpd.*
++.br
+
-+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
++.br
++.B initrc_var_run_t
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux klogd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their klogd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for klogd:
++ /var/run/utmp
++.br
++ /var/run/random-seed
++.br
++ /var/run/runlevel\.dir
++.br
++ /var/run/setmixer_flag
++.br
+
-+.EX
-+.B klogd_t
-+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++.br
++.B krb5_host_rcache_t
+
-+.SH "COMMANDS"
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
-+.PP
-+.B semanage permissive
-+can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
-+.PP
-+.B semanage module
-+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++ /var/cache/krb5rcache(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/tmp/nfs_0
++.br
++ /var/tmp/DNS_25
++.br
++ /var/tmp/host_0
++.br
++ /var/tmp/imap_0
++.br
++ /var/tmp/HTTP_23
++.br
++ /var/tmp/HTTP_48
++.br
++ /var/tmp/ldap_55
++.br
++ /var/tmp/ldap_487
++.br
++ /var/tmp/ldapmap1_0
++.br
+
-+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
-+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++.br
++.B lastlog_t
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++ /var/log/lastlog
++.br
+
-+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), klogd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/kpropd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/kpropd_selinux.8
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..1606af5
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/kpropd_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
-+.TH "kpropd_selinux" "8" "kpropd" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "kpropd SELinux Policy documentation"
-+.SH "NAME"
-+kpropd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the kpropd processes
-+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++.br
++.B pcscd_var_run_t
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the kpropd processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++ /var/run/pcscd(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/pcscd\.events(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/pcscd\.pid
++.br
++ /var/run/pcscd\.pub
++.br
++ /var/run/pcscd\.comm
++.br
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++.br
++.B security_t
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux kpropd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their kpropd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for kpropd:
++ /selinux
++.br
+
++.br
++.B var_auth_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B kpropd_exec_t
-+.EE
++ /var/ace(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/rsa(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/abl(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/rsa(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/pam_ssh(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/pam_ssh(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/pam_shield(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/google-authenticator(/.*)?
++.br
+
-+- Set files with the kpropd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the kpropd_t domain.
++.br
++.B wtmp_t
+
++ /var/log/wtmp.*
++.br
+
-+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
++.br
++.B xferlog_t
+
-+.SH PORT TYPES
-+SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
-+.PP
-+You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
++ /var/log/vsftpd.*
++.br
++ /var/log/xferlog.*
++.br
++ /var/log/proftpd(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/log/xferreport.*
++.br
++ /var/log/muddleftpd\.log.*
++.br
++ /usr/libexec/webmin/vsftpd/webalizer/xfer_log
++.br
+
-+.B semanage port -l
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
-+SELinux kpropd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their kpropd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following port types are defined for kpropd:
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the ftpd_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.TP 5
-+.B kprop_port_t
-+.TP 10
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
+
-+
-+Default Defined Ports:
-+tcp 754
-+.EE
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux kpropd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their kpropd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for kpropd:
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the ftpd_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B kpropd_t
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
+can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
-+.PP
+ .PP
+.B semanage permissive
+can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
+.PP
@@ -25406,135 +28185,102 @@ index 0000000..1606af5
+
+.B semanage port
+can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
+
+-selinux(8), ftpd(8), setsebool(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8)
++.B semanage boolean
++can also be used to manipulate the booleans
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), kpropd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/krb5kdc_selinux.8 b/man/man8/krb5kdc_selinux.8
++selinux(8), ftpd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, setsebool(8), ftpdctl_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/ftpdctl_selinux.8 b/man/man8/ftpdctl_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..f3acfe7
+index 0000000..c926027
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/krb5kdc_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,133 @@
-+.TH "krb5kdc_selinux" "8" "krb5kdc" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "krb5kdc SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/ftpdctl_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
++.TH "ftpdctl_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "ftpdctl" "SELinux Policy documentation for ftpdctl"
+.SH "NAME"
-+krb5kdc_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the krb5kdc processes
++ftpdctl_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the ftpdctl processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the krb5kdc processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the ftpdctl processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The ftpdctl processes execute with the ftpdctl_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux krb5kdc policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their krb5kdc processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for krb5kdc:
++For example:
+
++.B ps -eZ | grep ftpdctl_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B krb5kdc_conf_t
-+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the krb5kdc_conf_t type, if you want to treat the files as krb5kdc configuration data, usually stored under the /etc directory.
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/kerberos/krb5kdc(/.*)?, /etc/krb5kdc(/.*)?, /usr/local/var/krb5kdc(/.*)?
++The ftpdctl_t SELinux type can be entered via the "ftpdctl_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the ftpdctl_t domain are the following:"
+
-+.EX
++/usr/bin/ftpdctl
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+.B krb5kdc_exec_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the krb5kdc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the krb5kdc_t domain.
-+
-+
-+.EX
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+.B krb5kdc_lock_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the krb5kdc_lock_t type, if you want to treat the files as krb5kdc lock data, stored under the /var/lock directory
-+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/kerberos/krb5kdc/principal.*\.ok, /var/kerberos/krb5kdc/from_master.*
-+
-+.EX
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux ftpdctl policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ftpdctl processes in as secure a method as possible.
+.PP
-+.B krb5kdc_log_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the krb5kdc_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as krb5kdc log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
-+
++The following process types are defined for ftpdctl:
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B krb5kdc_principal_t
++.B ftpdctl_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
-+- Set files with the krb5kdc_principal_t type, if you want to treat the files as krb5kdc principal data.
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux ftpdctl policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ftpdctl processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for ftpdctl:
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/local/var/krb5kdc/principal.*, /etc/krb5kdc/principal.*, /var/kerberos/krb5kdc/principal.*
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B krb5kdc_tmp_t
++.B ftpdctl_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the krb5kdc_tmp_t type, if you want to store krb5kdc temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++- Set files with the ftpdctl_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ftpdctl_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B krb5kdc_var_run_t
++.B ftpdctl_tmp_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the krb5kdc_var_run_t type, if you want to store the krb5kdc files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the ftpdctl_tmp_t type, if you want to store ftpdctl temporary files in the /tmp directories.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux krb5kdc policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their krb5kdc processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for krb5kdc:
-+
-+.EX
-+.B krb5kdc_t
-+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -25547,111 +28293,180 @@ index 0000000..f3acfe7
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), krb5kdc(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/ksmtuned_selinux.8 b/man/man8/ksmtuned_selinux.8
++selinux(8), ftpdctl(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, ftpd_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/games_selinux.8 b/man/man8/games_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..3d5dd35
+index 0000000..3e88bfa
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/ksmtuned_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
-+.TH "ksmtuned_selinux" "8" "ksmtuned" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "ksmtuned SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/games_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,178 @@
++.TH "games_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "games" "SELinux Policy documentation for games"
+.SH "NAME"
-+ksmtuned_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the ksmtuned processes
++games_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the games processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the ksmtuned processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the games processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The games processes execute with the games_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the ksmtuned_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep games_t
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
+
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The games_t SELinux type can be entered via the "games_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the games_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/games/.*, /usr/lib/games(/.*)?, /usr/bin/civclient.*, /usr/bin/civserver.*, /usr/bin/sol, /usr/bin/micq, /usr/bin/kolf, /usr/bin/kpat, /usr/bin/gnect, /usr/bin/gtali, /usr/bin/iagno, /usr/bin/ksame, /usr/bin/ktron, /usr/bin/kwin4, /usr/bin/lskat, /usr/bin/gataxx, /usr/bin/glines, /usr/bin/klines, /usr/bin/kmines, /usr/bin/kpoker, /usr/bin/ksnake, /usr/bin/gnomine, /usr/bin/gnotski, /usr/bin/katomic, /usr/bin/kbounce, /usr/bin/kshisen, /usr/bin/ksirtet, /usr/bin/gnibbles, /usr/bin/gnobots2, /usr/bin/mahjongg, /usr/bin/atlantik, /usr/bin/kenolaba, /usr/bin/klickety, /usr/bin/konquest, /usr/bin/kreversi, /usr/bin/ksokoban, /usr/bin/blackjack, /usr/bin/gnotravex, /usr/bin/kblackbox, /usr/bin/kfouleggs, /usr/bin/kmahjongg, /usr/bin/kwin4proc, /usr/bin/lskatproc, /usr/bin/Maelstrom, /usr/bin/same-gnome, /usr/bin/kasteroids, /usr/bin/ksmiletris, /usr/bin/kspaceduel, /usr/bin/ktuberling, /usr/bin/kbackgammon, /usr/bin/kbattleship, /usr/bin/kgoldrunner, /usr/bin/gnome-stones, /
usr/bin/kjumpingcube
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the ksmtuned_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux games policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their games processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for games:
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B games_t, games_srv_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux ksmtuned policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ksmtuned processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for ksmtuned:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux games policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their games processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for games:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B ksmtuned_exec_t
++.B games_data_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the ksmtuned_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ksmtuned_t domain.
++- Set files with the games_data_t type, if you want to treat the files as games content.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B ksmtuned_initrc_exec_t
++.B games_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the ksmtuned_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ksmtuned_initrc_t domain.
++- Set files with the games_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the games_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B ksmtuned_log_t
++.B games_srv_var_run_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the ksmtuned_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as ksmtuned log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++- Set files with the games_srv_var_run_t type, if you want to store the games srv files under the /run directory.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B ksmtuned_var_run_t
++.B games_tmp_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the ksmtuned_var_run_t type, if you want to store the ksmtuned files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the games_tmp_t type, if you want to store games temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B games_tmpfs_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the games_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store games files on a tmpfs file system.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux ksmtuned policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ksmtuned processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for ksmtuned:
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+.EX
-+.B ksmtuned_t
-+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++The SELinux process type games_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B games_data_t
++
++ /var/games(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/games(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B games_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B games_tmpfs_t
++
++
++.br
++.B user_fonts_cache_t
++
++ /root/\.fontconfig(/.*)?
++.br
++ /root/\.fonts/auto(/.*)?
++.br
++ /root/\.fonts\.cache-.*
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.fontconfig(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.fonts/auto(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.fonts\.cache-.*
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.fontconfig(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.fonts/auto(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.fonts\.cache-.*
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.fontconfig(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.fonts/auto(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.fonts\.cache-.*
++.br
++
++.br
++.B user_tmp_t
++
++ /var/run/user(/.*)?
++.br
++ /tmp/gconfd-.*
++.br
++ /tmp/gconfd-dwalsh
++.br
++ /tmp/gconfd-xguest
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -25664,138 +28479,128 @@ index 0000000..3d5dd35
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), ksmtuned(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/ktalkd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/ktalkd_selinux.8
++selinux(8), games(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/gconfd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/gconfd_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..c5dca5b
+index 0000000..18de510
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/ktalkd_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,141 @@
-+.TH "ktalkd_selinux" "8" "ktalkd" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "ktalkd SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/gconfd_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,129 @@
++.TH "gconfd_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "gconfd" "SELinux Policy documentation for gconfd"
+.SH "NAME"
-+ktalkd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the ktalkd processes
++gconfd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the gconfd processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the ktalkd processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the gconfd processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The gconfd processes execute with the gconfd_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the ktalkd_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep gconfd_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
++The gconfd_t SELinux type can be entered via the "gconfd_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the gconfd_t domain are the following:"
++
++
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the ktalkd_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux gconfd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their gconfd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for gconfd:
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B gconfdefaultsm_t, gconfd_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux ktalkd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ktalkd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for ktalkd:
-+
-+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B ktalkd_exec_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the ktalkd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ktalkd_t domain.
-+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/sbin/in\.talkd, /usr/bin/ktalkd, /usr/sbin/in\.ntalkd
-+
-+.EX
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux gconfd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their gconfd processes in as secure a method as possible.
+.PP
-+.B ktalkd_log_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the ktalkd_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as ktalkd log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++The following file types are defined for gconfd:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B ktalkd_tmp_t
++.B gconfd_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the ktalkd_tmp_t type, if you want to store ktalkd temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++- Set files with the gconfd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the gconfd_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B ktalkd_var_run_t
++.B gconfdefaultsm_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the ktalkd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the ktalkd files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the gconfdefaultsm_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the gconfdefaultsm_t domain.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PORT TYPES
-+SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
-+.PP
-+You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+.B semanage port -l
++The SELinux process type gconfd_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
-+SELinux ktalkd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ktalkd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following port types are defined for ktalkd:
++.br
++.B gconf_home_t
+
-+.EX
-+.TP 5
-+.B ktalkd_port_t
-+.TP 10
-+.EE
++ /root/\.local.*
++.br
++ /root/\.gconf(d)?(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.local.*
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.gconf(d)?(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.local.*
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.gconf(d)?(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.local.*
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.gconf(d)?(/.*)?
++.br
+
++.br
++.B gconf_tmp_t
+
-+Default Defined Ports:
-+udp 517,518
-+.EE
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux ktalkd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ktalkd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for ktalkd:
++ /tmp/gconfd-.*/.*
++.br
++ /tmp/gconfd-dwalsh/.*
++.br
++ /tmp/gconfd-xguest/.*
++.br
+
-+.EX
-+.B ktalkd_t
-+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -25807,138 +28612,119 @@ index 0000000..c5dca5b
+.B semanage module
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
-+.B semanage port
-+can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
-+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), ktalkd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/l2tpd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/l2tpd_selinux.8
++selinux(8), gconfd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, gconfdefaultsm_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/gconfdefaultsm_selinux.8 b/man/man8/gconfdefaultsm_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..e87fd5d
+index 0000000..a13ef31
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/l2tpd_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,137 @@
-+.TH "l2tpd_selinux" "8" "l2tpd" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "l2tpd SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/gconfdefaultsm_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,117 @@
++.TH "gconfdefaultsm_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "gconfdefaultsm" "SELinux Policy documentation for gconfdefaultsm"
+.SH "NAME"
-+l2tpd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the l2tpd processes
++gconfdefaultsm_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the gconfdefaultsm processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the l2tpd processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the gconfdefaultsm processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The gconfdefaultsm processes execute with the gconfdefaultsm_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux l2tpd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their l2tpd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for l2tpd:
++For example:
+
++.B ps -eZ | grep gconfdefaultsm_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B l2tpd_exec_t
-+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the l2tpd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the l2tpd_t domain.
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/sbin/xl2tpd, /usr/sbin/prol2tpd, /usr/sbin/openl2tpd
++The gconfdefaultsm_t SELinux type can be entered via the "gconfdefaultsm_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the gconfdefaultsm_t domain are the following:"
+
-+.EX
++/usr/libexec/gconf-defaults-mechanism
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+.B l2tpd_initrc_exec_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the l2tpd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the l2tpd_initrc_t domain.
-+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/etc/rc\.d/init\.d/prol2tpd, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/openl2tpd, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/xl2tpd
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux gconfdefaultsm policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their gconfdefaultsm processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for gconfdefaultsm:
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B l2tpd_tmp_t
++.B gconfdefaultsm_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
-+- Set files with the l2tpd_tmp_t type, if you want to store l2tpd temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux gconfdefaultsm policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their gconfdefaultsm processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for gconfdefaultsm:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B l2tpd_var_run_t
++.B gconfdefaultsm_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the l2tpd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the l2tpd files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the gconfdefaultsm_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the gconfdefaultsm_t domain.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/run/prol2tpd(/.*)?, /var/run/prol2tpd\.pid, /var/run/prol2tpd\.ctl, /var/run/xl2tpd\.pid, /var/run/openl2tpd\.pid, /var/run/xl2tpd(/.*)?
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PORT TYPES
-+SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
-+.PP
-+You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+.B semanage port -l
++The SELinux process type gconfdefaultsm_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
-+SELinux l2tpd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their l2tpd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following port types are defined for l2tpd:
++.br
++.B gconf_etc_t
+
-+.EX
-+.TP 5
-+.B l2tp_port_t
-+.TP 10
-+.EE
++ /etc/gconf(/.*)?
++.br
+
++.br
++.B gconf_home_t
+
-+Default Defined Ports:
-+tcp 1701
-+.EE
-+udp 1701
-+.EE
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux l2tpd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their l2tpd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for l2tpd:
++ /root/\.local.*
++.br
++ /root/\.gconf(d)?(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.local.*
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.gconf(d)?(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.local.*
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.gconf(d)?(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.local.*
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.gconf(d)?(/.*)?
++.br
+
-+.EX
-+.B l2tpd_t
-+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -25950,285 +28736,215 @@ index 0000000..e87fd5d
+.B semanage module
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
-+.B semanage port
-+can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
-+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), l2tpd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/ldconfig_selinux.8 b/man/man8/ldconfig_selinux.8
++selinux(8), gconfdefaultsm(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, gconfd_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/getty_selinux.8 b/man/man8/getty_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..67c928e
+index 0000000..d3c311a
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/ldconfig_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,93 @@
-+.TH "ldconfig_selinux" "8" "ldconfig" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "ldconfig SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/getty_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,212 @@
++.TH "getty_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "getty" "SELinux Policy documentation for getty"
+.SH "NAME"
-+ldconfig_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the ldconfig processes
++getty_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the getty processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the ldconfig processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
-+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
-+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux ldconfig policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ldconfig processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for ldconfig:
-+
-+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B ldconfig_cache_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the ldconfig_cache_t type, if you want to store the files under the /var/cache directory.
-+
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the getty processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B ldconfig_exec_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the ldconfig_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ldconfig_t domain.
++The getty processes execute with the getty_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/sbin/ldconfig, /sbin/ldconfig
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B ldconfig_tmp_t
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep getty_t
+
-+- Set files with the ldconfig_tmp_t type, if you want to store ldconfig temporary files in the /tmp directories.
+
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
-+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
++The getty_t SELinux type can be entered via the "getty_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the getty_t domain are the following:"
+
++/sbin/.*getty, /usr/sbin/.*getty
+.SH PROCESS TYPES
+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux ldconfig policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ldconfig processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for ldconfig:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux getty policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their getty processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for getty:
+
+.EX
-+.B ldconfig_t
++.B getty_t
+.EE
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
-+.SH "COMMANDS"
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
-+.B semanage permissive
-+can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+.B semanage module
-+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
-+
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux getty policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their getty processes in as secure a method as possible.
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
-+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
-+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
-+
-+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), ldconfig(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/libra_selinux.8 b/man/man8/libra_selinux.8
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..cef3619
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/libra_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,185 @@
-+.TH "libra_selinux" "8" "libra" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "libra SELinux Policy documentation"
-+.SH "NAME"
-+libra_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the libra processes
-+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
-+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the libra processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
-+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The following file types are defined for getty:
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the libra_t, libra_mail_t, libra_net_t, libra_min_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
-+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the libra_t, libra_mail_t, libra_net_t, libra_min_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
-+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B getty_etc_t
+.EE
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux libra policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their libra processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for libra:
++- Set files with the getty_etc_t type, if you want to store getty files in the /etc directories.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B libra_cgroup_read_exec_t
++.B getty_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the libra_cgroup_read_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the libra_cgroup_read_t domain.
++- Set files with the getty_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the getty_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B libra_initrc_exec_t
++.B getty_lock_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the libra_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the libra_initrc_t domain.
++- Set files with the getty_lock_t type, if you want to treat the files as getty lock data, stored under the /var/lock directory
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/bin/rhc-restorer, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/mcollective, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/libra
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B libra_initrc_tmp_t
++.B getty_log_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the libra_initrc_tmp_t type, if you want to store libra initrc temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++- Set files with the getty_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as getty log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B libra_log_t
++.B getty_tmp_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the libra_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as libra log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++- Set files with the getty_tmp_t type, if you want to store getty temporary files in the /tmp directories.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B libra_mail_tmp_t
++.B getty_unit_file_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the libra_mail_tmp_t type, if you want to store libra mail temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++- Set files with the getty_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as getty unit content.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B libra_private_file_t
++.B getty_var_run_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the libra_private_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as libra private content.
++- Set files with the getty_var_run_t type, if you want to store the getty files under the /run directory.
+
+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B libra_rw_file_t
-+.EE
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
+
-+- Set files with the libra_rw_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as libra rw content.
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
++The SELinux process type getty_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B getty_lock_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B libra_tmp_t
-+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the libra_tmp_t type, if you want to store libra temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++.br
++.B getty_log_t
+
++ /var/log/mgetty\.log.*
++.br
++ /var/log/vgetty\.log\..*
++.br
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B libra_var_lib_t
-+.EE
++.br
++.B getty_tmp_t
+
-+- Set files with the libra_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the libra files under the /var/lib directory.
+
++.br
++.B getty_var_run_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B libra_var_run_t
-+.EE
++ /var/spool/fax(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/spool/voice(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/mgetty\.pid.*
++.br
+
-+- Set files with the libra_var_run_t type, if you want to store the libra files under the /run directory.
++.br
++.B initrc_var_run_t
+
++ /var/run/utmp
++.br
++ /var/run/random-seed
++.br
++ /var/run/runlevel\.dir
++.br
++ /var/run/setmixer_flag
++.br
+
-+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
++.br
++.B var_run_t
+
-+.SH PORT TYPES
-+SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
-+.PP
-+You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
++ /run/.*
++.br
++ /var/run/.*
++.br
++ /run
++.br
++ /var/run
++.br
++ /var/run
++.br
++ /var/spool/postfix/pid
++.br
+
-+.B semanage port -l
++.br
++.B wtmp_t
++
++ /var/log/wtmp.*
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
-+SELinux libra policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their libra processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following port types are defined for libra:
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the getty_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.TP 5
-+.B libra_port_t
-+.TP 10
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux libra policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their libra processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for libra:
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the getty_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B libra_t, libra_initrc_t, libra_mail_t, libra_net_app_t, libra_min_app_t, libra_app_t, libra_min_t, libra_net_t, libra_cgroup_read_t
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -26240,222 +28956,161 @@ index 0000000..cef3619
+.B semanage module
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
-+.B semanage port
-+can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
-+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), libra(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/lircd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/lircd_selinux.8
++selinux(8), getty(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/gfs_controld_selinux.8 b/man/man8/gfs_controld_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..630fc83
+index 0000000..d464731
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/lircd_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
-+.TH "lircd_selinux" "8" "lircd" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "lircd SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/gfs_controld_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,160 @@
++.TH "gfs_controld_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "gfs_controld" "SELinux Policy documentation for gfs_controld"
+.SH "NAME"
-+lircd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the lircd processes
++gfs_controld_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the gfs_controld processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the lircd processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the gfs_controld processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The gfs_controld processes execute with the gfs_controld_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep gfs_controld_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The gfs_controld_t SELinux type can be entered via the "gfs_controld_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the gfs_controld_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/sbin/gfs_controld
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux gfs_controld policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their gfs_controld processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for gfs_controld:
++
++.EX
++.B gfs_controld_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux lircd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their lircd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for lircd:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux gfs_controld policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their gfs_controld processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for gfs_controld:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B lircd_etc_t
++.B gfs_controld_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the lircd_etc_t type, if you want to store lircd files in the /etc directories.
++- Set files with the gfs_controld_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the gfs_controld_t domain.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/etc/lircd\.conf, /etc/lirc(/.*)?
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B lircd_exec_t
++.B gfs_controld_tmpfs_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the lircd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the lircd_t domain.
++- Set files with the gfs_controld_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store gfs controld files on a tmpfs file system.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B lircd_initrc_exec_t
++.B gfs_controld_var_log_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the lircd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the lircd_initrc_t domain.
++- Set files with the gfs_controld_var_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as gfs controld var log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B lircd_var_run_t
++.B gfs_controld_var_run_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the lircd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the lircd files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the gfs_controld_var_run_t type, if you want to store the gfs controld files under the /run directory.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/run/lirc(/.*)?, /var/run/lircd(/.*)?, /var/run/lircd\.pid
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PORT TYPES
-+SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
-+.PP
-+You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
-+
-+.B semanage port -l
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
-+SELinux lircd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their lircd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following port types are defined for lircd:
++The SELinux process type gfs_controld_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
-+.EX
-+.TP 5
-+.B lirc_port_t
-+.TP 10
-+.EE
++.br
++.B cluster_var_lib_t
+
++ /var/lib/cluster(/.*)?
++.br
+
-+Default Defined Ports:
-+tcp 8765
-+.EE
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux lircd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their lircd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for lircd:
++.br
++.B gfs_controld_tmpfs_t
+
-+.EX
-+.B lircd_t
-+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
-+.SH "COMMANDS"
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
-+.PP
-+.B semanage permissive
-+can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
-+.PP
-+.B semanage module
-+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++.br
++.B gfs_controld_var_log_t
+
-+.B semanage port
-+can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
++ /var/log/cluster/gfs_controld\.log.*
++.br
+
-+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
-+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++.br
++.B gfs_controld_var_run_t
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++ /var/run/gfs_controld\.pid
++.br
+
-+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), lircd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/livecd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/livecd_selinux.8
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..6e7333b
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/livecd_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
-+.TH "livecd_selinux" "8" "livecd" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "livecd SELinux Policy documentation"
-+.SH "NAME"
-+livecd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the livecd processes
-+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++.br
++.B initrc_tmp_t
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the livecd processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++.br
++.B sysfs_t
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux livecd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their livecd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for livecd:
++ /sys(/.*)?
++.br
+
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B livecd_exec_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the livecd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the livecd_t domain.
-+
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the gfs_controld_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B livecd_tmp_t
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the livecd_tmp_t type, if you want to store livecd temporary files in the /tmp directories.
-+
-+
-+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
-+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux livecd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their livecd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for livecd:
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the gfs_controld_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B livecd_t
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -26468,225 +29123,247 @@ index 0000000..6e7333b
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), livecd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/lldpad_selinux.8 b/man/man8/lldpad_selinux.8
++selinux(8), gfs_controld(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/git_selinux.8 b/man/man8/git_selinux.8
+deleted file mode 100644
+index e9c43b1..0000000
+--- a/man/man8/git_selinux.8
++++ /dev/null
+@@ -1,109 +0,0 @@
+-.TH "git_selinux" "8" "27 May 2010" "domg472 at gmail.com" "Git SELinux policy documentation"
+-.de EX
+-.nf
+-.ft CW
+-..
+-.de EE
+-.ft R
+-.fi
+-..
+-.SH "NAME"
+-git_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the Git daemon.
+-.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+-Security-Enhanced Linux secures the Git server via flexible mandatory access
+-control.
+-.SH FILE_CONTEXTS
+-SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+-Policy governs the access daemons have to these files.
+-SELinux Git policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their web services in as secure a method as possible.
+-.PP
+-The following file contexts types are by default defined for Git:
+-.EX
+-git_system_content_t
+-.EE
+-- Set files with git_system_content_t if you want the Git system daemon to read the file, and if you want the file to be modifiable and executable by all "Git shell" users.
+-.EX
+-git_session_content_t
+-.EE
+-- Set files with git_session_content_t if you want the Git session and system daemon to read the file, and if you want the file to be modifiable and executable by all users. Note that "Git shell" users may not interact with this type.
+-.SH BOOLEANS
+-SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. Git policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run Git with the tightest access possible.
+-.PP
+-Allow the Git system daemon to search user home directories so that it can find git session content. This is useful if you want the Git system daemon to host users personal repositories.
+-.EX
+-sudo setsebool -P git_system_enable_homedirs 1
+-.EE
+-.PP
+-Allow the Git system daemon to read system shared repositories on NFS shares.
+-.EX
+-sudo setsebool -P git_system_use_nfs 1
+-.EE
+-.PP
+-Allow the Git system daemon to read system shared repositories on Samba shares.
+-.EX
+-sudo setsebool -P git_system_use_cifs 1
+-.EE
+-.PP
+-Allow the Git session daemon to read users personal repositories on NFS mounted home directories.
+-.EX
+-sudo setsebool -P use_nfs_home_dirs 1
+-.EE
+-.PP
+-Allow the Git session daemon to read users personal repositories on Samba mounted home directories.
+-.EX
+-sudo setsebool -P use_samba_home_dirs 1
+-.EE
+-.PP
+-To also allow Git system daemon to read users personal repositories on NFS and Samba mounted home directories you must also allow the Git system daemon to search home directories so that it can find the repositories.
+-.EX
+-sudo setsebool -P git_system_enable_homedirs 1
+-.EE
+-.PP
+-To allow the Git System daemon mass hosting of users personal repositories you can allow the Git daemon to listen to any unreserved ports.
+-.EX
+-sudo setsebool -P git_session_bind_all_unreserved_ports 1
+-.EE
+-.SH GIT_SHELL
+-The Git policy by default provides a restricted user environment to be used with "Git shell". This default git_shell_u SELinux user can modify and execute generic Git system content (generic system shared respositories with type git_system_content_t).
+-.PP
+-To add a new Linux user and map him to this Git shell user domain automatically:
+-.EX
+-sudo useradd -Z git_shell_u joe
+-.EE
+-.SH ADVANCED_SYSTEM_SHARED_REPOSITORY_AND GIT_SHELL_RESTRICTIONS
+-Alternatively Git SELinux policy can be used to restrict "Git shell" users to git system shared repositories. The policy allows for the creation of new types of Git system content and Git shell user environment. The policy allows for delegation of types of "Git shell" environments to types of Git system content.
+-.PP
+-To add a new Git system repository type, for example "project1" create a file named project1.te and add to it:
+-.EX
+-policy_module(project1, 1.0.0)
+-git_content_template(project1)
+-.EE
+-Next create a file named project1.fc and add a file context specification for the new repository type to it:
+-.EX
+-/srv/git/project1\.git(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:git_project1_content_t,s0)
+-.EE
+-Build a binary representation of this source policy module, load it into the policy store and restore the context of the repository:
+-.EX
+-make -f /usr/share/selinux/devel/Makefile project.pp
+-sudo semodule -i project1.pp
+-sudo restorecon -R -v /srv/git/project1
+-.EE
+-To create a "Git shell" domain that can interact with this repository create a file named project1user.te in the same directory as where the source policy for the Git systemm content type is and add the following:
+-.EX
+-policy_module(project1user, 1.0.0)
+-git_role_template(project1user)
+-git_content_delegation(project1user_t, git_project1_content_t)
+-gen_user(project1user_u, user, project1user_r, s0, s0)
+-.EE
+-Build a binary representation of this source policy module, load it into the policy store and map Linux users to the new project1user_u SELinux user:
+-.EX
+-make -f /usr/share/selinux/devel/Makefile project1user.pp
+-sudo semodule -i project1user.pp
+-sudo useradd -Z project1user_u jane
+-.EE
+-.PP
+-system-config-selinux is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+-.SH AUTHOR
+-This manual page was written by Dominick Grift <domg472 at gmail.com>.
+-.SH "SEE ALSO"
+-selinux(8), git(8), chcon(1), semodule(8), setsebool(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/git_shell_selinux.8 b/man/man8/git_shell_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..748b532
+index 0000000..f991f0f
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/lldpad_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,105 @@
-+.TH "lldpad_selinux" "8" "lldpad" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "lldpad SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/git_shell_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,133 @@
++.TH "git_shell_selinux" "8" "git_shell" "mgrepl at redhat.com" "git_shell SELinux Policy documentation"
+.SH "NAME"
-+lldpad_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the lldpad processes
-+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++git_shell_u \- \fBgit_shell user role\fP - Security Enhanced Linux Policy
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the lldpad processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++.SH DESCRIPTION
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++\fBgit_shell_u\fP is an SELinux User defined in the SELinux
++policy. SELinux users have default roles, \fBgit_shell_r\fP. The
++default role has a default type, \fBgit_shell_t\fP, associated with it.
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux lldpad policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their lldpad processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for lldpad:
++The SELinux user will usually login to a system with a context that looks like:
+
++.B git_shell_u:git_shell_r:git_shell_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B lldpad_exec_t
-+.EE
++Linux users are automatically assigned an SELinux users at login.
++Login programs use the SELinux User to assign initial context to the user's shell.
+
-+- Set files with the lldpad_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the lldpad_t domain.
++SELinux policy uses the context to control the user's access.
+
++By default all users are assigned to the SELinux user via the \fB__default__\fP flag
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B lldpad_initrc_exec_t
-+.EE
++On Targeted policy systems the \fB__default__\fP user is assigned to the \fBunconfined_u\fP SELinux user.
+
-+- Set files with the lldpad_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the lldpad_initrc_t domain.
++You can list all Linux User to SELinux user mapping using:
+
++.B semanage login -l
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B lldpad_tmpfs_t
-+.EE
++If you wanted to change the default user mapping to use the git_shell_u user, you would execute:
+
-+- Set files with the lldpad_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store lldpad files on a tmpfs file system.
++.B semanage login -m -s git_shell_u __default__
+
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B lldpad_var_lib_t
-+.EE
++.SH USER DESCRIPTION
+
-+- Set files with the lldpad_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the lldpad files under the /var/lib directory.
++The SELinux user git_shell_u is defined in policy as a unprivileged user. SELinux prevents unprivileged users from doing administration tasks without transitioning to a different role.
+
++.SH SUDO
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B lldpad_var_run_t
-+.EE
++.SH X WINDOWS LOGIN
+
-+- Set files with the lldpad_var_run_t type, if you want to store the lldpad files under the /run directory.
++The SELinux user git_shell_u is not able to X Windows login.
+
++.SH NETWORK
+
-+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
++.TP
++The SELinux user git_shell_u is able to connect to the following tcp ports.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux lldpad policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their lldpad processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for lldpad:
++.B dns_port_t: 53
+
-+.EX
-+.B lldpad_t
-+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++.B ocsp_port_t: 9080
+
-+.SH "COMMANDS"
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
-+.PP
-+.B semanage permissive
-+can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
-+.PP
-+.B semanage module
-+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++.B kerberos_port_t: 88,750,4444
+
-+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
-+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++.TP
++The SELinux user git_shell_u is able to connect to the following tcp ports.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.B dns_port_t: 53
+
-+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), lldpad(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/load_selinux.8 b/man/man8/load_selinux.8
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..119294b
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/load_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,118 @@
-+.TH "load_selinux" "8" "load" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "load SELinux Policy documentation"
-+.SH "NAME"
-+load_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the load processes
-+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++.B ocsp_port_t: 9080
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the load processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++.B kerberos_port_t: 88,750,4444
+
-+.SH BOOLEANS
-+SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. load policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run load with the tightest access possible.
++.SH HOME_EXEC
+
++The SELinux user git_shell_u is able execute home content files.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to boolean to determine whether the system permits loading policy, setting enforcing mode, and changing boolean values. Set this to true and you have to reboot to set it back, you must turn on the secure_mode_policyload boolean.
++.SH TRANSITIONS
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P secure_mode_policyload 1
-+.EE
++Three things can happen when git_shell_t attempts to execute a program.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow the graphical login program to execute bootloader, you must turn on the xdm_exec_bootloader boolean.
++\fB1.\fP SELinux Policy can deny git_shell_t from executing the program.
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P xdm_exec_bootloader 1
-+.EE
++.TP
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow all domains to have the kernel load modules, you must turn on the domain_kernel_load_modules boolean.
++\fB2.\fP SELinux Policy can allow git_shell_t to execute the program in the current user type.
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P domain_kernel_load_modules 1
-+.EE
++Execute the following to see the types that the SELinux user git_shell_t can execute without transitioning:
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++.B search -A -s git_shell_t -c file -p execute_no_trans
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux load policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their load processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for load:
++.TP
+
++\fB3.\fP SELinux can allow git_shell_t to execute the program and transition to a new type.
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B load_policy_exec_t
-+.EE
++Execute the following to see the types that the SELinux user git_shell_t can execute and transition:
+
-+- Set files with the load_policy_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the load_policy_t domain.
++.B $ search -A -s git_shell_t -c process -p transition
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/sbin/load_policy, /sbin/load_policy
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B loadkeys_exec_t
-+.EE
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+- Set files with the loadkeys_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the loadkeys_t domain.
++The SELinux process type git_shell_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/bin/unikeys, /usr/bin/loadkeys
++.B alsa_home_t
+
-+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
++ /home/[^/]*/\.asoundrc
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.asoundrc
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.asoundrc
++.br
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux load policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their load processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for load:
++.br
++.B git_sys_content_t
+
-+.EX
-+.B loadkeys_t, load_policy_t
-+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++ /srv/git(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/git(/.*)?
++.br
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -26698,192 +29375,127 @@ index 0000000..119294b
+.B semanage module
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
-+.B semanage boolean
-+can also be used to manipulate the booleans
-+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), load(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-+, setsebool(8)
++selinux(8), git_shell(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, gitosis_selinux(8)
\ No newline at end of file
-diff --git a/man/man8/loadkeys_selinux.8 b/man/man8/loadkeys_selinux.8
+diff --git a/man/man8/gitosis_selinux.8 b/man/man8/gitosis_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..488849f
+index 0000000..56b4bdf
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/loadkeys_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
-+.TH "loadkeys_selinux" "8" "loadkeys" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "loadkeys SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/gitosis_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,128 @@
++.TH "gitosis_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "gitosis" "SELinux Policy documentation for gitosis"
+.SH "NAME"
-+loadkeys_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the loadkeys processes
++gitosis_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the gitosis processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the loadkeys processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
-+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the gitosis processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux loadkeys policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their loadkeys processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for loadkeys:
++The gitosis processes execute with the gitosis_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B loadkeys_exec_t
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep gitosis_t
+
-+- Set files with the loadkeys_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the loadkeys_t domain.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/bin/unikeys, /usr/bin/loadkeys
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
-+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
++The gitosis_t SELinux type can be entered via the "gitosis_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the gitosis_t domain are the following:"
+
++/usr/bin/gitosis-serve, /usr/bin/gl-auth-command
+.SH PROCESS TYPES
+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux loadkeys policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their loadkeys processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for loadkeys:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux gitosis policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their gitosis processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for gitosis:
+
+.EX
-+.B loadkeys_t
++.B gitosis_t
+.EE
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
-+.SH "COMMANDS"
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
-+.PP
-+.B semanage permissive
-+can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
-+.PP
-+.B semanage module
-+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
-+
-+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
-+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
-+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
-+
-+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), loadkeys(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/locate_selinux.8 b/man/man8/locate_selinux.8
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..ac8776b
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/locate_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
-+.TH "locate_selinux" "8" "locate" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "locate SELinux Policy documentation"
-+.SH "NAME"
-+locate_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the locate processes
-+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
-+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the locate processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++.SH BOOLEANS
++SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. gitosis policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run gitosis with the tightest access possible.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the locate_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++If you want to allow gitisis daemon to send mail, you must turn on the gitosis_can_sendmail boolean.
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.B setsebool -P gitosis_can_sendmail 1
+.EE
+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the locate_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++If you want to allow gitisis daemon to send mail, you must turn on the gitosis_can_sendmail boolean.
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B setsebool -P gitosis_can_sendmail 1
+.EE
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux locate policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their locate processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for locate:
-+
-+
-+.EX
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux gitosis policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their gitosis processes in as secure a method as possible.
+.PP
-+.B locate_exec_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the locate_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the locate_t domain.
++The following file types are defined for gitosis:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B locate_log_t
++.B gitosis_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the locate_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as locate log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++- Set files with the gitosis_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the gitosis_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B locate_var_lib_t
++.B gitosis_var_lib_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the locate_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the locate files under the /var/lib directory.
++- Set files with the gitosis_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the gitosis files under the /var/lib directory.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux locate policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their locate processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for locate:
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+.EX
-+.B locate_t
-+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++The SELinux process type gitosis_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B gitosis_var_lib_t
++
++ /var/lib/gitosis(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/gitolite(3)?(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -26895,282 +29507,287 @@ index 0000000..ac8776b
+.B semanage module
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
++.B semanage boolean
++can also be used to manipulate the booleans
++
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), locate(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/lockdev_selinux.8 b/man/man8/lockdev_selinux.8
++selinux(8), gitosis(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, setsebool(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/glance_api_selinux.8 b/man/man8/glance_api_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..ad0ae47
+index 0000000..f7a5295
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/lockdev_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
-+.TH "lockdev_selinux" "8" "lockdev" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "lockdev SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/glance_api_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,121 @@
++.TH "glance_api_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "glance_api" "SELinux Policy documentation for glance_api"
+.SH "NAME"
-+lockdev_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the lockdev processes
++glance_api_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the glance_api processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the lockdev processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
-+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
-+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux lockdev policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their lockdev processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for lockdev:
-+
-+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B lockdev_exec_t
-+.EE
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the glance_api processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+- Set files with the lockdev_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the lockdev_t domain.
++The glance_api processes execute with the glance_api_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B lockdev_lock_t
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep glance_api_t
+
-+- Set files with the lockdev_lock_t type, if you want to treat the files as lockdev lock data, stored under the /var/lock directory
+
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
-+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
++The glance_api_t SELinux type can be entered via the "glance_api_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the glance_api_t domain are the following:"
+
++/usr/bin/glance-api
+.SH PROCESS TYPES
+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux lockdev policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their lockdev processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for lockdev:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux glance_api policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their glance_api processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for glance_api:
+
+.EX
-+.B lockdev_t
++.B glance_api_t
+.EE
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
-+.SH "COMMANDS"
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
-+.B semanage permissive
-+can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+.B semanage module
-+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
-+
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux glance_api policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their glance_api processes in as secure a method as possible.
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
-+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
-+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++The following file types are defined for glance_api:
+
-+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), lockdev(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/logadm_selinux.8 b/man/man8/logadm_selinux.8
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..0edd73f
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/logadm_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
-+.TH "logadm_selinux" "8" "logadm" "mgrepl at redhat.com" "logadm SELinux Policy documentation"
-+.SH "NAME"
-+logadm_r \- \fBLog administrator role\fP - Security Enhanced Linux Policy
+
-+.SH DESCRIPTION
++.EX
++.PP
++.B glance_api_exec_t
++.EE
+
-+SELinux supports Roles Based Access Control, some Linux roles are login roles, while other roles need to be transition to.
++- Set files with the glance_api_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the glance_api_t domain.
+
-+Note: The examples in the man page will user the staff_u user.
+
-+Non login roles are usually used for administrative tasks.
++.EX
++.PP
++.B glance_api_initrc_exec_t
++.EE
+
-+Roles usually have default types assigned to them.
++- Set files with the glance_api_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the glance_api_initrc_t domain.
+
-+The default type for the logadm_r role is logadm_t.
+
-+You can use the
-+.B newrole
-+program to transition directly to this role.
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
+
-+.B newrole -r logadm_r -t logadm_t
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+.B sudo
-+can also be setup to transition to this role using the visudo command.
++The SELinux process type glance_api_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
-+USERNAME ALL=(ALL) ROLE=logadm_r TYPE=logadm_t COMMAND
+.br
-+sudo will run COMMAND as staff_u:logadm_r:logadm_t:LEVEL
-+
-+If you want to use a non login role, you need to make sure the SELinux user you are using can reach this role.
++.B glance_log_t
+
-+You can see all of the assigned SELinux roles using the following
-+
-+.B semanage user -l
-+
-+If you wanted to add logadm_r to the staff_u user, you would execute:
++ /var/log/glance(/.*)?
++.br
+
-+.B $ semanage user -m -R 'staff_r logadm_r' staff_u
++.br
++.B glance_tmp_t
+
+
++.br
++.B glance_var_lib_t
+
-+SELinux policy also controls which roles can transition to a different role.
-+You can list these rules using the following command.
++ /var/lib/glance(/.*)?
++.br
+
-+.B sesearch --role_allow
++.br
++.B glance_var_run_t
+
-+SELinux policy allows the staff_r role can transition to the logadm_r role.
++ /var/run/glance(/.*)?
++.br
+
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
-+.B semanage login
-+can also be used to manipulate the Linux User to SELinux User mappings
-+
-+.B semanage user
-+can also be used to manipulate SELinux user definitions.
-+
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genuserman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), semanage(8).
-diff --git a/man/man8/logrotate_selinux.8 b/man/man8/logrotate_selinux.8
++selinux(8), glance_api(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, glance_registry_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/glance_registry_selinux.8 b/man/man8/glance_registry_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..caaa89d
+index 0000000..1846d51
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/logrotate_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,123 @@
-+.TH "logrotate_selinux" "8" "logrotate" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "logrotate SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/glance_registry_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,157 @@
++.TH "glance_registry_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "glance_registry" "SELinux Policy documentation for glance_registry"
+.SH "NAME"
-+logrotate_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the logrotate processes
++glance_registry_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the glance_registry processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the logrotate processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the glance_registry processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The glance_registry processes execute with the glance_registry_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the logrotate_t, logrotate_mail_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep glance_registry_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The glance_registry_t SELinux type can be entered via the "glance_registry_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the glance_registry_t domain are the following:"
+
++/usr/bin/glance-registry
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the logrotate_t, logrotate_mail_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux glance_registry policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their glance_registry processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for glance_registry:
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B glance_registry_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux logrotate policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their logrotate processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for logrotate:
-+
-+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B logrotate_exec_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the logrotate_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the logrotate_t domain.
-+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/sbin/logrotate, /etc/cron\.(daily|weekly)/sysklogd
-+
-+.EX
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux glance_registry policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their glance_registry processes in as secure a method as possible.
+.PP
-+.B logrotate_lock_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the logrotate_lock_t type, if you want to treat the files as logrotate lock data, stored under the /var/lock directory
++The following file types are defined for glance_registry:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B logrotate_mail_tmp_t
++.B glance_registry_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the logrotate_mail_tmp_t type, if you want to store logrotate mail temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++- Set files with the glance_registry_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the glance_registry_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B logrotate_tmp_t
++.B glance_registry_initrc_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the logrotate_tmp_t type, if you want to store logrotate temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++- Set files with the glance_registry_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the glance_registry_initrc_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B logrotate_var_lib_t
++.B glance_registry_tmp_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the logrotate_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the logrotate files under the /var/lib directory.
++- Set files with the glance_registry_tmp_t type, if you want to store glance registry temporary files in the /tmp directories.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.SH PORT TYPES
++SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
++
++.B semanage port -l
++
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux logrotate policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their logrotate processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for logrotate:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
++SELinux glance_registry policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their glance_registry processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following port types are defined for glance_registry:
+
+.EX
-+.B logrotate_t, logrotate_mail_t
++.TP 5
++.B glance_registry_port_t
++.TP 10
+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++
++Default Defined Ports:
++tcp 9191
++.EE
++udp 9191
++.EE
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type glance_registry_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B glance_log_t
++
++ /var/log/glance(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B glance_registry_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B glance_var_lib_t
++
++ /var/lib/glance(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B glance_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/glance(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -27182,136 +29799,188 @@ index 0000000..caaa89d
+.B semanage module
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
++.B semanage port
++can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
++
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), logrotate(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/logwatch_selinux.8 b/man/man8/logwatch_selinux.8
++selinux(8), glance_registry(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, glance_api_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/glusterd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/glusterd_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..ee56475
+index 0000000..b54fc9a
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/logwatch_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,135 @@
-+.TH "logwatch_selinux" "8" "logwatch" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "logwatch SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/glusterd_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,182 @@
++.TH "glusterd_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "glusterd" "SELinux Policy documentation for glusterd"
+.SH "NAME"
-+logwatch_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the logwatch processes
++glusterd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the glusterd processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the logwatch processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the glusterd processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The glusterd processes execute with the glusterd_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the logwatch_mail_t, logwatch_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep glusterd_t
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
+
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The glusterd_t SELinux type can be entered via the "glusterd_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the glusterd_t domain are the following:"
++
++/opt/glusterfs/[^/]+/sbin/glusterfsd, /usr/sbin/glusterfsd
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the logwatch_mail_t, logwatch_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux glusterd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their glusterd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for glusterd:
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B glusterd_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux logwatch policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their logwatch processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for logwatch:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux glusterd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their glusterd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for glusterd:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B logwatch_cache_t
++.B glusterd_etc_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the logwatch_cache_t type, if you want to store the files under the /var/cache directory.
++- Set files with the glusterd_etc_t type, if you want to store glusterd files in the /etc directories.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/lib/epylog(/.*)?, /var/lib/logcheck(/.*)?, /var/cache/logwatch(/.*)?
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B logwatch_exec_t
++.B glusterd_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the logwatch_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the logwatch_t domain.
++- Set files with the glusterd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the glusterd_t domain.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/sbin/logcheck, /usr/sbin/epylog, /usr/share/logwatch/scripts/logwatch\.pl
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B logwatch_lock_t
++.B glusterd_initrc_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the logwatch_lock_t type, if you want to treat the files as logwatch lock data, stored under the /var/lock directory
++- Set files with the glusterd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the glusterd_initrc_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B logwatch_mail_tmp_t
++.B glusterd_log_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the logwatch_mail_tmp_t type, if you want to store logwatch mail temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++- Set files with the glusterd_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as glusterd log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B logwatch_tmp_t
++.B glusterd_tmp_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the logwatch_tmp_t type, if you want to store logwatch temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++- Set files with the glusterd_tmp_t type, if you want to store glusterd temporary files in the /tmp directories.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B logwatch_var_run_t
++.B glusterd_var_lib_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the logwatch_var_run_t type, if you want to store the logwatch files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the glusterd_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the glusterd files under the /var/lib directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B glusterd_var_run_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the glusterd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the glusterd files under the /run directory.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type glusterd_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B glusterd_etc_t
++
++ /etc/glusterd(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/glusterfs(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B glusterd_log_t
++
++ /var/log/glusterfs(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B glusterd_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B glusterd_var_lib_t
++
++
++.br
++.B glusterd_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/glusterd(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/glusterd\.pid
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux logwatch policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their logwatch processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for logwatch:
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the glusterd_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B logwatch_t, logwatch_mail_t
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
++
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the glusterd_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -27324,118 +29993,144 @@ index 0000000..ee56475
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), logwatch(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/lpd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/lpd_selinux.8
++selinux(8), glusterd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/gnomeclock_selinux.8 b/man/man8/gnomeclock_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..45fa127
+index 0000000..3f491fb
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/lpd_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,122 @@
-+.TH "lpd_selinux" "8" "lpd" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "lpd SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/gnomeclock_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,144 @@
++.TH "gnomeclock_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "gnomeclock" "SELinux Policy documentation for gnomeclock"
+.SH "NAME"
-+lpd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the lpd processes
++gnomeclock_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the gnomeclock processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the lpd processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
-+
-+.SH BOOLEANS
-+SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. lpd policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run lpd with the tightest access possible.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the gnomeclock processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
++The gnomeclock processes execute with the gnomeclock_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to use lpd server instead of cups, you must turn on the use_lpd_server boolean.
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P use_lpd_server 1
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep gnomeclock_t
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the lpr_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
++The gnomeclock_t SELinux type can be entered via the "gnomeclock_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the gnomeclock_t domain are the following:"
+
++/usr/libexec/kde(3|4)/kcmdatetimehelper, /usr/lib/systemd/systemd-timedated, /usr/libexec/gsd-datetime-mechanism, /usr/libexec/gnome-clock-applet-mechanism
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the lpr_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux gnomeclock policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their gnomeclock processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for gnomeclock:
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B gnomeclock_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux lpd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their lpd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for lpd:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux gnomeclock policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their gnomeclock processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for gnomeclock:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B lpd_exec_t
++.B gnomeclock_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the lpd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the lpd_t domain.
++- Set files with the gnomeclock_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the gnomeclock_t domain.
+
+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B lpd_tmp_t
-+.EE
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
+
-+- Set files with the lpd_tmp_t type, if you want to store lpd temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
++The SELinux process type gnomeclock_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B lpd_var_run_t
-+.EE
++.br
++.B config_usr_t
+
-+- Set files with the lpd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the lpd files under the /run directory.
++ /usr/share/config(/.*)?
++.br
+
+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/spool/turboprint(/.*)?, /var/run/lprng(/.*)?
++.B locale_t
+
-+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
++ /etc/locale.conf
++.br
++ /usr/lib/locale(/.*)?
++.br
++ /usr/share/locale(/.*)?
++.br
++ /usr/share/zoneinfo(/.*)?
++.br
++ /usr/share/X11/locale(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/timezone
++.br
++ /etc/localtime
++.br
++ /etc/sysconfig/clock
++.br
++ /etc/avahi/etc/localtime
++.br
++ /var/empty/sshd/etc/localtime
++.br
++ /var/spool/postfix/etc/localtime
++.br
++
++.br
++.B systemd_passwd_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/systemd/ask-password(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/systemd/ask-password-block(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux lpd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their lpd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for lpd:
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the gnomeclock_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B lpd_t, lpr_t
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
++
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the gnomeclock_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -27447,105 +30142,97 @@ index 0000000..45fa127
+.B semanage module
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
-+.B semanage boolean
-+can also be used to manipulate the booleans
-+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), lpd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-+, setsebool(8)
-\ No newline at end of file
-diff --git a/man/man8/lpr_selinux.8 b/man/man8/lpr_selinux.8
++selinux(8), gnomeclock(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/gnomesystemmm_selinux.8 b/man/man8/gnomesystemmm_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..e2d3b05
+index 0000000..a1956e7
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/lpr_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
-+.TH "lpr_selinux" "8" "lpr" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "lpr SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/gnomesystemmm_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
++.TH "gnomesystemmm_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "gnomesystemmm" "SELinux Policy documentation for gnomesystemmm"
+.SH "NAME"
-+lpr_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the lpr processes
++gnomesystemmm_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the gnomesystemmm processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the lpr processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the gnomesystemmm processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The gnomesystemmm processes execute with the gnomesystemmm_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the lpr_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep gnomesystemmm_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The gnomesystemmm_t SELinux type can be entered via the "gnomesystemmm_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the gnomesystemmm_t domain are the following:"
+
++/usr/libexec/kde(3|4)/ksysguardprocesslist_helper, /usr/libexec/gnome-system-monitor-mechanism
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the lpr_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux gnomesystemmm policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their gnomesystemmm processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for gnomesystemmm:
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B gnomesystemmm_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux lpr policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their lpr processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for lpr:
-+
-+
-+.EX
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux gnomesystemmm policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their gnomesystemmm processes in as secure a method as possible.
+.PP
-+.B lpr_exec_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the lpr_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the lpr_t domain.
++The following file types are defined for gnomesystemmm:
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/sbin/accept, /opt/gutenprint/s?bin(/.*)?, /usr/bin/cancel(\.cups)?, /usr/bin/lp(\.cups)?, /usr/bin/lpstat(\.cups)?, /usr/sbin/lpc(\.cups)?, /usr/local/linuxprinter/bin/l?lpr, /usr/bin/lpoptions, /usr/bin/lpq(\.cups)?, /usr/sbin/lpadmin, /usr/sbin/lpinfo, /usr/bin/lpr(\.cups)?, /usr/sbin/lpmove, /usr/bin/lprm(\.cups)?
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B lpr_tmp_t
++.B gnomesystemmm_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the lpr_tmp_t type, if you want to store lpr temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++- Set files with the gnomesystemmm_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the gnomesystemmm_t domain.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux lpr policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their lpr processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for lpr:
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+.EX
-+.B lpr_t
-+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++The SELinux process type gnomesystemmm_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B config_usr_t
++
++ /usr/share/config(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -27558,113 +30245,140 @@ index 0000000..e2d3b05
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), lpr(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/lsassd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/lsassd_selinux.8
++selinux(8), gnomesystemmm(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/gpg_agent_selinux.8 b/man/man8/gpg_agent_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..a2c5403
+index 0000000..c5861f9
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/lsassd_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
-+.TH "lsassd_selinux" "8" "lsassd" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "lsassd SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/gpg_agent_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,144 @@
++.TH "gpg_agent_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "gpg_agent" "SELinux Policy documentation for gpg_agent"
+.SH "NAME"
-+lsassd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the lsassd processes
++gpg_agent_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the gpg_agent processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the lsassd processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the gpg_agent processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The gpg_agent processes execute with the gpg_agent_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep gpg_agent_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The gpg_agent_t SELinux type can be entered via the "gpg_agent_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the gpg_agent_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/bin/gpg-agent
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux lsassd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their lsassd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for lsassd:
-+
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux gpg_agent policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their gpg_agent processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for gpg_agent:
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B lsassd_exec_t
++.B gpg_agent_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
-+- Set files with the lsassd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the lsassd_t domain.
++.SH BOOLEANS
++SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. gpg_agent policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run gpg_agent with the tightest access possible.
+
+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B lsassd_tmp_t
-+.EE
++If you want to allow usage of the gpg-agent --write-env-file option. This also allows gpg-agent to manage user files, you must turn on the gpg_agent_env_file boolean.
+
-+- Set files with the lsassd_tmp_t type, if you want to store lsassd temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P gpg_agent_env_file 1
++.EE
+
++.PP
++If you want to allow usage of the gpg-agent --write-env-file option. This also allows gpg-agent to manage user files, you must turn on the gpg_agent_env_file boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B lsassd_var_lib_t
++.B setsebool -P gpg_agent_env_file 1
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the lsassd_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the lsassd files under the /var/lib directory.
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux gpg_agent policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their gpg_agent processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for gpg_agent:
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/lib/likewise-open/krb5ccr_lsass, /var/lib/likewise-open/db/lsass-adstate\.filedb, /var/lib/likewise-open/lsasd\.err, /var/lib/likewise-open/db/lsass-adcache\.db, /var/lib/likewise-open/db/sam\.db
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B lsassd_var_run_t
++.B gpg_agent_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the lsassd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the lsassd files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the gpg_agent_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the gpg_agent_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B lsassd_var_socket_t
++.B gpg_agent_tmp_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the lsassd_var_socket_t type, if you want to treat the files as lsassd var socket data.
++- Set files with the gpg_agent_tmp_t type, if you want to store gpg agent temporary files in the /tmp directories.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/lib/likewise-open/\.lsassd, /var/lib/likewise-open/\.ntlmd, /var/lib/likewise-open/rpc/lsass
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux lsassd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their lsassd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for lsassd:
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+.EX
-+.B lsassd_t
-+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++The SELinux process type gpg_agent_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B gpg_agent_tmp_t
++
++ /home/[^/]*/\.gnupg/log-socket
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.gnupg/log-socket
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.gnupg/log-socket
++.br
++
++.br
++.B gpg_secret_t
++
++ /root/\.gnupg(/.+)?
++.br
++ /etc/mail/spamassassin/sa-update-keys(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.gnupg(/.+)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.gnupg(/.+)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.gnupg(/.+)?
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -27676,138 +30390,106 @@ index 0000000..a2c5403
+.B semanage module
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
++.B semanage boolean
++can also be used to manipulate the booleans
++
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), lsassd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/lvm_selinux.8 b/man/man8/lvm_selinux.8
++selinux(8), gpg_agent(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, setsebool(8), gpg_selinux(8), gpg_selinux(8), gpg_helper_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/gpg_helper_selinux.8 b/man/man8/gpg_helper_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..143acc0
+index 0000000..b331e87
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/lvm_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,137 @@
-+.TH "lvm_selinux" "8" "lvm" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "lvm SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/gpg_helper_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
++.TH "gpg_helper_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "gpg_helper" "SELinux Policy documentation for gpg_helper"
+.SH "NAME"
-+lvm_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the lvm processes
++gpg_helper_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the gpg_helper processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the lvm processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the gpg_helper processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The gpg_helper processes execute with the gpg_helper_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux lvm policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their lvm processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for lvm:
++For example:
+
++.B ps -eZ | grep gpg_helper_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B lvm_etc_t
-+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the lvm_etc_t type, if you want to store lvm files in the /etc directories.
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
++The gpg_helper_t SELinux type can be entered via the "gpg_helper_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the gpg_helper_t domain are the following:"
+
-+.EX
++/usr/lib/gnupg/gpgkeys.*
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+.B lvm_exec_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the lvm_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the lvm_t domain.
-+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/sbin/dmsetup, /usr/sbin/dmsetup, /usr/sbin/pvchange, /sbin/dmraid, /sbin/pvremove, /sbin/vgextend, /sbin/vgscan\.static, /sbin/vgrename, /usr/sbin/vgck, /sbin/lvdisplay, /usr/lib/lvm-10/.*, /sbin/pvs, /sbin/lvmdiskscan, /sbin/lvresize, /sbin/vgmknodes, /usr/sbin/lvdisplay, /usr/sbin/mount\.crypt, /usr/sbin/pvs, /usr/sbin/vgsplit, /usr/lib/systemd/systemd-cryptsetup, /sbin/pvmove, /sbin/multipath\.static, /usr/sbin/pvcreate, /usr/sbin/lvmdiskscan, /usr/sbin/vgcfgbackup, /usr/sbin/lvmiopversion, /usr/sbin/vgimport, /sbin/vgck, /sbin/pvscan, /usr/sbin/lvmchange, /sbin/lvreduce, /sbin/vgremove, /sbin/vgscan, /sbin/vgsplit, /lib/lvm-200/.*, /usr/sbin/lvremove, /sbin/vgmerge, /usr/sbin/vgchange\.static, /sbin/pvcreate, /usr/sbin/lvm, /usr/sbin/lvrename, /usr/sbin/lvmsadc, /usr/lib/lvm-200/.*, /usr/sbin/pvdata, /usr/sbin/lvmetad, /sbin/vgchange, /sbin/lvm\.static, /sbin/vgcfgbackup, /sbin/e2fsadm, /sbin/lvm, /sbin/pvdata, /usr/sbin/lvcreate, /usr/sbin/vgextend, /sbin/lvextend, /u
sr/lib/udev/udisks-lvm-pv-export, /sbin/vgcfgrestore, /usr/sbin/vgscan, /sbin/vgs, /sbin/lvmchange, /sbin/vgimport, /usr/sbin/lvscan, /usr/sbin/pvscan, /usr/sbin/vgreduce, /usr/sbin/dmsetup\.static, /usr/sbin/vgexport, /usr/sbin/lvextend, /usr/sbin/cryptsetup, /usr/sbin/dmraid, /usr/sbin/lvresize, /sbin/dmsetup\.static, /sbin/lvmsar, /usr/sbin/vgs, /usr/sbin/vgrename, /usr/sbin/lvs, /sbin/vgchange\.static, /usr/sbin/pvmove, /sbin/lvmsadc, /usr/sbin/vgmknodes, /sbin/lvmetad, /sbin/lvmiopversion, /usr/sbin/pvdisplay, /usr/sbin/vgremove, /usr/sbin/vgscan\.static, /sbin/pvdisplay, /usr/sbin/vgcfgrestore, /usr/sbin/kpartx, /sbin/cryptsetup, /lib/udev/udisks-lvm-pv-export, /sbin/vgwrapper, /sbin/lvchange, /sbin/pvchange, /usr/sbin/lvm\.static, /usr/sbin/multipathd, /sbin/mount\.crypt, /sbin/vgcreate, /usr/sbin/vgwrapper, /sbin/vgreduce, /usr/sbin/lvreduce, /sbin/lvrename, /sbin/multipathd, /usr/sbin/vgcreate, /usr/sbin/vgmerge, /usr/sbin/multipath\.static, /sbin/vgexport, /usr/sbi
n/lvchange, /sbin/lvs, /usr/sbin/lvmsar, /usr/sbin/vgchange, /sbin/kpartx, /lib/lvm-10/.*, /sbin/lvscan, /sbin/lvcreate, /sbin/vgdisplay, /usr/sbin/vgdisplay, /sbin/lvremove, /usr/sbin/pvremove, /usr/sbin/e2fsadm
-+
-+.EX
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+.B lvm_lock_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the lvm_lock_t type, if you want to treat the files as lvm lock data, stored under the /var/lock directory
-+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/lock/lvm(/.*)?, /etc/lvm/lock(/.*)?
-+
-+.EX
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux gpg_helper policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their gpg_helper processes in as secure a method as possible.
+.PP
-+.B lvm_metadata_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the lvm_metadata_t type, if you want to treat the files as lvm metadata data.
-+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/etc/lvm/backup(/.*)?, /var/cache/multipathd(/.*)?, /etc/lvmtab\.d(/.*)?, /etc/lvmtab(/.*)?, /etc/lvm/\.cache, /etc/lvm/archive(/.*)?, /etc/lvm/cache(/.*)?
++The following process types are defined for gpg_helper:
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B lvm_tmp_t
++.B gpg_helper_t
+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the lvm_tmp_t type, if you want to store lvm temporary files in the /tmp directories.
-+
-+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B lvm_var_lib_t
-+.EE
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
-+- Set files with the lvm_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the lvm files under the /var/lib directory.
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux gpg_helper policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their gpg_helper processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for gpg_helper:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B lvm_var_run_t
++.B gpg_helper_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the lvm_var_run_t type, if you want to store the lvm files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the gpg_helper_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the gpg_helper_t domain.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/run/lvm(/.*)?, /var/run/multipathd\.sock, /var/run/dmevent.*
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux lvm policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their lvm processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for lvm:
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the gpg_helper_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B lvm_t
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
++
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the gpg_helper_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -27820,307 +30502,359 @@ index 0000000..143acc0
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), lvm(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/lwiod_selinux.8 b/man/man8/lwiod_selinux.8
++selinux(8), gpg_helper(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, gpg_selinux(8), gpg_selinux(8), gpg_agent_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/gpg_selinux.8 b/man/man8/gpg_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..f030703
+index 0000000..4748f85
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/lwiod_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
-+.TH "lwiod_selinux" "8" "lwiod" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "lwiod SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/gpg_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,361 @@
++.TH "gpg_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "gpg" "SELinux Policy documentation for gpg"
+.SH "NAME"
-+lwiod_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the lwiod processes
++gpg_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the gpg processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the lwiod processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the gpg processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The gpg processes execute with the gpg_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux lwiod policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their lwiod processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for lwiod:
++For example:
+
++.B ps -eZ | grep gpg_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B lwiod_exec_t
-+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the lwiod_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the lwiod_t domain.
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
++The gpg_t SELinux type can be entered via the "gpg_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the gpg_t domain are the following:"
+
-+.EX
++/usr/bin/gpg(2)?, /usr/lib/gnupg/.*, /usr/bin/gpgsm
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+.B lwiod_var_lib_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the lwiod_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the lwiod files under the /var/lib directory.
-+
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux gpg policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their gpg processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for gpg:
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B lwiod_var_run_t
++.B gpg_t, gpg_pinentry_t, gpg_helper_t, gpg_web_t, gpg_agent_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
-+- Set files with the lwiod_var_run_t type, if you want to store the lwiod files under the /run directory.
++.SH BOOLEANS
++SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. gpg policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run gpg with the tightest access possible.
+
+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B lwiod_var_socket_t
++If you want to allow httpd to run gpg, you must turn on the httpd_use_gpg boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P httpd_use_gpg 1
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the lwiod_var_socket_t type, if you want to treat the files as lwiod var socket data.
++.PP
++If you want to allow usage of the gpg-agent --write-env-file option. This also allows gpg-agent to manage user files, you must turn on the gpg_agent_env_file boolean.
+
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P gpg_agent_env_file 1
++.EE
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
++If you want to allow httpd to run gpg, you must turn on the httpd_use_gpg boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P httpd_use_gpg 1
++.EE
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux lwiod policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their lwiod processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for lwiod:
++If you want to allow usage of the gpg-agent --write-env-file option. This also allows gpg-agent to manage user files, you must turn on the gpg_agent_env_file boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B lwiod_t
++.B setsebool -P gpg_agent_env_file 1
+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
-+.SH "COMMANDS"
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.SH SHARING FILES
++If you want to share files with multiple domains (Apache, FTP, rsync, Samba), you can set a file context of public_content_t and public_content_rw_t. These context allow any of the above domains to read the content. If you want a particular domain to write to the public_content_rw_t domain, you must set the appropriate boolean.
++.TP
++Allow gpg servers to read the /var/gpg directory by adding the public_content_t file type to the directory and by restoring the file type.
+.PP
-+.B semanage permissive
-+can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.B
++semanage fcontext -a -t public_content_t "/var/gpg(/.*)?"
++.br
++.B restorecon -F -R -v /var/gpg
++.pp
++.TP
++Allow gpg servers to read and write /var/tmp/incoming by adding the public_content_rw_t type to the directory and by restoring the file type. This also requires the allow_gpgd_anon_write boolean to be set.
+.PP
-+.B semanage module
-+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++.B
++semanage fcontext -a -t public_content_rw_t "/var/gpg/incoming(/.*)?"
++.br
++.B restorecon -F -R -v /var/gpg/incoming
+
-+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
-+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.PP
++If you want to allow gpg web domain to modify public files used for public file transfer services., you must turn on the gpg_web_anon_write boolean.
+
-+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), lwiod(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/lwregd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/lwregd_selinux.8
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..3cff5a3
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/lwregd_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
-+.TH "lwregd_selinux" "8" "lwregd" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "lwregd SELinux Policy documentation"
-+.SH "NAME"
-+lwregd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the lwregd processes
-+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P gpg_web_anon_write 1
++.EE
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the lwregd processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++.PP
++If you want to allow gpg web domain to modify public files used for public file transfer services., you must turn on the gpg_web_anon_write boolean.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P gpg_web_anon_write 1
++.EE
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux lwregd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their lwregd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for lwregd:
-+
-+
-+.EX
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux gpg policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their gpg processes in as secure a method as possible.
+.PP
-+.B lwregd_exec_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the lwregd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the lwregd_t domain.
++The following file types are defined for gpg:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B lwregd_var_lib_t
++.B gpg_agent_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the lwregd_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the lwregd files under the /var/lib directory.
++- Set files with the gpg_agent_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the gpg_agent_t domain.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/lib/likewise-open/db/registry\.db, /var/lib/likewise-open/regsd\.err
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B lwregd_var_run_t
++.B gpg_agent_tmp_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the lwregd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the lwregd files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the gpg_agent_tmp_t type, if you want to store gpg agent temporary files in the /tmp directories.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B lwregd_var_socket_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the lwregd_var_socket_t type, if you want to treat the files as lwregd var socket data.
-+
-+
-+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
-+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux lwregd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their lwregd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for lwregd:
-+
-+.EX
-+.B lwregd_t
++.B gpg_exec_t
+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
-+
-+.SH "COMMANDS"
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
-+.PP
-+.B semanage permissive
-+can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
-+.PP
-+.B semanage module
-+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
-+
-+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
-+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
-+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
-+
-+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), lwregd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/lwsmd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/lwsmd_selinux.8
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..9d5967e
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/lwsmd_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
-+.TH "lwsmd_selinux" "8" "lwsmd" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "lwsmd SELinux Policy documentation"
-+.SH "NAME"
-+lwsmd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the lwsmd processes
-+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
-+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the lwsmd processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
-+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux lwsmd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their lwsmd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for lwsmd:
++- Set files with the gpg_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the gpg_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B lwsmd_exec_t
++.B gpg_helper_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the lwsmd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the lwsmd_t domain.
++- Set files with the gpg_helper_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the gpg_helper_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B lwsmd_var_lib_t
++.B gpg_pinentry_tmp_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the lwsmd_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the lwsmd files under the /var/lib directory.
++- Set files with the gpg_pinentry_tmp_t type, if you want to store gpg pinentry temporary files in the /tmp directories.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B lwsmd_var_run_t
++.B gpg_pinentry_tmpfs_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the lwsmd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the lwsmd files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the gpg_pinentry_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store gpg pinentry files on a tmpfs file system.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B lwsmd_var_socket_t
++.B gpg_secret_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the lwsmd_var_socket_t type, if you want to treat the files as lwsmd var socket data.
++- Set files with the gpg_secret_t type, if you want to treat the files as gpg se secret data.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type gpg_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B etc_mail_t
++
++ /etc/mail(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B gpg_agent_tmp_t
++
++ /home/[^/]*/\.gnupg/log-socket
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.gnupg/log-socket
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.gnupg/log-socket
++.br
++
++.br
++.B gpg_secret_t
++
++ /root/\.gnupg(/.+)?
++.br
++ /etc/mail/spamassassin/sa-update-keys(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.gnupg(/.+)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.gnupg(/.+)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.gnupg(/.+)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B mozilla_home_t
++
++ /home/[^/]*/\.java(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.adobe(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.gnash(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.galeon(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.spicec(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.mozilla(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.phoenix(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.netscape(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.ICAClient(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.macromedia(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.thunderbird(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.gcjwebplugin(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.icedteaplugin(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/zimbrauserdata(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.config/chromium(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.java(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.adobe(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.gnash(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.galeon(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.spicec(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.mozilla(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.phoenix(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.netscape(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.ICAClient(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.macromedia(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.thunderbird(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.gcjwebplugin(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.icedteaplugin(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/zimbrauserdata(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.config/chromium(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.java(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.adobe(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.gnash(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.galeon(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.spicec(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.mozilla(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.phoenix(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.netscape(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.ICAClient(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.macromedia(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.thunderbird(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.gcjwebplugin(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.icedteaplugin(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/zimbrauserdata(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.config/chromium(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B user_home_t
++
++ /home/[^/]*/.+
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/.+
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/.+
++.br
++
++.br
++.B user_tmp_type
++
++ all user tmp files
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux lwsmd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their lwsmd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for lwsmd:
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the gpg_t, gpg_helper_t, gpg_pinentry_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B lwsmd_t
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
++
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the gpg_t, gpg_helper_t, gpg_pinentry_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -28132,287 +30866,313 @@ index 0000000..9d5967e
+.B semanage module
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
++.B semanage boolean
++can also be used to manipulate the booleans
++
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), lwsmd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/mail_selinux.8 b/man/man8/mail_selinux.8
++selinux(8), gpg(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, setsebool(8), gpg_agent_selinux(8), gpg_helper_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/gpm_selinux.8 b/man/man8/gpm_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..6bed566
+index 0000000..6c04bf7
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/mail_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,293 @@
-+.TH "mail_selinux" "8" "mail" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "mail SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/gpm_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,130 @@
++.TH "gpm_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "gpm" "SELinux Policy documentation for gpm"
+.SH "NAME"
-+mail_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the mail processes
++gpm_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the gpm processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the mail processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the gpm processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH BOOLEANS
-+SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. mail policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run mail with the tightest access possible.
++The gpm processes execute with the gpm_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
++For example:
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow postfix_local domain full write access to mail_spool directories, you must turn on the postfix_local_write_mail_spool boolean.
++.B ps -eZ | grep gpm_t
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P postfix_local_write_mail_spool 1
-+.EE
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow http daemon to send mail, you must turn on the httpd_can_sendmail boolean.
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P httpd_can_sendmail 1
-+.EE
++The gpm_t SELinux type can be entered via the "gpm_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the gpm_t domain are the following:"
+
++/usr/sbin/gpm
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow syslogd daemon to send mail, you must turn on the logging_syslogd_can_sendmail boolean.
-+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P logging_syslogd_can_sendmail 1
-+.EE
-+
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+If you want to allow gitisis daemon to send mail, you must turn on the gitosis_can_sendmail boolean.
-+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P gitosis_can_sendmail 1
-+.EE
-+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
-+
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux gpm policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their gpm processes in as secure a method as possible.
+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the mailman_mail_t, mailman_cgi_t, mailman_queue_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++The following process types are defined for gpm:
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.B gpm_t
+.EE
-+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the mailman_mail_t, mailman_cgi_t, mailman_queue_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
-+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
-+.EE
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux mail policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their mail processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for mail:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux gpm policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their gpm processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for gpm:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B mail_home_rw_t
++.B gpm_conf_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the mail_home_rw_t type, if you want to treat the files as mail home read/write content.
++- Set files with the gpm_conf_t type, if you want to treat the files as gpm configuration data, usually stored under the /etc directory.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B mail_home_t
++.B gpm_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the mail_home_t type, if you want to store mail files in the users home directory.
++- Set files with the gpm_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the gpm_t domain.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/root/\.mailrc, /root/dead\.letter, /root/\.esmtp_queue, /root/\.forward
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B mail_munin_plugin_exec_t
++.B gpm_tmp_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the mail_munin_plugin_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the mail_munin_plugin_t domain.
++- Set files with the gpm_tmp_t type, if you want to store gpm temporary files in the /tmp directories.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/share/munin/plugins/postfix_mail.*, /usr/share/munin/plugins/mailscanner, /usr/share/munin/plugins/courier_mta_.*, /usr/share/munin/plugins/mailman, /usr/share/munin/plugins/exim_mail.*, /usr/share/munin/plugins/qmail.*, /usr/share/munin/plugins/sendmail_.*
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B mail_munin_plugin_tmp_t
++.B gpm_var_run_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the mail_munin_plugin_tmp_t type, if you want to store mail munin plugin temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++- Set files with the gpm_var_run_t type, if you want to store the gpm files under the /run directory.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B mail_spool_t
++.B gpmctl_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the mail_spool_t type, if you want to store the mail files under the /var/spool directory.
++- Set files with the gpmctl_t type, if you want to treat the files as gpmctl data.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/mail(/.*)?, /var/spool/imap(/.*)?, /var/spool/mail(/.*)?
+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B mailman_archive_t
-+.EE
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
+
-+- Set files with the mailman_archive_t type, if you want to treat the files as mailman archive data.
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
++The SELinux process type gpm_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B mailman_cgi_exec_t
-+.EE
++.br
++.B gpm_tmp_t
+
-+- Set files with the mailman_cgi_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the mailman_cgi_t domain.
+
++.br
++.B gpm_var_run_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B mailman_cgi_tmp_t
-+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the mailman_cgi_tmp_t type, if you want to store mailman cgi temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B mailman_data_t
-+.EE
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+- Set files with the mailman_data_t type, if you want to treat the files as mailman content.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/etc/mailman.*, /var/spool/mailman.*, /var/lib/mailman.*
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), gpm(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/gpsd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/gpsd_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..9c4572e
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/gpsd_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,174 @@
++.TH "gpsd_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "gpsd" "SELinux Policy documentation for gpsd"
++.SH "NAME"
++gpsd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the gpsd processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B mailman_lock_t
-+.EE
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the gpsd processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+- Set files with the mailman_lock_t type, if you want to treat the files as mailman lock data, stored under the /var/lock directory
++The gpsd processes execute with the gpsd_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B mailman_log_t
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep gpsd_t
+
-+- Set files with the mailman_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as mailman log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
+
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
-+.EX
++The gpsd_t SELinux type can be entered via the "gpsd_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the gpsd_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/sbin/gpsd
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+.B mailman_mail_exec_t
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux gpsd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their gpsd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for gpsd:
++
++.EX
++.B gpsd_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
-+- Set files with the mailman_mail_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the mailman_mail_t domain.
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux gpsd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their gpsd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for gpsd:
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/lib/mailman.*/mail/mailman, /usr/lib/mailman.*/bin/mm-handler.*, /usr/share/doc/mailman.*/mm-handler.*, /usr/lib/mailman.*/bin/mailmanctl, /usr/lib/mailman.*/scripts/mailman
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B mailman_mail_tmp_t
++.B gpsd_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the mailman_mail_tmp_t type, if you want to store mailman mail temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++- Set files with the gpsd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the gpsd_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B mailman_queue_exec_t
++.B gpsd_initrc_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the mailman_queue_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the mailman_queue_t domain.
++- Set files with the gpsd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the gpsd_initrc_t domain.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/lib/mailman.*/cron/.*, /usr/lib/mailman.*/bin/qrunner
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B mailman_queue_tmp_t
++.B gpsd_tmpfs_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the mailman_queue_tmp_t type, if you want to store mailman queue temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++- Set files with the gpsd_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store gpsd files on a tmpfs file system.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B mailman_var_run_t
++.B gpsd_var_run_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the mailman_var_run_t type, if you want to store the mailman files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the gpsd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the gpsd files under the /run directory.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
+.SH PORT TYPES
-+SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
++SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
+.PP
-+You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
++You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
+
+.B semanage port -l
+
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
-+SELinux mail policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their mail processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following port types are defined for mail:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
++SELinux gpsd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their gpsd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following port types are defined for gpsd:
+
+.EX
+.TP 5
-+.B mail_port_t
++.B gpsd_port_t
+.TP 10
+.EE
+
+
+Default Defined Ports:
-+tcp 2000,3905
++tcp 2947
+.EE
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type gpsd_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B chronyd_tmpfs_t
++
++
++.br
++.B gpsd_tmpfs_t
++
++
++.br
++.B gpsd_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/gpsd\.pid
++.br
++ /var/run/gpsd\.sock
++.br
++
++.br
++.B ntpd_tmpfs_t
++
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux mail policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their mail processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for mail:
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the gpsd_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B mailman_cgi_t, mailman_mail_t, mail_munin_plugin_t, mailman_queue_t
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
++
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the gpsd_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -28427,185 +31187,309 @@ index 0000000..6bed566
+.B semanage port
+can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
+
-+.B semanage boolean
-+can also be used to manipulate the booleans
-+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), mail(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-+, setsebool(8)
-\ No newline at end of file
-diff --git a/man/man8/mailman_selinux.8 b/man/man8/mailman_selinux.8
++selinux(8), gpsd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/greylist_milter_selinux.8 b/man/man8/greylist_milter_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..4333059
+index 0000000..848aace
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/mailman_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,179 @@
-+.TH "mailman_selinux" "8" "mailman" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "mailman SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/greylist_milter_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,126 @@
++.TH "greylist_milter_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "greylist_milter" "SELinux Policy documentation for greylist_milter"
+.SH "NAME"
-+mailman_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the mailman processes
++greylist_milter_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the greylist_milter processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the mailman processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the greylist_milter processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The greylist_milter processes execute with the greylist_milter_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the mailman_mail_t, mailman_cgi_t, mailman_queue_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep greylist_milter_t
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
+
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The greylist_milter_t SELinux type can be entered via the "greylist_milter_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the greylist_milter_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/sbin/sqlgrey, /usr/sbin/milter-greylist
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the mailman_mail_t, mailman_cgi_t, mailman_queue_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux greylist_milter policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their greylist_milter processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for greylist_milter:
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B greylist_milter_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux mailman policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their mailman processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for mailman:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux greylist_milter policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their greylist_milter processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for greylist_milter:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B mailman_archive_t
++.B greylist_milter_data_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the mailman_archive_t type, if you want to treat the files as mailman archive data.
++- Set files with the greylist_milter_data_t type, if you want to treat the files as greylist milter content.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B mailman_cgi_exec_t
++.B greylist_milter_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the mailman_cgi_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the mailman_cgi_t domain.
++- Set files with the greylist_milter_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the greylist_milter_t domain.
+
+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B mailman_cgi_tmp_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the mailman_cgi_tmp_t type, if you want to store mailman cgi temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
+
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B mailman_data_t
-+.EE
++The SELinux process type greylist_milter_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
-+- Set files with the mailman_data_t type, if you want to treat the files as mailman content.
++.br
++.B greylist_milter_data_t
+
++ /var/lib/sqlgrey(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/milter-greylist(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/milter-greylist(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/sqlgrey\.pid
++.br
++ /var/run/milter-greylist\.pid
+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/etc/mailman.*, /var/spool/mailman.*, /var/lib/mailman.*
+
-+.EX
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
+.PP
-+.B mailman_lock_t
-+.EE
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the greylist_milter_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
-+- Set files with the mailman_lock_t type, if you want to treat the files as mailman lock data, stored under the /var/lock directory
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
+
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the greylist_milter_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B mailman_log_t
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the mailman_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as mailman log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
-+
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B mailman_mail_exec_t
-+.EE
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+- Set files with the mailman_mail_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the mailman_mail_t domain.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/lib/mailman.*/mail/mailman, /usr/lib/mailman.*/bin/mm-handler.*, /usr/share/doc/mailman.*/mm-handler.*, /usr/lib/mailman.*/bin/mailmanctl, /usr/lib/mailman.*/scripts/mailman
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), greylist_milter(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/groupadd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/groupadd_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..929fc9a
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/groupadd_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,176 @@
++.TH "groupadd_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "groupadd" "SELinux Policy documentation for groupadd"
++.SH "NAME"
++groupadd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the groupadd processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B mailman_mail_tmp_t
-+.EE
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the groupadd processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+- Set files with the mailman_mail_tmp_t type, if you want to store mailman mail temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++The groupadd processes execute with the groupadd_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B mailman_queue_exec_t
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep groupadd_t
+
-+- Set files with the mailman_queue_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the mailman_queue_t domain.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/lib/mailman.*/cron/.*, /usr/lib/mailman.*/bin/qrunner
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
-+.EX
++The groupadd_t SELinux type can be entered via the "groupadd_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the groupadd_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/bin/gpasswd, /usr/sbin/gpasswd, /usr/sbin/groupadd, /usr/sbin/groupdel, /usr/sbin/groupmod
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux groupadd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their groupadd processes in as secure a method as possible.
+.PP
-+.B mailman_queue_tmp_t
++The following process types are defined for groupadd:
++
++.EX
++.B groupadd_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
-+- Set files with the mailman_queue_tmp_t type, if you want to store mailman queue temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux groupadd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their groupadd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for groupadd:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B mailman_var_run_t
++.B groupadd_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the mailman_var_run_t type, if you want to store the mailman files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the groupadd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the groupadd_t domain.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type groupadd_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B faillog_t
++
++ /var/log/btmp.*
++.br
++ /var/run/faillock(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/log/faillog
++.br
++ /var/log/tallylog
++.br
++
++.br
++.B lastlog_t
++
++ /var/log/lastlog
++.br
++
++.br
++.B passwd_file_t
++
++ /etc/group[-\+]?
++.br
++ /etc/passwd[-\+]?
++.br
++ /etc/passwd\.adjunct.*
++.br
++ /etc/ptmptmp
++.br
++ /etc/\.pwd\.lock
++.br
++ /etc/group\.lock
++.br
++ /etc/passwd\.OLD
++.br
++ /etc/passwd\.lock
++.br
++
++.br
++.B pcscd_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/pcscd(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/pcscd\.events(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/pcscd\.pid
++.br
++ /var/run/pcscd\.pub
++.br
++ /var/run/pcscd\.comm
++.br
++
++.br
++.B security_t
++
++ /selinux
++.br
++
++.br
++.B shadow_t
++
++ /etc/shadow.*
++.br
++ /etc/gshadow.*
++.br
++ /var/db/shadow.*
++.br
++ /etc/security/opasswd
++.br
++ /etc/security/opasswd\.old
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux mailman policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their mailman processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for mailman:
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the groupadd_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B mailman_cgi_t, mailman_mail_t, mailman_queue_t
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
++
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the groupadd_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -28618,222 +31502,152 @@ index 0000000..4333059
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), mailman(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/matahari_selinux.8 b/man/man8/matahari_selinux.8
++selinux(8), groupadd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/groupd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/groupd_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..ffc17aa
+index 0000000..88f7928
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/matahari_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,225 @@
-+.TH "matahari_selinux" "8" "matahari" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "matahari SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/groupd_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,153 @@
++.TH "groupd_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "groupd" "SELinux Policy documentation for groupd"
+.SH "NAME"
-+matahari_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the matahari processes
++groupd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the groupd processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the matahari processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the groupd processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The groupd processes execute with the groupd_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux matahari policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their matahari processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for matahari:
++For example:
+
++.B ps -eZ | grep groupd_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B matahari_hostd_exec_t
-+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the matahari_hostd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the matahari_hostd_t domain.
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/sbin/matahari-qmf-hostd, /usr/sbin/matahari-hostd, /usr/sbin/matahari-dbus-hostd
++The groupd_t SELinux type can be entered via the "groupd_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the groupd_t domain are the following:"
+
-+.EX
++/usr/sbin/groupd
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+.B matahari_hostd_unit_file_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the matahari_hostd_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as matahari hostd unit content.
-+
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux groupd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their groupd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for groupd:
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B matahari_initrc_exec_t
++.B groupadd_t, groupd_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
-+- Set files with the matahari_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the matahari_initrc_t domain.
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux groupd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their groupd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for groupd:
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/etc/rc\.d/init\.d/matahari-sysconfig, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/matahari-host, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/matahari-service, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/matahari-net, /etc/rc\.d/init.d/matahari-sysconfig-console
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B matahari_netd_exec_t
++.B groupd_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the matahari_netd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the matahari_netd_t domain.
++- Set files with the groupd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the groupd_t domain.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/sbin/matahari-qmf-networkd, /usr/sbin/matahari-netd, /usr/sbin/matahari-dbus-networkd
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B matahari_netd_unit_file_t
++.B groupd_tmpfs_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the matahari_netd_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as matahari netd unit content.
++- Set files with the groupd_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store groupd files on a tmpfs file system.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B matahari_rpcd_exec_t
++.B groupd_var_log_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the matahari_rpcd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the matahari_rpcd_t domain.
++- Set files with the groupd_var_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as groupd var log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B matahari_rpcd_unit_file_t
++.B groupd_var_run_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the matahari_rpcd_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as matahari rpcd unit content.
++- Set files with the groupd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the groupd files under the /run directory.
+
+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B matahari_serviced_exec_t
-+.EE
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+- Set files with the matahari_serviced_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the matahari_serviced_t domain.
++The SELinux process type groupd_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/sbin/matahari-serviced, /usr/sbin/matahari-dbus-serviced, /usr/sbin/matahari-qmf-serviced
-+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B matahari_serviced_unit_file_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the matahari_serviced_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as matahari serviced unit content.
-+
-+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B matahari_sysconfigd_exec_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the matahari_sysconfigd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the matahari_sysconfigd_t domain.
++.B cluster_var_lib_t
+
++ /var/lib/cluster(/.*)?
+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/sbin/matahari-qmf-sysconfig-consoled, /usr/sbin/matahari-dbus-sysconfigd, /usr/sbin/matahari-qmf-sysconfigd
-+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B matahari_sysconfigd_unit_file_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the matahari_sysconfigd_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as matahari sysconfigd unit content.
+
+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/lib/systemd/system/matahari-sysconfig-console.*, /usr/lib/systemd/system/matahari-sysconfig.*
-+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B matahari_var_lib_t
-+.EE
++.B groupd_tmpfs_t
+
-+- Set files with the matahari_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the matahari files under the /var/lib directory.
+
++.br
++.B groupd_var_log_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B matahari_var_run_t
-+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the matahari_var_run_t type, if you want to store the matahari files under the /run directory.
++.br
++.B groupd_var_run_t
+
++ /var/run/groupd\.pid
+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/run/matahari(/.*)?, /var/run/matahari\.pid, /var/run/matahari-broker\.pid
+
-+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
++.br
++.B initrc_tmp_t
+
-+.SH PORT TYPES
-+SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
-+.PP
-+You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
+
-+.B semanage port -l
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
-+SELinux matahari policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their matahari processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following port types are defined for matahari:
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the groupd_t, groupadd_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.TP 5
-+.B matahari_port_t
-+.TP 10
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
+
-+
-+Default Defined Ports:
-+tcp 49000
-+.EE
-+udp 49000
-+.EE
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux matahari policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their matahari processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for matahari:
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the groupd_t, groupadd_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B matahari_serviced_t, matahari_sysconfigd_t, matahari_hostd_t, matahari_netd_t, matahari_rpcd_t
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -28845,93 +31659,203 @@ index 0000000..ffc17aa
+.B semanage module
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
-+.B semanage port
-+can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
-+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), matahari(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/mcelog_selinux.8 b/man/man8/mcelog_selinux.8
++selinux(8), groupd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, groupadd_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/gssd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/gssd_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..0d5483c
+index 0000000..071e84c
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/mcelog_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
-+.TH "mcelog_selinux" "8" "mcelog" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "mcelog SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/gssd_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,204 @@
++.TH "gssd_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "gssd" "SELinux Policy documentation for gssd"
+.SH "NAME"
-+mcelog_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the mcelog processes
++gssd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the gssd processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the mcelog processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the gssd processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The gssd processes execute with the gssd_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep gssd_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The gssd_t SELinux type can be entered via the "gssd_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the gssd_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/sbin/rpc\.gssd, /usr/sbin/rpc\.svcgssd
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux gssd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their gssd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for gssd:
++
++.EX
++.B gssd_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH BOOLEANS
++SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. gssd policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run gssd with the tightest access possible.
++
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow gssd to read temp directory. For access to kerberos tgt, you must turn on the gssd_read_tmp boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P gssd_read_tmp 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow gssd to read temp directory. For access to kerberos tgt, you must turn on the gssd_read_tmp boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P gssd_read_tmp 1
++.EE
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux mcelog policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their mcelog processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for mcelog:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux gssd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their gssd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for gssd:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B mcelog_exec_t
++.B gssd_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the mcelog_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the mcelog_t domain.
++- Set files with the gssd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the gssd_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B mcelog_log_t
++.B gssd_keytab_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the mcelog_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as mcelog log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++- Set files with the gssd_keytab_t type, if you want to treat the files as kerberos keytab files.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B mcelog_var_run_t
++.B gssd_tmp_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the mcelog_var_run_t type, if you want to store the mcelog files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the gssd_tmp_t type, if you want to store gssd temporary files in the /tmp directories.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type gssd_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B auth_cache_t
++
++ /var/cache/coolkey(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B gssd_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B krb5_host_rcache_t
++
++ /var/cache/krb5rcache(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/tmp/nfs_0
++.br
++ /var/tmp/DNS_25
++.br
++ /var/tmp/host_0
++.br
++ /var/tmp/imap_0
++.br
++ /var/tmp/HTTP_23
++.br
++ /var/tmp/HTTP_48
++.br
++ /var/tmp/ldap_55
++.br
++ /var/tmp/ldap_487
++.br
++ /var/tmp/ldapmap1_0
++.br
++
++.br
++.B user_tmp_t
++
++ /var/run/user(/.*)?
++.br
++ /tmp/gconfd-.*
++.br
++ /tmp/gconfd-dwalsh
++.br
++ /tmp/gconfd-xguest
++.br
++
++.br
++.B var_lib_nfs_t
++
++ /var/lib/nfs(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B xdm_tmp_t
++
++ /tmp/\.X11-unix(/.*)?
++.br
++ /tmp/\.ICE-unix(/.*)?
++.br
++ /tmp/\.X0-lock
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux mcelog policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their mcelog processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for mcelog:
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the gssd_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B mcelog_t
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
++
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the gssd_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -28943,104 +31867,243 @@ index 0000000..0d5483c
+.B semanage module
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
++.B semanage boolean
++can also be used to manipulate the booleans
++
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), mcelog(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/mdadm_selinux.8 b/man/man8/mdadm_selinux.8
++selinux(8), gssd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, setsebool(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/guest_selinux.8 b/man/man8/guest_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..beefadb
+index 0000000..dc5e824
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/mdadm_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
-+.TH "mdadm_selinux" "8" "mdadm" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "mdadm SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/guest_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,241 @@
++.TH "guest_selinux" "8" "guest" "mgrepl at redhat.com" "guest SELinux Policy documentation"
+.SH "NAME"
-+mdadm_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the mdadm processes
-+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++guest_u \- \fBLeast privledge terminal user role\fP - Security Enhanced Linux Policy
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the mdadm processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++.SH DESCRIPTION
++
++\fBguest_u\fP is an SELinux User defined in the SELinux
++policy. SELinux users have default roles, \fBguest_r\fP. The
++default role has a default type, \fBguest_t\fP, associated with it.
++
++The SELinux user will usually login to a system with a context that looks like:
++
++.B guest_u:guest_r:guest_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023
++
++Linux users are automatically assigned an SELinux users at login.
++Login programs use the SELinux User to assign initial context to the user's shell.
++
++SELinux policy uses the context to control the user's access.
++
++By default all users are assigned to the SELinux user via the \fB__default__\fP flag
++
++On Targeted policy systems the \fB__default__\fP user is assigned to the \fBunconfined_u\fP SELinux user.
++
++You can list all Linux User to SELinux user mapping using:
++
++.B semanage login -l
++
++If you wanted to change the default user mapping to use the guest_u user, you would execute:
++
++.B semanage login -m -s guest_u __default__
++
++
++If you want to map the one Linux user (joe) to the SELinux user guest, you would execute:
++
++.B $ semanage login -a -s guest_u joe
++
++
++.SH USER DESCRIPTION
++
++The SELinux user guest_u is defined in policy as a unprivileged user. SELinux prevents unprivileged users from doing administration tasks without transitioning to a different role.
++
++.SH SUDO
++
++.SH X WINDOWS LOGIN
++
++The SELinux user guest_u is not able to X Windows login.
++
++.SH NETWORK
++
++.TP
++The SELinux user guest_u is able to connect to the following tcp ports.
++
++.B dns_port_t: 53
++
++.B ocsp_port_t: 9080
++
++.B kerberos_port_t: 88,750,4444
++
++.TP
++The SELinux user guest_u is able to connect to the following tcp ports.
++
++.B dns_port_t: 53
++
++.B ocsp_port_t: 9080
++
++.B kerberos_port_t: 88,750,4444
++
++.SH BOOLEANS
++SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. guest policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run guest with the tightest access possible.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the mdadm_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++If you want to allow xguest users to mount removable media, you must turn on the xguest_mount_media boolean.
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.B setsebool -P xguest_mount_media 1
+.EE
+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the mdadm_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++If you want to allow xguest users to configure Network Manager and connect to apache ports, you must turn on the xguest_connect_network boolean.
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B setsebool -P xguest_connect_network 1
+.EE
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++If you want to allow xguest to use blue tooth devices, you must turn on the xguest_use_bluetooth boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P xguest_use_bluetooth 1
++.EE
++
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux mdadm policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their mdadm processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for mdadm:
++If you want to allow xguest users to mount removable media, you must turn on the xguest_mount_media boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P xguest_mount_media 1
++.EE
+
++.PP
++If you want to allow xguest users to configure Network Manager and connect to apache ports, you must turn on the xguest_connect_network boolean.
+
+.EX
++.B setsebool -P xguest_connect_network 1
++.EE
++
+.PP
-+.B mdadm_exec_t
++If you want to allow xguest to use blue tooth devices, you must turn on the xguest_use_bluetooth boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P xguest_use_bluetooth 1
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the mdadm_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the mdadm_t domain.
++.SH HOME_EXEC
++
++The SELinux user guest_u is able execute home content files.
++
++.SH TRANSITIONS
++
++Three things can happen when guest_t attempts to execute a program.
++
++\fB1.\fP SELinux Policy can deny guest_t from executing the program.
++
++.TP
++
++\fB2.\fP SELinux Policy can allow guest_t to execute the program in the current user type.
++
++Execute the following to see the types that the SELinux user guest_t can execute without transitioning:
++
++.B search -A -s guest_t -c file -p execute_no_trans
++
++.TP
++
++\fB3.\fP SELinux can allow guest_t to execute the program and transition to a new type.
++
++Execute the following to see the types that the SELinux user guest_t can execute and transition:
++
++.B $ search -A -s guest_t -c process -p transition
++
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type guest_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/sbin/raid-check, /sbin/mdmpd, /usr/sbin/iprinit, /usr/sbin/mdadm, /usr/sbin/iprupdate, /sbin/mdadm, /usr/sbin/mdmpd, /usr/sbin/iprdump
++.B anon_inodefs_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B mdadm_var_run_t
-+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the mdadm_var_run_t type, if you want to store the mdadm files under the /run directory.
++.br
++.B auth_cache_t
+
++ /var/cache/coolkey(/.*)?
+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/run/mdadm(/.*)?, /dev/md/.*, /dev/.mdadm\.map
+
-+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
++.br
++.B httpd_user_content_t
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux mdadm policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their mdadm processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for mdadm:
++ /home/[^/]*/((www)|(web)|(public_html))(/.+)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/((www)|(web)|(public_html))(/.+)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/((www)|(web)|(public_html))(/.+)?
++.br
+
-+.EX
-+.B mdadm_t
-+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++.br
++.B httpd_user_htaccess_t
++
++ /home/[^/]*/((www)|(web)|(public_html))(/.*)?/\.htaccess
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/((www)|(web)|(public_html))(/.*)?/\.htaccess
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/((www)|(web)|(public_html))(/.*)?/\.htaccess
++.br
++
++.br
++.B httpd_user_ra_content_t
++
++ /home/[^/]*/((www)|(web)|(public_html))(/.*)?/logs(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/((www)|(web)|(public_html))(/.*)?/logs(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/((www)|(web)|(public_html))(/.*)?/logs(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B httpd_user_rw_content_t
++
++
++.br
++.B httpd_user_script_exec_t
++
++ /home/[^/]*/((www)|(web)|(public_html))/cgi-bin(/.+)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/((www)|(web)|(public_html))/cgi-bin(/.+)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/((www)|(web)|(public_html))/cgi-bin(/.+)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B user_home_type
++
++ all user home files
++.br
++
++.br
++.B user_tmp_type
++
++ all user tmp files
++.br
++
++.br
++.B user_tmpfs_type
++
++ all user content in tmpfs file systems
++.br
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -29052,144 +32115,131 @@ index 0000000..beefadb
+.B semanage module
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
++.B semanage boolean
++can also be used to manipulate the booleans
++
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), mdadm(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/memcached_selinux.8 b/man/man8/memcached_selinux.8
++selinux(8), guest(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, setsebool(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/hddtemp_selinux.8 b/man/man8/hddtemp_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..92c134f
+index 0000000..3f4d9a5
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/memcached_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,150 @@
-+.TH "memcached_selinux" "8" "memcached" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "memcached SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/hddtemp_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,128 @@
++.TH "hddtemp_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "hddtemp" "SELinux Policy documentation for hddtemp"
+.SH "NAME"
-+memcached_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the memcached processes
++hddtemp_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the hddtemp processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the memcached processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
-+
-+.SH BOOLEANS
-+SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. memcached policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run memcached with the tightest access possible.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the hddtemp processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
++The hddtemp processes execute with the hddtemp_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow httpd to connect to memcache server, you must turn on the httpd_can_network_memcache boolean.
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P httpd_can_network_memcache 1
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep hddtemp_t
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the memcached_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
++The hddtemp_t SELinux type can be entered via the "hddtemp_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the hddtemp_t domain are the following:"
+
++/usr/sbin/hddtemp
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the memcached_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux hddtemp policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their hddtemp processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for hddtemp:
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B hddtemp_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux memcached policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their memcached processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for memcached:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux hddtemp policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their hddtemp processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for hddtemp:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B memcached_exec_t
++.B hddtemp_etc_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the memcached_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the memcached_t domain.
++- Set files with the hddtemp_etc_t type, if you want to store hddtemp files in the /etc directories.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B memcached_initrc_exec_t
++.B hddtemp_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the memcached_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the memcached_initrc_t domain.
++- Set files with the hddtemp_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the hddtemp_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B memcached_var_run_t
++.B hddtemp_initrc_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the memcached_var_run_t type, if you want to store the memcached files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the hddtemp_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the hddtemp_initrc_t domain.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/run/ipa_memcached(/.*)?, /var/run/memcached(/.*)?
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
+.SH PORT TYPES
-+SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
++SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
+.PP
-+You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
++You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
+
+.B semanage port -l
+
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
-+SELinux memcached policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their memcached processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following port types are defined for memcached:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
++SELinux hddtemp policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their hddtemp processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following port types are defined for hddtemp:
+
+.EX
+.TP 5
-+.B memcache_port_t
++.B hddtemp_port_t
+.TP 10
+.EE
+
+
+Default Defined Ports:
-+tcp 11211
-+.EE
-+udp 11211
-+.EE
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux memcached policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their memcached processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for memcached:
-+
-+.EX
-+.B memcached_t
++tcp 7634
+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -29204,223 +32254,288 @@ index 0000000..92c134f
+.B semanage port
+can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
+
-+.B semanage boolean
-+can also be used to manipulate the booleans
-+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), memcached(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-+, setsebool(8)
-\ No newline at end of file
-diff --git a/man/man8/mencoder_selinux.8 b/man/man8/mencoder_selinux.8
++selinux(8), hddtemp(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/hostname_selinux.8 b/man/man8/hostname_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..01fc97c
+index 0000000..5de0695
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/mencoder_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
-+.TH "mencoder_selinux" "8" "mencoder" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "mencoder SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/hostname_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
++.TH "hostname_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "hostname" "SELinux Policy documentation for hostname"
+.SH "NAME"
-+mencoder_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the mencoder processes
++hostname_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the hostname processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the mencoder processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
-+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the hostname processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux mencoder policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their mencoder processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for mencoder:
++The hostname processes execute with the hostname_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B mencoder_exec_t
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep hostname_t
+
-+- Set files with the mencoder_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the mencoder_t domain.
+
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
-+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
++The hostname_t SELinux type can be entered via the "hostname_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the hostname_t domain are the following:"
+
++/bin/hostname, /usr/bin/hostname
+.SH PROCESS TYPES
+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux mencoder policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their mencoder processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for mencoder:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux hostname policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their hostname processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for hostname:
+
+.EX
-+.B mencoder_t
++.B hostname_t
+.EE
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
-+.SH "COMMANDS"
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
-+.B semanage permissive
-+can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+.B semanage module
-+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux hostname policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their hostname processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for hostname:
++
+
++.EX
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
-+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++.B hostname_exec_t
++.EE
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++- Set files with the hostname_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the hostname_t domain.
+
-+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), mencoder(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/mock_selinux.8 b/man/man8/mock_selinux.8
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), hostname(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/hplip_selinux.8 b/man/man8/hplip_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..f7d8a3b
+index 0000000..d23889a
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/mock_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,142 @@
-+.TH "mock_selinux" "8" "mock" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "mock SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/hplip_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,198 @@
++.TH "hplip_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "hplip" "SELinux Policy documentation for hplip"
+.SH "NAME"
-+mock_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the mock processes
++hplip_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the hplip processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the mock processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
-+
-+.SH BOOLEANS
-+SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. mock policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run mock with the tightest access possible.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the hplip processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
++The hplip processes execute with the hplip_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow mock to read files in home directories, you must turn on the mock_enable_homedirs boolean.
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P mock_enable_homedirs 1
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep hplip_t
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the mock_t, mock_build_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
++The hplip_t SELinux type can be entered via the "hplip_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the hplip_t domain are the following:"
+
++/usr/sbin/hp-[^/]+, /usr/share/hplip/.*\.py, /usr/lib/cups/backend/hp.*, /usr/bin/hpijs, /usr/sbin/hpiod
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the mock_t, mock_build_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux hplip policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their hplip processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for hplip:
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B hplip_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux mock policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their mock processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for mock:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux hplip policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their hplip processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for hplip:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B mock_build_exec_t
++.B hplip_etc_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the mock_build_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the mock_build_t domain.
++- Set files with the hplip_etc_t type, if you want to store hplip files in the /etc directories.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B mock_cache_t
++.B hplip_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the mock_cache_t type, if you want to store the files under the /var/cache directory.
++- Set files with the hplip_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the hplip_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B mock_etc_t
++.B hplip_tmp_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the mock_etc_t type, if you want to store mock files in the /etc directories.
++- Set files with the hplip_tmp_t type, if you want to store hplip temporary files in the /tmp directories.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B mock_exec_t
++.B hplip_var_lib_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the mock_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the mock_t domain.
++- Set files with the hplip_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the hplip files under the /var/lib directory.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B mock_tmp_t
++.B hplip_var_log_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the mock_tmp_t type, if you want to store mock temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++- Set files with the hplip_var_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as hplip var log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B mock_var_lib_t
++.B hplip_var_run_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the mock_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the mock files under the /var/lib directory.
++- Set files with the hplip_var_run_t type, if you want to store the hplip files under the /run directory.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.SH PORT TYPES
++SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
++
++.B semanage port -l
++
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux mock policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their mock processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for mock:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
++SELinux hplip policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their hplip processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following port types are defined for hplip:
+
+.EX
-+.B mock_t, mock_build_t
++.TP 5
++.B hplip_port_t
++.TP 10
+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++
++Default Defined Ports:
++tcp 1782,2207,2208,8290,50000,50002,8292,9100,9101,9102,9220,9221,9222,9280,9281,9282,9290,9291
++.EE
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type hplip_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B anon_inodefs_t
++
++
++.br
++.B cupsd_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B hplip_var_lib_t
++
++ /var/lib/hp(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B hplip_var_log_t
++
++ /var/log/hp(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B hplip_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/hp.*\.pid
++.br
++ /var/run/hp.*\.port
++.br
++
++.br
++.B print_spool_t
++
++ /var/spool/lpd(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/spool/cups(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/spool/cups-pdf(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B usbfs_t
++
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -29432,79 +32547,98 @@ index 0000000..f7d8a3b
+.B semanage module
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
-+.B semanage boolean
-+can also be used to manipulate the booleans
++.B semanage port
++can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), mock(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-+, setsebool(8)
-\ No newline at end of file
-diff --git a/man/man8/modemmanager_selinux.8 b/man/man8/modemmanager_selinux.8
++selinux(8), hplip(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/httpd_apcupsd_cgi_script_selinux.8 b/man/man8/httpd_apcupsd_cgi_script_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..e87cce2
+index 0000000..b70ebe0
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/modemmanager_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
-+.TH "modemmanager_selinux" "8" "modemmanager" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "modemmanager SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/httpd_apcupsd_cgi_script_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
++.TH "httpd_apcupsd_cgi_script_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "httpd_apcupsd_cgi_script" "SELinux Policy documentation for httpd_apcupsd_cgi_script"
+.SH "NAME"
-+modemmanager_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the modemmanager processes
++httpd_apcupsd_cgi_script_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the httpd_apcupsd_cgi_script processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the modemmanager processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the httpd_apcupsd_cgi_script processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The httpd_apcupsd_cgi_script processes execute with the httpd_apcupsd_cgi_script_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep httpd_apcupsd_cgi_script_t
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The httpd_apcupsd_cgi_script_t SELinux type can be entered via the "shell_exec_t,httpd_apcupsd_cgi_script_exec_t,httpd_apcupsd_cgi_script_exec_t" file types. The default entrypoint paths for the httpd_apcupsd_cgi_script_t domain are the following:"
++
++/bin/d?ash, /bin/zsh.*, /bin/ksh.*, /usr/bin/d?ash, /usr/bin/ksh.*, /usr/bin/zsh.*, /bin/esh, /bin/mksh, /bin/sash, /bin/tcsh, /bin/yash, /bin/bash, /bin/fish, /bin/bash2, /usr/bin/esh, /usr/bin/mksh, /usr/bin/sash, /usr/bin/bash, /usr/bin/fish, /usr/bin/tcsh, /usr/bin/yash, /sbin/nologin, /usr/sbin/sesh, /usr/bin/bash2, /usr/sbin/smrsh, /usr/bin/scponly, /usr/sbin/nologin, /usr/libexec/sesh, /usr/sbin/scponlyc, /usr/bin/git-shell, /usr/libexec/git-core/git-shell, /var/www/cgi-bin/apcgui(/.*)?, /var/www/apcupsd/multimon\.cgi, /var/www/apcupsd/upsimage\.cgi, /var/www/apcupsd/upsstats\.cgi, /var/www/apcupsd/upsfstats\.cgi, /var/www/cgi-bin/apcgui(/.*)?, /var/www/apcupsd/multimon\.cgi, /var/www/apcupsd/upsimage\.cgi, /var/www/apcupsd/upsstats\.cgi, /var/www/apcupsd/upsfstats\.cgi
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux httpd_apcupsd_cgi_script policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their httpd_apcupsd_cgi_script processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for httpd_apcupsd_cgi_script:
++
++.EX
++.B httpd_apcupsd_cgi_script_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux modemmanager policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their modemmanager processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for modemmanager:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux httpd_apcupsd_cgi_script policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their httpd_apcupsd_cgi_script processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for httpd_apcupsd_cgi_script:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B modemmanager_exec_t
++.B httpd_apcupsd_cgi_script_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the modemmanager_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the modemmanager_t domain.
++- Set files with the httpd_apcupsd_cgi_script_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the httpd_apcupsd_cgi_script_t domain.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux modemmanager policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their modemmanager processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for modemmanager:
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+.EX
-+.B modemmanager_t
-+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++The SELinux process type httpd_apcupsd_cgi_script_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B httpd_apcupsd_cgi_rw_content_t
++
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -29517,148 +32651,100 @@ index 0000000..e87cce2
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), modemmanager(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/mongod_selinux.8 b/man/man8/mongod_selinux.8
++selinux(8), httpd_apcupsd_cgi_script(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, httpd_selinux(8), httpd_selinux(8), httpd_awstats_script_selinux(8), httpd_bugzilla_script_selinux(8), httpd_cobbler_script_selinux(8), httpd_collectd_script_selinux(8), httpd_cvs_script_selinux(8), httpd_dirsrvadmin_script_selinux(8), httpd_dspam_script_selinux(8), httpd_git_script_selinux(8), httpd_helper_selinux(8), httpd_man2html_script_selinux(8), httpd_mediawiki_script_selinux(8), httpd_mojomojo_script_selinux(8), httpd_munin_script_selinux(8), httpd_nagios_script_selinux(8), httpd_nutups_cgi_script_selinux(8), httpd_openshift_script_selinux(8), httpd_passwd_selinux(8), httpd_php_selinux(8), httpd_prewikka_script_selinux(8), httpd_rotatelogs_selinux(8), httpd_smokeping_cgi_script_selinux(8), httpd_squid_script_selinux(8), httpd_suexec_selinux(8), httpd_sys_script_selinux(8), httpd_user_script_selinux(8), httpd_w3c_validator_script_selinux(8), httpd_zoneminder_script_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/httpd_awstats_script_selinux.8 b/man/man8/httpd_awstats_script_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..d9d4da8
+index 0000000..d03827d
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/mongod_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,151 @@
-+.TH "mongod_selinux" "8" "mongod" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "mongod SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/httpd_awstats_script_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
++.TH "httpd_awstats_script_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "httpd_awstats_script" "SELinux Policy documentation for httpd_awstats_script"
+.SH "NAME"
-+mongod_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the mongod processes
++httpd_awstats_script_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the httpd_awstats_script processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the mongod processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the httpd_awstats_script processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The httpd_awstats_script processes execute with the httpd_awstats_script_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux mongod policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their mongod processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for mongod:
++For example:
+
++.B ps -eZ | grep httpd_awstats_script_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B mongod_exec_t
-+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the mongod_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the mongod_t domain.
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/bin/mongod, /usr/share/aeolus-conductor/dbomatic/dbomatic
++The httpd_awstats_script_t SELinux type can be entered via the "shell_exec_t,httpd_awstats_script_exec_t,httpd_awstats_script_exec_t" file types. The default entrypoint paths for the httpd_awstats_script_t domain are the following:"
+
-+.EX
++/bin/d?ash, /bin/zsh.*, /bin/ksh.*, /usr/bin/d?ash, /usr/bin/ksh.*, /usr/bin/zsh.*, /bin/esh, /bin/mksh, /bin/sash, /bin/tcsh, /bin/yash, /bin/bash, /bin/fish, /bin/bash2, /usr/bin/esh, /usr/bin/mksh, /usr/bin/sash, /usr/bin/bash, /usr/bin/fish, /usr/bin/tcsh, /usr/bin/yash, /sbin/nologin, /usr/sbin/sesh, /usr/bin/bash2, /usr/sbin/smrsh, /usr/bin/scponly, /usr/sbin/nologin, /usr/libexec/sesh, /usr/sbin/scponlyc, /usr/bin/git-shell, /usr/libexec/git-core/git-shell, /usr/share/awstats/wwwroot/cgi-bin(/.*)?, /usr/share/awstats/wwwroot/cgi-bin(/.*)?
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+.B mongod_initrc_exec_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the mongod_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the mongod_initrc_t domain.
-+
-+
-+.EX
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+.B mongod_log_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the mongod_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as mongod log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
-+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/log/aeolus-conductor/dbomatic\.log.*, /var/log/mongodb(/.*)?
-+
-+.EX
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux httpd_awstats_script policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their httpd_awstats_script processes in as secure a method as possible.
+.PP
-+.B mongod_tmp_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the mongod_tmp_t type, if you want to store mongod temporary files in the /tmp directories.
-+
++The following process types are defined for httpd_awstats_script:
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B mongod_var_lib_t
++.B httpd_awstats_script_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
-+- Set files with the mongod_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the mongod files under the /var/lib directory.
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux httpd_awstats_script policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their httpd_awstats_script processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for httpd_awstats_script:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B mongod_var_run_t
++.B httpd_awstats_script_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the mongod_var_run_t type, if you want to store the mongod files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the httpd_awstats_script_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the httpd_awstats_script_t domain.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/run/mongodb(/.*)?, /var/run/aeolus/dbomatic\.pid
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PORT TYPES
-+SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
-+.PP
-+You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+.B semanage port -l
++The SELinux process type httpd_awstats_script_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
-+SELinux mongod policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their mongod processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following port types are defined for mongod:
++.br
++.B awstats_tmp_t
+
-+.EX
-+.TP 5
-+.B mongod_port_t
-+.TP 10
-+.EE
+
++.br
++.B httpd_awstats_rw_content_t
+
-+Default Defined Ports:
-+tcp 27017
-+.EE
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux mongod policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their mongod processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for mongod:
+
-+.EX
-+.B mongod_t
-+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -29670,162 +32756,206 @@ index 0000000..d9d4da8
+.B semanage module
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
-+.B semanage port
-+can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
-+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), mongod(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/mount_selinux.8 b/man/man8/mount_selinux.8
++selinux(8), httpd_awstats_script(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, httpd_selinux(8), httpd_selinux(8), httpd_apcupsd_cgi_script_selinux(8), httpd_bugzilla_script_selinux(8), httpd_cobbler_script_selinux(8), httpd_collectd_script_selinux(8), httpd_cvs_script_selinux(8), httpd_dirsrvadmin_script_selinux(8), httpd_dspam_script_selinux(8), httpd_git_script_selinux(8), httpd_helper_selinux(8), httpd_man2html_script_selinux(8), httpd_mediawiki_script_selinux(8), httpd_mojomojo_script_selinux(8), httpd_munin_script_selinux(8), httpd_nagios_script_selinux(8), httpd_nutups_cgi_script_selinux(8), httpd_openshift_script_selinux(8), httpd_passwd_selinux(8), httpd_php_selinux(8), httpd_prewikka_script_selinux(8), httpd_rotatelogs_selinux(8), httpd_smokeping_cgi_script_selinux(8), httpd_squid_script_selinux(8), httpd_suexec_selinux(8), httpd_sys_script_selinux(8), httpd_user_script_selinux(8), httpd_w3c_validator_script_selinux(8), httpd_zoneminder_script_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/httpd_bugzilla_script_selinux.8 b/man/man8/httpd_bugzilla_script_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..264fa29
+index 0000000..84e7a1b
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/mount_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,161 @@
-+.TH "mount_selinux" "8" "mount" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "mount SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/httpd_bugzilla_script_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
++.TH "httpd_bugzilla_script_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "httpd_bugzilla_script" "SELinux Policy documentation for httpd_bugzilla_script"
+.SH "NAME"
-+mount_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the mount processes
++httpd_bugzilla_script_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the httpd_bugzilla_script processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the mount processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
-+
-+.SH BOOLEANS
-+SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. mount policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run mount with the tightest access possible.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the httpd_bugzilla_script processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
++The httpd_bugzilla_script processes execute with the httpd_bugzilla_script_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow the mount command to mount any directory or file, you must turn on the mount_anyfile boolean.
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P mount_anyfile 1
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep httpd_bugzilla_script_t
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow xguest users to mount removable media, you must turn on the xguest_mount_media boolean.
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P xguest_mount_media 1
-+.EE
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The httpd_bugzilla_script_t SELinux type can be entered via the "httpd_bugzilla_script_exec_t,shell_exec_t,httpd_bugzilla_script_exec_t" file types. The default entrypoint paths for the httpd_bugzilla_script_t domain are the following:"
+
++/usr/share/bugzilla(/.*)?, /bin/d?ash, /bin/zsh.*, /bin/ksh.*, /usr/bin/d?ash, /usr/bin/ksh.*, /usr/bin/zsh.*, /bin/esh, /bin/mksh, /bin/sash, /bin/tcsh, /bin/yash, /bin/bash, /bin/fish, /bin/bash2, /usr/bin/esh, /usr/bin/mksh, /usr/bin/sash, /usr/bin/bash, /usr/bin/fish, /usr/bin/tcsh, /usr/bin/yash, /sbin/nologin, /usr/sbin/sesh, /usr/bin/bash2, /usr/sbin/smrsh, /usr/bin/scponly, /usr/sbin/nologin, /usr/libexec/sesh, /usr/sbin/scponlyc, /usr/bin/git-shell, /usr/libexec/git-core/git-shell, /usr/share/bugzilla(/.*)?
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the mount_t, mount_ecryptfs_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
-+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
-+
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the mount_t, mount_ecryptfs_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux httpd_bugzilla_script policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their httpd_bugzilla_script processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for httpd_bugzilla_script:
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B httpd_bugzilla_script_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux mount policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their mount processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for mount:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux httpd_bugzilla_script policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their httpd_bugzilla_script processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for httpd_bugzilla_script:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B mount_ecryptfs_exec_t
++.B httpd_bugzilla_script_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the mount_ecryptfs_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the mount_ecryptfs_t domain.
++- Set files with the httpd_bugzilla_script_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the httpd_bugzilla_script_t domain.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/sbin/mount\.ecryptfs_private, /usr/sbin/mount\.ecryptfs, /usr/sbin/umount\.ecryptfs, /usr/sbin/umount\.ecryptfs_private
+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B mount_ecryptfs_tmpfs_t
-+.EE
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
+
-+- Set files with the mount_ecryptfs_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store mount ecryptfs files on a tmpfs file system.
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
++The SELinux process type httpd_bugzilla_script_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B mount_exec_t
-+.EE
++.br
++.B httpd_bugzilla_rw_content_t
+
-+- Set files with the mount_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the mount_t domain.
++ /var/lib/bugzilla(/.*)?
++.br
+
+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/sbin/mount.*, /sbin/umount.*, /usr/bin/umount.*, /usr/sbin/umount.*, /bin/umount.*, /usr/bin/mount.*, /bin/mount.*, /usr/sbin/mount.*
++.B httpd_bugzilla_tmp_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B mount_loopback_t
-+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the mount_loopback_t type, if you want to treat the files as mount loopback data.
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B mount_tmp_t
-+.EE
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+- Set files with the mount_tmp_t type, if you want to store mount temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), httpd_bugzilla_script(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, httpd_selinux(8), httpd_selinux(8), httpd_apcupsd_cgi_script_selinux(8), httpd_awstats_script_selinux(8), httpd_cobbler_script_selinux(8), httpd_collectd_script_selinux(8), httpd_cvs_script_selinux(8), httpd_dirsrvadmin_script_selinux(8), httpd_dspam_script_selinux(8), httpd_git_script_selinux(8), httpd_helper_selinux(8), httpd_man2html_script_selinux(8), httpd_mediawiki_script_selinux(8), httpd_mojomojo_script_selinux(8), httpd_munin_script_selinux(8), httpd_nagios_script_selinux(8), httpd_nutups_cgi_script_selinux(8), httpd_openshift_script_selinux(8), httpd_passwd_selinux(8), httpd_php_selinux(8), httpd_prewikka_script_selinux(8), httpd_rotatelogs_selinux(8), httpd_smokeping_cgi_script_selinux(8), httpd_squid_script_selinux(8), httpd_suexec_selinux(8), httpd_sys_script_selinux(8), httpd_user_script_selinux(8), httpd_w3c_validator_script_selinux(8), httpd_zoneminder_script_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/httpd_cobbler_script_selinux.8 b/man/man8/httpd_cobbler_script_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..9a182d6
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/httpd_cobbler_script_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
++.TH "httpd_cobbler_script_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "httpd_cobbler_script" "SELinux Policy documentation for httpd_cobbler_script"
++.SH "NAME"
++httpd_cobbler_script_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the httpd_cobbler_script processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B mount_var_run_t
-+.EE
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the httpd_cobbler_script processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+- Set files with the mount_var_run_t type, if you want to store the mount files under the /run directory.
++The httpd_cobbler_script processes execute with the httpd_cobbler_script_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/run/mount(/.*)?, /dev/\.mount(/.*)?, /var/run/mount(/.*)?, /var/run/davfs2(/.*)?, /var/cache/davfs2(/.*)?
++For example:
+
-+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
++.B ps -eZ | grep httpd_cobbler_script_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The httpd_cobbler_script_t SELinux type can be entered via the "httpd_cobbler_script_exec_t,shell_exec_t,httpd_cobbler_script_exec_t" file types. The default entrypoint paths for the httpd_cobbler_script_t domain are the following:"
+
++/bin/d?ash, /bin/zsh.*, /bin/ksh.*, /usr/bin/d?ash, /usr/bin/ksh.*, /usr/bin/zsh.*, /bin/esh, /bin/mksh, /bin/sash, /bin/tcsh, /bin/yash, /bin/bash, /bin/fish, /bin/bash2, /usr/bin/esh, /usr/bin/mksh, /usr/bin/sash, /usr/bin/bash, /usr/bin/fish, /usr/bin/tcsh, /usr/bin/yash, /sbin/nologin, /usr/sbin/sesh, /usr/bin/bash2, /usr/sbin/smrsh, /usr/bin/scponly, /usr/sbin/nologin, /usr/libexec/sesh, /usr/sbin/scponlyc, /usr/bin/git-shell, /usr/libexec/git-core/git-shell
+.SH PROCESS TYPES
+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux mount policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their mount processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for mount:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux httpd_cobbler_script policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their httpd_cobbler_script processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for httpd_cobbler_script:
+
+.EX
-+.B mount_t, mount_ecryptfs_t
++.B httpd_cobbler_script_t
+.EE
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux httpd_cobbler_script policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their httpd_cobbler_script processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for httpd_cobbler_script:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B httpd_cobbler_script_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the httpd_cobbler_script_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the httpd_cobbler_script_t domain.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type httpd_cobbler_script_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B httpd_cobbler_rw_content_t
++
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
+can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
@@ -29836,198 +32966,203 @@ index 0000000..264fa29
+.B semanage module
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
-+.B semanage boolean
-+can also be used to manipulate the booleans
-+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), mount(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-+, setsebool(8)
++selinux(8), httpd_cobbler_script(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, httpd_selinux(8), httpd_selinux(8), httpd_apcupsd_cgi_script_selinux(8), httpd_awstats_script_selinux(8), httpd_bugzilla_script_selinux(8), httpd_collectd_script_selinux(8), httpd_cvs_script_selinux(8), httpd_dirsrvadmin_script_selinux(8), httpd_dspam_script_selinux(8), httpd_git_script_selinux(8), httpd_helper_selinux(8), httpd_man2html_script_selinux(8), httpd_mediawiki_script_selinux(8), httpd_mojomojo_script_selinux(8), httpd_munin_script_selinux(8), httpd_nagios_script_selinux(8), httpd_nutups_cgi_script_selinux(8), httpd_openshift_script_selinux(8), httpd_passwd_selinux(8), httpd_php_selinux(8), httpd_prewikka_script_selinux(8), httpd_rotatelogs_selinux(8), httpd_smokeping_cgi_script_selinux(8), httpd_squid_script_selinux(8), httpd_suexec_selinux(8), httpd_sys_script_selinux(8), httpd_user_script_selinux(8), httpd_w3c_validator_script_selinux(8), httpd_zoneminder_script_selinux(8)
\ No newline at end of file
-diff --git a/man/man8/mozilla_selinux.8 b/man/man8/mozilla_selinux.8
+diff --git a/man/man8/httpd_collectd_script_selinux.8 b/man/man8/httpd_collectd_script_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..aabcac2
+index 0000000..8b345d1
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/mozilla_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,196 @@
-+.TH "mozilla_selinux" "8" "mozilla" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "mozilla SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/httpd_collectd_script_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
++.TH "httpd_collectd_script_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "httpd_collectd_script" "SELinux Policy documentation for httpd_collectd_script"
+.SH "NAME"
-+mozilla_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the mozilla processes
++httpd_collectd_script_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the httpd_collectd_script processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the mozilla processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the httpd_collectd_script processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH BOOLEANS
-+SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. mozilla policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run mozilla with the tightest access possible.
++The httpd_collectd_script processes execute with the httpd_collectd_script_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
++For example:
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined web browsers to read home directory content, you must turn on the mozilla_read_content boolean.
++.B ps -eZ | grep httpd_collectd_script_t
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P mozilla_read_content 1
-+.EE
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow unconfined users to transition to the Mozilla plugin domain when running xulrunner plugin-container, you must turn on the unconfined_mozilla_plugin_transition boolean.
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P unconfined_mozilla_plugin_transition 1
-+.EE
++The httpd_collectd_script_t SELinux type can be entered via the "shell_exec_t,httpd_collectd_script_exec_t,httpd_collectd_script_exec_t" file types. The default entrypoint paths for the httpd_collectd_script_t domain are the following:"
+
++/bin/d?ash, /bin/zsh.*, /bin/ksh.*, /usr/bin/d?ash, /usr/bin/ksh.*, /usr/bin/zsh.*, /bin/esh, /bin/mksh, /bin/sash, /bin/tcsh, /bin/yash, /bin/bash, /bin/fish, /bin/bash2, /usr/bin/esh, /usr/bin/mksh, /usr/bin/sash, /usr/bin/bash, /usr/bin/fish, /usr/bin/tcsh, /usr/bin/yash, /sbin/nologin, /usr/sbin/sesh, /usr/bin/bash2, /usr/sbin/smrsh, /usr/bin/scponly, /usr/sbin/nologin, /usr/libexec/sesh, /usr/sbin/scponlyc, /usr/bin/git-shell, /usr/libexec/git-core/git-shell, /usr/share/collectd/collection3/bin/.*\.cgi, /usr/share/collectd/collection3/bin/.*\.cgi
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow mozilla_plugins to create random content in the users home directory, you must turn on the mozilla_plugin_enable_homedirs boolean.
-+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P mozilla_plugin_enable_homedirs 1
-+.EE
-+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
-+
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the mozilla_plugin_config_t, mozilla_t, mozilla_plugin_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
-+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
-+
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux httpd_collectd_script policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their httpd_collectd_script processes in as secure a method as possible.
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the mozilla_plugin_config_t, mozilla_t, mozilla_plugin_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++The following process types are defined for httpd_collectd_script:
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B httpd_collectd_script_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux mozilla policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their mozilla processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for mozilla:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux httpd_collectd_script policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their httpd_collectd_script processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for httpd_collectd_script:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B mozilla_conf_t
++.B httpd_collectd_script_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the mozilla_conf_t type, if you want to treat the files as mozilla configuration data, usually stored under the /etc directory.
++- Set files with the httpd_collectd_script_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the httpd_collectd_script_t domain.
+
+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B mozilla_exec_t
-+.EE
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
+
-+- Set files with the mozilla_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the mozilla_t domain.
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type httpd_collectd_script_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/lib/[^/]*firefox[^/]*/firefox, /usr/lib/galeon/galeon, /usr/lib/netscape/.+/communicator/communicator-smotif\.real, /usr/bin/netscape, /usr/bin/mozilla-bin-[0-9].*, /usr/bin/epiphany-bin, /usr/lib/mozilla[^/]*/reg.+, /usr/lib/netscape/base-4/wrapper, /usr/bin/mozilla-snapshot, /usr/lib/[^/]*firefox[^/]*/firefox-bin, /usr/bin/mozilla-[0-9].*, /usr/lib/firefox[^/]*/mozilla-.*, /usr/lib/mozilla[^/]*/mozilla-.*, /usr/bin/mozilla, /usr/bin/epiphany
++.B httpd_collectd_rw_content_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B mozilla_home_t
-+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the mozilla_home_t type, if you want to store mozilla files in the users home directory.
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B mozilla_plugin_config_exec_t
-+.EE
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+- Set files with the mozilla_plugin_config_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the mozilla_plugin_config_t domain.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), httpd_collectd_script(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, httpd_selinux(8), httpd_selinux(8), httpd_apcupsd_cgi_script_selinux(8), httpd_awstats_script_selinux(8), httpd_bugzilla_script_selinux(8), httpd_cobbler_script_selinux(8), httpd_cvs_script_selinux(8), httpd_dirsrvadmin_script_selinux(8), httpd_dspam_script_selinux(8), httpd_git_script_selinux(8), httpd_helper_selinux(8), httpd_man2html_script_selinux(8), httpd_mediawiki_script_selinux(8), httpd_mojomojo_script_selinux(8), httpd_munin_script_selinux(8), httpd_nagios_script_selinux(8), httpd_nutups_cgi_script_selinux(8), httpd_openshift_script_selinux(8), httpd_passwd_selinux(8), httpd_php_selinux(8), httpd_prewikka_script_selinux(8), httpd_rotatelogs_selinux(8), httpd_smokeping_cgi_script_selinux(8), httpd_squid_script_selinux(8), httpd_suexec_selinux(8), httpd_sys_script_selinux(8), httpd_user_script_selinux(8), httpd_w3c_validator_script_selinux(8), httpd_zoneminder_script_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/httpd_cvs_script_selinux.8 b/man/man8/httpd_cvs_script_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..4c09121
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/httpd_cvs_script_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
++.TH "httpd_cvs_script_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "httpd_cvs_script" "SELinux Policy documentation for httpd_cvs_script"
++.SH "NAME"
++httpd_cvs_script_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the httpd_cvs_script processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B mozilla_plugin_exec_t
-+.EE
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the httpd_cvs_script processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+- Set files with the mozilla_plugin_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the mozilla_plugin_t domain.
++The httpd_cvs_script processes execute with the httpd_cvs_script_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/bin/nspluginscan, /usr/lib/nspluginwrapper/npviewer.bin, /usr/lib/xulrunner[^/]*/plugin-container, /usr/bin/nspluginviewer
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B mozilla_plugin_rw_t
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep httpd_cvs_script_t
+
-+- Set files with the mozilla_plugin_rw_t type, if you want to treat the files as mozilla plugin read/write content.
+
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B mozilla_plugin_tmp_t
-+.EE
++The httpd_cvs_script_t SELinux type can be entered via the "shell_exec_t,httpd_cvs_script_exec_t,httpd_cvs_script_exec_t" file types. The default entrypoint paths for the httpd_cvs_script_t domain are the following:"
+
-+- Set files with the mozilla_plugin_tmp_t type, if you want to store mozilla plugin temporary files in the /tmp directories.
-+
-+
-+.EX
++/bin/d?ash, /bin/zsh.*, /bin/ksh.*, /usr/bin/d?ash, /usr/bin/ksh.*, /usr/bin/zsh.*, /bin/esh, /bin/mksh, /bin/sash, /bin/tcsh, /bin/yash, /bin/bash, /bin/fish, /bin/bash2, /usr/bin/esh, /usr/bin/mksh, /usr/bin/sash, /usr/bin/bash, /usr/bin/fish, /usr/bin/tcsh, /usr/bin/yash, /sbin/nologin, /usr/sbin/sesh, /usr/bin/bash2, /usr/sbin/smrsh, /usr/bin/scponly, /usr/sbin/nologin, /usr/libexec/sesh, /usr/sbin/scponlyc, /usr/bin/git-shell, /usr/libexec/git-core/git-shell, /var/www/cgi-bin/cvsweb\.cgi, /usr/share/cvsweb/cvsweb\.cgi, /var/www/cgi-bin/cvsweb\.cgi, /usr/share/cvsweb/cvsweb\.cgi
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+.B mozilla_plugin_tmpfs_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the mozilla_plugin_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store mozilla plugin files on a tmpfs file system.
-+
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux httpd_cvs_script policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their httpd_cvs_script processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for httpd_cvs_script:
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B mozilla_tmp_t
++.B httpd_cvs_script_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
-+- Set files with the mozilla_tmp_t type, if you want to store mozilla temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux httpd_cvs_script policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their httpd_cvs_script processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for httpd_cvs_script:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B mozilla_tmpfs_t
++.B httpd_cvs_script_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the mozilla_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store mozilla files on a tmpfs file system.
++- Set files with the httpd_cvs_script_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the httpd_cvs_script_t domain.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux mozilla policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their mozilla processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for mozilla:
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type httpd_cvs_script_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B cvs_tmp_t
+
-+.EX
-+.B mozilla_t, mozilla_plugin_config_t, mozilla_plugin_t
-+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.br
++.B httpd_cvs_rw_content_t
++
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -30039,215 +33174,241 @@ index 0000000..aabcac2
+.B semanage module
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
-+.B semanage boolean
-+can also be used to manipulate the booleans
-+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), mozilla(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-+, setsebool(8)
++selinux(8), httpd_cvs_script(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, httpd_selinux(8), httpd_selinux(8), httpd_apcupsd_cgi_script_selinux(8), httpd_awstats_script_selinux(8), httpd_bugzilla_script_selinux(8), httpd_cobbler_script_selinux(8), httpd_collectd_script_selinux(8), httpd_dirsrvadmin_script_selinux(8), httpd_dspam_script_selinux(8), httpd_git_script_selinux(8), httpd_helper_selinux(8), httpd_man2html_script_selinux(8), httpd_mediawiki_script_selinux(8), httpd_mojomojo_script_selinux(8), httpd_munin_script_selinux(8), httpd_nagios_script_selinux(8), httpd_nutups_cgi_script_selinux(8), httpd_openshift_script_selinux(8), httpd_passwd_selinux(8), httpd_php_selinux(8), httpd_prewikka_script_selinux(8), httpd_rotatelogs_selinux(8), httpd_smokeping_cgi_script_selinux(8), httpd_squid_script_selinux(8), httpd_suexec_selinux(8), httpd_sys_script_selinux(8), httpd_user_script_selinux(8), httpd_w3c_validator_script_selinux(8), httpd_zoneminder_script_selinux(8)
\ No newline at end of file
-diff --git a/man/man8/mpd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/mpd_selinux.8
+diff --git a/man/man8/httpd_dirsrvadmin_script_selinux.8 b/man/man8/httpd_dirsrvadmin_script_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..90cd776
+index 0000000..8523dac
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/mpd_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,216 @@
-+.TH "mpd_selinux" "8" "mpd" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "mpd SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/httpd_dirsrvadmin_script_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,137 @@
++.TH "httpd_dirsrvadmin_script_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "httpd_dirsrvadmin_script" "SELinux Policy documentation for httpd_dirsrvadmin_script"
+.SH "NAME"
-+mpd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the mpd processes
++httpd_dirsrvadmin_script_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the httpd_dirsrvadmin_script processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the mpd processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the httpd_dirsrvadmin_script processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH BOOLEANS
-+SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. mpd policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run mpd with the tightest access possible.
++The httpd_dirsrvadmin_script processes execute with the httpd_dirsrvadmin_script_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
++For example:
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow mplayer executable stack, you must turn on the mplayer_execstack boolean.
++.B ps -eZ | grep httpd_dirsrvadmin_script_t
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P mplayer_execstack 1
-+.EE
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow gssd to read temp directory. For access to kerberos tgt, you must turn on the gssd_read_tmp boolean.
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P gssd_read_tmp 1
-+.EE
++The httpd_dirsrvadmin_script_t SELinux type can be entered via the "httpd_dirsrvadmin_script_exec_t,shell_exec_t,httpd_dirsrvadmin_script_exec_t" file types. The default entrypoint paths for the httpd_dirsrvadmin_script_t domain are the following:"
+
++/usr/lib/dirsrv/cgi-bin(/.*)?, /usr/lib/dirsrv/dsgw-cgi-bin(/.*)?, /bin/d?ash, /bin/zsh.*, /bin/ksh.*, /usr/bin/d?ash, /usr/bin/ksh.*, /usr/bin/zsh.*, /bin/esh, /bin/mksh, /bin/sash, /bin/tcsh, /bin/yash, /bin/bash, /bin/fish, /bin/bash2, /usr/bin/esh, /usr/bin/mksh, /usr/bin/sash, /usr/bin/bash, /usr/bin/fish, /usr/bin/tcsh, /usr/bin/yash, /sbin/nologin, /usr/sbin/sesh, /usr/bin/bash2, /usr/sbin/smrsh, /usr/bin/scponly, /usr/sbin/nologin, /usr/libexec/sesh, /usr/sbin/scponlyc, /usr/bin/git-shell, /usr/libexec/git-core/git-shell, /usr/lib/dirsrv/cgi-bin(/.*)?, /usr/lib/dirsrv/dsgw-cgi-bin(/.*)?
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow Apache to execute tmp content, you must turn on the httpd_tmp_exec boolean.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux httpd_dirsrvadmin_script policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their httpd_dirsrvadmin_script processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for httpd_dirsrvadmin_script:
+
+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P httpd_tmp_exec 1
++.B httpd_dirsrvadmin_script_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
-+If you want to allow video playing tools to run unconfined, you must turn on the unconfined_mplayer boolean.
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux httpd_dirsrvadmin_script policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their httpd_dirsrvadmin_script processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for httpd_dirsrvadmin_script:
++
+
+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P unconfined_mplayer 1
++.PP
++.B httpd_dirsrvadmin_script_exec_t
+.EE
+
++- Set files with the httpd_dirsrvadmin_script_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the httpd_dirsrvadmin_script_t domain.
++
++
+.PP
-+If you want to allow all daemons to write corefiles to /, you must turn on the daemons_dump_core boolean.
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P daemons_dump_core 1
-+.EE
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The SELinux process type httpd_dirsrvadmin_script_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the mpd_t, mplayer_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++.br
++.B dirsrv_config_t
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
++ /etc/dirsrv(/.*)?
++.br
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the mpd_t, mplayer_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++.br
++.B dirsrv_var_lib_t
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
-+.EE
++ /var/lib/dirsrv(/.*)?
++.br
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux mpd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their mpd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for mpd:
++.br
++.B dirsrv_var_log_t
+
++ /var/log/dirsrv(/.*)?
++.br
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B mpd_data_t
-+.EE
++.br
++.B dirsrv_var_run_t
+
-+- Set files with the mpd_data_t type, if you want to treat the files as mpd content.
++ /var/run/dirsrv(/.*)?
++.br
+
+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/lib/mpd/playlists(/.*)?, /var/lib/mpd/music(/.*)?
++.B dirsrvadmin_config_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B mpd_etc_t
-+.EE
++ /etc/dirsrv/dsgw(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/dirsrv/admin-serv(/.*)?
++.br
+
-+- Set files with the mpd_etc_t type, if you want to store mpd files in the /etc directories.
++.br
++.B dirsrvadmin_lock_t
+
++ /var/lock/subsys/dirsrv
++.br
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B mpd_exec_t
-+.EE
++.br
++.B dirsrvadmin_tmp_t
+
-+- Set files with the mpd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the mpd_t domain.
+
++.br
++.B httpd_dirsrvadmin_rw_content_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B mpd_initrc_exec_t
-+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the mpd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the mpd_initrc_t domain.
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B mpd_log_t
-+.EE
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+- Set files with the mpd_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as mpd log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), httpd_dirsrvadmin_script(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, httpd_selinux(8), httpd_selinux(8), httpd_apcupsd_cgi_script_selinux(8), httpd_awstats_script_selinux(8), httpd_bugzilla_script_selinux(8), httpd_cobbler_script_selinux(8), httpd_collectd_script_selinux(8), httpd_cvs_script_selinux(8), httpd_dspam_script_selinux(8), httpd_git_script_selinux(8), httpd_helper_selinux(8), httpd_man2html_script_selinux(8), httpd_mediawiki_script_selinux(8), httpd_mojomojo_script_selinux(8), httpd_munin_script_selinux(8), httpd_nagios_script_selinux(8), httpd_nutups_cgi_script_selinux(8), httpd_openshift_script_selinux(8), httpd_passwd_selinux(8), httpd_php_selinux(8), httpd_prewikka_script_selinux(8), httpd_rotatelogs_selinux(8), httpd_smokeping_cgi_script_selinux(8), httpd_squid_script_selinux(8), httpd_suexec_selinux(8), httpd_sys_script_selinux(8), httpd_user_script_selinux(8), httpd_w3c_validator_script_selinux(8), httpd_zoneminder_script_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/httpd_dspam_script_selinux.8 b/man/man8/httpd_dspam_script_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..09ee1ed
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/httpd_dspam_script_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
++.TH "httpd_dspam_script_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "httpd_dspam_script" "SELinux Policy documentation for httpd_dspam_script"
++.SH "NAME"
++httpd_dspam_script_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the httpd_dspam_script processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B mpd_tmp_t
-+.EE
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the httpd_dspam_script processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+- Set files with the mpd_tmp_t type, if you want to store mpd temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++The httpd_dspam_script processes execute with the httpd_dspam_script_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
++For example:
+
-+.EX
++.B ps -eZ | grep httpd_dspam_script_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The httpd_dspam_script_t SELinux type can be entered via the "httpd_dspam_script_exec_t,shell_exec_t,httpd_dspam_script_exec_t" file types. The default entrypoint paths for the httpd_dspam_script_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/share/dspam-web/dspam\.cgi, /bin/d?ash, /bin/zsh.*, /bin/ksh.*, /usr/bin/d?ash, /usr/bin/ksh.*, /usr/bin/zsh.*, /bin/esh, /bin/mksh, /bin/sash, /bin/tcsh, /bin/yash, /bin/bash, /bin/fish, /bin/bash2, /usr/bin/esh, /usr/bin/mksh, /usr/bin/sash, /usr/bin/bash, /usr/bin/fish, /usr/bin/tcsh, /usr/bin/yash, /sbin/nologin, /usr/sbin/sesh, /usr/bin/bash2, /usr/sbin/smrsh, /usr/bin/scponly, /usr/sbin/nologin, /usr/libexec/sesh, /usr/sbin/scponlyc, /usr/bin/git-shell, /usr/libexec/git-core/git-shell, /usr/share/dspam-web/dspam\.cgi
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+.B mpd_tmpfs_t
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux httpd_dspam_script policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their httpd_dspam_script processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for httpd_dspam_script:
++
++.EX
++.B httpd_dspam_script_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
-+- Set files with the mpd_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store mpd files on a tmpfs file system.
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux httpd_dspam_script policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their httpd_dspam_script processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for httpd_dspam_script:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B mpd_var_lib_t
++.B httpd_dspam_script_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the mpd_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the mpd files under the /var/lib directory.
++- Set files with the httpd_dspam_script_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the httpd_dspam_script_t domain.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PORT TYPES
-+SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
-+.PP
-+You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
-+
-+.B semanage port -l
-+
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
-+SELinux mpd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their mpd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following port types are defined for mpd:
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+.EX
-+.TP 5
-+.B mpd_port_t
-+.TP 10
-+.EE
++The SELinux process type httpd_dspam_script_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
++.br
++.B httpd_dspam_rw_content_t
+
-+Default Defined Ports:
-+tcp 6600
-+.EE
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux mpd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their mpd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for mpd:
+
-+.EX
-+.B mpd_t, mplayer_t
-+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -30259,142 +33420,115 @@ index 0000000..90cd776
+.B semanage module
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
-+.B semanage port
-+can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
-+
-+.B semanage boolean
-+can also be used to manipulate the booleans
-+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), mpd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-+, setsebool(8)
++selinux(8), httpd_dspam_script(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, httpd_selinux(8), httpd_selinux(8), httpd_apcupsd_cgi_script_selinux(8), httpd_awstats_script_selinux(8), httpd_bugzilla_script_selinux(8), httpd_cobbler_script_selinux(8), httpd_collectd_script_selinux(8), httpd_cvs_script_selinux(8), httpd_dirsrvadmin_script_selinux(8), httpd_git_script_selinux(8), httpd_helper_selinux(8), httpd_man2html_script_selinux(8), httpd_mediawiki_script_selinux(8), httpd_mojomojo_script_selinux(8), httpd_munin_script_selinux(8), httpd_nagios_script_selinux(8), httpd_nutups_cgi_script_selinux(8), httpd_openshift_script_selinux(8), httpd_passwd_selinux(8), httpd_php_selinux(8), httpd_prewikka_script_selinux(8), httpd_rotatelogs_selinux(8), httpd_smokeping_cgi_script_selinux(8), httpd_squid_script_selinux(8), httpd_suexec_selinux(8), httpd_sys_script_selinux(8), httpd_user_script_selinux(8), httpd_w3c_validator_script_selinux(8), httpd_zoneminder_script_selinux(8)
\ No newline at end of file
-diff --git a/man/man8/mplayer_selinux.8 b/man/man8/mplayer_selinux.8
+diff --git a/man/man8/httpd_git_script_selinux.8 b/man/man8/httpd_git_script_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..d79c378
+index 0000000..3518b85
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/mplayer_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,137 @@
-+.TH "mplayer_selinux" "8" "mplayer" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "mplayer SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/httpd_git_script_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
++.TH "httpd_git_script_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "httpd_git_script" "SELinux Policy documentation for httpd_git_script"
+.SH "NAME"
-+mplayer_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the mplayer processes
++httpd_git_script_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the httpd_git_script processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the mplayer processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
-+
-+.SH BOOLEANS
-+SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. mplayer policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run mplayer with the tightest access possible.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the httpd_git_script processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
++The httpd_git_script processes execute with the httpd_git_script_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow mplayer executable stack, you must turn on the mplayer_execstack boolean.
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P mplayer_execstack 1
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep httpd_git_script_t
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow video playing tools to run unconfined, you must turn on the unconfined_mplayer boolean.
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P unconfined_mplayer 1
-+.EE
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The httpd_git_script_t SELinux type can be entered via the "shell_exec_t,httpd_git_script_exec_t,httpd_git_script_exec_t" file types. The default entrypoint paths for the httpd_git_script_t domain are the following:"
+
++/bin/d?ash, /bin/zsh.*, /bin/ksh.*, /usr/bin/d?ash, /usr/bin/ksh.*, /usr/bin/zsh.*, /bin/esh, /bin/mksh, /bin/sash, /bin/tcsh, /bin/yash, /bin/bash, /bin/fish, /bin/bash2, /usr/bin/esh, /usr/bin/mksh, /usr/bin/sash, /usr/bin/bash, /usr/bin/fish, /usr/bin/tcsh, /usr/bin/yash, /sbin/nologin, /usr/sbin/sesh, /usr/bin/bash2, /usr/sbin/smrsh, /usr/bin/scponly, /usr/sbin/nologin, /usr/libexec/sesh, /usr/sbin/scponlyc, /usr/bin/git-shell, /usr/libexec/git-core/git-shell, /var/www/cgi-bin/cgit, /var/www/git/gitweb\.cgi, /var/www/gitweb-caching/gitweb\.cgi, /var/www/cgi-bin/cgit, /var/www/git/gitweb\.cgi, /var/www/gitweb-caching/gitweb\.cgi
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the mplayer_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
-+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
-+
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the mplayer_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux httpd_git_script policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their httpd_git_script processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for httpd_git_script:
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B httpd_git_script_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux mplayer policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their mplayer processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for mplayer:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux httpd_git_script policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their httpd_git_script processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for httpd_git_script:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B mplayer_etc_t
++.B httpd_git_script_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the mplayer_etc_t type, if you want to store mplayer files in the /etc directories.
++- Set files with the httpd_git_script_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the httpd_git_script_t domain.
+
+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B mplayer_exec_t
-+.EE
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
+
-+- Set files with the mplayer_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the mplayer_t domain.
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type httpd_git_script_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/bin/vlc, /usr/bin/mplayer, /usr/bin/xine
++.B httpd_git_rw_content_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B mplayer_home_t
-+.EE
++ /var/cache/cgit(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/cache/gitweb-caching(/.*)?
++.br
+
-+- Set files with the mplayer_home_t type, if you want to store mplayer files in the users home directory.
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the httpd_git_script_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B mplayer_tmpfs_t
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the mplayer_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store mplayer files on a tmpfs file system.
-+
-+
-+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
-+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux mplayer policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their mplayer processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for mplayer:
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the httpd_git_script_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B mplayer_t
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -30406,137 +33540,89 @@ index 0000000..d79c378
+.B semanage module
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
-+.B semanage boolean
-+can also be used to manipulate the booleans
-+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), mplayer(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-+, setsebool(8)
++selinux(8), httpd_git_script(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, httpd_selinux(8), httpd_selinux(8), httpd_apcupsd_cgi_script_selinux(8), httpd_awstats_script_selinux(8), httpd_bugzilla_script_selinux(8), httpd_cobbler_script_selinux(8), httpd_collectd_script_selinux(8), httpd_cvs_script_selinux(8), httpd_dirsrvadmin_script_selinux(8), httpd_dspam_script_selinux(8), httpd_helper_selinux(8), httpd_man2html_script_selinux(8), httpd_mediawiki_script_selinux(8), httpd_mojomojo_script_selinux(8), httpd_munin_script_selinux(8), httpd_nagios_script_selinux(8), httpd_nutups_cgi_script_selinux(8), httpd_openshift_script_selinux(8), httpd_passwd_selinux(8), httpd_php_selinux(8), httpd_prewikka_script_selinux(8), httpd_rotatelogs_selinux(8), httpd_smokeping_cgi_script_selinux(8), httpd_squid_script_selinux(8), httpd_suexec_selinux(8), httpd_sys_script_selinux(8), httpd_user_script_selinux(8), httpd_w3c_validator_script_selinux(8), httpd_zoneminder_script_selinux(8)
\ No newline at end of file
-diff --git a/man/man8/mrtg_selinux.8 b/man/man8/mrtg_selinux.8
+diff --git a/man/man8/httpd_helper_selinux.8 b/man/man8/httpd_helper_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..58fd320
+index 0000000..3f124b1
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/mrtg_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
-+.TH "mrtg_selinux" "8" "mrtg" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "mrtg SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/httpd_helper_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
++.TH "httpd_helper_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "httpd_helper" "SELinux Policy documentation for httpd_helper"
+.SH "NAME"
-+mrtg_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the mrtg processes
++httpd_helper_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the httpd_helper processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the mrtg processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the httpd_helper processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The httpd_helper processes execute with the httpd_helper_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the mrtg_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep httpd_helper_t
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the mrtg_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
-+.EE
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++The httpd_helper_t SELinux type can be entered via the "httpd_helper_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the httpd_helper_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/bin/htsslpass
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux mrtg policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their mrtg processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for mrtg:
-+
-+
-+.EX
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux httpd_helper policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their httpd_helper processes in as secure a method as possible.
+.PP
-+.B mrtg_etc_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the mrtg_etc_t type, if you want to store mrtg files in the /etc directories.
-+
++The following process types are defined for httpd_helper:
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B mrtg_exec_t
++.B httpd_helper_t
+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the mrtg_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the mrtg_t domain.
-+
-+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B mrtg_lock_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the mrtg_lock_t type, if you want to treat the files as mrtg lock data, stored under the /var/lock directory
-+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/lock/mrtg(/.*)?, /etc/mrtg/mrtg\.ok
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
-+.EX
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
-+.B mrtg_log_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the mrtg_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as mrtg log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
-+
-+
-+.EX
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+.B mrtg_var_lib_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the mrtg_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the mrtg files under the /var/lib directory.
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux httpd_helper policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their httpd_helper processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for httpd_helper:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B mrtg_var_run_t
++.B httpd_helper_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the mrtg_var_run_t type, if you want to store the mrtg files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the httpd_helper_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the httpd_helper_t domain.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux mrtg policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their mrtg processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for mrtg:
-+
-+.EX
-+.B mrtg_t
-+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -30549,141 +33635,110 @@ index 0000000..58fd320
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), mrtg(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/mscan_selinux.8 b/man/man8/mscan_selinux.8
++selinux(8), httpd_helper(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, httpd_selinux(8), httpd_selinux(8), httpd_apcupsd_cgi_script_selinux(8), httpd_awstats_script_selinux(8), httpd_bugzilla_script_selinux(8), httpd_cobbler_script_selinux(8), httpd_collectd_script_selinux(8), httpd_cvs_script_selinux(8), httpd_dirsrvadmin_script_selinux(8), httpd_dspam_script_selinux(8), httpd_git_script_selinux(8), httpd_man2html_script_selinux(8), httpd_mediawiki_script_selinux(8), httpd_mojomojo_script_selinux(8), httpd_munin_script_selinux(8), httpd_nagios_script_selinux(8), httpd_nutups_cgi_script_selinux(8), httpd_openshift_script_selinux(8), httpd_passwd_selinux(8), httpd_php_selinux(8), httpd_prewikka_script_selinux(8), httpd_rotatelogs_selinux(8), httpd_smokeping_cgi_script_selinux(8), httpd_squid_script_selinux(8), httpd_suexec_selinux(8), httpd_sys_script_selinux(8), httpd_user_script_selinux(8), httpd_w3c_validator_script_selinux(8), httpd_zoneminder_script_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/httpd_man2html_script_selinux.8 b/man/man8/httpd_man2html_script_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..f950632
+index 0000000..e3292a9
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/mscan_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,145 @@
-+.TH "mscan_selinux" "8" "mscan" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "mscan SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/httpd_man2html_script_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
++.TH "httpd_man2html_script_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "httpd_man2html_script" "SELinux Policy documentation for httpd_man2html_script"
+.SH "NAME"
-+mscan_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the mscan processes
++httpd_man2html_script_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the httpd_man2html_script processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the mscan processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
-+
-+.SH BOOLEANS
-+SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. mscan policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run mscan with the tightest access possible.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the httpd_man2html_script processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
++The httpd_man2html_script processes execute with the httpd_man2html_script_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow clamscan to read user content, you must turn on the clamscan_read_user_content boolean.
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P clamscan_read_user_content 1
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep httpd_man2html_script_t
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow clamscan to non security files on a system, you must turn on the clamscan_can_scan_system boolean.
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P clamscan_can_scan_system 1
-+.EE
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The httpd_man2html_script_t SELinux type can be entered via the "shell_exec_t,httpd_man2html_script_exec_t,httpd_man2html_script_exec_t" file types. The default entrypoint paths for the httpd_man2html_script_t domain are the following:"
+
++/bin/d?ash, /bin/zsh.*, /bin/ksh.*, /usr/bin/d?ash, /usr/bin/ksh.*, /usr/bin/zsh.*, /bin/esh, /bin/mksh, /bin/sash, /bin/tcsh, /bin/yash, /bin/bash, /bin/fish, /bin/bash2, /usr/bin/esh, /usr/bin/mksh, /usr/bin/sash, /usr/bin/bash, /usr/bin/fish, /usr/bin/tcsh, /usr/bin/yash, /sbin/nologin, /usr/sbin/sesh, /usr/bin/bash2, /usr/sbin/smrsh, /usr/bin/scponly, /usr/sbin/nologin, /usr/libexec/sesh, /usr/sbin/scponlyc, /usr/bin/git-shell, /usr/libexec/git-core/git-shell, /usr/lib/man2html/cgi-bin/man/mansec, /usr/lib/man2html/cgi-bin/man/man2html, /usr/lib/man2html/cgi-bin/man/manwhatis, /usr/lib/man2html/cgi-bin/man/mansec, /usr/lib/man2html/cgi-bin/man/man2html, /usr/lib/man2html/cgi-bin/man/manwhatis
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the mscan_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
-+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
-+
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the mscan_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux httpd_man2html_script policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their httpd_man2html_script processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for httpd_man2html_script:
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B httpd_man2html_script_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux mscan policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their mscan processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for mscan:
-+
-+
-+.EX
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux httpd_man2html_script policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their httpd_man2html_script processes in as secure a method as possible.
+.PP
-+.B mscan_etc_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the mscan_etc_t type, if you want to store mscan files in the /etc directories.
++The following file types are defined for httpd_man2html_script:
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/etc/sysconfig/MailScanner, /etc/MailScanner(/.*)?, /etc/sysconfig/update_spamassassin
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B mscan_exec_t
++.B httpd_man2html_script_cache_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the mscan_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the mscan_t domain.
++- Set files with the httpd_man2html_script_cache_t type, if you want to store the files under the /var/cache directory.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B mscan_initrc_exec_t
++.B httpd_man2html_script_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the mscan_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the mscan_initrc_t domain.
++- Set files with the httpd_man2html_script_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the httpd_man2html_script_t domain.
+
+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B mscan_tmp_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the mscan_tmp_t type, if you want to store mscan temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
+
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B mscan_var_run_t
-+.EE
++The SELinux process type httpd_man2html_script_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
-+- Set files with the mscan_var_run_t type, if you want to store the mscan files under the /run directory.
++.br
++.B httpd_man2html_rw_content_t
+
+
-+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
++.br
++.B httpd_man2html_script_cache_t
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux mscan policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their mscan processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for mscan:
++ /var/cache/man2html(/.*)?
++.br
+
-+.EX
-+.B mscan_t
-+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -30695,178 +33750,207 @@ index 0000000..f950632
+.B semanage module
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
-+.B semanage boolean
-+can also be used to manipulate the booleans
-+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), mscan(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-+, setsebool(8)
++selinux(8), httpd_man2html_script(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, httpd_selinux(8), httpd_selinux(8), httpd_apcupsd_cgi_script_selinux(8), httpd_awstats_script_selinux(8), httpd_bugzilla_script_selinux(8), httpd_cobbler_script_selinux(8), httpd_collectd_script_selinux(8), httpd_cvs_script_selinux(8), httpd_dirsrvadmin_script_selinux(8), httpd_dspam_script_selinux(8), httpd_git_script_selinux(8), httpd_helper_selinux(8), httpd_mediawiki_script_selinux(8), httpd_mojomojo_script_selinux(8), httpd_munin_script_selinux(8), httpd_nagios_script_selinux(8), httpd_nutups_cgi_script_selinux(8), httpd_openshift_script_selinux(8), httpd_passwd_selinux(8), httpd_php_selinux(8), httpd_prewikka_script_selinux(8), httpd_rotatelogs_selinux(8), httpd_smokeping_cgi_script_selinux(8), httpd_squid_script_selinux(8), httpd_suexec_selinux(8), httpd_sys_script_selinux(8), httpd_user_script_selinux(8), httpd_w3c_validator_script_selinux(8), httpd_zoneminder_script_selinux(8)
\ No newline at end of file
-diff --git a/man/man8/munin_selinux.8 b/man/man8/munin_selinux.8
+diff --git a/man/man8/httpd_mediawiki_script_selinux.8 b/man/man8/httpd_mediawiki_script_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..5be69aa
+index 0000000..eaf2b98
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/munin_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,175 @@
-+.TH "munin_selinux" "8" "munin" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "munin SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/httpd_mediawiki_script_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
++.TH "httpd_mediawiki_script_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "httpd_mediawiki_script" "SELinux Policy documentation for httpd_mediawiki_script"
+.SH "NAME"
-+munin_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the munin processes
++httpd_mediawiki_script_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the httpd_mediawiki_script processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the munin processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the httpd_mediawiki_script processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The httpd_mediawiki_script processes execute with the httpd_mediawiki_script_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the munin_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep httpd_mediawiki_script_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The httpd_mediawiki_script_t SELinux type can be entered via the "httpd_mediawiki_script_exec_t,shell_exec_t,httpd_mediawiki_script_exec_t" file types. The default entrypoint paths for the httpd_mediawiki_script_t domain are the following:"
+
++/usr/lib/mediawiki/math/texvc, /usr/lib/mediawiki/math/texvc_tex, /usr/lib/mediawiki/math/texvc_tes, /bin/d?ash, /bin/zsh.*, /bin/ksh.*, /usr/bin/d?ash, /usr/bin/ksh.*, /usr/bin/zsh.*, /bin/esh, /bin/mksh, /bin/sash, /bin/tcsh, /bin/yash, /bin/bash, /bin/fish, /bin/bash2, /usr/bin/esh, /usr/bin/mksh, /usr/bin/sash, /usr/bin/bash, /usr/bin/fish, /usr/bin/tcsh, /usr/bin/yash, /sbin/nologin, /usr/sbin/sesh, /usr/bin/bash2, /usr/sbin/smrsh, /usr/bin/scponly, /usr/sbin/nologin, /usr/libexec/sesh, /usr/sbin/scponlyc, /usr/bin/git-shell, /usr/libexec/git-core/git-shell, /usr/lib/mediawiki/math/texvc, /usr/lib/mediawiki/math/texvc_tex, /usr/lib/mediawiki/math/texvc_tes
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the munin_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux httpd_mediawiki_script policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their httpd_mediawiki_script processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for httpd_mediawiki_script:
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B httpd_mediawiki_script_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux munin policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their munin processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for munin:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux httpd_mediawiki_script policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their httpd_mediawiki_script processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for httpd_mediawiki_script:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B munin_etc_t
++.B httpd_mediawiki_script_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the munin_etc_t type, if you want to store munin files in the /etc directories.
++- Set files with the httpd_mediawiki_script_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the httpd_mediawiki_script_t domain.
+
+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B munin_exec_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the munin_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the munin_t domain.
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type httpd_mediawiki_script_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/sbin/munin-.*, /usr/share/munin/munin-.*, /usr/share/munin/plugins/.*, /usr/bin/munin-.*
++.B httpd_mediawiki_rw_content_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B munin_initrc_exec_t
-+.EE
++ /var/www/wiki(/.*)?
++.br
+
-+- Set files with the munin_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the munin_initrc_t domain.
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B munin_log_t
-+.EE
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+- Set files with the munin_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as munin log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), httpd_mediawiki_script(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, httpd_selinux(8), httpd_selinux(8), httpd_apcupsd_cgi_script_selinux(8), httpd_awstats_script_selinux(8), httpd_bugzilla_script_selinux(8), httpd_cobbler_script_selinux(8), httpd_collectd_script_selinux(8), httpd_cvs_script_selinux(8), httpd_dirsrvadmin_script_selinux(8), httpd_dspam_script_selinux(8), httpd_git_script_selinux(8), httpd_helper_selinux(8), httpd_man2html_script_selinux(8), httpd_mojomojo_script_selinux(8), httpd_munin_script_selinux(8), httpd_nagios_script_selinux(8), httpd_nutups_cgi_script_selinux(8), httpd_openshift_script_selinux(8), httpd_passwd_selinux(8), httpd_php_selinux(8), httpd_prewikka_script_selinux(8), httpd_rotatelogs_selinux(8), httpd_smokeping_cgi_script_selinux(8), httpd_squid_script_selinux(8), httpd_suexec_selinux(8), httpd_sys_script_selinux(8), httpd_user_script_selinux(8), httpd_w3c_validator_script_selinux(8), httpd_zoneminder_script_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/httpd_mojomojo_script_selinux.8 b/man/man8/httpd_mojomojo_script_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..8ff95bf
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/httpd_mojomojo_script_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
++.TH "httpd_mojomojo_script_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "httpd_mojomojo_script" "SELinux Policy documentation for httpd_mojomojo_script"
++.SH "NAME"
++httpd_mojomojo_script_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the httpd_mojomojo_script processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the httpd_mojomojo_script processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B munin_plugin_state_t
-+.EE
++The httpd_mojomojo_script processes execute with the httpd_mojomojo_script_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+- Set files with the munin_plugin_state_t type, if you want to treat the files as munin plugin state data.
++For example:
+
++.B ps -eZ | grep httpd_mojomojo_script_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B munin_tmp_t
-+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the munin_tmp_t type, if you want to store munin temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
++The httpd_mojomojo_script_t SELinux type can be entered via the "httpd_mojomojo_script_exec_t,shell_exec_t,httpd_mojomojo_script_exec_t" file types. The default entrypoint paths for the httpd_mojomojo_script_t domain are the following:"
+
-+.EX
++/usr/bin/mojomojo_fastcgi\.pl, /bin/d?ash, /bin/zsh.*, /bin/ksh.*, /usr/bin/d?ash, /usr/bin/ksh.*, /usr/bin/zsh.*, /bin/esh, /bin/mksh, /bin/sash, /bin/tcsh, /bin/yash, /bin/bash, /bin/fish, /bin/bash2, /usr/bin/esh, /usr/bin/mksh, /usr/bin/sash, /usr/bin/bash, /usr/bin/fish, /usr/bin/tcsh, /usr/bin/yash, /sbin/nologin, /usr/sbin/sesh, /usr/bin/bash2, /usr/sbin/smrsh, /usr/bin/scponly, /usr/sbin/nologin, /usr/libexec/sesh, /usr/sbin/scponlyc, /usr/bin/git-shell, /usr/libexec/git-core/git-shell, /usr/bin/mojomojo_fastcgi\.pl
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux httpd_mojomojo_script policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their httpd_mojomojo_script processes in as secure a method as possible.
+.PP
-+.B munin_var_lib_t
++The following process types are defined for httpd_mojomojo_script:
++
++.EX
++.B httpd_mojomojo_script_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
-+- Set files with the munin_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the munin files under the /var/lib directory.
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux httpd_mojomojo_script policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their httpd_mojomojo_script processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for httpd_mojomojo_script:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B munin_var_run_t
++.B httpd_mojomojo_script_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the munin_var_run_t type, if you want to store the munin files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the httpd_mojomojo_script_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the httpd_mojomojo_script_t domain.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PORT TYPES
-+SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
-+.PP
-+You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+.B semanage port -l
++The SELinux process type httpd_mojomojo_script_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
-+SELinux munin policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their munin processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following port types are defined for munin:
++.br
++.B httpd_mojomojo_rw_content_t
+
-+.EX
-+.TP 5
-+.B munin_port_t
-+.TP 10
-+.EE
++ /var/lib/mojomojo(/.*)?
++.br
+
++.br
++.B httpd_mojomojo_tmp_t
+
-+Default Defined Ports:
-+tcp 4949
-+.EE
-+udp 4949
-+.EE
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux munin policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their munin processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for munin:
+
-+.EX
-+.B munin_t
-+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -30878,228 +33962,302 @@ index 0000000..5be69aa
+.B semanage module
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
-+.B semanage port
-+can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
-+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), munin(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/mysqld_selinux.8 b/man/man8/mysqld_selinux.8
++selinux(8), httpd_mojomojo_script(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, httpd_selinux(8), httpd_selinux(8), httpd_apcupsd_cgi_script_selinux(8), httpd_awstats_script_selinux(8), httpd_bugzilla_script_selinux(8), httpd_cobbler_script_selinux(8), httpd_collectd_script_selinux(8), httpd_cvs_script_selinux(8), httpd_dirsrvadmin_script_selinux(8), httpd_dspam_script_selinux(8), httpd_git_script_selinux(8), httpd_helper_selinux(8), httpd_man2html_script_selinux(8), httpd_mediawiki_script_selinux(8), httpd_munin_script_selinux(8), httpd_nagios_script_selinux(8), httpd_nutups_cgi_script_selinux(8), httpd_openshift_script_selinux(8), httpd_passwd_selinux(8), httpd_php_selinux(8), httpd_prewikka_script_selinux(8), httpd_rotatelogs_selinux(8), httpd_smokeping_cgi_script_selinux(8), httpd_squid_script_selinux(8), httpd_suexec_selinux(8), httpd_sys_script_selinux(8), httpd_user_script_selinux(8), httpd_w3c_validator_script_selinux(8), httpd_zoneminder_script_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/httpd_munin_script_selinux.8 b/man/man8/httpd_munin_script_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..8c48ea1
+index 0000000..df7ae1a
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/mysqld_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,230 @@
-+.TH "mysqld_selinux" "8" "mysqld" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "mysqld SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/httpd_munin_script_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
++.TH "httpd_munin_script_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "httpd_munin_script" "SELinux Policy documentation for httpd_munin_script"
+.SH "NAME"
-+mysqld_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the mysqld processes
++httpd_munin_script_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the httpd_munin_script processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the mysqld processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
-+
-+.SH BOOLEANS
-+SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. mysqld policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run mysqld with the tightest access possible.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the httpd_munin_script processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
++The httpd_munin_script processes execute with the httpd_munin_script_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow mysqld to connect to all ports, you must turn on the mysql_connect_any boolean.
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P mysql_connect_any 1
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep httpd_munin_script_t
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to connect to the local mysql server, you must turn on the user_mysql_connect boolean.
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P user_mysql_connect 1
-+.EE
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The httpd_munin_script_t SELinux type can be entered via the "httpd_munin_script_exec_t,shell_exec_t,httpd_munin_script_exec_t" file types. The default entrypoint paths for the httpd_munin_script_t domain are the following:"
+
++/var/www/html/munin/cgi(/.*)?, /bin/d?ash, /bin/zsh.*, /bin/ksh.*, /usr/bin/d?ash, /usr/bin/ksh.*, /usr/bin/zsh.*, /bin/esh, /bin/mksh, /bin/sash, /bin/tcsh, /bin/yash, /bin/bash, /bin/fish, /bin/bash2, /usr/bin/esh, /usr/bin/mksh, /usr/bin/sash, /usr/bin/bash, /usr/bin/fish, /usr/bin/tcsh, /usr/bin/yash, /sbin/nologin, /usr/sbin/sesh, /usr/bin/bash2, /usr/sbin/smrsh, /usr/bin/scponly, /usr/sbin/nologin, /usr/libexec/sesh, /usr/sbin/scponlyc, /usr/bin/git-shell, /usr/libexec/git-core/git-shell, /var/www/html/munin/cgi(/.*)?
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the mysqld_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
-+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
-+
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the mysqld_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux httpd_munin_script policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their httpd_munin_script processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for httpd_munin_script:
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B httpd_munin_script_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux mysqld policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their mysqld processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for mysqld:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux httpd_munin_script policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their httpd_munin_script processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for httpd_munin_script:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B mysqld_db_t
++.B httpd_munin_script_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the mysqld_db_t type, if you want to treat the files as mysqld database content.
++- Set files with the httpd_munin_script_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the httpd_munin_script_t domain.
+
+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B mysqld_etc_t
-+.EE
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
+
-+- Set files with the mysqld_etc_t type, if you want to store mysqld files in the /etc directories.
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/etc/my\.cnf, /etc/mysql(/.*)?
++The SELinux process type httpd_munin_script_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B mysqld_exec_t
-+.EE
++.br
++.B httpd_munin_rw_content_t
+
-+- Set files with the mysqld_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the mysqld_t domain.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/libexec/mysqld, /usr/bin/mysql_upgrade, /usr/sbin/mysqld(-max)?, /usr/sbin/ndbd
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
-+.EX
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
+.PP
-+.B mysqld_home_t
-+.EE
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
-+- Set files with the mysqld_home_t type, if you want to store mysqld files in the users home directory.
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B mysqld_initrc_exec_t
-+.EE
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), httpd_munin_script(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, httpd_selinux(8), httpd_selinux(8), httpd_apcupsd_cgi_script_selinux(8), httpd_awstats_script_selinux(8), httpd_bugzilla_script_selinux(8), httpd_cobbler_script_selinux(8), httpd_collectd_script_selinux(8), httpd_cvs_script_selinux(8), httpd_dirsrvadmin_script_selinux(8), httpd_dspam_script_selinux(8), httpd_git_script_selinux(8), httpd_helper_selinux(8), httpd_man2html_script_selinux(8), httpd_mediawiki_script_selinux(8), httpd_mojomojo_script_selinux(8), httpd_nagios_script_selinux(8), httpd_nutups_cgi_script_selinux(8), httpd_openshift_script_selinux(8), httpd_passwd_selinux(8), httpd_php_selinux(8), httpd_prewikka_script_selinux(8), httpd_rotatelogs_selinux(8), httpd_smokeping_cgi_script_selinux(8), httpd_squid_script_selinux(8), httpd_suexec_selinux(8), httpd_sys_script_selinux(8), httpd_user_script_selinux(8), httpd_w3c_validator_script_selinux(8), httpd_zoneminder_script_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/httpd_nagios_script_selinux.8 b/man/man8/httpd_nagios_script_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..8bdd9ee
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/httpd_nagios_script_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
++.TH "httpd_nagios_script_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "httpd_nagios_script" "SELinux Policy documentation for httpd_nagios_script"
++.SH "NAME"
++httpd_nagios_script_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the httpd_nagios_script processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+- Set files with the mysqld_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the mysqld_initrc_t domain.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the httpd_nagios_script processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
++The httpd_nagios_script processes execute with the httpd_nagios_script_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B mysqld_log_t
-+.EE
++For example:
+
-+- Set files with the mysqld_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as mysqld log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++.B ps -eZ | grep httpd_nagios_script_t
+
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B mysqld_safe_exec_t
-+.EE
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
-+- Set files with the mysqld_safe_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the mysqld_safe_t domain.
++The httpd_nagios_script_t SELinux type can be entered via the "httpd_nagios_script_exec_t,shell_exec_t,httpd_nagios_script_exec_t" file types. The default entrypoint paths for the httpd_nagios_script_t domain are the following:"
+
++/usr/lib/nagios/cgi(/.*)?, /usr/lib/cgi-bin/nagios(/.+)?, /usr/lib/nagios/cgi-bin(/.*)?, /usr/lib/cgi-bin/netsaint(/.*)?, /bin/d?ash, /bin/zsh.*, /bin/ksh.*, /usr/bin/d?ash, /usr/bin/ksh.*, /usr/bin/zsh.*, /bin/esh, /bin/mksh, /bin/sash, /bin/tcsh, /bin/yash, /bin/bash, /bin/fish, /bin/bash2, /usr/bin/esh, /usr/bin/mksh, /usr/bin/sash, /usr/bin/bash, /usr/bin/fish, /usr/bin/tcsh, /usr/bin/yash, /sbin/nologin, /usr/sbin/sesh, /usr/bin/bash2, /usr/sbin/smrsh, /usr/bin/scponly, /usr/sbin/nologin, /usr/libexec/sesh, /usr/sbin/scponlyc, /usr/bin/git-shell, /usr/libexec/git-core/git-shell, /usr/lib/nagios/cgi(/.*)?, /usr/lib/cgi-bin/nagios(/.+)?, /usr/lib/nagios/cgi-bin(/.*)?, /usr/lib/cgi-bin/netsaint(/.*)?
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux httpd_nagios_script policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their httpd_nagios_script processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for httpd_nagios_script:
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B mysqld_tmp_t
++.B httpd_nagios_script_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
-+- Set files with the mysqld_tmp_t type, if you want to store mysqld temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux httpd_nagios_script policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their httpd_nagios_script processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for httpd_nagios_script:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B mysqld_unit_file_t
++.B httpd_nagios_script_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the mysqld_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as mysqld unit content.
++- Set files with the httpd_nagios_script_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the httpd_nagios_script_t domain.
+
+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B mysqld_var_run_t
-+.EE
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
+
-+- Set files with the mysqld_var_run_t type, if you want to store the mysqld files under the /run directory.
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type httpd_nagios_script_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/run/mysqld(/.*)?, /var/lib/mysql/mysql\.sock
++.B httpd_nagios_rw_content_t
++
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
-+.SH PORT TYPES
-+SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
+.PP
-+You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.B semanage port -l
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
-+SELinux mysqld policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their mysqld processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following port types are defined for mysqld:
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), httpd_nagios_script(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, httpd_selinux(8), httpd_selinux(8), httpd_apcupsd_cgi_script_selinux(8), httpd_awstats_script_selinux(8), httpd_bugzilla_script_selinux(8), httpd_cobbler_script_selinux(8), httpd_collectd_script_selinux(8), httpd_cvs_script_selinux(8), httpd_dirsrvadmin_script_selinux(8), httpd_dspam_script_selinux(8), httpd_git_script_selinux(8), httpd_helper_selinux(8), httpd_man2html_script_selinux(8), httpd_mediawiki_script_selinux(8), httpd_mojomojo_script_selinux(8), httpd_munin_script_selinux(8), httpd_nutups_cgi_script_selinux(8), httpd_openshift_script_selinux(8), httpd_passwd_selinux(8), httpd_php_selinux(8), httpd_prewikka_script_selinux(8), httpd_rotatelogs_selinux(8), httpd_smokeping_cgi_script_selinux(8), httpd_squid_script_selinux(8), httpd_suexec_selinux(8), httpd_sys_script_selinux(8), httpd_user_script_selinux(8), httpd_w3c_validator_script_selinux(8), httpd_zoneminder_script_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/httpd_nutups_cgi_script_selinux.8 b/man/man8/httpd_nutups_cgi_script_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..6f120e5
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/httpd_nutups_cgi_script_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
++.TH "httpd_nutups_cgi_script_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "httpd_nutups_cgi_script" "SELinux Policy documentation for httpd_nutups_cgi_script"
++.SH "NAME"
++httpd_nutups_cgi_script_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the httpd_nutups_cgi_script processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+.EX
-+.TP 5
-+.B mysqld_port_t
-+.TP 10
-+.EE
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the httpd_nutups_cgi_script processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
++The httpd_nutups_cgi_script processes execute with the httpd_nutups_cgi_script_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+Default Defined Ports:
-+tcp 1186,3306,63132-63164
-+.EE
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+.TP 5
-+.B mysqlmanagerd_port_t
-+.TP 10
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep httpd_nutups_cgi_script_t
+
+
-+Default Defined Ports:
-+tcp 2273
-+.EE
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The httpd_nutups_cgi_script_t SELinux type can be entered via the "shell_exec_t,httpd_nutups_cgi_script_exec_t,httpd_nutups_cgi_script_exec_t" file types. The default entrypoint paths for the httpd_nutups_cgi_script_t domain are the following:"
++
++/bin/d?ash, /bin/zsh.*, /bin/ksh.*, /usr/bin/d?ash, /usr/bin/ksh.*, /usr/bin/zsh.*, /bin/esh, /bin/mksh, /bin/sash, /bin/tcsh, /bin/yash, /bin/bash, /bin/fish, /bin/bash2, /usr/bin/esh, /usr/bin/mksh, /usr/bin/sash, /usr/bin/bash, /usr/bin/fish, /usr/bin/tcsh, /usr/bin/yash, /sbin/nologin, /usr/sbin/sesh, /usr/bin/bash2, /usr/sbin/smrsh, /usr/bin/scponly, /usr/sbin/nologin, /usr/libexec/sesh, /usr/sbin/scponlyc, /usr/bin/git-shell, /usr/libexec/git-core/git-shell, /var/www/nut-cgi-bin/upsset\.cgi, /var/www/nut-cgi-bin/upsimage\.cgi, /var/www/nut-cgi-bin/upsstats\.cgi, /var/www/nut-cgi-bin/upsset\.cgi, /var/www/nut-cgi-bin/upsimage\.cgi, /var/www/nut-cgi-bin/upsstats\.cgi
+.SH PROCESS TYPES
+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux mysqld policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their mysqld processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for mysqld:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux httpd_nutups_cgi_script policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their httpd_nutups_cgi_script processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for httpd_nutups_cgi_script:
+
+.EX
-+.B mysqld_safe_t, mysqlmanagerd_t, mysqld_t
++.B httpd_nutups_cgi_script_t
+.EE
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux httpd_nutups_cgi_script policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their httpd_nutups_cgi_script processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for httpd_nutups_cgi_script:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B httpd_nutups_cgi_script_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the httpd_nutups_cgi_script_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the httpd_nutups_cgi_script_t domain.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type httpd_nutups_cgi_script_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B httpd_nutups_cgi_rw_content_t
++
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
+can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
@@ -31110,121 +34268,97 @@ index 0000000..8c48ea1
+.B semanage module
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
-+.B semanage port
-+can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
-+
-+.B semanage boolean
-+can also be used to manipulate the booleans
-+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), mysqld(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-+, setsebool(8)
++selinux(8), httpd_nutups_cgi_script(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, httpd_selinux(8), httpd_selinux(8), httpd_apcupsd_cgi_script_selinux(8), httpd_awstats_script_selinux(8), httpd_bugzilla_script_selinux(8), httpd_cobbler_script_selinux(8), httpd_collectd_script_selinux(8), httpd_cvs_script_selinux(8), httpd_dirsrvadmin_script_selinux(8), httpd_dspam_script_selinux(8), httpd_git_script_selinux(8), httpd_helper_selinux(8), httpd_man2html_script_selinux(8), httpd_mediawiki_script_selinux(8), httpd_mojomojo_script_selinux(8), httpd_munin_script_selinux(8), httpd_nagios_script_selinux(8), httpd_openshift_script_selinux(8), httpd_passwd_selinux(8), httpd_php_selinux(8), httpd_prewikka_script_selinux(8), httpd_rotatelogs_selinux(8), httpd_smokeping_cgi_script_selinux(8), httpd_squid_script_selinux(8), httpd_suexec_selinux(8), httpd_sys_script_selinux(8), httpd_user_script_selinux(8), httpd_w3c_validator_script_selinux(8), httpd_zoneminder_script_selinux(8)
\ No newline at end of file
-diff --git a/man/man8/mysqlmanagerd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/mysqlmanagerd_selinux.8
+diff --git a/man/man8/httpd_openshift_script_selinux.8 b/man/man8/httpd_openshift_script_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..20bc2e9
+index 0000000..e19d72d
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/mysqlmanagerd_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,115 @@
-+.TH "mysqlmanagerd_selinux" "8" "mysqlmanagerd" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "mysqlmanagerd SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/httpd_openshift_script_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
++.TH "httpd_openshift_script_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "httpd_openshift_script" "SELinux Policy documentation for httpd_openshift_script"
+.SH "NAME"
-+mysqlmanagerd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the mysqlmanagerd processes
++httpd_openshift_script_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the httpd_openshift_script processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the mysqlmanagerd processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the httpd_openshift_script processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The httpd_openshift_script processes execute with the httpd_openshift_script_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux mysqlmanagerd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their mysqlmanagerd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for mysqlmanagerd:
++For example:
+
++.B ps -eZ | grep httpd_openshift_script_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B mysqlmanagerd_exec_t
-+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the mysqlmanagerd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the mysqlmanagerd_t domain.
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
++The httpd_openshift_script_t SELinux type can be entered via the "httpd_openshift_script_exec_t,shell_exec_t,httpd_openshift_script_exec_t" file types. The default entrypoint paths for the httpd_openshift_script_t domain are the following:"
+
-+.EX
++/usr/bin/(oo|rhc)-restorer-wrapper.sh, /bin/d?ash, /bin/zsh.*, /bin/ksh.*, /usr/bin/d?ash, /usr/bin/ksh.*, /usr/bin/zsh.*, /bin/esh, /bin/mksh, /bin/sash, /bin/tcsh, /bin/yash, /bin/bash, /bin/fish, /bin/bash2, /usr/bin/esh, /usr/bin/mksh, /usr/bin/sash, /usr/bin/bash, /usr/bin/fish, /usr/bin/tcsh, /usr/bin/yash, /sbin/nologin, /usr/sbin/sesh, /usr/bin/bash2, /usr/sbin/smrsh, /usr/bin/scponly, /usr/sbin/nologin, /usr/libexec/sesh, /usr/sbin/scponlyc, /usr/bin/git-shell, /usr/libexec/git-core/git-shell, /usr/bin/(oo|rhc)-restorer-wrapper.sh
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+.B mysqlmanagerd_initrc_exec_t
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux httpd_openshift_script policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their httpd_openshift_script processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for httpd_openshift_script:
++
++.EX
++.B httpd_openshift_script_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
-+- Set files with the mysqlmanagerd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the mysqlmanagerd_initrc_t domain.
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux httpd_openshift_script policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their httpd_openshift_script processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for httpd_openshift_script:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B mysqlmanagerd_var_run_t
++.B httpd_openshift_script_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the mysqlmanagerd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the mysqlmanagerd files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the httpd_openshift_script_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the httpd_openshift_script_t domain.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PORT TYPES
-+SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
-+.PP
-+You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
-+
-+.B semanage port -l
-+
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
-+SELinux mysqlmanagerd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their mysqlmanagerd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following port types are defined for mysqlmanagerd:
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+.EX
-+.TP 5
-+.B mysqlmanagerd_port_t
-+.TP 10
-+.EE
++The SELinux process type httpd_openshift_script_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
++.br
++.B httpd_openshift_rw_content_t
+
-+Default Defined Ports:
-+tcp 2273
-+.EE
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux mysqlmanagerd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their mysqlmanagerd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for mysqlmanagerd:
+
-+.EX
-+.B mysqlmanagerd_t
-+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -31236,239 +34370,239 @@ index 0000000..20bc2e9
+.B semanage module
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
-+.B semanage port
-+can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
-+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), mysqlmanagerd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/nagios_selinux.8 b/man/man8/nagios_selinux.8
++selinux(8), httpd_openshift_script(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, httpd_selinux(8), httpd_selinux(8), httpd_apcupsd_cgi_script_selinux(8), httpd_awstats_script_selinux(8), httpd_bugzilla_script_selinux(8), httpd_cobbler_script_selinux(8), httpd_collectd_script_selinux(8), httpd_cvs_script_selinux(8), httpd_dirsrvadmin_script_selinux(8), httpd_dspam_script_selinux(8), httpd_git_script_selinux(8), httpd_helper_selinux(8), httpd_man2html_script_selinux(8), httpd_mediawiki_script_selinux(8), httpd_mojomojo_script_selinux(8), httpd_munin_script_selinux(8), httpd_nagios_script_selinux(8), httpd_nutups_cgi_script_selinux(8), httpd_passwd_selinux(8), httpd_php_selinux(8), httpd_prewikka_script_selinux(8), httpd_rotatelogs_selinux(8), httpd_smokeping_cgi_script_selinux(8), httpd_squid_script_selinux(8), httpd_suexec_selinux(8), httpd_sys_script_selinux(8), httpd_user_script_selinux(8), httpd_w3c_validator_script_selinux(8), httpd_zoneminder_script_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/httpd_passwd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/httpd_passwd_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..131c93d
+index 0000000..11ff56f
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/nagios_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,235 @@
-+.TH "nagios_selinux" "8" "nagios" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "nagios SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/httpd_passwd_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
++.TH "httpd_passwd_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "httpd_passwd" "SELinux Policy documentation for httpd_passwd"
+.SH "NAME"
-+nagios_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the nagios processes
++httpd_passwd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the httpd_passwd processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the nagios processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the httpd_passwd processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The httpd_passwd processes execute with the httpd_passwd_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the nagios_services_plugin_t, nagios_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep httpd_passwd_t
+
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The httpd_passwd_t SELinux type can be entered via the "httpd_passwd_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the httpd_passwd_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/libexec/httpd-ssl-pass-dialog
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the nagios_services_plugin_t, nagios_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux httpd_passwd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their httpd_passwd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for httpd_passwd:
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B httpd_passwd_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux nagios policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their nagios processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for nagios:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux httpd_passwd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their httpd_passwd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for httpd_passwd:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B nagios_admin_plugin_exec_t
++.B httpd_passwd_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the nagios_admin_plugin_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the nagios_admin_plugin_t domain.
++- Set files with the httpd_passwd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the httpd_passwd_t domain.
+
+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B nagios_checkdisk_plugin_exec_t
-+.EE
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
+
-+- Set files with the nagios_checkdisk_plugin_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the nagios_checkdisk_plugin_t domain.
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type httpd_passwd_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_linux_raid, /usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_disk_smb, /usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_ide_smart, /usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_disk
++.B systemd_passwd_var_run_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B nagios_etc_t
-+.EE
++ /var/run/systemd/ask-password(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/systemd/ask-password-block(/.*)?
++.br
+
-+- Set files with the nagios_etc_t type, if you want to store nagios files in the /etc directories.
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the httpd_passwd_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B nagios_eventhandler_plugin_exec_t
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the nagios_eventhandler_plugin_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the nagios_eventhandler_plugin_t domain.
-+
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the httpd_passwd_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B nagios_eventhandler_plugin_tmp_t
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the nagios_eventhandler_plugin_tmp_t type, if you want to store nagios eventhandler plugin temporary files in the /tmp directories.
-+
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B nagios_exec_t
-+.EE
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+- Set files with the nagios_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the nagios_t domain.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), httpd_passwd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, httpd_selinux(8), httpd_selinux(8), httpd_apcupsd_cgi_script_selinux(8), httpd_awstats_script_selinux(8), httpd_bugzilla_script_selinux(8), httpd_cobbler_script_selinux(8), httpd_collectd_script_selinux(8), httpd_cvs_script_selinux(8), httpd_dirsrvadmin_script_selinux(8), httpd_dspam_script_selinux(8), httpd_git_script_selinux(8), httpd_helper_selinux(8), httpd_man2html_script_selinux(8), httpd_mediawiki_script_selinux(8), httpd_mojomojo_script_selinux(8), httpd_munin_script_selinux(8), httpd_nagios_script_selinux(8), httpd_nutups_cgi_script_selinux(8), httpd_openshift_script_selinux(8), httpd_php_selinux(8), httpd_prewikka_script_selinux(8), httpd_rotatelogs_selinux(8), httpd_smokeping_cgi_script_selinux(8), httpd_squid_script_selinux(8), httpd_suexec_selinux(8), httpd_sys_script_selinux(8), httpd_user_script_selinux(8), httpd_w3c_validator_script_selinux(8), httpd_zoneminder_script_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/httpd_php_selinux.8 b/man/man8/httpd_php_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..6690ac0
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/httpd_php_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,117 @@
++.TH "httpd_php_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "httpd_php" "SELinux Policy documentation for httpd_php"
++.SH "NAME"
++httpd_php_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the httpd_php processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B nagios_initrc_exec_t
-+.EE
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the httpd_php processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+- Set files with the nagios_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the nagios_initrc_t domain.
++The httpd_php processes execute with the httpd_php_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/etc/rc\.d/init\.d/nagios, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/nrpe
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B nagios_log_t
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep httpd_php_t
+
-+- Set files with the nagios_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as nagios log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/log/netsaint(/.*)?, /var/log/nagios(/.*)?
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B nagios_mail_plugin_exec_t
-+.EE
++The httpd_php_t SELinux type can be entered via the "httpd_php_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the httpd_php_t domain are the following:"
+
-+- Set files with the nagios_mail_plugin_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the nagios_mail_plugin_t domain.
+
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux httpd_php policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their httpd_php processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for httpd_php:
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B nagios_services_plugin_exec_t
++.B httpd_php_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
-+- Set files with the nagios_services_plugin_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the nagios_services_plugin_t domain.
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux httpd_php policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their httpd_php processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for httpd_php:
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_time, /usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_dhcp, /usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_radius, /usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_nrpe, /usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_smtp, /usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_cluster, /usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_sip, /usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_ssh, /usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_pgsql, /usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_ntp.*, /usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_ldap, /usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_real, /usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_dummy, /usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_ping, /usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_nt, /usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_game, /usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_breeze, /usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_tcp, /usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_rpc, /usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_oracle, /usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_ups, /usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_ircd, /usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_dig, /usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_mysql_query, /usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_hpjd, /usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_mysql, /usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_icmp, /usr
/lib/nagios/plugins/check_http, /usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_snmp.*, /usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_fping, /usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_dns
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B nagios_spool_t
++.B httpd_php_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the nagios_spool_t type, if you want to store the nagios files under the /var/spool directory.
++- Set files with the httpd_php_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the httpd_php_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B nagios_system_plugin_exec_t
++.B httpd_php_tmp_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the nagios_system_plugin_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the nagios_system_plugin_t domain.
++- Set files with the httpd_php_tmp_t type, if you want to store httpd php temporary files in the /tmp directories.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_log, /usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_load, /usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_nwstat, /usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_flexlm, /usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_swap, /usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_users, /usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_ifstatus, /usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_ifoperstatus, /usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_nagios, /usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_wave, /usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_mrtgtraf, /usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_procs, /usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_sensors, /usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_mrtg, /usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_overcr
+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B nagios_system_plugin_tmp_t
-+.EE
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
+
-+- Set files with the nagios_system_plugin_tmp_t type, if you want to store nagios system plugin temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
++The SELinux process type httpd_php_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B nagios_tmp_t
-+.EE
++.br
++.B httpd_php_tmp_t
+
-+- Set files with the nagios_tmp_t type, if you want to store nagios temporary files in the /tmp directories.
+
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B nagios_unconfined_plugin_exec_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the nagios_unconfined_plugin_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the nagios_unconfined_plugin_t domain.
-+
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the httpd_php_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B nagios_var_lib_t
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the nagios_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the nagios files under the /var/lib directory.
-+
-+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B nagios_var_run_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the nagios_var_run_t type, if you want to store the nagios files under the /run directory.
-+
-+
-+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
-+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux nagios policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their nagios processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for nagios:
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the httpd_php_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B nagios_t, nagios_mail_plugin_t, nagios_checkdisk_plugin_t, nagios_services_plugin_t, nagios_eventhandler_plugin_t, nagios_system_plugin_t, nagios_unconfined_plugin_t, nagios_admin_plugin_t
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -31481,235 +34615,110 @@ index 0000000..131c93d
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), nagios(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/named_selinux.8 b/man/man8/named_selinux.8
-index fce0b48..8828c8c 100644
---- a/man/man8/named_selinux.8
-+++ b/man/man8/named_selinux.8
-@@ -1,30 +1,221 @@
--.TH "named_selinux" "8" "17 Jan 2005" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "named Selinux Policy documentation"
--.de EX
--.nf
--.ft CW
--..
--.de EE
--.ft R
--.fi
--..
-+.TH "named_selinux" "8" "named" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "named SELinux Policy documentation"
- .SH "NAME"
--named_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the Internet Name server (named) daemon
-+named_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the named processes
- .SH "DESCRIPTION"
-
--Security-Enhanced Linux secures the named server via flexible mandatory access
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the named processes via flexible mandatory access
- control.
-+
- .SH BOOLEANS
--SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. So by
--default SELinux policy does not allow named to write master zone files. If you want to have named update the master zone files you need to set the named_write_master_zones boolean.
-+SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. named policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run named with the tightest access possible.
-+
-+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow BIND to write the master zone files. Generally this is used for dynamic DNS or zone transfers, you must turn on the named_write_master_zones boolean.
++selinux(8), httpd_php(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, httpd_selinux(8), httpd_selinux(8), httpd_apcupsd_cgi_script_selinux(8), httpd_awstats_script_selinux(8), httpd_bugzilla_script_selinux(8), httpd_cobbler_script_selinux(8), httpd_collectd_script_selinux(8), httpd_cvs_script_selinux(8), httpd_dirsrvadmin_script_selinux(8), httpd_dspam_script_selinux(8), httpd_git_script_selinux(8), httpd_helper_selinux(8), httpd_man2html_script_selinux(8), httpd_mediawiki_script_selinux(8), httpd_mojomojo_script_selinux(8), httpd_munin_script_selinux(8), httpd_nagios_script_selinux(8), httpd_nutups_cgi_script_selinux(8), httpd_openshift_script_selinux(8), httpd_passwd_selinux(8), httpd_prewikka_script_selinux(8), httpd_rotatelogs_selinux(8), httpd_smokeping_cgi_script_selinux(8), httpd_squid_script_selinux(8), httpd_suexec_selinux(8), httpd_sys_script_selinux(8), httpd_user_script_selinux(8), httpd_w3c_validator_script_selinux(8), httpd_zoneminder_script_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/httpd_prewikka_script_selinux.8 b/man/man8/httpd_prewikka_script_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..8b729f1
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/httpd_prewikka_script_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
++.TH "httpd_prewikka_script_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "httpd_prewikka_script" "SELinux Policy documentation for httpd_prewikka_script"
++.SH "NAME"
++httpd_prewikka_script_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the httpd_prewikka_script processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
- .EX
--setsebool -P named_write_master_zones 1
-+.B setsebool -P named_write_master_zones 1
- .EE
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the httpd_prewikka_script processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
- .PP
--system-config-selinux is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
--.SH AUTHOR
--This manual page was written by Dan Walsh <dwalsh at redhat.com>.
-+If you want to allow BIND to bind apache port, you must turn on the named_bind_http_port boolean.
-
--.SH "SEE ALSO"
--selinux(8), named(8), chcon(1), setsebool(8)
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P named_bind_http_port 1
-+.EE
++The httpd_prewikka_script processes execute with the httpd_prewikka_script_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++For example:
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the namespace_init_t, named_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++.B ps -eZ | grep httpd_prewikka_script_t
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the namespace_init_t, named_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
-+.EE
++The httpd_prewikka_script_t SELinux type can be entered via the "shell_exec_t,httpd_prewikka_script_exec_t,httpd_prewikka_script_exec_t" file types. The default entrypoint paths for the httpd_prewikka_script_t domain are the following:"
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++/bin/d?ash, /bin/zsh.*, /bin/ksh.*, /usr/bin/d?ash, /usr/bin/ksh.*, /usr/bin/zsh.*, /bin/esh, /bin/mksh, /bin/sash, /bin/tcsh, /bin/yash, /bin/bash, /bin/fish, /bin/bash2, /usr/bin/esh, /usr/bin/mksh, /usr/bin/sash, /usr/bin/bash, /usr/bin/fish, /usr/bin/tcsh, /usr/bin/yash, /sbin/nologin, /usr/sbin/sesh, /usr/bin/bash2, /usr/sbin/smrsh, /usr/bin/scponly, /usr/sbin/nologin, /usr/libexec/sesh, /usr/sbin/scponlyc, /usr/bin/git-shell, /usr/libexec/git-core/git-shell, /usr/share/prewikka/cgi-bin(/.*)?, /usr/share/prewikka/cgi-bin(/.*)?
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux named policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their named processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for named:
-+
-+
-+.EX
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux httpd_prewikka_script policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their httpd_prewikka_script processes in as secure a method as possible.
+.PP
-+.B named_cache_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the named_cache_t type, if you want to store the files under the /var/cache directory.
-+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/named/chroot/var/named/data(/.*)?, /var/named/chroot/var/tmp(/.*)?, /var/named/data(/.*)?, /var/named/chroot/var/named/slaves(/.*)?, /var/named/dynamic(/.*)?, /var/named/slaves(/.*)?, /var/named/chroot/var/named/dynamic(/.*)?
++The following process types are defined for httpd_prewikka_script:
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B named_checkconf_exec_t
++.B httpd_prewikka_script_t
+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the named_checkconf_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the named_checkconf_t domain.
-+
-+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B named_conf_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the named_conf_t type, if you want to treat the files as named configuration data, usually stored under the /etc directory.
-+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/named/chroot/etc/named\.root\.hints, /var/named/chroot(/.*)?, /var/named/named\.ca, /etc/unbound(/.*)?, /var/named/chroot/etc/named\.caching-nameserver\.conf, /etc/named\.rfc1912.zones, /etc/named\.caching-nameserver\.conf, /etc/named\.conf, /var/named/chroot/var/named/named\.ca, /var/named/chroot/etc/named\.conf, /etc/rndc.*, /var/named/chroot/etc/named\.rfc1912.zones, /etc/named\.root\.hints
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
-+.EX
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
-+.B named_exec_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the named_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the named_t domain.
-+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/sbin/lwresd, /usr/sbin/named, /usr/sbin/unbound
-+
-+.EX
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+.B named_initrc_exec_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the named_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the named_initrc_t domain.
-
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/etc/rc\.d/init\.d/named, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/unbound
-
-+.EX
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux httpd_prewikka_script policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their httpd_prewikka_script processes in as secure a method as possible.
+.PP
-+.B named_keytab_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the named_keytab_t type, if you want to treat the files as kerberos keytab files.
++The following file types are defined for httpd_prewikka_script:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B named_log_t
++.B httpd_prewikka_script_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the named_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as named log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++- Set files with the httpd_prewikka_script_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the httpd_prewikka_script_t domain.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/log/named.*, /var/named/chroot/var/log/named.*
+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B named_tmp_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the named_tmp_t type, if you want to store named temporary files in the /tmp directories.
-+
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B named_unit_file_t
-+.EE
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+- Set files with the named_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as named unit content.
++The SELinux process type httpd_prewikka_script_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/lib/systemd/system/unbound.*, /usr/lib/systemd/system/named.*
++.B httpd_prewikka_rw_content_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B named_var_run_t
-+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the named_var_run_t type, if you want to store the named files under the /run directory.
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/named/chroot/var/run/named.*, /var/run/ndc, /var/run/bind(/.*)?, /var/run/named(/.*)?, /var/run/unbound(/.*)?
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the httpd_prewikka_script_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B named_zone_t
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the named_zone_t type, if you want to treat the files as named zone data.
-+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/named/chroot/var/named(/.*)?, /var/named(/.*)?
-+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
-+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux named policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their named processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for named:
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the httpd_prewikka_script_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B named_t, namespace_init_t
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -31721,93 +34730,123 @@ index fce0b48..8828c8c 100644
+.B semanage module
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
-+.B semanage boolean
-+can also be used to manipulate the booleans
-+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), named(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-+, setsebool(8)
++selinux(8), httpd_prewikka_script(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, httpd_selinux(8), httpd_selinux(8), httpd_apcupsd_cgi_script_selinux(8), httpd_awstats_script_selinux(8), httpd_bugzilla_script_selinux(8), httpd_cobbler_script_selinux(8), httpd_collectd_script_selinux(8), httpd_cvs_script_selinux(8), httpd_dirsrvadmin_script_selinux(8), httpd_dspam_script_selinux(8), httpd_git_script_selinux(8), httpd_helper_selinux(8), httpd_man2html_script_selinux(8), httpd_mediawiki_script_selinux(8), httpd_mojomojo_script_selinux(8), httpd_munin_script_selinux(8), httpd_nagios_script_selinux(8), httpd_nutups_cgi_script_selinux(8), httpd_openshift_script_selinux(8), httpd_passwd_selinux(8), httpd_php_selinux(8), httpd_rotatelogs_selinux(8), httpd_smokeping_cgi_script_selinux(8), httpd_squid_script_selinux(8), httpd_suexec_selinux(8), httpd_sys_script_selinux(8), httpd_user_script_selinux(8), httpd_w3c_validator_script_selinux(8), httpd_zoneminder_script_selinux(8)
\ No newline at end of file
-diff --git a/man/man8/namespace_selinux.8 b/man/man8/namespace_selinux.8
+diff --git a/man/man8/httpd_rotatelogs_selinux.8 b/man/man8/httpd_rotatelogs_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..3d5eb82
+index 0000000..bbe80c8
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/namespace_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
-+.TH "namespace_selinux" "8" "namespace" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "namespace SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/httpd_rotatelogs_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,121 @@
++.TH "httpd_rotatelogs_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "httpd_rotatelogs" "SELinux Policy documentation for httpd_rotatelogs"
+.SH "NAME"
-+namespace_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the namespace processes
++httpd_rotatelogs_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the httpd_rotatelogs processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the namespace processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the httpd_rotatelogs processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The httpd_rotatelogs processes execute with the httpd_rotatelogs_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the namespace_init_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep httpd_rotatelogs_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
++The httpd_rotatelogs_t SELinux type can be entered via the "httpd_rotatelogs_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the httpd_rotatelogs_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/sbin/rotatelogs
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the namespace_init_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux httpd_rotatelogs policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their httpd_rotatelogs processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for httpd_rotatelogs:
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B httpd_rotatelogs_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux namespace policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their namespace processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for namespace:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux httpd_rotatelogs policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their httpd_rotatelogs processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for httpd_rotatelogs:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B namespace_init_exec_t
++.B httpd_rotatelogs_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the namespace_init_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the namespace_init_t domain.
++- Set files with the httpd_rotatelogs_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the httpd_rotatelogs_t domain.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux namespace policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their namespace processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for namespace:
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+.EX
-+.B namespace_init_t
-+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++The SELinux process type httpd_rotatelogs_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B httpd_log_t
++
++ /var/www(/.*)?/logs(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/log/cacti(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/log/httpd(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/log/apache(2)?(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/log/cherokee(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/log/lighttpd(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/log/suphp\.log.*
++.br
++ /var/log/apache-ssl(2)?(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/log/cgiwrap\.log.*
++.br
++ /var/www/stickshift/[^/]*/log(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/log/roundcubemail(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/log/dirsrv/admin-serv(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/httpd/logs
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -31820,2731 +34859,2221 @@ index 0000000..3d5eb82
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), namespace(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/ncftool_selinux.8 b/man/man8/ncftool_selinux.8
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..b4ceef0
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/ncftool_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
-+.TH "ncftool_selinux" "8" "ncftool" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "ncftool SELinux Policy documentation"
-+.SH "NAME"
-+ncftool_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the ncftool processes
-+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
-+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the ncftool processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
-+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++selinux(8), httpd_rotatelogs(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, httpd_selinux(8), httpd_selinux(8), httpd_apcupsd_cgi_script_selinux(8), httpd_awstats_script_selinux(8), httpd_bugzilla_script_selinux(8), httpd_cobbler_script_selinux(8), httpd_collectd_script_selinux(8), httpd_cvs_script_selinux(8), httpd_dirsrvadmin_script_selinux(8), httpd_dspam_script_selinux(8), httpd_git_script_selinux(8), httpd_helper_selinux(8), httpd_man2html_script_selinux(8), httpd_mediawiki_script_selinux(8), httpd_mojomojo_script_selinux(8), httpd_munin_script_selinux(8), httpd_nagios_script_selinux(8), httpd_nutups_cgi_script_selinux(8), httpd_openshift_script_selinux(8), httpd_passwd_selinux(8), httpd_php_selinux(8), httpd_prewikka_script_selinux(8), httpd_smokeping_cgi_script_selinux(8), httpd_squid_script_selinux(8), httpd_suexec_selinux(8), httpd_sys_script_selinux(8), httpd_user_script_selinux(8), httpd_w3c_validator_script_selinux(8), httpd_zoneminder_script_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/httpd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/httpd_selinux.8
+index 16e8b13..d05f08b 100644
+--- a/man/man8/httpd_selinux.8
++++ b/man/man8/httpd_selinux.8
+@@ -1,120 +1,2164 @@
+-.TH "httpd_selinux" "8" "17 Jan 2005" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "httpd Selinux Policy documentation"
+-.de EX
+-.nf
+-.ft CW
+-..
+-.de EE
+-.ft R
+-.fi
+-..
++.TH "httpd_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "httpd" "SELinux Policy documentation for httpd"
+ .SH "NAME"
+-httpd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the httpd daemon
++httpd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the httpd processes
+ .SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
+-Security-Enhanced Linux secures the httpd server via flexible mandatory access
+-control.
+-.SH FILE_CONTEXTS
+-SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+-Policy governs the access daemons have to these files.
+-SELinux httpd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their web services in as secure a method as possible.
+-.PP
+-The following file contexts types are defined for httpd:
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the httpd processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux ncftool policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ncftool processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for ncftool:
++The httpd processes execute with the httpd_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B ncftool_exec_t
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep httpd_t
+
-+- Set files with the ncftool_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ncftool_t domain.
+
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
-+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
++The httpd_t SELinux type can be entered via the "httpd_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the httpd_t domain are the following:"
+
++/usr/sbin/httpd(\.worker)?, /usr/sbin/apache(2)?, /usr/lib/apache-ssl/.+, /usr/sbin/apache-ssl(2)?, /usr/share/jetty/bin/jetty.sh, /usr/sbin/cherokee, /usr/sbin/lighttpd, /usr/sbin/httpd\.event, /usr/bin/mongrel_rails
+.SH PROCESS TYPES
+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux ncftool policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ncftool processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for ncftool:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux httpd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their httpd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for httpd:
+
+.EX
-+.B ncftool_t
++.B httpd_collectd_script_t, httpd_cvs_script_t, httpd_rotatelogs_t, httpd_bugzilla_script_t, httpd_smokeping_cgi_script_t, httpd_nagios_script_t, httpd_dirsrvadmin_script_t, httpd_suexec_t, httpd_mojomojo_script_t, httpd_php_t, httpd_w3c_validator_script_t, httpd_user_script_t, httpd_awstats_script_t, httpd_apcupsd_cgi_script_t, httpd_nutups_cgi_script_t, httpd_munin_script_t, httpd_zoneminder_script_t, httpd_openshift_script_t, httpd_sys_script_t, httpd_dspam_script_t, httpd_prewikka_script_t, httpd_git_script_t, httpd_t, httpd_man2html_script_t, httpd_passwd_t, httpd_helper_t, httpd_squid_script_t, httpd_cobbler_script_t, httpd_mediawiki_script_t
+.EE
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
-+.SH "COMMANDS"
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
-+.PP
-+.B semanage permissive
-+can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
-+.PP
-+.B semanage module
-+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
-+
-+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
-+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
-+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
-+
-+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), ncftool(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/ndc_selinux.8 b/man/man8/ndc_selinux.8
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..1e7e844
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/ndc_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
-+.TH "ndc_selinux" "8" "ndc" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "ndc SELinux Policy documentation"
-+.SH "NAME"
-+ndc_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the ndc processes
-+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
-+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the ndc processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++.SH BOOLEANS
++SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. httpd policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run httpd with the tightest access possible.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the ndc_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++If you want to allow httpd processes to manage IPA content, you must turn on the httpd_manage_ipa boolean.
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.B setsebool -P httpd_manage_ipa 1
+.EE
+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the ndc_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++If you want to allow Apache to run in stickshift mode, not transition to passenger, you must turn on the httpd_run_stickshift boolean.
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B setsebool -P httpd_run_stickshift 1
+.EE
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux ndc policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ndc processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for ndc:
-+
++If you want to allow httpd to access FUSE file systems, you must turn on the httpd_use_fusefs boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B ndc_exec_t
++.B setsebool -P httpd_use_fusefs 1
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the ndc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ndc_t domain.
-+
-+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
++If you want to allow httpd to access openstack ports, you must turn on the httpd_use_openstack boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P httpd_use_openstack 1
++.EE
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux ndc policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ndc processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for ndc:
++If you want to allow httpd to connect to the ldap port, you must turn on the httpd_can_connect_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B ndc_t
++.B setsebool -P httpd_can_connect_ldap 1
+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
-+.SH "COMMANDS"
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
-+.PP
-+.B semanage permissive
-+can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
+.PP
-+.B semanage module
-+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++If you want to allow httpd daemon to change its resource limits, you must turn on the httpd_setrlimit boolean.
+
-+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
-+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P httpd_setrlimit 1
++.EE
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.PP
++If you want to allow httpd to communicate with oddjob to start up a service, you must turn on the httpd_use_oddjob boolean.
+
-+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), ndc(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/netlabel_selinux.8 b/man/man8/netlabel_selinux.8
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..5c0e840
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/netlabel_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
-+.TH "netlabel_selinux" "8" "netlabel" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "netlabel SELinux Policy documentation"
-+.SH "NAME"
-+netlabel_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the netlabel processes
-+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P httpd_use_oddjob 1
++.EE
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the netlabel processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++.PP
++If you want to allow httpd to act as a FTP server by listening on the ftp port, you must turn on the httpd_enable_ftp_server boolean.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P httpd_enable_ftp_server 1
++.EE
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux netlabel policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their netlabel processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for netlabel:
-+
++If you want to allow httpd to access nfs file systems, you must turn on the httpd_use_nfs boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B netlabel_mgmt_exec_t
++.B setsebool -P httpd_use_nfs 1
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the netlabel_mgmt_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the netlabel_mgmt_t domain.
++.PP
++If you want to allow httpd to act as a relay, you must turn on the httpd_can_network_relay boolean.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/sbin/netlabelctl, /usr/sbin/netlabelctl
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P httpd_can_network_relay 1
++.EE
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
++If you want to allow http daemon to check spam, you must turn on the httpd_can_check_spam boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P httpd_can_check_spam 1
++.EE
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux netlabel policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their netlabel processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for netlabel:
++If you want to unify HTTPD to communicate with the terminal. Needed for entering the passphrase for certificates at the terminal, you must turn on the httpd_tty_comm boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B netlabel_mgmt_t
++.B setsebool -P httpd_tty_comm 1
+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
-+.SH "COMMANDS"
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
-+.PP
-+.B semanage permissive
-+can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
+.PP
-+.B semanage module
-+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++If you want to unify HTTPD handling of all content files, you must turn on the httpd_unified boolean.
+
-+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
-+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P httpd_unified 1
++.EE
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.PP
++If you want to allow httpd to connect to memcache server, you must turn on the httpd_can_network_memcache boolean.
+
-+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), netlabel(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/netlogond_selinux.8 b/man/man8/netlogond_selinux.8
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..e698666
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/netlogond_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
-+.TH "netlogond_selinux" "8" "netlogond" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "netlogond SELinux Policy documentation"
-+.SH "NAME"
-+netlogond_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the netlogond processes
-+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P httpd_can_network_memcache 1
++.EE
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the netlogond processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++.PP
++If you want to allow HTTPD to connect to port 80 for graceful shutdown, you must turn on the httpd_graceful_shutdown boolean.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P httpd_graceful_shutdown 1
++.EE
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux netlogond policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their netlogond processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for netlogond:
-+
++If you want to allow httpd to run gpg, you must turn on the httpd_use_gpg boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B netlogond_exec_t
++.B setsebool -P httpd_use_gpg 1
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the netlogond_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the netlogond_t domain.
-+
++.PP
++If you want to allow httpd to use built in scripting (usually php), you must turn on the httpd_builtin_scripting boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B netlogond_var_lib_t
++.B setsebool -P httpd_builtin_scripting 1
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the netlogond_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the netlogond files under the /var/lib directory.
-+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/lib/likewise-open/krb5-affinity.conf, /var/lib/likewise-open/LWNetsd\.err
++.PP
++If you want to allow http daemon to send mail, you must turn on the httpd_can_sendmail boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B netlogond_var_run_t
++.B setsebool -P httpd_can_sendmail 1
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the netlogond_var_run_t type, if you want to store the netlogond files under the /run directory.
-+
++.PP
++If you want to allow httpd cgi support, you must turn on the httpd_enable_cgi boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B netlogond_var_socket_t
++.B setsebool -P httpd_enable_cgi 1
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the netlogond_var_socket_t type, if you want to treat the files as netlogond var socket data.
++.PP
++If you want to allow Apache to use mod_auth_pam, you must turn on the httpd_mod_auth_pam boolean.
+
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P httpd_mod_auth_pam 1
++.EE
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
++If you want to allow httpd to read user content, you must turn on the httpd_read_user_content boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P httpd_read_user_content 1
++.EE
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux netlogond policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their netlogond processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for netlogond:
++If you want to allow Apache to query NS records, you must turn on the httpd_verify_dns boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B netlogond_t
++.B setsebool -P httpd_verify_dns 1
+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
-+.SH "COMMANDS"
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
-+.PP
-+.B semanage permissive
-+can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
+.PP
-+.B semanage module
-+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++If you want to allow BIND to bind apache port, you must turn on the named_bind_http_port boolean.
+
-+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
-+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P named_bind_http_port 1
++.EE
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.PP
++If you want to allow httpd to act as a FTP client connecting to the ftp port and ephemeral ports, you must turn on the httpd_can_connect_ftp boolean.
+
-+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), netlogond(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/netutils_selinux.8 b/man/man8/netutils_selinux.8
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..159b943
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/netutils_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
-+.TH "netutils_selinux" "8" "netutils" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "netutils SELinux Policy documentation"
-+.SH "NAME"
-+netutils_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the netutils processes
-+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P httpd_can_connect_ftp 1
++.EE
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the netutils processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++.PP
++If you want to allow HTTPD scripts and modules to connect to cobbler over the network, you must turn on the httpd_can_network_connect_cobbler boolean.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P httpd_can_network_connect_cobbler 1
++.EE
+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the netutils_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++If you want to allow Apache to use mod_auth_ntlm_winbind, you must turn on the httpd_mod_auth_ntlm_winbind boolean.
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.B setsebool -P httpd_mod_auth_ntlm_winbind 1
+.EE
+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the netutils_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++If you want to allow Apache to communicate with avahi service via dbus, you must turn on the httpd_dbus_avahi boolean.
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B setsebool -P httpd_dbus_avahi 1
+.EE
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux netutils policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their netutils processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for netutils:
-+
++If you want to allow httpd to read home directories, you must turn on the httpd_enable_homedirs boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B netutils_exec_t
++.B setsebool -P httpd_enable_homedirs 1
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the netutils_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the netutils_t domain.
-+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/sbin/arping, /usr/sbin/arping, /usr/sbin/tcpdump
++.PP
++If you want to allow HTTPD to run SSI executables in the same domain as system CGI scripts, you must turn on the httpd_ssi_exec boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B netutils_tmp_t
++.B setsebool -P httpd_ssi_exec 1
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the netutils_tmp_t type, if you want to store netutils temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++.PP
++If you want to allow Apache to execute tmp content, you must turn on the httpd_tmp_exec boolean.
+
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P httpd_tmp_exec 1
++.EE
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
++If you want to allow httpd to access cifs file systems, you must turn on the httpd_use_cifs boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P httpd_use_cifs 1
++.EE
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux netutils policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their netutils processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for netutils:
++If you want to allow httpd scripts and modules execmem/execstack, you must turn on the httpd_execmem boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B netutils_t
++.B setsebool -P httpd_execmem 1
+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
-+.SH "COMMANDS"
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
-+.PP
-+.B semanage permissive
-+can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
+.PP
-+.B semanage module
-+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++If you want to allow http daemon to connect to zabbix, you must turn on the httpd_can_connect_zabbix boolean.
+
-+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
-+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P httpd_can_connect_zabbix 1
++.EE
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.PP
++If you want to allow HTTPD scripts and modules to connect to the network using TCP, you must turn on the httpd_can_network_connect boolean.
+
-+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), netutils(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/newrole_selinux.8 b/man/man8/newrole_selinux.8
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..e87c6b4
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/newrole_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
-+.TH "newrole_selinux" "8" "newrole" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "newrole SELinux Policy documentation"
-+.SH "NAME"
-+newrole_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the newrole processes
-+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P httpd_can_network_connect 1
++.EE
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the newrole processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++.PP
++If you want to allow HTTPD scripts and modules to connect to databases over the network, you must turn on the httpd_can_network_connect_db boolean.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P httpd_can_network_connect_db 1
++.EE
+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the newrole_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++If you want to allow httpd processes to manage IPA content, you must turn on the httpd_manage_ipa boolean.
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.B setsebool -P httpd_manage_ipa 1
+.EE
+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the newrole_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++If you want to allow Apache to run in stickshift mode, not transition to passenger, you must turn on the httpd_run_stickshift boolean.
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B setsebool -P httpd_run_stickshift 1
+.EE
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux newrole policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their newrole processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for newrole:
++If you want to allow httpd to access FUSE file systems, you must turn on the httpd_use_fusefs boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P httpd_use_fusefs 1
++.EE
+
++.PP
++If you want to allow httpd to access openstack ports, you must turn on the httpd_use_openstack boolean.
+
+.EX
++.B setsebool -P httpd_use_openstack 1
++.EE
++
+.PP
-+.B newrole_exec_t
++If you want to allow httpd to connect to the ldap port, you must turn on the httpd_can_connect_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P httpd_can_connect_ldap 1
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the newrole_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the newrole_t domain.
++.PP
++If you want to allow httpd daemon to change its resource limits, you must turn on the httpd_setrlimit boolean.
+
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P httpd_setrlimit 1
++.EE
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
++If you want to allow httpd to communicate with oddjob to start up a service, you must turn on the httpd_use_oddjob boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P httpd_use_oddjob 1
++.EE
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++If you want to allow httpd to act as a FTP server by listening on the ftp port, you must turn on the httpd_enable_ftp_server boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P httpd_enable_ftp_server 1
++.EE
++
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux newrole policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their newrole processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for newrole:
++If you want to allow httpd to access nfs file systems, you must turn on the httpd_use_nfs boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B newrole_t
++.B setsebool -P httpd_use_nfs 1
+.EE
++
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++If you want to allow httpd to act as a relay, you must turn on the httpd_can_network_relay boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P httpd_can_network_relay 1
++.EE
+
-+.SH "COMMANDS"
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
+.PP
-+.B semanage permissive
-+can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++If you want to allow http daemon to check spam, you must turn on the httpd_can_check_spam boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P httpd_can_check_spam 1
++.EE
++
+.PP
-+.B semanage module
-+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++If you want to unify HTTPD to communicate with the terminal. Needed for entering the passphrase for certificates at the terminal, you must turn on the httpd_tty_comm boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P httpd_tty_comm 1
++.EE
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
-+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++If you want to unify HTTPD handling of all content files, you must turn on the httpd_unified boolean.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P httpd_unified 1
++.EE
+
-+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), newrole(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/nfsd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/nfsd_selinux.8
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..2256e23
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/nfsd_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,304 @@
-+.TH "nfsd_selinux" "8" "nfsd" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "nfsd SELinux Policy documentation"
-+.SH "NAME"
-+nfsd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the nfsd processes
-+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++.PP
++If you want to allow httpd to connect to memcache server, you must turn on the httpd_can_network_memcache boolean.
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the nfsd processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P httpd_can_network_memcache 1
++.EE
+
-+.SH BOOLEANS
-+SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. nfsd policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run nfsd with the tightest access possible.
++.PP
++If you want to allow HTTPD to connect to port 80 for graceful shutdown, you must turn on the httpd_graceful_shutdown boolean.
+
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P httpd_graceful_shutdown 1
++.EE
+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow xen to manage nfs files, you must turn on the xen_use_nfs boolean.
++If you want to allow httpd to run gpg, you must turn on the httpd_use_gpg boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P xen_use_nfs 1
++.B setsebool -P httpd_use_gpg 1
+.EE
+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined virtual guests to manage nfs files, you must turn on the virt_use_nfs boolean.
++If you want to allow httpd to use built in scripting (usually php), you must turn on the httpd_builtin_scripting boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P virt_use_nfs 1
++.B setsebool -P httpd_builtin_scripting 1
+.EE
+
+.PP
-+If you want to determine whether Git system daemon can access nfs file systems, you must turn on the git_system_use_nfs boolean.
++If you want to allow http daemon to send mail, you must turn on the httpd_can_sendmail boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P git_system_use_nfs 1
++.B setsebool -P httpd_can_sendmail 1
+.EE
+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow qemu to use nfs file systems, you must turn on the qemu_use_nfs boolean.
++If you want to allow httpd cgi support, you must turn on the httpd_enable_cgi boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P qemu_use_nfs 1
++.B setsebool -P httpd_enable_cgi 1
+.EE
+
+.PP
-+If you want to determine whether Git CGI can access nfs file systems, you must turn on the git_cgi_use_nfs boolean.
++If you want to allow Apache to use mod_auth_pam, you must turn on the httpd_mod_auth_pam boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P git_cgi_use_nfs 1
++.B setsebool -P httpd_mod_auth_pam 1
+.EE
+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow rsync servers to share nfs files systems, you must turn on the rsync_use_nfs boolean.
++If you want to allow httpd to read user content, you must turn on the httpd_read_user_content boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P rsync_use_nfs 1
++.B setsebool -P httpd_read_user_content 1
+.EE
+
+.PP
-+If you want to support NFS home directories, you must turn on the use_nfs_home_dirs boolean.
++If you want to allow Apache to query NS records, you must turn on the httpd_verify_dns boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P use_nfs_home_dirs 1
++.B setsebool -P httpd_verify_dns 1
+.EE
+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow Cobbler to access nfs file systems, you must turn on the cobbler_use_nfs boolean.
++If you want to allow BIND to bind apache port, you must turn on the named_bind_http_port boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P cobbler_use_nfs 1
++.B setsebool -P named_bind_http_port 1
+.EE
+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow httpd to access nfs file systems, you must turn on the httpd_use_nfs boolean.
++If you want to allow httpd to act as a FTP client connecting to the ftp port and ephemeral ports, you must turn on the httpd_can_connect_ftp boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P httpd_use_nfs 1
++.B setsebool -P httpd_can_connect_ftp 1
+.EE
+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow sge to access nfs file systems, you must turn on the sge_use_nfs boolean.
++If you want to allow HTTPD scripts and modules to connect to cobbler over the network, you must turn on the httpd_can_network_connect_cobbler boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P sge_use_nfs 1
++.B setsebool -P httpd_can_network_connect_cobbler 1
+.EE
+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow any files/directories to be exported read/write via NFS, you must turn on the nfs_export_all_rw boolean.
++If you want to allow Apache to use mod_auth_ntlm_winbind, you must turn on the httpd_mod_auth_ntlm_winbind boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P nfs_export_all_rw 1
++.B setsebool -P httpd_mod_auth_ntlm_winbind 1
+.EE
+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow sanlock to manage nfs files, you must turn on the sanlock_use_nfs boolean.
++If you want to allow Apache to communicate with avahi service via dbus, you must turn on the httpd_dbus_avahi boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P sanlock_use_nfs 1
++.B setsebool -P httpd_dbus_avahi 1
+.EE
+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow samba to export NFS volumes, you must turn on the samba_share_nfs boolean.
++If you want to allow httpd to read home directories, you must turn on the httpd_enable_homedirs boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P samba_share_nfs 1
++.B setsebool -P httpd_enable_homedirs 1
+.EE
+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow ftp servers to use nfs used for public file transfer services, you must turn on the ftpd_use_nfs boolean.
++If you want to allow HTTPD to run SSI executables in the same domain as system CGI scripts, you must turn on the httpd_ssi_exec boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P ftpd_use_nfs 1
++.B setsebool -P httpd_ssi_exec 1
+.EE
+
+.PP
-+If you want to determine whether Polipo can access nfs file systems, you must turn on the polipo_use_nfs boolean.
++If you want to allow Apache to execute tmp content, you must turn on the httpd_tmp_exec boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P polipo_use_nfs 1
++.B setsebool -P httpd_tmp_exec 1
+.EE
+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow the portage domains to use NFS mounts (regular nfs_t), you must turn on the portage_use_nfs boolean.
++If you want to allow httpd to access cifs file systems, you must turn on the httpd_use_cifs boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P portage_use_nfs 1
++.B setsebool -P httpd_use_cifs 1
+.EE
+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow any files/directories to be exported read/only via NFS, you must turn on the nfs_export_all_ro boolean.
++If you want to allow httpd scripts and modules execmem/execstack, you must turn on the httpd_execmem boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P nfs_export_all_ro 1
++.B setsebool -P httpd_execmem 1
+.EE
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++.PP
++If you want to allow http daemon to connect to zabbix, you must turn on the httpd_can_connect_zabbix boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P httpd_can_connect_zabbix 1
++.EE
+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the nfsd_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++If you want to allow HTTPD scripts and modules to connect to the network using TCP, you must turn on the httpd_can_network_connect boolean.
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.B setsebool -P httpd_can_network_connect 1
+.EE
+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the nfsd_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++If you want to allow HTTPD scripts and modules to connect to databases over the network, you must turn on the httpd_can_network_connect_db boolean.
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B setsebool -P httpd_can_network_connect_db 1
+.EE
+
+.SH SHARING FILES
+If you want to share files with multiple domains (Apache, FTP, rsync, Samba), you can set a file context of public_content_t and public_content_rw_t. These context allow any of the above domains to read the content. If you want a particular domain to write to the public_content_rw_t domain, you must set the appropriate boolean.
+.TP
-+Allow nfsd servers to read the /var/nfsd directory by adding the public_content_t file type to the directory and by restoring the file type.
++Allow httpd servers to read the /var/httpd directory by adding the public_content_t file type to the directory and by restoring the file type.
+.PP
+.B
-+semanage fcontext -a -t public_content_t "/var/nfsd(/.*)?"
++semanage fcontext -a -t public_content_t "/var/httpd(/.*)?"
+.br
-+.B restorecon -F -R -v /var/nfsd
++.B restorecon -F -R -v /var/httpd
+.pp
+.TP
-+Allow nfsd servers to read and write /var/tmp/incoming by adding the public_content_rw_t type to the directory and by restoring the file type. This also requires the allow_nfsdd_anon_write boolean to be set.
++Allow httpd servers to read and write /var/tmp/incoming by adding the public_content_rw_t type to the directory and by restoring the file type. This also requires the allow_httpdd_anon_write boolean to be set.
+.PP
+.B
-+semanage fcontext -a -t public_content_rw_t "/var/nfsd/incoming(/.*)?"
++semanage fcontext -a -t public_content_rw_t "/var/httpd/incoming(/.*)?"
+.br
-+.B restorecon -F -R -v /var/nfsd/incoming
++.B restorecon -F -R -v /var/httpd/incoming
+
+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow nfs servers to modify public files used for public file transfer services. Files/Directories must be labeled public_content_rw_t., you must turn on the nfsd_anon_write boolean.
++If you want to allow Apache to modify public files used for public file transfer services. Directories/Files must be labeled public_content_rw_t., you must turn on the httpd_anon_write boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P nfsd_anon_write 1
++.B setsebool -P httpd_anon_write 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow apache scripts to write to public content, directories/files must be labeled public_rw_content_t., you must turn on the httpd_sys_script_anon_write boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P httpd_sys_script_anon_write 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow Apache to modify public files used for public file transfer services. Directories/Files must be labeled public_content_rw_t., you must turn on the httpd_anon_write boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P httpd_anon_write 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow apache scripts to write to public content, directories/files must be labeled public_rw_content_t., you must turn on the httpd_sys_script_anon_write boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P httpd_sys_script_anon_write 1
+.EE
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux nfsd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their nfsd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for nfsd:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux httpd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their httpd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for httpd:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B nfsd_exec_t
++.B httpd_apcupsd_cgi_content_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the nfsd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the nfsd_t domain.
++- Set files with the httpd_apcupsd_cgi_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd apcupsd cgi content.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/sbin/rpc\.mountd, /usr/sbin/rpc\.nfsd
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B nfsd_initrc_exec_t
++.B httpd_apcupsd_cgi_htaccess_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the nfsd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the nfsd_initrc_t domain.
++- Set files with the httpd_apcupsd_cgi_htaccess_t type, if you want to treat the file as a httpd apcupsd cgi access file.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B nfsd_ro_t
++.B httpd_apcupsd_cgi_ra_content_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the nfsd_ro_t type, if you want to treat the files as nfsd read/only content.
++- Set files with the httpd_apcupsd_cgi_ra_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd apcupsd cgi read/append content.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B nfsd_rw_t
++.B httpd_apcupsd_cgi_rw_content_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the nfsd_rw_t type, if you want to treat the files as nfsd read/write content.
++- Set files with the httpd_apcupsd_cgi_rw_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd apcupsd cgi read/write content.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B nfsd_unit_file_t
++.B httpd_apcupsd_cgi_script_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the nfsd_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as nfsd unit content.
++- Set files with the httpd_apcupsd_cgi_script_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the httpd_apcupsd_cgi_script_t domain.
+
+
++.EX
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
++.B httpd_awstats_content_t
++.EE
+
-+.SH PORT TYPES
-+SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
-+.PP
-+You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
++- Set files with the httpd_awstats_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd awstats content.
+
-+.B semanage port -l
+
++.EX
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
-+SELinux nfsd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their nfsd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following port types are defined for nfsd:
++.B httpd_awstats_htaccess_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the httpd_awstats_htaccess_t type, if you want to treat the file as a httpd awstats access file.
++
+
+.EX
-+.TP 5
-+.B nfs_port_t
-+.TP 10
++.PP
++.B httpd_awstats_ra_content_t
+.EE
+
++- Set files with the httpd_awstats_ra_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd awstats read/append content.
+
-+Default Defined Ports:
-+tcp 2049,20048-20049
-+.EE
-+udp 2049,20048-20049
-+.EE
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux nfsd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their nfsd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for nfsd:
+
+.EX
-+.B nfsd_t
-+.EE
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++.B httpd_awstats_rw_content_t
++.EE
+
-+.SH "COMMANDS"
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
-+.PP
-+.B semanage permissive
-+can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++- Set files with the httpd_awstats_rw_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd awstats read/write content.
++
++
++.EX
+.PP
-+.B semanage module
-+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++.B httpd_awstats_script_exec_t
++.EE
+
-+.B semanage port
-+can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
++- Set files with the httpd_awstats_script_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the httpd_awstats_script_t domain.
+
-+.B semanage boolean
-+can also be used to manipulate the booleans
+
++.EX
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
-+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++.B httpd_bugzilla_content_t
++.EE
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++- Set files with the httpd_bugzilla_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd bugzilla content.
+
-+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), nfsd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-+, setsebool(8)
-\ No newline at end of file
-diff --git a/man/man8/nginx_selinux.8 b/man/man8/nginx_selinux.8
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..87983d6
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/nginx_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
-+.TH "nginx_selinux" "8" "nginx" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "nginx SELinux Policy documentation"
-+.SH "NAME"
-+nginx_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the nginx processes
-+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
++.EX
++.PP
++.B httpd_bugzilla_htaccess_t
++.EE
+
++- Set files with the httpd_bugzilla_htaccess_t type, if you want to treat the file as a httpd bugzilla access file.
+
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.EX
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux nginx policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their nginx processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for nginx:
++.B httpd_bugzilla_ra_content_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the httpd_bugzilla_ra_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd bugzilla read/append content.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B nginx_exec_t
++.B httpd_bugzilla_rw_content_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the nginx_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the nginx_t domain.
++- Set files with the httpd_bugzilla_rw_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd bugzilla read/write content.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B nginx_initrc_exec_t
++.B httpd_bugzilla_script_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the nginx_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the nginx_initrc_t domain.
++- Set files with the httpd_bugzilla_script_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the httpd_bugzilla_script_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B nginx_log_t
++.B httpd_bugzilla_tmp_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the nginx_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as nginx log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++- Set files with the httpd_bugzilla_tmp_t type, if you want to store httpd bugzilla temporary files in the /tmp directories.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B nginx_var_lib_t
++.B httpd_cache_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the nginx_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the nginx files under the /var/lib directory.
++- Set files with the httpd_cache_t type, if you want to store the files under the /var/cache directory.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B nginx_var_run_t
++.B httpd_cobbler_content_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the nginx_var_run_t type, if you want to store the nginx files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the httpd_cobbler_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd cobbler content.
+
+
++.EX
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
++.B httpd_cobbler_htaccess_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the httpd_cobbler_htaccess_t type, if you want to treat the file as a httpd cobbler access file.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux nginx policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their nginx processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for nginx:
+
+.EX
-+.B nginx_t
-+.EE
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++.B httpd_cobbler_ra_content_t
++.EE
+
-+.SH "COMMANDS"
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
-+.PP
-+.B semanage permissive
-+can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++- Set files with the httpd_cobbler_ra_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd cobbler read/append content.
++
++
++.EX
+.PP
-+.B semanage module
-+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++.B httpd_cobbler_rw_content_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the httpd_cobbler_rw_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd cobbler read/write content.
+
++
++.EX
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
-+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++.B httpd_cobbler_script_exec_t
++.EE
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++- Set files with the httpd_cobbler_script_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the httpd_cobbler_script_t domain.
+
-+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), nginx(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/nmbd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/nmbd_selinux.8
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..7fbdb85
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/nmbd_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,125 @@
-+.TH "nmbd_selinux" "8" "nmbd" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "nmbd SELinux Policy documentation"
-+.SH "NAME"
-+nmbd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the nmbd processes
-+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the nmbd processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++.EX
++.PP
++.B httpd_collectd_content_t
++.EE
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++- Set files with the httpd_collectd_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd collectd content.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the nmbd_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.PP
++.B httpd_collectd_htaccess_t
+.EE
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the nmbd_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++- Set files with the httpd_collectd_htaccess_t type, if you want to treat the file as a httpd collectd access file.
++
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.PP
++.B httpd_collectd_ra_content_t
+.EE
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux nmbd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their nmbd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for nmbd:
++- Set files with the httpd_collectd_ra_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd collectd read/append content.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B nmbd_exec_t
++.B httpd_collectd_rw_content_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the nmbd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the nmbd_t domain.
++- Set files with the httpd_collectd_rw_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd collectd read/write content.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B nmbd_var_run_t
++.B httpd_collectd_script_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the nmbd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the nmbd files under the /run directory.
-+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/run/samba/nmbd(/.*)?, /var/run/samba/messages\.tdb, /var/run/samba/namelist\.debug, /var/run/nmbd(/.*)?, /var/run/samba/unexpected\.tdb, /var/run/samba/nmbd\.pid
++- Set files with the httpd_collectd_script_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the httpd_collectd_script_t domain.
+
-+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PORT TYPES
-+SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
++.EX
+.PP
-+You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
++.B httpd_config_t
++.EE
+
-+.B semanage port -l
++- Set files with the httpd_config_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd configuration data, usually stored under the /etc directory.
+
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
-+SELinux nmbd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their nmbd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following port types are defined for nmbd:
+
+.EX
-+.TP 5
-+.B nmbd_port_t
-+.TP 10
++.PP
++.B httpd_cvs_content_t
+.EE
+
++- Set files with the httpd_cvs_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd cvs content.
+
-+Default Defined Ports:
-+udp 137,138
-+.EE
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux nmbd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their nmbd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for nmbd:
+
+.EX
-+.B nmbd_t
-+.EE
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++.B httpd_cvs_htaccess_t
++.EE
+
-+.SH "COMMANDS"
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
-+.PP
-+.B semanage permissive
-+can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
-+.PP
-+.B semanage module
-+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++- Set files with the httpd_cvs_htaccess_t type, if you want to treat the file as a httpd cvs access file.
+
-+.B semanage port
-+can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
+
++.EX
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
-+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++.B httpd_cvs_ra_content_t
++.EE
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++- Set files with the httpd_cvs_ra_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd cvs read/append content.
+
-+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), nmbd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/nova_selinux.8 b/man/man8/nova_selinux.8
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..d7c5ff3
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/nova_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,383 @@
-+.TH "nova_selinux" "8" "nova" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "nova SELinux Policy documentation"
-+.SH "NAME"
-+nova_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the nova processes
-+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the nova processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++.EX
++.PP
++.B httpd_cvs_rw_content_t
++.EE
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++- Set files with the httpd_cvs_rw_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd cvs read/write content.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the nova_console_t, nova_cert_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.PP
++.B httpd_cvs_script_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the nova_console_t, nova_cert_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++- Set files with the httpd_cvs_script_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the httpd_cvs_script_t domain.
++
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.PP
++.B httpd_dirsrvadmin_content_t
+.EE
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux nova policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their nova processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for nova:
++- Set files with the httpd_dirsrvadmin_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd dirsrvadmin content.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B nova_ajax_exec_t
++.B httpd_dirsrvadmin_htaccess_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the nova_ajax_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the nova_ajax_t domain.
++- Set files with the httpd_dirsrvadmin_htaccess_t type, if you want to treat the file as a httpd dirsrvadmin access file.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B nova_ajax_tmp_t
++.B httpd_dirsrvadmin_ra_content_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the nova_ajax_tmp_t type, if you want to store nova ajax temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++- Set files with the httpd_dirsrvadmin_ra_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd dirsrvadmin read/append content.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B nova_ajax_unit_file_t
++.B httpd_dirsrvadmin_rw_content_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the nova_ajax_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as nova ajax unit content.
++- Set files with the httpd_dirsrvadmin_rw_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd dirsrvadmin read/write content.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B nova_api_exec_t
++.B httpd_dirsrvadmin_script_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the nova_api_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the nova_api_t domain.
++- Set files with the httpd_dirsrvadmin_script_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the httpd_dirsrvadmin_script_t domain.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/bin/nova-api, /usr//bin/nova-api-metadata
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B nova_api_tmp_t
++.B httpd_dspam_content_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the nova_api_tmp_t type, if you want to store nova api temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++- Set files with the httpd_dspam_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd dspam content.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B nova_api_unit_file_t
++.B httpd_dspam_htaccess_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the nova_api_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as nova api unit content.
++- Set files with the httpd_dspam_htaccess_t type, if you want to treat the file as a httpd dspam access file.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/lib/systemd/system/openstack-nova-metadata-api.service.*, /usr/lib/systemd/system/openstack-nova-api.*
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B nova_cert_exec_t
++.B httpd_dspam_ra_content_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the nova_cert_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the nova_cert_t domain.
++- Set files with the httpd_dspam_ra_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd dspam read/append content.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B nova_cert_tmp_t
++.B httpd_dspam_rw_content_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the nova_cert_tmp_t type, if you want to store nova cert temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++- Set files with the httpd_dspam_rw_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd dspam read/write content.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B nova_cert_unit_file_t
++.B httpd_dspam_script_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the nova_cert_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as nova cert unit content.
++- Set files with the httpd_dspam_script_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the httpd_dspam_script_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B nova_compute_exec_t
++.B httpd_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the nova_compute_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the nova_compute_t domain.
++- Set files with the httpd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the httpd_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B nova_compute_tmp_t
++.B httpd_git_content_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the nova_compute_tmp_t type, if you want to store nova compute temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++- Set files with the httpd_git_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd git content.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B nova_compute_unit_file_t
++.B httpd_git_htaccess_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the nova_compute_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as nova compute unit content.
++- Set files with the httpd_git_htaccess_t type, if you want to treat the file as a httpd git access file.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B nova_console_exec_t
++.B httpd_git_ra_content_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the nova_console_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the nova_console_t domain.
++- Set files with the httpd_git_ra_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd git read/append content.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B nova_console_tmp_t
++.B httpd_git_rw_content_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the nova_console_tmp_t type, if you want to store nova console temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++- Set files with the httpd_git_rw_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd git read/write content.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B nova_console_unit_file_t
++.B httpd_git_script_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the nova_console_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as nova console unit content.
++- Set files with the httpd_git_script_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the httpd_git_script_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B nova_direct_exec_t
++.B httpd_helper_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the nova_direct_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the nova_direct_t domain.
++- Set files with the httpd_helper_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the httpd_helper_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B nova_direct_tmp_t
++.B httpd_initrc_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the nova_direct_tmp_t type, if you want to store nova direct temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++- Set files with the httpd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the httpd_initrc_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B nova_direct_unit_file_t
++.B httpd_keytab_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the nova_direct_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as nova direct unit content.
++- Set files with the httpd_keytab_t type, if you want to treat the files as kerberos keytab files.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B nova_log_t
++.B httpd_lock_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the nova_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as nova log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++- Set files with the httpd_lock_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd lock data, stored under the /var/lock directory
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B nova_network_exec_t
++.B httpd_log_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the nova_network_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the nova_network_t domain.
++- Set files with the httpd_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as httpd log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B nova_network_tmp_t
++.B httpd_man2html_content_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the nova_network_tmp_t type, if you want to store nova network temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++- Set files with the httpd_man2html_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd man2html content.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B nova_network_unit_file_t
++.B httpd_man2html_htaccess_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the nova_network_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as nova network unit content.
++- Set files with the httpd_man2html_htaccess_t type, if you want to treat the file as a httpd man2html access file.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B nova_objectstore_exec_t
++.B httpd_man2html_ra_content_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the nova_objectstore_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the nova_objectstore_t domain.
++- Set files with the httpd_man2html_ra_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd man2html read/append content.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B nova_objectstore_tmp_t
++.B httpd_man2html_rw_content_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the nova_objectstore_tmp_t type, if you want to store nova objectstore temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++- Set files with the httpd_man2html_rw_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd man2html read/write content.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B nova_objectstore_unit_file_t
++.B httpd_man2html_script_cache_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the nova_objectstore_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as nova objectstore unit content.
++- Set files with the httpd_man2html_script_cache_t type, if you want to store the files under the /var/cache directory.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B nova_scheduler_exec_t
++.B httpd_man2html_script_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the nova_scheduler_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the nova_scheduler_t domain.
++- Set files with the httpd_man2html_script_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the httpd_man2html_script_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B nova_scheduler_tmp_t
++.B httpd_mediawiki_content_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the nova_scheduler_tmp_t type, if you want to store nova scheduler temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++- Set files with the httpd_mediawiki_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd mediawiki content.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B nova_scheduler_unit_file_t
++.B httpd_mediawiki_htaccess_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the nova_scheduler_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as nova scheduler unit content.
++- Set files with the httpd_mediawiki_htaccess_t type, if you want to treat the file as a httpd mediawiki access file.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B nova_var_lib_t
++.B httpd_mediawiki_ra_content_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the nova_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the nova files under the /var/lib directory.
++- Set files with the httpd_mediawiki_ra_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd mediawiki read/append content.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B nova_var_run_t
++.B httpd_mediawiki_rw_content_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the nova_var_run_t type, if you want to store the nova files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the httpd_mediawiki_rw_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd mediawiki read/write content.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B nova_vncproxy_exec_t
++.B httpd_mediawiki_script_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the nova_vncproxy_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the nova_vncproxy_t domain.
++- Set files with the httpd_mediawiki_script_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the httpd_mediawiki_script_t domain.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/bin/nova-vncproxy, /usr/bin/nova-xvpvncproxy
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B nova_vncproxy_tmp_t
++.B httpd_modules_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the nova_vncproxy_tmp_t type, if you want to store nova vncproxy temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++- Set files with the httpd_modules_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd modules.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B nova_vncproxy_unit_file_t
++.B httpd_mojomojo_content_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the nova_vncproxy_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as nova vncproxy unit content.
++- Set files with the httpd_mojomojo_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd mojomojo content.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/lib/systemd/system/openstack-nova-xvpvncproxy.*, /usr/lib/systemd/system/openstack-nova-vncproxy.*
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B nova_volume_exec_t
++.B httpd_mojomojo_htaccess_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the nova_volume_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the nova_volume_t domain.
++- Set files with the httpd_mojomojo_htaccess_t type, if you want to treat the file as a httpd mojomojo access file.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B nova_volume_tmp_t
++.B httpd_mojomojo_ra_content_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the nova_volume_tmp_t type, if you want to store nova volume temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++- Set files with the httpd_mojomojo_ra_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd mojomojo read/append content.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B nova_volume_unit_file_t
++.B httpd_mojomojo_rw_content_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the nova_volume_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as nova volume unit content.
++- Set files with the httpd_mojomojo_rw_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd mojomojo read/write content.
+
+
++.EX
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
++.B httpd_mojomojo_script_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the httpd_mojomojo_script_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the httpd_mojomojo_script_t domain.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux nova policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their nova processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for nova:
+
+.EX
-+.B nova_api_t, nova_compute_t, nova_console_t, nova_network_t, nova_objectstore_t, nova_vncproxy_t, nova_volume_t, nova_scheduler_t, nova_ajax_t, nova_cert_t, nova_direct_t
-+.EE
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++.B httpd_mojomojo_tmp_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the httpd_mojomojo_tmp_t type, if you want to store httpd mojomojo temporary files in the /tmp directories.
+
-+.SH "COMMANDS"
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
-+.PP
-+.B semanage permissive
-+can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
-+.PP
-+.B semanage module
-+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
++.EX
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
-+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++.B httpd_munin_content_t
++.EE
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++- Set files with the httpd_munin_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd munin content.
+
-+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), nova(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/nrpe_selinux.8 b/man/man8/nrpe_selinux.8
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..6a0a8ea
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/nrpe_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
-+.TH "nrpe_selinux" "8" "nrpe" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "nrpe SELinux Policy documentation"
-+.SH "NAME"
-+nrpe_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the nrpe processes
-+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the nrpe processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++.EX
++.PP
++.B httpd_munin_htaccess_t
++.EE
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++- Set files with the httpd_munin_htaccess_t type, if you want to treat the file as a httpd munin access file.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the nrpe_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.PP
++.B httpd_munin_ra_content_t
+.EE
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the nrpe_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++- Set files with the httpd_munin_ra_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd munin read/append content.
++
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.PP
++.B httpd_munin_rw_content_t
+.EE
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux nrpe policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their nrpe processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for nrpe:
++- Set files with the httpd_munin_rw_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd munin read/write content.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B nrpe_etc_t
++.B httpd_munin_script_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the nrpe_etc_t type, if you want to store nrpe files in the /etc directories.
++- Set files with the httpd_munin_script_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the httpd_munin_script_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B nrpe_exec_t
++.B httpd_nagios_content_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the nrpe_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the nrpe_t domain.
++- Set files with the httpd_nagios_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd nagios content.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B nrpe_var_run_t
++.B httpd_nagios_htaccess_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the nrpe_var_run_t type, if you want to store the nrpe files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the httpd_nagios_htaccess_t type, if you want to treat the file as a httpd nagios access file.
+
+
++.EX
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
++.B httpd_nagios_ra_content_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the httpd_nagios_ra_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd nagios read/append content.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux nrpe policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their nrpe processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for nrpe:
+
+.EX
-+.B nrpe_t
-+.EE
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++.B httpd_nagios_rw_content_t
++.EE
+
-+.SH "COMMANDS"
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
-+.PP
-+.B semanage permissive
-+can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
-+.PP
-+.B semanage module
-+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++- Set files with the httpd_nagios_rw_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd nagios read/write content.
+
-+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
-+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.EX
++.PP
++.B httpd_nagios_script_exec_t
++.EE
+
-+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), nrpe(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/nscd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/nscd_selinux.8
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..0501d6c
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/nscd_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,138 @@
-+.TH "nscd_selinux" "8" "nscd" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "nscd SELinux Policy documentation"
-+.SH "NAME"
-+nscd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the nscd processes
-+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++- Set files with the httpd_nagios_script_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the httpd_nagios_script_t domain.
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the nscd processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
+
-+.SH BOOLEANS
-+SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. nscd policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run nscd with the tightest access possible.
++.EX
++.PP
++.B httpd_nutups_cgi_content_t
++.EE
+
++- Set files with the httpd_nutups_cgi_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd nutups cgi content.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to use nscd shared memory, you must turn on the nscd_use_shm boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P nscd_use_shm 1
++.PP
++.B httpd_nutups_cgi_htaccess_t
+.EE
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++- Set files with the httpd_nutups_cgi_htaccess_t type, if you want to treat the file as a httpd nutups cgi access file.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the nscd_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.PP
++.B httpd_nutups_cgi_ra_content_t
+.EE
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the nscd_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++- Set files with the httpd_nutups_cgi_ra_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd nutups cgi read/append content.
++
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.PP
++.B httpd_nutups_cgi_rw_content_t
+.EE
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux nscd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their nscd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for nscd:
++- Set files with the httpd_nutups_cgi_rw_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd nutups cgi read/write content.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B nscd_exec_t
++.B httpd_nutups_cgi_script_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the nscd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the nscd_t domain.
++- Set files with the httpd_nutups_cgi_script_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the httpd_nutups_cgi_script_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B nscd_initrc_exec_t
++.B httpd_openshift_content_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the nscd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the nscd_initrc_t domain.
++- Set files with the httpd_openshift_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd openshift content.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B nscd_log_t
++.B httpd_openshift_htaccess_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the nscd_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as nscd log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++- Set files with the httpd_openshift_htaccess_t type, if you want to treat the file as a httpd openshift access file.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B nscd_unit_file_t
++.B httpd_openshift_ra_content_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the nscd_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as nscd unit content.
++- Set files with the httpd_openshift_ra_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd openshift read/append content.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B nscd_var_run_t
++.B httpd_openshift_rw_content_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the nscd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the nscd files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the httpd_openshift_rw_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd openshift read/write content.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/run/nscd\.pid, /var/run/nscd(/.*)?, /var/db/nscd(/.*)?, /var/run/\.nscd_socket, /var/cache/nscd(/.*)?
+
++.EX
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
++.B httpd_openshift_script_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the httpd_openshift_script_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the httpd_openshift_script_t domain.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux nscd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their nscd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for nscd:
+
+.EX
-+.B nscd_t
-+.EE
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++.B httpd_passwd_exec_t
++.EE
+
-+.SH "COMMANDS"
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
-+.PP
-+.B semanage permissive
-+can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
-+.PP
-+.B semanage module
-+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++- Set files with the httpd_passwd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the httpd_passwd_t domain.
+
-+.B semanage boolean
-+can also be used to manipulate the booleans
+
++.EX
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
-+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++.B httpd_php_exec_t
++.EE
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++- Set files with the httpd_php_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the httpd_php_t domain.
+
-+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), nscd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-+, setsebool(8)
-\ No newline at end of file
-diff --git a/man/man8/nslcd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/nslcd_selinux.8
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..1188ea0
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/nslcd_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
-+.TH "nslcd_selinux" "8" "nslcd" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "nslcd SELinux Policy documentation"
-+.SH "NAME"
-+nslcd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the nslcd processes
-+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the nslcd processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++.EX
++.PP
++.B httpd_php_tmp_t
++.EE
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++- Set files with the httpd_php_tmp_t type, if you want to store httpd php temporary files in the /tmp directories.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the nslcd_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.PP
++.B httpd_prewikka_content_t
+.EE
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the nslcd_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++- Set files with the httpd_prewikka_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd prewikka content.
++
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.PP
++.B httpd_prewikka_htaccess_t
+.EE
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux nslcd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their nslcd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for nslcd:
++- Set files with the httpd_prewikka_htaccess_t type, if you want to treat the file as a httpd prewikka access file.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B nslcd_conf_t
++.B httpd_prewikka_ra_content_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the nslcd_conf_t type, if you want to treat the files as nslcd configuration data, usually stored under the /etc directory.
++- Set files with the httpd_prewikka_ra_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd prewikka read/append content.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B nslcd_exec_t
++.B httpd_prewikka_rw_content_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the nslcd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the nslcd_t domain.
++- Set files with the httpd_prewikka_rw_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd prewikka read/write content.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B nslcd_initrc_exec_t
++.B httpd_prewikka_script_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the nslcd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the nslcd_initrc_t domain.
++- Set files with the httpd_prewikka_script_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the httpd_prewikka_script_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B nslcd_var_run_t
++.B httpd_rotatelogs_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the nslcd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the nslcd files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the httpd_rotatelogs_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the httpd_rotatelogs_t domain.
+
+
++.EX
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
++.B httpd_smokeping_cgi_content_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the httpd_smokeping_cgi_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd smokeping cgi content.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux nslcd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their nslcd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for nslcd:
+
+.EX
-+.B nslcd_t
-+.EE
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++.B httpd_smokeping_cgi_htaccess_t
++.EE
+
-+.SH "COMMANDS"
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
-+.PP
-+.B semanage permissive
-+can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
-+.PP
-+.B semanage module
-+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++- Set files with the httpd_smokeping_cgi_htaccess_t type, if you want to treat the file as a httpd smokeping cgi access file.
+
++
++.EX
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
-+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++.B httpd_smokeping_cgi_ra_content_t
++.EE
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++- Set files with the httpd_smokeping_cgi_ra_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd smokeping cgi read/append content.
+
-+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), nslcd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/ntop_selinux.8 b/man/man8/ntop_selinux.8
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..52c56b8
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/ntop_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,155 @@
-+.TH "ntop_selinux" "8" "ntop" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "ntop SELinux Policy documentation"
-+.SH "NAME"
-+ntop_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the ntop processes
-+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the ntop processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++.EX
++.PP
++.B httpd_smokeping_cgi_rw_content_t
++.EE
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++- Set files with the httpd_smokeping_cgi_rw_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd smokeping cgi read/write content.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the ntop_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.PP
++.B httpd_smokeping_cgi_script_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the ntop_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++- Set files with the httpd_smokeping_cgi_script_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the httpd_smokeping_cgi_script_t domain.
++
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.PP
++.B httpd_squid_content_t
+.EE
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux ntop policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ntop processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for ntop:
++- Set files with the httpd_squid_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd squid content.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B ntop_etc_t
++.B httpd_squid_htaccess_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the ntop_etc_t type, if you want to store ntop files in the /etc directories.
++- Set files with the httpd_squid_htaccess_t type, if you want to treat the file as a httpd squid access file.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B ntop_exec_t
++.B httpd_squid_ra_content_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the ntop_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ntop_t domain.
++- Set files with the httpd_squid_ra_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd squid read/append content.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B ntop_initrc_exec_t
++.B httpd_squid_rw_content_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the ntop_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ntop_initrc_t domain.
++- Set files with the httpd_squid_rw_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd squid read/write content.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B ntop_tmp_t
++.B httpd_squid_script_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the ntop_tmp_t type, if you want to store ntop temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++- Set files with the httpd_squid_script_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the httpd_squid_script_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B ntop_var_lib_t
++.B httpd_squirrelmail_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the ntop_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the ntop files under the /var/lib directory.
++- Set files with the httpd_squirrelmail_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd squirrelmail data.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B ntop_var_run_t
++.B httpd_suexec_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the ntop_var_run_t type, if you want to store the ntop files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the httpd_suexec_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the httpd_suexec_t domain.
+
+
+ .EX
+-httpd_sys_content_t
+-.EE
+-- Set files with httpd_sys_content_t if you want httpd_sys_script_exec_t scripts and the daemon to read the file, and disallow other non sys scripts from access.
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
++.B httpd_suexec_tmp_t
++.EE
+
-+.SH PORT TYPES
-+SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
-+.PP
-+You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
++- Set files with the httpd_suexec_tmp_t type, if you want to store httpd suexec temporary files in the /tmp directories.
+
-+.B semanage port -l
+
+ .EX
+-httpd_sys_script_exec_t
+-.EE
+-- Set cgi scripts with httpd_sys_script_exec_t to allow them to run with access to all sys types.
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
-+SELinux ntop policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ntop processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following port types are defined for ntop:
-+
-+.EX
-+.TP 5
-+.B ntop_port_t
-+.TP 10
++.B httpd_sys_content_t
+.EE
+
++- Set files with the httpd_sys_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd sys content.
+
-+Default Defined Ports:
-+tcp 3000-3001
-+.EE
-+udp 3000-3001
-+.EE
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux ntop policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ntop processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for ntop:
+
-+.EX
-+.B ntop_t
-+.EE
+ .EX
+-httpd_sys_content_rw_t
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++.B httpd_sys_htaccess_t
+ .EE
+-- Set files with httpd_sys_content_rw_t if you want httpd_sys_script_exec_t scripts and the daemon to read/write the data, and disallow other non sys scripts from access.
+
-+.SH "COMMANDS"
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
-+.PP
-+.B semanage permissive
-+can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
-+.PP
-+.B semanage module
-+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++- Set files with the httpd_sys_htaccess_t type, if you want to treat the file as a httpd sys access file.
+
-+.B semanage port
-+can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
+
+ .EX
+-httpd_sys_content_ra_t
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
-+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
-+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
-+
-+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), ntop(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/ntpd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/ntpd_selinux.8
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..3a52789
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/ntpd_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,189 @@
-+.TH "ntpd_selinux" "8" "ntpd" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "ntpd SELinux Policy documentation"
-+.SH "NAME"
-+ntpd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the ntpd processes
-+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
-+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the ntpd processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
-+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++.B httpd_sys_ra_content_t
+ .EE
+-- Set files with httpd_sys_content_ra_t if you want httpd_sys_script_exec_t scripts and the daemon to read/append to the file, and disallow other non sys scripts from access.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the ntpd_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++- Set files with the httpd_sys_ra_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd sys read/append content.
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
+
+ .EX
+-httpd_unconfined_script_exec_t
+-.EE
+-- Set cgi scripts with httpd_unconfined_script_exec_t to allow them to run without any SELinux protection. This should only be used for a very complex httpd scripts, after exhausting all other options. It is better to use this script rather than turning off SELinux protection for httpd.
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the ntpd_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
-+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B httpd_sys_rw_content_t
+.EE
-+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+
+-.SH NOTE
+-With certain policies you can define additional file contexts based on roles like user or staff. httpd_user_script_exec_t can be defined where it would only have access to "user" contexts.
++- Set files with the httpd_sys_rw_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd sys read/write content.
+
+-.SH SHARING FILES
+-If you want to share files with multiple domains (Apache, FTP, rsync, Samba), you can set a file context of public_content_t and public_content_rw_t. These context allow any of the above domains to read the content. If you want a particular domain to write to the public_content_rw_t domain, you must set the appropriate boolean. allow_DOMAIN_anon_write. So for httpd you would execute:
+
+ .EX
+-setsebool -P allow_httpd_anon_write=1
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux ntpd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ntpd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for ntpd:
-+
++.B httpd_sys_script_exec_t
+ .EE
+
+-or
++- Set files with the httpd_sys_script_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the httpd_sys_script_t domain.
+
-+.EX
+
+ .EX
+-setsebool -P allow_httpd_sys_script_anon_write=1
+.PP
-+.B ntpd_exec_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the ntpd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ntpd_t domain.
++.B httpd_tmp_t
+ .EE
+
+-.SH BOOLEANS
+-SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. SELinux can be setup to prevent certain http scripts from working. httpd policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run httpd with the tightest access possible.
++- Set files with the httpd_tmp_t type, if you want to store httpd temporary files in the /tmp directories.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/sbin/ntpd, /etc/cron\.(daily|weekly)/ntp-server, /etc/cron\.(daily|weekly)/ntp-simple
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B ntpd_initrc_exec_t
++.B httpd_tmpfs_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the ntpd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ntpd_initrc_t domain.
++- Set files with the httpd_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store httpd files on a tmpfs file system.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B ntpd_key_t
++.B httpd_unit_file_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the ntpd_key_t type, if you want to treat the files as ntpd key data.
++- Set files with the httpd_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd unit content.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/etc/ntp/crypto(/.*)?, /etc/ntp/keys
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B ntpd_log_t
++.B httpd_user_content_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the ntpd_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as ntpd log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++- Set files with the httpd_user_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd user content.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/log/ntpstats(/.*)?, /var/log/xntpd.*, /var/log/ntp.*
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B ntpd_tmp_t
++.B httpd_user_htaccess_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the ntpd_tmp_t type, if you want to store ntpd temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++- Set files with the httpd_user_htaccess_t type, if you want to treat the file as a httpd user access file.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B ntpd_tmpfs_t
++.B httpd_user_ra_content_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the ntpd_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store ntpd files on a tmpfs file system.
++- Set files with the httpd_user_ra_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd user read/append content.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B ntpd_unit_file_t
++.B httpd_user_rw_content_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the ntpd_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as ntpd unit content.
++- Set files with the httpd_user_rw_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd user read/write content.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B ntpd_var_run_t
++.B httpd_user_script_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the ntpd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the ntpd files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the httpd_user_script_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the httpd_user_script_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B ntpdate_exec_t
+ .PP
+-httpd can be setup to allow cgi scripts to be executed, set httpd_enable_cgi to allow this
++.B httpd_var_lib_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the ntpdate_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ntpdate_t domain.
-+
-+
-+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
++- Set files with the httpd_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the httpd files under the /var/lib directory.
+
-+.SH PORT TYPES
-+SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
+
+ .EX
+-setsebool -P httpd_enable_cgi 1
+.PP
-+You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
-+
-+.B semanage port -l
++.B httpd_var_run_t
+ .EE
+
++- Set files with the httpd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the httpd files under the /run directory.
+
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
-+SELinux ntpd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ntpd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following port types are defined for ntpd:
+
+.EX
-+.TP 5
-+.B ntp_port_t
-+.TP 10
+ .PP
+-SELinux policy for httpd can be setup to not allowed to access users home directories. If you want to allow access to users home directories you need to set the httpd_enable_homedirs boolean and change the context of the files that you want people to access off the home dir.
++.B httpd_w3c_validator_content_t
+.EE
+
++- Set files with the httpd_w3c_validator_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd w3c validator content.
+
-+Default Defined Ports:
-+udp 123
-+.EE
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+
+ .EX
+-setsebool -P httpd_enable_homedirs 1
+-chcon -R -t httpd_sys_content_t ~user/public_html
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux ntpd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ntpd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for ntpd:
++.B httpd_w3c_validator_htaccess_t
+ .EE
+
++- Set files with the httpd_w3c_validator_htaccess_t type, if you want to treat the file as a httpd w3c validator access file.
++
+
+.EX
-+.B ntpd_t
+ .PP
+-SELinux policy for httpd can be setup to not allow access to the controlling terminal. In most cases this is preferred, because an intruder might be able to use the access to the terminal to gain privileges. But in certain situations httpd needs to prompt for a password to open a certificate file, in these cases, terminal access is required. Set the httpd_tty_comm boolean to allow terminal access.
++.B httpd_w3c_validator_ra_content_t
+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
-+
-+.SH "COMMANDS"
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
-+.PP
-+.B semanage permissive
-+can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
-+.PP
-+.B semanage module
-+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
-+.B semanage port
-+can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
++- Set files with the httpd_w3c_validator_ra_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd w3c validator read/append content.
+
+
+ .EX
+-setsebool -P httpd_tty_comm 1
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
-+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
-+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.B httpd_w3c_validator_rw_content_t
+ .EE
+
++- Set files with the httpd_w3c_validator_rw_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd w3c validator read/write content.
+
-+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), ntpd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/numad_selinux.8 b/man/man8/numad_selinux.8
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..05c319a
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/numad_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
-+.TH "numad_selinux" "8" "numad" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "numad SELinux Policy documentation"
-+.SH "NAME"
-+numad_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the numad processes
-+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the numad processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++.EX
+ .PP
+-httpd can be configured to not differentiate file controls based on context, i.e. all files labeled as httpd context can be read/write/execute. Setting this boolean to false allows you to setup the security policy such that one httpd service can not interfere with another.
++.B httpd_w3c_validator_script_exec_t
++.EE
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++- Set files with the httpd_w3c_validator_script_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the httpd_w3c_validator_script_t domain.
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+
+ .EX
+-setsebool -P httpd_unified 0
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux numad policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their numad processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for numad:
++.B httpd_w3c_validator_tmp_t
+ .EE
+
++- Set files with the httpd_w3c_validator_tmp_t type, if you want to store httpd w3c validator temporary files in the /tmp directories.
+
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B numad_exec_t
+ .PP
+-SELinu policy for httpd can be configured to turn on sending email. This is a security feature, since it would prevent a vulnerabiltiy in http from causing a spam attack. I certain situations, you may want http modules to send mail. You can turn on the httpd_send_mail boolean.
++.B httpd_zoneminder_content_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the numad_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the numad_t domain.
-+
++- Set files with the httpd_zoneminder_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd zoneminder content.
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B numad_unit_file_t
+
+ .EX
+-setsebool -P httpd_can_sendmail 1
+ .PP
+-httpd can be configured to turn off internal scripting (PHP). PHP and other
+-loadable modules run under the same context as httpd. Therefore several policy rules allow httpd greater access to the system then is needed if you only use external cgi scripts.
++.B httpd_zoneminder_htaccess_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the numad_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as numad unit content.
-+
++- Set files with the httpd_zoneminder_htaccess_t type, if you want to treat the file as a httpd zoneminder access file.
+
-+.EX
+
+ .EX
+-setsebool -P httpd_builtin_scripting 0
+.PP
-+.B numad_var_log_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the numad_var_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as numad var log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++.B httpd_zoneminder_ra_content_t
+ .EE
+
++- Set files with the httpd_zoneminder_ra_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd zoneminder read/append content.
+
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B numad_var_run_t
+ .PP
+-SELinux policy can be setup such that httpd scripts are not allowed to connect out to the network.
+-This would prevent a hacker from breaking into you httpd server and attacking
+-other machines. If you need scripts to be able to connect you can set the httpd_can_network_connect boolean on.
++.B httpd_zoneminder_rw_content_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the numad_var_run_t type, if you want to store the numad files under the /run directory.
-+
++- Set files with the httpd_zoneminder_rw_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd zoneminder read/write content.
+
+
+ .EX
+-setsebool -P httpd_can_network_connect 1
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++.B httpd_zoneminder_script_exec_t
+ .EE
+
++- Set files with the httpd_zoneminder_script_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the httpd_zoneminder_script_t domain.
++
++
+ .PP
+-system-config-selinux is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+-.SH AUTHOR
+-This manual page was written by Dan Walsh <dwalsh at redhat.com>.
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
+-.SH "SEE ALSO"
+-selinux(8), httpd(8), chcon(1), setsebool(8)
++.SH PORT TYPES
++SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
++.PP
++You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
++
++.B semanage port -l
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
++SELinux httpd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their httpd processes in as secure a method as possible.
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux numad policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their numad processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for numad:
++The following port types are defined for httpd:
+
+.EX
-+.B numad_t
++.TP 5
++.B http_cache_port_t
++.TP 10
++.EE
+
+
++Default Defined Ports:
++tcp 8080,8118,10001-10010
++.EE
++udp 3130
+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
-+.SH "COMMANDS"
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
-+.PP
-+.B semanage permissive
-+can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
-+.PP
-+.B semanage module
-+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++.EX
++.TP 5
++.B http_port_t
++.TP 10
++.EE
+
-+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
-+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++Default Defined Ports:
++tcp 80,81,443,488,8008,8009,8443
++.EE
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), numad(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/nut_selinux.8 b/man/man8/nut_selinux.8
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..742a692
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/nut_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,123 @@
-+.TH "nut_selinux" "8" "nut" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "nut SELinux Policy documentation"
-+.SH "NAME"
-+nut_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the nut processes
-+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++The SELinux process type httpd_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the nut processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++.br
++.B abrt_retrace_spool_t
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++ /var/spool/abrt-retrace(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/spool/retrace-server(/.*)?
++.br
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the nut_upsmon_t, nut_upsdrvctl_t, nut_upsd_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++.br
++.B dirsrv_config_t
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
++ /etc/dirsrv(/.*)?
++.br
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the nut_upsmon_t, nut_upsdrvctl_t, nut_upsd_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++.br
++.B dirsrv_var_log_t
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
-+.EE
++ /var/log/dirsrv(/.*)?
++.br
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux nut policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their nut processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for nut:
++.br
++.B dirsrv_var_run_t
+
++ /var/run/dirsrv(/.*)?
++.br
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B nut_conf_t
-+.EE
++.br
++.B dirsrvadmin_config_t
+
-+- Set files with the nut_conf_t type, if you want to treat the files as nut configuration data, usually stored under the /etc directory.
++ /etc/dirsrv/dsgw(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/dirsrv/admin-serv(/.*)?
++.br
+
++.br
++.B dirsrvadmin_tmp_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B nut_upsd_exec_t
-+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the nut_upsd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the nut_upsd_t domain.
++.br
++.B httpd_apcupsd_cgi_rw_content_t
+
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B nut_upsdrvctl_exec_t
-+.EE
++.br
++.B httpd_awstats_rw_content_t
+
-+- Set files with the nut_upsdrvctl_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the nut_upsdrvctl_t domain.
+
+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/sbin/upsdrvctl, /sbin/upsdrvctl
-+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B nut_upsmon_exec_t
-+.EE
++.B httpd_bugzilla_rw_content_t
+
-+- Set files with the nut_upsmon_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the nut_upsmon_t domain.
++ /var/lib/bugzilla(/.*)?
++.br
+
++.br
++.B httpd_cache_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B nut_var_run_t
-+.EE
++ /var/cache/rt3(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/cache/ssl.*\.sem
++.br
++ /var/cache/mod_.*
++.br
++ /var/cache/php-.*
++.br
++ /var/cache/httpd(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/cache/mason(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/cache/mod_ssl(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/cache/lighttpd(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/cache/mediawiki(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/cache/mod_proxy(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/cache/mod_gnutls(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/cache/php-mmcache(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/cache/php-eaccelerator(/.*)?
++.br
+
-+- Set files with the nut_var_run_t type, if you want to store the nut files under the /run directory.
++.br
++.B httpd_cobbler_rw_content_t
+
+
-+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
++.br
++.B httpd_collectd_rw_content_t
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux nut policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their nut processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for nut:
+
-+.EX
-+.B nut_upsd_t, nut_upsmon_t, nut_upsdrvctl_t
-+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++.br
++.B httpd_cvs_rw_content_t
+
-+.SH "COMMANDS"
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
-+.PP
-+.B semanage permissive
-+can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
-+.PP
-+.B semanage module
-+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
-+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
-+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++.br
++.B httpd_dirsrvadmin_rw_content_t
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
+
-+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), nut(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/nx_selinux.8 b/man/man8/nx_selinux.8
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..7383682
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/nx_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
-+.TH "nx_selinux" "8" "nx" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "nx SELinux Policy documentation"
-+.SH "NAME"
-+nx_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the nx processes
-+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++.br
++.B httpd_dspam_rw_content_t
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the nx processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++.br
++.B httpd_git_rw_content_t
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the nx_server_ssh_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++ /var/cache/cgit(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/cache/gitweb-caching(/.*)?
++.br
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
++.br
++.B httpd_lock_t
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the nx_server_ssh_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
-+.EE
++.br
++.B httpd_man2html_rw_content_t
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux nx policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their nx processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for nx:
+
++.br
++.B httpd_mediawiki_rw_content_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B nx_server_exec_t
-+.EE
++ /var/www/wiki(/.*)?
++.br
+
-+- Set files with the nx_server_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the nx_server_t domain.
++.br
++.B httpd_mojomojo_rw_content_t
+
++ /var/lib/mojomojo(/.*)?
+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/opt/NX/bin/nxserver, /usr/NX/bin/nxserver, /usr/libexec/nx/nxserver
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B nx_server_home_ssh_t
-+.EE
++.br
++.B httpd_munin_rw_content_t
+
-+- Set files with the nx_server_home_ssh_t type, if you want to treat the files as nx server home ssh data.
+
+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/opt/NX/home/nx/\.ssh(/.*)?, /usr/NX/home/nx/\.ssh(/.*)?, /var/lib/nxserver/home/.ssh(/.*)?
++.B httpd_nagios_rw_content_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B nx_server_tmp_t
-+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the nx_server_tmp_t type, if you want to store nx server temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++.br
++.B httpd_nutups_cgi_rw_content_t
+
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B nx_server_var_lib_t
-+.EE
++.br
++.B httpd_openshift_rw_content_t
+
-+- Set files with the nx_server_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the nx server files under the /var/lib directory.
+
+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/opt/NX/home(/.*)?, /usr/NX/home(/.*)?, /var/lib/nxserver(/.*)?
++.B httpd_prewikka_rw_content_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B nx_server_var_run_t
-+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the nx_server_var_run_t type, if you want to store the nx server files under the /run directory.
++.br
++.B httpd_smokeping_cgi_rw_content_t
+
+
-+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
++.br
++.B httpd_squid_rw_content_t
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux nx policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their nx processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for nx:
+
-+.EX
-+.B nx_server_t, nx_server_ssh_t
-+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++.br
++.B httpd_squirrelmail_t
+
-+.SH "COMMANDS"
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
-+.PP
-+.B semanage permissive
-+can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
-+.PP
-+.B semanage module
-+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++ /var/lib/squirrelmail/prefs(/.*)?
++.br
+
-+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
-+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++.br
++.B httpd_sys_rw_content_t
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++ /etc/drupal.*
++.br
++ /var/lib/svn(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/www/svn(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/mock/koji(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/www/html/[^/]*/sites/default/files(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/www/html/[^/]*/sites/default/settings\.php
++.br
++ /var/lib/drupal.*
++.br
++ /etc/zabbix/web(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/spool/gosa(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/WebCalendar(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/dokuwiki(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/spool/viewvc(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/pootle/po(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/www/moodledata(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/www/gallery/albums(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/www/html/wp-content(/.*)?
++.br
++ /usr/share/wordpress-mu/wp-content(/.*)?
++.br
++ /usr/share/wordpress/wp-content/uploads(/.*)?
++.br
++ /usr/share/wordpress/wp-content/upgrade(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/owncloud/config\.php
++.br
++ /var/www/html/configuration\.php
++.br
+
-+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), nx(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/nx_server_selinux.8 b/man/man8/nx_server_selinux.8
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..2746ea3
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/nx_server_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
-+.TH "nx_server_selinux" "8" "nx_server" "mgrepl at redhat.com" "nx_server SELinux Policy documentation"
-+.SH "NAME"
-+nx_server_r \- \fBnx_server user role\fP - Security Enhanced Linux Policy
++.br
++.B httpd_tmp_t
+
-+.SH DESCRIPTION
++ /var/run/user/apache(/.*)?
++.br
+
-+SELinux supports Roles Based Access Control, some Linux roles are login roles, while other roles need to be transition to.
++.br
++.B httpd_tmpfs_t
+
-+Note: The examples in the man page will user the staff_u user.
+
-+Non login roles are usually used for administrative tasks.
++.br
++.B httpd_user_rw_content_t
+
-+Roles usually have default types assigned to them.
+
-+The default type for the nx_server_r role is nx_server_t.
++.br
++.B httpd_var_lib_t
+
-+You can use the
-+.B newrole
-+program to transition directly to this role.
++ /var/lib/dav(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/php(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/httpd(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/cherokee(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/lighttpd(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/rt3/data/RT-Shredder(/.*)?
++.br
+
-+.B newrole -r nx_server_r -t nx_server_t
++.br
++.B httpd_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/mod_.*
++.br
++ /var/run/wsgi.*
++.br
++ /var/run/httpd.*
++.br
++ /var/run/apache.*
++.br
++ /var/run/lighttpd(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/php/session(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/dirsrv/admin-serv.*
++.br
++ /opt/dirsrv/var/run/dirsrv/dsgw/cookies(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/gcache_port
++.br
++ /var/run/cherokee\.pid
++.br
++
++.br
++.B httpd_w3c_validator_rw_content_t
+
-+.B sudo
-+can also be setup to transition to this role using the visudo command.
+
-+USERNAME ALL=(ALL) ROLE=nx_server_r TYPE=nx_server_t COMMAND
+.br
-+sudo will run COMMAND as staff_u:nx_server_r:nx_server_t:LEVEL
++.B httpd_zoneminder_rw_content_t
+
-+If you want to use a non login role, you need to make sure the SELinux user you are using can reach this role.
+
-+You can see all of the assigned SELinux roles using the following
++.br
++.B jetty_cache_t
+
-+.B semanage user -l
++ /var/cache/jetty(/.*)?
++.br
+
-+If you wanted to add nx_server_r to the staff_u user, you would execute:
++.br
++.B jetty_log_t
+
-+.B $ semanage user -m -R 'staff_r nx_server_r' staff_u
++ /var/log/jetty(/.*)?
++.br
+
++.br
++.B jetty_var_lib_t
+
-+.SH "COMMANDS"
++ /var/lib/jetty(/.*)?
++.br
+
-+.B semanage login
-+can also be used to manipulate the Linux User to SELinux User mappings
++.br
++.B jetty_var_run_t
+
-+.B semanage user
-+can also be used to manipulate SELinux user definitions.
++ /var/run/jetty(/.*)?
++.br
+
-+.B system-config-selinux
-+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++.br
++.B krb5_host_rcache_t
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genuserman.py.
++ /var/cache/krb5rcache(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/tmp/nfs_0
++.br
++ /var/tmp/DNS_25
++.br
++ /var/tmp/host_0
++.br
++ /var/tmp/imap_0
++.br
++ /var/tmp/HTTP_23
++.br
++ /var/tmp/HTTP_48
++.br
++ /var/tmp/ldap_55
++.br
++ /var/tmp/ldap_487
++.br
++ /var/tmp/ldapmap1_0
++.br
+
-+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), semanage(8).
-diff --git a/man/man8/obex_selinux.8 b/man/man8/obex_selinux.8
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..b43de4f
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/obex_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
-+.TH "obex_selinux" "8" "obex" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "obex SELinux Policy documentation"
-+.SH "NAME"
-+obex_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the obex processes
-+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++.br
++.B passenger_tmp_t
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the obex processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++.br
++.B passenger_var_run_t
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux obex policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their obex processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for obex:
++ /var/run/passenger(/.*)?
++.br
+
++.br
++.B pki_apache_config
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B obex_exec_t
-+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the obex_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the obex_t domain.
++.br
++.B pki_apache_var_lib
+
+
-+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
++.br
++.B pki_apache_var_log
++
++
++.br
++.B squirrelmail_spool_t
++
++ /var/spool/squirrelmail(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B systemd_passwd_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/systemd/ask-password(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/systemd/ask-password-block(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B zarafa_var_lib_t
++
++ /var/lib/zarafa(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/zarafa-webaccess(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux obex policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their obex processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for obex:
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the httpd_prewikka_script_t, httpd_passwd_t, httpd_t, httpd_php_t, httpd_git_script_t, httpd_suexec_t, httpd_sys_script_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B obex_t
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
++
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the httpd_prewikka_script_t, httpd_passwd_t, httpd_t, httpd_php_t, httpd_git_script_t, httpd_suexec_t, httpd_sys_script_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -34556,119 +37085,109 @@ index 0000000..b43de4f
+.B semanage module
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
++.B semanage port
++can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
++
++.B semanage boolean
++can also be used to manipulate the booleans
++
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), obex(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/oddjob_selinux.8 b/man/man8/oddjob_selinux.8
++selinux(8), httpd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, setsebool(8), httpd_apcupsd_cgi_script_selinux(8), httpd_awstats_script_selinux(8), httpd_bugzilla_script_selinux(8), httpd_cobbler_script_selinux(8), httpd_collectd_script_selinux(8), httpd_cvs_script_selinux(8), httpd_dirsrvadmin_script_selinux(8), httpd_dspam_script_selinux(8), httpd_git_script_selinux(8), httpd_helper_selinux(8), httpd_man2html_script_selinux(8), httpd_mediawiki_script_selinux(8), httpd_mojomojo_script_selinux(8), httpd_munin_script_selinux(8), httpd_nagios_script_selinux(8), httpd_nutups_cgi_script_selinux(8), httpd_openshift_script_selinux(8), httpd_passwd_selinux(8), httpd_php_selinux(8), httpd_prewikka_script_selinux(8), httpd_rotatelogs_selinux(8), httpd_smokeping_cgi_script_selinux(8), httpd_squid_script_selinux(8), httpd_suexec_selinux(8), httpd_sys_script_selinux(8), httpd_user_script_selinux(8), httpd_w3c_validator_script_selinux(8), httpd_zoneminder_script_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/httpd_smokeping_cgi_script_selinux.8 b/man/man8/httpd_smokeping_cgi_script_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..5697e76
+index 0000000..d4560e5
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/oddjob_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,122 @@
-+.TH "oddjob_selinux" "8" "oddjob" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "oddjob SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/httpd_smokeping_cgi_script_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
++.TH "httpd_smokeping_cgi_script_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "httpd_smokeping_cgi_script" "SELinux Policy documentation for httpd_smokeping_cgi_script"
+.SH "NAME"
-+oddjob_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the oddjob processes
++httpd_smokeping_cgi_script_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the httpd_smokeping_cgi_script processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the oddjob processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
-+
-+.SH BOOLEANS
-+SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. oddjob policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run oddjob with the tightest access possible.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the httpd_smokeping_cgi_script processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
++The httpd_smokeping_cgi_script processes execute with the httpd_smokeping_cgi_script_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow httpd to communicate with oddjob to start up a service, you must turn on the httpd_use_oddjob boolean.
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P httpd_use_oddjob 1
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep httpd_smokeping_cgi_script_t
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the oddjob_mkhomedir_t, oddjob_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
++The httpd_smokeping_cgi_script_t SELinux type can be entered via the "shell_exec_t,httpd_smokeping_cgi_script_exec_t,httpd_smokeping_cgi_script_exec_t" file types. The default entrypoint paths for the httpd_smokeping_cgi_script_t domain are the following:"
+
++/bin/d?ash, /bin/zsh.*, /bin/ksh.*, /usr/bin/d?ash, /usr/bin/ksh.*, /usr/bin/zsh.*, /bin/esh, /bin/mksh, /bin/sash, /bin/tcsh, /bin/yash, /bin/bash, /bin/fish, /bin/bash2, /usr/bin/esh, /usr/bin/mksh, /usr/bin/sash, /usr/bin/bash, /usr/bin/fish, /usr/bin/tcsh, /usr/bin/yash, /sbin/nologin, /usr/sbin/sesh, /usr/bin/bash2, /usr/sbin/smrsh, /usr/bin/scponly, /usr/sbin/nologin, /usr/libexec/sesh, /usr/sbin/scponlyc, /usr/bin/git-shell, /usr/libexec/git-core/git-shell, /usr/share/smokeping/cgi(/.*)?, /usr/share/smokeping/cgi(/.*)?
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the oddjob_mkhomedir_t, oddjob_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux httpd_smokeping_cgi_script policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their httpd_smokeping_cgi_script processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for httpd_smokeping_cgi_script:
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B httpd_smokeping_cgi_script_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux oddjob policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their oddjob processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for oddjob:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux httpd_smokeping_cgi_script policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their httpd_smokeping_cgi_script processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for httpd_smokeping_cgi_script:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B oddjob_exec_t
++.B httpd_smokeping_cgi_script_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the oddjob_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the oddjob_t domain.
++- Set files with the httpd_smokeping_cgi_script_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the httpd_smokeping_cgi_script_t domain.
+
+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B oddjob_mkhomedir_exec_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the oddjob_mkhomedir_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the oddjob_mkhomedir_t domain.
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/libexec/oddjob/mkhomedir, /usr/lib/oddjob/mkhomedir
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B oddjob_var_run_t
-+.EE
++The SELinux process type httpd_smokeping_cgi_script_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
-+- Set files with the oddjob_var_run_t type, if you want to store the oddjob files under the /run directory.
++.br
++.B httpd_smokeping_cgi_rw_content_t
+
+
-+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
++.br
++.B smokeping_var_lib_t
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux oddjob policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their oddjob processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for oddjob:
++ /var/lib/smokeping(/.*)?
++.br
+
-+.EX
-+.B oddjob_mkhomedir_t, oddjob_t
-+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -34680,91 +37199,97 @@ index 0000000..5697e76
+.B semanage module
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
-+.B semanage boolean
-+can also be used to manipulate the booleans
-+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), oddjob(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-+, setsebool(8)
++selinux(8), httpd_smokeping_cgi_script(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, httpd_selinux(8), httpd_selinux(8), httpd_apcupsd_cgi_script_selinux(8), httpd_awstats_script_selinux(8), httpd_bugzilla_script_selinux(8), httpd_cobbler_script_selinux(8), httpd_collectd_script_selinux(8), httpd_cvs_script_selinux(8), httpd_dirsrvadmin_script_selinux(8), httpd_dspam_script_selinux(8), httpd_git_script_selinux(8), httpd_helper_selinux(8), httpd_man2html_script_selinux(8), httpd_mediawiki_script_selinux(8), httpd_mojomojo_script_selinux(8), httpd_munin_script_selinux(8), httpd_nagios_script_selinux(8), httpd_nutups_cgi_script_selinux(8), httpd_openshift_script_selinux(8), httpd_passwd_selinux(8), httpd_php_selinux(8), httpd_prewikka_script_selinux(8), httpd_rotatelogs_selinux(8), httpd_squid_script_selinux(8), httpd_suexec_selinux(8), httpd_sys_script_selinux(8), httpd_user_script_selinux(8), httpd_w3c_validator_script_selinux(8), httpd_zoneminder_script_selinux(8)
\ No newline at end of file
-diff --git a/man/man8/openct_selinux.8 b/man/man8/openct_selinux.8
+diff --git a/man/man8/httpd_squid_script_selinux.8 b/man/man8/httpd_squid_script_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..c9e9507
+index 0000000..fa0892f
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/openct_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
-+.TH "openct_selinux" "8" "openct" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "openct SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/httpd_squid_script_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
++.TH "httpd_squid_script_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "httpd_squid_script" "SELinux Policy documentation for httpd_squid_script"
+.SH "NAME"
-+openct_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the openct processes
++httpd_squid_script_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the httpd_squid_script processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the openct processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the httpd_squid_script processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The httpd_squid_script processes execute with the httpd_squid_script_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep httpd_squid_script_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The httpd_squid_script_t SELinux type can be entered via the "httpd_squid_script_exec_t,shell_exec_t,httpd_squid_script_exec_t" file types. The default entrypoint paths for the httpd_squid_script_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/share/lightsquid/cgi(/.*)?, /usr/lib/squid/cachemgr\.cgi, /bin/d?ash, /bin/zsh.*, /bin/ksh.*, /usr/bin/d?ash, /usr/bin/ksh.*, /usr/bin/zsh.*, /bin/esh, /bin/mksh, /bin/sash, /bin/tcsh, /bin/yash, /bin/bash, /bin/fish, /bin/bash2, /usr/bin/esh, /usr/bin/mksh, /usr/bin/sash, /usr/bin/bash, /usr/bin/fish, /usr/bin/tcsh, /usr/bin/yash, /sbin/nologin, /usr/sbin/sesh, /usr/bin/bash2, /usr/sbin/smrsh, /usr/bin/scponly, /usr/sbin/nologin, /usr/libexec/sesh, /usr/sbin/scponlyc, /usr/bin/git-shell, /usr/libexec/git-core/git-shell, /usr/share/lightsquid/cgi(/.*)?, /usr/lib/squid/cachemgr\.cgi
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux openct policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their openct processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for openct:
-+
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux httpd_squid_script policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their httpd_squid_script processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for httpd_squid_script:
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B openct_exec_t
++.B httpd_squid_script_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
-+- Set files with the openct_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the openct_t domain.
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux httpd_squid_script policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their httpd_squid_script processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for httpd_squid_script:
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/sbin/ifdhandler, /usr/sbin/openct-control
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B openct_var_run_t
++.B httpd_squid_script_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the openct_var_run_t type, if you want to store the openct files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the httpd_squid_script_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the httpd_squid_script_t domain.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux openct policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their openct processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for openct:
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+.EX
-+.B openct_t
-+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++The SELinux process type httpd_squid_script_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B httpd_squid_rw_content_t
++
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -34777,175 +37302,118 @@ index 0000000..c9e9507
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), openct(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/openvpn_selinux.8 b/man/man8/openvpn_selinux.8
++selinux(8), httpd_squid_script(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, httpd_selinux(8), httpd_selinux(8), httpd_apcupsd_cgi_script_selinux(8), httpd_awstats_script_selinux(8), httpd_bugzilla_script_selinux(8), httpd_cobbler_script_selinux(8), httpd_collectd_script_selinux(8), httpd_cvs_script_selinux(8), httpd_dirsrvadmin_script_selinux(8), httpd_dspam_script_selinux(8), httpd_git_script_selinux(8), httpd_helper_selinux(8), httpd_man2html_script_selinux(8), httpd_mediawiki_script_selinux(8), httpd_mojomojo_script_selinux(8), httpd_munin_script_selinux(8), httpd_nagios_script_selinux(8), httpd_nutups_cgi_script_selinux(8), httpd_openshift_script_selinux(8), httpd_passwd_selinux(8), httpd_php_selinux(8), httpd_prewikka_script_selinux(8), httpd_rotatelogs_selinux(8), httpd_smokeping_cgi_script_selinux(8), httpd_suexec_selinux(8), httpd_sys_script_selinux(8), httpd_user_script_selinux(8), httpd_w3c_validator_script_selinux(8), httpd_zoneminder_script_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/httpd_suexec_selinux.8 b/man/man8/httpd_suexec_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..f6b1589
+index 0000000..2f8bbb0
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/openvpn_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,182 @@
-+.TH "openvpn_selinux" "8" "openvpn" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "openvpn SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/httpd_suexec_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,117 @@
++.TH "httpd_suexec_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "httpd_suexec" "SELinux Policy documentation for httpd_suexec"
+.SH "NAME"
-+openvpn_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the openvpn processes
++httpd_suexec_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the httpd_suexec processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the openvpn processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
-+
-+.SH BOOLEANS
-+SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. openvpn policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run openvpn with the tightest access possible.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the httpd_suexec processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
++The httpd_suexec processes execute with the httpd_suexec_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow openvpn to read home directories, you must turn on the openvpn_enable_homedirs boolean.
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P openvpn_enable_homedirs 1
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep httpd_suexec_t
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the openvpn_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
++The httpd_suexec_t SELinux type can be entered via the "httpd_suexec_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the httpd_suexec_t domain are the following:"
+
++/usr/lib/apache(2)?/suexec(2)?, /usr/lib/cgi-bin/(nph-)?cgiwrap(d)?, /usr/sbin/suexec
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the openvpn_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
-+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
-+.EE
-+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux httpd_suexec policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their httpd_suexec processes in as secure a method as possible.
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux openvpn policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their openvpn processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for openvpn:
-+
++The following process types are defined for httpd_suexec:
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B openvpn_etc_rw_t
++.B httpd_suexec_t
+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the openvpn_etc_rw_t type, if you want to treat the files as openvpn etc read/write content.
-+
-+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B openvpn_etc_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the openvpn_etc_t type, if you want to store openvpn files in the /etc directories.
-+
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
-+.EX
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
-+.B openvpn_exec_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the openvpn_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the openvpn_t domain.
-+
-+
-+.EX
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+.B openvpn_initrc_exec_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the openvpn_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the openvpn_initrc_t domain.
-+
-+
-+.EX
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux httpd_suexec policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their httpd_suexec processes in as secure a method as possible.
+.PP
-+.B openvpn_tmp_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the openvpn_tmp_t type, if you want to store openvpn temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++The following file types are defined for httpd_suexec:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B openvpn_var_log_t
++.B httpd_suexec_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the openvpn_var_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as openvpn var log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++- Set files with the httpd_suexec_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the httpd_suexec_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B openvpn_var_run_t
++.B httpd_suexec_tmp_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the openvpn_var_run_t type, if you want to store the openvpn files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the httpd_suexec_tmp_t type, if you want to store httpd suexec temporary files in the /tmp directories.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/run/openvpn(/.*)?, /var/run/openvpn\.client.*
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PORT TYPES
-+SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
-+.PP
-+You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+.B semanage port -l
++The SELinux process type httpd_suexec_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B httpd_suexec_tmp_t
++
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
-+SELinux openvpn policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their openvpn processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following port types are defined for openvpn:
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the httpd_suexec_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.TP 5
-+.B openvpn_port_t
-+.TP 10
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
+
-+
-+Default Defined Ports:
-+tcp 1194
-+.EE
-+udp 1194
-+.EE
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux openvpn policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their openvpn processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for openvpn:
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the httpd_suexec_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B openvpn_t
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -34957,132 +37425,192 @@ index 0000000..f6b1589
+.B semanage module
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
-+.B semanage port
-+can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
-+
-+.B semanage boolean
-+can also be used to manipulate the booleans
-+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), openvpn(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-+, setsebool(8)
++selinux(8), httpd_suexec(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, httpd_selinux(8), httpd_selinux(8), httpd_apcupsd_cgi_script_selinux(8), httpd_awstats_script_selinux(8), httpd_bugzilla_script_selinux(8), httpd_cobbler_script_selinux(8), httpd_collectd_script_selinux(8), httpd_cvs_script_selinux(8), httpd_dirsrvadmin_script_selinux(8), httpd_dspam_script_selinux(8), httpd_git_script_selinux(8), httpd_helper_selinux(8), httpd_man2html_script_selinux(8), httpd_mediawiki_script_selinux(8), httpd_mojomojo_script_selinux(8), httpd_munin_script_selinux(8), httpd_nagios_script_selinux(8), httpd_nutups_cgi_script_selinux(8), httpd_openshift_script_selinux(8), httpd_passwd_selinux(8), httpd_php_selinux(8), httpd_prewikka_script_selinux(8), httpd_rotatelogs_selinux(8), httpd_smokeping_cgi_script_selinux(8), httpd_squid_script_selinux(8), httpd_sys_script_selinux(8), httpd_user_script_selinux(8), httpd_w3c_validator_script_selinux(8), httpd_zoneminder_script_selinux(8)
\ No newline at end of file
-diff --git a/man/man8/pacemaker_selinux.8 b/man/man8/pacemaker_selinux.8
+diff --git a/man/man8/httpd_sys_script_selinux.8 b/man/man8/httpd_sys_script_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..3dee1f7
+index 0000000..566f6fa
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/pacemaker_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,123 @@
-+.TH "pacemaker_selinux" "8" "pacemaker" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "pacemaker SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/httpd_sys_script_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,190 @@
++.TH "httpd_sys_script_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "httpd_sys_script" "SELinux Policy documentation for httpd_sys_script"
+.SH "NAME"
-+pacemaker_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the pacemaker processes
++httpd_sys_script_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the httpd_sys_script processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the pacemaker processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the httpd_sys_script processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The httpd_sys_script processes execute with the httpd_sys_script_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the pacemaker_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep httpd_sys_script_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The httpd_sys_script_t SELinux type can be entered via the "httpd_sys_script_exec_t,httpd_sys_content_t,cifs_t,shell_exec_t,nfs_t,httpd_sys_script_exec_t" file types. The default entrypoint paths for the httpd_sys_script_t domain are the following:"
+
++/usr/.*\.cgi, /opt/.*\.cgi, /var/www/[^/]*/cgi-bin(/.*)?, /var/www/perl(/.*)?, /var/www/html/[^/]*/cgi-bin(/.*)?, /usr/lib/cgi-bin(/.*)?, /var/www/cgi-bin(/.*)?, /var/www/svn/hooks(/.*)?, /usr/share/wordpress/.*\.php, /usr/share/wordpress/wp-includes/.*\.php, /usr/share/mythtv/mythweather/scripts(/.*)?, /usr/share/mythweb/mythweb\.pl, /usr/share/wordpress-mu/wp-config\.php, /srv/([^/]*/)?www(/.*)?, /var/www(/.*)?, /etc/htdig(/.*)?, /srv/gallery2(/.*)?, /var/lib/trac(/.*)?, /var/lib/htdig(/.*)?, /var/www/icons(/.*)?, /usr/share/htdig(/.*)?, /usr/share/drupal.*, /var/www/svn/conf(/.*)?, /usr/share/icecast(/.*)?, /usr/share/mythweb(/.*)?, /var/lib/cacti/rra(/.*)?, /usr/share/ntop/html(/.*)?, /usr/share/mythtv/data(/.*)?, /usr/share/doc/ghc/html(/.*)?, /usr/share/openca/htdocs(/.*)?, /usr/share/selinux-policy[^/]*/html(/.*)?, /bin/d?ash, /bin/zsh.*, /bin/ksh.*, /usr/bin/d?ash, /usr/bin/ksh.*, /usr/bin/zsh.*, /bin/esh, /bin/mksh, /bin/sash, /bin/tcsh, /bin/yash, /bin/bash, /bin/
fish, /bin/bash2, /usr/bin/esh, /usr/bin/mksh, /usr/bin/sash, /usr/bin/bash, /usr/bin/fish, /usr/bin/tcsh, /usr/bin/yash, /sbin/nologin, /usr/sbin/sesh, /usr/bin/bash2, /usr/sbin/smrsh, /usr/bin/scponly, /usr/sbin/nologin, /usr/libexec/sesh, /usr/sbin/scponlyc, /usr/bin/git-shell, /usr/libexec/git-core/git-shell, /usr/.*\.cgi, /opt/.*\.cgi, /var/www/[^/]*/cgi-bin(/.*)?, /var/www/perl(/.*)?, /var/www/html/[^/]*/cgi-bin(/.*)?, /usr/lib/cgi-bin(/.*)?, /var/www/cgi-bin(/.*)?, /var/www/svn/hooks(/.*)?, /usr/share/wordpress/.*\.php, /usr/share/wordpress/wp-includes/.*\.php, /usr/share/mythtv/mythweather/scripts(/.*)?, /usr/share/mythweb/mythweb\.pl, /usr/share/wordpress-mu/wp-config\.php
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the pacemaker_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux httpd_sys_script policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their httpd_sys_script processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for httpd_sys_script:
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B httpd_sys_script_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.SH SHARING FILES
++If you want to share files with multiple domains (Apache, FTP, rsync, Samba), you can set a file context of public_content_t and public_content_rw_t. These context allow any of the above domains to read the content. If you want a particular domain to write to the public_content_rw_t domain, you must set the appropriate boolean.
++.TP
++Allow httpd_sys_script servers to read the /var/httpd_sys_script directory by adding the public_content_t file type to the directory and by restoring the file type.
+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.B
++semanage fcontext -a -t public_content_t "/var/httpd_sys_script(/.*)?"
++.br
++.B restorecon -F -R -v /var/httpd_sys_script
++.pp
++.TP
++Allow httpd_sys_script servers to read and write /var/tmp/incoming by adding the public_content_rw_t type to the directory and by restoring the file type. This also requires the allow_httpd_sys_scriptd_anon_write boolean to be set.
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux pacemaker policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their pacemaker processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for pacemaker:
++.B
++semanage fcontext -a -t public_content_rw_t "/var/httpd_sys_script/incoming(/.*)?"
++.br
++.B restorecon -F -R -v /var/httpd_sys_script/incoming
+
+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B pacemaker_exec_t
-+.EE
++If you want to allow apache scripts to write to public content, directories/files must be labeled public_rw_content_t., you must turn on the httpd_sys_script_anon_write boolean.
+
-+- Set files with the pacemaker_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the pacemaker_t domain.
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P httpd_sys_script_anon_write 1
++.EE
+
++.PP
++If you want to allow apache scripts to write to public content, directories/files must be labeled public_rw_content_t., you must turn on the httpd_sys_script_anon_write boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B pacemaker_initrc_exec_t
++.B setsebool -P httpd_sys_script_anon_write 1
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the pacemaker_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the pacemaker_initrc_t domain.
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux httpd_sys_script policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their httpd_sys_script processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for httpd_sys_script:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B pacemaker_unit_file_t
++.B httpd_sys_script_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the pacemaker_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as pacemaker unit content.
++- Set files with the httpd_sys_script_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the httpd_sys_script_t domain.
+
+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B pacemaker_var_lib_t
-+.EE
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
+
-+- Set files with the pacemaker_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the pacemaker files under the /var/lib directory.
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type httpd_sys_script_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/lib/pengine(/.*)?, /var/lib/heartbeat/crm(/.*)?
++.B httpd_sys_rw_content_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B pacemaker_var_run_t
-+.EE
++ /etc/drupal.*
++.br
++ /var/lib/svn(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/www/svn(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/mock/koji(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/www/html/[^/]*/sites/default/files(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/www/html/[^/]*/sites/default/settings\.php
++.br
++ /var/lib/drupal.*
++.br
++ /etc/zabbix/web(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/spool/gosa(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/WebCalendar(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/dokuwiki(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/spool/viewvc(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/pootle/po(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/www/moodledata(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/www/gallery/albums(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/www/html/wp-content(/.*)?
++.br
++ /usr/share/wordpress-mu/wp-content(/.*)?
++.br
++ /usr/share/wordpress/wp-content/uploads(/.*)?
++.br
++ /usr/share/wordpress/wp-content/upgrade(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/owncloud/config\.php
++.br
++ /var/www/html/configuration\.php
++.br
+
-+- Set files with the pacemaker_var_run_t type, if you want to store the pacemaker files under the /run directory.
++.br
++.B httpd_tmp_t
+
++ /var/run/user/apache(/.*)?
++.br
+
-+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux pacemaker policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their pacemaker processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for pacemaker:
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the httpd_sys_script_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B pacemaker_t
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
++
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the httpd_sys_script_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -35095,101 +37623,96 @@ index 0000000..3dee1f7
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), pacemaker(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/pads_selinux.8 b/man/man8/pads_selinux.8
++selinux(8), httpd_sys_script(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, httpd_selinux(8), httpd_selinux(8), httpd_apcupsd_cgi_script_selinux(8), httpd_awstats_script_selinux(8), httpd_bugzilla_script_selinux(8), httpd_cobbler_script_selinux(8), httpd_collectd_script_selinux(8), httpd_cvs_script_selinux(8), httpd_dirsrvadmin_script_selinux(8), httpd_dspam_script_selinux(8), httpd_git_script_selinux(8), httpd_helper_selinux(8), httpd_man2html_script_selinux(8), httpd_mediawiki_script_selinux(8), httpd_mojomojo_script_selinux(8), httpd_munin_script_selinux(8), httpd_nagios_script_selinux(8), httpd_nutups_cgi_script_selinux(8), httpd_openshift_script_selinux(8), httpd_passwd_selinux(8), httpd_php_selinux(8), httpd_prewikka_script_selinux(8), httpd_rotatelogs_selinux(8), httpd_smokeping_cgi_script_selinux(8), httpd_squid_script_selinux(8), httpd_suexec_selinux(8), httpd_user_script_selinux(8), httpd_w3c_validator_script_selinux(8), httpd_zoneminder_script_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/httpd_user_script_selinux.8 b/man/man8/httpd_user_script_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..9bdc166
+index 0000000..4764520
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/pads_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
-+.TH "pads_selinux" "8" "pads" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "pads SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/httpd_user_script_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
++.TH "httpd_user_script_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "httpd_user_script" "SELinux Policy documentation for httpd_user_script"
+.SH "NAME"
-+pads_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the pads processes
++httpd_user_script_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the httpd_user_script processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the pads processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the httpd_user_script processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The httpd_user_script processes execute with the httpd_user_script_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux pads policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their pads processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for pads:
++For example:
+
++.B ps -eZ | grep httpd_user_script_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B pads_config_t
-+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the pads_config_t type, if you want to treat the files as pads configuration data, usually stored under the /etc directory.
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/etc/pads-assets.csv, /etc/pads-ether-codes, /etc/pads\.conf, /etc/pads-signature-list
++The httpd_user_script_t SELinux type can be entered via the "shell_exec_t,httpd_user_script_exec_t,httpd_user_script_exec_t" file types. The default entrypoint paths for the httpd_user_script_t domain are the following:"
+
-+.EX
++/bin/d?ash, /bin/zsh.*, /bin/ksh.*, /usr/bin/d?ash, /usr/bin/ksh.*, /usr/bin/zsh.*, /bin/esh, /bin/mksh, /bin/sash, /bin/tcsh, /bin/yash, /bin/bash, /bin/fish, /bin/bash2, /usr/bin/esh, /usr/bin/mksh, /usr/bin/sash, /usr/bin/bash, /usr/bin/fish, /usr/bin/tcsh, /usr/bin/yash, /sbin/nologin, /usr/sbin/sesh, /usr/bin/bash2, /usr/sbin/smrsh, /usr/bin/scponly, /usr/sbin/nologin, /usr/libexec/sesh, /usr/sbin/scponlyc, /usr/bin/git-shell, /usr/libexec/git-core/git-shell, /home/[^/]*/((www)|(web)|(public_html))/cgi-bin(/.+)?, /home/dwalsh/((www)|(web)|(public_html))/cgi-bin(/.+)?, /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/((www)|(web)|(public_html))/cgi-bin(/.+)?, /home/[^/]*/((www)|(web)|(public_html))/cgi-bin(/.+)?, /home/dwalsh/((www)|(web)|(public_html))/cgi-bin(/.+)?, /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/((www)|(web)|(public_html))/cgi-bin(/.+)?
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+.B pads_exec_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the pads_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the pads_t domain.
-+
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux httpd_user_script policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their httpd_user_script processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for httpd_user_script:
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B pads_initrc_exec_t
++.B httpd_user_script_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
-+- Set files with the pads_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the pads_initrc_t domain.
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux httpd_user_script policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their httpd_user_script processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for httpd_user_script:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B pads_var_run_t
++.B httpd_user_script_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the pads_var_run_t type, if you want to store the pads files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the httpd_user_script_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the httpd_user_script_t domain.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux pads policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their pads processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for pads:
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type httpd_user_script_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B httpd_user_rw_content_t
+
-+.EX
-+.B pads_t
-+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -35202,128 +37725,203 @@ index 0000000..9bdc166
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), pads(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/passenger_selinux.8 b/man/man8/passenger_selinux.8
++selinux(8), httpd_user_script(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, httpd_selinux(8), httpd_selinux(8), httpd_apcupsd_cgi_script_selinux(8), httpd_awstats_script_selinux(8), httpd_bugzilla_script_selinux(8), httpd_cobbler_script_selinux(8), httpd_collectd_script_selinux(8), httpd_cvs_script_selinux(8), httpd_dirsrvadmin_script_selinux(8), httpd_dspam_script_selinux(8), httpd_git_script_selinux(8), httpd_helper_selinux(8), httpd_man2html_script_selinux(8), httpd_mediawiki_script_selinux(8), httpd_mojomojo_script_selinux(8), httpd_munin_script_selinux(8), httpd_nagios_script_selinux(8), httpd_nutups_cgi_script_selinux(8), httpd_openshift_script_selinux(8), httpd_passwd_selinux(8), httpd_php_selinux(8), httpd_prewikka_script_selinux(8), httpd_rotatelogs_selinux(8), httpd_smokeping_cgi_script_selinux(8), httpd_squid_script_selinux(8), httpd_suexec_selinux(8), httpd_sys_script_selinux(8), httpd_w3c_validator_script_selinux(8), httpd_zoneminder_script_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/httpd_w3c_validator_script_selinux.8 b/man/man8/httpd_w3c_validator_script_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..c98960e
+index 0000000..1191c99
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/passenger_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,127 @@
-+.TH "passenger_selinux" "8" "passenger" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "passenger SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/httpd_w3c_validator_script_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
++.TH "httpd_w3c_validator_script_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "httpd_w3c_validator_script" "SELinux Policy documentation for httpd_w3c_validator_script"
+.SH "NAME"
-+passenger_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the passenger processes
++httpd_w3c_validator_script_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the httpd_w3c_validator_script processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the passenger processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the httpd_w3c_validator_script processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The httpd_w3c_validator_script processes execute with the httpd_w3c_validator_script_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the passenger_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep httpd_w3c_validator_script_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
++The httpd_w3c_validator_script_t SELinux type can be entered via the "shell_exec_t,httpd_w3c_validator_script_exec_t,httpd_w3c_validator_script_exec_t" file types. The default entrypoint paths for the httpd_w3c_validator_script_t domain are the following:"
++
++/bin/d?ash, /bin/zsh.*, /bin/ksh.*, /usr/bin/d?ash, /usr/bin/ksh.*, /usr/bin/zsh.*, /bin/esh, /bin/mksh, /bin/sash, /bin/tcsh, /bin/yash, /bin/bash, /bin/fish, /bin/bash2, /usr/bin/esh, /usr/bin/mksh, /usr/bin/sash, /usr/bin/bash, /usr/bin/fish, /usr/bin/tcsh, /usr/bin/yash, /sbin/nologin, /usr/sbin/sesh, /usr/bin/bash2, /usr/sbin/smrsh, /usr/bin/scponly, /usr/sbin/nologin, /usr/libexec/sesh, /usr/sbin/scponlyc, /usr/bin/git-shell, /usr/libexec/git-core/git-shell, /usr/share/w3c-markup-validator/cgi-bin(/.*)?, /usr/lib/cgi-bin/check, /usr/share/w3c-markup-validator/cgi-bin(/.*)?, /usr/lib/cgi-bin/check
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the passenger_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux httpd_w3c_validator_script policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their httpd_w3c_validator_script processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for httpd_w3c_validator_script:
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B httpd_w3c_validator_script_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux passenger policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their passenger processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for passenger:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux httpd_w3c_validator_script policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their httpd_w3c_validator_script processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for httpd_w3c_validator_script:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B passenger_exec_t
++.B httpd_w3c_validator_script_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the passenger_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the passenger_t domain.
++- Set files with the httpd_w3c_validator_script_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the httpd_w3c_validator_script_t domain.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/lib/ruby/gems/.*/passenger-.*/agents/PassengerLoggingAgent, /usr/lib/ruby/gems/.*/passenger-.*/agents/apache2/PassengerHelperAgent, /usr/lib/ruby/gems/.*/passenger-.*/agents/PassengerWatchdog, /usr/lib/ruby/gems/.*/passenger-.*/ext/apache2/ApplicationPoolServerExecutable
+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B passenger_log_t
-+.EE
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
+
-+- Set files with the passenger_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as passenger log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type httpd_w3c_validator_script_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/log/passenger.*, /var/log/passenger(/.*)?
++.B httpd_w3c_validator_rw_content_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B passenger_tmp_t
-+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the passenger_tmp_t type, if you want to store passenger temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++.br
++.B httpd_w3c_validator_tmp_t
+
+
-+.EX
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
+.PP
-+.B passenger_var_lib_t
-+.EE
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
-+- Set files with the passenger_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the passenger files under the /var/lib directory.
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B passenger_var_run_t
-+.EE
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), httpd_w3c_validator_script(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, httpd_selinux(8), httpd_selinux(8), httpd_apcupsd_cgi_script_selinux(8), httpd_awstats_script_selinux(8), httpd_bugzilla_script_selinux(8), httpd_cobbler_script_selinux(8), httpd_collectd_script_selinux(8), httpd_cvs_script_selinux(8), httpd_dirsrvadmin_script_selinux(8), httpd_dspam_script_selinux(8), httpd_git_script_selinux(8), httpd_helper_selinux(8), httpd_man2html_script_selinux(8), httpd_mediawiki_script_selinux(8), httpd_mojomojo_script_selinux(8), httpd_munin_script_selinux(8), httpd_nagios_script_selinux(8), httpd_nutups_cgi_script_selinux(8), httpd_openshift_script_selinux(8), httpd_passwd_selinux(8), httpd_php_selinux(8), httpd_prewikka_script_selinux(8), httpd_rotatelogs_selinux(8), httpd_smokeping_cgi_script_selinux(8), httpd_squid_script_selinux(8), httpd_suexec_selinux(8), httpd_sys_script_selinux(8), httpd_user_script_selinux(8), httpd_zoneminder_script_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/httpd_zoneminder_script_selinux.8 b/man/man8/httpd_zoneminder_script_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..9666a60
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/httpd_zoneminder_script_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
++.TH "httpd_zoneminder_script_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "httpd_zoneminder_script" "SELinux Policy documentation for httpd_zoneminder_script"
++.SH "NAME"
++httpd_zoneminder_script_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the httpd_zoneminder_script processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+- Set files with the passenger_var_run_t type, if you want to store the passenger files under the /run directory.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the httpd_zoneminder_script processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
++The httpd_zoneminder_script processes execute with the httpd_zoneminder_script_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep httpd_zoneminder_script_t
+
-+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
+
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The httpd_zoneminder_script_t SELinux type can be entered via the "httpd_zoneminder_script_exec_t,shell_exec_t,httpd_zoneminder_script_exec_t" file types. The default entrypoint paths for the httpd_zoneminder_script_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/libexec/zoneminder/cgi-bin(/.*)?, /bin/d?ash, /bin/zsh.*, /bin/ksh.*, /usr/bin/d?ash, /usr/bin/ksh.*, /usr/bin/zsh.*, /bin/esh, /bin/mksh, /bin/sash, /bin/tcsh, /bin/yash, /bin/bash, /bin/fish, /bin/bash2, /usr/bin/esh, /usr/bin/mksh, /usr/bin/sash, /usr/bin/bash, /usr/bin/fish, /usr/bin/tcsh, /usr/bin/yash, /sbin/nologin, /usr/sbin/sesh, /usr/bin/bash2, /usr/sbin/smrsh, /usr/bin/scponly, /usr/sbin/nologin, /usr/libexec/sesh, /usr/sbin/scponlyc, /usr/bin/git-shell, /usr/libexec/git-core/git-shell, /usr/libexec/zoneminder/cgi-bin(/.*)?
+.SH PROCESS TYPES
+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux passenger policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their passenger processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for passenger:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux httpd_zoneminder_script policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their httpd_zoneminder_script processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for httpd_zoneminder_script:
+
+.EX
-+.B passenger_t
++.B httpd_zoneminder_script_t
+.EE
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux httpd_zoneminder_script policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their httpd_zoneminder_script processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for httpd_zoneminder_script:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B httpd_zoneminder_script_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the httpd_zoneminder_script_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the httpd_zoneminder_script_t domain.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type httpd_zoneminder_script_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B httpd_zoneminder_rw_content_t
++
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
+can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
@@ -35335,103 +37933,112 @@ index 0000000..c98960e
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), passenger(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/passwd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/passwd_selinux.8
++selinux(8), httpd_zoneminder_script(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, httpd_selinux(8), httpd_selinux(8), httpd_apcupsd_cgi_script_selinux(8), httpd_awstats_script_selinux(8), httpd_bugzilla_script_selinux(8), httpd_cobbler_script_selinux(8), httpd_collectd_script_selinux(8), httpd_cvs_script_selinux(8), httpd_dirsrvadmin_script_selinux(8), httpd_dspam_script_selinux(8), httpd_git_script_selinux(8), httpd_helper_selinux(8), httpd_man2html_script_selinux(8), httpd_mediawiki_script_selinux(8), httpd_mojomojo_script_selinux(8), httpd_munin_script_selinux(8), httpd_nagios_script_selinux(8), httpd_nutups_cgi_script_selinux(8), httpd_openshift_script_selinux(8), httpd_passwd_selinux(8), httpd_php_selinux(8), httpd_prewikka_script_selinux(8), httpd_rotatelogs_selinux(8), httpd_smokeping_cgi_script_selinux(8), httpd_squid_script_selinux(8), httpd_suexec_selinux(8), httpd_sys_script_selinux(8), httpd_user_script_selinux(8), httpd_w3c_validator_script_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/hwclock_selinux.8 b/man/man8/hwclock_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..1b99b6f
+index 0000000..5f81eee
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/passwd_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
-+.TH "passwd_selinux" "8" "passwd" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "passwd SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/hwclock_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,110 @@
++.TH "hwclock_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "hwclock" "SELinux Policy documentation for hwclock"
+.SH "NAME"
-+passwd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the passwd processes
++hwclock_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the hwclock processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the passwd processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the hwclock processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The hwclock processes execute with the hwclock_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the passwd_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep hwclock_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The hwclock_t SELinux type can be entered via the "hwclock_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the hwclock_t domain are the following:"
+
++/sbin/hwclock, /usr/sbin/hwclock
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the passwd_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux hwclock policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their hwclock processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for hwclock:
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B hwclock_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux passwd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their passwd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for passwd:
-+
-+
-+.EX
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux hwclock policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their hwclock processes in as secure a method as possible.
+.PP
-+.B passwd_exec_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the passwd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the passwd_t domain.
++The following file types are defined for hwclock:
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/bin/passwd, /usr/bin/chage
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B passwd_file_t
++.B hwclock_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the passwd_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as passwd content.
++- Set files with the hwclock_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the hwclock_t domain.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/etc/passwd\.OLD, /etc/ptmptmp, /etc/group[-\+]?, /etc/passwd[-\+]?
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type hwclock_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B adjtime_t
++
++ /etc/adjtime
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux passwd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their passwd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for passwd:
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the hwclock_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B passwd_t
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
++
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the hwclock_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -35444,85 +38051,118 @@ index 0000000..1b99b6f
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), passwd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/pcscd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/pcscd_selinux.8
++selinux(8), hwclock(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/iceauth_selinux.8 b/man/man8/iceauth_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..c2a4661
+index 0000000..2459ffa
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/pcscd_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
-+.TH "pcscd_selinux" "8" "pcscd" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "pcscd SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/iceauth_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,118 @@
++.TH "iceauth_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "iceauth" "SELinux Policy documentation for iceauth"
+.SH "NAME"
-+pcscd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the pcscd processes
++iceauth_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the iceauth processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the pcscd processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the iceauth processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The iceauth processes execute with the iceauth_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep iceauth_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The iceauth_t SELinux type can be entered via the "iceauth_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the iceauth_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/bin/iceauth, /usr/X11R6/bin/iceauth
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux iceauth policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their iceauth processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for iceauth:
++
++.EX
++.B iceauth_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux pcscd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their pcscd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for pcscd:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux iceauth policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their iceauth processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for iceauth:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B pcscd_exec_t
++.B iceauth_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the pcscd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the pcscd_t domain.
++- Set files with the iceauth_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the iceauth_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B pcscd_var_run_t
++.B iceauth_home_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the pcscd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the pcscd files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the iceauth_home_t type, if you want to store iceauth files in the users home directory.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/run/pcscd\.pid, /var/run/pcscd\.comm, /var/run/pcscd\.events(/.*)?, /var/run/pcscd\.pub, /var/run/pcscd(/.*)?
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux pcscd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their pcscd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for pcscd:
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+.EX
-+.B pcscd_t
-+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++The SELinux process type iceauth_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B iceauth_home_t
++
++ /root/\.DCOP.*
++.br
++ /root/\.ICEauthority.*
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.DCOP.*
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.ICEauthority.*
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.DCOP.*
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.ICEauthority.*
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.DCOP.*
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.ICEauthority.*
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -35535,169 +38175,158 @@ index 0000000..c2a4661
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), pcscd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/pegasus_selinux.8 b/man/man8/pegasus_selinux.8
++selinux(8), iceauth(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/icecast_selinux.8 b/man/man8/icecast_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..95434a5
+index 0000000..f0455d7
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/pegasus_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,172 @@
-+.TH "pegasus_selinux" "8" "pegasus" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "pegasus SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/icecast_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,162 @@
++.TH "icecast_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "icecast" "SELinux Policy documentation for icecast"
+.SH "NAME"
-+pegasus_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the pegasus processes
++icecast_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the icecast processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the pegasus processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the icecast processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The icecast processes execute with the icecast_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the pegasus_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep icecast_t
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the pegasus_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
-+.EE
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++The icecast_t SELinux type can be entered via the "icecast_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the icecast_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/bin/icecast
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux pegasus policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their pegasus processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for pegasus:
-+
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux icecast policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their icecast processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for icecast:
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B pegasus_conf_t
++.B icecast_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH BOOLEANS
++SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. icecast policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run icecast with the tightest access possible.
+
-+- Set files with the pegasus_conf_t type, if you want to treat the files as pegasus configuration data, usually stored under the /etc directory.
+
++.PP
++If you want to allow icecast to connect to all ports, not just sound ports, you must turn on the icecast_connect_any boolean.
+
+.EX
++.B setsebool -P icecast_connect_any 1
++.EE
++
+.PP
-+.B pegasus_data_t
++If you want to allow icecast to connect to all ports, not just sound ports, you must turn on the icecast_connect_any boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P icecast_connect_any 1
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the pegasus_data_t type, if you want to treat the files as pegasus content.
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux icecast policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their icecast processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for icecast:
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/etc/Pegasus/pegasus_current\.conf, /var/lib/Pegasus(/.*)?
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B pegasus_exec_t
++.B icecast_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the pegasus_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the pegasus_t domain.
++- Set files with the icecast_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the icecast_t domain.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/sbin/init_repository, /usr/sbin/cimserver
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B pegasus_mof_t
++.B icecast_initrc_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the pegasus_mof_t type, if you want to treat the files as pegasus mof data.
++- Set files with the icecast_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the icecast_initrc_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B pegasus_tmp_t
++.B icecast_log_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the pegasus_tmp_t type, if you want to store pegasus temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++- Set files with the icecast_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as icecast log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B pegasus_var_run_t
++.B icecast_var_run_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the pegasus_var_run_t type, if you want to store the pegasus files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the icecast_var_run_t type, if you want to store the icecast files under the /run directory.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PORT TYPES
-+SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
-+.PP
-+You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+.B semanage port -l
++The SELinux process type icecast_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
-+SELinux pegasus policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their pegasus processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following port types are defined for pegasus:
++.br
++.B icecast_log_t
+
-+.EX
-+.TP 5
-+.B pegasus_http_port_t
-+.TP 10
-+.EE
++ /var/log/icecast(/.*)?
++.br
+
++.br
++.B icecast_var_run_t
+
-+Default Defined Ports:
-+tcp 5988
-+.EE
++ /var/run/icecast(/.*)?
++.br
+
-+.EX
-+.TP 5
-+.B pegasus_https_port_t
-+.TP 10
-+.EE
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the icecast_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
-+Default Defined Ports:
-+tcp 5989
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux pegasus policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their pegasus processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for pegasus:
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the icecast_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B pegasus_t
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -35709,115 +38338,120 @@ index 0000000..95434a5
+.B semanage module
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
-+.B semanage port
-+can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
++.B semanage boolean
++can also be used to manipulate the booleans
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), pegasus(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/phpfpm_selinux.8 b/man/man8/phpfpm_selinux.8
++selinux(8), icecast(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, setsebool(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/ifconfig_selinux.8 b/man/man8/ifconfig_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..343e576
+index 0000000..955a7ad
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/phpfpm_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
-+.TH "phpfpm_selinux" "8" "phpfpm" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "phpfpm SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/ifconfig_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,114 @@
++.TH "ifconfig_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "ifconfig" "SELinux Policy documentation for ifconfig"
+.SH "NAME"
-+phpfpm_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the phpfpm processes
++ifconfig_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the ifconfig processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the phpfpm processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the ifconfig processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The ifconfig processes execute with the ifconfig_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the phpfpm_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep ifconfig_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The ifconfig_t SELinux type can be entered via the "ifconfig_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the ifconfig_t domain are the following:"
+
++/bin/ip, /sbin/ip, /sbin/tc, /usr/bin/ip, /usr/sbin/ip, /usr/sbin/tc, /sbin/ethtool, /sbin/ifconfig, /sbin/iwconfig, /sbin/mii-tool, /usr/sbin/ethtool, /usr/sbin/ifconfig, /usr/sbin/iwconfig, /usr/sbin/mii-tool, /sbin/ipx_configure, /sbin/ipx_interface, /sbin/ipx_internal_net, /usr/sbin/ipx_configure, /usr/sbin/ipx_interface, /usr/sbin/ipx_internal_net
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the phpfpm_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux ifconfig policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ifconfig processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for ifconfig:
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B ifconfig_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux phpfpm policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their phpfpm processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for phpfpm:
-+
-+
-+.EX
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux ifconfig policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ifconfig processes in as secure a method as possible.
+.PP
-+.B phpfpm_exec_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the phpfpm_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the phpfpm_t domain.
++The following file types are defined for ifconfig:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B phpfpm_log_t
++.B ifconfig_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the phpfpm_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as phpfpm log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++- Set files with the ifconfig_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ifconfig_t domain.
+
+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B phpfpm_unit_file_t
-+.EE
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
+
-+- Set files with the phpfpm_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as phpfpm unit content.
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
++The SELinux process type ifconfig_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B phpfpm_var_run_t
-+.EE
++.br
++.B ipsec_var_run_t
+
-+- Set files with the phpfpm_var_run_t type, if you want to store the phpfpm files under the /run directory.
++ /var/racoon(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/pluto(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/racoon\.pid
++.br
+
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the ifconfig_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux phpfpm policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their phpfpm processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for phpfpm:
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the ifconfig_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B phpfpm_t
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -35830,157 +38464,153 @@ index 0000000..343e576
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), phpfpm(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/ping_selinux.8 b/man/man8/ping_selinux.8
++selinux(8), ifconfig(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/inetd_child_selinux.8 b/man/man8/inetd_child_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..f9fabf0
+index 0000000..8239b51
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/ping_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,164 @@
-+.TH "ping_selinux" "8" "ping" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "ping SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/inetd_child_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,157 @@
++.TH "inetd_child_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "inetd_child" "SELinux Policy documentation for inetd_child"
+.SH "NAME"
-+ping_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the ping processes
++inetd_child_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the inetd_child processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the ping processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
-+
-+.SH BOOLEANS
-+SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. ping policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run ping with the tightest access possible.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the inetd_child processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
++The inetd_child processes execute with the inetd_child_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to control users use of ping and traceroute, you must turn on the user_ping boolean.
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P user_ping 1
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep inetd_child_t
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the pingd_t, ping_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
++The inetd_child_t SELinux type can be entered via the "inetd_child_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the inetd_child_t domain are the following:"
+
++/usr/sbin/in\..*d, /usr/local/lib/pysieved/pysieved.*\.py, /usr/sbin/identd
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the pingd_t, ping_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux inetd_child policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their inetd_child processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for inetd_child:
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B inetd_child_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux ping policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ping processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for ping:
-+
-+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B ping_exec_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the ping_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ping_t domain.
-+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/bin/ping.*, /usr/sbin/hping2, /usr/sbin/fping.*, /bin/ping.*, /usr/sbin/send_arp
-+
-+.EX
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux inetd_child policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their inetd_child processes in as secure a method as possible.
+.PP
-+.B pingd_etc_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the pingd_etc_t type, if you want to store pingd files in the /etc directories.
++The following file types are defined for inetd_child:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B pingd_exec_t
++.B inetd_child_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the pingd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the pingd_t domain.
++- Set files with the inetd_child_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the inetd_child_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B pingd_initrc_exec_t
++.B inetd_child_tmp_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the pingd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the pingd_initrc_t domain.
++- Set files with the inetd_child_tmp_t type, if you want to store inetd child temporary files in the /tmp directories.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B pingd_modules_t
++.B inetd_child_var_run_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the pingd_modules_t type, if you want to treat the files as pingd modules.
++- Set files with the inetd_child_var_run_t type, if you want to store the inetd child files under the /run directory.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
+.SH PORT TYPES
-+SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
++SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
+.PP
-+You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
++You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
+
+.B semanage port -l
+
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
-+SELinux ping policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ping processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following port types are defined for ping:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
++SELinux inetd_child policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their inetd_child processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following port types are defined for inetd_child:
+
+.EX
+.TP 5
-+.B pingd_port_t
++.B inetd_child_port_t
+.TP 10
+.EE
+
+
+Default Defined Ports:
-+tcp 9125
++tcp 1,9,13,19,512,543,544,891,892,2105,5666
+.EE
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++udp 1,9,13,19,891,892
++.EE
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type inetd_child_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B inetd_child_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B inetd_child_var_run_t
++
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux ping policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ping processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for ping:
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the inetd_child_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B ping_t, pingd_t
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
++
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the inetd_child_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -35995,151 +38625,202 @@ index 0000000..f9fabf0
+.B semanage port
+can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
+
-+.B semanage boolean
-+can also be used to manipulate the booleans
-+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), ping(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-+, setsebool(8)
++selinux(8), inetd_child(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, inetd_selinux(8), inetd_selinux(8)
\ No newline at end of file
-diff --git a/man/man8/pingd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/pingd_selinux.8
+diff --git a/man/man8/inetd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/inetd_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..7e85446
+index 0000000..3f605ab
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/pingd_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,152 @@
-+.TH "pingd_selinux" "8" "pingd" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "pingd SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/inetd_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,203 @@
++.TH "inetd_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "inetd" "SELinux Policy documentation for inetd"
+.SH "NAME"
-+pingd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the pingd processes
++inetd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the inetd processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the pingd processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the inetd processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH BOOLEANS
-+SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. pingd policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run pingd with the tightest access possible.
++The inetd processes execute with the inetd_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
++For example:
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to control users use of ping and traceroute, you must turn on the user_ping boolean.
++.B ps -eZ | grep inetd_t
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P user_ping 1
-+.EE
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The inetd_t SELinux type can be entered via the "inetd_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the inetd_t domain are the following:"
+
++/usr/sbin/inetd, /usr/sbin/xinetd, /usr/sbin/rlinetd
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the pingd_t, ping_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux inetd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their inetd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for inetd:
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.B inetd_t, inetd_child_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the pingd_t, ping_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux inetd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their inetd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for inetd:
++
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.PP
++.B inetd_child_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++- Set files with the inetd_child_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the inetd_child_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.B inetd_child_tmp_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the inetd_child_tmp_t type, if you want to store inetd child temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++
++
++.EX
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux pingd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their pingd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for pingd:
++.B inetd_child_var_run_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the inetd_child_var_run_t type, if you want to store the inetd child files under the /run directory.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B pingd_etc_t
++.B inetd_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the pingd_etc_t type, if you want to store pingd files in the /etc directories.
++- Set files with the inetd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the inetd_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B pingd_exec_t
++.B inetd_log_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the pingd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the pingd_t domain.
++- Set files with the inetd_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as inetd log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B pingd_initrc_exec_t
++.B inetd_tmp_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the pingd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the pingd_initrc_t domain.
++- Set files with the inetd_tmp_t type, if you want to store inetd temporary files in the /tmp directories.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B pingd_modules_t
++.B inetd_var_run_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the pingd_modules_t type, if you want to treat the files as pingd modules.
++- Set files with the inetd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the inetd files under the /run directory.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
+.SH PORT TYPES
-+SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
++SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
+.PP
-+You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
++You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
+
+.B semanage port -l
+
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
-+SELinux pingd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their pingd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following port types are defined for pingd:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
++SELinux inetd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their inetd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following port types are defined for inetd:
+
+.EX
+.TP 5
-+.B pingd_port_t
++.B inetd_child_port_t
+.TP 10
+.EE
+
+
+Default Defined Ports:
-+tcp 9125
++tcp 1,9,13,19,512,543,544,891,892,2105,5666
+.EE
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++udp 1,9,13,19,891,892
++.EE
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type inetd_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B inetd_log_t
++
++ /var/log/(x)?inetd\.log.*
++.br
++
++.br
++.B inetd_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B inetd_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/(x)?inetd\.pid
++.br
++
++.br
++.B security_t
++
++ /selinux
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux pingd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their pingd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for pingd:
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the inetd_t, inetd_child_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B ping_t, pingd_t
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
++
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the inetd_t, inetd_child_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -36154,243 +38835,467 @@ index 0000000..7e85446
+.B semanage port
+can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
+
-+.B semanage boolean
-+can also be used to manipulate the booleans
-+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), pingd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-+, setsebool(8)
++selinux(8), inetd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, inetd_child_selinux(8)
\ No newline at end of file
-diff --git a/man/man8/piranha_selinux.8 b/man/man8/piranha_selinux.8
+diff --git a/man/man8/init_selinux.8 b/man/man8/init_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..7ca6103
+index 0000000..d772d9a
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/piranha_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,244 @@
-+.TH "piranha_selinux" "8" "piranha" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "piranha SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/init_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,465 @@
++.TH "init_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "init" "SELinux Policy documentation for init"
+.SH "NAME"
-+piranha_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the piranha processes
++init_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the init processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the piranha processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
-+
-+.SH BOOLEANS
-+SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. piranha policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run piranha with the tightest access possible.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the init processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
++The init processes execute with the init_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow piranha-lvs domain to connect to the network using TCP, you must turn on the piranha_lvs_can_network_connect boolean.
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P piranha_lvs_can_network_connect 1
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep init_t
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the piranha_pulse_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
++The init_t SELinux type can be entered via the "init_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the init_t domain are the following:"
+
++/sbin/init(ng)?, /usr/sbin/init(ng)?, /usr/lib/systemd/[^/]*, /usr/lib/systemd/system-generators/[^/]*, /bin/systemd, /sbin/upstart, /usr/bin/systemd, /usr/sbin/upstart
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the piranha_pulse_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux init policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their init processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for init:
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B initrc_t, init_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux piranha policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their piranha processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for piranha:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux init policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their init processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for init:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B piranha_etc_rw_t
++.B init_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the piranha_etc_rw_t type, if you want to treat the files as piranha etc read/write content.
++- Set files with the init_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the init_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B piranha_fos_exec_t
++.B init_var_lib_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the piranha_fos_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the piranha_fos_t domain.
++- Set files with the init_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the init files under the /var/lib directory.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B piranha_fos_var_run_t
++.B init_var_run_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the piranha_fos_var_run_t type, if you want to store the piranha fos files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the init_var_run_t type, if you want to store the init files under the /run directory.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B piranha_log_t
++.B initctl_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the piranha_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as piranha log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++- Set files with the initctl_t type, if you want to treat the files as initctl data.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B piranha_lvs_exec_t
++.B initrc_devpts_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the piranha_lvs_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the piranha_lvs_t domain.
++- Set files with the initrc_devpts_t type, if you want to treat the files as initrc devpts data.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B piranha_lvs_var_run_t
++.B initrc_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the piranha_lvs_var_run_t type, if you want to store the piranha lvs files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the initrc_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B piranha_pulse_exec_t
++.B initrc_state_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the piranha_pulse_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the piranha_pulse_t domain.
++- Set files with the initrc_state_t type, if you want to treat the files as initrc state data.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B piranha_pulse_initrc_exec_t
++.B initrc_tmp_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the piranha_pulse_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the piranha_pulse_initrc_t domain.
++- Set files with the initrc_tmp_t type, if you want to store initrc temporary files in the /tmp directories.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B piranha_pulse_var_run_t
++.B initrc_var_log_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the piranha_pulse_var_run_t type, if you want to store the piranha pulse files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the initrc_var_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as initrc var log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B piranha_web_conf_t
++.B initrc_var_run_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the piranha_web_conf_t type, if you want to treat the files as piranha web configuration data, usually stored under the /etc directory.
++- Set files with the initrc_var_run_t type, if you want to store the initrc files under the /run directory.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/lib/luci/etc(/.*)?, /var/lib/luci/cert(/.*)?
+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B piranha_web_data_t
-+.EE
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
+
-+- Set files with the piranha_web_data_t type, if you want to treat the files as piranha web content.
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
++The SELinux process type init_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B piranha_web_exec_t
-+.EE
++.br
++.B binfmt_misc_fs_t
+
-+- Set files with the piranha_web_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the piranha_web_t domain.
+
++.br
++.B boolean_type
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B piranha_web_tmp_t
-+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the piranha_web_tmp_t type, if you want to store piranha web temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++.br
++.B cgroup_t
+
++ /cgroup
++.br
++ /sys/fs/cgroup
++.br
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B piranha_web_tmpfs_t
-+.EE
++.br
++.B consolekit_log_t
+
-+- Set files with the piranha_web_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store piranha web files on a tmpfs file system.
++ /var/log/ConsoleKit(/.*)?
++.br
+
++.br
++.B device_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B piranha_web_var_run_t
-+.EE
++ /dev/.*
++.br
++ /lib/udev/devices(/.*)?
++.br
++ /usr/lib/udev/devices(/.*)?
++.br
++ /dev
++.br
++ /etc/udev/devices
++.br
++ /var/named/chroot/dev
++.br
++ /var/spool/postfix/dev
++.br
+
-+- Set files with the piranha_web_var_run_t type, if you want to store the piranha web files under the /run directory.
++.br
++.B etc_runtime_t
+
++ /[^/]+
++.br
++ /etc/mtab.*
++.br
++ /etc/blkid(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/nologin.*
++.br
++ /etc/\.fstab\.hal\..+
++.br
++ /halt
++.br
++ /fastboot
++.br
++ /poweroff
++.br
++ /etc/cmtab
++.br
++ /\.autofsck
++.br
++ /forcefsck
++.br
++ /\.suspended
++.br
++ /fsckoptions
++.br
++ /\.autorelabel
++.br
++ /etc/securetty
++.br
++ /etc/killpower
++.br
++ /etc/nohotplug
++.br
++ /etc/ioctl\.save
++.br
++ /etc/fstab\.REVOKE
++.br
++ /etc/network/ifstate
++.br
++ /etc/sysconfig/hwconf
++.br
++ /etc/ptal/ptal-printd-like
++.br
++ /etc/sysconfig/iptables\.save
++.br
++ /etc/xorg\.conf\.d/00-system-setup-keyboard\.conf
++.br
++ /etc/X11/xorg\.conf\.d/00-system-setup-keyboard\.conf
++.br
+
-+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
++.br
++.B init_var_lib_t
+
-+.SH PORT TYPES
-+SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
-+.PP
-+You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
+
-+.B semanage port -l
++.br
++.B init_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/systemd(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B initrc_state_t
++
++
++.br
++.B initrc_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/utmp
++.br
++ /var/run/random-seed
++.br
++ /var/run/runlevel\.dir
++.br
++ /var/run/setmixer_flag
++.br
++
++.br
++.B ld_so_cache_t
++
++ /etc/ld\.so\.cache
++.br
++ /etc/ld\.so\.cache~
++.br
++ /etc/ld\.so\.preload
++.br
++ /etc/ld\.so\.preload~
++.br
++
++.br
++.B locale_t
++
++ /etc/locale.conf
++.br
++ /usr/lib/locale(/.*)?
++.br
++ /usr/share/locale(/.*)?
++.br
++ /usr/share/zoneinfo(/.*)?
++.br
++ /usr/share/X11/locale(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/timezone
++.br
++ /etc/localtime
++.br
++ /etc/sysconfig/clock
++.br
++ /etc/avahi/etc/localtime
++.br
++ /var/empty/sshd/etc/localtime
++.br
++ /var/spool/postfix/etc/localtime
++.br
++
++.br
++.B machineid_t
++
++ /etc/machine-id
++.br
++ /var/run/systemd/machine-id
++.br
++
++.br
++.B print_spool_t
++
++ /var/spool/lpd(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/spool/cups(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/spool/cups-pdf(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B random_seed_t
++
++ /var/lib/random-seed
++.br
++ /usr/var/lib/random-seed
++.br
++
++.br
++.B sysfs_t
++
++ /sys(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B systemd_passwd_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/systemd/ask-password(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/systemd/ask-password-block(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B systemd_unit_file_type
++
++
++.br
++.B tmpfs_t
++
++ /dev/shm
++.br
++ /lib/udev/devices/shm
++.br
++ /usr/lib/udev/devices/shm
++.br
++
++.br
++.B var_lib_t
++
++ /opt/(.*/)?var/lib(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B var_log_t
++
++ /var/log/.*
++.br
++ /nsr/logs(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/webmin(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/log/cron[^/]*
++.br
++ /var/log/secure[^/]*
++.br
++ /opt/zimbra/log(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/log/maillog[^/]*
++.br
++ /var/log/spooler[^/]*
++.br
++ /var/log/messages[^/]*
++.br
++ /usr/centreon/log(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/spool/rsyslog(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/axfrdns/log/main(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/spool/bacula/log(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/tinydns/log/main(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/dnscache/log/main(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/stockmaniac/templates_cache(/.*)?
++.br
++ /opt/Symantec/scspagent/IDS/system(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/log
++.br
++ /var/log/dmesg
++.br
++ /var/log/syslog
++.br
++ /var/named/chroot/var/log
++.br
++
++.br
++.B var_run_t
++
++ /run/.*
++.br
++ /var/run/.*
++.br
++ /run
++.br
++ /var/run
++.br
++ /var/run
++.br
++ /var/spool/postfix/pid
++.br
++
++.br
++.B wtmp_t
++
++ /var/log/wtmp.*
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
-+SELinux piranha policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their piranha processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following port types are defined for piranha:
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the init_t, initrc_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.TP 5
-+.B piranha_port_t
-+.TP 10
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
+
-+
-+Default Defined Ports:
-+tcp 3636
-+.EE
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux piranha policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their piranha processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for piranha:
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the init_t, initrc_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B piranha_pulse_t, piranha_fos_t, piranha_lvs_t, piranha_web_t
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -36402,510 +39307,817 @@ index 0000000..7ca6103
+.B semanage module
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
-+.B semanage port
-+can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
-+
-+.B semanage boolean
-+can also be used to manipulate the booleans
-+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), piranha(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-+, setsebool(8)
++selinux(8), init(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, initrc_selinux(8)
\ No newline at end of file
-diff --git a/man/man8/pki_selinux.8 b/man/man8/pki_selinux.8
+diff --git a/man/man8/initrc_selinux.8 b/man/man8/initrc_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..2272c46
+index 0000000..6dc8740
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/pki_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,504 @@
-+.TH "pki_selinux" "8" "pki" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "pki SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/initrc_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,815 @@
++.TH "initrc_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "initrc" "SELinux Policy documentation for initrc"
+.SH "NAME"
-+pki_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the pki processes
++initrc_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the initrc processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the initrc processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
++The initrc processes execute with the initrc_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
++For example:
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux pki policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their pki processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for pki:
++.B ps -eZ | grep initrc_t
+
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B pki_ca_etc_rw_t
-+.EE
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
-+- Set files with the pki_ca_etc_rw_t type, if you want to treat the files as pki ca etc read/write content.
++The initrc_t SELinux type can be entered via the "glance_api_initrc_exec_t,slapd_initrc_exec_t,clamd_initrc_exec_t,ntop_initrc_exec_t,ntpd_initrc_exec_t,syslogd_initrc_exec_t,ulogd_initrc_exec_t,nscd_initrc_exec_t,bluetooth_initrc_exec_t,chronyd_initrc_exec_t,polipo_initrc_exec_t,boinc_initrc_exec_t,openvpn_initrc_exec_t,nfsd_initrc_exec_t,denyhosts_initrc_exec_t,cgconfig_initrc_exec_t,ddclient_initrc_exec_t,dictd_initrc_exec_t,mongod_initrc_exec_t,ricci_initrc_exec_t,automount_initrc_exec_t,innd_initrc_exec_t,pingd_initrc_exec_t,roundup_initrc_exec_t,zoneminder_initrc_exec_t,certmonger_initrc_exec_t,snort_initrc_exec_t,iwhd_initrc_exec_t,snmpd_initrc_exec_t,radiusd_initrc_exec_t,dhcpd_initrc_exec_t,lircd_initrc_exec_t,cyrus_initrc_exec_t,varnishd_initrc_exec_t,virtd_initrc_exec_t,aiccu_initrc_exec_t,mysqlmanagerd_initrc_exec_t,zabbix_agent_initrc_exec_t,varnishlog_initrc_exec_t,piranha_pulse_initrc_exec_t,glance_registry_initrc_exec_t,collectd_initrc_exec_t,puppetmaster_in
itrc_exec_t,dovecot_initrc_exec_t,zebra_initrc_exec_t,lldpad_initrc_exec_t,httpd_initrc_exec_t,kdump_initrc_exec_t,munin_initrc_exec_t,soundd_initrc_exec_t,bin_t,uuidd_initrc_exec_t,postfix_initrc_exec_t,ctdbd_initrc_exec_t,glusterd_initrc_exec_t,saslauthd_initrc_exec_t,postgresql_initrc_exec_t,kerberos_initrc_exec_t,apcupsd_initrc_exec_t,cupsd_initrc_exec_t,ksmtuned_initrc_exec_t,tuned_initrc_exec_t,exim_initrc_exec_t,fsdaemon_initrc_exec_t,tgtd_initrc_exec_t,ftpd_initrc_exec_t,ajaxterm_initrc_exec_t,hddtemp_initrc_exec_t,tcsd_initrc_exec_t,rhsmcertd_initrc_exec_t,svnserve_initrc_exec_t,shorewall_initrc_exec_t,aisexec_initrc_exec_t,auditd_initrc_exec_t,likewise_initrc_exec_t,cfengine_initrc_exec_t,initrc_exec_t,wdmd_initrc_exec_t,postgrey_initrc_exec_t,avahi_initrc_exec_t,gpsd_initrc_exec_t,privoxy_initrc_exec_t,pki_ra_script_exec_t,shell_exec_t,nagios_initrc_exec_t,rgmanager_initrc_exec_t,tor_initrc_exec_t,radvd_initrc_exec_t,cgred_initrc_exec_t,abrt_initrc_exec_t,ipsec_in
itrc_exec_t,puppet_initrc_exec_t,named_initrc_exec_t,squid_initrc_exec_t,cvs_initrc_exec_t,psad_initrc_exec_t,pppd_initrc_exec_t,afs_initrc_exec_t,canna_initrc_exec_t,firewalld_initrc_exec_t,spamd_initrc_exec_t,nis_initrc_exec_t,samba_initrc_exec_t,pacemaker_initrc_exec_t,mpd_initrc_exec_t,amavis_initrc_exec_t,arpwatch_initrc_exec_t,qpidd_initrc_exec_t,smokeping_initrc_exec_t,bcfg2_initrc_exec_t,callweaver_initrc_exec_t,pki_tps_script_exec_t,pads_initrc_exec_t,mscan_initrc_exec_t,isnsd_initrc_exec_t,rwho_initrc_exec_t,l2tpd_initrc_exec_t,portreserve_initrc_exec_t,NetworkManager_initrc_exec_t,icecast_initrc_exec_t,jabberd_initrc_exec_t,rpcd_initrc_exec_t,vhostmd_initrc_exec_t,nslcd_initrc_exec_t,certmaster_initrc_exec_t,slpd_initrc_exec_t,mysqld_initrc_exec_t,memcached_initrc_exec_t,crond_initrc_exec_t,asterisk_initrc_exec_t,fail2ban_initrc_exec_t,corosync_initrc_exec_t,sssd_initrc_exec_t,zabbix_initrc_exec_t,ypbind_initrc_exec_t,sshd_initrc_exec_t,clvmd_initrc_exec_t,dspam_i
nitrc_exec_t,dhcpc_helper_exec_t,setrans_initrc_exec_t,cmirrord_initrc_exec_t,rngd_initrc_exec_t,prelude_initrc_exec_t,iptables_initrc_exec_t,sendmail_initrc_exec_t,rpcbind_initrc_exec_t,cobblerd_initrc_exec_t,dnsmasq_initrc_exec_t,bitlbee_initrc_exec_t,sanlock_initrc_exec_t" file types. The default entrypoint paths for the initrc_t domain are the following:"
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/etc/pki-ca(/.*)?, /etc/sysconfig/pki/ca(/.*)?
++/etc/rc\.d/init\.d/openstack-glance-api, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/slapd, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/clamd-wrapper, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/ntpd, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/rsyslog, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/ulogd, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/nscd, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/dund, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/pand, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/bluetooth, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/chronyd, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/polipo, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/boinc-client, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/openvpn, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/nfs, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/denyhosts, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/cgconfig, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/ddclient, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/dictd, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/mongod, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/ricci, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/autofs, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/innd, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/whatsup-pingd, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/roundup, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/motion, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/zoneminder, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/certmonger, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/snortd, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/iwhd, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/snmpd, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/snmptrapd, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/radiusd, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/dhcpd(6)?, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/lirc, /e
tc/rc\.d/init\.d/cyrus, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/varnish, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/libvirtd, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/aiccu, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/mysqlmanager, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/zabbix-agentd, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/varnishlog, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/varnishncsa, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/pulse, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/openstack-glance-registry, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/collectd, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/puppetmaster, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/dovecot, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/bgpd, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/ripd, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/ospfd, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/zebra, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/ospf6d, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/ripngd, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/lldpad, /etc/init\.d/cherokee, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/httpd, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/lighttpd, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/kdump, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/munin-node, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/nasd, /bin/.*, /opt/(.*/)?bin(/.*)?, /usr/(.*/)?Bin(/.*)?, /usr/(.*/)?bin(/.*)?, /usr/(.*/)?sbin(/.*)?, /opt/(.*/)?sbin(/.*)?, /opt/(.*/)?libexec(/.*)?, /sbin/.*, /usr/lib(.*/)?bin(/.*)?, /usr/lib(.*/)?sbin(/.*)?, /etc/gdm/[^/]+, /root/bin(/.*)?, /etc/g
dm/[^/]+/.*, /etc/cron.daily(/.*)?, /etc/cron.weekly(/.*)?, /etc/cron.hourly(/.*)?, /etc/cron.monthly(/.*)?, /usr/lib/.*/program(/.*)?, /usr/lib/.*/scripts(/.*)?, /usr/lib/[^/]*/run-mozilla\.sh, /usr/lib/[^/]*/mozilla-xremote-client, /usr/lib/[^/]*thunderbird[^/]*/thunderbird, /usr/lib/[^/]*thunderbird[^/]*/open-browser\.sh, /usr/lib/[^/]*thunderbird[^/]*/thunderbird-bin, /lib/udev/[^/]*, /etc/auto\.[^/]*, /etc/avahi/.*\.action, /usr/lib/qt.*/bin(/.*)?, /usr/lib/yp/.+, /var/ftp/bin(/.*)?, /usr/Brother(/.*)?, /usr/Printer(/.*)?, /usr/libexec(/.*)?, /lib/upstart(/.*)?, /etc/kde/env(/.*)?, /etc/profile.d(/.*)?, /var/mailman.*/bin(/.*)?, /etc/lxdm/Pre.*, /etc/hotplug/.*rc, /usr/lib/cups(/.*)?, /etc/hotplug/.*agent, /usr/Brother/(.*/)?inf/setup.*, /usr/Brother/(.*/)?inf/brprintconf.*, /usr/lib/dpkg/.+, /etc/lxdm/Post.*, /usr/lib/udev/[^/]*, /var/qmail/bin(/.*)?, /usr/lib/xfce4(/.*)?, /usr/lib/fence(/.*)?, /etc/X11/xinit(/.*)?, /lib/readahead(/.*)?, /etc/netplug\.d(/.*)?, /usr/lib
/gimp/.*/plug-ins(/.*)?, /usr/lib/ipsec/.*, /etc/ppp/ip-up\..*, /usr/bin/pingus.*, /etc/cipe/ip-up.*, /usr/lib/dracut(/.*)?, /etc/pm/power\.d(/.*)?, /etc/pm/sleep\.d(/.*)?, /etc/redhat-lsb(/.*)?, /usr/lib/tuned/.*/.*\.sh, /usr/lib/xen/bin(/.*)?, /usr/lib/upstart(/.*)?, /usr/lib/courier(/.*)?, /etc/xen/scripts(/.*)?, /usr/share/tucan.*/tucan.py, /usr/lib/mailman.*/bin(/.*)?, /usr/lib/mailman.*/mail(/.*)?, /etc/ppp/ipv6-up\..*, /etc/ppp/ip-down\..*, /etc/cipe/ip-down.*, /usr/share/hplip/[^/]*, /usr/lib/news/bin(/.*)?, /usr/lib/pm-utils(/.*)?, /etc/vmware-tools(/.*)?, /etc/kde/shutdown(/.*)?, /etc/acpi/actions(/.*)?, /etc/pki/tls/misc(/.*)?, /usr/lib/jvm/java(.*/)bin(/.*), /usr/lib/tumbler-[^/]*/tumblerd, /usr/lib/readahead(/.*)?, /opt/google/chrome(/.*)?, /etc/munin/plugins(/.*)?, /usr/lib/bluetooth(/.*)?, /usr/lib/debug/bin(/.*)?, /usr/lib/xulrunner[^/]*/updater, /usr/lib/xulrunner[^/]*/crashreporter, /usr/lib/xulrunner[^/]*/xulrunner[^/]*, /usr/lib/ruby/gems(/.*)?/helper-scr
ipts(/.*)?, /usr/share/debconf/.+, /etc/ppp/ipv6-down\..*, /usr/share/cluster/.*\.sh, /usr/share/sectool/.*\.py, /usr/share/ssl/misc(/.*)?, /usr/share/e16/misc(/.*)?, /usr/lib/ccache/bin(/.*)?, /etc/racoon/scripts(/.*)?, /usr/lib/debug/sbin(/.*)?, /usr/lib/ruby/gems/.*/agents(/.*)?, /usr/share/mc/extfs/.*, /usr/lib/apt/methods.+, /usr/lib/portage/bin(/.*)?, /usr/lib/MailScanner(/.*)?, /etc/mcelog/triggers(/.*)?, /etc/dhcp/dhclient\.d(/.*)?, /emul/ia32-linux/bin(/.*)?, /usr/lib/libreoffice(/.*)?/bin(/.*)?, /emul/ia32-linux/usr(/.*)?/bin(/.*)?, /emul/ia32-linux/usr(/.*)?/Bin(/.*)?, /emul/ia32-linux/usr(/.*)?/sbin(/.*)?, /usr/lib/thunderbird.*/mozilla-xremote-client, /usr/lib/cyrus-imapd/.*, /usr/share/createrepo(/.*)?, /emul/ia32-linux/sbin(/.*)?, /usr/share/virtualbox/.*\.sh, /usr/share/wicd/daemon(/.*)?, /usr/share/hal/scripts(/.*)?, /lib/security/pam_krb5(/.*)?, /opt/google/talkplugin(/.*)?, /etc/PackageKit/events(/.*)?, /usr/lib/debug/usr/bin(/.*)?, /usr/lib/vmware-tools/(
s)?bin64(/.*)?, /usr/lib/vmware-tools/(s)?bin32(/.*)?, /etc/gdm/XKeepsCrashing[^/]*, /usr/lib/oracle/xe/apps(/.*)?, /usr/share/Modules/init(/.*)?, /usr/share/smolt/client(/.*)?, /usr/lib/nagios/plugins(/.*)?, /usr/lib/debug/usr/sbin(/.*)?, /usr/share/apr-0/build/[^/]+\.sh, /usr/lib/emacsen-common/.*, /usr/share/ajaxterm/qweb.py.*, /var/lib/asterisk/agi-bin(/.*)?, /usr/share/shorewall-perl(/.*)?, /usr/share/shorewall-lite(/.*)?, /usr/linuxprinter/filters(/.*)?, /usr/lib/netsaint/plugins(/.*)?, /usr/lib/chromium-browser(/.*)?, /usr/share/turboprint/lib(/.*)?, /usr/lib/nfs-utils/scripts(/.*)?, /usr/share/shorewall6-lite(/.*)?, /usr/share/shorewall-shell(/.*)?, /usr/share/vhostmd/scripts(/.*)?, /usr/lib/debug/usr/libexec(/.*)?, /etc/ConsoleKit/run-seat\.d(/.*)?, /usr/lib/nspluginwrapper/np.*, /usr/share/sandbox/sandboxX.sh, /usr/lib/ConsoleKit/scripts(/.*)?, /usr/share/ajaxterm/ajaxterm.py.*, /usr/lib/pgsql/test/regress/.*\.sh, /usr/share/denyhosts/scripts(/.*)?, /usr/share/deny
hosts/plugins(/.*)?, /emul/ia32-linux/usr/libexec(/.*)?, /usr/lib/mediawiki/math/texvc.*, /usr/share/PackageKit/helpers(/.*)?, /etc/ConsoleKit/run-session\.d(/.*)?, /etc/hotplug\.d/default/default.*, /usr/lib/systemd/system-sleep/(.*)?, /opt/gutenprint/cups/lib/filter(/.*)?, /usr/share/system-config-network(/netconfig)?/[^/]+\.py, /usr/lib/ConsoleKit/run-session\.d(/.*)?, /etc/sysconfig/network-scripts/net.*, /etc/sysconfig/network-scripts/ifup.*, /etc/sysconfig/network-scripts/init.*, /usr/share/kde4/apps/kajongg/kajongg.py, /etc/sysconfig/network-scripts/ifdown.*, /opt/OpenPrinting-Gutenprint/cups/lib/filter(/.*)?, /usr/share/gedit-2/plugins/externaltools/tools(/.*)?, /bin, /sbin, /usr/bin, /dev/MAKEDEV, /var/qmail/rc, /var/qmail/bin, /etc/mail/make, /bin/mountpoint, /usr/lib/rpm/rpmq, /usr/lib/rpm/rpmv, /usr/lib/rpm/rpmd, /usr/lib/rpm/rpmk, /lib/udev/scsi_id, /sbin/mkfs\.cramfs, /etc/xen/qemu-ifup, /etc/lxdm/Xsession, /etc/sysconfig/init, /usr/bin/mountpoint, /etc/apcupsd
/commok, /usr/lib/sftp-server, /etc/sysconfig/crond, /etc/lxdm/LoginReady, /usr/sbin/mkfs\.cramfs, /usr/lib/udev/scsi_id, /etc/X11/xdm/Xsetup_0, /etc/init\.d/functions, /etc/apcupsd/changeme, /usr/lib/iscan/network, /etc/apcupsd/onbattery, /usr/lib/yaboot/addnote, /etc/sysconfig/libvirtd, /etc/apcupsd/apccontrol, /etc/apcupsd/offbattery, /usr/lib/wicd/monitor\.py, /etc/X11/xdm/TakeConsole, /etc/X11/xdm/GiveConsole, /etc/apcupsd/commfailure, /usr/lib/misc/sftp-server, /etc/sysconfig/netconsole, /lib/udev/devices/MAKEDEV, /var/lib/iscan/interpreter, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/functions, /etc/apcupsd/masterconnect, /etc/apcupsd/mastertimeout, /usr/share/pydict/pydict\.py, /usr/share/clamav/clamd-gen, /sbin/insmod_ksymoops_clean, /etc/mgetty\+sendfax/new_fax, /usr/lib/xfce4/panel/migrate, /usr/lib/xfce4/panel/wrapper, /etc/sysconfig/readonly-root, /usr/lib/vte/gnome-pty-helper, /usr/lib/udev/devices/MAKEDEV, /usr/lib/xfce4/xfconf/xfconfd, /usr/share/cvs/contrib/rcs2log, /usr/share/hwbro
wser/hwbrowser, /usr/X11R6/lib/X11/xkb/xkbcomp, /usr/lib/virtualbox/VBoxManage, /usr/share/cluster/SAPInstance, /usr/share/cluster/checkquorum, /usr/share/shorewall/getparams, /usr/share/apr-0/build/libtool, /usr/share/cluster/SAPDatabase, /etc/hotplug/hotplug\.functions, /usr/share/texmf/web2c/mktexdir, /usr/share/texmf/web2c/mktexnam, /usr/share/texmf/web2c/mktexupd, /usr/share/shorewall/configpath, /usr/sbin/insmod_ksymoops_clean, /etc/mcelog/cache-error-trigger, /usr/share/shorewall/compiler\.pl, /usr/share/dayplanner/dayplanner, /usr/libexec/openssh/sftp-server, /usr/share/texmf/texconfig/tcfmgr, /usr/share/clamav/freshclam-sleep, /usr/share/cluster/svclib_nfslock, /usr/share/cluster/ocf-shellfuncs, /usr/lib/xfce4/exo-1/exo-helper-1, /usr/share/pwlib/make/ptlib-config, /usr/share/fedora-usermgmt/wrapper, /usr/share/printconf/util/print\.py, /usr/lib/xfce4/xfwm4/helper-dialog, /etc/pki/tls/certs/make-dummy-cert, /usr/share/rhn/rhn_applet/applet\.py, /usr/share/authconfig
/authconfig\.py, /usr/share/spamassassin/sa-update\.cron, /usr/share/gnucash/finance-quote-check, /usr/share/cluster/fence_scsi_check\.pl, /usr/share/selinux/devel/policygentool, /usr/share/switchdesk/switchdesk-gui\.py, /usr/share/authconfig/authconfig-tui\.py, /usr/share/authconfig/authconfig-gtk\.py, /usr/share/gnucash/finance-quote-helper, /usr/share/gitolite/hooks/common/update, /usr/lib/xfce4/exo-1/exo-compose-mail-1, /usr/share/system-config-services/gui\.py, /lib/security/pam_krb5/pam_krb5_storetmp, /usr/share/system-config-netboot/pxeos\.py, /usr/lib/xfce4/session/balou-export-theme, /usr/share/system-config-selinux/polgen\.py, /usr/share/system-config-nfs/nfs-export\.py, /usr/share/system-config-printer/applet\.py, /usr/share/PackageKit/pk-upgrade-distro\.sh, /usr/lib/xfce4/session/balou-install-theme, /usr/share/system-config-netboot/pxeboot\.py, /usr/lib/xfce4/session/xfsm-shutdown-helper, /usr/share/rhn/rhn_applet/needed-packages\.py, /usr/lib/security/pam_krb5/
pam_krb5_storetmp, /usr/share/system-logviewer/system-logviewer\.py, /usr/share/system-config-network/neat-control\.py, /usr/share/system-config-services/serviceconf\.py, /usr/share/hal/device-manager/hal-device-manager, /usr/share/system-config-lvm/system-config-lvm\.py, /usr/share/system-config-nfs/system-config-nfs\.py, /usr/share/system-config-mouse/system-config-mouse, /usr/share/system-config-httpd/system-config-httpd, /usr/share/system-config-users/system-config-users, /usr/share/system-config-date/system-config-date\.py, /usr/share/doc/ghc/html/libraries/gen_contents_index, /usr/share/gitolite/hooks/gitolite-admin/post-update, /usr/share/system-config-samba/system-config-samba\.py, /usr/share/system-config-display/system-config-display, /usr/share/system-config-keyboard/system-config-keyboard, /usr/share/system-config-language/system-config-language, /usr/share/system-config-services/system-config-services, /usr/share/system-config-selinux/system-config-selinux\.py,
/usr/share/system-config-netboot/system-config-netboot\.py, /usr/share/system-config-soundcard/system-config-soundcard, /usr/share/system-config-rootpassword/system-config-rootpassword, /usr/share/system-config-securitylevel/system-config-securitylevel\.py, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/uuidd, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/postfix, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/ctdb, /usr/sbin/glusterd, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/glusterd, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/sasl, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/(se)?postgresql, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/kprop, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/kadmind, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/krb524d, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/krb5kdc, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/apcupsd, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/cups, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/ksmtuned, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/tuned, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/exim, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/smartd, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/tgtd, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/vsftpd, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/proftpd, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/ajaxterm, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/hddtemp, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/tcsd, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/rhsmcertd, /etc/rc.d/init.d/svnserve, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/shorewall, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/shor
ewall-lite, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/openais, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/auditd, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/lwiod, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/lwsmd, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/lsassd, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/lwregd, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/dcerpcd, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/srvsvcd, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/eventlogd, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/netlogond, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/cf-execd, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/cf-serverd, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/cf-monitord, /etc/init\.d/.*, /etc/rc\.d/rc\.[^/]+, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/.*, /opt/nfast/sbin/init.d-ncipher, /usr/libexec/dcc/stop-.*, /usr/libexec/dcc/start-.*, /usr/lib/systemd/fedora[^/]*, /opt/nfast/scripts/init.d/(.*), /etc/rc\.d/rc, /etc/X11/prefdm, /usr/sbin/startx, /usr/bin/sepg_ctl, /usr/sbin/apachectl, /usr/sbin/ldap-agent, /usr/sbin/start-dirsrv, /usr/sbin/open_init_pty, /usr/sbin/restart-dirsrv, /etc/sysconfig/network-scripts/ifup-ipsec, /usr/share/system-config-services/system-config-services-mechanism\.py, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/wdmd, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/postgrey, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/avahi.*, /etc/rc\.d/init
\.d/gpsd, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/privoxy, /bin/d?ash, /bin/zsh.*, /bin/ksh.*, /usr/bin/d?ash, /usr/bin/ksh.*, /usr/bin/zsh.*, /bin/esh, /bin/mksh, /bin/sash, /bin/tcsh, /bin/yash, /bin/bash, /bin/fish, /bin/bash2, /usr/bin/esh, /usr/bin/mksh, /usr/bin/sash, /usr/bin/bash, /usr/bin/fish, /usr/bin/tcsh, /usr/bin/yash, /sbin/nologin, /usr/sbin/sesh, /usr/bin/bash2, /usr/sbin/smrsh, /usr/bin/scponly, /usr/sbin/nologin, /usr/libexec/sesh, /usr/sbin/scponlyc, /usr/bin/git-shell, /usr/libexec/git-core/git-shell, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/nrpe, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/nagios, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/cpglockd, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/rgmanager, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/heartbeat, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/tor, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/radvd, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/cgred, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/abrt, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/ipsec, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/racoon, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/puppet, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/named, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/unbound, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/squid, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/psad, /etc/ppp/(auth|ip(v6|x)?)-(up|down), /etc/rc\.d/init\.d
/ppp, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/afs, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/openafs-client, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/canna, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/firewalld, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/mimedefang.*, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/spamd, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/spampd, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/pyzord, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/ypserv, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/ypxfrd, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/yppasswd, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/nmb, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/smb, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/winbind, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/pacemaker, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/mpd, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/amavis, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/amavisd-snmp, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/arpwatch, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/qpidd, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/smokeping, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/bcfg2, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/callweaver, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/pads, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/MailScanner, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/isnsd, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/rwhod, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/xl2tpd, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/prol2tpd, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/openl2tpd, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/portreserve, /usr/libexec/nm-dispatcher.action, /etc/NetworkManager/dispatcher\.d(/.*)?, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/wicd, /etc/rc\.d/i
nit\.d/icecast, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/jabberd, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/nfslock, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/rpcidmapd, /etc/rc.d/init.d/vhostmd, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/nslcd, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/certmaster, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/slpd, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/mysqld, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/memcached, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/atd, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/asterisk, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/fail2ban, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/corosync, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/sssd, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/zabbix, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/zabbix-server, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/ypbind, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/sshd, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/dspam, /etc/firestarter/firestarter\.sh, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/mcstrans, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/cmirrord, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/rngd, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/prelude-lml, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/prelude-manager, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/prelude-correlator, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/ip6?tables, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/ebtables, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/sendmail, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/rpcbind, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/cobblerd, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/dnsmasq, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/bitlbee, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/sa
nlock
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux initrc policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their initrc processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for initrc:
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B pki_ca_exec_t
++.B initrc_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
-+- Set files with the pki_ca_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the pki_ca_t domain.
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux initrc policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their initrc processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for initrc:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B pki_ca_log_t
++.B initrc_devpts_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the pki_ca_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as pki ca log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++- Set files with the initrc_devpts_t type, if you want to treat the files as initrc devpts data.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B pki_ca_tomcat_exec_t
++.B initrc_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the pki_ca_tomcat_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the pki_ca_tomcat_t domain.
++- Set files with the initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the initrc_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B pki_ca_var_lib_t
++.B initrc_state_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the pki_ca_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the pki ca files under the /var/lib directory.
++- Set files with the initrc_state_t type, if you want to treat the files as initrc state data.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B pki_ca_var_run_t
++.B initrc_tmp_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the pki_ca_var_run_t type, if you want to store the pki ca files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the initrc_tmp_t type, if you want to store initrc temporary files in the /tmp directories.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/run/pki-ca.pid, /var/run/pki/ca(/.*)?
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B pki_common_dev_t
++.B initrc_var_log_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the pki_common_dev_t type, if you want to treat the files as pki common dev data.
++- Set files with the initrc_var_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as initrc var log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B pki_common_t
++.B initrc_var_run_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the pki_common_t type, if you want to treat the files as pki common data.
++- Set files with the initrc_var_run_t type, if you want to store the initrc files under the /run directory.
+
+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B pki_kra_etc_rw_t
-+.EE
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
+
-+- Set files with the pki_kra_etc_rw_t type, if you want to treat the files as pki kra etc read/write content.
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type initrc_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/etc/pki-kra(/.*)?, /etc/sysconfig/pki/kra(/.*)?
++.B abrt_var_run_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B pki_kra_exec_t
-+.EE
++ /var/run/abrt(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/abrtd?\.lock
++.br
++ /var/run/abrtd?\.socket
++.br
++ /var/run/abrt\.pid
++.br
+
-+- Set files with the pki_kra_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the pki_kra_t domain.
++.br
++.B alsa_etc_rw_t
+
++ /etc/asound(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/alsa/pcm(/.*)?
++.br
++ /usr/share/alsa/pcm(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/asound\.state
++.br
++ /etc/alsa/asound\.state
++.br
++ /usr/share/alsa/alsa\.conf
++.br
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B pki_kra_log_t
-+.EE
++.br
++.B binfmt_misc_fs_t
+
-+- Set files with the pki_kra_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as pki kra log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
+
++.br
++.B boot_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B pki_kra_tomcat_exec_t
-+.EE
++ /boot/.*
++.br
++ /vmlinuz.*
++.br
++ /initrd\.img.*
++.br
++ /boot
++.br
+
-+- Set files with the pki_kra_tomcat_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the pki_kra_tomcat_t domain.
++.br
++.B cert_t
+
++ /etc/pki(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/httpd/alias(/.*)?
++.br
++ /usr/share/ssl/certs(/.*)?
++.br
++ /usr/share/ssl/private(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/named/chroot/etc/pki(/.*)?
++.br
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B pki_kra_var_lib_t
-+.EE
++.br
++.B cgroup_t
+
-+- Set files with the pki_kra_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the pki kra files under the /var/lib directory.
++ /cgroup
++.br
++ /sys/fs/cgroup
++.br
+
++.br
++.B consolekit_log_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B pki_kra_var_run_t
-+.EE
++ /var/log/ConsoleKit(/.*)?
++.br
+
-+- Set files with the pki_kra_var_run_t type, if you want to store the pki kra files under the /run directory.
++.br
++.B cupsd_log_t
+
++ /var/log/cups(/.*)?
++.br
++ /usr/Brother/fax/.*\.log.*
++.br
++ /var/log/turboprint.*
+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/run/pki-kra.pid, /var/run/pki/kra(/.*)?
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B pki_ocsp_etc_rw_t
-+.EE
++.br
++.B cyrus_var_lib_t
+
-+- Set files with the pki_ocsp_etc_rw_t type, if you want to treat the files as pki ocsp etc read/write content.
++ /var/imap(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/imap(/.*)?
++.br
+
+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/etc/pki-ocsp(/.*)?, /etc/sysconfig/pki/ocsp(/.*)?
++.B device_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B pki_ocsp_exec_t
-+.EE
++ /dev/.*
++.br
++ /lib/udev/devices(/.*)?
++.br
++ /usr/lib/udev/devices(/.*)?
++.br
++ /dev
++.br
++ /etc/udev/devices
++.br
++ /var/named/chroot/dev
++.br
++ /var/spool/postfix/dev
++.br
+
-+- Set files with the pki_ocsp_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the pki_ocsp_t domain.
++.br
++.B dhcp_etc_t
+
++ /etc/dhcpc.*
++.br
++ /etc/dhcp3(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/dhcpd(6)?\.conf
++.br
++ /etc/dhcp3?/dhclient.*
++.br
++ /etc/dhclient.*conf
++.br
++ /etc/dhcp/dhcpd(6)?\.conf
++.br
++ /etc/dhclient-script
++.br
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B pki_ocsp_log_t
-+.EE
++.br
++.B dhcpc_state_t
+
-+- Set files with the pki_ocsp_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as pki ocsp log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++ /var/lib/dhcp3?/dhclient.*
++.br
++ /var/lib/dhcpcd(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/dhclient(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/wifiroamd(/.*)?
++.br
+
++.br
++.B dirsrv_var_run_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B pki_ocsp_tomcat_exec_t
-+.EE
++ /var/run/dirsrv(/.*)?
++.br
+
-+- Set files with the pki_ocsp_tomcat_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the pki_ocsp_tomcat_t domain.
++.br
++.B etc_aliases_t
+
++ /etc/mail/aliases.*
++.br
++ /etc/postfix/aliases.*
++.br
++ /etc/aliases
++.br
++ /etc/aliases\.db
++.br
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B pki_ocsp_var_lib_t
-+.EE
++.br
++.B etc_mail_t
+
-+- Set files with the pki_ocsp_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the pki ocsp files under the /var/lib directory.
++ /etc/mail(/.*)?
++.br
+
++.br
++.B etc_runtime_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B pki_ocsp_var_run_t
-+.EE
++ /[^/]+
++.br
++ /etc/mtab.*
++.br
++ /etc/blkid(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/nologin.*
++.br
++ /etc/\.fstab\.hal\..+
++.br
++ /halt
++.br
++ /fastboot
++.br
++ /poweroff
++.br
++ /etc/cmtab
++.br
++ /\.autofsck
++.br
++ /forcefsck
++.br
++ /\.suspended
++.br
++ /fsckoptions
++.br
++ /\.autorelabel
++.br
++ /etc/securetty
++.br
++ /etc/killpower
++.br
++ /etc/nohotplug
++.br
++ /etc/ioctl\.save
++.br
++ /etc/fstab\.REVOKE
++.br
++ /etc/network/ifstate
++.br
++ /etc/sysconfig/hwconf
++.br
++ /etc/ptal/ptal-printd-like
++.br
++ /etc/sysconfig/iptables\.save
++.br
++ /etc/xorg\.conf\.d/00-system-setup-keyboard\.conf
++.br
++ /etc/X11/xorg\.conf\.d/00-system-setup-keyboard\.conf
++.br
+
-+- Set files with the pki_ocsp_var_run_t type, if you want to store the pki ocsp files under the /run directory.
++.br
++.B exports_t
+
++ /etc/exports
+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/run/pki-ocsp.pid, /var/run/pki/ocsp(/.*)?
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B pki_ra_etc_rw_t
-+.EE
++.br
++.B faillog_t
+
-+- Set files with the pki_ra_etc_rw_t type, if you want to treat the files as pki ra etc read/write content.
++ /var/log/btmp.*
++.br
++ /var/run/faillock(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/log/faillog
++.br
++ /var/log/tallylog
++.br
+
+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/etc/sysconfig/pki/ra(/.*)?, /etc/pki-ra(/.*)?
++.B fonts_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B pki_ra_exec_t
-+.EE
++ /usr/share/fonts(/.*)?
++.br
++ /usr/share/X11/fonts(/.*)?
++.br
++ /usr/X11R6/lib/X11/fonts(/.*)?
++.br
++ /usr/share/ghostscript/fonts(/.*)?
++.br
+
-+- Set files with the pki_ra_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the pki_ra_t domain.
++.br
++.B gconf_etc_t
+
++ /etc/gconf(/.*)?
++.br
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B pki_ra_log_t
-+.EE
++.br
++.B glance_var_run_t
+
-+- Set files with the pki_ra_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as pki ra log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++ /var/run/glance(/.*)?
++.br
+
++.br
++.B initrc_state_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B pki_ra_script_exec_t
-+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the pki_ra_script_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the pki_ra_script_t domain.
++.br
++.B initrc_tmp_t
+
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B pki_ra_tomcat_exec_t
-+.EE
++.br
++.B initrc_var_log_t
+
-+- Set files with the pki_ra_tomcat_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the pki_ra_tomcat_t domain.
+
++.br
++.B initrc_var_run_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B pki_ra_var_lib_t
-+.EE
++ /var/run/utmp
++.br
++ /var/run/random-seed
++.br
++ /var/run/runlevel\.dir
++.br
++ /var/run/setmixer_flag
++.br
+
-+- Set files with the pki_ra_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the pki ra files under the /var/lib directory.
++.br
++.B ipsec_var_run_t
++
++ /var/racoon(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/pluto(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/racoon\.pid
++.br
+
++.br
++.B lastlog_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B pki_ra_var_run_t
-+.EE
++ /var/log/lastlog
++.br
+
-+- Set files with the pki_ra_var_run_t type, if you want to store the pki ra files under the /run directory.
++.br
++.B ld_so_cache_t
+
++ /etc/ld\.so\.cache
++.br
++ /etc/ld\.so\.cache~
++.br
++ /etc/ld\.so\.preload
++.br
++ /etc/ld\.so\.preload~
++.br
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B pki_tks_etc_rw_t
-+.EE
++.br
++.B locale_t
+
-+- Set files with the pki_tks_etc_rw_t type, if you want to treat the files as pki tks etc read/write content.
++ /etc/locale.conf
++.br
++ /usr/lib/locale(/.*)?
++.br
++ /usr/share/locale(/.*)?
++.br
++ /usr/share/zoneinfo(/.*)?
++.br
++ /usr/share/X11/locale(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/timezone
++.br
++ /etc/localtime
++.br
++ /etc/sysconfig/clock
++.br
++ /etc/avahi/etc/localtime
++.br
++ /var/empty/sshd/etc/localtime
++.br
++ /var/spool/postfix/etc/localtime
++.br
+
+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/etc/sysconfig/pki/tks(/.*)?, /etc/pki-tks(/.*)?
++.B lockfile
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B pki_tks_exec_t
-+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the pki_tks_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the pki_tks_t domain.
++.br
++.B mdadm_var_run_t
+
++ /dev/.mdadm\.map
++.br
++ /dev/md/.*
++.br
++ /var/run/mdadm(/.*)?
++.br
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B pki_tks_log_t
-+.EE
++.br
++.B mnt_t
++
++ /mnt(/[^/]*)
++.br
++ /mnt(/[^/]*)?
++.br
++ /rhev(/[^/]*)?
++.br
++ /media(/[^/]*)
++.br
++ /media(/[^/]*)?
++.br
++ /media/\.hal-.*
++.br
++ /var/run/media(/[^/]*)?
++.br
++ /net
++.br
++ /afs
++.br
++ /rhev
++.br
++ /misc
++.br
+
-+- Set files with the pki_tks_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as pki tks log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++.br
++.B mysqld_log_t
+
++ /var/log/mysql.*
++.br
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B pki_tks_tomcat_exec_t
-+.EE
++.br
++.B named_conf_t
+
-+- Set files with the pki_tks_tomcat_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the pki_tks_tomcat_t domain.
++ /etc/rndc.*
++.br
++ /etc/unbound(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/named/chroot(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/named\.rfc1912.zones
++.br
++ /var/named/chroot/etc/named\.rfc1912.zones
++.br
++ /etc/named\.conf
++.br
++ /var/named/named\.ca
++.br
++ /etc/named\.root\.hints
++.br
++ /var/named/chroot/etc/named\.conf
++.br
++ /etc/named\.caching-nameserver\.conf
++.br
++ /var/named/chroot/var/named/named\.ca
++.br
++ /var/named/chroot/etc/named\.root\.hints
++.br
++ /var/named/chroot/etc/named\.caching-nameserver\.conf
++.br
+
++.br
++.B net_conf_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B pki_tks_var_lib_t
-+.EE
++ /etc/ntpd?\.conf.*
++.br
++ /etc/hosts[^/]*
++.br
++ /etc/yp\.conf.*
++.br
++ /etc/denyhosts.*
++.br
++ /etc/hosts\.deny.*
++.br
++ /etc/resolv\.conf.*
++.br
++ /etc/ntp/step-tickers.*
++.br
++ /etc/sysconfig/networking(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/sysconfig/network-scripts(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/sysconfig/network-scripts/.*resolv\.conf
++.br
++ /etc/ethers
++.br
+
-+- Set files with the pki_tks_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the pki tks files under the /var/lib directory.
++.br
++.B postgresql_db_t
+
++ /var/lib/pgsql(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/sepgsql(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/postgres(ql)?(/.*)?
++.br
++ /usr/share/jonas/pgsql(/.*)?
++.br
++ /usr/lib/pgsql/test/regress(/.*)?
++.br
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B pki_tks_var_run_t
-+.EE
++.br
++.B psad_var_log_t
+
-+- Set files with the pki_tks_var_run_t type, if you want to store the pki tks files under the /run directory.
++ /var/log/psad(/.*)?
++.br
+
+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/run/pki-tks.pid, /var/run/pki/tks(/.*)?
++.B qpidd_var_run_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B pki_tps_etc_rw_t
-+.EE
++ /var/run/qpidd(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/qpidd\.pid
++.br
+
-+- Set files with the pki_tps_etc_rw_t type, if you want to treat the files as pki tps etc read/write content.
++.br
++.B quota_flag_t
+
++ /var/lib/quota(/.*)?
+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/etc/sysconfig/pki/tps(/.*)?, /etc/pki-tps(/.*)?
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B pki_tps_exec_t
-+.EE
++.br
++.B ricci_var_lib_t
+
-+- Set files with the pki_tps_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the pki_tps_t domain.
++ /var/lib/ricci(/.*)?
++.br
+
++.br
++.B samba_etc_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B pki_tps_log_t
-+.EE
++ /etc/samba(/.*)?
++.br
+
-+- Set files with the pki_tps_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as pki tps log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++.br
++.B sanlock_var_run_t
+
++ /var/run/sanlock(/.*)?
++.br
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B pki_tps_script_exec_t
-+.EE
++.br
++.B squid_log_t
+
-+- Set files with the pki_tps_script_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the pki_tps_script_t domain.
++ /var/log/squid(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/log/squidGuard(/.*)?
++.br
+
++.br
++.B svc_svc_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B pki_tps_tomcat_exec_t
-+.EE
++ /service/.*
++.br
++ /var/axfrdns(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/tinydns(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/service/.*
++.br
++ /var/dnscache(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/qmail/supervise(/.*)?
++.br
++ /service
++.br
+
-+- Set files with the pki_tps_tomcat_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the pki_tps_tomcat_t domain.
++.br
++.B sysctl_type
+
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B pki_tps_var_lib_t
-+.EE
++.br
++.B sysfs_t
+
-+- Set files with the pki_tps_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the pki tps files under the /var/lib directory.
++ /sys(/.*)?
++.br
+
++.br
++.B system_conf_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B pki_tps_var_run_t
-+.EE
++ /etc/sysctl\.conf(\.old)?
++.br
++ /etc/sysconfig/ip6?tables.*
++.br
++ /etc/sysconfig/ipvsadm.*
++.br
++ /etc/sysconfig/ebtables.*
++.br
++ /etc/sysconfig/system-config-firewall.*
++.br
+
-+- Set files with the pki_tps_var_run_t type, if you want to store the pki tps files under the /run directory.
++.br
++.B system_dbusd_var_lib_t
+
++ /var/lib/dbus(/.*)?
++.br
+
-+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
++.br
++.B systemd_passwd_var_run_t
+
-+.SH PORT TYPES
-+SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
-+.PP
-+You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
++ /var/run/systemd/ask-password(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/systemd/ask-password-block(/.*)?
++.br
+
-+.B semanage port -l
++.br
++.B udev_rules_t
+
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
-+SELinux pki policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their pki processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following port types are defined for pki:
++ /etc/udev/rules.d(/.*)?
++.br
+
-+.EX
-+.TP 5
-+.B pki_ca_port_t
-+.TP 10
-+.EE
++.br
++.B udev_var_run_t
+
++ /dev/\.udev(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/udev(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/libgpod(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/PackageKit/udev(/.*)?
++.br
++ /dev/\.udevdb
++.br
++ /dev/udev\.tbl
++.br
+
-+Default Defined Ports:
-+tcp 8021
-+.EE
++.br
++.B var_lib_nfs_t
+
-+.EX
-+.TP 5
-+.B pki_kra_port_t
-+.TP 10
-+.EE
++ /var/lib/nfs(/.*)?
++.br
+
++.br
++.B var_lib_t
+
-+Default Defined Ports:
-+tcp 8021
-+.EE
++ /opt/(.*/)?var/lib(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib(/.*)?
++.br
+
-+.EX
-+.TP 5
-+.B pki_ocsp_port_t
-+.TP 10
-+.EE
++.br
++.B var_log_t
++
++ /var/log/.*
++.br
++ /nsr/logs(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/webmin(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/log/cron[^/]*
++.br
++ /var/log/secure[^/]*
++.br
++ /opt/zimbra/log(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/log/maillog[^/]*
++.br
++ /var/log/spooler[^/]*
++.br
++ /var/log/messages[^/]*
++.br
++ /usr/centreon/log(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/spool/rsyslog(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/axfrdns/log/main(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/spool/bacula/log(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/tinydns/log/main(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/dnscache/log/main(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/stockmaniac/templates_cache(/.*)?
++.br
++ /opt/Symantec/scspagent/IDS/system(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/log
++.br
++ /var/log/dmesg
++.br
++ /var/log/syslog
++.br
++ /var/named/chroot/var/log
++.br
+
++.br
++.B var_spool_t
+
-+Default Defined Ports:
-+tcp 8021
-+.EE
++ /var/spool(/.*)?
++.br
+
-+.EX
-+.TP 5
-+.B pki_ra_port_t
-+.TP 10
-+.EE
++.br
++.B virt_cache_t
+
++ /var/cache/oz(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/cache/libvirt(/.*)?
++.br
+
-+Default Defined Ports:
-+tcp 8021
-+.EE
++.br
++.B virt_var_lib_t
+
-+.EX
-+.TP 5
-+.B pki_tks_port_t
-+.TP 10
-+.EE
++ /var/lib/oz(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/libvirt(/.*)?
++.br
+
++.br
++.B wdmd_var_run_t
+
-+Default Defined Ports:
-+tcp 8021
-+.EE
++ /var/run/wdmd(/.*)?
++.br
+
-+.EX
-+.TP 5
-+.B pki_tps_port_t
-+.TP 10
-+.EE
++.br
++.B wtmp_t
+
++ /var/log/wtmp.*
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
-+Default Defined Ports:
-+tcp 8021
-+.EE
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux pki policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their pki processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for pki:
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the initrc_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B pki_ca_t, pki_ra_t, pki_ca_script_t, pki_ocsp_t, pki_kra_t, pki_tks_t, pki_tps_t, pki_ocsp_script_t, pki_kra_script_t, pki_tks_script_t
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
++
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the initrc_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -36917,125 +40129,182 @@ index 0000000..2272c46
+.B semanage module
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
-+.B semanage port
-+can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
-+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), pki(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/plymouth_selinux.8 b/man/man8/plymouth_selinux.8
++selinux(8), initrc(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, init_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/innd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/innd_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..d65e7f3
+index 0000000..e89f4a3
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/plymouth_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,121 @@
-+.TH "plymouth_selinux" "8" "plymouth" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "plymouth SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/innd_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,182 @@
++.TH "innd_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "innd" "SELinux Policy documentation for innd"
+.SH "NAME"
-+plymouth_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the plymouth processes
++innd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the innd processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the plymouth processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the innd processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The innd processes execute with the innd_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep innd_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The innd_t SELinux type can be entered via the "innd_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the innd_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/sbin/innd.*, /usr/bin/suck, /etc/news/boot, /usr/bin/inews, /usr/bin/rnews, /usr/bin/rpost, /usr/sbin/in\.nnrpd, /usr/lib/news/bin/sm, /usr/lib/news/bin/innd, /usr/lib/news/bin/inews, /usr/lib/news/bin/inndf, /usr/lib/news/bin/nnrpd, /usr/lib/news/bin/rnews, /usr/lib/news/bin/expire, /usr/lib/news/bin/fastrm, /usr/lib/news/bin/shlock, /usr/lib/news/bin/actsync, /usr/lib/news/bin/archive, /usr/lib/news/bin/batcher, /usr/lib/news/bin/ctlinnd, /usr/lib/news/bin/getlist, /usr/lib/news/bin/innfeed, /usr/lib/news/bin/innxmit, /usr/lib/news/bin/makedbz, /usr/lib/news/bin/nntpget, /usr/lib/news/bin/buffchan, /usr/lib/news/bin/convdate, /usr/lib/news/bin/cvtbatch, /usr/lib/news/bin/filechan, /usr/lib/news/bin/overchan, /usr/lib/news/bin/inndstart, /usr/lib/news/bin/innxbatch, /usr/lib/news/bin/expireover, /usr/lib/news/bin/innconfval, /usr/lib/news/bin/shrinkfile, /usr/lib/news/bin/grephistory, /usr/lib/news/bin/makehistory, /usr/lib/news/bin/newsrequeue, /usr/lib/news/bin/ovdb
_recover, /usr/lib/news/bin/prunehistory, /usr/lib/news/bin/startinnfeed
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux innd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their innd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for innd:
++
++.EX
++.B innd_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux plymouth policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their plymouth processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for plymouth:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux innd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their innd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for innd:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B plymouth_exec_t
++.B innd_etc_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the plymouth_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the plymouth_t domain.
++- Set files with the innd_etc_t type, if you want to store innd files in the /etc directories.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/bin/plymouth, /usr/bin/plymouth
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B plymouthd_exec_t
++.B innd_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the plymouthd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the plymouthd_t domain.
++- Set files with the innd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the innd_t domain.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/sbin/plymouthd, /usr/sbin/plymouthd
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B plymouthd_spool_t
++.B innd_initrc_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the plymouthd_spool_t type, if you want to store the plymouthd files under the /var/spool directory.
++- Set files with the innd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the innd_initrc_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B plymouthd_var_lib_t
++.B innd_log_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the plymouthd_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the plymouthd files under the /var/lib directory.
++- Set files with the innd_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as innd log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B plymouthd_var_log_t
++.B innd_var_lib_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the plymouthd_var_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as plymouthd var log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++- Set files with the innd_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the innd files under the /var/lib directory.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B plymouthd_var_run_t
++.B innd_var_run_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the plymouthd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the plymouthd files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the innd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the innd files under the /run directory.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.SH PORT TYPES
++SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
++
++.B semanage port -l
++
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux plymouth policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their plymouth processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for plymouth:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
++SELinux innd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their innd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following port types are defined for innd:
+
+.EX
-+.B plymouth_t, plymouthd_t
++.TP 5
++.B innd_port_t
++.TP 10
+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++
++Default Defined Ports:
++tcp 119
++.EE
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type innd_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B innd_log_t
++
++ /var/log/news(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B innd_var_lib_t
++
++ /var/lib/news(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B innd_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/innd(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/news(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B news_spool_t
++
++ /var/spool/news(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -37047,110 +40316,194 @@ index 0000000..d65e7f3
+.B semanage module
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
++.B semanage port
++can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
++
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), plymouth(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/plymouthd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/plymouthd_selinux.8
++selinux(8), innd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/insmod_selinux.8 b/man/man8/insmod_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..2862f31
+index 0000000..58787ca
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/plymouthd_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
-+.TH "plymouthd_selinux" "8" "plymouthd" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "plymouthd SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/insmod_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,194 @@
++.TH "insmod_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "insmod" "SELinux Policy documentation for insmod"
+.SH "NAME"
-+plymouthd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the plymouthd processes
++insmod_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the insmod processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the plymouthd processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the insmod processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The insmod processes execute with the insmod_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep insmod_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The insmod_t SELinux type can be entered via the "insmod_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the insmod_t domain are the following:"
++
++/sbin/rmmod.*, /sbin/insmod.*, /sbin/modprobe.*, /usr/sbin/rmmod.*, /usr/sbin/insmod.*, /usr/sbin/modprobe.*, /usr/bin/kmod
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux plymouthd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their plymouthd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for plymouthd:
-+
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux insmod policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their insmod processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for insmod:
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B plymouthd_exec_t
++.B insmod_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
-+- Set files with the plymouthd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the plymouthd_t domain.
++.SH BOOLEANS
++SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. insmod policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run insmod with the tightest access possible.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/sbin/plymouthd, /usr/sbin/plymouthd
+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B plymouthd_spool_t
++If you want to allow pppd to load kernel modules for certain modems, you must turn on the pppd_can_insmod boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P pppd_can_insmod 1
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the plymouthd_spool_t type, if you want to store the plymouthd files under the /var/spool directory.
++.PP
++If you want to disable kernel module loading, you must turn on the secure_mode_insmod boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P secure_mode_insmod 1
++.EE
+
++.PP
++If you want to allow pppd to load kernel modules for certain modems, you must turn on the pppd_can_insmod boolean.
+
+.EX
++.B setsebool -P pppd_can_insmod 1
++.EE
++
+.PP
-+.B plymouthd_var_lib_t
++If you want to disable kernel module loading, you must turn on the secure_mode_insmod boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P secure_mode_insmod 1
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the plymouthd_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the plymouthd files under the /var/lib directory.
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux insmod policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their insmod processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for insmod:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B plymouthd_var_log_t
++.B insmod_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the plymouthd_var_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as plymouthd var log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++- Set files with the insmod_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the insmod_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B plymouthd_var_run_t
++.B insmod_tmpfs_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the plymouthd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the plymouthd files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the insmod_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store insmod files on a tmpfs file system.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type insmod_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B initrc_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B insmod_tmpfs_t
++
++
++.br
++.B kdumpctl_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B modules_dep_t
++
++ /lib/modules/[^/]+/modules\..+
++.br
++
++.br
++.B modules_object_t
++
++ /lib/modules(/.*)?
++.br
++ /usr/lib/modules(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B mtrr_device_t
++
++ /dev/cpu/mtrr
++.br
++
++.br
++.B ramfs_t
++
++
++.br
++.B rpm_script_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B sysfs_t
++
++ /sys(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux plymouthd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their plymouthd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for plymouthd:
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the insmod_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B plymouth_t, plymouthd_t
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
++
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the insmod_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -37162,102 +40515,194 @@ index 0000000..2862f31
+.B semanage module
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
++.B semanage boolean
++can also be used to manipulate the booleans
++
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), plymouthd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/podsleuth_selinux.8 b/man/man8/podsleuth_selinux.8
++selinux(8), insmod(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, setsebool(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/ipsec_mgmt_selinux.8 b/man/man8/ipsec_mgmt_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..b0c4cf1
+index 0000000..d3feccd
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/podsleuth_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
-+.TH "podsleuth_selinux" "8" "podsleuth" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "podsleuth SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/ipsec_mgmt_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,189 @@
++.TH "ipsec_mgmt_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "ipsec_mgmt" "SELinux Policy documentation for ipsec_mgmt"
+.SH "NAME"
-+podsleuth_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the podsleuth processes
++ipsec_mgmt_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the ipsec_mgmt processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the podsleuth processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the ipsec_mgmt processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The ipsec_mgmt processes execute with the ipsec_mgmt_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep ipsec_mgmt_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The ipsec_mgmt_t SELinux type can be entered via the "shell_exec_t,ipsec_mgmt_exec_t" file types. The default entrypoint paths for the ipsec_mgmt_t domain are the following:"
++
++/bin/d?ash, /bin/zsh.*, /bin/ksh.*, /usr/bin/d?ash, /usr/bin/ksh.*, /usr/bin/zsh.*, /bin/esh, /bin/mksh, /bin/sash, /bin/tcsh, /bin/yash, /bin/bash, /bin/fish, /bin/bash2, /usr/bin/esh, /usr/bin/mksh, /usr/bin/sash, /usr/bin/bash, /usr/bin/fish, /usr/bin/tcsh, /usr/bin/yash, /sbin/nologin, /usr/sbin/sesh, /usr/bin/bash2, /usr/sbin/smrsh, /usr/bin/scponly, /usr/sbin/nologin, /usr/libexec/sesh, /usr/sbin/scponlyc, /usr/bin/git-shell, /usr/libexec/git-core/git-shell, /usr/sbin/ipsec, /usr/lib/ipsec/_plutorun, /usr/lib/ipsec/_plutoload, /usr/libexec/ipsec/_plutorun, /usr/libexec/ipsec/_plutoload, /usr/libexec/nm-openswan-service
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux podsleuth policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their podsleuth processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for podsleuth:
-+
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux ipsec_mgmt policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ipsec_mgmt processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for ipsec_mgmt:
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B podsleuth_cache_t
++.B ipsec_mgmt_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
-+- Set files with the podsleuth_cache_t type, if you want to store the files under the /var/cache directory.
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux ipsec_mgmt policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ipsec_mgmt processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for ipsec_mgmt:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B podsleuth_exec_t
++.B ipsec_mgmt_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the podsleuth_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the podsleuth_t domain.
++- Set files with the ipsec_mgmt_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ipsec_mgmt_t domain.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/bin/podsleuth, /usr/libexec/hal-podsleuth
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B podsleuth_tmp_t
++.B ipsec_mgmt_lock_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the podsleuth_tmp_t type, if you want to store podsleuth temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++- Set files with the ipsec_mgmt_lock_t type, if you want to treat the files as ipsec mgmt lock data, stored under the /var/lock directory
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B podsleuth_tmpfs_t
++.B ipsec_mgmt_var_run_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the podsleuth_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store podsleuth files on a tmpfs file system.
++- Set files with the ipsec_mgmt_var_run_t type, if you want to store the ipsec mgmt files under the /run directory.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type ipsec_mgmt_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B ipsec_key_file_t
++
++ /etc/ipsec\.d(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/racoon/certs(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/ipsec\.secrets
++.br
++ /etc/racoon/psk\.txt
++.br
++
++.br
++.B ipsec_log_t
++
++ /var/log/pluto\.log
++.br
++
++.br
++.B ipsec_mgmt_lock_t
++
++ /var/lock/subsys/ipsec
++.br
++
++.br
++.B ipsec_mgmt_var_run_t
++
++
++.br
++.B ipsec_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B ipsec_var_run_t
++
++ /var/racoon(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/pluto(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/racoon\.pid
++.br
++
++.br
++.B net_conf_t
++
++ /etc/ntpd?\.conf.*
++.br
++ /etc/hosts[^/]*
++.br
++ /etc/yp\.conf.*
++.br
++ /etc/denyhosts.*
++.br
++ /etc/hosts\.deny.*
++.br
++ /etc/resolv\.conf.*
++.br
++ /etc/ntp/step-tickers.*
++.br
++ /etc/sysconfig/networking(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/sysconfig/network-scripts(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/sysconfig/network-scripts/.*resolv\.conf
++.br
++ /etc/ethers
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux podsleuth policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their podsleuth processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for podsleuth:
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the ipsec_mgmt_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B podsleuth_t
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
++
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the ipsec_mgmt_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -37270,163 +40715,261 @@ index 0000000..b0c4cf1
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), podsleuth(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/policykit_selinux.8 b/man/man8/policykit_selinux.8
++selinux(8), ipsec_mgmt(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, ipsec_selinux(8), ipsec_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/ipsec_selinux.8 b/man/man8/ipsec_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..3845e60
+index 0000000..2c1a0c0
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/policykit_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,163 @@
-+.TH "policykit_selinux" "8" "policykit" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "policykit SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/ipsec_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,263 @@
++.TH "ipsec_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "ipsec" "SELinux Policy documentation for ipsec"
+.SH "NAME"
-+policykit_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the policykit processes
++ipsec_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the ipsec processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the policykit processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the ipsec processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The ipsec processes execute with the ipsec_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the policykit_grant_t, policykit_auth_t, policykit_t, policykit_resolve_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep ipsec_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
++The ipsec_t SELinux type can be entered via the "ipsec_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the ipsec_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/lib/ipsec/spi, /usr/lib/ipsec/pluto, /usr/lib/ipsec/eroute, /usr/libexec/ipsec/spi, /usr/libexec/ipsec/pluto, /usr/lib/ipsec/klipsdebug, /usr/libexec/ipsec/eroute, /usr/libexec/ipsec/klipsdebug
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the policykit_grant_t, policykit_auth_t, policykit_t, policykit_resolve_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux ipsec policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ipsec processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for ipsec:
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B ipsec_t, ipsec_mgmt_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux policykit policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their policykit processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for policykit:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux ipsec policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ipsec processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for ipsec:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B policykit_auth_exec_t
++.B ipsec_conf_file_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the policykit_auth_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the policykit_auth_t domain.
++- Set files with the ipsec_conf_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as ipsec conf content.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/libexec/polkit-read-auth-helper, /usr/libexec/polkit-1/polkit-agent-helper-1, /usr/lib/polkit-1/polkit-agent-helper-1, /usr/lib/policykit/polkit-read-auth-helper
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B policykit_exec_t
++.B ipsec_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the policykit_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the policykit_t domain.
++- Set files with the ipsec_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ipsec_t domain.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/lib/polkit-1/polkitd, /usr/libexec/polkitd.*, /usr/libexec/polkit-1/polkitd.*, /usr/lib/policykit/polkitd
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B policykit_grant_exec_t
++.B ipsec_initrc_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the policykit_grant_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the policykit_grant_t domain.
++- Set files with the ipsec_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ipsec_initrc_t domain.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/libexec/polkit-grant-helper.*, /usr/lib/policykit/polkit-grant-helper.*
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B policykit_reload_t
++.B ipsec_key_file_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the policykit_reload_t type, if you want to treat the files as policykit reload data.
++- Set files with the ipsec_key_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as ipsec key content.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B policykit_resolve_exec_t
++.B ipsec_log_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the policykit_resolve_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the policykit_resolve_t domain.
++- Set files with the ipsec_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as ipsec log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/lib/policykit/polkit-resolve-exe-helper.*, /usr/libexec/polkit-resolve-exe-helper.*
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B policykit_tmp_t
++.B ipsec_mgmt_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the policykit_tmp_t type, if you want to store policykit temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++- Set files with the ipsec_mgmt_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ipsec_mgmt_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B policykit_var_lib_t
++.B ipsec_mgmt_lock_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the policykit_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the policykit files under the /var/lib directory.
++- Set files with the ipsec_mgmt_lock_t type, if you want to treat the files as ipsec mgmt lock data, stored under the /var/lock directory
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/lib/PolicyKit-public(/.*)?, /var/lib/PolicyKit(/.*)?, /var/lib/polkit-1(/.*)?
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B policykit_var_run_t
++.B ipsec_mgmt_var_run_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the policykit_var_run_t type, if you want to store the policykit files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the ipsec_mgmt_var_run_t type, if you want to store the ipsec mgmt files under the /run directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B ipsec_tmp_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the ipsec_tmp_t type, if you want to store ipsec temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B ipsec_var_run_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the ipsec_var_run_t type, if you want to store the ipsec files under the /run directory.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.SH PORT TYPES
++SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
++
++.B semanage port -l
++
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux policykit policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their policykit processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for policykit:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
++SELinux ipsec policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ipsec processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following port types are defined for ipsec:
++
++.EX
++.TP 5
++.B ipsecnat_port_t
++.TP 10
++.EE
++
++
++Default Defined Ports:
++tcp 4500
++.EE
++udp 4500
++.EE
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type ipsec_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B ipsec_key_file_t
++
++ /etc/ipsec\.d(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/racoon/certs(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/ipsec\.secrets
++.br
++ /etc/racoon/psk\.txt
++.br
++
++.br
++.B ipsec_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B ipsec_var_run_t
++
++ /var/racoon(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/pluto(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/racoon\.pid
++.br
++
++.br
++.B net_conf_t
++
++ /etc/ntpd?\.conf.*
++.br
++ /etc/hosts[^/]*
++.br
++ /etc/yp\.conf.*
++.br
++ /etc/denyhosts.*
++.br
++ /etc/hosts\.deny.*
++.br
++ /etc/resolv\.conf.*
++.br
++ /etc/ntp/step-tickers.*
++.br
++ /etc/sysconfig/networking(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/sysconfig/network-scripts(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/sysconfig/network-scripts/.*resolv\.conf
++.br
++ /etc/ethers
++.br
++
++.br
++.B security_t
++
++ /selinux
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the ipsec_t, ipsec_mgmt_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B policykit_grant_t, policykit_auth_t, policykit_t, policykit_resolve_t
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
++
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the ipsec_t, ipsec_mgmt_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -37438,198 +40981,260 @@ index 0000000..3845e60
+.B semanage module
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
++.B semanage port
++can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
++
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), policykit(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/polipo_selinux.8 b/man/man8/polipo_selinux.8
++selinux(8), ipsec(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, ipsec_mgmt_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/iptables_selinux.8 b/man/man8/iptables_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..b456ae1
+index 0000000..66ccd4a
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/polipo_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,201 @@
-+.TH "polipo_selinux" "8" "polipo" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "polipo SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/iptables_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,258 @@
++.TH "iptables_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "iptables" "SELinux Policy documentation for iptables"
+.SH "NAME"
-+polipo_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the polipo processes
++iptables_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the iptables processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the polipo processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the iptables processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH BOOLEANS
-+SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. polipo policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run polipo with the tightest access possible.
++The iptables processes execute with the iptables_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
++For example:
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow polipo to connect to all ports > 1023, you must turn on the polipo_connect_all_unreserved boolean.
++.B ps -eZ | grep iptables_t
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P polipo_connect_all_unreserved 1
-+.EE
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to determine whether polipo can access cifs file systems, you must turn on the polipo_use_cifs boolean.
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P polipo_use_cifs 1
-+.EE
++The iptables_t SELinux type can be entered via the "iptables_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the iptables_t domain are the following:"
+
++/sbin/ip6?tables, /sbin/ip6?tables-multi, /sbin/ip6?tables-restore, /usr/sbin/ip6?tables, /usr/sbin/ip6?tables-multi, /usr/sbin/ip6?tables-restore, /sbin/ipchains.*, /usr/sbin/ipchains.*, /sbin/ipvsadm, /sbin/ebtables, /usr/sbin/ipvsadm, /sbin/ipvsadm-save, /usr/sbin/ebtables, /sbin/xtables-multi, /sbin/ipvsadm-restore, /sbin/ebtables-restore, /usr/sbin/ipvsadm-save, /usr/sbin/xtables-multi, /usr/sbin/ipvsadm-restore, /usr/sbin/ebtables-restore
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to determine whether Polipo session daemon can send syslog messages, you must turn on the polipo_session_send_syslog_msg boolean.
-+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P polipo_session_send_syslog_msg 1
-+.EE
-+
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+If you want to determine whether Polipo session daemon can bind tcp sockets to all unreserved ports, you must turn on the polipo_session_bind_all_unreserved_ports boolean.
-+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P polipo_session_bind_all_unreserved_ports 1
-+.EE
-+
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux iptables policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their iptables processes in as secure a method as possible.
+.PP
-+If you want to determine whether calling user domains can execute Polipo daemon in the polipo_session_t domain, you must turn on the polipo_session_users boolean.
++The following process types are defined for iptables:
+
+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P polipo_session_users 1
++.B iptables_t
+.EE
-+
+.PP
-+If you want to determine whether Polipo can access nfs file systems, you must turn on the polipo_use_nfs boolean.
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P polipo_use_nfs 1
-+.EE
++.SH BOOLEANS
++SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. iptables policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run iptables with the tightest access possible.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the polipo_t, polipo_session_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++If you want to allow dhcpc client applications to execute iptables commands, you must turn on the dhcpc_exec_iptables boolean.
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.B setsebool -P dhcpc_exec_iptables 1
+.EE
+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the polipo_t, polipo_session_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++If you want to allow dhcpc client applications to execute iptables commands, you must turn on the dhcpc_exec_iptables boolean.
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B setsebool -P dhcpc_exec_iptables 1
+.EE
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux polipo policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their polipo processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for polipo:
-+
-+
-+.EX
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux iptables policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their iptables processes in as secure a method as possible.
+.PP
-+.B polipo_cache_home_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the polipo_cache_home_t type, if you want to store polipo cache files in the users home directory.
++The following file types are defined for iptables:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B polipo_cache_t
++.B iptables_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the polipo_cache_t type, if you want to store the files under the /var/cache directory.
++- Set files with the iptables_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the iptables_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B polipo_config_home_t
++.B iptables_initrc_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the polipo_config_home_t type, if you want to store polipo config files in the users home directory.
++- Set files with the iptables_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the iptables_initrc_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B polipo_etc_t
++.B iptables_tmp_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the polipo_etc_t type, if you want to store polipo files in the /etc directories.
++- Set files with the iptables_tmp_t type, if you want to store iptables temporary files in the /tmp directories.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B polipo_exec_t
++.B iptables_unit_file_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the polipo_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the polipo_t domain.
++- Set files with the iptables_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as iptables unit content.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B polipo_initrc_exec_t
++.B iptables_var_run_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the polipo_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the polipo_initrc_t domain.
++- Set files with the iptables_var_run_t type, if you want to store the iptables files under the /run directory.
+
+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B polipo_log_t
-+.EE
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
+
-+- Set files with the polipo_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as polipo log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
++The SELinux process type iptables_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B polipo_pid_t
-+.EE
++.br
++.B etc_runtime_t
+
-+- Set files with the polipo_pid_t type, if you want to store the polipo files under the /run directory.
++ /[^/]+
++.br
++ /etc/mtab.*
++.br
++ /etc/blkid(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/nologin.*
++.br
++ /etc/\.fstab\.hal\..+
++.br
++ /halt
++.br
++ /fastboot
++.br
++ /poweroff
++.br
++ /etc/cmtab
++.br
++ /\.autofsck
++.br
++ /forcefsck
++.br
++ /\.suspended
++.br
++ /fsckoptions
++.br
++ /\.autorelabel
++.br
++ /etc/securetty
++.br
++ /etc/killpower
++.br
++ /etc/nohotplug
++.br
++ /etc/ioctl\.save
++.br
++ /etc/fstab\.REVOKE
++.br
++ /etc/network/ifstate
++.br
++ /etc/sysconfig/hwconf
++.br
++ /etc/ptal/ptal-printd-like
++.br
++ /etc/sysconfig/iptables\.save
++.br
++ /etc/xorg\.conf\.d/00-system-setup-keyboard\.conf
++.br
++ /etc/X11/xorg\.conf\.d/00-system-setup-keyboard\.conf
++.br
+
++.br
++.B initrc_tmp_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B polipo_unit_file_t
-+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the polipo_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as polipo unit content.
++.br
++.B iptables_tmp_t
+
+
-+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
++.br
++.B iptables_var_run_t
++
++
++.br
++.B psad_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B psad_var_log_t
++
++ /var/log/psad(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B shorewall_var_lib_t
++
++ /var/lib/shorewall(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/shorewall6(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/shorewall-lite(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B system_conf_t
++
++ /etc/sysctl\.conf(\.old)?
++.br
++ /etc/sysconfig/ip6?tables.*
++.br
++ /etc/sysconfig/ipvsadm.*
++.br
++ /etc/sysconfig/ebtables.*
++.br
++ /etc/sysconfig/system-config-firewall.*
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux polipo policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their polipo processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for polipo:
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the iptables_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B polipo_t, polipo_session_t
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
++
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the iptables_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -37645,157 +41250,145 @@ index 0000000..b456ae1
+can also be used to manipulate the booleans
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), polipo(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
++selinux(8), iptables(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+, setsebool(8)
\ No newline at end of file
-diff --git a/man/man8/portmap_selinux.8 b/man/man8/portmap_selinux.8
+diff --git a/man/man8/irc_selinux.8 b/man/man8/irc_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..e031461
+index 0000000..8ca561c
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/portmap_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,162 @@
-+.TH "portmap_selinux" "8" "portmap" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "portmap SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/irc_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,146 @@
++.TH "irc_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "irc" "SELinux Policy documentation for irc"
+.SH "NAME"
-+portmap_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the portmap processes
++irc_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the irc processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the portmap processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
-+
-+.SH BOOLEANS
-+SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. portmap policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run portmap with the tightest access possible.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the irc processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
++The irc processes execute with the irc_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow samba to act as a portmapper, you must turn on the samba_portmapper boolean.
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P samba_portmapper 1
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep irc_t
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the portmap_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
++The irc_t SELinux type can be entered via the "irc_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the irc_t domain are the following:"
+
++/usr/bin/[st]irc, /usr/bin/ircII, /usr/bin/tinyirc
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the portmap_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux irc policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their irc processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for irc:
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B irc_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux portmap policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their portmap processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for portmap:
-+
-+
-+.EX
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux irc policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their irc processes in as secure a method as possible.
+.PP
-+.B portmap_exec_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the portmap_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the portmap_t domain.
++The following file types are defined for irc:
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/sbin/portmap, /usr/sbin/portmap
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B portmap_helper_exec_t
++.B irc_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the portmap_helper_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the portmap_helper_t domain.
++- Set files with the irc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the irc_t domain.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/sbin/pmap_set, /usr/sbin/pmap_dump
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B portmap_tmp_t
++.B irc_home_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the portmap_tmp_t type, if you want to store portmap temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++- Set files with the irc_home_t type, if you want to store irc files in the users home directory.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B portmap_var_run_t
++.B irc_tmp_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the portmap_var_run_t type, if you want to store the portmap files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the irc_tmp_t type, if you want to store irc temporary files in the /tmp directories.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
+.SH PORT TYPES
-+SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
++SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
+.PP
-+You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
++You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
+
+.B semanage port -l
+
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
-+SELinux portmap policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their portmap processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following port types are defined for portmap:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
++SELinux irc policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their irc processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following port types are defined for irc:
+
+.EX
+.TP 5
-+.B portmap_port_t
++.B ircd_port_t
+.TP 10
+.EE
+
+
+Default Defined Ports:
-+tcp 111
-+.EE
-+udp 111
++tcp 6667,6697
+.EE
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux portmap policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their portmap processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for portmap:
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type irc_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B irc_home_t
++
++ /home/[^/]*/\.ircmotd
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.ircmotd
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.ircmotd
++.br
++
++.br
++.B irc_tmp_t
+
-+.EX
-+.B portmap_helper_t, portmap_t
-+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -37810,107 +41403,103 @@ index 0000000..e031461
+.B semanage port
+can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
+
-+.B semanage boolean
-+can also be used to manipulate the booleans
-+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), portmap(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-+, setsebool(8)
-\ No newline at end of file
-diff --git a/man/man8/portreserve_selinux.8 b/man/man8/portreserve_selinux.8
++selinux(8), irc(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/irqbalance_selinux.8 b/man/man8/irqbalance_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..3345ff0
+index 0000000..e967562
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/portreserve_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
-+.TH "portreserve_selinux" "8" "portreserve" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "portreserve SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/irqbalance_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,102 @@
++.TH "irqbalance_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "irqbalance" "SELinux Policy documentation for irqbalance"
+.SH "NAME"
-+portreserve_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the portreserve processes
++irqbalance_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the irqbalance processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the portreserve processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the irqbalance processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The irqbalance processes execute with the irqbalance_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux portreserve policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their portreserve processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for portreserve:
++For example:
+
++.B ps -eZ | grep irqbalance_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B portreserve_etc_t
-+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the portreserve_etc_t type, if you want to store portreserve files in the /etc directories.
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
++The irqbalance_t SELinux type can be entered via the "irqbalance_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the irqbalance_t domain are the following:"
+
-+.EX
++/usr/sbin/irqbalance
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+.B portreserve_exec_t
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux irqbalance policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their irqbalance processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for irqbalance:
++
++.EX
++.B irqbalance_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
-+- Set files with the portreserve_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the portreserve_t domain.
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux irqbalance policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their irqbalance processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for irqbalance:
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/sbin/portreserve, /sbin/portreserve
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B portreserve_initrc_exec_t
++.B irqbalance_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the portreserve_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the portreserve_initrc_t domain.
++- Set files with the irqbalance_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the irqbalance_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B portreserve_var_run_t
++.B irqbalance_var_run_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the portreserve_var_run_t type, if you want to store the portreserve files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the irqbalance_var_run_t type, if you want to store the irqbalance files under the /run directory.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux portreserve policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their portreserve processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for portreserve:
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+.EX
-+.B portreserve_t
-+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++The SELinux process type irqbalance_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B irqbalance_var_run_t
++
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -37923,425 +41512,484 @@ index 0000000..3345ff0
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), portreserve(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/postfix_selinux.8 b/man/man8/postfix_selinux.8
++selinux(8), irqbalance(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/irssi_selinux.8 b/man/man8/irssi_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..562d40c
+index 0000000..36617d8
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/postfix_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,432 @@
-+.TH "postfix_selinux" "8" "postfix" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "postfix SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/irssi_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,158 @@
++.TH "irssi_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "irssi" "SELinux Policy documentation for irssi"
+.SH "NAME"
-+postfix_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the postfix processes
++irssi_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the irssi processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the postfix processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the irssi processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH BOOLEANS
-+SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. postfix policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run postfix with the tightest access possible.
++The irssi processes execute with the irssi_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
++For example:
+
++.B ps -eZ | grep irssi_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The irssi_t SELinux type can be entered via the "irssi_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the irssi_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/bin/irssi
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow postfix_local domain full write access to mail_spool directories, you must turn on the postfix_local_write_mail_spool boolean.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux irssi policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their irssi processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for irssi:
+
+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P postfix_local_write_mail_spool 1
++.B irssi_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH BOOLEANS
++SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. irssi policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run irssi with the tightest access possible.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the postfix_smtp_t, postfix_map_t, postfix_showq_t, postfix_virtual_t, postfix_smtpd_t, postfix_local_t, postfix_cleanup_t, postfix_master_t, postfix_postdrop_t, postfix_pickup_t, postfix_bounce_t, postfix_qmgr_t, postfix_pipe_t, postfix_postqueue_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++If you want to allow the Irssi IRC Client to connect to any port, and to bind to any unreserved port, you must turn on the irssi_use_full_network boolean.
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.B setsebool -P irssi_use_full_network 1
+.EE
+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the postfix_smtp_t, postfix_map_t, postfix_showq_t, postfix_virtual_t, postfix_smtpd_t, postfix_local_t, postfix_cleanup_t, postfix_master_t, postfix_postdrop_t, postfix_pickup_t, postfix_bounce_t, postfix_qmgr_t, postfix_pipe_t, postfix_postqueue_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++If you want to allow the Irssi IRC Client to connect to any port, and to bind to any unreserved port, you must turn on the irssi_use_full_network boolean.
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B setsebool -P irssi_use_full_network 1
+.EE
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux postfix policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their postfix processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for postfix:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux irssi policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their irssi processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for irssi:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B postfix_bounce_exec_t
++.B irssi_etc_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the postfix_bounce_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the postfix_bounce_t domain.
++- Set files with the irssi_etc_t type, if you want to store irssi files in the /etc directories.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B postfix_bounce_tmp_t
++.B irssi_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the postfix_bounce_tmp_t type, if you want to store postfix bounce temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++- Set files with the irssi_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the irssi_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B postfix_cleanup_exec_t
++.B irssi_home_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the postfix_cleanup_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the postfix_cleanup_t domain.
++- Set files with the irssi_home_t type, if you want to store irssi files in the users home directory.
+
+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B postfix_cleanup_tmp_t
-+.EE
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
+
-+- Set files with the postfix_cleanup_tmp_t type, if you want to store postfix cleanup temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
++The SELinux process type irssi_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B postfix_data_t
-+.EE
++.br
++.B irssi_home_t
+
-+- Set files with the postfix_data_t type, if you want to treat the files as postfix content.
++ /home/[^/]*/\.irssi(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/irclogs(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.irssi(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/irclogs(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.irssi(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/irclogs(/.*)?
++.br
+
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B postfix_etc_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the postfix_etc_t type, if you want to store postfix files in the /etc directories.
-+
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the irssi_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B postfix_exec_t
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the postfix_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the postfix_t domain.
-+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/etc/postfix/postfix-script.*, /usr/libexec/postfix/.*
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the irssi_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B postfix_initrc_exec_t
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the postfix_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the postfix_initrc_t domain.
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
++.B semanage boolean
++can also be used to manipulate the booleans
+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B postfix_keytab_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the postfix_keytab_t type, if you want to treat the files as kerberos keytab files.
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B postfix_local_exec_t
-+.EE
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), irssi(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, setsebool(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/iscsid_selinux.8 b/man/man8/iscsid_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..4e63ee8
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/iscsid_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,160 @@
++.TH "iscsid_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "iscsid" "SELinux Policy documentation for iscsid"
++.SH "NAME"
++iscsid_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the iscsid processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+- Set files with the postfix_local_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the postfix_local_t domain.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the iscsid processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
++The iscsid processes execute with the iscsid_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B postfix_local_tmp_t
-+.EE
++For example:
+
-+- Set files with the postfix_local_tmp_t type, if you want to store postfix local temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++.B ps -eZ | grep iscsid_t
+
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B postfix_map_exec_t
-+.EE
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
-+- Set files with the postfix_map_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the postfix_map_t domain.
++The iscsid_t SELinux type can be entered via the "iscsid_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the iscsid_t domain are the following:"
+
++/sbin/iscsid, /sbin/iscsiuio, /usr/sbin/iscsid, /usr/sbin/iscsiuio, /sbin/brcm_iscsiuio, /usr/sbin/brcm_iscsiuio
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux iscsid policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their iscsid processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for iscsid:
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B postfix_map_tmp_t
++.B iscsid_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
-+- Set files with the postfix_map_tmp_t type, if you want to store postfix map temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux iscsid policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their iscsid processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for iscsid:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B postfix_master_exec_t
++.B iscsid_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the postfix_master_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the postfix_master_t domain.
++- Set files with the iscsid_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the iscsid_t domain.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/sbin/postcat, /usr/sbin/postfix, /usr/libexec/postfix/master, /usr/sbin/postkick, /usr/sbin/postsuper, /usr/sbin/postalias, /usr/sbin/postlock, /usr/sbin/postlog
+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B postfix_pickup_exec_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the postfix_pickup_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the postfix_pickup_t domain.
-+
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
+
-+.EX
++.SH PORT TYPES
++SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
+.PP
-+.B postfix_pickup_tmp_t
-+.EE
++You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
+
-+- Set files with the postfix_pickup_tmp_t type, if you want to store postfix pickup temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++.B semanage port -l
+
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
++SELinux iscsid policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their iscsid processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following port types are defined for iscsid:
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B postfix_pipe_exec_t
++.TP 5
++.B iscsi_port_t
++.TP 10
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the postfix_pipe_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the postfix_pipe_t domain.
-+
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B postfix_pipe_tmp_t
++Default Defined Ports:
++tcp 3260
+.EE
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+- Set files with the postfix_pipe_tmp_t type, if you want to store postfix pipe temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++The SELinux process type iscsid_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
++.br
++.B iscsi_lock_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B postfix_postdrop_exec_t
-+.EE
++ /var/lock/iscsi(/.*)?
++.br
+
-+- Set files with the postfix_postdrop_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the postfix_postdrop_t domain.
++.br
++.B iscsi_log_t
+
++ /var/log/iscsiuio\.log.*
++.br
++ /var/log/brcm-iscsi\.log.*
++.br
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B postfix_postqueue_exec_t
-+.EE
++.br
++.B iscsi_tmp_t
+
-+- Set files with the postfix_postqueue_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the postfix_postqueue_t domain.
+
++.br
++.B iscsi_var_run_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B postfix_private_t
-+.EE
++ /var/run/iscsid\.pid
++.br
+
-+- Set files with the postfix_private_t type, if you want to treat the files as postfix private data.
++.br
++.B sysfs_t
+
++ /sys(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B postfix_prng_t
-+.EE
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the iscsid_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
-+- Set files with the postfix_prng_t type, if you want to treat the files as postfix prng data.
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
+
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the iscsid_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B postfix_public_t
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the postfix_public_t type, if you want to treat the files as postfix public data.
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
++.B semanage port
++can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B postfix_qmgr_exec_t
-+.EE
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+- Set files with the postfix_qmgr_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the postfix_qmgr_t domain.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), iscsid(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/isnsd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/isnsd_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..9811117
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/isnsd_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,156 @@
++.TH "isnsd_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "isnsd" "SELinux Policy documentation for isnsd"
++.SH "NAME"
++isnsd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the isnsd processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the isnsd processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B postfix_qmgr_tmp_t
-+.EE
++The isnsd processes execute with the isnsd_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+- Set files with the postfix_qmgr_tmp_t type, if you want to store postfix qmgr temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++For example:
+
++.B ps -eZ | grep isnsd_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B postfix_showq_exec_t
-+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the postfix_showq_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the postfix_showq_t domain.
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
++The isnsd_t SELinux type can be entered via the "isnsd_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the isnsd_t domain are the following:"
+
-+.EX
++/usr/sbin/isnsd
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+.B postfix_smtp_exec_t
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux isnsd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their isnsd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for isnsd:
++
++.EX
++.B isnsd_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
-+- Set files with the postfix_smtp_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the postfix_smtp_t domain.
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux isnsd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their isnsd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for isnsd:
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/libexec/postfix/lmtp, /usr/libexec/postfix/smtp, /usr/libexec/postfix/scache
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B postfix_smtp_tmp_t
++.B isnsd_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the postfix_smtp_tmp_t type, if you want to store postfix smtp temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++- Set files with the isnsd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the isnsd_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B postfix_smtpd_exec_t
++.B isnsd_initrc_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the postfix_smtpd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the postfix_smtpd_t domain.
++- Set files with the isnsd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the isnsd_initrc_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B postfix_smtpd_tmp_t
++.B isnsd_var_lib_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the postfix_smtpd_tmp_t type, if you want to store postfix smtpd temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++- Set files with the isnsd_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the isnsd files under the /var/lib directory.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B postfix_spool_bounce_t
++.B isnsd_var_run_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the postfix_spool_bounce_t type, if you want to treat the files as postfix spool bounce data.
++- Set files with the isnsd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the isnsd files under the /run directory.
+
+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B postfix_spool_flush_t
-+.EE
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH PORT TYPES
++SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
++.PP
++You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
+
-+- Set files with the postfix_spool_flush_t type, if you want to treat the files as postfix spool flush data.
++.B semanage port -l
+
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
++SELinux isnsd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their isnsd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following port types are defined for isnsd:
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B postfix_spool_maildrop_t
++.TP 5
++.B isns_port_t
++.TP 10
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the postfix_spool_maildrop_t type, if you want to treat the files as postfix spool maildrop data.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/spool/postfix/defer(/.*)?, /var/spool/postfix/deferred(/.*)?, /var/spool/postfix/maildrop(/.*)?
-+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B postfix_spool_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the postfix_spool_t type, if you want to store the postfix files under the /var/spool directory.
-+
-+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B postfix_var_run_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the postfix_var_run_t type, if you want to store the postfix files under the /run directory.
-+
-+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B postfix_virtual_exec_t
++Default Defined Ports:
++tcp 3205
+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the postfix_virtual_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the postfix_virtual_t domain.
-+
-+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B postfix_virtual_tmp_t
++udp 3205
+.EE
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+- Set files with the postfix_virtual_tmp_t type, if you want to store postfix virtual temporary files in the /tmp directories.
-+
-+
-+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
-+
-+.SH PORT TYPES
-+SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
-+.PP
-+You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
-+
-+.B semanage port -l
++The SELinux process type isnsd_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
-+SELinux postfix policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their postfix processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following port types are defined for postfix:
++.br
++.B isnsd_var_lib_t
+
-+.EX
-+.TP 5
-+.B postfix_policyd_port_t
-+.TP 10
-+.EE
++ /var/lib/isns(/.*)?
++.br
+
++.br
++.B isnsd_var_run_t
+
-+Default Defined Ports:
-+tcp 10031
-+.EE
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux postfix policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their postfix processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for postfix:
++ /var/run/isnsctl
++.br
++ /var/run/isnsd\.pid
++.br
+
-+.EX
-+.B postfix_bounce_t, postfix_cleanup_t, postfix_showq_t, postfix_virtual_t, postfix_postdrop_t, postfix_postqueue_t, postfix_pipe_t, postfix_master_t, postfix_pickup_t, postfix_local_t, postfix_smtpd_t, postfix_qmgr_t, postfix_smtp_t, postfix_map_t
-+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -38356,199 +42004,141 @@ index 0000000..562d40c
+.B semanage port
+can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
+
-+.B semanage boolean
-+can also be used to manipulate the booleans
-+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), postfix(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-+, setsebool(8)
-\ No newline at end of file
-diff --git a/man/man8/postgresql_selinux.8 b/man/man8/postgresql_selinux.8
++selinux(8), isnsd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/iwhd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/iwhd_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..ea8f221
+index 0000000..cea1bb7
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/postgresql_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,200 @@
-+.TH "postgresql_selinux" "8" "postgresql" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "postgresql SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/iwhd_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,140 @@
++.TH "iwhd_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "iwhd" "SELinux Policy documentation for iwhd"
+.SH "NAME"
-+postgresql_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the postgresql processes
++iwhd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the iwhd processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the postgresql processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
-+
-+.SH BOOLEANS
-+SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. postgresql policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run postgresql with the tightest access possible.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the iwhd processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
++The iwhd processes execute with the iwhd_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to connect to PostgreSQL, you must turn on the user_postgresql_connect boolean.
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P user_postgresql_connect 1
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep iwhd_t
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the postgresql_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
++The iwhd_t SELinux type can be entered via the "iwhd_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the iwhd_t domain are the following:"
+
++/usr/bin/iwhd
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the postgresql_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux iwhd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their iwhd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for iwhd:
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B iwhd_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux postgresql policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their postgresql processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for postgresql:
-+
-+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B postgresql_db_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the postgresql_db_t type, if you want to treat the files as postgresql database content.
-+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/share/jonas/pgsql(/.*)?, /var/lib/postgres(ql)?(/.*)?, /var/lib/sepgsql(/.*)?, /usr/lib/pgsql/test/regress(/.*)?, /var/lib/pgsql(/.*)?
-+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B postgresql_etc_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the postgresql_etc_t type, if you want to store postgresql files in the /etc directories.
-+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/etc/sysconfig/pgsql(/.*)?, /etc/postgresql(/.*)?
-+
-+.EX
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux iwhd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their iwhd processes in as secure a method as possible.
+.PP
-+.B postgresql_exec_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the postgresql_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the postgresql_t domain.
++The following file types are defined for iwhd:
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/bin/(se)?postgres, /usr/lib/postgresql/bin/.*, /usr/lib/pgsql/test/regress/pg_regress, /usr/bin/initdb(\.sepgsql)?
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B postgresql_initrc_exec_t
++.B iwhd_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the postgresql_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the postgresql_initrc_t domain.
++- Set files with the iwhd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the iwhd_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B postgresql_lock_t
++.B iwhd_initrc_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the postgresql_lock_t type, if you want to treat the files as postgresql lock data, stored under the /var/lock directory
++- Set files with the iwhd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the iwhd_initrc_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B postgresql_log_t
++.B iwhd_log_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the postgresql_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as postgresql log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++- Set files with the iwhd_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as iwhd log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/lib/pgsql/logfile(/.*)?, /var/log/postgresql(/.*)?, /var/log/postgres\.log.*, /var/lib/sepgsql/pgstartup\.log, /var/log/rhdb/rhdb(/.*)?, /var/lib/pgsql/.*\.log, /var/log/sepostgresql\.log.*
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B postgresql_tmp_t
++.B iwhd_var_lib_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the postgresql_tmp_t type, if you want to store postgresql temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++- Set files with the iwhd_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the iwhd files under the /var/lib directory.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B postgresql_var_run_t
++.B iwhd_var_run_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the postgresql_var_run_t type, if you want to store the postgresql files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the iwhd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the iwhd files under the /run directory.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PORT TYPES
-+SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
-+.PP
-+You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+.B semanage port -l
++The SELinux process type iwhd_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
-+SELinux postgresql policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their postgresql processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following port types are defined for postgresql:
++.br
++.B iwhd_log_t
+
-+.EX
-+.TP 5
-+.B postgresql_port_t
-+.TP 10
-+.EE
++ /var/log/iwhd\.log.*
++.br
+
++.br
++.B iwhd_var_lib_t
+
-+Default Defined Ports:
-+tcp 5432
-+.EE
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux postgresql policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their postgresql processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for postgresql:
++ /var/lib/iwhd(/.*)?
++.br
+
-+.EX
-+.B postgresql_t
-+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++.br
++.B iwhd_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/iwhd\.pid
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -38560,149 +42150,97 @@ index 0000000..ea8f221
+.B semanage module
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
-+.B semanage port
-+can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
-+
-+.B semanage boolean
-+can also be used to manipulate the booleans
-+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), postgresql(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-+, setsebool(8)
-\ No newline at end of file
-diff --git a/man/man8/postgrey_selinux.8 b/man/man8/postgrey_selinux.8
++selinux(8), iwhd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/jabberd_router_selinux.8 b/man/man8/jabberd_router_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..7655902
+index 0000000..6c57f11
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/postgrey_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,143 @@
-+.TH "postgrey_selinux" "8" "postgrey" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "postgrey SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/jabberd_router_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
++.TH "jabberd_router_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "jabberd_router" "SELinux Policy documentation for jabberd_router"
+.SH "NAME"
-+postgrey_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the postgrey processes
++jabberd_router_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the jabberd_router processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the postgrey processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the jabberd_router processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The jabberd_router processes execute with the jabberd_router_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux postgrey policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their postgrey processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for postgrey:
++For example:
+
++.B ps -eZ | grep jabberd_router_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B postgrey_etc_t
-+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the postgrey_etc_t type, if you want to store postgrey files in the /etc directories.
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
++The jabberd_router_t SELinux type can be entered via the "jabberd_router_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the jabberd_router_t domain are the following:"
+
-+.EX
++/usr/bin/c2s, /usr/bin/router
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+.B postgrey_exec_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the postgrey_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the postgrey_t domain.
-+
-+
-+.EX
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+.B postgrey_initrc_exec_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the postgrey_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the postgrey_initrc_t domain.
-+
-+
-+.EX
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux jabberd_router policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their jabberd_router processes in as secure a method as possible.
+.PP
-+.B postgrey_spool_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the postgrey_spool_t type, if you want to store the postgrey files under the /var/spool directory.
-+
++The following process types are defined for jabberd_router:
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B postgrey_var_lib_t
++.B jabberd_router_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
-+- Set files with the postgrey_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the postgrey files under the /var/lib directory.
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux jabberd_router policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their jabberd_router processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for jabberd_router:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B postgrey_var_run_t
++.B jabberd_router_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the postgrey_var_run_t type, if you want to store the postgrey files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the jabberd_router_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the jabberd_router_t domain.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/run/postgrey\.pid, /var/run/postgrey(/.*)?
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PORT TYPES
-+SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
-+.PP
-+You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
-+
-+.B semanage port -l
-+
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
-+SELinux postgrey policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their postgrey processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following port types are defined for postgrey:
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+.EX
-+.TP 5
-+.B postgrey_port_t
-+.TP 10
-+.EE
++The SELinux process type jabberd_router_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
++.br
++.B jabberd_var_lib_t
+
-+Default Defined Ports:
-+tcp 60000
-+.EE
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux postgrey policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their postgrey processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for postgrey:
++ /var/lib/jabberd(/.*)?
++.br
+
-+.EX
-+.B postgrey_t
-+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -38714,205 +42252,168 @@ index 0000000..7655902
+.B semanage module
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
-+.B semanage port
-+can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
-+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), postgrey(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/pppd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/pppd_selinux.8
++selinux(8), jabberd_router(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, jabberd_selinux(8), jabberd_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/jabberd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/jabberd_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..6b97eb9
+index 0000000..520a42b
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/pppd_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,205 @@
-+.TH "pppd_selinux" "8" "pppd" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "pppd SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/jabberd_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,169 @@
++.TH "jabberd_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "jabberd" "SELinux Policy documentation for jabberd"
+.SH "NAME"
-+pppd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the pppd processes
++jabberd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the jabberd processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the pppd processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
-+
-+.SH BOOLEANS
-+SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. pppd policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run pppd with the tightest access possible.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the jabberd processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
++The jabberd processes execute with the jabberd_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow pppd to be run for a regular user, you must turn on the pppd_for_user boolean.
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P pppd_for_user 1
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep jabberd_t
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow pppd to load kernel modules for certain modems, you must turn on the pppd_can_insmod boolean.
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P pppd_can_insmod 1
-+.EE
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The jabberd_t SELinux type can be entered via the "jabberd_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the jabberd_t domain are the following:"
+
++/usr/bin/sm, /usr/bin/s2s
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the pppd_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
-+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
-+
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the pppd_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux jabberd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their jabberd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for jabberd:
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B jabberd_router_t, jabberd_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux pppd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their pppd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for pppd:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux jabberd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their jabberd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for jabberd:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B pppd_etc_rw_t
++.B jabberd_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the pppd_etc_rw_t type, if you want to treat the files as pppd etc read/write content.
++- Set files with the jabberd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the jabberd_t domain.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/etc/ppp(/.*)?, /etc/ppp/resolv\.conf, /etc/ppp/peers(/.*)?
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B pppd_etc_t
++.B jabberd_initrc_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the pppd_etc_t type, if you want to store pppd files in the /etc directories.
++- Set files with the jabberd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the jabberd_initrc_t domain.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/etc/ppp, /root/.ppprc
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B pppd_exec_t
++.B jabberd_router_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the pppd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the pppd_t domain.
++- Set files with the jabberd_router_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the jabberd_router_t domain.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/sbin/pppd, /usr/sbin/ipppd, /usr/sbin/pppoe-server, /usr/sbin/ppp-watch, /sbin/pppoe-server, /sbin/ppp-watch
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B pppd_initrc_exec_t
++.B jabberd_var_lib_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the pppd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the pppd_initrc_t domain.
++- Set files with the jabberd_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the jabberd files under the /var/lib directory.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/etc/rc\.d/init\.d/ppp, /etc/ppp/(auth|ip(v6|x)?)-(up|down)
+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B pppd_lock_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the pppd_lock_t type, if you want to treat the files as pppd lock data, stored under the /var/lock directory
-+
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
+
-+.EX
++.SH PORT TYPES
++SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
+.PP
-+.B pppd_log_t
-+.EE
++You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
+
-+- Set files with the pppd_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as pppd log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++.B semanage port -l
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/log/ppp(/.*)?, /var/log/ppp-connect-errors.*
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
++SELinux jabberd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their jabberd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following port types are defined for jabberd:
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B pppd_secret_t
++.TP 5
++.B jabber_client_port_t
++.TP 10
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the pppd_secret_t type, if you want to treat the files as pppd se secret data.
+
++Default Defined Ports:
++tcp 5222,5223
++.EE
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B pppd_tmp_t
++.TP 5
++.B jabber_interserver_port_t
++.TP 10
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the pppd_tmp_t type, if you want to store pppd temporary files in the /tmp directories.
+
++Default Defined Ports:
++tcp 5269
++.EE
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B pppd_unit_file_t
++.TP 5
++.B jabber_router_port_t
++.TP 10
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the pppd_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as pppd unit content.
-+
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B pppd_var_run_t
++Default Defined Ports:
++tcp 5347
+.EE
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+- Set files with the pppd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the pppd files under the /run directory.
++The SELinux process type jabberd_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/run/pppd[0-9]*\.tdb, /var/run/ppp(/.*)?, /var/run/(i)?ppp.*pid[^/]*
-+
-+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
++.B jabberd_var_lib_t
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux pppd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their pppd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for pppd:
++ /var/lib/jabberd(/.*)?
++.br
+
-+.EX
-+.B pppd_t
-+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -38924,134 +42425,126 @@ index 0000000..6b97eb9
+.B semanage module
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
-+.B semanage boolean
-+can also be used to manipulate the booleans
++.B semanage port
++can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), pppd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-+, setsebool(8)
++selinux(8), jabberd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, jabberd_router_selinux(8)
\ No newline at end of file
-diff --git a/man/man8/pptp_selinux.8 b/man/man8/pptp_selinux.8
+diff --git a/man/man8/jockey_selinux.8 b/man/man8/jockey_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..e13f5c3
+index 0000000..2615dc1
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/pptp_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
-+.TH "pptp_selinux" "8" "pptp" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "pptp SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/jockey_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,120 @@
++.TH "jockey_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "jockey" "SELinux Policy documentation for jockey"
+.SH "NAME"
-+pptp_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the pptp processes
++jockey_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the jockey processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the pptp processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the jockey processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The jockey processes execute with the jockey_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the pptp_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep jockey_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The jockey_t SELinux type can be entered via the "jockey_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the jockey_t domain are the following:"
+
++/usr/share/jockey/jockey-backend
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the pptp_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux jockey policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their jockey processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for jockey:
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B jockey_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux pptp policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their pptp processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for pptp:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux jockey policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their jockey processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for jockey:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B pptp_exec_t
++.B jockey_cache_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the pptp_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the pptp_t domain.
++- Set files with the jockey_cache_t type, if you want to store the files under the /var/cache directory.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B pptp_log_t
++.B jockey_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the pptp_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as pptp log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++- Set files with the jockey_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the jockey_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B pptp_var_run_t
++.B jockey_var_log_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the pptp_var_run_t type, if you want to store the pptp files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the jockey_var_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as jockey var log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PORT TYPES
-+SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
-+.PP
-+You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+.B semanage port -l
++The SELinux process type jockey_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
-+SELinux pptp policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their pptp processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following port types are defined for pptp:
++.br
++.B jockey_cache_t
+
-+.EX
-+.TP 5
-+.B pptp_port_t
-+.TP 10
-+.EE
++ /var/cache/jockey(/.*)?
++.br
+
++.br
++.B jockey_var_log_t
+
-+Default Defined Ports:
-+tcp 1723
-+.EE
-+udp 1723
-+.EE
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux pptp policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their pptp processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for pptp:
++ /var/log/jockey(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/log/jockey\.log.*
++.br
+
-+.EX
-+.B pptp_t
-+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -39063,147 +42556,163 @@ index 0000000..e13f5c3
+.B semanage module
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
-+.B semanage port
-+can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
-+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), pptp(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/prelink_selinux.8 b/man/man8/prelink_selinux.8
++selinux(8), jockey(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/kadmind_selinux.8 b/man/man8/kadmind_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..a314c41
+index 0000000..f4e852a
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/prelink_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,143 @@
-+.TH "prelink_selinux" "8" "prelink" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "prelink SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/kadmind_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,162 @@
++.TH "kadmind_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "kadmind" "SELinux Policy documentation for kadmind"
+.SH "NAME"
-+prelink_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the prelink processes
++kadmind_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the kadmind processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the prelink processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the kadmind processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The kadmind processes execute with the kadmind_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the prelink_cron_system_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep kadmind_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The kadmind_t SELinux type can be entered via the "kadmind_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the kadmind_t domain are the following:"
+
++/usr/(kerberos/)?sbin/kadmind, /usr/kerberos/sbin/kadmin\.local
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the prelink_cron_system_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux kadmind policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their kadmind processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for kadmind:
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B kadmind_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux prelink policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their prelink processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for prelink:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux kadmind policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their kadmind processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for kadmind:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B prelink_cache_t
++.B kadmind_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the prelink_cache_t type, if you want to store the files under the /var/cache directory.
++- Set files with the kadmind_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the kadmind_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B prelink_cron_system_exec_t
++.B kadmind_log_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the prelink_cron_system_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the prelink_cron_system_t domain.
++- Set files with the kadmind_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as kadmind log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B prelink_exec_t
++.B kadmind_tmp_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the prelink_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the prelink_t domain.
++- Set files with the kadmind_tmp_t type, if you want to store kadmind temporary files in the /tmp directories.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B prelink_log_t
++.B kadmind_var_run_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the prelink_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as prelink log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++- Set files with the kadmind_var_run_t type, if you want to store the kadmind files under the /run directory.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/log/prelink(/.*)?, /var/log/prelink\.log.*
+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B prelink_tmp_t
-+.EE
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
+
-+- Set files with the prelink_tmp_t type, if you want to store prelink temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
++The SELinux process type kadmind_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B prelink_tmpfs_t
-+.EE
++.br
++.B kadmind_log_t
+
-+- Set files with the prelink_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store prelink files on a tmpfs file system.
++ /var/log/kadmin(d)?\.log.*
++.br
++
++.br
++.B kadmind_tmp_t
+
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B prelink_var_lib_t
-+.EE
++.br
++.B kadmind_var_run_t
+
-+- Set files with the prelink_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the prelink files under the /var/lib directory.
+
+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/lib/prelink(/.*)?, /var/lib/misc/prelink.*
++.B krb5kdc_conf_t
+
-+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
++ /etc/krb5kdc(/.*)?
++.br
++ /usr/var/krb5kdc(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/kerberos/krb5kdc(/.*)?
++.br
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux prelink policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their prelink processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for prelink:
++.br
++.B krb5kdc_lock_t
+
-+.EX
-+.B prelink_cron_system_t, prelink_t
-+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++ /var/kerberos/krb5kdc/principal.*\.ok
++.br
++ /var/kerberos/krb5kdc/from_master.*
++.br
++
++.br
++.B krb5kdc_principal_t
++
++ /etc/krb5kdc/principal.*
++.br
++ /usr/var/krb5kdc/principal.*
++.br
++ /var/kerberos/krb5kdc/principal.*
++.br
++
++.br
++.B security_t
++
++ /selinux
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -39216,220 +42725,156 @@ index 0000000..a314c41
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), prelink(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/prelude_selinux.8 b/man/man8/prelude_selinux.8
++selinux(8), kadmind(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/kdump_selinux.8 b/man/man8/kdump_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..b6d1c35
+index 0000000..5b31590
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/prelude_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,223 @@
-+.TH "prelude_selinux" "8" "prelude" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "prelude SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/kdump_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,157 @@
++.TH "kdump_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "kdump" "SELinux Policy documentation for kdump"
+.SH "NAME"
-+prelude_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the prelude processes
++kdump_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the kdump processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the prelude processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the kdump processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The kdump processes execute with the kdump_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the prelude_lml_t, prelude_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep kdump_t
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the prelude_lml_t, prelude_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
-+.EE
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++The kdump_t SELinux type can be entered via the "kdump_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the kdump_t domain are the following:"
++
++/sbin/kdump, /sbin/kexec, /usr/sbin/kdump, /usr/sbin/kexec
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux prelude policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their prelude processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for prelude:
-+
-+
-+.EX
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux kdump policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their kdump processes in as secure a method as possible.
+.PP
-+.B prelude_audisp_exec_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the prelude_audisp_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the prelude_audisp_t domain.
-+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/sbin/audisp-prelude, /usr/sbin/audisp-prelude
++The following process types are defined for kdump:
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B prelude_audisp_var_run_t
++.B kdumpgui_t, kdumpctl_t, kdump_t
+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the prelude_audisp_var_run_t type, if you want to store the prelude audisp files under the /run directory.
-+
-+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B prelude_correlator_config_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the prelude_correlator_config_t type, if you want to treat the files as prelude correlator configuration data, usually stored under the /etc directory.
-+
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
-+.EX
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
-+.B prelude_correlator_exec_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the prelude_correlator_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the prelude_correlator_t domain.
-+
-+
-+.EX
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+.B prelude_exec_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the prelude_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the prelude_t domain.
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux kdump policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their kdump processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for kdump:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B prelude_initrc_exec_t
++.B kdump_etc_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the prelude_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the prelude_initrc_t domain.
++- Set files with the kdump_etc_t type, if you want to store kdump files in the /etc directories.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/etc/rc\.d/init\.d/prelude-correlator, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/prelude-manager, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/prelude-lml
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B prelude_lml_exec_t
++.B kdump_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the prelude_lml_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the prelude_lml_t domain.
++- Set files with the kdump_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the kdump_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B prelude_lml_tmp_t
++.B kdump_initrc_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the prelude_lml_tmp_t type, if you want to store prelude lml temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++- Set files with the kdump_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the kdump_initrc_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B prelude_lml_var_run_t
++.B kdump_unit_file_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the prelude_lml_var_run_t type, if you want to store the prelude lml files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the kdump_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as kdump unit content.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B prelude_log_t
++.B kdumpctl_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the prelude_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as prelude log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++- Set files with the kdumpctl_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the kdumpctl_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B prelude_spool_t
++.B kdumpctl_tmp_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the prelude_spool_t type, if you want to store the prelude files under the /var/spool directory.
++- Set files with the kdumpctl_tmp_t type, if you want to store kdumpctl temporary files in the /tmp directories.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/spool/prelude(/.*)?, /var/spool/prelude-manager(/.*)?
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B prelude_var_lib_t
++.B kdumpgui_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the prelude_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the prelude files under the /var/lib directory.
++- Set files with the kdumpgui_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the kdumpgui_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B prelude_var_run_t
++.B kdumpgui_tmp_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the prelude_var_run_t type, if you want to store the prelude files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the kdumpgui_tmp_t type, if you want to store kdumpgui temporary files in the /tmp directories.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PORT TYPES
-+SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
-+.PP
-+You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
-+
-+.B semanage port -l
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
-+SELinux prelude policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their prelude processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following port types are defined for prelude:
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the kdumpgui_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.TP 5
-+.B prelude_port_t
-+.TP 10
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
+
-+
-+Default Defined Ports:
-+tcp 4690
-+.EE
-+udp 4690
-+.EE
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux prelude policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their prelude processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for prelude:
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the kdumpgui_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B prelude_lml_t, prelude_t, prelude_audisp_t, prelude_correlator_t
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -39441,134 +42886,171 @@ index 0000000..b6d1c35
+.B semanage module
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
-+.B semanage port
-+can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
-+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), prelude(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/privoxy_selinux.8 b/man/man8/privoxy_selinux.8
++selinux(8), kdump(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, kdumpctl_selinux(8), kdumpgui_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/kdumpctl_selinux.8 b/man/man8/kdumpctl_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..b4b4c69
+index 0000000..64c0c6f
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/privoxy_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,134 @@
-+.TH "privoxy_selinux" "8" "privoxy" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "privoxy SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/kdumpctl_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,169 @@
++.TH "kdumpctl_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "kdumpctl" "SELinux Policy documentation for kdumpctl"
+.SH "NAME"
-+privoxy_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the privoxy processes
++kdumpctl_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the kdumpctl processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the privoxy processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
-+
-+.SH BOOLEANS
-+SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. privoxy policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run privoxy with the tightest access possible.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the kdumpctl processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
++The kdumpctl processes execute with the kdumpctl_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow privoxy to connect to all ports, not just HTTP, FTP, and Gopher ports, you must turn on the privoxy_connect_any boolean.
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P privoxy_connect_any 1
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep kdumpctl_t
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the privoxy_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
++The kdumpctl_t SELinux type can be entered via the "kdumpctl_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the kdumpctl_t domain are the following:"
+
++/usr/bin/kdumpctl
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the privoxy_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux kdumpctl policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their kdumpctl processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for kdumpctl:
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B kdumpctl_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux privoxy policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their privoxy processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for privoxy:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux kdumpctl policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their kdumpctl processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for kdumpctl:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B privoxy_etc_rw_t
++.B kdumpctl_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the privoxy_etc_rw_t type, if you want to treat the files as privoxy etc read/write content.
++- Set files with the kdumpctl_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the kdumpctl_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B privoxy_exec_t
++.B kdumpctl_tmp_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the privoxy_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the privoxy_t domain.
++- Set files with the kdumpctl_tmp_t type, if you want to store kdumpctl temporary files in the /tmp directories.
+
+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B privoxy_initrc_exec_t
-+.EE
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
+
-+- Set files with the privoxy_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the privoxy_initrc_t domain.
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
++The SELinux process type kdumpctl_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B privoxy_log_t
-+.EE
++.br
++.B boot_t
+
-+- Set files with the privoxy_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as privoxy log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++ /boot/.*
++.br
++ /vmlinuz.*
++.br
++ /initrd\.img.*
++.br
++ /boot
++.br
+
++.br
++.B kdumpctl_tmp_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B privoxy_var_run_t
-+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the privoxy_var_run_t type, if you want to store the privoxy files under the /run directory.
++.br
++.B systemd_passwd_var_run_t
+
++ /var/run/systemd/ask-password(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/systemd/ask-password-block(/.*)?
++.br
+
-+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
++.br
++.B var_log_t
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux privoxy policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their privoxy processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for privoxy:
++ /var/log/.*
++.br
++ /nsr/logs(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/webmin(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/log/cron[^/]*
++.br
++ /var/log/secure[^/]*
++.br
++ /opt/zimbra/log(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/log/maillog[^/]*
++.br
++ /var/log/spooler[^/]*
++.br
++ /var/log/messages[^/]*
++.br
++ /usr/centreon/log(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/spool/rsyslog(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/axfrdns/log/main(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/spool/bacula/log(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/tinydns/log/main(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/dnscache/log/main(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/stockmaniac/templates_cache(/.*)?
++.br
++ /opt/Symantec/scspagent/IDS/system(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/log
++.br
++ /var/log/dmesg
++.br
++ /var/log/syslog
++.br
++ /var/named/chroot/var/log
++.br
+
-+.EX
-+.B privoxy_t
-+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -39580,121 +43062,199 @@ index 0000000..b4b4c69
+.B semanage module
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
-+.B semanage boolean
-+can also be used to manipulate the booleans
-+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), privoxy(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-+, setsebool(8)
++selinux(8), kdumpctl(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, kdump_selinux(8)
\ No newline at end of file
-diff --git a/man/man8/procmail_selinux.8 b/man/man8/procmail_selinux.8
+diff --git a/man/man8/kdumpgui_selinux.8 b/man/man8/kdumpgui_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..15f4183
+index 0000000..cdb1f42
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/procmail_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,115 @@
-+.TH "procmail_selinux" "8" "procmail" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "procmail SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/kdumpgui_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,197 @@
++.TH "kdumpgui_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "kdumpgui" "SELinux Policy documentation for kdumpgui"
+.SH "NAME"
-+procmail_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the procmail processes
++kdumpgui_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the kdumpgui processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the procmail processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the kdumpgui processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The kdumpgui processes execute with the kdumpgui_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the procmail_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep kdumpgui_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
++The kdumpgui_t SELinux type can be entered via the "kdumpgui_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the kdumpgui_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/share/system-config-kdump/system-config-kdump-backend\.py
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the procmail_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux kdumpgui policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their kdumpgui processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for kdumpgui:
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B kdumpgui_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux procmail policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their procmail processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for procmail:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux kdumpgui policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their kdumpgui processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for kdumpgui:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B procmail_exec_t
++.B kdumpgui_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the procmail_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the procmail_t domain.
++- Set files with the kdumpgui_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the kdumpgui_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B procmail_home_t
++.B kdumpgui_tmp_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the procmail_home_t type, if you want to store procmail files in the users home directory.
++- Set files with the kdumpgui_tmp_t type, if you want to store kdumpgui temporary files in the /tmp directories.
+
+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B procmail_log_t
-+.EE
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
+
-+- Set files with the procmail_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as procmail log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type kdumpgui_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/log/procmail\.log.*, /var/log/procmail(/.*)?
++.B boot_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B procmail_tmp_t
-+.EE
++ /boot/.*
++.br
++ /vmlinuz.*
++.br
++ /initrd\.img.*
++.br
++ /boot
++.br
+
-+- Set files with the procmail_tmp_t type, if you want to store procmail temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++.br
++.B etc_runtime_t
++
++ /[^/]+
++.br
++ /etc/mtab.*
++.br
++ /etc/blkid(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/nologin.*
++.br
++ /etc/\.fstab\.hal\..+
++.br
++ /halt
++.br
++ /fastboot
++.br
++ /poweroff
++.br
++ /etc/cmtab
++.br
++ /\.autofsck
++.br
++ /forcefsck
++.br
++ /\.suspended
++.br
++ /fsckoptions
++.br
++ /\.autorelabel
++.br
++ /etc/securetty
++.br
++ /etc/killpower
++.br
++ /etc/nohotplug
++.br
++ /etc/ioctl\.save
++.br
++ /etc/fstab\.REVOKE
++.br
++ /etc/network/ifstate
++.br
++ /etc/sysconfig/hwconf
++.br
++ /etc/ptal/ptal-printd-like
++.br
++ /etc/sysconfig/iptables\.save
++.br
++ /etc/xorg\.conf\.d/00-system-setup-keyboard\.conf
++.br
++ /etc/X11/xorg\.conf\.d/00-system-setup-keyboard\.conf
++.br
+
++.br
++.B kdump_etc_t
+
-+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
++ /etc/kdump\.conf
++.br
++
++.br
++.B kdumpgui_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B systemd_passwd_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/systemd/ask-password(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/systemd/ask-password-block(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux procmail policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their procmail processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for procmail:
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the kdumpgui_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B procmail_t
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
++
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the kdumpgui_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -39707,261 +43267,425 @@ index 0000000..15f4183
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), procmail(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/psad_selinux.8 b/man/man8/psad_selinux.8
++selinux(8), kdumpgui(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, kdump_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/kerberos_selinux.8 b/man/man8/kerberos_selinux.8
+deleted file mode 100644
+index a8f81c8..0000000
+--- a/man/man8/kerberos_selinux.8
++++ /dev/null
+@@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
+-.TH "kerberos_selinux" "8" "17 Jan 2005" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "kerberos Selinux Policy documentation"
+-.de EX
+-.nf
+-.ft CW
+-..
+-.de EE
+-.ft R
+-.fi
+-..
+-.SH "NAME"
+-kerberos_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for Kerberos.
+-.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+-
+-Security-Enhanced Linux secures the system via flexible mandatory access
+-control. SELinux policy can be configured to deny Kerberos access to confined applications, since it requires daemons to be allowed greater access to certain secure files and additional access to the network.
+-.SH BOOLEANS
+-.PP
+-You must set the allow_kerberos boolean to allow your system to work properly in a Kerberos environment.
+-.EX
+-setsebool -P allow_kerberos 1
+-.EE
+-.PP
+-system-config-selinux is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+-.SH AUTHOR
+-This manual page was written by Dan Walsh <dwalsh at redhat.com>.
+-
+-.SH "SEE ALSO"
+-selinux(8), kerberos(1), chcon(1), setsebool(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/keyboardd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/keyboardd_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..aa9f2e2
+index 0000000..d16fc27
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/psad_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,135 @@
-+.TH "psad_selinux" "8" "psad" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "psad SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/keyboardd_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,144 @@
++.TH "keyboardd_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "keyboardd" "SELinux Policy documentation for keyboardd"
+.SH "NAME"
-+psad_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the psad processes
++keyboardd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the keyboardd processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the psad processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the keyboardd processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The keyboardd processes execute with the keyboardd_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the psad_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep keyboardd_t
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
+
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The keyboardd_t SELinux type can be entered via the "keyboardd_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the keyboardd_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/bin/system-setup-keyboard
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the psad_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux keyboardd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their keyboardd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for keyboardd:
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B keyboardd_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux psad policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their psad processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for psad:
-+
-+
-+.EX
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux keyboardd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their keyboardd processes in as secure a method as possible.
+.PP
-+.B psad_etc_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the psad_etc_t type, if you want to store psad files in the /etc directories.
++The following file types are defined for keyboardd:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B psad_exec_t
++.B keyboardd_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the psad_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the psad_t domain.
++- Set files with the keyboardd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the keyboardd_t domain.
+
+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B psad_initrc_exec_t
-+.EE
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
+
-+- Set files with the psad_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the psad_initrc_t domain.
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
++The SELinux process type keyboardd_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B psad_tmp_t
-+.EE
++.br
++.B etc_runtime_t
+
-+- Set files with the psad_tmp_t type, if you want to store psad temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++ /[^/]+
++.br
++ /etc/mtab.*
++.br
++ /etc/blkid(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/nologin.*
++.br
++ /etc/\.fstab\.hal\..+
++.br
++ /halt
++.br
++ /fastboot
++.br
++ /poweroff
++.br
++ /etc/cmtab
++.br
++ /\.autofsck
++.br
++ /forcefsck
++.br
++ /\.suspended
++.br
++ /fsckoptions
++.br
++ /\.autorelabel
++.br
++ /etc/securetty
++.br
++ /etc/killpower
++.br
++ /etc/nohotplug
++.br
++ /etc/ioctl\.save
++.br
++ /etc/fstab\.REVOKE
++.br
++ /etc/network/ifstate
++.br
++ /etc/sysconfig/hwconf
++.br
++ /etc/ptal/ptal-printd-like
++.br
++ /etc/sysconfig/iptables\.save
++.br
++ /etc/xorg\.conf\.d/00-system-setup-keyboard\.conf
++.br
++ /etc/X11/xorg\.conf\.d/00-system-setup-keyboard\.conf
++.br
+
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
-+.EX
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
+.PP
-+.B psad_var_lib_t
-+.EE
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
-+- Set files with the psad_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the psad files under the /var/lib directory.
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B psad_var_log_t
-+.EE
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), keyboardd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/keystone_selinux.8 b/man/man8/keystone_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..92a2ad3
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/keystone_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,242 @@
++.TH "keystone_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "keystone" "SELinux Policy documentation for keystone"
++.SH "NAME"
++keystone_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the keystone processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+- Set files with the psad_var_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as psad var log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the keystone processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
++The keystone processes execute with the keystone_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B psad_var_run_t
-+.EE
++For example:
+
-+- Set files with the psad_var_run_t type, if you want to store the psad files under the /run directory.
++.B ps -eZ | grep keystone_t
+
+
-+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
++The keystone_t SELinux type can be entered via the "keystone_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the keystone_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/bin/keystone-all
+.SH PROCESS TYPES
+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux psad policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their psad processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for psad:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux keystone policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their keystone processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for keystone:
+
+.EX
-+.B psad_t
++.B keystone_t
+.EE
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
-+.SH "COMMANDS"
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
-+.B semanage permissive
-+can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+.B semanage module
-+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
-+
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux keystone policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their keystone processes in as secure a method as possible.
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
-+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++The following file types are defined for keystone:
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
+
-+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), psad(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/ptal_selinux.8 b/man/man8/ptal_selinux.8
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..e1a8de5
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/ptal_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,123 @@
-+.TH "ptal_selinux" "8" "ptal" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "ptal SELinux Policy documentation"
-+.SH "NAME"
-+ptal_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the ptal processes
-+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++.EX
++.PP
++.B keystone_exec_t
++.EE
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the ptal processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++- Set files with the keystone_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the keystone_t domain.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.EX
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux ptal policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ptal processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for ptal:
++.B keystone_log_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the keystone_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as keystone log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B ptal_etc_t
++.B keystone_tmp_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the ptal_etc_t type, if you want to store ptal files in the /etc directories.
++- Set files with the keystone_tmp_t type, if you want to store keystone temporary files in the /tmp directories.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B ptal_exec_t
++.B keystone_unit_file_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the ptal_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ptal_t domain.
++- Set files with the keystone_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as keystone unit content.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/sbin/ptal-photod, /usr/sbin/ptal-mlcd, /usr/sbin/ptal-printd
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B ptal_var_run_t
++.B keystone_var_lib_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the ptal_var_run_t type, if you want to store the ptal files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the keystone_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the keystone files under the /var/lib directory.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/run/ptal-mlcd(/.*)?, /var/run/ptal-printd(/.*)?
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
+.SH PORT TYPES
-+SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
++SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
+.PP
-+You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
++You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
+
+.B semanage port -l
+
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
-+SELinux ptal policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ptal processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following port types are defined for ptal:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
++SELinux keystone policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their keystone processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following port types are defined for keystone:
+
+.EX
+.TP 5
-+.B ptal_port_t
++.B keystone_port_t
+.TP 10
+.EE
+
+
+Default Defined Ports:
-+tcp 5703
++tcp 5000
+.EE
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++udp 5000
++.EE
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type keystone_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B faillog_t
++
++ /var/log/btmp.*
++.br
++ /var/run/faillock(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/log/faillog
++.br
++ /var/log/tallylog
++.br
++
++.br
++.B keystone_log_t
++
++ /var/log/keystone(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B keystone_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B keystone_var_lib_t
++
++ /var/lib/keystone(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B krb5_host_rcache_t
++
++ /var/cache/krb5rcache(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/tmp/nfs_0
++.br
++ /var/tmp/DNS_25
++.br
++ /var/tmp/host_0
++.br
++ /var/tmp/imap_0
++.br
++ /var/tmp/HTTP_23
++.br
++ /var/tmp/HTTP_48
++.br
++ /var/tmp/ldap_55
++.br
++ /var/tmp/ldap_487
++.br
++ /var/tmp/ldapmap1_0
++.br
++
++.br
++.B lastlog_t
++
++ /var/log/lastlog
++.br
++
++.br
++.B pcscd_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/pcscd(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/pcscd\.events(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/pcscd\.pid
++.br
++ /var/run/pcscd\.pub
++.br
++ /var/run/pcscd\.comm
++.br
++
++.br
++.B security_t
++
++ /selinux
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux ptal policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ptal processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for ptal:
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the keystone_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B ptal_t
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
++
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the keystone_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -39977,164 +43701,188 @@ index 0000000..e1a8de5
+can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), ptal(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/ptchown_selinux.8 b/man/man8/ptchown_selinux.8
++selinux(8), keystone(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/kismet_selinux.8 b/man/man8/kismet_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..911b6fe
+index 0000000..74f62b3
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/ptchown_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
-+.TH "ptchown_selinux" "8" "ptchown" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "ptchown SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/kismet_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,188 @@
++.TH "kismet_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "kismet" "SELinux Policy documentation for kismet"
+.SH "NAME"
-+ptchown_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the ptchown processes
++kismet_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the kismet processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the ptchown processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
-+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the kismet processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux ptchown policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ptchown processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for ptchown:
++The kismet processes execute with the kismet_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B ptchown_exec_t
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep kismet_t
+
-+- Set files with the ptchown_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ptchown_t domain.
+
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
-+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
++The kismet_t SELinux type can be entered via the "kismet_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the kismet_t domain are the following:"
+
++/usr/bin/kismet
+.SH PROCESS TYPES
+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux ptchown policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ptchown processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for ptchown:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux kismet policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their kismet processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for kismet:
+
+.EX
-+.B ptchown_t
++.B kismet_t
+.EE
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
-+.SH "COMMANDS"
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
-+.B semanage permissive
-+can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+.B semanage module
-+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux kismet policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their kismet processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for kismet:
+
++
++.EX
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
-+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++.B kismet_exec_t
++.EE
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++- Set files with the kismet_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the kismet_t domain.
+
-+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), ptchown(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/publicfile_selinux.8 b/man/man8/publicfile_selinux.8
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..174d4ce
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/publicfile_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
-+.TH "publicfile_selinux" "8" "publicfile" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "publicfile SELinux Policy documentation"
-+.SH "NAME"
-+publicfile_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the publicfile processes
-+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the publicfile processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++.EX
++.PP
++.B kismet_home_t
++.EE
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++- Set files with the kismet_home_t type, if you want to store kismet files in the users home directory.
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++
++.EX
+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.B kismet_log_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the kismet_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as kismet log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++
++
++.EX
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux publicfile policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their publicfile processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for publicfile:
++.B kismet_tmp_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the kismet_tmp_t type, if you want to store kismet temporary files in the /tmp directories.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B publicfile_content_t
++.B kismet_tmpfs_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the publicfile_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as publicfile content.
++- Set files with the kismet_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store kismet files on a tmpfs file system.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B publicfile_exec_t
++.B kismet_var_lib_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the publicfile_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the publicfile_t domain.
++- Set files with the kismet_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the kismet files under the /var/lib directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B kismet_var_run_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the kismet_var_run_t type, if you want to store the kismet files under the /run directory.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/bin/httpd, /usr/bin/ftpd
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type kismet_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B kismet_home_t
++
++ /home/[^/]*/\.kismet(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.kismet(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.kismet(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B kismet_log_t
++
++ /var/log/kismet(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B kismet_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B kismet_tmpfs_t
++
++
++.br
++.B kismet_var_lib_t
++
++ /var/lib/kismet(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B kismet_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/kismet_server.pid
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux publicfile policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their publicfile processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for publicfile:
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the kismet_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B publicfile_t
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
++
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the kismet_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -40147,148 +43895,116 @@ index 0000000..174d4ce
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), publicfile(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/pulseaudio_selinux.8 b/man/man8/pulseaudio_selinux.8
++selinux(8), kismet(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/klogd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/klogd_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..36f8ee1
+index 0000000..729c100
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/pulseaudio_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,151 @@
-+.TH "pulseaudio_selinux" "8" "pulseaudio" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "pulseaudio SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/klogd_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,116 @@
++.TH "klogd_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "klogd" "SELinux Policy documentation for klogd"
+.SH "NAME"
-+pulseaudio_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the pulseaudio processes
++klogd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the klogd processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the pulseaudio processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the klogd processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The klogd processes execute with the klogd_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the pulseaudio_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep klogd_t
+
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The klogd_t SELinux type can be entered via the "klogd_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the klogd_t domain are the following:"
++
++/sbin/klogd, /sbin/rklogd, /usr/sbin/klogd, /usr/sbin/rklogd
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the pulseaudio_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux klogd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their klogd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for klogd:
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B klogd_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux pulseaudio policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their pulseaudio processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for pulseaudio:
-+
-+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B pulseaudio_exec_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the pulseaudio_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the pulseaudio_t domain.
-+
-+
-+.EX
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux klogd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their klogd processes in as secure a method as possible.
+.PP
-+.B pulseaudio_home_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the pulseaudio_home_t type, if you want to store pulseaudio files in the users home directory.
++The following file types are defined for klogd:
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/root/\.pulse-cookie, /root/\.pulse(/.*)?, /root/\.esd_auth
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B pulseaudio_tmpfs_t
++.B klogd_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the pulseaudio_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store pulseaudio files on a tmpfs file system.
++- Set files with the klogd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the klogd_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B pulseaudio_var_lib_t
++.B klogd_tmp_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the pulseaudio_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the pulseaudio files under the /var/lib directory.
++- Set files with the klogd_tmp_t type, if you want to store klogd temporary files in the /tmp directories.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B pulseaudio_var_run_t
++.B klogd_var_run_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the pulseaudio_var_run_t type, if you want to store the pulseaudio files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the klogd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the klogd files under the /run directory.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PORT TYPES
-+SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
-+.PP
-+You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+.B semanage port -l
++The SELinux process type klogd_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
-+SELinux pulseaudio policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their pulseaudio processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following port types are defined for pulseaudio:
++.br
++.B klogd_tmp_t
+
-+.EX
-+.TP 5
-+.B pulseaudio_port_t
-+.TP 10
-+.EE
+
++.br
++.B klogd_var_run_t
+
-+Default Defined Ports:
-+tcp 4713
-+.EE
-+udp 4713
-+.EE
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux pulseaudio policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their pulseaudio processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for pulseaudio:
++ /var/run/klogd\.pid
++.br
+
-+.EX
-+.B pulseaudio_t
-+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -40300,212 +44016,166 @@ index 0000000..36f8ee1
+.B semanage module
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
-+.B semanage port
-+can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
-+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), pulseaudio(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/puppet_selinux.8 b/man/man8/puppet_selinux.8
++selinux(8), klogd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/kpropd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/kpropd_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..6466e46
+index 0000000..37b1a4f
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/puppet_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,215 @@
-+.TH "puppet_selinux" "8" "puppet" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "puppet SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/kpropd_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,168 @@
++.TH "kpropd_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "kpropd" "SELinux Policy documentation for kpropd"
+.SH "NAME"
-+puppet_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the puppet processes
++kpropd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the kpropd processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the puppet processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
-+
-+.SH BOOLEANS
-+SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. puppet policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run puppet with the tightest access possible.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the kpropd processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
++The kpropd processes execute with the kpropd_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow Puppet client to manage all file types, you must turn on the puppet_manage_all_files boolean.
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P puppet_manage_all_files 1
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep kpropd_t
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow Puppet master to use connect to MySQL and PostgreSQL database, you must turn on the puppetmaster_use_db boolean.
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P puppetmaster_use_db 1
-+.EE
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The kpropd_t SELinux type can be entered via the "kpropd_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the kpropd_t domain are the following:"
+
++/usr/sbin/kpropd, /usr/kerberos/sbin/kpropd
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the puppetmaster_t, puppet_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
-+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
-+
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the puppetmaster_t, puppet_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux kpropd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their kpropd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for kpropd:
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B kpropd_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux puppet policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their puppet processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for puppet:
-+
-+
-+.EX
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux kpropd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their kpropd processes in as secure a method as possible.
+.PP
-+.B puppet_etc_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the puppet_etc_t type, if you want to store puppet files in the /etc directories.
++The following file types are defined for kpropd:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B puppet_exec_t
++.B kpropd_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the puppet_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the puppet_t domain.
++- Set files with the kpropd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the kpropd_t domain.
+
+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B puppet_initrc_exec_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the puppet_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the puppet_initrc_t domain.
-+
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
+
-+.EX
++.SH PORT TYPES
++SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
+.PP
-+.B puppet_log_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the puppet_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as puppet log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
+
++.B semanage port -l
+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B puppet_tmp_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the puppet_tmp_t type, if you want to store puppet temporary files in the /tmp directories.
-+
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
++SELinux kpropd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their kpropd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following port types are defined for kpropd:
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B puppet_var_lib_t
++.TP 5
++.B kprop_port_t
++.TP 10
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the puppet_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the puppet files under the /var/lib directory.
-+
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B puppet_var_run_t
++Default Defined Ports:
++tcp 754
+.EE
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+- Set files with the puppet_var_run_t type, if you want to store the puppet files under the /run directory.
++The SELinux process type kpropd_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
++.br
++.B krb5_host_rcache_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B puppetca_exec_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the puppetca_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the puppetca_t domain.
-+
-+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B puppetmaster_exec_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the puppetmaster_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the puppetmaster_t domain.
-+
-+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B puppetmaster_initrc_exec_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the puppetmaster_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the puppetmaster_initrc_t domain.
-+
-+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B puppetmaster_tmp_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the puppetmaster_tmp_t type, if you want to store puppetmaster temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++ /var/cache/krb5rcache(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/tmp/nfs_0
++.br
++ /var/tmp/DNS_25
++.br
++ /var/tmp/host_0
++.br
++ /var/tmp/imap_0
++.br
++ /var/tmp/HTTP_23
++.br
++ /var/tmp/HTTP_48
++.br
++ /var/tmp/ldap_55
++.br
++ /var/tmp/ldap_487
++.br
++ /var/tmp/ldapmap1_0
++.br
+
++.br
++.B krb5kdc_lock_t
+
-+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
++ /var/kerberos/krb5kdc/principal.*\.ok
++.br
++ /var/kerberos/krb5kdc/from_master.*
++.br
+
-+.SH PORT TYPES
-+SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
-+.PP
-+You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
++.br
++.B krb5kdc_principal_t
+
-+.B semanage port -l
++ /etc/krb5kdc/principal.*
++.br
++ /usr/var/krb5kdc/principal.*
++.br
++ /var/kerberos/krb5kdc/principal.*
++.br
+
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
-+SELinux puppet policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their puppet processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following port types are defined for puppet:
++.br
++.B krb5kdc_tmp_t
+
-+.EX
-+.TP 5
-+.B puppet_port_t
-+.TP 10
-+.EE
+
++.br
++.B security_t
+
-+Default Defined Ports:
-+tcp 8140
-+.EE
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux puppet policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their puppet processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for puppet:
++ /selinux
++.br
+
-+.EX
-+.B puppet_t, puppetmaster_t, puppetca_t
-+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -40520,199 +44190,177 @@ index 0000000..6466e46
+.B semanage port
+can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
+
-+.B semanage boolean
-+can also be used to manipulate the booleans
-+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), puppet(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-+, setsebool(8)
-\ No newline at end of file
-diff --git a/man/man8/puppetca_selinux.8 b/man/man8/puppetca_selinux.8
++selinux(8), kpropd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/krb5kdc_selinux.8 b/man/man8/krb5kdc_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..65ebab6
+index 0000000..5b1f8f4
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/puppetca_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
-+.TH "puppetca_selinux" "8" "puppetca" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "puppetca SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/krb5kdc_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,176 @@
++.TH "krb5kdc_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "krb5kdc" "SELinux Policy documentation for krb5kdc"
+.SH "NAME"
-+puppetca_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the puppetca processes
++krb5kdc_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the krb5kdc processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the puppetca processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
-+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the krb5kdc processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux puppetca policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their puppetca processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for puppetca:
++The krb5kdc processes execute with the krb5kdc_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B puppetca_exec_t
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep krb5kdc_t
+
-+- Set files with the puppetca_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the puppetca_t domain.
+
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
-+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
++The krb5kdc_t SELinux type can be entered via the "krb5kdc_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the krb5kdc_t domain are the following:"
+
++/usr/(kerberos/)?sbin/krb5kdc
+.SH PROCESS TYPES
+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux puppetca policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their puppetca processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for puppetca:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux krb5kdc policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their krb5kdc processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for krb5kdc:
+
+.EX
-+.B puppetca_t
++.B krb5kdc_t
+.EE
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
-+.SH "COMMANDS"
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
-+.B semanage permissive
-+can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+.B semanage module
-+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
-+
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux krb5kdc policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their krb5kdc processes in as secure a method as possible.
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
-+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
-+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
-+
-+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), puppetca(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/puppetmaster_selinux.8 b/man/man8/puppetmaster_selinux.8
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..b491444
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/puppetmaster_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,118 @@
-+.TH "puppetmaster_selinux" "8" "puppetmaster" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "puppetmaster SELinux Policy documentation"
-+.SH "NAME"
-+puppetmaster_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the puppetmaster processes
-+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++The following file types are defined for krb5kdc:
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the puppetmaster processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
+
-+.SH BOOLEANS
-+SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. puppetmaster policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run puppetmaster with the tightest access possible.
++.EX
++.PP
++.B krb5kdc_conf_t
++.EE
+
++- Set files with the krb5kdc_conf_t type, if you want to treat the files as krb5kdc configuration data, usually stored under the /etc directory.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow Puppet master to use connect to MySQL and PostgreSQL database, you must turn on the puppetmaster_use_db boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P puppetmaster_use_db 1
++.PP
++.B krb5kdc_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++- Set files with the krb5kdc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the krb5kdc_t domain.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the puppetmaster_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.PP
++.B krb5kdc_lock_t
+.EE
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the puppetmaster_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++- Set files with the krb5kdc_lock_t type, if you want to treat the files as krb5kdc lock data, stored under the /var/lock directory
++
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.PP
++.B krb5kdc_log_t
+.EE
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux puppetmaster policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their puppetmaster processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for puppetmaster:
++- Set files with the krb5kdc_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as krb5kdc log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B puppetmaster_exec_t
++.B krb5kdc_principal_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the puppetmaster_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the puppetmaster_t domain.
++- Set files with the krb5kdc_principal_t type, if you want to treat the files as krb5kdc principal data.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B puppetmaster_initrc_exec_t
++.B krb5kdc_tmp_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the puppetmaster_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the puppetmaster_initrc_t domain.
++- Set files with the krb5kdc_tmp_t type, if you want to store krb5kdc temporary files in the /tmp directories.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B puppetmaster_tmp_t
++.B krb5kdc_var_run_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the puppetmaster_tmp_t type, if you want to store puppetmaster temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++- Set files with the krb5kdc_var_run_t type, if you want to store the krb5kdc files under the /run directory.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux puppetmaster policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their puppetmaster processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for puppetmaster:
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+.EX
-+.B puppetmaster_t
-+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++The SELinux process type krb5kdc_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B krb5kdc_lock_t
++
++ /var/kerberos/krb5kdc/principal.*\.ok
++.br
++ /var/kerberos/krb5kdc/from_master.*
++.br
++
++.br
++.B krb5kdc_log_t
++
++ /var/log/krb5kdc\.log.*
++.br
++
++.br
++.B krb5kdc_principal_t
++
++ /etc/krb5kdc/principal.*
++.br
++ /usr/var/krb5kdc/principal.*
++.br
++ /var/kerberos/krb5kdc/principal.*
++.br
++
++.br
++.B krb5kdc_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B krb5kdc_var_run_t
++
++
++.br
++.B security_t
++
++ /selinux
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -40724,101 +44372,147 @@ index 0000000..b491444
+.B semanage module
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
-+.B semanage boolean
-+can also be used to manipulate the booleans
-+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), puppetmaster(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-+, setsebool(8)
-\ No newline at end of file
-diff --git a/man/man8/pwauth_selinux.8 b/man/man8/pwauth_selinux.8
++selinux(8), krb5kdc(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/ksmtuned_selinux.8 b/man/man8/ksmtuned_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..c1ee52c
+index 0000000..dba373c
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/pwauth_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
-+.TH "pwauth_selinux" "8" "pwauth" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "pwauth SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/ksmtuned_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,146 @@
++.TH "ksmtuned_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "ksmtuned" "SELinux Policy documentation for ksmtuned"
+.SH "NAME"
-+pwauth_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the pwauth processes
++ksmtuned_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the ksmtuned processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the pwauth processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the ksmtuned processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The ksmtuned processes execute with the ksmtuned_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the pwauth_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep ksmtuned_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The ksmtuned_t SELinux type can be entered via the "ksmtuned_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the ksmtuned_t domain are the following:"
+
++/usr/sbin/ksmtuned
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the pwauth_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux ksmtuned policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ksmtuned processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for ksmtuned:
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B ksmtuned_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux pwauth policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their pwauth processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for pwauth:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux ksmtuned policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ksmtuned processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for ksmtuned:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B pwauth_exec_t
++.B ksmtuned_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the pwauth_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the pwauth_t domain.
++- Set files with the ksmtuned_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ksmtuned_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B pwauth_var_run_t
++.B ksmtuned_initrc_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the pwauth_var_run_t type, if you want to store the pwauth files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the ksmtuned_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ksmtuned_initrc_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B ksmtuned_log_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the ksmtuned_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as ksmtuned log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B ksmtuned_var_run_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the ksmtuned_var_run_t type, if you want to store the ksmtuned files under the /run directory.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type ksmtuned_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B ksmtuned_log_t
++
++ /var/log/ksmtuned.*
++.br
++
++.br
++.B ksmtuned_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/ksmtune\.pid
++.br
++
++.br
++.B sysfs_t
++
++ /sys(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux pwauth policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their pwauth processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for pwauth:
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the ksmtuned_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B pwauth_t
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
++
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the ksmtuned_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -40831,111 +44525,165 @@ index 0000000..c1ee52c
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), pwauth(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/pyicqt_selinux.8 b/man/man8/pyicqt_selinux.8
++selinux(8), ksmtuned(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/ktalkd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/ktalkd_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..5a860b7
+index 0000000..090a1a6
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/pyicqt_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
-+.TH "pyicqt_selinux" "8" "pyicqt" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "pyicqt SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/ktalkd_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,168 @@
++.TH "ktalkd_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "ktalkd" "SELinux Policy documentation for ktalkd"
+.SH "NAME"
-+pyicqt_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the pyicqt processes
++ktalkd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the ktalkd processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the pyicqt processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the ktalkd processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The ktalkd processes execute with the ktalkd_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the pyicqt_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep ktalkd_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
++The ktalkd_t SELinux type can be entered via the "ktalkd_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the ktalkd_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/bin/ktalkd, /usr/sbin/in\.talkd, /usr/sbin/in\.ntalkd
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the pyicqt_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux ktalkd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ktalkd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for ktalkd:
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B ktalkd_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux pyicqt policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their pyicqt processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for pyicqt:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux ktalkd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ktalkd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for ktalkd:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B pyicqt_exec_t
++.B ktalkd_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the pyicqt_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the pyicqt_t domain.
++- Set files with the ktalkd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ktalkd_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B pyicqt_log_t
++.B ktalkd_log_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the pyicqt_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as pyicqt log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++- Set files with the ktalkd_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as ktalkd log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B pyicqt_var_run_t
++.B ktalkd_tmp_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the pyicqt_var_run_t type, if you want to store the pyicqt files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the ktalkd_tmp_t type, if you want to store ktalkd temporary files in the /tmp directories.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B pyicqt_var_spool_t
++.B ktalkd_var_run_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the pyicqt_var_spool_t type, if you want to store the pyicqt var files under the /var/spool directory.
++- Set files with the ktalkd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the ktalkd files under the /run directory.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.SH PORT TYPES
++SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
++
++.B semanage port -l
++
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux pyicqt policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their pyicqt processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for pyicqt:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
++SELinux ktalkd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ktalkd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following port types are defined for ktalkd:
++
++.EX
++.TP 5
++.B ktalkd_port_t
++.TP 10
++.EE
++
++
++Default Defined Ports:
++udp 517,518
++.EE
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type ktalkd_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B ktalkd_log_t
++
++ /var/log/talkd.*
++.br
++
++.br
++.B ktalkd_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B ktalkd_var_run_t
++
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the ktalkd_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B pyicqt_t
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
++
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the ktalkd_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -40947,120 +44695,159 @@ index 0000000..5a860b7
+.B semanage module
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
++.B semanage port
++can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
++
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), pyicqt(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/qdiskd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/qdiskd_selinux.8
++selinux(8), ktalkd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/l2tpd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/l2tpd_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..3e46dd9
+index 0000000..d28edaa
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/qdiskd_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,119 @@
-+.TH "qdiskd_selinux" "8" "qdiskd" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "qdiskd SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/l2tpd_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,158 @@
++.TH "l2tpd_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "l2tpd" "SELinux Policy documentation for l2tpd"
+.SH "NAME"
-+qdiskd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the qdiskd processes
++l2tpd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the l2tpd processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the qdiskd processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the l2tpd processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The l2tpd processes execute with the l2tpd_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the qdiskd_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep l2tpd_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
++The l2tpd_t SELinux type can be entered via the "l2tpd_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the l2tpd_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/sbin/xl2tpd, /usr/sbin/prol2tpd, /usr/sbin/openl2tpd
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the qdiskd_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux l2tpd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their l2tpd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for l2tpd:
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B l2tpd_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux qdiskd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their qdiskd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for qdiskd:
-+
-+
-+.EX
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux l2tpd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their l2tpd processes in as secure a method as possible.
+.PP
-+.B qdiskd_exec_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the qdiskd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the qdiskd_t domain.
++The following file types are defined for l2tpd:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B qdiskd_tmpfs_t
++.B l2tpd_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the qdiskd_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store qdiskd files on a tmpfs file system.
++- Set files with the l2tpd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the l2tpd_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B qdiskd_var_lib_t
++.B l2tpd_initrc_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the qdiskd_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the qdiskd files under the /var/lib directory.
++- Set files with the l2tpd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the l2tpd_initrc_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B qdiskd_var_log_t
++.B l2tpd_tmp_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the qdiskd_var_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as qdiskd var log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++- Set files with the l2tpd_tmp_t type, if you want to store l2tpd temporary files in the /tmp directories.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B qdiskd_var_run_t
++.B l2tpd_var_run_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the qdiskd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the qdiskd files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the l2tpd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the l2tpd files under the /run directory.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.SH PORT TYPES
++SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
++
++.B semanage port -l
++
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux qdiskd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their qdiskd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for qdiskd:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
++SELinux l2tpd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their l2tpd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following port types are defined for l2tpd:
+
+.EX
-+.B qdiskd_t
++.TP 5
++.B l2tp_port_t
++.TP 10
+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++
++Default Defined Ports:
++tcp 1701
++.EE
++udp 1701
++.EE
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type l2tpd_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B l2tpd_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/xl2tpd(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/prol2tpd(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/xl2tpd\.pid
++.br
++ /var/run/prol2tpd\.ctl
++.br
++ /var/run/prol2tpd\.pid
++.br
++ /var/run/openl2tpd\.pid
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -41072,144 +44859,162 @@ index 0000000..3e46dd9
+.B semanage module
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
++.B semanage port
++can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
++
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), qdiskd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/qemu_selinux.8 b/man/man8/qemu_selinux.8
++selinux(8), l2tpd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/ldconfig_selinux.8 b/man/man8/ldconfig_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..1836a66
+index 0000000..ff3b691
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/qemu_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,147 @@
-+.TH "qemu_selinux" "8" "qemu" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "qemu SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/ldconfig_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,158 @@
++.TH "ldconfig_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "ldconfig" "SELinux Policy documentation for ldconfig"
+.SH "NAME"
-+qemu_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the qemu processes
++ldconfig_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the ldconfig processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the qemu processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the ldconfig processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH BOOLEANS
-+SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. qemu policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run qemu with the tightest access possible.
++The ldconfig processes execute with the ldconfig_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
++For example:
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow qemu to use serial/parallel communication ports, you must turn on the qemu_use_comm boolean.
++.B ps -eZ | grep ldconfig_t
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P qemu_use_comm 1
-+.EE
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow qemu to use nfs file systems, you must turn on the qemu_use_nfs boolean.
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P qemu_use_nfs 1
-+.EE
++The ldconfig_t SELinux type can be entered via the "ldconfig_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the ldconfig_t domain are the following:"
+
++/sbin/ldconfig, /usr/sbin/ldconfig
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow qemu to use usb devices, you must turn on the qemu_use_usb boolean.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux ldconfig policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ldconfig processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for ldconfig:
+
+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P qemu_use_usb 1
++.B ldconfig_t
+.EE
-+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow qemu to connect fully to the network, you must turn on the qemu_full_network boolean.
-+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P qemu_full_network 1
-+.EE
-+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow xend to run qemu-dm. Not required if using paravirt and no vfb, you must turn on the xend_run_qemu boolean.
-+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P xend_run_qemu 1
-+.EE
-+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow qemu to use cifs/Samba file systems, you must turn on the qemu_use_cifs boolean.
-+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P qemu_use_cifs 1
-+.EE
-+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux qemu policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their qemu processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for qemu:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux ldconfig policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ldconfig processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for ldconfig:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B qemu_dm_exec_t
++.B ldconfig_cache_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the qemu_dm_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the qemu_dm_t domain.
++- Set files with the ldconfig_cache_t type, if you want to store the files under the /var/cache directory.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B qemu_exec_t
++.B ldconfig_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the qemu_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the qemu_t domain.
++- Set files with the ldconfig_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ldconfig_t domain.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/bin/qemu-system-.*, /usr/libexec/qemu.*, /usr/bin/qemu, /usr/bin/qemu-kvm
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B qemu_var_run_t
++.B ldconfig_tmp_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the qemu_var_run_t type, if you want to store the qemu files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the ldconfig_tmp_t type, if you want to store ldconfig temporary files in the /tmp directories.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/run/libvirt/qemu(/.*)?, /var/lib/libvirt/qemu(/.*)?
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux qemu policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their qemu processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for qemu:
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type ldconfig_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B kdumpctl_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B ld_so_cache_t
++
++ /etc/ld\.so\.cache
++.br
++ /etc/ld\.so\.cache~
++.br
++ /etc/ld\.so\.preload
++.br
++ /etc/ld\.so\.preload~
++.br
++
++.br
++.B ldconfig_cache_t
++
++ /var/cache/ldconfig(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B ldconfig_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B rpm_script_tmp_t
+
-+.EX
-+.B qemu_dm_t
-+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.br
++.B user_home_t
++
++ /home/[^/]*/.+
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/.+
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/.+
++.br
++
++.br
++.B user_tmp_t
++
++ /var/run/user(/.*)?
++.br
++ /tmp/gconfd-.*
++.br
++ /tmp/gconfd-dwalsh
++.br
++ /tmp/gconfd-xguest
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -41221,229 +45026,279 @@ index 0000000..1836a66
+.B semanage module
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
-+.B semanage boolean
-+can also be used to manipulate the booleans
-+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), qemu(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-+, setsebool(8)
++selinux(8), ldconfig(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/libvirt_selinux.8 b/man/man8/libvirt_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..ee560da
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/libvirt_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1 @@
++.so man8/virtd_selinux.8
\ No newline at end of file
-diff --git a/man/man8/qmail_selinux.8 b/man/man8/qmail_selinux.8
+diff --git a/man/man8/lircd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/lircd_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..05df219
+index 0000000..4f9932c
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/qmail_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,223 @@
-+.TH "qmail_selinux" "8" "qmail" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "qmail SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/lircd_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,160 @@
++.TH "lircd_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "lircd" "SELinux Policy documentation for lircd"
+.SH "NAME"
-+qmail_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the qmail processes
++lircd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the lircd processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the qmail processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the lircd processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The lircd processes execute with the lircd_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the qmail_local_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep lircd_t
+
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The lircd_t SELinux type can be entered via the "lircd_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the lircd_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/sbin/lircd
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the qmail_local_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux lircd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their lircd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for lircd:
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B lircd_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux qmail policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their qmail processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for qmail:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux lircd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their lircd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for lircd:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B qmail_alias_home_t
++.B lircd_etc_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the qmail_alias_home_t type, if you want to store qmail alias files in the users home directory.
++- Set files with the lircd_etc_t type, if you want to store lircd files in the /etc directories.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/qmail/alias, /var/qmail/alias(/.*)?
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B qmail_clean_exec_t
++.B lircd_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the qmail_clean_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the qmail_clean_t domain.
++- Set files with the lircd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the lircd_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B qmail_etc_t
++.B lircd_initrc_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the qmail_etc_t type, if you want to store qmail files in the /etc directories.
++- Set files with the lircd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the lircd_initrc_t domain.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/qmail/owners(/.*)?, /var/qmail/control(/.*)?
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B qmail_exec_t
++.B lircd_var_run_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the qmail_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the qmail_t domain.
++- Set files with the lircd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the lircd files under the /run directory.
+
+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B qmail_inject_exec_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the qmail_inject_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the qmail_inject_t domain.
-+
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
+
-+.EX
++.SH PORT TYPES
++SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
+.PP
-+.B qmail_keytab_t
-+.EE
++You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
+
-+- Set files with the qmail_keytab_t type, if you want to treat the files as kerberos keytab files.
++.B semanage port -l
+
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
++SELinux lircd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their lircd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following port types are defined for lircd:
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B qmail_local_exec_t
++.TP 5
++.B lirc_port_t
++.TP 10
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the qmail_local_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the qmail_local_t domain.
-+
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B qmail_lspawn_exec_t
++Default Defined Ports:
++tcp 8765
+.EE
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+- Set files with the qmail_lspawn_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the qmail_lspawn_t domain.
++The SELinux process type lircd_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
++.br
++.B lircd_var_run_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B qmail_queue_exec_t
-+.EE
++ /var/run/lirc(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/lircd(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/lircd\.pid
++.br
+
-+- Set files with the qmail_queue_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the qmail_queue_t domain.
++.br
++.B var_lock_t
+
++ /var/lock(/.*)?
++.br
++ /run/lock(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lock
++.br
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B qmail_remote_exec_t
-+.EE
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
-+- Set files with the qmail_remote_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the qmail_remote_t domain.
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
++.B semanage port
++can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B qmail_rspawn_exec_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the qmail_rspawn_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the qmail_rspawn_t domain.
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B qmail_send_exec_t
-+.EE
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), lircd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/livecd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/livecd_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..d7d48dd
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/livecd_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
++.TH "livecd_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "livecd" "SELinux Policy documentation for livecd"
++.SH "NAME"
++livecd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the livecd processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+- Set files with the qmail_send_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the qmail_send_t domain.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the livecd processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
++The livecd processes execute with the livecd_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B qmail_smtpd_exec_t
-+.EE
++For example:
+
-+- Set files with the qmail_smtpd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the qmail_smtpd_t domain.
++.B ps -eZ | grep livecd_t
+
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B qmail_splogger_exec_t
-+.EE
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
-+- Set files with the qmail_splogger_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the qmail_splogger_t domain.
++The livecd_t SELinux type can be entered via the "filesystem_type,unlabeled_t,proc_type,mtrr_device_t,sysctl_type,file_type,livecd_exec_t" file types. The default entrypoint paths for the livecd_t domain are the following:"
+
++/dev/cpu/mtrr, all files on the system, /usr/bin/livecd-creator
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux livecd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their livecd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for livecd:
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B qmail_spool_t
++.B livecd_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
-+- Set files with the qmail_spool_t type, if you want to store the qmail files under the /var/spool directory.
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux livecd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their livecd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for livecd:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B qmail_start_exec_t
++.B livecd_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the qmail_start_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the qmail_start_t domain.
++- Set files with the livecd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the livecd_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B qmail_tcp_env_exec_t
++.B livecd_tmp_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the qmail_tcp_env_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the qmail_tcp_env_t domain.
++- Set files with the livecd_tmp_t type, if you want to store livecd temporary files in the /tmp directories.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux qmail policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their qmail processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for qmail:
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+.EX
-+.B qmail_tcp_env_t, qmail_rspawn_t, qmail_inject_t, qmail_lspawn_t, qmail_clean_t, qmail_local_t, qmail_smtpd_t, qmail_start_t, qmail_send_t, qmail_remote_t, qmail_queue_t, qmail_splogger_t
-+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++The SELinux process type livecd_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B file_type
++
++ all files on the system
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -41456,109 +45311,138 @@ index 0000000..05df219
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), qmail(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/qpidd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/qpidd_selinux.8
++selinux(8), livecd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/lldpad_selinux.8 b/man/man8/lldpad_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..a11b85c
+index 0000000..3cbeec5
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/qpidd_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
-+.TH "qpidd_selinux" "8" "qpidd" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "qpidd SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/lldpad_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,138 @@
++.TH "lldpad_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "lldpad" "SELinux Policy documentation for lldpad"
+.SH "NAME"
-+qpidd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the qpidd processes
++lldpad_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the lldpad processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the qpidd processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the lldpad processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The lldpad processes execute with the lldpad_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep lldpad_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The lldpad_t SELinux type can be entered via the "lldpad_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the lldpad_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/sbin/lldpad
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux lldpad policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their lldpad processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for lldpad:
++
++.EX
++.B lldpad_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux qpidd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their qpidd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for qpidd:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux lldpad policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their lldpad processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for lldpad:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B qpidd_exec_t
++.B lldpad_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the qpidd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the qpidd_t domain.
++- Set files with the lldpad_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the lldpad_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B qpidd_initrc_exec_t
++.B lldpad_initrc_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the qpidd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the qpidd_initrc_t domain.
++- Set files with the lldpad_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the lldpad_initrc_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B qpidd_tmpfs_t
++.B lldpad_tmpfs_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the qpidd_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store qpidd files on a tmpfs file system.
++- Set files with the lldpad_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store lldpad files on a tmpfs file system.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B qpidd_var_lib_t
++.B lldpad_var_lib_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the qpidd_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the qpidd files under the /var/lib directory.
++- Set files with the lldpad_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the lldpad files under the /var/lib directory.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B qpidd_var_run_t
++.B lldpad_var_run_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the qpidd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the qpidd files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the lldpad_var_run_t type, if you want to store the lldpad files under the /run directory.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/run/qpidd(/.*)?, /var/run/qpidd\.pid
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux qpidd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their qpidd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for qpidd:
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+.EX
-+.B qpidd_t
-+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++The SELinux process type lldpad_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B lldpad_tmpfs_t
++
++
++.br
++.B lldpad_var_lib_t
++
++ /var/lib/lldpad(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B lldpad_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/lldpad\.pid
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -41571,147 +45455,189 @@ index 0000000..a11b85c
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), qpidd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/quantum_selinux.8 b/man/man8/quantum_selinux.8
++selinux(8), lldpad(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/load_policy_selinux.8 b/man/man8/load_policy_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..79f1f0d
+index 0000000..30c76e6
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/quantum_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,149 @@
-+.TH "quantum_selinux" "8" "quantum" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "quantum SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/load_policy_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
++.TH "load_policy_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "load_policy" "SELinux Policy documentation for load_policy"
+.SH "NAME"
-+quantum_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the quantum processes
++load_policy_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the load_policy processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the quantum processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the load_policy processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The load_policy processes execute with the load_policy_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the quantum_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep load_policy_t
+
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The load_policy_t SELinux type can be entered via the "load_policy_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the load_policy_t domain are the following:"
++
++/sbin/load_policy, /usr/sbin/load_policy
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the quantum_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux load_policy policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their load_policy processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for load_policy:
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B load_policy_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux quantum policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their quantum processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for quantum:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux load_policy policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their load_policy processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for load_policy:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B quantum_exec_t
++.B load_policy_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the quantum_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the quantum_t domain.
++- Set files with the load_policy_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the load_policy_t domain.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/bin/quantum-openvswitch-agent, /usr/bin/quantum-server, /usr/bin/quantum-ryu-agent, /usr/bin/quantum-linuxbridge-agent
+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B quantum_log_t
-+.EE
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
+
-+- Set files with the quantum_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as quantum log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
++The SELinux process type load_policy_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B quantum_tmp_t
-+.EE
++.br
++.B boolean_type
+
-+- Set files with the quantum_tmp_t type, if you want to store quantum temporary files in the /tmp directories.
+
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
-+.EX
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
+.PP
-+.B quantum_unit_file_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the quantum_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as quantum unit content.
-+
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B quantum_var_lib_t
-+.EE
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+- Set files with the quantum_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the quantum files under the /var/lib directory.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), load_policy(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, loadkeys_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/loadkeys_selinux.8 b/man/man8/loadkeys_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..3c43c48
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/loadkeys_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
++.TH "loadkeys_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "loadkeys" "SELinux Policy documentation for loadkeys"
++.SH "NAME"
++loadkeys_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the loadkeys processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the loadkeys processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH PORT TYPES
-+SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
-+.PP
-+You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
++The loadkeys processes execute with the loadkeys_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.B semanage port -l
++For example:
+
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
-+SELinux quantum policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their quantum processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following port types are defined for quantum:
++.B ps -eZ | grep loadkeys_t
+
-+.EX
-+.TP 5
-+.B quantum_port_t
-+.TP 10
-+.EE
+
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
-+Default Defined Ports:
-+tcp 9696
-+.EE
++The loadkeys_t SELinux type can be entered via the "loadkeys_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the loadkeys_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/bin/unikeys, /usr/bin/loadkeys
+.SH PROCESS TYPES
+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux quantum policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their quantum processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for quantum:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux loadkeys policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their loadkeys processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for loadkeys:
+
+.EX
-+.B quantum_t
++.B loadkeys_t
+.EE
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux loadkeys policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their loadkeys processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for loadkeys:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B loadkeys_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the loadkeys_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the loadkeys_t domain.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
+can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
@@ -41722,131 +45648,127 @@ index 0000000..79f1f0d
+.B semanage module
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
-+.B semanage port
-+can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
-+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), quantum(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/quota_selinux.8 b/man/man8/quota_selinux.8
++selinux(8), loadkeys(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/locate_selinux.8 b/man/man8/locate_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..f36de79
+index 0000000..1ab1c6b
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/quota_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,127 @@
-+.TH "quota_selinux" "8" "quota" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "quota SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/locate_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,126 @@
++.TH "locate_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "locate" "SELinux Policy documentation for locate"
+.SH "NAME"
-+quota_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the quota processes
++locate_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the locate processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the quota processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the locate processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The locate processes execute with the locate_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the quota_nld_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep locate_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
++The locate_t SELinux type can be entered via the "locate_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the locate_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/bin/updatedb
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the quota_nld_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux locate policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their locate processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for locate:
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B locate_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux quota policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their quota processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for quota:
-+
-+
-+.EX
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux locate policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their locate processes in as secure a method as possible.
+.PP
-+.B quota_db_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the quota_db_t type, if you want to treat the files as quota database content.
++The following file types are defined for locate:
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/boot/a?quota\.(user|group), /etc/a?quota\.(user|group), /var/lib/stickshift/a?quota\.(user|group), /a?quota\.(user|group), /var/a?quota\.(user|group), /var/spool/(.*/)?a?quota\.(user|group)
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B quota_exec_t
++.B locate_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the quota_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the quota_t domain.
++- Set files with the locate_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the locate_t domain.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/sbin/convertquota, /usr/sbin/quota(check|on), /sbin/quota(check|on)
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B quota_flag_t
++.B locate_log_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the quota_flag_t type, if you want to treat the files as quota flag data.
++- Set files with the locate_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as locate log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B quota_nld_exec_t
++.B locate_var_lib_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the quota_nld_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the quota_nld_t domain.
++- Set files with the locate_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the locate files under the /var/lib directory.
+
+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B quota_nld_var_run_t
-+.EE
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
+
-+- Set files with the quota_nld_var_run_t type, if you want to store the quota nld files under the /run directory.
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
++The SELinux process type locate_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
-+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
++.br
++.B locate_var_lib_t
++
++ /var/lib/[sm]locate(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux quota policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their quota processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for quota:
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the locate_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B quota_t, quota_nld_t
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
++
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the locate_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -41859,97 +45781,102 @@ index 0000000..f36de79
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), quota(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/rabbitmq_selinux.8 b/man/man8/rabbitmq_selinux.8
++selinux(8), locate(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/lockdev_selinux.8 b/man/man8/lockdev_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..48bea51
+index 0000000..8c5a3fe
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/rabbitmq_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
-+.TH "rabbitmq_selinux" "8" "rabbitmq" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "rabbitmq SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/lockdev_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,102 @@
++.TH "lockdev_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "lockdev" "SELinux Policy documentation for lockdev"
+.SH "NAME"
-+rabbitmq_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the rabbitmq processes
++lockdev_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the lockdev processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the rabbitmq processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the lockdev processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The lockdev processes execute with the lockdev_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux rabbitmq policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their rabbitmq processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for rabbitmq:
++For example:
+
++.B ps -eZ | grep lockdev_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B rabbitmq_beam_exec_t
-+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the rabbitmq_beam_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the rabbitmq_beam_t domain.
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
++The lockdev_t SELinux type can be entered via the "lockdev_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the lockdev_t domain are the following:"
+
-+.EX
++/usr/sbin/lockdev
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux lockdev policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their lockdev processes in as secure a method as possible.
+.PP
-+.B rabbitmq_epmd_exec_t
++The following process types are defined for lockdev:
++
++.EX
++.B lockdev_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
-+- Set files with the rabbitmq_epmd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the rabbitmq_epmd_t domain.
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux lockdev policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their lockdev processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for lockdev:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B rabbitmq_var_lib_t
++.B lockdev_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the rabbitmq_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the rabbitmq files under the /var/lib directory.
++- Set files with the lockdev_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the lockdev_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B rabbitmq_var_log_t
++.B lockdev_lock_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the rabbitmq_var_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as rabbitmq var log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++- Set files with the lockdev_lock_t type, if you want to treat the files as lockdev lock data, stored under the /var/lock directory
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux rabbitmq policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their rabbitmq processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for rabbitmq:
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+.EX
-+.B rabbitmq_beam_t, rabbitmq_epmd_t
-+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++The SELinux process type lockdev_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B lockdev_lock_t
++
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -41962,106 +45889,161 @@ index 0000000..48bea51
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), rabbitmq(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/racoon_selinux.8 b/man/man8/racoon_selinux.8
++selinux(8), lockdev(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/logadm_selinux.8 b/man/man8/logadm_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..5b2cad0
+index 0000000..9e18695
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/racoon_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,110 @@
-+.TH "racoon_selinux" "8" "racoon" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "racoon SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/logadm_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,161 @@
++.TH "logadm_selinux" "8" "logadm" "mgrepl at redhat.com" "logadm SELinux Policy documentation"
+.SH "NAME"
-+racoon_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the racoon processes
-+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++logadm_r \- \fBLog administrator role\fP - Security Enhanced Linux Policy
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the racoon processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++.SH DESCRIPTION
+
-+.SH BOOLEANS
-+SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. racoon policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run racoon with the tightest access possible.
++SELinux supports Roles Based Access Control (RBAC), some Linux roles are login roles, while other roles need to be transition into.
+
++.I Note:
++Examples in this man page will use the
++.B staff_u
++SELinux user.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow racoon to read shadow, you must turn on the racoon_read_shadow boolean.
++Non login roles are usually used for administrative tasks. For example, tasks that require root privileges. Roles control which types a user can run processes with. Roles often have default types assigned to them.
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P racoon_read_shadow 1
-+.EE
++The default type for the logadm_r role is logadm_t.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The
++.B newrole
++program to transition directly to this role.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the racoon_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++.B newrole -r logadm_r -t logadm_t
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
++.B sudo
++is the preferred method to do transition from one role to another. You setup sudo to transition to logadm_r by adding a similar line to the /etc/sudoers file.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the racoon_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++USERNAME ALL=(ALL) ROLE=logadm_r TYPE=logadm_t COMMAND
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
-+.EE
++.br
++sudo will run COMMAND as staff_u:logadm_r:logadm_t:LEVEL
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux racoon policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their racoon processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for racoon:
++When using a a non login role, you need to setup SELinux so that your SELinux user can reach logadm_r role.
+
++Execute the following to see all of the assigned SELinux roles:
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B racoon_exec_t
-+.EE
++.B semanage user -l
+
-+- Set files with the racoon_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the racoon_t domain.
++You need to add logadm_r to the staff_u user. You could setup the staff_u user to be able to use the logadm_r role with a command like:
+
++.B $ semanage user -m -R 'staff_r system_r logadm_r' staff_u
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B racoon_tmp_t
-+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the racoon_tmp_t type, if you want to store racoon temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
++The SELinux process type logadm_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
-+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
++.br
++.B auditd_etc_t
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux racoon policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their racoon processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for racoon:
++ /etc/audit(/.*)?
++.br
+
-+.EX
-+.B racoon_t
-+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++.br
++.B auditd_log_t
++
++ /var/log/audit(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/log/audit\.log
++.br
++
++.br
++.B auditd_unit_file_t
++
++ /usr/lib/systemd/system/auditd.*
++.br
++
++.br
++.B auditd_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/auditd\.pid
++.br
++ /var/run/auditd_sock
++.br
++ /var/run/audit_events
++.br
++
++.br
++.B klogd_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B klogd_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/klogd\.pid
++.br
++
++.br
++.B logfile
++
++ all log files
++.br
++
++.br
++.B syslog_conf_t
++
++ /etc/syslog.conf
++.br
++ /etc/rsyslog.conf
++.br
++
++.br
++.B syslogd_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B syslogd_var_lib_t
++
++ /var/lib/r?syslog(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/syslog-ng(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/syslog-ng.persist
++.br
++
++.br
++.B syslogd_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/log(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/syslog-ng.ctl
++.br
++ /var/log/syslog-ng(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/syslog-ng(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/systemd/journal(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/metalog\.pid
++.br
++ /var/run/syslogd\.pid
++.br
++
++.br
++.B systemd_passwd_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/systemd/ask-password(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/systemd/ask-password-block(/.*)?
++.br
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -42073,187 +46055,199 @@ index 0000000..5b2cad0
+.B semanage module
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
-+.B semanage boolean
-+can also be used to manipulate the booleans
-+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), racoon(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-+, setsebool(8)
-\ No newline at end of file
-diff --git a/man/man8/radiusd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/radiusd_selinux.8
++selinux(8), logadm(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/logrotate_selinux.8 b/man/man8/logrotate_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..5e2ca22
+index 0000000..b7cec54
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/radiusd_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,188 @@
-+.TH "radiusd_selinux" "8" "radiusd" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "radiusd SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/logrotate_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,198 @@
++.TH "logrotate_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "logrotate" "SELinux Policy documentation for logrotate"
+.SH "NAME"
-+radiusd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the radiusd processes
++logrotate_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the logrotate processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the radiusd processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
-+
-+.SH BOOLEANS
-+SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. radiusd policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run radiusd with the tightest access possible.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the logrotate processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
++The logrotate processes execute with the logrotate_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to login using a radius server, you must turn on the authlogin_radius boolean.
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P authlogin_radius 1
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep logrotate_t
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the radiusd_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
++The logrotate_t SELinux type can be entered via the "logrotate_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the logrotate_t domain are the following:"
+
++/etc/cron\.(daily|weekly)/sysklogd, /usr/sbin/logrotate
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the radiusd_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux logrotate policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their logrotate processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for logrotate:
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B logrotate_t, logrotate_mail_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux radiusd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their radiusd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for radiusd:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux logrotate policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their logrotate processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for logrotate:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B radiusd_etc_rw_t
++.B logrotate_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the radiusd_etc_rw_t type, if you want to treat the files as radiusd etc read/write content.
++- Set files with the logrotate_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the logrotate_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B radiusd_etc_t
++.B logrotate_lock_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the radiusd_etc_t type, if you want to store radiusd files in the /etc directories.
++- Set files with the logrotate_lock_t type, if you want to treat the files as logrotate lock data, stored under the /var/lock directory
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B radiusd_exec_t
++.B logrotate_mail_tmp_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the radiusd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the radiusd_t domain.
++- Set files with the logrotate_mail_tmp_t type, if you want to store logrotate mail temporary files in the /tmp directories.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/sbin/freeradius, /etc/cron\.(daily|monthly)/radiusd, /usr/sbin/radiusd, /etc/cron\.(daily|weekly|monthly)/freeradius
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B radiusd_initrc_exec_t
++.B logrotate_tmp_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the radiusd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the radiusd_initrc_t domain.
++- Set files with the logrotate_tmp_t type, if you want to store logrotate temporary files in the /tmp directories.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B radiusd_log_t
++.B logrotate_var_lib_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the radiusd_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as radiusd log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++- Set files with the logrotate_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the logrotate files under the /var/lib directory.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/log/radacct(/.*)?, /var/log/radiusd-freeradius(/.*)?, /var/log/radius\.log.*, /var/log/radutmp, /var/log/radwtmp.*, /var/log/radius(/.*)?, /var/log/freeradius(/.*)?
+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B radiusd_var_lib_t
-+.EE
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
+
-+- Set files with the radiusd_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the radiusd files under the /var/lib directory.
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
++The SELinux process type logrotate_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B radiusd_var_run_t
-+.EE
++.br
++.B abrt_var_cache_t
+
-+- Set files with the radiusd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the radiusd files under the /run directory.
++ /var/cache/abrt(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/spool/abrt(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/cache/abrt-di(/.*)?
++.br
+
+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/run/radiusd\.pid, /var/run/radiusd(/.*)?
++.B logfile
+
-+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
++ all log files
++.br
+
-+.SH PORT TYPES
-+SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
-+.PP
-+You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
++.br
++.B logrotate_lock_t
+
-+.B semanage port -l
++
++.br
++.B logrotate_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B logrotate_var_lib_t
++
++ /var/lib/logrotate\.status
++.br
++
++.br
++.B named_cache_t
++
++ /var/named/data(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/named/slaves(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/named/dynamic(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/named/chroot/var/tmp(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/named/chroot/var/named/data(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/named/chroot/var/named/slaves(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/named/chroot/var/named/dynamic(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B systemd_passwd_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/systemd/ask-password(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/systemd/ask-password-block(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B var_spool_t
++
++ /var/spool(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
-+SELinux radiusd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their radiusd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following port types are defined for radiusd:
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the logrotate_t, logrotate_mail_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.TP 5
-+.B radius_port_t
-+.TP 10
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
+
-+
-+Default Defined Ports:
-+udp 1645,1812
-+.EE
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux radiusd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their radiusd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for radiusd:
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the logrotate_t, logrotate_mail_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B radiusd_t
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -42265,124 +46259,171 @@ index 0000000..5e2ca22
+.B semanage module
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
-+.B semanage port
-+can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
-+
-+.B semanage boolean
-+can also be used to manipulate the booleans
-+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), radiusd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-+, setsebool(8)
-\ No newline at end of file
-diff --git a/man/man8/radvd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/radvd_selinux.8
++selinux(8), logrotate(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/logwatch_selinux.8 b/man/man8/logwatch_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..51248cc
+index 0000000..bc7bf81
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/radvd_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,115 @@
-+.TH "radvd_selinux" "8" "radvd" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "radvd SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/logwatch_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,170 @@
++.TH "logwatch_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "logwatch" "SELinux Policy documentation for logwatch"
+.SH "NAME"
-+radvd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the radvd processes
++logwatch_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the logwatch processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the radvd processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the logwatch processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The logwatch processes execute with the logwatch_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the radvd_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep logwatch_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
++The logwatch_t SELinux type can be entered via the "logwatch_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the logwatch_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/sbin/epylog, /usr/sbin/logcheck, /usr/share/logwatch/scripts/logwatch\.pl
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the radvd_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux logwatch policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their logwatch processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for logwatch:
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B logwatch_t, logwatch_mail_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux radvd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their radvd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for radvd:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux logwatch policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their logwatch processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for logwatch:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B radvd_etc_t
++.B logwatch_cache_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the radvd_etc_t type, if you want to store radvd files in the /etc directories.
++- Set files with the logwatch_cache_t type, if you want to store the files under the /var/cache directory.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B radvd_exec_t
++.B logwatch_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the radvd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the radvd_t domain.
++- Set files with the logwatch_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the logwatch_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B radvd_initrc_exec_t
++.B logwatch_lock_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the radvd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the radvd_initrc_t domain.
++- Set files with the logwatch_lock_t type, if you want to treat the files as logwatch lock data, stored under the /var/lock directory
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B radvd_var_run_t
++.B logwatch_mail_tmp_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the radvd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the radvd files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the logwatch_mail_tmp_t type, if you want to store logwatch mail temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B logwatch_tmp_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the logwatch_tmp_t type, if you want to store logwatch temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B logwatch_var_run_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the logwatch_var_run_t type, if you want to store the logwatch files under the /run directory.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/run/radvd(/.*)?, /var/run/radvd\.pid
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type logwatch_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B logwatch_cache_t
++
++ /var/lib/epylog(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/logcheck(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/cache/logwatch(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B logwatch_lock_t
++
++ /var/log/logcheck/.+
++.br
++
++.br
++.B logwatch_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B logwatch_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/epylog\.pid
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux radvd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their radvd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for radvd:
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the logwatch_mail_t, logwatch_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B radvd_t
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
++
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the logwatch_mail_t, logwatch_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -42395,259 +46436,160 @@ index 0000000..51248cc
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), radvd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/rdisc_selinux.8 b/man/man8/rdisc_selinux.8
++selinux(8), logwatch(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/lpd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/lpd_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..91fd7f7
+index 0000000..0b08fa7
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/rdisc_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
-+.TH "rdisc_selinux" "8" "rdisc" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "rdisc SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/lpd_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,164 @@
++.TH "lpd_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "lpd" "SELinux Policy documentation for lpd"
+.SH "NAME"
-+rdisc_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the rdisc processes
++lpd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the lpd processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the rdisc processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
-+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the lpd processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux rdisc policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their rdisc processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for rdisc:
++The lpd processes execute with the lpd_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B rdisc_exec_t
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep lpd_t
+
-+- Set files with the rdisc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the rdisc_t domain.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/sbin/rdisc, /usr/sbin/rdisc
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
-+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
++The lpd_t SELinux type can be entered via the "lpd_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the lpd_t domain are the following:"
+
++/usr/sbin/lpd
+.SH PROCESS TYPES
+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux rdisc policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their rdisc processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for rdisc:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux lpd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their lpd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for lpd:
+
+.EX
-+.B rdisc_t
++.B lpd_t, lpr_t
+.EE
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
-+.SH "COMMANDS"
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
-+.PP
-+.B semanage permissive
-+can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
-+.PP
-+.B semanage module
-+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++.SH BOOLEANS
++SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. lpd policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run lpd with the tightest access possible.
+
-+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
-+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.PP
++If you want to use lpd server instead of cups, you must turn on the use_lpd_server boolean.
+
-+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), rdisc(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/readahead_selinux.8 b/man/man8/readahead_selinux.8
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..8f2fb7a
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/readahead_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
-+.TH "readahead_selinux" "8" "readahead" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "readahead SELinux Policy documentation"
-+.SH "NAME"
-+readahead_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the readahead processes
-+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P use_lpd_server 1
++.EE
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the readahead processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++.PP
++If you want to use lpd server instead of cups, you must turn on the use_lpd_server boolean.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P use_lpd_server 1
++.EE
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux readahead policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their readahead processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for readahead:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux lpd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their lpd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for lpd:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B readahead_exec_t
++.B lpd_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the readahead_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the readahead_t domain.
++- Set files with the lpd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the lpd_t domain.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/sbin/readahead.*, /usr/lib/systemd/systemd-readahead.*, /usr/sbin/readahead.*
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B readahead_var_lib_t
++.B lpd_tmp_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the readahead_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the readahead files under the /var/lib directory.
++- Set files with the lpd_tmp_t type, if you want to store lpd temporary files in the /tmp directories.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B readahead_var_run_t
++.B lpd_var_run_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the readahead_var_run_t type, if you want to store the readahead files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the lpd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the lpd files under the /run directory.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/run/systemd/readahead(/.*)?, /dev/\.systemd/readahead(/.*)?
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux readahead policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their readahead processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for readahead:
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+.EX
-+.B readahead_t
-+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++The SELinux process type lpd_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
-+.SH "COMMANDS"
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
-+.PP
-+.B semanage permissive
-+can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
-+.PP
-+.B semanage module
-+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++.br
++.B lpd_tmp_t
+
-+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
-+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.br
++.B lpd_var_run_t
+
-+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), readahead(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/realmd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/realmd_selinux.8
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..9bd9549
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/realmd_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
-+.TH "realmd_selinux" "8" "realmd" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "realmd SELinux Policy documentation"
-+.SH "NAME"
-+realmd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the realmd processes
-+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++ /var/run/lprng(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/spool/turboprint(/.*)?
++.br
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the realmd processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++.br
++.B print_spool_t
++
++ /var/spool/lpd(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/spool/cups(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/spool/cups-pdf(/.*)?
++.br
+
+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux realmd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their realmd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for realmd:
-+
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the lpr_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B realmd_exec_t
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the realmd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the realmd_t domain.
-+
-+
-+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
-+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux realmd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their realmd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for realmd:
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the lpr_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B realmd_t
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -42659,96 +46601,114 @@ index 0000000..9bd9549
+.B semanage module
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
++.B semanage boolean
++can also be used to manipulate the booleans
++
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), realmd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/regex_selinux.8 b/man/man8/regex_selinux.8
++selinux(8), lpd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, setsebool(8), lpr_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/lpr_selinux.8 b/man/man8/lpr_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..0431f98
+index 0000000..2aa3249
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/regex_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
-+.TH "regex_selinux" "8" "regex" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "regex SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/lpr_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
++.TH "lpr_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "lpr" "SELinux Policy documentation for lpr"
+.SH "NAME"
-+regex_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the regex processes
++lpr_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the lpr processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the regex processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the lpr processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The lpr processes execute with the lpr_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the regex_milter_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep lpr_t
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
+
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The lpr_t SELinux type can be entered via the "lpr_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the lpr_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/bin/lp(\.cups)?, /usr/bin/lpq(\.cups)?, /usr/bin/lpr(\.cups)?, /usr/bin/lprm(\.cups)?, /usr/sbin/lpc(\.cups)?, /usr/bin/cancel(\.cups)?, /usr/bin/lpstat(\.cups)?, /opt/gutenprint/s?bin(/.*)?, /usr/linuxprinter/bin/l?lpr, /usr/sbin/accept, /usr/sbin/lpinfo, /usr/sbin/lpmove, /usr/sbin/lpadmin, /usr/bin/lpoptions
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the regex_milter_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux lpr policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their lpr processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for lpr:
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B lpr_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux regex policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their regex processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for regex:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux lpr policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their lpr processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for lpr:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B regex_milter_data_t
++.B lpr_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the regex_milter_data_t type, if you want to treat the files as regex milter content.
++- Set files with the lpr_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the lpr_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B regex_milter_exec_t
++.B lpr_tmp_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the regex_milter_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the regex_milter_t domain.
++- Set files with the lpr_tmp_t type, if you want to store lpr temporary files in the /tmp directories.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux regex policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their regex processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for regex:
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the lpr_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B regex_milter_t
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
++
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the lpr_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -42761,95 +46721,264 @@ index 0000000..0431f98
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), regex(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/restorecond_selinux.8 b/man/man8/restorecond_selinux.8
++selinux(8), lpr(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/lsassd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/lsassd_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..c1d4bcc
+index 0000000..9b130b2
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/restorecond_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
-+.TH "restorecond_selinux" "8" "restorecond" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "restorecond SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/lsassd_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,264 @@
++.TH "lsassd_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "lsassd" "SELinux Policy documentation for lsassd"
+.SH "NAME"
-+restorecond_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the restorecond processes
++lsassd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the lsassd processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the restorecond processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the lsassd processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The lsassd processes execute with the lsassd_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the restorecond_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep lsassd_t
+
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The lsassd_t SELinux type can be entered via the "lsassd_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the lsassd_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/sbin/lsassd
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the restorecond_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux lsassd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their lsassd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for lsassd:
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B lsassd_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux restorecond policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their restorecond processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for restorecond:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux lsassd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their lsassd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for lsassd:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B restorecond_exec_t
++.B lsassd_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the restorecond_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the restorecond_t domain.
++- Set files with the lsassd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the lsassd_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B restorecond_var_run_t
++.B lsassd_tmp_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the restorecond_var_run_t type, if you want to store the restorecond files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the lsassd_tmp_t type, if you want to store lsassd temporary files in the /tmp directories.
+
+
++.EX
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
++.B lsassd_var_lib_t
++.EE
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++- Set files with the lsassd_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the lsassd files under the /var/lib directory.
++
++
++.EX
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux restorecond policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their restorecond processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for restorecond:
++.B lsassd_var_run_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the lsassd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the lsassd files under the /run directory.
++
+
+.EX
-+.B restorecond_t
++.PP
++.B lsassd_var_socket_t
+.EE
++
++- Set files with the lsassd_var_socket_t type, if you want to treat the files as lsassd var socket data.
++
++
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type lsassd_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B etc_runtime_t
++
++ /[^/]+
++.br
++ /etc/mtab.*
++.br
++ /etc/blkid(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/nologin.*
++.br
++ /etc/\.fstab\.hal\..+
++.br
++ /halt
++.br
++ /fastboot
++.br
++ /poweroff
++.br
++ /etc/cmtab
++.br
++ /\.autofsck
++.br
++ /forcefsck
++.br
++ /\.suspended
++.br
++ /fsckoptions
++.br
++ /\.autorelabel
++.br
++ /etc/securetty
++.br
++ /etc/killpower
++.br
++ /etc/nohotplug
++.br
++ /etc/ioctl\.save
++.br
++ /etc/fstab\.REVOKE
++.br
++ /etc/network/ifstate
++.br
++ /etc/sysconfig/hwconf
++.br
++ /etc/ptal/ptal-printd-like
++.br
++ /etc/sysconfig/iptables\.save
++.br
++ /etc/xorg\.conf\.d/00-system-setup-keyboard\.conf
++.br
++ /etc/X11/xorg\.conf\.d/00-system-setup-keyboard\.conf
++.br
++
++.br
++.B etc_t
++
++ /etc/.*
++.br
++ /var/db/.*\.db
++.br
++ /usr/etc(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/ftp/etc(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/openshift/.limits.d(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/openshift/.openshift-proxy.d(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/openshift/.stickshift-proxy.d(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/stickshift/.limits.d(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/stickshift/.stickshift-proxy.d(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/named/chroot/etc(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/ipsec\.d/examples(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/spool/postfix/etc(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc
++.br
++ /etc/cups/client\.conf
++.br
++
++.br
++.B krb5_keytab_t
++
++ /etc/krb5\.keytab
++.br
++ /etc/krb5kdc/kadm5\.keytab
++.br
++ /var/kerberos/krb5kdc/kadm5\.keytab
++.br
++
++.br
++.B likewise_etc_t
++
++ /etc/likewise-open(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B lsassd_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B lsassd_var_lib_t
++
++ /var/lib/likewise-open/lsasd\.err
++.br
++ /var/lib/likewise-open/db/sam\.db
++.br
++ /var/lib/likewise-open/krb5ccr_lsass
++.br
++ /var/lib/likewise-open/db/lsass-adcache\.db
++.br
++ /var/lib/likewise-open/db/lsass-adstate\.filedb
++.br
++
++.br
++.B lsassd_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/lsassd.pid
++.br
++
++.br
++.B security_t
++
++ /selinux
++.br
++
++.br
++.B user_home_t
++
++ /home/[^/]*/.+
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/.+
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/.+
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -42862,142 +46991,236 @@ index 0000000..c1d4bcc
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), restorecond(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/rgmanager_selinux.8 b/man/man8/rgmanager_selinux.8
++selinux(8), lsassd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/lvm_selinux.8 b/man/man8/lvm_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..3abdac8
+index 0000000..9793bb8
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/rgmanager_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,146 @@
-+.TH "rgmanager_selinux" "8" "rgmanager" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "rgmanager SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/lvm_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,236 @@
++.TH "lvm_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "lvm" "SELinux Policy documentation for lvm"
+.SH "NAME"
-+rgmanager_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the rgmanager processes
++lvm_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the lvm processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the rgmanager processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
-+
-+.SH BOOLEANS
-+SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. rgmanager policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run rgmanager with the tightest access possible.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the lvm processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
++The lvm processes execute with the lvm_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow rgmanager domain to connect to the network using TCP, you must turn on the rgmanager_can_network_connect boolean.
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P rgmanager_can_network_connect 1
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep lvm_t
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the rgmanager_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
++The lvm_t SELinux type can be entered via the "lvm_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the lvm_t domain are the following:"
+
++/lib/lvm-10/.*, /lib/lvm-200/.*, /usr/lib/lvm-10/.*, /usr/lib/lvm-200/.*, /sbin/lvm, /sbin/lvs, /sbin/pvs, /sbin/vgs, /sbin/vgck, /sbin/dmraid, /sbin/kpartx, /sbin/lvmsar, /sbin/lvscan, /sbin/pvdata, /sbin/pvmove, /sbin/pvscan, /sbin/vgscan, /sbin/dmsetup, /sbin/e2fsadm, /sbin/lvmetad, /sbin/lvmsadc, /sbin/vgmerge, /sbin/vgsplit, /usr/sbin/lvm, /usr/sbin/lvs, /usr/sbin/pvs, /usr/sbin/vgs, /sbin/lvchange, /sbin/lvcreate, /sbin/lvextend, /sbin/lvreduce, /sbin/lvremove, /sbin/lvrename, /sbin/lvresize, /sbin/pvchange, /sbin/pvcreate, /sbin/pvremove, /sbin/vgchange, /sbin/vgcreate, /sbin/vgexport, /sbin/vgextend, /sbin/vgimport, /sbin/vgreduce, /sbin/vgremove, /sbin/vgrename, /usr/sbin/vgck, /sbin/lvdisplay, /sbin/lvmchange, /sbin/pvdisplay, /sbin/vgdisplay, /sbin/vgmknodes, /sbin/vgwrapper, /sbin/cryptsetup, /sbin/lvm\.static, /sbin/multipathd, /usr/sbin/dmraid, /usr/sbin/kpartx, /usr/sbin/lvmsar, /usr/sbin/lvscan, /usr/sbin/pvdata, /usr/sbin/pvmove, /usr/sbin/pvscan, /usr/sbin
/vgscan, /sbin/mount\.crypt, /sbin/lvmdiskscan, /sbin/vgcfgbackup, /usr/sbin/dmsetup, /usr/sbin/e2fsadm, /usr/sbin/lvmetad, /usr/sbin/lvmsadc, /usr/sbin/vgmerge, /usr/sbin/vgsplit, /sbin/vgcfgrestore, /usr/sbin/dmeventd, /usr/sbin/lvchange, /usr/sbin/lvcreate, /usr/sbin/lvextend, /usr/sbin/lvreduce, /usr/sbin/lvremove, /usr/sbin/lvrename, /usr/sbin/lvresize, /usr/sbin/pvchange, /usr/sbin/pvcreate, /usr/sbin/pvremove, /usr/sbin/vgchange, /usr/sbin/vgcreate, /usr/sbin/vgexport, /usr/sbin/vgextend, /usr/sbin/vgimport, /usr/sbin/vgreduce, /usr/sbin/vgremove, /usr/sbin/vgrename, /sbin/lvmiopversion, /sbin/vgscan\.static, /usr/sbin/lvdisplay, /usr/sbin/lvmchange, /usr/sbin/pvdisplay, /usr/sbin/vgdisplay, /usr/sbin/vgmknodes, /usr/sbin/vgwrapper, /sbin/dmsetup\.static, /usr/sbin/cryptsetup, /usr/sbin/lvm\.static, /usr/sbin/multipathd, /sbin/vgchange\.static, /usr/sbin/lvmdiskscan, /usr/sbin/mount\.crypt, /usr/sbin/vgcfgbackup, /sbin/multipath\.static, /usr/sbin/vgcfgrestore, /usr/s
bin/lvmiopversion, /usr/sbin/vgscan\.static, /usr/sbin/dmsetup\.static, /usr/sbin/vgchange\.static, /usr/sbin/multipath\.static, /lib/udev/udisks-lvm-pv-export, /usr/lib/udev/udisks-lvm-pv-export, /usr/lib/systemd/systemd-cryptsetup
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the rgmanager_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux lvm policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their lvm processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for lvm:
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B lvm_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux rgmanager policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their rgmanager processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for rgmanager:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux lvm policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their lvm processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for lvm:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B rgmanager_exec_t
++.B lvm_etc_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the rgmanager_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the rgmanager_t domain.
++- Set files with the lvm_etc_t type, if you want to store lvm files in the /etc directories.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B rgmanager_initrc_exec_t
++.B lvm_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the rgmanager_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the rgmanager_initrc_t domain.
++- Set files with the lvm_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the lvm_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B rgmanager_tmp_t
++.B lvm_lock_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the rgmanager_tmp_t type, if you want to store rgmanager temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++- Set files with the lvm_lock_t type, if you want to treat the files as lvm lock data, stored under the /var/lock directory
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B rgmanager_tmpfs_t
++.B lvm_metadata_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the rgmanager_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store rgmanager files on a tmpfs file system.
++- Set files with the lvm_metadata_t type, if you want to treat the files as lvm metadata data.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B rgmanager_var_log_t
++.B lvm_tmp_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the rgmanager_var_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as rgmanager var log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++- Set files with the lvm_tmp_t type, if you want to store lvm temporary files in the /tmp directories.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B rgmanager_var_run_t
++.B lvm_var_lib_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the rgmanager_var_run_t type, if you want to store the rgmanager files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the lvm_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the lvm files under the /var/lib directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B lvm_var_run_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the lvm_var_run_t type, if you want to store the lvm files under the /run directory.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/run/rgmanager\.pid, /var/run/cluster/rgmanager\.sk
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux rgmanager policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their rgmanager processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for rgmanager:
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+.EX
-+.B rgmanager_t
-+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++The SELinux process type lvm_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B anon_inodefs_t
++
++
++.br
++.B device_t
++
++ /dev/.*
++.br
++ /lib/udev/devices(/.*)?
++.br
++ /usr/lib/udev/devices(/.*)?
++.br
++ /dev
++.br
++ /etc/udev/devices
++.br
++ /var/named/chroot/dev
++.br
++ /var/spool/postfix/dev
++.br
++
++.br
++.B lvm_lock_t
++
++ /etc/lvm/lock(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lock/lvm(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B lvm_metadata_t
++
++ /etc/lvmtab(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/lvmtab\.d(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/lvm/cache(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/lvm/backup(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/lvm/archive(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/cache/multipathd(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/lvm/\.cache
++.br
++
++.br
++.B lvm_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B lvm_var_lib_t
++
++ /var/lib/multipath(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B lvm_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/lvm(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/dmevent.*
++.br
++ /var/run/multipathd\.sock
++.br
++
++.br
++.B rpm_script_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B security_t
++
++ /selinux
++.br
++
++.br
++.B sysfs_t
++
++ /sys(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B systemd_passwd_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/systemd/ask-password(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/systemd/ask-password-block(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B virt_image_type
++
++ all virtual image files
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -43009,216 +47232,131 @@ index 0000000..3abdac8
+.B semanage module
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
-+.B semanage boolean
-+can also be used to manipulate the booleans
-+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), rgmanager(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-+, setsebool(8)
-\ No newline at end of file
-diff --git a/man/man8/rhev_selinux.8 b/man/man8/rhev_selinux.8
++selinux(8), lvm(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/lwiod_selinux.8 b/man/man8/lwiod_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..9d50cd5
+index 0000000..249014f
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/rhev_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,123 @@
-+.TH "rhev_selinux" "8" "rhev" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "rhev SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/lwiod_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,130 @@
++.TH "lwiod_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "lwiod" "SELinux Policy documentation for lwiod"
+.SH "NAME"
-+rhev_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the rhev processes
++lwiod_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the lwiod processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the rhev processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the lwiod processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The lwiod processes execute with the lwiod_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the rhev_agentd_t, rhev_agentd_consolehelper_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep lwiod_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The lwiod_t SELinux type can be entered via the "lwiod_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the lwiod_t domain are the following:"
+
++/usr/sbin/lwiod
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the rhev_agentd_t, rhev_agentd_consolehelper_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux lwiod policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their lwiod processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for lwiod:
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B lwiod_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux rhev policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their rhev processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for rhev:
-+
-+
-+.EX
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux lwiod policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their lwiod processes in as secure a method as possible.
+.PP
-+.B rhev_agentd_exec_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the rhev_agentd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the rhev_agentd_t domain.
++The following file types are defined for lwiod:
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/share/rhev-agent/rhev-agentd\.py, /usr/share/ovirt-guest-agent
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B rhev_agentd_log_t
++.B lwiod_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the rhev_agentd_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as rhev agentd log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++- Set files with the lwiod_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the lwiod_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B rhev_agentd_tmp_t
++.B lwiod_var_lib_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the rhev_agentd_tmp_t type, if you want to store rhev agentd temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++- Set files with the lwiod_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the lwiod files under the /var/lib directory.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B rhev_agentd_unit_file_t
++.B lwiod_var_run_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the rhev_agentd_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as rhev agentd unit content.
++- Set files with the lwiod_var_run_t type, if you want to store the lwiod files under the /run directory.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B rhev_agentd_var_run_t
++.B lwiod_var_socket_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the rhev_agentd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the rhev agentd files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the lwiod_var_socket_t type, if you want to treat the files as lwiod var socket data.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux rhev policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their rhev processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for rhev:
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+.EX
-+.B rhev_agentd_t, rhev_agentd_consolehelper_t
-+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++The SELinux process type lwiod_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
-+.SH "COMMANDS"
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
-+.PP
-+.B semanage permissive
-+can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
-+.PP
-+.B semanage module
-+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++.br
++.B krb5_conf_t
+
-+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
-+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
-+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
-+
-+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), rhev(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/rhgb_selinux.8 b/man/man8/rhgb_selinux.8
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..033248f
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/rhgb_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
-+.TH "rhgb_selinux" "8" "rhgb" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "rhgb SELinux Policy documentation"
-+.SH "NAME"
-+rhgb_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the rhgb processes
-+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
-+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the rhgb processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
-+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
-+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux rhgb policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their rhgb processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for rhgb:
-+
-+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B rhgb_exec_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the rhgb_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the rhgb_t domain.
-+
-+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B rhgb_tmpfs_t
-+.EE
++ /etc/krb5\.conf
++.br
+
-+- Set files with the rhgb_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store rhgb files on a tmpfs file system.
++.br
++.B lwiod_var_lib_t
+
+
-+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
++.br
++.B lwiod_var_run_t
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux rhgb policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their rhgb processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for rhgb:
++ /var/run/lwiod.pid
++.br
+
-+.EX
-+.B rhgb_t
-+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -43231,113 +47369,128 @@ index 0000000..033248f
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), rhgb(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/rhsmcertd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/rhsmcertd_selinux.8
++selinux(8), lwiod(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/lwregd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/lwregd_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..a147aab
+index 0000000..9bc985a
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/rhsmcertd_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
-+.TH "rhsmcertd_selinux" "8" "rhsmcertd" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "rhsmcertd SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/lwregd_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,128 @@
++.TH "lwregd_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "lwregd" "SELinux Policy documentation for lwregd"
+.SH "NAME"
-+rhsmcertd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the rhsmcertd processes
++lwregd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the lwregd processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the rhsmcertd processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the lwregd processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The lwregd processes execute with the lwregd_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux rhsmcertd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their rhsmcertd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for rhsmcertd:
++For example:
+
++.B ps -eZ | grep lwregd_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B rhsmcertd_exec_t
-+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the rhsmcertd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the rhsmcertd_t domain.
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
++The lwregd_t SELinux type can be entered via the "lwregd_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the lwregd_t domain are the following:"
+
-+.EX
++/usr/sbin/lwregd
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux lwregd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their lwregd processes in as secure a method as possible.
+.PP
-+.B rhsmcertd_initrc_exec_t
++The following process types are defined for lwregd:
++
++.EX
++.B lwregd_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
-+- Set files with the rhsmcertd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the rhsmcertd_initrc_t domain.
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux lwregd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their lwregd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for lwregd:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B rhsmcertd_lock_t
++.B lwregd_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the rhsmcertd_lock_t type, if you want to treat the files as rhsmcertd lock data, stored under the /var/lock directory
++- Set files with the lwregd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the lwregd_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B rhsmcertd_log_t
++.B lwregd_var_lib_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the rhsmcertd_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as rhsmcertd log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++- Set files with the lwregd_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the lwregd files under the /var/lib directory.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B rhsmcertd_var_lib_t
++.B lwregd_var_run_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the rhsmcertd_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the rhsmcertd files under the /var/lib directory.
++- Set files with the lwregd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the lwregd files under the /run directory.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B rhsmcertd_var_run_t
++.B lwregd_var_socket_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the rhsmcertd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the rhsmcertd files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the lwregd_var_socket_t type, if you want to treat the files as lwregd var socket data.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux rhsmcertd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their rhsmcertd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for rhsmcertd:
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+.EX
-+.B rhsmcertd_t
-+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++The SELinux process type lwregd_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B lwregd_var_lib_t
++
++ /var/lib/likewise-open/regsd\.err
++.br
++ /var/lib/likewise-open/db/registry\.db
++.br
++
++.br
++.B lwregd_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/lwregd.pid
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -43350,257 +47503,242 @@ index 0000000..a147aab
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), rhsmcertd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/ricci_selinux.8 b/man/man8/ricci_selinux.8
++selinux(8), lwregd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/lwsmd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/lwsmd_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..f2556e7
+index 0000000..82a32da
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/ricci_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,260 @@
-+.TH "ricci_selinux" "8" "ricci" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "ricci SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/lwsmd_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,122 @@
++.TH "lwsmd_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "lwsmd" "SELinux Policy documentation for lwsmd"
+.SH "NAME"
-+ricci_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the ricci processes
++lwsmd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the lwsmd processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the ricci processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the lwsmd processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The lwsmd processes execute with the lwsmd_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the ricci_modstorage_t, ricci_modcluster_t, ricci_modclusterd_t, ricci_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep lwsmd_t
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
+
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The lwsmd_t SELinux type can be entered via the "lwsmd_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the lwsmd_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/sbin/lwsmd
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the ricci_modstorage_t, ricci_modcluster_t, ricci_modclusterd_t, ricci_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux lwsmd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their lwsmd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for lwsmd:
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B lwsmd_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux ricci policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ricci processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for ricci:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux lwsmd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their lwsmd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for lwsmd:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B ricci_exec_t
++.B lwsmd_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the ricci_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ricci_t domain.
++- Set files with the lwsmd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the lwsmd_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B ricci_initrc_exec_t
++.B lwsmd_var_lib_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the ricci_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ricci_initrc_t domain.
++- Set files with the lwsmd_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the lwsmd files under the /var/lib directory.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B ricci_modcluster_exec_t
++.B lwsmd_var_run_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the ricci_modcluster_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ricci_modcluster_t domain.
++- Set files with the lwsmd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the lwsmd files under the /run directory.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B ricci_modcluster_var_lib_t
++.B lwsmd_var_socket_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the ricci_modcluster_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the ricci modcluster files under the /var/lib directory.
++- Set files with the lwsmd_var_socket_t type, if you want to treat the files as lwsmd var socket data.
+
+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B ricci_modcluster_var_log_t
-+.EE
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
+
-+- Set files with the ricci_modcluster_var_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as ricci modcluster var log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
++The SELinux process type lwsmd_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B ricci_modcluster_var_run_t
-+.EE
++.br
++.B lwsmd_var_lib_t
+
-+- Set files with the ricci_modcluster_var_run_t type, if you want to store the ricci modcluster files under the /run directory.
+
+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/run/modclusterd\.pid, /var/run/clumond\.sock
-+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B ricci_modclusterd_exec_t
-+.EE
++.B lwsmd_var_run_t
+
-+- Set files with the ricci_modclusterd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ricci_modclusterd_t domain.
+
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
-+.EX
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
+.PP
-+.B ricci_modclusterd_tmpfs_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the ricci_modclusterd_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store ricci modclusterd files on a tmpfs file system.
-+
-+
-+.EX
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
+.PP
-+.B ricci_modlog_exec_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the ricci_modlog_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ricci_modlog_t domain.
-+
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B ricci_modrpm_exec_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the ricci_modrpm_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ricci_modrpm_t domain.
-+
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B ricci_modservice_exec_t
-+.EE
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
-+- Set files with the ricci_modservice_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ricci_modservice_t domain.
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), lwsmd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/mail_munin_plugin_selinux.8 b/man/man8/mail_munin_plugin_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..fc8cf0a
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/mail_munin_plugin_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,115 @@
++.TH "mail_munin_plugin_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "mail_munin_plugin" "SELinux Policy documentation for mail_munin_plugin"
++.SH "NAME"
++mail_munin_plugin_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the mail_munin_plugin processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the mail_munin_plugin processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B ricci_modstorage_exec_t
-+.EE
++The mail_munin_plugin processes execute with the mail_munin_plugin_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+- Set files with the ricci_modstorage_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ricci_modstorage_t domain.
++For example:
+
++.B ps -eZ | grep mail_munin_plugin_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B ricci_modstorage_lock_t
-+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the ricci_modstorage_lock_t type, if you want to treat the files as ricci modstorage lock data, stored under the /var/lock directory
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
++The mail_munin_plugin_t SELinux type can be entered via the "mail_munin_plugin_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the mail_munin_plugin_t domain are the following:"
+
-+.EX
++/usr/share/munin/plugins/qmail.*, /usr/share/munin/plugins/exim_mail.*, /usr/share/munin/plugins/sendmail_.*, /usr/share/munin/plugins/courier_mta_.*, /usr/share/munin/plugins/postfix_mail.*, /usr/share/munin/plugins/mailman, /usr/share/munin/plugins/mailscanner
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+.B ricci_tmp_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the ricci_tmp_t type, if you want to store ricci temporary files in the /tmp directories.
-+
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux mail_munin_plugin policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their mail_munin_plugin processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for mail_munin_plugin:
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B ricci_var_lib_t
++.B mail_munin_plugin_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
-+- Set files with the ricci_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the ricci files under the /var/lib directory.
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux mail_munin_plugin policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their mail_munin_plugin processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for mail_munin_plugin:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B ricci_var_log_t
++.B mail_munin_plugin_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the ricci_var_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as ricci var log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++- Set files with the mail_munin_plugin_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the mail_munin_plugin_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B ricci_var_run_t
++.B mail_munin_plugin_tmp_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the ricci_var_run_t type, if you want to store the ricci files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the mail_munin_plugin_tmp_t type, if you want to store mail munin plugin temporary files in the /tmp directories.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PORT TYPES
-+SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
-+.PP
-+You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
-+
-+.B semanage port -l
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
-+SELinux ricci policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ricci processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following port types are defined for ricci:
++The SELinux process type mail_munin_plugin_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
-+.EX
-+.TP 5
-+.B ricci_modcluster_port_t
-+.TP 10
-+.EE
++.br
++.B mail_munin_plugin_tmp_t
+
+
-+Default Defined Ports:
-+tcp 16851
-+.EE
-+udp 16851
-+.EE
++.br
++.B munin_plugin_state_t
+
-+.EX
-+.TP 5
-+.B ricci_port_t
-+.TP 10
-+.EE
++ /var/lib/munin/plugin-state(/.*)?
++.br
+
++.br
++.B munin_var_lib_t
+
-+Default Defined Ports:
-+tcp 11111
-+.EE
-+udp 11111
-+.EE
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux ricci policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ricci processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for ricci:
++ /var/lib/munin(/.*)?
++.br
+
-+.EX
-+.B ricci_t, ricci_modservice_t, ricci_modstorage_t, ricci_modclusterd_t, ricci_modlog_t, ricci_modrpm_t, ricci_modcluster_t
-+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -43612,154 +47750,147 @@ index 0000000..f2556e7
+.B semanage module
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
-+.B semanage port
-+can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
-+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), ricci(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/rlogind_selinux.8 b/man/man8/rlogind_selinux.8
++selinux(8), mail_munin_plugin(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, mailman_cgi_selinux(8), mailman_mail_selinux(8), mailman_queue_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/mailman_cgi_selinux.8 b/man/man8/mailman_cgi_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..d24aec9
+index 0000000..3314d81
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/rlogind_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,153 @@
-+.TH "rlogind_selinux" "8" "rlogind" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "rlogind SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/mailman_cgi_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,145 @@
++.TH "mailman_cgi_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "mailman_cgi" "SELinux Policy documentation for mailman_cgi"
+.SH "NAME"
-+rlogind_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the rlogind processes
++mailman_cgi_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the mailman_cgi processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the rlogind processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the mailman_cgi processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The mailman_cgi processes execute with the mailman_cgi_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the rlogind_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep mailman_cgi_t
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
+
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The mailman_cgi_t SELinux type can be entered via the "mailman_cgi_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the mailman_cgi_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/lib/mailman.*/cgi-bin/.*
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the rlogind_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux mailman_cgi policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their mailman_cgi processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for mailman_cgi:
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B mailman_cgi_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux rlogind policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their rlogind processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for rlogind:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux mailman_cgi policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their mailman_cgi processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for mailman_cgi:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B rlogind_exec_t
++.B mailman_cgi_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the rlogind_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the rlogind_t domain.
++- Set files with the mailman_cgi_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the mailman_cgi_t domain.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/lib/telnetlogin, /usr/kerberos/sbin/klogind, /usr/sbin/in\.rlogind
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B rlogind_home_t
++.B mailman_cgi_tmp_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the rlogind_home_t type, if you want to store rlogind files in the users home directory.
++- Set files with the mailman_cgi_tmp_t type, if you want to store mailman cgi temporary files in the /tmp directories.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/root/\.rlogin, /root/\.rhosts
+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B rlogind_keytab_t
-+.EE
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
+
-+- Set files with the rlogind_keytab_t type, if you want to treat the files as kerberos keytab files.
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
++The SELinux process type mailman_cgi_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B rlogind_tmp_t
-+.EE
++.br
++.B mailman_archive_t
+
-+- Set files with the rlogind_tmp_t type, if you want to store rlogind temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++ /var/lib/mailman.*/archives(/.*)?
++.br
+
++.br
++.B mailman_cgi_tmp_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B rlogind_var_run_t
-+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the rlogind_var_run_t type, if you want to store the rlogind files under the /run directory.
++.br
++.B mailman_data_t
+
++ /etc/mailman.*
++.br
++ /var/lib/mailman.*
++.br
++ /var/spool/mailman.*
++.br
+
-+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
++.br
++.B mailman_lock_t
+
-+.SH PORT TYPES
-+SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
-+.PP
-+You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
++ /var/lock/mailman.*
++.br
+
-+.B semanage port -l
++.br
++.B mailman_log_t
++
++ /var/log/mailman.*
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
-+SELinux rlogind policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their rlogind processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following port types are defined for rlogind:
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the mailman_cgi_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.TP 5
-+.B rlogind_port_t
-+.TP 10
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
+
-+
-+Default Defined Ports:
-+tcp 513
-+.EE
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux rlogind policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their rlogind processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for rlogind:
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the mailman_cgi_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B rlogind_t
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -43771,101 +47902,157 @@ index 0000000..d24aec9
+.B semanage module
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
-+.B semanage port
-+can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
-+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), rlogind(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/roundup_selinux.8 b/man/man8/roundup_selinux.8
++selinux(8), mailman_cgi(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, mailman_mail_selinux(8), mailman_queue_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/mailman_mail_selinux.8 b/man/man8/mailman_mail_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..34ca865
+index 0000000..e86936f
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/roundup_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
-+.TH "roundup_selinux" "8" "roundup" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "roundup SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/mailman_mail_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,155 @@
++.TH "mailman_mail_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "mailman_mail" "SELinux Policy documentation for mailman_mail"
+.SH "NAME"
-+roundup_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the roundup processes
++mailman_mail_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the mailman_mail processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the roundup processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the mailman_mail processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The mailman_mail processes execute with the mailman_mail_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux roundup policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their roundup processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for roundup:
++For example:
+
++.B ps -eZ | grep mailman_mail_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B roundup_exec_t
-+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the roundup_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the roundup_t domain.
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
++The mailman_mail_t SELinux type can be entered via the "mailman_mail_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the mailman_mail_t domain are the following:"
+
-+.EX
++/usr/lib/mailman.*/mail/mailman, /usr/lib/mailman.*/bin/mailmanctl, /usr/lib/mailman.*/scripts/mailman, /usr/lib/mailman.*/bin/mm-handler.*, /usr/share/doc/mailman.*/mm-handler.*
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+.B roundup_initrc_exec_t
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux mailman_mail policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their mailman_mail processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for mailman_mail:
++
++.EX
++.B mailman_mail_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
-+- Set files with the roundup_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the roundup_initrc_t domain.
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux mailman_mail policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their mailman_mail processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for mailman_mail:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B roundup_var_lib_t
++.B mailman_mail_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the roundup_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the roundup files under the /var/lib directory.
++- Set files with the mailman_mail_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the mailman_mail_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B roundup_var_run_t
++.B mailman_mail_tmp_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the roundup_var_run_t type, if you want to store the roundup files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the mailman_mail_tmp_t type, if you want to store mailman mail temporary files in the /tmp directories.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type mailman_mail_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B anon_inodefs_t
++
++
++.br
++.B mailman_archive_t
++
++ /var/lib/mailman.*/archives(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B mailman_data_t
++
++ /etc/mailman.*
++.br
++ /var/lib/mailman.*
++.br
++ /var/spool/mailman.*
++.br
++
++.br
++.B mailman_lock_t
++
++ /var/lock/mailman.*
++.br
++
++.br
++.B mailman_log_t
++
++ /var/log/mailman.*
++.br
++
++.br
++.B mailman_mail_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B mailman_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/mailman.*
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux roundup policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their roundup processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for roundup:
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the mailman_mail_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B roundup_t
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
++
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the mailman_mail_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -43878,110 +48065,415 @@ index 0000000..34ca865
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), roundup(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/rpcbind_selinux.8 b/man/man8/rpcbind_selinux.8
++selinux(8), mailman_mail(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, mailman_cgi_selinux(8), mailman_queue_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/mailman_queue_selinux.8 b/man/man8/mailman_queue_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..070558a
+index 0000000..b1d3963
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/rpcbind_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
-+.TH "rpcbind_selinux" "8" "rpcbind" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "rpcbind SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/mailman_queue_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,171 @@
++.TH "mailman_queue_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "mailman_queue" "SELinux Policy documentation for mailman_queue"
+.SH "NAME"
-+rpcbind_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the rpcbind processes
++mailman_queue_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the mailman_queue processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the rpcbind processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the mailman_queue processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The mailman_queue processes execute with the mailman_queue_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux rpcbind policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their rpcbind processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for rpcbind:
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep mailman_queue_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The mailman_queue_t SELinux type can be entered via the "mailman_queue_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the mailman_queue_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/lib/mailman.*/cron/.*, /usr/lib/mailman.*/bin/qrunner
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux mailman_queue policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their mailman_queue processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for mailman_queue:
++
++.EX
++.B mailman_queue_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux mailman_queue policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their mailman_queue processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for mailman_queue:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B rpcbind_exec_t
++.B mailman_queue_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the rpcbind_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the rpcbind_t domain.
++- Set files with the mailman_queue_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the mailman_queue_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B mailman_queue_tmp_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the mailman_queue_tmp_t type, if you want to store mailman queue temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type mailman_queue_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/sbin/rpcbind, /sbin/rpcbind
++.B faillog_t
++
++ /var/log/btmp.*
++.br
++ /var/run/faillock(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/log/faillog
++.br
++ /var/log/tallylog
++.br
++
++.br
++.B mailman_archive_t
++
++ /var/lib/mailman.*/archives(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B mailman_data_t
++
++ /etc/mailman.*
++.br
++ /var/lib/mailman.*
++.br
++ /var/spool/mailman.*
++.br
++
++.br
++.B mailman_lock_t
++
++ /var/lock/mailman.*
++.br
++
++.br
++.B mailman_log_t
++
++ /var/log/mailman.*
++.br
++
++.br
++.B mailman_queue_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B pcscd_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/pcscd(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/pcscd\.events(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/pcscd\.pid
++.br
++ /var/run/pcscd\.pub
++.br
++ /var/run/pcscd\.comm
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the mailman_queue_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
++
+.PP
-+.B rpcbind_initrc_exec_t
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the mailman_queue_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the rpcbind_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the rpcbind_initrc_t domain.
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), mailman_queue(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, mailman_cgi_selinux(8), mailman_mail_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/mandb_selinux.8 b/man/man8/mandb_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..962bcc4
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/mandb_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
++.TH "mandb_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "mandb" "SELinux Policy documentation for mandb"
++.SH "NAME"
++mandb_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the mandb processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the mandb processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The mandb processes execute with the mandb_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep mandb_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The mandb_t SELinux type can be entered via the "mandb_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the mandb_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/bin/mandb
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux mandb policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their mandb processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for mandb:
++
++.EX
++.B mandb_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux mandb policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their mandb processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for mandb:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B rpcbind_var_lib_t
++.B mandb_cache_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the rpcbind_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the rpcbind files under the /var/lib directory.
++- Set files with the mandb_cache_t type, if you want to store the files under the /var/cache directory.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/lib/rpcbind(/.*)?, /var/cache/rpcbind(/.*)?
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B rpcbind_var_run_t
++.B mandb_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the rpcbind_var_run_t type, if you want to store the rpcbind files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the mandb_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the mandb_t domain.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/run/rpcbind\.sock, /var/run/rpcbind\.lock, /var/run/rpc.statd\.pid
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type mandb_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B mandb_cache_t
++
++ /var/cache/man(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), mandb(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/mcelog_selinux.8 b/man/man8/mcelog_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..5259ce7
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/mcelog_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,124 @@
++.TH "mcelog_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "mcelog" "SELinux Policy documentation for mcelog"
++.SH "NAME"
++mcelog_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the mcelog processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the mcelog processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The mcelog processes execute with the mcelog_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep mcelog_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The mcelog_t SELinux type can be entered via the "mcelog_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the mcelog_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/sbin/mcelog
+.SH PROCESS TYPES
+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux rpcbind policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their rpcbind processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for rpcbind:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux mcelog policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their mcelog processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for mcelog:
+
+.EX
-+.B rpcbind_t
++.B mcelog_t
+.EE
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux mcelog policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their mcelog processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for mcelog:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B mcelog_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the mcelog_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the mcelog_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B mcelog_log_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the mcelog_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as mcelog log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B mcelog_var_run_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the mcelog_var_run_t type, if you want to store the mcelog files under the /run directory.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type mcelog_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B mcelog_log_t
++
++ /var/log/mcelog.*
++.br
++
++.br
++.B mcelog_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/mcelog.*
++.br
++
++.br
++.B sysfs_t
++
++ /sys(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
+can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
@@ -43993,123 +48485,41485 @@ index 0000000..070558a
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), rpcbind(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/rpcd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/rpcd_selinux.8
++selinux(8), mcelog(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/mdadm_selinux.8 b/man/man8/mdadm_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..eee7969
+index 0000000..e023488
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/rpcd_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,123 @@
-+.TH "rpcd_selinux" "8" "rpcd" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "rpcd SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/mdadm_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,128 @@
++.TH "mdadm_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "mdadm" "SELinux Policy documentation for mdadm"
+.SH "NAME"
-+rpcd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the rpcd processes
++mdadm_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the mdadm processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the rpcd processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the mdadm processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The mdadm processes execute with the mdadm_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep mdadm_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The mdadm_t SELinux type can be entered via the "mdadm_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the mdadm_t domain are the following:"
++
++/sbin/mdadm, /sbin/mdmpd, /usr/sbin/mdadm, /usr/sbin/mdmpd, /usr/sbin/iprdump, /usr/sbin/iprinit, /usr/sbin/iprupdate, /usr/sbin/raid-check
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux mdadm policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their mdadm processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for mdadm:
++
++.EX
++.B mdadm_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux mdadm policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their mdadm processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for mdadm:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B mdadm_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the mdadm_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the mdadm_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B mdadm_var_run_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the mdadm_var_run_t type, if you want to store the mdadm files under the /run directory.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type mdadm_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B mdadm_var_run_t
++
++ /dev/.mdadm\.map
++.br
++ /dev/md/.*
++.br
++ /var/run/mdadm(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B sysfs_t
++
++ /sys(/.*)?
++.br
+
+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the rpcd_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the mdadm_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the rpcd_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the mdadm_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), mdadm(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/memcached_selinux.8 b/man/man8/memcached_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..f286679
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/memcached_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,178 @@
++.TH "memcached_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "memcached" "SELinux Policy documentation for memcached"
++.SH "NAME"
++memcached_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the memcached processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the memcached processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The memcached processes execute with the memcached_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep memcached_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The memcached_t SELinux type can be entered via the "memcached_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the memcached_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/bin/memcached
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux memcached policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their memcached processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for memcached:
++
++.EX
++.B memcached_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH BOOLEANS
++SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. memcached policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run memcached with the tightest access possible.
++
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow httpd to connect to memcache server, you must turn on the httpd_can_network_memcache boolean.
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B setsebool -P httpd_can_network_memcache 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow httpd to connect to memcache server, you must turn on the httpd_can_network_memcache boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P httpd_can_network_memcache 1
+.EE
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux rpcd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their rpcd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for rpcd:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux memcached policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their memcached processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for memcached:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B rpcd_exec_t
++.B memcached_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the rpcd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the rpcd_t domain.
++- Set files with the memcached_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the memcached_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B memcached_initrc_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the memcached_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the memcached_initrc_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B memcached_var_run_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the memcached_var_run_t type, if you want to store the memcached files under the /run directory.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH PORT TYPES
++SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
++.PP
++You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
++
++.B semanage port -l
++
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
++SELinux memcached policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their memcached processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following port types are defined for memcached:
++
++.EX
++.TP 5
++.B memcache_port_t
++.TP 10
++.EE
++
++
++Default Defined Ports:
++tcp 11211
++.EE
++udp 11211
++.EE
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type memcached_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B memcached_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/memcached(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/ipa_memcached(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the memcached_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the memcached_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.B semanage port
++can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
++
++.B semanage boolean
++can also be used to manipulate the booleans
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), memcached(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, setsebool(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/mencoder_selinux.8 b/man/man8/mencoder_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..70bc6e1
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/mencoder_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
++.TH "mencoder_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "mencoder" "SELinux Policy documentation for mencoder"
++.SH "NAME"
++mencoder_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the mencoder processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the mencoder processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The mencoder processes execute with the mencoder_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep mencoder_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The mencoder_t SELinux type can be entered via the "mencoder_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the mencoder_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/bin/mencoder
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux mencoder policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their mencoder processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for mencoder:
++
++.EX
++.B mencoder_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux mencoder policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their mencoder processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for mencoder:
++
+
++.EX
++.PP
++.B mencoder_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the mencoder_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the mencoder_t domain.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type mencoder_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B mplayer_home_t
++
++ /home/[^/]*/\.mplayer(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.mplayer(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.mplayer(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), mencoder(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/mock_build_selinux.8 b/man/man8/mock_build_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..82e2f70
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/mock_build_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,129 @@
++.TH "mock_build_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "mock_build" "SELinux Policy documentation for mock_build"
++.SH "NAME"
++mock_build_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the mock_build processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the mock_build processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The mock_build processes execute with the mock_build_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep mock_build_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The mock_build_t SELinux type can be entered via the "mock_var_lib_t,mock_build_exec_t,mock_tmp_t" file types. The default entrypoint paths for the mock_build_t domain are the following:"
++
++/var/lib/mock(/.*)?
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux mock_build policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their mock_build processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for mock_build:
++
++.EX
++.B mock_build_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux mock_build policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their mock_build processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for mock_build:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B mock_build_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the mock_build_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the mock_build_t domain.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type mock_build_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B mock_cache_t
++
++ /var/cache/mock(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B mock_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B mock_var_lib_t
++
++ /var/lib/mock(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B systemd_passwd_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/systemd/ask-password(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/systemd/ask-password-block(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the mock_build_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the mock_build_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), mock_build(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, mock_selinux(8), mock_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/mock_selinux.8 b/man/man8/mock_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..d8f798e
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/mock_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,190 @@
++.TH "mock_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "mock" "SELinux Policy documentation for mock"
++.SH "NAME"
++mock_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the mock processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the mock processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The mock processes execute with the mock_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep mock_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The mock_t SELinux type can be entered via the "mock_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the mock_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/sbin/mock
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux mock policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their mock processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for mock:
++
++.EX
++.B mock_t, mock_build_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH BOOLEANS
++SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. mock policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run mock with the tightest access possible.
++
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow mock to read files in home directories, you must turn on the mock_enable_homedirs boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P mock_enable_homedirs 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow mock to read files in home directories, you must turn on the mock_enable_homedirs boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P mock_enable_homedirs 1
++.EE
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux mock policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their mock processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for mock:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B mock_build_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the mock_build_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the mock_build_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B mock_cache_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the mock_cache_t type, if you want to store the files under the /var/cache directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B mock_etc_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the mock_etc_t type, if you want to store mock files in the /etc directories.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B mock_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the mock_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the mock_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B mock_tmp_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the mock_tmp_t type, if you want to store mock temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B mock_var_lib_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the mock_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the mock files under the /var/lib directory.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type mock_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B mock_cache_t
++
++ /var/cache/mock(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B mock_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B mock_var_lib_t
++
++ /var/lib/mock(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B systemd_passwd_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/systemd/ask-password(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/systemd/ask-password-block(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the mock_t, mock_build_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the mock_t, mock_build_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.B semanage boolean
++can also be used to manipulate the booleans
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), mock(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, setsebool(8), mock_build_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/modemmanager_selinux.8 b/man/man8/modemmanager_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..97ff255
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/modemmanager_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
++.TH "modemmanager_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "modemmanager" "SELinux Policy documentation for modemmanager"
++.SH "NAME"
++modemmanager_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the modemmanager processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the modemmanager processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The modemmanager processes execute with the modemmanager_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep modemmanager_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The modemmanager_t SELinux type can be entered via the "modemmanager_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the modemmanager_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/sbin/modem-manager
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux modemmanager policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their modemmanager processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for modemmanager:
++
++.EX
++.B modemmanager_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux modemmanager policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their modemmanager processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for modemmanager:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B modemmanager_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the modemmanager_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the modemmanager_t domain.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), modemmanager(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/mongod_selinux.8 b/man/man8/mongod_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..a9bc3c3
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/mongod_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,186 @@
++.TH "mongod_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "mongod" "SELinux Policy documentation for mongod"
++.SH "NAME"
++mongod_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the mongod processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the mongod processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The mongod processes execute with the mongod_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep mongod_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The mongod_t SELinux type can be entered via the "mongod_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the mongod_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/bin/mongod, /usr/share/aeolus-conductor/dbomatic/dbomatic
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux mongod policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their mongod processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for mongod:
++
++.EX
++.B mongod_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux mongod policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their mongod processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for mongod:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B mongod_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the mongod_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the mongod_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B mongod_initrc_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the mongod_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the mongod_initrc_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B mongod_log_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the mongod_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as mongod log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B mongod_tmp_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the mongod_tmp_t type, if you want to store mongod temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B mongod_var_lib_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the mongod_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the mongod files under the /var/lib directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B mongod_var_run_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the mongod_var_run_t type, if you want to store the mongod files under the /run directory.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH PORT TYPES
++SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
++.PP
++You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
++
++.B semanage port -l
++
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
++SELinux mongod policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their mongod processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following port types are defined for mongod:
++
++.EX
++.TP 5
++.B mongod_port_t
++.TP 10
++.EE
++
++
++Default Defined Ports:
++tcp 27017
++.EE
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type mongod_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B mongod_log_t
++
++ /var/log/mongo(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/log/mongodb(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/log/mongo/mongod\.log.*
++.br
++ /var/log/aeolus-conductor/dbomatic\.log.*
++.br
++
++.br
++.B mongod_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B mongod_var_lib_t
++
++ /var/lib/mongodb(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B mongod_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/mongodb(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/aeolus/dbomatic\.pid
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.B semanage port
++can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), mongod(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/mount_ecryptfs_selinux.8 b/man/man8/mount_ecryptfs_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..47e1952
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/mount_ecryptfs_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,125 @@
++.TH "mount_ecryptfs_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "mount_ecryptfs" "SELinux Policy documentation for mount_ecryptfs"
++.SH "NAME"
++mount_ecryptfs_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the mount_ecryptfs processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the mount_ecryptfs processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The mount_ecryptfs processes execute with the mount_ecryptfs_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep mount_ecryptfs_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The mount_ecryptfs_t SELinux type can be entered via the "mount_ecryptfs_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the mount_ecryptfs_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/sbin/mount\.ecryptfs, /usr/sbin/umount\.ecryptfs, /usr/sbin/mount\.ecryptfs_private, /usr/sbin/umount\.ecryptfs_private
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux mount_ecryptfs policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their mount_ecryptfs processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for mount_ecryptfs:
++
++.EX
++.B mount_ecryptfs_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux mount_ecryptfs policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their mount_ecryptfs processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for mount_ecryptfs:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B mount_ecryptfs_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the mount_ecryptfs_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the mount_ecryptfs_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B mount_ecryptfs_tmpfs_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the mount_ecryptfs_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store mount ecryptfs files on a tmpfs file system.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type mount_ecryptfs_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B mount_ecryptfs_tmpfs_t
++
++
++.br
++.B user_tmpfs_t
++
++ /dev/shm/mono.*
++.br
++ /dev/shm/pulse-shm.*
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the mount_ecryptfs_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the mount_ecryptfs_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), mount_ecryptfs(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, mount_selinux(8), mount_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/mount_selinux.8 b/man/man8/mount_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..1f6de58
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/mount_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,242 @@
++.TH "mount_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "mount" "SELinux Policy documentation for mount"
++.SH "NAME"
++mount_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the mount processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the mount processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The mount processes execute with the mount_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep mount_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The mount_t SELinux type can be entered via the "mount_exec_t,fusermount_exec_t" file types. The default entrypoint paths for the mount_t domain are the following:"
++
++/bin/mount.*, /bin/umount.*, /sbin/mount.*, /sbin/umount.*, /usr/bin/mount.*, /usr/bin/umount.*, /usr/sbin/mount.*, /usr/sbin/umount.*, /bin/fusermount, /usr/bin/fusermount
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux mount policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their mount processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for mount:
++
++.EX
++.B mount_t, mount_ecryptfs_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH BOOLEANS
++SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. mount policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run mount with the tightest access possible.
++
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow xguest users to mount removable media, you must turn on the xguest_mount_media boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P xguest_mount_media 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow the mount command to mount any directory or file, you must turn on the mount_anyfile boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P mount_anyfile 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow xguest users to mount removable media, you must turn on the xguest_mount_media boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P xguest_mount_media 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow the mount command to mount any directory or file, you must turn on the mount_anyfile boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P mount_anyfile 1
++.EE
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux mount policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their mount processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for mount:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B mount_ecryptfs_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the mount_ecryptfs_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the mount_ecryptfs_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B mount_ecryptfs_tmpfs_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the mount_ecryptfs_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store mount ecryptfs files on a tmpfs file system.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B mount_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the mount_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the mount_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B mount_loopback_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the mount_loopback_t type, if you want to treat the files as mount loopback data.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B mount_tmp_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the mount_tmp_t type, if you want to store mount temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B mount_var_run_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the mount_var_run_t type, if you want to store the mount files under the /run directory.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type mount_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B etc_runtime_t
++
++ /[^/]+
++.br
++ /etc/mtab.*
++.br
++ /etc/blkid(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/nologin.*
++.br
++ /etc/\.fstab\.hal\..+
++.br
++ /halt
++.br
++ /fastboot
++.br
++ /poweroff
++.br
++ /etc/cmtab
++.br
++ /\.autofsck
++.br
++ /forcefsck
++.br
++ /\.suspended
++.br
++ /fsckoptions
++.br
++ /\.autorelabel
++.br
++ /etc/securetty
++.br
++ /etc/killpower
++.br
++ /etc/nohotplug
++.br
++ /etc/ioctl\.save
++.br
++ /etc/fstab\.REVOKE
++.br
++ /etc/network/ifstate
++.br
++ /etc/sysconfig/hwconf
++.br
++ /etc/ptal/ptal-printd-like
++.br
++ /etc/sysconfig/iptables\.save
++.br
++ /etc/xorg\.conf\.d/00-system-setup-keyboard\.conf
++.br
++ /etc/X11/xorg\.conf\.d/00-system-setup-keyboard\.conf
++.br
++
++.br
++.B nfsd_fs_t
++
++
++.br
++.B non_security_file_type
++
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the mount_t, mount_ecryptfs_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the mount_t, mount_ecryptfs_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.B semanage boolean
++can also be used to manipulate the booleans
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), mount(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, setsebool(8), mount_ecryptfs_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/mozilla_plugin_config_selinux.8 b/man/man8/mozilla_plugin_config_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..ad663f1
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/mozilla_plugin_config_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,233 @@
++.TH "mozilla_plugin_config_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "mozilla_plugin_config" "SELinux Policy documentation for mozilla_plugin_config"
++.SH "NAME"
++mozilla_plugin_config_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the mozilla_plugin_config processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the mozilla_plugin_config processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The mozilla_plugin_config processes execute with the mozilla_plugin_config_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep mozilla_plugin_config_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The mozilla_plugin_config_t SELinux type can be entered via the "mozilla_plugin_config_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the mozilla_plugin_config_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/lib/nspluginwrapper/plugin-config
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux mozilla_plugin_config policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their mozilla_plugin_config processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for mozilla_plugin_config:
++
++.EX
++.B mozilla_plugin_config_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux mozilla_plugin_config policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their mozilla_plugin_config processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for mozilla_plugin_config:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B mozilla_plugin_config_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the mozilla_plugin_config_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the mozilla_plugin_config_t domain.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type mozilla_plugin_config_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B mozilla_home_t
++
++ /home/[^/]*/\.java(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.adobe(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.gnash(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.galeon(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.spicec(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.mozilla(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.phoenix(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.netscape(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.ICAClient(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.macromedia(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.thunderbird(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.gcjwebplugin(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.icedteaplugin(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/zimbrauserdata(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.config/chromium(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.java(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.adobe(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.gnash(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.galeon(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.spicec(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.mozilla(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.phoenix(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.netscape(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.ICAClient(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.macromedia(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.thunderbird(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.gcjwebplugin(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.icedteaplugin(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/zimbrauserdata(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.config/chromium(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.java(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.adobe(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.gnash(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.galeon(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.spicec(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.mozilla(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.phoenix(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.netscape(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.ICAClient(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.macromedia(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.thunderbird(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.gcjwebplugin(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.icedteaplugin(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/zimbrauserdata(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.config/chromium(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B mozilla_plugin_rw_t
++
++ /usr/lib/mozilla/plugins-wrapped(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B user_fonts_cache_t
++
++ /root/\.fontconfig(/.*)?
++.br
++ /root/\.fonts/auto(/.*)?
++.br
++ /root/\.fonts\.cache-.*
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.fontconfig(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.fonts/auto(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.fonts\.cache-.*
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.fontconfig(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.fonts/auto(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.fonts\.cache-.*
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.fontconfig(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.fonts/auto(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.fonts\.cache-.*
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the mozilla_plugin_config_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the mozilla_plugin_config_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), mozilla_plugin_config(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, mozilla_selinux(8), mozilla_selinux(8), mozilla_plugin_selinux(8), mozilla_plugin_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/mozilla_plugin_selinux.8 b/man/man8/mozilla_plugin_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..a873bb4
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/mozilla_plugin_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,392 @@
++.TH "mozilla_plugin_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "mozilla_plugin" "SELinux Policy documentation for mozilla_plugin"
++.SH "NAME"
++mozilla_plugin_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the mozilla_plugin processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the mozilla_plugin processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The mozilla_plugin processes execute with the mozilla_plugin_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep mozilla_plugin_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The mozilla_plugin_t SELinux type can be entered via the "mozilla_plugin_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the mozilla_plugin_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/lib/xulrunner[^/]*/plugin-container, /usr/lib/nspluginwrapper/npviewer.bin, /usr/bin/nspluginscan, /usr/bin/nspluginviewer
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux mozilla_plugin policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their mozilla_plugin processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for mozilla_plugin:
++
++.EX
++.B mozilla_plugin_config_t, mozilla_plugin_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH BOOLEANS
++SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. mozilla_plugin policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run mozilla_plugin with the tightest access possible.
++
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow mozilla plugin domain to connect to the network using TCP, you must turn on the mozilla_plugin_can_network_connect boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P mozilla_plugin_can_network_connect 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow mozilla_plugins to create random content in the users home directory, you must turn on the mozilla_plugin_enable_homedirs boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P mozilla_plugin_enable_homedirs 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow unconfined users to transition to the Mozilla plugin domain when running xulrunner plugin-container, you must turn on the unconfined_mozilla_plugin_transition boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P unconfined_mozilla_plugin_transition 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow mozilla plugin domain to connect to the network using TCP, you must turn on the mozilla_plugin_can_network_connect boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P mozilla_plugin_can_network_connect 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow mozilla_plugins to create random content in the users home directory, you must turn on the mozilla_plugin_enable_homedirs boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P mozilla_plugin_enable_homedirs 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow unconfined users to transition to the Mozilla plugin domain when running xulrunner plugin-container, you must turn on the unconfined_mozilla_plugin_transition boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P unconfined_mozilla_plugin_transition 1
++.EE
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux mozilla_plugin policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their mozilla_plugin processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for mozilla_plugin:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B mozilla_plugin_config_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the mozilla_plugin_config_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the mozilla_plugin_config_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B mozilla_plugin_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the mozilla_plugin_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the mozilla_plugin_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B mozilla_plugin_rw_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the mozilla_plugin_rw_t type, if you want to treat the files as mozilla plugin read/write content.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B mozilla_plugin_tmp_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the mozilla_plugin_tmp_t type, if you want to store mozilla plugin temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B mozilla_plugin_tmpfs_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the mozilla_plugin_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store mozilla plugin files on a tmpfs file system.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type mozilla_plugin_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B gnome_home_type
++
++
++.br
++.B home_cert_t
++
++ /root/\.pki(/.*)?
++.br
++ /root/\.cert(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/.kde/share/apps/networkmanagement/certificates(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.pki(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.cert(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/.kde/share/apps/networkmanagement/certificates(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.pki(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.cert(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/.kde/share/apps/networkmanagement/certificates(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.pki(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.cert(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B mozilla_home_t
++
++ /home/[^/]*/\.java(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.adobe(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.gnash(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.galeon(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.spicec(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.mozilla(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.phoenix(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.netscape(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.ICAClient(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.macromedia(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.thunderbird(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.gcjwebplugin(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.icedteaplugin(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/zimbrauserdata(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.config/chromium(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.java(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.adobe(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.gnash(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.galeon(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.spicec(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.mozilla(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.phoenix(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.netscape(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.ICAClient(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.macromedia(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.thunderbird(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.gcjwebplugin(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.icedteaplugin(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/zimbrauserdata(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.config/chromium(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.java(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.adobe(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.gnash(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.galeon(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.spicec(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.mozilla(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.phoenix(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.netscape(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.ICAClient(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.macromedia(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.thunderbird(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.gcjwebplugin(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.icedteaplugin(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/zimbrauserdata(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.config/chromium(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B mozilla_plugin_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B mozilla_plugin_tmpfs_t
++
++
++.br
++.B mplayer_home_t
++
++ /home/[^/]*/\.mplayer(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.mplayer(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.mplayer(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B pulseaudio_home_t
++
++ /root/\.pulse(/.*)?
++.br
++ /root/\.esd_auth
++.br
++ /root/\.pulse-cookie
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.pulse(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.esd_auth
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.pulse-cookie
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.pulse(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.esd_auth
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.pulse-cookie
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.pulse(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.esd_auth
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.pulse-cookie
++.br
++
++.br
++.B user_fonts_cache_t
++
++ /root/\.fontconfig(/.*)?
++.br
++ /root/\.fonts/auto(/.*)?
++.br
++ /root/\.fonts\.cache-.*
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.fontconfig(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.fonts/auto(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.fonts\.cache-.*
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.fontconfig(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.fonts/auto(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.fonts\.cache-.*
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.fontconfig(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.fonts/auto(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.fonts\.cache-.*
++.br
++
++.br
++.B user_tmpfs_t
++
++ /dev/shm/mono.*
++.br
++ /dev/shm/pulse-shm.*
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the mozilla_plugin_config_t, mozilla_plugin_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the mozilla_plugin_config_t, mozilla_plugin_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.B semanage boolean
++can also be used to manipulate the booleans
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), mozilla_plugin(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, setsebool(8), mozilla_selinux(8), mozilla_selinux(8), mozilla_plugin_config_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/mozilla_selinux.8 b/man/man8/mozilla_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..5c7618a
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/mozilla_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,422 @@
++.TH "mozilla_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "mozilla" "SELinux Policy documentation for mozilla"
++.SH "NAME"
++mozilla_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the mozilla processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the mozilla processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The mozilla processes execute with the mozilla_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep mozilla_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The mozilla_t SELinux type can be entered via the "mozilla_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the mozilla_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/lib/[^/]*firefox[^/]*/firefox, /usr/lib/[^/]*firefox[^/]*/firefox-bin, /usr/lib/mozilla[^/]*/reg.+, /usr/lib/mozilla[^/]*/mozilla-.*, /usr/lib/firefox[^/]*/mozilla-.*, /usr/bin/mozilla-[0-9].*, /usr/lib/netscape/.+/communicator/communicator-smotif\.real, /usr/bin/mozilla-bin-[0-9].*, /usr/bin/mozilla, /usr/bin/netscape, /usr/bin/epiphany, /usr/bin/epiphany-bin, /usr/lib/galeon/galeon, /usr/bin/mozilla-snapshot, /usr/lib/netscape/base-4/wrapper
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux mozilla policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their mozilla processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for mozilla:
++
++.EX
++.B mozilla_t, mozilla_plugin_config_t, mozilla_plugin_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH BOOLEANS
++SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. mozilla policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run mozilla with the tightest access possible.
++
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow mozilla plugin domain to connect to the network using TCP, you must turn on the mozilla_plugin_can_network_connect boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P mozilla_plugin_can_network_connect 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined web browsers to read home directory content, you must turn on the mozilla_read_content boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P mozilla_read_content 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow mozilla_plugins to create random content in the users home directory, you must turn on the mozilla_plugin_enable_homedirs boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P mozilla_plugin_enable_homedirs 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow unconfined users to transition to the Mozilla plugin domain when running xulrunner plugin-container, you must turn on the unconfined_mozilla_plugin_transition boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P unconfined_mozilla_plugin_transition 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow mozilla plugin domain to connect to the network using TCP, you must turn on the mozilla_plugin_can_network_connect boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P mozilla_plugin_can_network_connect 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined web browsers to read home directory content, you must turn on the mozilla_read_content boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P mozilla_read_content 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow mozilla_plugins to create random content in the users home directory, you must turn on the mozilla_plugin_enable_homedirs boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P mozilla_plugin_enable_homedirs 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow unconfined users to transition to the Mozilla plugin domain when running xulrunner plugin-container, you must turn on the unconfined_mozilla_plugin_transition boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P unconfined_mozilla_plugin_transition 1
++.EE
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux mozilla policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their mozilla processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for mozilla:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B mozilla_conf_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the mozilla_conf_t type, if you want to treat the files as mozilla configuration data, usually stored under the /etc directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B mozilla_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the mozilla_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the mozilla_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B mozilla_home_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the mozilla_home_t type, if you want to store mozilla files in the users home directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B mozilla_plugin_config_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the mozilla_plugin_config_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the mozilla_plugin_config_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B mozilla_plugin_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the mozilla_plugin_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the mozilla_plugin_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B mozilla_plugin_rw_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the mozilla_plugin_rw_t type, if you want to treat the files as mozilla plugin read/write content.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B mozilla_plugin_tmp_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the mozilla_plugin_tmp_t type, if you want to store mozilla plugin temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B mozilla_plugin_tmpfs_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the mozilla_plugin_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store mozilla plugin files on a tmpfs file system.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B mozilla_tmp_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the mozilla_tmp_t type, if you want to store mozilla temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B mozilla_tmpfs_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the mozilla_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store mozilla files on a tmpfs file system.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type mozilla_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B gconf_home_t
++
++ /root/\.local.*
++.br
++ /root/\.gconf(d)?(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.local.*
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.gconf(d)?(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.local.*
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.gconf(d)?(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.local.*
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.gconf(d)?(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B gnome_home_type
++
++
++.br
++.B mozilla_home_t
++
++ /home/[^/]*/\.java(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.adobe(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.gnash(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.galeon(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.spicec(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.mozilla(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.phoenix(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.netscape(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.ICAClient(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.macromedia(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.thunderbird(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.gcjwebplugin(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.icedteaplugin(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/zimbrauserdata(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.config/chromium(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.java(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.adobe(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.gnash(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.galeon(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.spicec(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.mozilla(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.phoenix(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.netscape(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.ICAClient(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.macromedia(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.thunderbird(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.gcjwebplugin(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.icedteaplugin(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/zimbrauserdata(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.config/chromium(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.java(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.adobe(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.gnash(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.galeon(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.spicec(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.mozilla(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.phoenix(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.netscape(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.ICAClient(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.macromedia(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.thunderbird(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.gcjwebplugin(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.icedteaplugin(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/zimbrauserdata(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.config/chromium(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B mozilla_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B mozilla_tmpfs_t
++
++
++.br
++.B pulseaudio_home_t
++
++ /root/\.pulse(/.*)?
++.br
++ /root/\.esd_auth
++.br
++ /root/\.pulse-cookie
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.pulse(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.esd_auth
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.pulse-cookie
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.pulse(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.esd_auth
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.pulse-cookie
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.pulse(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.esd_auth
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.pulse-cookie
++.br
++
++.br
++.B user_fonts_cache_t
++
++ /root/\.fontconfig(/.*)?
++.br
++ /root/\.fonts/auto(/.*)?
++.br
++ /root/\.fonts\.cache-.*
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.fontconfig(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.fonts/auto(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.fonts\.cache-.*
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.fontconfig(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.fonts/auto(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.fonts\.cache-.*
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.fontconfig(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.fonts/auto(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.fonts\.cache-.*
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the mozilla_plugin_config_t, mozilla_t, mozilla_plugin_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the mozilla_plugin_config_t, mozilla_t, mozilla_plugin_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.B semanage boolean
++can also be used to manipulate the booleans
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), mozilla(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, setsebool(8), mozilla_plugin_selinux(8), mozilla_plugin_config_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/mpd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/mpd_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..ee3fb08
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/mpd_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,296 @@
++.TH "mpd_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "mpd" "SELinux Policy documentation for mpd"
++.SH "NAME"
++mpd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the mpd processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the mpd processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The mpd processes execute with the mpd_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep mpd_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The mpd_t SELinux type can be entered via the "mpd_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the mpd_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/bin/mpd
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux mpd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their mpd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for mpd:
++
++.EX
++.B mpd_t, mplayer_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH BOOLEANS
++SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. mpd policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run mpd with the tightest access possible.
++
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow mplayer executable stack, you must turn on the mplayer_execstack boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P mplayer_execstack 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow all daemons to write corefiles to /, you must turn on the daemons_dump_core boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P daemons_dump_core 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow gssd to read temp directory. For access to kerberos tgt, you must turn on the gssd_read_tmp boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P gssd_read_tmp 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow Apache to execute tmp content, you must turn on the httpd_tmp_exec boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P httpd_tmp_exec 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow video playing tools to run unconfined, you must turn on the unconfined_mplayer boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P unconfined_mplayer 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow mplayer executable stack, you must turn on the mplayer_execstack boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P mplayer_execstack 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow all daemons to write corefiles to /, you must turn on the daemons_dump_core boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P daemons_dump_core 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow gssd to read temp directory. For access to kerberos tgt, you must turn on the gssd_read_tmp boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P gssd_read_tmp 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow Apache to execute tmp content, you must turn on the httpd_tmp_exec boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P httpd_tmp_exec 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow video playing tools to run unconfined, you must turn on the unconfined_mplayer boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P unconfined_mplayer 1
++.EE
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux mpd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their mpd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for mpd:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B mpd_data_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the mpd_data_t type, if you want to treat the files as mpd content.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B mpd_etc_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the mpd_etc_t type, if you want to store mpd files in the /etc directories.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B mpd_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the mpd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the mpd_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B mpd_initrc_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the mpd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the mpd_initrc_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B mpd_log_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the mpd_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as mpd log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B mpd_tmp_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the mpd_tmp_t type, if you want to store mpd temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B mpd_tmpfs_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the mpd_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store mpd files on a tmpfs file system.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B mpd_var_lib_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the mpd_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the mpd files under the /var/lib directory.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH PORT TYPES
++SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
++.PP
++You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
++
++.B semanage port -l
++
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
++SELinux mpd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their mpd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following port types are defined for mpd:
++
++.EX
++.TP 5
++.B mpd_port_t
++.TP 10
++.EE
++
++
++Default Defined Ports:
++tcp 6600
++.EE
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type mpd_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B anon_inodefs_t
++
++
++.br
++.B mpd_data_t
++
++ /var/lib/mpd/music(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/mpd/playlists(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B mpd_log_t
++
++ /var/log/mpd(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B mpd_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B mpd_tmpfs_t
++
++
++.br
++.B mpd_var_lib_t
++
++ /var/lib/mpd(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the mpd_t, mplayer_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the mpd_t, mplayer_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.B semanage port
++can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
++
++.B semanage boolean
++can also be used to manipulate the booleans
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), mpd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, setsebool(8), mplayer_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/mplayer_selinux.8 b/man/man8/mplayer_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..5be39fe
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/mplayer_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,206 @@
++.TH "mplayer_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "mplayer" "SELinux Policy documentation for mplayer"
++.SH "NAME"
++mplayer_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the mplayer processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the mplayer processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The mplayer processes execute with the mplayer_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep mplayer_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The mplayer_t SELinux type can be entered via the "mplayer_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the mplayer_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/bin/vlc, /usr/bin/xine, /usr/bin/mplayer
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux mplayer policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their mplayer processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for mplayer:
++
++.EX
++.B mplayer_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH BOOLEANS
++SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. mplayer policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run mplayer with the tightest access possible.
++
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow mplayer executable stack, you must turn on the mplayer_execstack boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P mplayer_execstack 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow video playing tools to run unconfined, you must turn on the unconfined_mplayer boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P unconfined_mplayer 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow mplayer executable stack, you must turn on the mplayer_execstack boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P mplayer_execstack 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow video playing tools to run unconfined, you must turn on the unconfined_mplayer boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P unconfined_mplayer 1
++.EE
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux mplayer policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their mplayer processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for mplayer:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B mplayer_etc_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the mplayer_etc_t type, if you want to store mplayer files in the /etc directories.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B mplayer_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the mplayer_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the mplayer_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B mplayer_home_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the mplayer_home_t type, if you want to store mplayer files in the users home directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B mplayer_tmpfs_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the mplayer_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store mplayer files on a tmpfs file system.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type mplayer_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B mplayer_home_t
++
++ /home/[^/]*/\.mplayer(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.mplayer(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.mplayer(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B mplayer_tmpfs_t
++
++
++.br
++.B user_fonts_cache_t
++
++ /root/\.fontconfig(/.*)?
++.br
++ /root/\.fonts/auto(/.*)?
++.br
++ /root/\.fonts\.cache-.*
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.fontconfig(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.fonts/auto(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.fonts\.cache-.*
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.fontconfig(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.fonts/auto(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.fonts\.cache-.*
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.fontconfig(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.fonts/auto(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.fonts\.cache-.*
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the mplayer_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the mplayer_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.B semanage boolean
++can also be used to manipulate the booleans
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), mplayer(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, setsebool(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/mrtg_selinux.8 b/man/man8/mrtg_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..f49743b
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/mrtg_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,210 @@
++.TH "mrtg_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "mrtg" "SELinux Policy documentation for mrtg"
++.SH "NAME"
++mrtg_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the mrtg processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the mrtg processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The mrtg processes execute with the mrtg_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep mrtg_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The mrtg_t SELinux type can be entered via the "mrtg_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the mrtg_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/bin/mrtg
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux mrtg policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their mrtg processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for mrtg:
++
++.EX
++.B mrtg_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux mrtg policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their mrtg processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for mrtg:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B mrtg_etc_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the mrtg_etc_t type, if you want to store mrtg files in the /etc directories.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B mrtg_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the mrtg_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the mrtg_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B mrtg_lock_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the mrtg_lock_t type, if you want to treat the files as mrtg lock data, stored under the /var/lock directory
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B mrtg_log_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the mrtg_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as mrtg log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B mrtg_var_lib_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the mrtg_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the mrtg files under the /var/lib directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B mrtg_var_run_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the mrtg_var_run_t type, if you want to store the mrtg files under the /run directory.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type mrtg_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B httpd_sys_content_t
++
++ /srv/([^/]*/)?www(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/www(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/htdig(/.*)?
++.br
++ /srv/gallery2(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/trac(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/htdig(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/www/icons(/.*)?
++.br
++ /usr/share/htdig(/.*)?
++.br
++ /usr/share/drupal.*
++.br
++ /var/www/svn/conf(/.*)?
++.br
++ /usr/share/icecast(/.*)?
++.br
++ /usr/share/mythweb(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/cacti/rra(/.*)?
++.br
++ /usr/share/ntop/html(/.*)?
++.br
++ /usr/share/mythtv/data(/.*)?
++.br
++ /usr/share/doc/ghc/html(/.*)?
++.br
++ /usr/share/openca/htdocs(/.*)?
++.br
++ /usr/share/selinux-policy[^/]*/html(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B mrtg_lock_t
++
++ /var/lock/mrtg(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/mrtg/mrtg\.ok
++.br
++
++.br
++.B mrtg_log_t
++
++ /var/log/mrtg(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B mrtg_var_lib_t
++
++ /var/lib/mrtg(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B mrtg_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/mrtg\.pid
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the mrtg_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the mrtg_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), mrtg(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/mscan_selinux.8 b/man/man8/mscan_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..3349daa
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/mscan_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,204 @@
++.TH "mscan_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "mscan" "SELinux Policy documentation for mscan"
++.SH "NAME"
++mscan_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the mscan processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the mscan processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The mscan processes execute with the mscan_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep mscan_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The mscan_t SELinux type can be entered via the "mscan_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the mscan_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/sbin/MailScanner
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux mscan policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their mscan processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for mscan:
++
++.EX
++.B mscan_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH BOOLEANS
++SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. mscan policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run mscan with the tightest access possible.
++
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow clamscan to non security files on a system, you must turn on the clamscan_can_scan_system boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P clamscan_can_scan_system 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow clamscan to read user content, you must turn on the clamscan_read_user_content boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P clamscan_read_user_content 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow clamscan to non security files on a system, you must turn on the clamscan_can_scan_system boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P clamscan_can_scan_system 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow clamscan to read user content, you must turn on the clamscan_read_user_content boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P clamscan_read_user_content 1
++.EE
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux mscan policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their mscan processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for mscan:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B mscan_etc_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the mscan_etc_t type, if you want to store mscan files in the /etc directories.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B mscan_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the mscan_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the mscan_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B mscan_initrc_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the mscan_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the mscan_initrc_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B mscan_tmp_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the mscan_tmp_t type, if you want to store mscan temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B mscan_var_run_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the mscan_var_run_t type, if you want to store the mscan files under the /run directory.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type mscan_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B clamd_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/clamd.*
++.br
++ /var/run/clamav.*
++.br
++ /var/run/amavis(d)?/clamd\.pid
++.br
++ /var/spool/MailScanner(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/spool/amavisd/clamd\.sock
++.br
++
++.br
++.B mqueue_spool_t
++
++ /var/spool/(client)?mqueue(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/spool/mqueue\.in(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B mscan_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B mscan_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/MailScanner\.pid
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the mscan_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the mscan_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.B semanage boolean
++can also be used to manipulate the booleans
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), mscan(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, setsebool(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/munin_selinux.8 b/man/man8/munin_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..4e6e830
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/munin_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,222 @@
++.TH "munin_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "munin" "SELinux Policy documentation for munin"
++.SH "NAME"
++munin_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the munin processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the munin processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The munin processes execute with the munin_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep munin_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The munin_t SELinux type can be entered via the "munin_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the munin_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/bin/munin-.*, /usr/sbin/munin-.*, /usr/share/munin/munin-.*, /usr/share/munin/plugins/.*
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux munin policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their munin processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for munin:
++
++.EX
++.B munin_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux munin policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their munin processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for munin:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B munin_etc_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the munin_etc_t type, if you want to store munin files in the /etc directories.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B munin_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the munin_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the munin_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B munin_initrc_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the munin_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the munin_initrc_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B munin_log_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the munin_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as munin log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B munin_plugin_state_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the munin_plugin_state_t type, if you want to treat the files as munin plugin state data.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B munin_tmp_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the munin_tmp_t type, if you want to store munin temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B munin_var_lib_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the munin_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the munin files under the /var/lib directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B munin_var_run_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the munin_var_run_t type, if you want to store the munin files under the /run directory.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH PORT TYPES
++SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
++.PP
++You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
++
++.B semanage port -l
++
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
++SELinux munin policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their munin processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following port types are defined for munin:
++
++.EX
++.TP 5
++.B munin_port_t
++.TP 10
++.EE
++
++
++Default Defined Ports:
++tcp 4949
++.EE
++udp 4949
++.EE
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type munin_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B httpd_munin_content_t
++
++ /var/www/html/munin(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B munin_log_t
++
++ /var/log/munin.*
++.br
++
++.br
++.B munin_plugin_state_t
++
++ /var/lib/munin/plugin-state(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B munin_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B munin_var_lib_t
++
++ /var/lib/munin(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B munin_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/munin(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the munin_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the munin_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.B semanage port
++can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), munin(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/mysqld_safe_selinux.8 b/man/man8/mysqld_safe_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..33c4086
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/mysqld_safe_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
++.TH "mysqld_safe_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "mysqld_safe" "SELinux Policy documentation for mysqld_safe"
++.SH "NAME"
++mysqld_safe_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the mysqld_safe processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the mysqld_safe processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The mysqld_safe processes execute with the mysqld_safe_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep mysqld_safe_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The mysqld_safe_t SELinux type can be entered via the "mysqld_safe_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the mysqld_safe_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/bin/mysqld_safe
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux mysqld_safe policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their mysqld_safe processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for mysqld_safe:
++
++.EX
++.B mysqld_safe_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux mysqld_safe policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their mysqld_safe processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for mysqld_safe:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B mysqld_safe_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the mysqld_safe_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the mysqld_safe_t domain.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type mysqld_safe_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B mysqld_db_t
++
++ /var/lib/mysql(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B mysqld_log_t
++
++ /var/log/mysql.*
++.br
++
++.br
++.B mysqld_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/mysqld(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/mysql/mysql\.sock
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), mysqld_safe(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, mysqld_selinux(8), mysqld_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/mysqld_selinux.8 b/man/man8/mysqld_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..4a21c03
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/mysqld_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,283 @@
++.TH "mysqld_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "mysqld" "SELinux Policy documentation for mysqld"
++.SH "NAME"
++mysqld_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the mysqld processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the mysqld processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The mysqld processes execute with the mysqld_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep mysqld_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The mysqld_t SELinux type can be entered via the "mysqld_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the mysqld_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/sbin/mysqld(-max)?, /usr/sbin/ndbd, /usr/libexec/mysqld, /usr/bin/mysql_upgrade
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux mysqld policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their mysqld processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for mysqld:
++
++.EX
++.B mysqld_safe_t, mysqlmanagerd_t, mysqld_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH BOOLEANS
++SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. mysqld policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run mysqld with the tightest access possible.
++
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow mysqld to connect to all ports, you must turn on the mysql_connect_any boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P mysql_connect_any 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to connect to the local mysql server, you must turn on the selinuxuser_mysql_connect_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P selinuxuser_mysql_connect_enabled 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow mysqld to connect to all ports, you must turn on the mysql_connect_any boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P mysql_connect_any 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to connect to the local mysql server, you must turn on the selinuxuser_mysql_connect_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P selinuxuser_mysql_connect_enabled 1
++.EE
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux mysqld policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their mysqld processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for mysqld:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B mysqld_db_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the mysqld_db_t type, if you want to treat the files as mysqld database content.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B mysqld_etc_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the mysqld_etc_t type, if you want to store mysqld files in the /etc directories.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B mysqld_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the mysqld_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the mysqld_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B mysqld_home_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the mysqld_home_t type, if you want to store mysqld files in the users home directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B mysqld_initrc_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the mysqld_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the mysqld_initrc_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B mysqld_log_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the mysqld_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as mysqld log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B mysqld_safe_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the mysqld_safe_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the mysqld_safe_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B mysqld_tmp_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the mysqld_tmp_t type, if you want to store mysqld temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B mysqld_unit_file_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the mysqld_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as mysqld unit content.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B mysqld_var_run_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the mysqld_var_run_t type, if you want to store the mysqld files under the /run directory.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH PORT TYPES
++SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
++.PP
++You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
++
++.B semanage port -l
++
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
++SELinux mysqld policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their mysqld processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following port types are defined for mysqld:
++
++.EX
++.TP 5
++.B mysqld_port_t
++.TP 10
++.EE
++
++
++Default Defined Ports:
++tcp 1186,3306,63132-63164
++.EE
++
++.EX
++.TP 5
++.B mysqlmanagerd_port_t
++.TP 10
++.EE
++
++
++Default Defined Ports:
++tcp 2273
++.EE
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type mysqld_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B hugetlbfs_t
++
++ /dev/hugepages
++.br
++ /lib/udev/devices/hugepages
++.br
++ /usr/lib/udev/devices/hugepages
++.br
++
++.br
++.B mysqld_db_t
++
++ /var/lib/mysql(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B mysqld_log_t
++
++ /var/log/mysql.*
++.br
++
++.br
++.B mysqld_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B mysqld_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/mysqld(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/mysql/mysql\.sock
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the mysqld_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the mysqld_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.B semanage port
++can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
++
++.B semanage boolean
++can also be used to manipulate the booleans
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), mysqld(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, setsebool(8), mysqld_safe_selinux(8), mysqlmanagerd_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/mysqlmanagerd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/mysqlmanagerd_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..1634a0c
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/mysqlmanagerd_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,138 @@
++.TH "mysqlmanagerd_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "mysqlmanagerd" "SELinux Policy documentation for mysqlmanagerd"
++.SH "NAME"
++mysqlmanagerd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the mysqlmanagerd processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the mysqlmanagerd processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The mysqlmanagerd processes execute with the mysqlmanagerd_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep mysqlmanagerd_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The mysqlmanagerd_t SELinux type can be entered via the "mysqlmanagerd_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the mysqlmanagerd_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/sbin/mysqlmanager
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux mysqlmanagerd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their mysqlmanagerd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for mysqlmanagerd:
++
++.EX
++.B mysqlmanagerd_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux mysqlmanagerd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their mysqlmanagerd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for mysqlmanagerd:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B mysqlmanagerd_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the mysqlmanagerd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the mysqlmanagerd_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B mysqlmanagerd_initrc_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the mysqlmanagerd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the mysqlmanagerd_initrc_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B mysqlmanagerd_var_run_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the mysqlmanagerd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the mysqlmanagerd files under the /run directory.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH PORT TYPES
++SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
++.PP
++You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
++
++.B semanage port -l
++
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
++SELinux mysqlmanagerd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their mysqlmanagerd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following port types are defined for mysqlmanagerd:
++
++.EX
++.TP 5
++.B mysqlmanagerd_port_t
++.TP 10
++.EE
++
++
++Default Defined Ports:
++tcp 2273
++.EE
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type mysqlmanagerd_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B mysqlmanagerd_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/mysqld/mysqlmanager.*
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.B semanage port
++can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), mysqlmanagerd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/nagios_admin_plugin_selinux.8 b/man/man8/nagios_admin_plugin_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..505d3a1
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/nagios_admin_plugin_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
++.TH "nagios_admin_plugin_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "nagios_admin_plugin" "SELinux Policy documentation for nagios_admin_plugin"
++.SH "NAME"
++nagios_admin_plugin_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the nagios_admin_plugin processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the nagios_admin_plugin processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The nagios_admin_plugin processes execute with the nagios_admin_plugin_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep nagios_admin_plugin_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The nagios_admin_plugin_t SELinux type can be entered via the "nagios_admin_plugin_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the nagios_admin_plugin_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_file_age
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux nagios_admin_plugin policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their nagios_admin_plugin processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for nagios_admin_plugin:
++
++.EX
++.B nagios_admin_plugin_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux nagios_admin_plugin policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their nagios_admin_plugin processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for nagios_admin_plugin:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B nagios_admin_plugin_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the nagios_admin_plugin_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the nagios_admin_plugin_t domain.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), nagios_admin_plugin(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, nagios_selinux(8), nagios_selinux(8), nagios_checkdisk_plugin_selinux(8), nagios_eventhandler_plugin_selinux(8), nagios_mail_plugin_selinux(8), nagios_services_plugin_selinux(8), nagios_system_plugin_selinux(8), nagios_unconfined_plugin_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/nagios_checkdisk_plugin_selinux.8 b/man/man8/nagios_checkdisk_plugin_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..9ccef93
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/nagios_checkdisk_plugin_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
++.TH "nagios_checkdisk_plugin_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "nagios_checkdisk_plugin" "SELinux Policy documentation for nagios_checkdisk_plugin"
++.SH "NAME"
++nagios_checkdisk_plugin_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the nagios_checkdisk_plugin processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the nagios_checkdisk_plugin processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The nagios_checkdisk_plugin processes execute with the nagios_checkdisk_plugin_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep nagios_checkdisk_plugin_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The nagios_checkdisk_plugin_t SELinux type can be entered via the "nagios_checkdisk_plugin_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the nagios_checkdisk_plugin_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_disk, /usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_disk_smb, /usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_ide_smart, /usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_linux_raid
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux nagios_checkdisk_plugin policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their nagios_checkdisk_plugin processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for nagios_checkdisk_plugin:
++
++.EX
++.B nagios_checkdisk_plugin_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux nagios_checkdisk_plugin policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their nagios_checkdisk_plugin processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for nagios_checkdisk_plugin:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B nagios_checkdisk_plugin_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the nagios_checkdisk_plugin_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the nagios_checkdisk_plugin_t domain.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), nagios_checkdisk_plugin(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, nagios_selinux(8), nagios_selinux(8), nagios_admin_plugin_selinux(8), nagios_eventhandler_plugin_selinux(8), nagios_mail_plugin_selinux(8), nagios_services_plugin_selinux(8), nagios_system_plugin_selinux(8), nagios_unconfined_plugin_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/nagios_eventhandler_plugin_selinux.8 b/man/man8/nagios_eventhandler_plugin_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..507c175
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/nagios_eventhandler_plugin_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
++.TH "nagios_eventhandler_plugin_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "nagios_eventhandler_plugin" "SELinux Policy documentation for nagios_eventhandler_plugin"
++.SH "NAME"
++nagios_eventhandler_plugin_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the nagios_eventhandler_plugin processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the nagios_eventhandler_plugin processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The nagios_eventhandler_plugin processes execute with the nagios_eventhandler_plugin_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep nagios_eventhandler_plugin_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The nagios_eventhandler_plugin_t SELinux type can be entered via the "nagios_eventhandler_plugin_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the nagios_eventhandler_plugin_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/lib/nagios/plugins/eventhandlers(/.*)
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux nagios_eventhandler_plugin policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their nagios_eventhandler_plugin processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for nagios_eventhandler_plugin:
++
++.EX
++.B nagios_eventhandler_plugin_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux nagios_eventhandler_plugin policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their nagios_eventhandler_plugin processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for nagios_eventhandler_plugin:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B nagios_eventhandler_plugin_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the nagios_eventhandler_plugin_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the nagios_eventhandler_plugin_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B nagios_eventhandler_plugin_tmp_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the nagios_eventhandler_plugin_tmp_t type, if you want to store nagios eventhandler plugin temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type nagios_eventhandler_plugin_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B nagios_eventhandler_plugin_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B systemd_passwd_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/systemd/ask-password(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/systemd/ask-password-block(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), nagios_eventhandler_plugin(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, nagios_selinux(8), nagios_selinux(8), nagios_admin_plugin_selinux(8), nagios_checkdisk_plugin_selinux(8), nagios_mail_plugin_selinux(8), nagios_services_plugin_selinux(8), nagios_system_plugin_selinux(8), nagios_unconfined_plugin_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/nagios_mail_plugin_selinux.8 b/man/man8/nagios_mail_plugin_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..0140264
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/nagios_mail_plugin_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
++.TH "nagios_mail_plugin_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "nagios_mail_plugin" "SELinux Policy documentation for nagios_mail_plugin"
++.SH "NAME"
++nagios_mail_plugin_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the nagios_mail_plugin processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the nagios_mail_plugin processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The nagios_mail_plugin processes execute with the nagios_mail_plugin_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep nagios_mail_plugin_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The nagios_mail_plugin_t SELinux type can be entered via the "nagios_mail_plugin_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the nagios_mail_plugin_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_mailq
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux nagios_mail_plugin policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their nagios_mail_plugin processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for nagios_mail_plugin:
++
++.EX
++.B nagios_mail_plugin_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux nagios_mail_plugin policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their nagios_mail_plugin processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for nagios_mail_plugin:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B nagios_mail_plugin_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the nagios_mail_plugin_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the nagios_mail_plugin_t domain.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), nagios_mail_plugin(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, nagios_selinux(8), nagios_selinux(8), nagios_admin_plugin_selinux(8), nagios_checkdisk_plugin_selinux(8), nagios_eventhandler_plugin_selinux(8), nagios_services_plugin_selinux(8), nagios_system_plugin_selinux(8), nagios_unconfined_plugin_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/nagios_selinux.8 b/man/man8/nagios_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..2208671
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/nagios_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,257 @@
++.TH "nagios_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "nagios" "SELinux Policy documentation for nagios"
++.SH "NAME"
++nagios_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the nagios processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the nagios processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The nagios processes execute with the nagios_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep nagios_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The nagios_t SELinux type can be entered via the "nagios_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the nagios_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/s?bin/nagios
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux nagios policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their nagios processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for nagios:
++
++.EX
++.B nagios_t, nagios_mail_plugin_t, nagios_checkdisk_plugin_t, nagios_services_plugin_t, nagios_eventhandler_plugin_t, nagios_system_plugin_t, nagios_unconfined_plugin_t, nagios_admin_plugin_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux nagios policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their nagios processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for nagios:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B nagios_admin_plugin_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the nagios_admin_plugin_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the nagios_admin_plugin_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B nagios_checkdisk_plugin_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the nagios_checkdisk_plugin_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the nagios_checkdisk_plugin_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B nagios_etc_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the nagios_etc_t type, if you want to store nagios files in the /etc directories.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B nagios_eventhandler_plugin_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the nagios_eventhandler_plugin_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the nagios_eventhandler_plugin_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B nagios_eventhandler_plugin_tmp_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the nagios_eventhandler_plugin_tmp_t type, if you want to store nagios eventhandler plugin temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B nagios_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the nagios_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the nagios_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B nagios_initrc_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the nagios_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the nagios_initrc_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B nagios_log_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the nagios_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as nagios log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B nagios_mail_plugin_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the nagios_mail_plugin_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the nagios_mail_plugin_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B nagios_services_plugin_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the nagios_services_plugin_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the nagios_services_plugin_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B nagios_spool_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the nagios_spool_t type, if you want to store the nagios files under the /var/spool directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B nagios_system_plugin_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the nagios_system_plugin_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the nagios_system_plugin_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B nagios_system_plugin_tmp_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the nagios_system_plugin_tmp_t type, if you want to store nagios system plugin temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B nagios_tmp_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the nagios_tmp_t type, if you want to store nagios temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B nagios_unconfined_plugin_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the nagios_unconfined_plugin_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the nagios_unconfined_plugin_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B nagios_var_lib_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the nagios_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the nagios files under the /var/lib directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B nagios_var_run_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the nagios_var_run_t type, if you want to store the nagios files under the /run directory.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type nagios_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B nagios_log_t
++
++ /var/log/nagios(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/log/netsaint(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B nagios_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B nagios_var_lib_t
++
++ /usr/lib/pnp4nagios(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B nagios_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/nagios.*
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the nagios_services_plugin_t, nagios_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the nagios_services_plugin_t, nagios_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), nagios(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, nagios_admin_plugin_selinux(8), nagios_checkdisk_plugin_selinux(8), nagios_eventhandler_plugin_selinux(8), nagios_mail_plugin_selinux(8), nagios_services_plugin_selinux(8), nagios_system_plugin_selinux(8), nagios_unconfined_plugin_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/nagios_services_plugin_selinux.8 b/man/man8/nagios_services_plugin_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..4b2f93e
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/nagios_services_plugin_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
++.TH "nagios_services_plugin_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "nagios_services_plugin" "SELinux Policy documentation for nagios_services_plugin"
++.SH "NAME"
++nagios_services_plugin_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the nagios_services_plugin processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the nagios_services_plugin processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The nagios_services_plugin processes execute with the nagios_services_plugin_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep nagios_services_plugin_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The nagios_services_plugin_t SELinux type can be entered via the "nagios_services_plugin_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the nagios_services_plugin_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_ntp.*, /usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_snmp.*, /usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_nt, /usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_dig, /usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_dns, /usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_rpc, /usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_tcp, /usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_sip, /usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_ssh, /usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_ups, /usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_dhcp, /usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_game, /usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_hpjd, /usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_http, /usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_icmp, /usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_ircd, /usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_ldap, /usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_nrpe, /usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_ping, /usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_real, /usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_time, /usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_smtp, /usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_dummy, /usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_fping, /usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_mysql, /usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_pgsql, /usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_breeze, /usr/lib/nagios/
plugins/check_oracle, /usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_radius, /usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_cluster, /usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_mysql_query
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux nagios_services_plugin policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their nagios_services_plugin processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for nagios_services_plugin:
++
++.EX
++.B nagios_services_plugin_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux nagios_services_plugin policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their nagios_services_plugin processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for nagios_services_plugin:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B nagios_services_plugin_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the nagios_services_plugin_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the nagios_services_plugin_t domain.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the nagios_services_plugin_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the nagios_services_plugin_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), nagios_services_plugin(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, nagios_selinux(8), nagios_selinux(8), nagios_admin_plugin_selinux(8), nagios_checkdisk_plugin_selinux(8), nagios_eventhandler_plugin_selinux(8), nagios_mail_plugin_selinux(8), nagios_system_plugin_selinux(8), nagios_unconfined_plugin_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/nagios_system_plugin_selinux.8 b/man/man8/nagios_system_plugin_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..0005f14
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/nagios_system_plugin_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
++.TH "nagios_system_plugin_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "nagios_system_plugin" "SELinux Policy documentation for nagios_system_plugin"
++.SH "NAME"
++nagios_system_plugin_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the nagios_system_plugin processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the nagios_system_plugin processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The nagios_system_plugin processes execute with the nagios_system_plugin_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep nagios_system_plugin_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The nagios_system_plugin_t SELinux type can be entered via the "nagios_system_plugin_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the nagios_system_plugin_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_log, /usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_load, /usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_mrtg, /usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_swap, /usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_wave, /usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_procs, /usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_users, /usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_flexlm, /usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_nagios, /usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_nwstat, /usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_overcr, /usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_sensors, /usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_ifstatus, /usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_mrtgtraf, /usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_ifoperstatus
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux nagios_system_plugin policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their nagios_system_plugin processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for nagios_system_plugin:
++
++.EX
++.B nagios_system_plugin_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux nagios_system_plugin policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their nagios_system_plugin processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for nagios_system_plugin:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B nagios_system_plugin_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the nagios_system_plugin_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the nagios_system_plugin_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B nagios_system_plugin_tmp_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the nagios_system_plugin_tmp_t type, if you want to store nagios system plugin temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type nagios_system_plugin_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B nagios_system_plugin_tmp_t
++
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), nagios_system_plugin(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, nagios_selinux(8), nagios_selinux(8), nagios_admin_plugin_selinux(8), nagios_checkdisk_plugin_selinux(8), nagios_eventhandler_plugin_selinux(8), nagios_mail_plugin_selinux(8), nagios_services_plugin_selinux(8), nagios_unconfined_plugin_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/nagios_unconfined_plugin_selinux.8 b/man/man8/nagios_unconfined_plugin_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..ccf2eed
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/nagios_unconfined_plugin_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
++.TH "nagios_unconfined_plugin_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "nagios_unconfined_plugin" "SELinux Policy documentation for nagios_unconfined_plugin"
++.SH "NAME"
++nagios_unconfined_plugin_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the nagios_unconfined_plugin processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the nagios_unconfined_plugin processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The nagios_unconfined_plugin processes execute with the nagios_unconfined_plugin_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep nagios_unconfined_plugin_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The nagios_unconfined_plugin_t SELinux type can be entered via the "nagios_unconfined_plugin_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the nagios_unconfined_plugin_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_by_ssh
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux nagios_unconfined_plugin policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their nagios_unconfined_plugin processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for nagios_unconfined_plugin:
++
++.EX
++.B nagios_unconfined_plugin_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux nagios_unconfined_plugin policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their nagios_unconfined_plugin processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for nagios_unconfined_plugin:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B nagios_unconfined_plugin_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the nagios_unconfined_plugin_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the nagios_unconfined_plugin_t domain.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), nagios_unconfined_plugin(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, nagios_selinux(8), nagios_selinux(8), nagios_admin_plugin_selinux(8), nagios_checkdisk_plugin_selinux(8), nagios_eventhandler_plugin_selinux(8), nagios_mail_plugin_selinux(8), nagios_services_plugin_selinux(8), nagios_system_plugin_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/named_selinux.8 b/man/man8/named_selinux.8
+index fce0b48..8d2debb 100644
+--- a/man/man8/named_selinux.8
++++ b/man/man8/named_selinux.8
+@@ -1,30 +1,288 @@
+-.TH "named_selinux" "8" "17 Jan 2005" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "named Selinux Policy documentation"
+-.de EX
+-.nf
+-.ft CW
+-..
+-.de EE
+-.ft R
+-.fi
+-..
++.TH "named_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "named" "SELinux Policy documentation for named"
+ .SH "NAME"
+-named_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the Internet Name server (named) daemon
++named_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the named processes
+ .SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
+-Security-Enhanced Linux secures the named server via flexible mandatory access
+-control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the named processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The named processes execute with the named_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep named_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The named_t SELinux type can be entered via the "named_exec_t,named_checkconf_exec_t" file types. The default entrypoint paths for the named_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/sbin/named, /usr/sbin/lwresd, /usr/sbin/unbound, /usr/sbin/named-checkconf
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux named policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their named processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for named:
++
++.EX
++.B named_t, namespace_init_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
+ .SH BOOLEANS
+-SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. So by
+-default SELinux policy does not allow named to write master zone files. If you want to have named update the master zone files you need to set the named_write_master_zones boolean.
++SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. named policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run named with the tightest access possible.
++
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow BIND to write the master zone files. Generally this is used for dynamic DNS or zone transfers, you must turn on the named_write_master_zones boolean.
++
+ .EX
+-setsebool -P named_write_master_zones 1
++.B setsebool -P named_write_master_zones 1
+ .EE
++
+ .PP
+-system-config-selinux is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+-.SH AUTHOR
+-This manual page was written by Dan Walsh <dwalsh at redhat.com>.
++If you want to allow BIND to bind apache port, you must turn on the named_bind_http_port boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P named_bind_http_port 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow BIND to write the master zone files. Generally this is used for dynamic DNS or zone transfers, you must turn on the named_write_master_zones boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P named_write_master_zones 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow BIND to bind apache port, you must turn on the named_bind_http_port boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P named_bind_http_port 1
++.EE
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux named policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their named processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for named:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B named_cache_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the named_cache_t type, if you want to store the files under the /var/cache directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B named_checkconf_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the named_checkconf_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the named_checkconf_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B named_conf_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the named_conf_t type, if you want to treat the files as named configuration data, usually stored under the /etc directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B named_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the named_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the named_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B named_initrc_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the named_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the named_initrc_t domain.
+
+-.SH "SEE ALSO"
+-selinux(8), named(8), chcon(1), setsebool(8)
+
++.EX
++.PP
++.B named_keytab_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the named_keytab_t type, if you want to treat the files as kerberos keytab files.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B named_log_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the named_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as named log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B named_tmp_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the named_tmp_t type, if you want to store named temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B named_unit_file_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the named_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as named unit content.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B named_var_run_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the named_var_run_t type, if you want to store the named files under the /run directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B named_zone_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the named_zone_t type, if you want to treat the files as named zone data.
+
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type named_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B krb5_host_rcache_t
++
++ /var/cache/krb5rcache(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/tmp/nfs_0
++.br
++ /var/tmp/DNS_25
++.br
++ /var/tmp/host_0
++.br
++ /var/tmp/imap_0
++.br
++ /var/tmp/HTTP_23
++.br
++ /var/tmp/HTTP_48
++.br
++ /var/tmp/ldap_55
++.br
++ /var/tmp/ldap_487
++.br
++ /var/tmp/ldapmap1_0
++.br
++
++.br
++.B named_cache_t
++
++ /var/named/data(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/named/slaves(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/named/dynamic(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/named/chroot/var/tmp(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/named/chroot/var/named/data(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/named/chroot/var/named/slaves(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/named/chroot/var/named/dynamic(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B named_log_t
++
++ /var/log/named.*
++.br
++ /var/named/chroot/var/log/named.*
++.br
++
++.br
++.B named_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B named_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/bind(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/named(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/unbound(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/named/chroot/var/run/named.*
++.br
++ /var/run/ndc
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the namespace_init_t, named_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the namespace_init_t, named_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.B semanage boolean
++can also be used to manipulate the booleans
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), named(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, setsebool(8), namespace_init_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/namespace_init_selinux.8 b/man/man8/namespace_init_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..9d3197d
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/namespace_init_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,120 @@
++.TH "namespace_init_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "namespace_init" "SELinux Policy documentation for namespace_init"
++.SH "NAME"
++namespace_init_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the namespace_init processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the namespace_init processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The namespace_init processes execute with the namespace_init_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep namespace_init_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The namespace_init_t SELinux type can be entered via the "namespace_init_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the namespace_init_t domain are the following:"
++
++/etc/security/namespace.init
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux namespace_init policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their namespace_init processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for namespace_init:
++
++.EX
++.B namespace_init_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux namespace_init policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their namespace_init processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for namespace_init:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B namespace_init_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the namespace_init_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the namespace_init_t domain.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type namespace_init_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B security_t
++
++ /selinux
++.br
++
++.br
++.B user_home_t
++
++ /home/[^/]*/.+
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/.+
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/.+
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the namespace_init_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the namespace_init_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), namespace_init(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/ncftool_selinux.8 b/man/man8/ncftool_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..2b164c1
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/ncftool_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,138 @@
++.TH "ncftool_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "ncftool" "SELinux Policy documentation for ncftool"
++.SH "NAME"
++ncftool_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the ncftool processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the ncftool processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The ncftool processes execute with the ncftool_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep ncftool_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The ncftool_t SELinux type can be entered via the "ncftool_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the ncftool_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/bin/ncftool
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux ncftool policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ncftool processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for ncftool:
++
++.EX
++.B ncftool_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux ncftool policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ncftool processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for ncftool:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B ncftool_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the ncftool_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ncftool_t domain.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type ncftool_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B net_conf_t
++
++ /etc/ntpd?\.conf.*
++.br
++ /etc/hosts[^/]*
++.br
++ /etc/yp\.conf.*
++.br
++ /etc/denyhosts.*
++.br
++ /etc/hosts\.deny.*
++.br
++ /etc/resolv\.conf.*
++.br
++ /etc/ntp/step-tickers.*
++.br
++ /etc/sysconfig/networking(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/sysconfig/network-scripts(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/sysconfig/network-scripts/.*resolv\.conf
++.br
++ /etc/ethers
++.br
++
++.br
++.B system_conf_t
++
++ /etc/sysctl\.conf(\.old)?
++.br
++ /etc/sysconfig/ip6?tables.*
++.br
++ /etc/sysconfig/ipvsadm.*
++.br
++ /etc/sysconfig/ebtables.*
++.br
++ /etc/sysconfig/system-config-firewall.*
++.br
++
++.br
++.B systemd_passwd_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/systemd/ask-password(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/systemd/ask-password-block(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), ncftool(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/ndc_selinux.8 b/man/man8/ndc_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..3fbc319
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/ndc_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
++.TH "ndc_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "ndc" "SELinux Policy documentation for ndc"
++.SH "NAME"
++ndc_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the ndc processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the ndc processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The ndc processes execute with the ndc_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep ndc_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The ndc_t SELinux type can be entered via the "ndc_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the ndc_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/sbin/r?ndc
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux ndc policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ndc processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for ndc:
++
++.EX
++.B ndc_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux ndc policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ndc processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for ndc:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B ndc_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the ndc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ndc_t domain.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the ndc_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the ndc_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), ndc(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/netlabel_mgmt_selinux.8 b/man/man8/netlabel_mgmt_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..9ee6f73
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/netlabel_mgmt_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
++.TH "netlabel_mgmt_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "netlabel_mgmt" "SELinux Policy documentation for netlabel_mgmt"
++.SH "NAME"
++netlabel_mgmt_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the netlabel_mgmt processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the netlabel_mgmt processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The netlabel_mgmt processes execute with the netlabel_mgmt_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep netlabel_mgmt_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The netlabel_mgmt_t SELinux type can be entered via the "netlabel_mgmt_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the netlabel_mgmt_t domain are the following:"
++
++/sbin/netlabelctl, /usr/sbin/netlabelctl
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux netlabel_mgmt policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their netlabel_mgmt processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for netlabel_mgmt:
++
++.EX
++.B netlabel_mgmt_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux netlabel_mgmt policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their netlabel_mgmt processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for netlabel_mgmt:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B netlabel_mgmt_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the netlabel_mgmt_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the netlabel_mgmt_t domain.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), netlabel_mgmt(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/netlogond_selinux.8 b/man/man8/netlogond_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..56dbd55
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/netlogond_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,134 @@
++.TH "netlogond_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "netlogond" "SELinux Policy documentation for netlogond"
++.SH "NAME"
++netlogond_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the netlogond processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the netlogond processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The netlogond processes execute with the netlogond_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep netlogond_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The netlogond_t SELinux type can be entered via the "netlogond_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the netlogond_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/sbin/netlogond
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux netlogond policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their netlogond processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for netlogond:
++
++.EX
++.B netlogond_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux netlogond policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their netlogond processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for netlogond:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B netlogond_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the netlogond_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the netlogond_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B netlogond_var_lib_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the netlogond_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the netlogond files under the /var/lib directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B netlogond_var_run_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the netlogond_var_run_t type, if you want to store the netlogond files under the /run directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B netlogond_var_socket_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the netlogond_var_socket_t type, if you want to treat the files as netlogond var socket data.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type netlogond_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B likewise_etc_t
++
++ /etc/likewise-open(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B netlogond_var_lib_t
++
++ /var/lib/likewise-open/krb5-affinity.conf
++.br
++ /var/lib/likewise-open/LWNetsd\.err
++.br
++
++.br
++.B netlogond_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/netlogond.pid
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), netlogond(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/netutils_selinux.8 b/man/man8/netutils_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..0c0688f
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/netutils_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,116 @@
++.TH "netutils_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "netutils" "SELinux Policy documentation for netutils"
++.SH "NAME"
++netutils_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the netutils processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the netutils processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The netutils processes execute with the netutils_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep netutils_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The netutils_t SELinux type can be entered via the "netutils_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the netutils_t domain are the following:"
++
++/sbin/arping, /usr/sbin/arping, /usr/sbin/tcpdump
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux netutils policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their netutils processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for netutils:
++
++.EX
++.B netutils_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux netutils policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their netutils processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for netutils:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B netutils_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the netutils_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the netutils_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B netutils_tmp_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the netutils_tmp_t type, if you want to store netutils temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type netutils_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B netutils_tmp_t
++
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the netutils_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the netutils_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), netutils(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/newrole_selinux.8 b/man/man8/newrole_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..fc68433
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/newrole_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,178 @@
++.TH "newrole_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "newrole" "SELinux Policy documentation for newrole"
++.SH "NAME"
++newrole_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the newrole processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the newrole processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The newrole processes execute with the newrole_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep newrole_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The newrole_t SELinux type can be entered via the "newrole_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the newrole_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/bin/newrole
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux newrole policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their newrole processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for newrole:
++
++.EX
++.B newrole_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux newrole policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their newrole processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for newrole:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B newrole_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the newrole_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the newrole_t domain.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type newrole_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B faillog_t
++
++ /var/log/btmp.*
++.br
++ /var/run/faillock(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/log/faillog
++.br
++ /var/log/tallylog
++.br
++
++.br
++.B initrc_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/utmp
++.br
++ /var/run/random-seed
++.br
++ /var/run/runlevel\.dir
++.br
++ /var/run/setmixer_flag
++.br
++
++.br
++.B krb5_host_rcache_t
++
++ /var/cache/krb5rcache(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/tmp/nfs_0
++.br
++ /var/tmp/DNS_25
++.br
++ /var/tmp/host_0
++.br
++ /var/tmp/imap_0
++.br
++ /var/tmp/HTTP_23
++.br
++ /var/tmp/HTTP_48
++.br
++ /var/tmp/ldap_55
++.br
++ /var/tmp/ldap_487
++.br
++ /var/tmp/ldapmap1_0
++.br
++
++.br
++.B lastlog_t
++
++ /var/log/lastlog
++.br
++
++.br
++.B pcscd_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/pcscd(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/pcscd\.events(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/pcscd\.pid
++.br
++ /var/run/pcscd\.pub
++.br
++ /var/run/pcscd\.comm
++.br
++
++.br
++.B security_t
++
++ /selinux
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the newrole_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the newrole_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), newrole(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/nfs_selinux.8 b/man/man8/nfs_selinux.8
+deleted file mode 100644
+index 8e30c4c..0000000
+--- a/man/man8/nfs_selinux.8
++++ /dev/null
+@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
+-.TH "nfs_selinux" "8" "9 Feb 2009" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "NFS SELinux Policy documentation"
+-.SH "NAME"
+-nfs_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for NFS
+-.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+-
+-Security Enhanced Linux secures the NFS server via flexible mandatory access
+-control.
+-.SH BOOLEANS
+-SELinux policy is customizable based on the least level of access required. SELinux can be configured to not allow NFS to share files. If you want to share NFS partitions, and only allow read-only access to those NFS partitions, turn the nfs_export_all_ro boolean on:
+-
+-.TP
+-setsebool -P nfs_export_all_ro 1
+-.TP
+-If you want to share files read/write you must set the nfs_export_all_rw boolean.
+-.TP
+-setsebool -P nfs_export_all_rw 1
+-
+-.TP
+-These booleans are not required when files to be shared are labeled with the public_content_t or public_content_rw_t types. NFS can share files labeled with the public_content_t or public_content_rw_t types even if the nfs_export_all_ro and nfs_export_all_rw booleans are off.
+-
+-.TP
+-If you want to use a remote NFS server for the home directories on this machine, you must set the use_nfs_home_dirs boolean:
+-.TP
+-setsebool -P use_nfs_home_dirs 1
+-.TP
+-system-config-selinux is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+-.SH AUTHOR
+-This manual page was written by Dan Walsh <dwalsh at redhat.com>.
+-
+-.SH "SEE ALSO"
+-selinux(8), chcon(1), setsebool(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/nfsd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/nfsd_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..72cf8db
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/nfsd_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,447 @@
++.TH "nfsd_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "nfsd" "SELinux Policy documentation for nfsd"
++.SH "NAME"
++nfsd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the nfsd processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the nfsd processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The nfsd processes execute with the nfsd_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep nfsd_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The nfsd_t SELinux type can be entered via the "nfsd_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the nfsd_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/sbin/rpc\.nfsd, /usr/sbin/rpc\.mountd
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux nfsd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their nfsd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for nfsd:
++
++.EX
++.B nfsd_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH BOOLEANS
++SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. nfsd policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run nfsd with the tightest access possible.
++
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow ftp servers to use nfs used for public file transfer services, you must turn on the ftpd_use_nfs boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P ftpd_use_nfs 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow httpd to access nfs file systems, you must turn on the httpd_use_nfs boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P httpd_use_nfs 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow any files/directories to be exported read/only via NFS, you must turn on the nfs_export_all_ro boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P nfs_export_all_ro 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined virtual guests to manage nfs files, you must turn on the virt_use_nfs boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P virt_use_nfs 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow sge to access nfs file systems, you must turn on the sge_use_nfs boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P sge_use_nfs 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow Cobbler to access nfs file systems, you must turn on the cobbler_use_nfs boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P cobbler_use_nfs 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to determine whether Git system daemon can access nfs file systems, you must turn on the git_system_use_nfs boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P git_system_use_nfs 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow rsync servers to share nfs files systems, you must turn on the rsync_use_nfs boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P rsync_use_nfs 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow samba to export NFS volumes, you must turn on the samba_share_nfs boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P samba_share_nfs 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow xen to manage nfs files, you must turn on the xen_use_nfs boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P xen_use_nfs 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to determine whether Polipo can access nfs file systems, you must turn on the polipo_use_nfs boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P polipo_use_nfs 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow any files/directories to be exported read/write via NFS, you must turn on the nfs_export_all_rw boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P nfs_export_all_rw 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow sanlock to manage nfs files, you must turn on the sanlock_use_nfs boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P sanlock_use_nfs 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to determine whether Git CGI can access nfs file systems, you must turn on the git_cgi_use_nfs boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P git_cgi_use_nfs 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to support NFS home directories, you must turn on the use_nfs_home_dirs boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P use_nfs_home_dirs 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow ftp servers to use nfs used for public file transfer services, you must turn on the ftpd_use_nfs boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P ftpd_use_nfs 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow httpd to access nfs file systems, you must turn on the httpd_use_nfs boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P httpd_use_nfs 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow any files/directories to be exported read/only via NFS, you must turn on the nfs_export_all_ro boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P nfs_export_all_ro 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined virtual guests to manage nfs files, you must turn on the virt_use_nfs boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P virt_use_nfs 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow sge to access nfs file systems, you must turn on the sge_use_nfs boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P sge_use_nfs 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow Cobbler to access nfs file systems, you must turn on the cobbler_use_nfs boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P cobbler_use_nfs 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to determine whether Git system daemon can access nfs file systems, you must turn on the git_system_use_nfs boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P git_system_use_nfs 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow rsync servers to share nfs files systems, you must turn on the rsync_use_nfs boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P rsync_use_nfs 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow samba to export NFS volumes, you must turn on the samba_share_nfs boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P samba_share_nfs 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow xen to manage nfs files, you must turn on the xen_use_nfs boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P xen_use_nfs 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to determine whether Polipo can access nfs file systems, you must turn on the polipo_use_nfs boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P polipo_use_nfs 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow any files/directories to be exported read/write via NFS, you must turn on the nfs_export_all_rw boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P nfs_export_all_rw 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow sanlock to manage nfs files, you must turn on the sanlock_use_nfs boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P sanlock_use_nfs 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to determine whether Git CGI can access nfs file systems, you must turn on the git_cgi_use_nfs boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P git_cgi_use_nfs 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to support NFS home directories, you must turn on the use_nfs_home_dirs boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P use_nfs_home_dirs 1
++.EE
++
++.SH SHARING FILES
++If you want to share files with multiple domains (Apache, FTP, rsync, Samba), you can set a file context of public_content_t and public_content_rw_t. These context allow any of the above domains to read the content. If you want a particular domain to write to the public_content_rw_t domain, you must set the appropriate boolean.
++.TP
++Allow nfsd servers to read the /var/nfsd directory by adding the public_content_t file type to the directory and by restoring the file type.
++.PP
++.B
++semanage fcontext -a -t public_content_t "/var/nfsd(/.*)?"
++.br
++.B restorecon -F -R -v /var/nfsd
++.pp
++.TP
++Allow nfsd servers to read and write /var/tmp/incoming by adding the public_content_rw_t type to the directory and by restoring the file type. This also requires the allow_nfsdd_anon_write boolean to be set.
++.PP
++.B
++semanage fcontext -a -t public_content_rw_t "/var/nfsd/incoming(/.*)?"
++.br
++.B restorecon -F -R -v /var/nfsd/incoming
++
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow nfs servers to modify public files used for public file transfer services. Files/Directories must be labeled public_content_rw_t., you must turn on the nfsd_anon_write boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P nfsd_anon_write 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow nfs servers to modify public files used for public file transfer services. Files/Directories must be labeled public_content_rw_t., you must turn on the nfsd_anon_write boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P nfsd_anon_write 1
++.EE
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux nfsd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their nfsd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for nfsd:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B nfsd_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the nfsd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the nfsd_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B nfsd_initrc_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the nfsd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the nfsd_initrc_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B nfsd_ro_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the nfsd_ro_t type, if you want to treat the files as nfsd read/only content.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B nfsd_rw_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the nfsd_rw_t type, if you want to treat the files as nfsd read/write content.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B nfsd_unit_file_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the nfsd_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as nfsd unit content.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH PORT TYPES
++SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
++.PP
++You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
++
++.B semanage port -l
++
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
++SELinux nfsd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their nfsd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following port types are defined for nfsd:
++
++.EX
++.TP 5
++.B nfs_port_t
++.TP 10
++.EE
++
++
++Default Defined Ports:
++tcp 2049,20048-20049
++.EE
++udp 2049,20048-20049
++.EE
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type nfsd_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B mount_var_run_t
++
++ /run/mount(/.*)?
++.br
++ /dev/\.mount(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/mount(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/davfs2(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/cache/davfs2(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B nfsd_fs_t
++
++
++.br
++.B var_lib_nfs_t
++
++ /var/lib/nfs(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B var_lib_t
++
++ /opt/(.*/)?var/lib(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the nfsd_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the nfsd_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.B semanage port
++can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
++
++.B semanage boolean
++can also be used to manipulate the booleans
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), nfsd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, setsebool(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/nis_selinux.8 b/man/man8/nis_selinux.8
+deleted file mode 100644
+index 6271c95..0000000
+--- a/man/man8/nis_selinux.8
++++ /dev/null
+@@ -1 +0,0 @@
+-.so man8/ypbind_selinux.8
+diff --git a/man/man8/nmbd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/nmbd_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..d15f44d
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/nmbd_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,170 @@
++.TH "nmbd_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "nmbd" "SELinux Policy documentation for nmbd"
++.SH "NAME"
++nmbd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the nmbd processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the nmbd processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The nmbd processes execute with the nmbd_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep nmbd_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The nmbd_t SELinux type can be entered via the "nmbd_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the nmbd_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/sbin/nmbd
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux nmbd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their nmbd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for nmbd:
++
++.EX
++.B nmbd_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux nmbd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their nmbd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for nmbd:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B nmbd_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the nmbd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the nmbd_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B nmbd_var_run_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the nmbd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the nmbd files under the /run directory.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH PORT TYPES
++SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
++.PP
++You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
++
++.B semanage port -l
++
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
++SELinux nmbd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their nmbd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following port types are defined for nmbd:
++
++.EX
++.TP 5
++.B nmbd_port_t
++.TP 10
++.EE
++
++
++Default Defined Ports:
++udp 137,138
++.EE
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type nmbd_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B nmbd_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/nmbd(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/samba/nmbd(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/samba/nmbd\.pid
++.br
++ /var/run/samba/messages\.tdb
++.br
++ /var/run/samba/namelist\.debug
++.br
++ /var/run/samba/unexpected\.tdb
++.br
++
++.br
++.B samba_log_t
++
++ /var/log/samba(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B samba_var_t
++
++ /var/lib/samba(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/cache/samba(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/spool/samba(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the nmbd_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the nmbd_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.B semanage port
++can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), nmbd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/nova_ajax_selinux.8 b/man/man8/nova_ajax_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..f57b656
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/nova_ajax_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,129 @@
++.TH "nova_ajax_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "nova_ajax" "SELinux Policy documentation for nova_ajax"
++.SH "NAME"
++nova_ajax_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the nova_ajax processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the nova_ajax processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The nova_ajax processes execute with the nova_ajax_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep nova_ajax_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The nova_ajax_t SELinux type can be entered via the "nova_ajax_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the nova_ajax_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/bin/nova-ajax-console-proxy
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux nova_ajax policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their nova_ajax processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for nova_ajax:
++
++.EX
++.B nova_ajax_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux nova_ajax policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their nova_ajax processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for nova_ajax:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B nova_ajax_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the nova_ajax_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the nova_ajax_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B nova_ajax_tmp_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the nova_ajax_tmp_t type, if you want to store nova ajax temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B nova_ajax_unit_file_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the nova_ajax_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as nova ajax unit content.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type nova_ajax_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B nova_ajax_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B nova_log_t
++
++ /var/log/nova(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B nova_var_lib_t
++
++ /var/lib/nova(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B nova_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/nova(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), nova_ajax(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, nova_api_selinux(8), nova_cert_selinux(8), nova_compute_selinux(8), nova_console_selinux(8), nova_direct_selinux(8), nova_network_selinux(8), nova_objectstore_selinux(8), nova_scheduler_selinux(8), nova_vncproxy_selinux(8), nova_volume_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/nova_api_selinux.8 b/man/man8/nova_api_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..094a9ae
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/nova_api_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,129 @@
++.TH "nova_api_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "nova_api" "SELinux Policy documentation for nova_api"
++.SH "NAME"
++nova_api_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the nova_api processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the nova_api processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The nova_api processes execute with the nova_api_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep nova_api_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The nova_api_t SELinux type can be entered via the "nova_api_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the nova_api_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/bin/nova-api, /usr//bin/nova-api-metadata
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux nova_api policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their nova_api processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for nova_api:
++
++.EX
++.B nova_api_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux nova_api policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their nova_api processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for nova_api:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B nova_api_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the nova_api_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the nova_api_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B nova_api_tmp_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the nova_api_tmp_t type, if you want to store nova api temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B nova_api_unit_file_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the nova_api_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as nova api unit content.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type nova_api_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B nova_api_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B nova_log_t
++
++ /var/log/nova(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B nova_var_lib_t
++
++ /var/lib/nova(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B nova_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/nova(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), nova_api(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, nova_ajax_selinux(8), nova_cert_selinux(8), nova_compute_selinux(8), nova_console_selinux(8), nova_direct_selinux(8), nova_network_selinux(8), nova_objectstore_selinux(8), nova_scheduler_selinux(8), nova_vncproxy_selinux(8), nova_volume_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/nova_cert_selinux.8 b/man/man8/nova_cert_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..252fa7f
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/nova_cert_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,143 @@
++.TH "nova_cert_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "nova_cert" "SELinux Policy documentation for nova_cert"
++.SH "NAME"
++nova_cert_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the nova_cert processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the nova_cert processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The nova_cert processes execute with the nova_cert_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep nova_cert_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The nova_cert_t SELinux type can be entered via the "nova_cert_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the nova_cert_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/bin/nova-cert
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux nova_cert policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their nova_cert processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for nova_cert:
++
++.EX
++.B nova_cert_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux nova_cert policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their nova_cert processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for nova_cert:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B nova_cert_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the nova_cert_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the nova_cert_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B nova_cert_tmp_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the nova_cert_tmp_t type, if you want to store nova cert temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B nova_cert_unit_file_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the nova_cert_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as nova cert unit content.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type nova_cert_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B nova_cert_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B nova_log_t
++
++ /var/log/nova(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B nova_var_lib_t
++
++ /var/lib/nova(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B nova_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/nova(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the nova_cert_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the nova_cert_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), nova_cert(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, nova_ajax_selinux(8), nova_api_selinux(8), nova_compute_selinux(8), nova_console_selinux(8), nova_direct_selinux(8), nova_network_selinux(8), nova_objectstore_selinux(8), nova_scheduler_selinux(8), nova_vncproxy_selinux(8), nova_volume_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/nova_compute_selinux.8 b/man/man8/nova_compute_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..cd73723
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/nova_compute_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,129 @@
++.TH "nova_compute_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "nova_compute" "SELinux Policy documentation for nova_compute"
++.SH "NAME"
++nova_compute_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the nova_compute processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the nova_compute processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The nova_compute processes execute with the nova_compute_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep nova_compute_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The nova_compute_t SELinux type can be entered via the "nova_compute_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the nova_compute_t domain are the following:"
++
++
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux nova_compute policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their nova_compute processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for nova_compute:
++
++.EX
++.B nova_compute_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux nova_compute policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their nova_compute processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for nova_compute:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B nova_compute_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the nova_compute_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the nova_compute_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B nova_compute_tmp_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the nova_compute_tmp_t type, if you want to store nova compute temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B nova_compute_unit_file_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the nova_compute_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as nova compute unit content.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type nova_compute_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B nova_compute_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B nova_log_t
++
++ /var/log/nova(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B nova_var_lib_t
++
++ /var/lib/nova(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B nova_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/nova(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), nova_compute(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, nova_ajax_selinux(8), nova_api_selinux(8), nova_cert_selinux(8), nova_console_selinux(8), nova_direct_selinux(8), nova_network_selinux(8), nova_objectstore_selinux(8), nova_scheduler_selinux(8), nova_vncproxy_selinux(8), nova_volume_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/nova_console_selinux.8 b/man/man8/nova_console_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..3ac720b
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/nova_console_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,143 @@
++.TH "nova_console_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "nova_console" "SELinux Policy documentation for nova_console"
++.SH "NAME"
++nova_console_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the nova_console processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the nova_console processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The nova_console processes execute with the nova_console_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep nova_console_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The nova_console_t SELinux type can be entered via the "nova_console_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the nova_console_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/bin/nova-console.*
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux nova_console policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their nova_console processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for nova_console:
++
++.EX
++.B nova_console_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux nova_console policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their nova_console processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for nova_console:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B nova_console_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the nova_console_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the nova_console_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B nova_console_tmp_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the nova_console_tmp_t type, if you want to store nova console temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B nova_console_unit_file_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the nova_console_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as nova console unit content.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type nova_console_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B nova_console_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B nova_log_t
++
++ /var/log/nova(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B nova_var_lib_t
++
++ /var/lib/nova(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B nova_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/nova(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the nova_console_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the nova_console_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), nova_console(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, nova_ajax_selinux(8), nova_api_selinux(8), nova_cert_selinux(8), nova_compute_selinux(8), nova_direct_selinux(8), nova_network_selinux(8), nova_objectstore_selinux(8), nova_scheduler_selinux(8), nova_vncproxy_selinux(8), nova_volume_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/nova_direct_selinux.8 b/man/man8/nova_direct_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..7739204
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/nova_direct_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,129 @@
++.TH "nova_direct_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "nova_direct" "SELinux Policy documentation for nova_direct"
++.SH "NAME"
++nova_direct_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the nova_direct processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the nova_direct processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The nova_direct processes execute with the nova_direct_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep nova_direct_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The nova_direct_t SELinux type can be entered via the "nova_direct_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the nova_direct_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/bin/nova-direct-api
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux nova_direct policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their nova_direct processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for nova_direct:
++
++.EX
++.B nova_direct_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux nova_direct policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their nova_direct processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for nova_direct:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B nova_direct_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the nova_direct_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the nova_direct_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B nova_direct_tmp_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the nova_direct_tmp_t type, if you want to store nova direct temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B nova_direct_unit_file_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the nova_direct_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as nova direct unit content.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type nova_direct_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B nova_direct_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B nova_log_t
++
++ /var/log/nova(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B nova_var_lib_t
++
++ /var/lib/nova(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B nova_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/nova(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), nova_direct(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, nova_ajax_selinux(8), nova_api_selinux(8), nova_cert_selinux(8), nova_compute_selinux(8), nova_console_selinux(8), nova_network_selinux(8), nova_objectstore_selinux(8), nova_scheduler_selinux(8), nova_vncproxy_selinux(8), nova_volume_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/nova_network_selinux.8 b/man/man8/nova_network_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..953274d
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/nova_network_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,129 @@
++.TH "nova_network_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "nova_network" "SELinux Policy documentation for nova_network"
++.SH "NAME"
++nova_network_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the nova_network processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the nova_network processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The nova_network processes execute with the nova_network_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep nova_network_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The nova_network_t SELinux type can be entered via the "nova_network_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the nova_network_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/bin/nova-network
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux nova_network policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their nova_network processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for nova_network:
++
++.EX
++.B nova_network_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux nova_network policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their nova_network processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for nova_network:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B nova_network_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the nova_network_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the nova_network_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B nova_network_tmp_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the nova_network_tmp_t type, if you want to store nova network temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B nova_network_unit_file_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the nova_network_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as nova network unit content.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type nova_network_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B nova_log_t
++
++ /var/log/nova(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B nova_network_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B nova_var_lib_t
++
++ /var/lib/nova(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B nova_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/nova(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), nova_network(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, nova_ajax_selinux(8), nova_api_selinux(8), nova_cert_selinux(8), nova_compute_selinux(8), nova_console_selinux(8), nova_direct_selinux(8), nova_objectstore_selinux(8), nova_scheduler_selinux(8), nova_vncproxy_selinux(8), nova_volume_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/nova_objectstore_selinux.8 b/man/man8/nova_objectstore_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..449bba7
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/nova_objectstore_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,129 @@
++.TH "nova_objectstore_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "nova_objectstore" "SELinux Policy documentation for nova_objectstore"
++.SH "NAME"
++nova_objectstore_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the nova_objectstore processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the nova_objectstore processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The nova_objectstore processes execute with the nova_objectstore_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep nova_objectstore_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The nova_objectstore_t SELinux type can be entered via the "nova_objectstore_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the nova_objectstore_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/bin/nova-objectstore
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux nova_objectstore policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their nova_objectstore processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for nova_objectstore:
++
++.EX
++.B nova_objectstore_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux nova_objectstore policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their nova_objectstore processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for nova_objectstore:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B nova_objectstore_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the nova_objectstore_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the nova_objectstore_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B nova_objectstore_tmp_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the nova_objectstore_tmp_t type, if you want to store nova objectstore temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B nova_objectstore_unit_file_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the nova_objectstore_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as nova objectstore unit content.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type nova_objectstore_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B nova_log_t
++
++ /var/log/nova(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B nova_objectstore_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B nova_var_lib_t
++
++ /var/lib/nova(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B nova_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/nova(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), nova_objectstore(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, nova_ajax_selinux(8), nova_api_selinux(8), nova_cert_selinux(8), nova_compute_selinux(8), nova_console_selinux(8), nova_direct_selinux(8), nova_network_selinux(8), nova_scheduler_selinux(8), nova_vncproxy_selinux(8), nova_volume_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/nova_scheduler_selinux.8 b/man/man8/nova_scheduler_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..ef40436
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/nova_scheduler_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,129 @@
++.TH "nova_scheduler_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "nova_scheduler" "SELinux Policy documentation for nova_scheduler"
++.SH "NAME"
++nova_scheduler_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the nova_scheduler processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the nova_scheduler processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The nova_scheduler processes execute with the nova_scheduler_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep nova_scheduler_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The nova_scheduler_t SELinux type can be entered via the "nova_scheduler_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the nova_scheduler_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/bin/nova-scheduler
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux nova_scheduler policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their nova_scheduler processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for nova_scheduler:
++
++.EX
++.B nova_scheduler_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux nova_scheduler policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their nova_scheduler processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for nova_scheduler:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B nova_scheduler_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the nova_scheduler_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the nova_scheduler_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B nova_scheduler_tmp_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the nova_scheduler_tmp_t type, if you want to store nova scheduler temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B nova_scheduler_unit_file_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the nova_scheduler_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as nova scheduler unit content.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type nova_scheduler_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B nova_log_t
++
++ /var/log/nova(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B nova_scheduler_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B nova_var_lib_t
++
++ /var/lib/nova(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B nova_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/nova(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), nova_scheduler(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, nova_ajax_selinux(8), nova_api_selinux(8), nova_cert_selinux(8), nova_compute_selinux(8), nova_console_selinux(8), nova_direct_selinux(8), nova_network_selinux(8), nova_objectstore_selinux(8), nova_vncproxy_selinux(8), nova_volume_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/nova_vncproxy_selinux.8 b/man/man8/nova_vncproxy_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..452fe26
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/nova_vncproxy_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,129 @@
++.TH "nova_vncproxy_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "nova_vncproxy" "SELinux Policy documentation for nova_vncproxy"
++.SH "NAME"
++nova_vncproxy_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the nova_vncproxy processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the nova_vncproxy processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The nova_vncproxy processes execute with the nova_vncproxy_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep nova_vncproxy_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The nova_vncproxy_t SELinux type can be entered via the "nova_vncproxy_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the nova_vncproxy_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/bin/nova-vncproxy, /usr/bin/nova-xvpvncproxy
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux nova_vncproxy policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their nova_vncproxy processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for nova_vncproxy:
++
++.EX
++.B nova_vncproxy_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux nova_vncproxy policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their nova_vncproxy processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for nova_vncproxy:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B nova_vncproxy_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the nova_vncproxy_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the nova_vncproxy_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B nova_vncproxy_tmp_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the nova_vncproxy_tmp_t type, if you want to store nova vncproxy temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B nova_vncproxy_unit_file_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the nova_vncproxy_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as nova vncproxy unit content.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type nova_vncproxy_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B nova_log_t
++
++ /var/log/nova(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B nova_var_lib_t
++
++ /var/lib/nova(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B nova_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/nova(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B nova_vncproxy_tmp_t
++
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), nova_vncproxy(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, nova_ajax_selinux(8), nova_api_selinux(8), nova_cert_selinux(8), nova_compute_selinux(8), nova_console_selinux(8), nova_direct_selinux(8), nova_network_selinux(8), nova_objectstore_selinux(8), nova_scheduler_selinux(8), nova_volume_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/nova_volume_selinux.8 b/man/man8/nova_volume_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..b39d068
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/nova_volume_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,129 @@
++.TH "nova_volume_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "nova_volume" "SELinux Policy documentation for nova_volume"
++.SH "NAME"
++nova_volume_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the nova_volume processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the nova_volume processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The nova_volume processes execute with the nova_volume_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep nova_volume_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The nova_volume_t SELinux type can be entered via the "nova_volume_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the nova_volume_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/bin/nova-volume
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux nova_volume policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their nova_volume processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for nova_volume:
++
++.EX
++.B nova_volume_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux nova_volume policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their nova_volume processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for nova_volume:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B nova_volume_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the nova_volume_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the nova_volume_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B nova_volume_tmp_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the nova_volume_tmp_t type, if you want to store nova volume temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B nova_volume_unit_file_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the nova_volume_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as nova volume unit content.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type nova_volume_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B nova_log_t
++
++ /var/log/nova(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B nova_var_lib_t
++
++ /var/lib/nova(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B nova_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/nova(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B nova_volume_tmp_t
++
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), nova_volume(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, nova_ajax_selinux(8), nova_api_selinux(8), nova_cert_selinux(8), nova_compute_selinux(8), nova_console_selinux(8), nova_direct_selinux(8), nova_network_selinux(8), nova_objectstore_selinux(8), nova_scheduler_selinux(8), nova_vncproxy_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/nrpe_selinux.8 b/man/man8/nrpe_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..f91aa56
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/nrpe_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,124 @@
++.TH "nrpe_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "nrpe" "SELinux Policy documentation for nrpe"
++.SH "NAME"
++nrpe_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the nrpe processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the nrpe processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The nrpe processes execute with the nrpe_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep nrpe_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The nrpe_t SELinux type can be entered via the "nrpe_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the nrpe_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/s?bin/nrpe
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux nrpe policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their nrpe processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for nrpe:
++
++.EX
++.B nrpe_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux nrpe policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their nrpe processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for nrpe:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B nrpe_etc_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the nrpe_etc_t type, if you want to store nrpe files in the /etc directories.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B nrpe_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the nrpe_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the nrpe_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B nrpe_var_run_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the nrpe_var_run_t type, if you want to store the nrpe files under the /run directory.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type nrpe_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B nrpe_var_run_t
++
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the nrpe_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the nrpe_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), nrpe(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/nscd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/nscd_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..2d79417
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/nscd_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,184 @@
++.TH "nscd_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "nscd" "SELinux Policy documentation for nscd"
++.SH "NAME"
++nscd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the nscd processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the nscd processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The nscd processes execute with the nscd_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep nscd_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The nscd_t SELinux type can be entered via the "nscd_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the nscd_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/sbin/nscd
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux nscd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their nscd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for nscd:
++
++.EX
++.B nscd_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH BOOLEANS
++SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. nscd policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run nscd with the tightest access possible.
++
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to use nscd shared memory, you must turn on the nscd_use_shm boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P nscd_use_shm 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to use nscd shared memory, you must turn on the nscd_use_shm boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P nscd_use_shm 1
++.EE
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux nscd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their nscd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for nscd:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B nscd_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the nscd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the nscd_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B nscd_initrc_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the nscd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the nscd_initrc_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B nscd_log_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the nscd_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as nscd log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B nscd_unit_file_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the nscd_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as nscd unit content.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B nscd_var_run_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the nscd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the nscd files under the /run directory.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type nscd_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B nscd_log_t
++
++ /var/log/nscd\.log.*
++.br
++
++.br
++.B nscd_var_run_t
++
++ /var/db/nscd(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/nscd(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/cache/nscd(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/nscd\.pid
++.br
++ /var/run/\.nscd_socket
++.br
++
++.br
++.B security_t
++
++ /selinux
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the nscd_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the nscd_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.B semanage boolean
++can also be used to manipulate the booleans
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), nscd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, setsebool(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/nslcd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/nslcd_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..a01b48c
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/nslcd_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,134 @@
++.TH "nslcd_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "nslcd" "SELinux Policy documentation for nslcd"
++.SH "NAME"
++nslcd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the nslcd processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the nslcd processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The nslcd processes execute with the nslcd_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep nslcd_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The nslcd_t SELinux type can be entered via the "nslcd_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the nslcd_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/sbin/nslcd
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux nslcd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their nslcd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for nslcd:
++
++.EX
++.B nslcd_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux nslcd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their nslcd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for nslcd:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B nslcd_conf_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the nslcd_conf_t type, if you want to treat the files as nslcd configuration data, usually stored under the /etc directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B nslcd_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the nslcd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the nslcd_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B nslcd_initrc_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the nslcd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the nslcd_initrc_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B nslcd_var_run_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the nslcd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the nslcd files under the /run directory.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type nslcd_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B nslcd_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/nslcd(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the nslcd_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the nslcd_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), nslcd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/ntop_selinux.8 b/man/man8/ntop_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..ea60031
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/ntop_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,188 @@
++.TH "ntop_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "ntop" "SELinux Policy documentation for ntop"
++.SH "NAME"
++ntop_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the ntop processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the ntop processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The ntop processes execute with the ntop_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep ntop_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The ntop_t SELinux type can be entered via the "ntop_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the ntop_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/bin/ntop
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux ntop policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ntop processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for ntop:
++
++.EX
++.B ntop_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux ntop policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ntop processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for ntop:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B ntop_etc_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the ntop_etc_t type, if you want to store ntop files in the /etc directories.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B ntop_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the ntop_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ntop_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B ntop_initrc_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the ntop_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ntop_initrc_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B ntop_tmp_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the ntop_tmp_t type, if you want to store ntop temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B ntop_var_lib_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the ntop_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the ntop files under the /var/lib directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B ntop_var_run_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the ntop_var_run_t type, if you want to store the ntop files under the /run directory.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH PORT TYPES
++SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
++.PP
++You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
++
++.B semanage port -l
++
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
++SELinux ntop policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ntop processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following port types are defined for ntop:
++
++.EX
++.TP 5
++.B ntop_port_t
++.TP 10
++.EE
++
++
++Default Defined Ports:
++tcp 3000-3001
++.EE
++udp 3000-3001
++.EE
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type ntop_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B ntop_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B ntop_var_lib_t
++
++ /var/lib/ntop(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B ntop_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/ntop\.pid
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the ntop_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the ntop_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.B semanage port
++can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), ntop(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/ntpd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/ntpd_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..d93b729
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/ntpd_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,240 @@
++.TH "ntpd_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "ntpd" "SELinux Policy documentation for ntpd"
++.SH "NAME"
++ntpd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the ntpd processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the ntpd processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The ntpd processes execute with the ntpd_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep ntpd_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The ntpd_t SELinux type can be entered via the "ntpd_exec_t,ntpdate_exec_t" file types. The default entrypoint paths for the ntpd_t domain are the following:"
++
++/etc/cron\.(daily|weekly)/ntp-simple, /etc/cron\.(daily|weekly)/ntp-server, /usr/sbin/ntpd, /usr/sbin/ntpdate
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux ntpd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ntpd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for ntpd:
++
++.EX
++.B ntpd_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux ntpd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ntpd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for ntpd:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B ntpd_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the ntpd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ntpd_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B ntpd_initrc_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the ntpd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ntpd_initrc_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B ntpd_key_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the ntpd_key_t type, if you want to treat the files as ntpd key data.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B ntpd_log_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the ntpd_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as ntpd log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B ntpd_tmp_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the ntpd_tmp_t type, if you want to store ntpd temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B ntpd_tmpfs_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the ntpd_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store ntpd files on a tmpfs file system.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B ntpd_unit_file_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the ntpd_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as ntpd unit content.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B ntpd_var_run_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the ntpd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the ntpd files under the /run directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B ntpdate_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the ntpdate_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ntpdate_t domain.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH PORT TYPES
++SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
++.PP
++You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
++
++.B semanage port -l
++
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
++SELinux ntpd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ntpd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following port types are defined for ntpd:
++
++.EX
++.TP 5
++.B ntp_port_t
++.TP 10
++.EE
++
++
++Default Defined Ports:
++udp 123
++.EE
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type ntpd_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B gpsd_tmpfs_t
++
++
++.br
++.B ntp_drift_t
++
++ /var/lib/ntp(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/ntp/data(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B ntpd_log_t
++
++ /var/log/ntp.*
++.br
++ /var/log/xntpd.*
++.br
++ /var/log/ntpstats(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B ntpd_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B ntpd_tmpfs_t
++
++
++.br
++.B ntpd_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/ntpd\.pid
++.br
++
++.br
++.B tmpfs_t
++
++ /dev/shm
++.br
++ /lib/udev/devices/shm
++.br
++ /usr/lib/udev/devices/shm
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the ntpd_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the ntpd_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.B semanage port
++can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), ntpd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/numad_selinux.8 b/man/man8/numad_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..4602514
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/numad_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,126 @@
++.TH "numad_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "numad" "SELinux Policy documentation for numad"
++.SH "NAME"
++numad_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the numad processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the numad processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The numad processes execute with the numad_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep numad_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The numad_t SELinux type can be entered via the "numad_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the numad_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/bin/numad
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux numad policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their numad processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for numad:
++
++.EX
++.B numad_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux numad policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their numad processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for numad:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B numad_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the numad_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the numad_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B numad_unit_file_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the numad_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as numad unit content.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B numad_var_log_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the numad_var_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as numad var log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B numad_var_run_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the numad_var_run_t type, if you want to store the numad files under the /run directory.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type numad_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B numad_var_log_t
++
++ /var/log/numad\.log.*
++.br
++
++.br
++.B numad_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/numad\.pid
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), numad(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/nut_upsd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/nut_upsd_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..f9abfb2
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/nut_upsd_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,119 @@
++.TH "nut_upsd_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "nut_upsd" "SELinux Policy documentation for nut_upsd"
++.SH "NAME"
++nut_upsd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the nut_upsd processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the nut_upsd processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The nut_upsd processes execute with the nut_upsd_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep nut_upsd_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The nut_upsd_t SELinux type can be entered via the "nut_upsd_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the nut_upsd_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/sbin/upsd
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux nut_upsd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their nut_upsd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for nut_upsd:
++
++.EX
++.B nut_upsd_t, nut_upsmon_t, nut_upsdrvctl_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux nut_upsd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their nut_upsd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for nut_upsd:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B nut_upsd_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the nut_upsd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the nut_upsd_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B nut_upsdrvctl_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the nut_upsdrvctl_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the nut_upsdrvctl_t domain.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type nut_upsd_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B nut_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/nut(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the nut_upsmon_t, nut_upsdrvctl_t, nut_upsd_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the nut_upsmon_t, nut_upsdrvctl_t, nut_upsd_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), nut_upsd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, nut_upsdrvctl_selinux(8), nut_upsmon_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/nut_upsdrvctl_selinux.8 b/man/man8/nut_upsdrvctl_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..fbe671e
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/nut_upsdrvctl_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
++.TH "nut_upsdrvctl_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "nut_upsdrvctl" "SELinux Policy documentation for nut_upsdrvctl"
++.SH "NAME"
++nut_upsdrvctl_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the nut_upsdrvctl processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the nut_upsdrvctl processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The nut_upsdrvctl processes execute with the nut_upsdrvctl_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep nut_upsdrvctl_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The nut_upsdrvctl_t SELinux type can be entered via the "nut_upsdrvctl_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the nut_upsdrvctl_t domain are the following:"
++
++/sbin/upsdrvctl, /usr/sbin/upsdrvctl
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux nut_upsdrvctl policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their nut_upsdrvctl processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for nut_upsdrvctl:
++
++.EX
++.B nut_upsdrvctl_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux nut_upsdrvctl policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their nut_upsdrvctl processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for nut_upsdrvctl:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B nut_upsdrvctl_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the nut_upsdrvctl_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the nut_upsdrvctl_t domain.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type nut_upsdrvctl_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B nut_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/nut(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the nut_upsdrvctl_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the nut_upsdrvctl_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), nut_upsdrvctl(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, nut_upsd_selinux(8), nut_upsd_selinux(8), nut_upsmon_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/nut_upsmon_selinux.8 b/man/man8/nut_upsmon_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..8abe28c
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/nut_upsmon_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,185 @@
++.TH "nut_upsmon_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "nut_upsmon" "SELinux Policy documentation for nut_upsmon"
++.SH "NAME"
++nut_upsmon_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the nut_upsmon processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the nut_upsmon processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The nut_upsmon processes execute with the nut_upsmon_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep nut_upsmon_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The nut_upsmon_t SELinux type can be entered via the "nut_upsmon_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the nut_upsmon_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/sbin/upsmon
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux nut_upsmon policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their nut_upsmon processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for nut_upsmon:
++
++.EX
++.B nut_upsmon_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux nut_upsmon policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their nut_upsmon processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for nut_upsmon:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B nut_upsmon_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the nut_upsmon_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the nut_upsmon_t domain.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type nut_upsmon_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B etc_runtime_t
++
++ /[^/]+
++.br
++ /etc/mtab.*
++.br
++ /etc/blkid(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/nologin.*
++.br
++ /etc/\.fstab\.hal\..+
++.br
++ /halt
++.br
++ /fastboot
++.br
++ /poweroff
++.br
++ /etc/cmtab
++.br
++ /\.autofsck
++.br
++ /forcefsck
++.br
++ /\.suspended
++.br
++ /fsckoptions
++.br
++ /\.autorelabel
++.br
++ /etc/securetty
++.br
++ /etc/killpower
++.br
++ /etc/nohotplug
++.br
++ /etc/ioctl\.save
++.br
++ /etc/fstab\.REVOKE
++.br
++ /etc/network/ifstate
++.br
++ /etc/sysconfig/hwconf
++.br
++ /etc/ptal/ptal-printd-like
++.br
++ /etc/sysconfig/iptables\.save
++.br
++ /etc/xorg\.conf\.d/00-system-setup-keyboard\.conf
++.br
++ /etc/X11/xorg\.conf\.d/00-system-setup-keyboard\.conf
++.br
++
++.br
++.B initrc_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/utmp
++.br
++ /var/run/random-seed
++.br
++ /var/run/runlevel\.dir
++.br
++ /var/run/setmixer_flag
++.br
++
++.br
++.B nut_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/nut(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B systemd_passwd_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/systemd/ask-password(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/systemd/ask-password-block(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the nut_upsmon_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the nut_upsmon_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), nut_upsmon(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, nut_upsd_selinux(8), nut_upsdrvctl_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/nx_server_selinux.8 b/man/man8/nx_server_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..e551b42
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/nx_server_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,129 @@
++.TH "nx_server_selinux" "8" "nx_server" "mgrepl at redhat.com" "nx_server SELinux Policy documentation"
++.SH "NAME"
++nx_server_r \- \fBnx_server user role\fP - Security Enhanced Linux Policy
++
++.SH DESCRIPTION
++
++SELinux supports Roles Based Access Control (RBAC), some Linux roles are login roles, while other roles need to be transition into.
++
++.I Note:
++Examples in this man page will use the
++.B staff_u
++SELinux user.
++
++Non login roles are usually used for administrative tasks. For example, tasks that require root privileges. Roles control which types a user can run processes with. Roles often have default types assigned to them.
++
++The default type for the nx_server_r role is nx_server_t.
++
++The
++.B newrole
++program to transition directly to this role.
++
++.B newrole -r nx_server_r -t nx_server_t
++
++.B sudo
++is the preferred method to do transition from one role to another. You setup sudo to transition to nx_server_r by adding a similar line to the /etc/sudoers file.
++
++USERNAME ALL=(ALL) ROLE=nx_server_r TYPE=nx_server_t COMMAND
++
++.br
++sudo will run COMMAND as staff_u:nx_server_r:nx_server_t:LEVEL
++
++When using a a non login role, you need to setup SELinux so that your SELinux user can reach nx_server_r role.
++
++Execute the following to see all of the assigned SELinux roles:
++
++.B semanage user -l
++
++You need to add nx_server_r to the staff_u user. You could setup the staff_u user to be able to use the nx_server_r role with a command like:
++
++.B $ semanage user -m -R 'staff_r system_r nx_server_r' staff_u
++
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type nx_server_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B nx_server_home_ssh_t
++
++ /opt/NX/home/nx/\.ssh(/.*)?
++.br
++ /usr/NX/home/nx/\.ssh(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/nxserver/home/.ssh(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B nx_server_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B nx_server_var_lib_t
++
++ /opt/NX/home(/.*)?
++.br
++ /usr/NX/home(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/nxserver(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B nx_server_var_run_t
++
++ /opt/NX/var(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B ssh_home_t
++
++ /root/\.ssh(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/openshift/[^/]+/\.ssh(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/amanda/\.ssh(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/stickshift/[^/]+/\.ssh(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/gitolite/\.ssh(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/nocpulse/\.ssh(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/gitolite3/\.ssh(/.*)?
++.br
++ /root/\.shosts
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.ssh(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.shosts
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.ssh(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.shosts
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.ssh(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.shosts
++.br
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), nx_server(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/obex_selinux.8 b/man/man8/obex_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..516eea1
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/obex_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
++.TH "obex_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "obex" "SELinux Policy documentation for obex"
++.SH "NAME"
++obex_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the obex processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the obex processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The obex processes execute with the obex_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep obex_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The obex_t SELinux type can be entered via the "obex_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the obex_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/bin/obex-data-server
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux obex policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their obex processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for obex:
++
++.EX
++.B obex_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux obex policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their obex processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for obex:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B obex_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the obex_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the obex_t domain.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), obex(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/oddjob_mkhomedir_selinux.8 b/man/man8/oddjob_mkhomedir_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..a049201
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/oddjob_mkhomedir_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,117 @@
++.TH "oddjob_mkhomedir_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "oddjob_mkhomedir" "SELinux Policy documentation for oddjob_mkhomedir"
++.SH "NAME"
++oddjob_mkhomedir_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the oddjob_mkhomedir processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the oddjob_mkhomedir processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The oddjob_mkhomedir processes execute with the oddjob_mkhomedir_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep oddjob_mkhomedir_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The oddjob_mkhomedir_t SELinux type can be entered via the "oddjob_mkhomedir_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the oddjob_mkhomedir_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/lib/oddjob/mkhomedir, /usr/sbin/mkhomedir_helper, /usr/libexec/oddjob/mkhomedir
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux oddjob_mkhomedir policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their oddjob_mkhomedir processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for oddjob_mkhomedir:
++
++.EX
++.B oddjob_mkhomedir_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux oddjob_mkhomedir policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their oddjob_mkhomedir processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for oddjob_mkhomedir:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B oddjob_mkhomedir_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the oddjob_mkhomedir_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the oddjob_mkhomedir_t domain.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type oddjob_mkhomedir_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B security_t
++
++ /selinux
++.br
++
++.br
++.B user_home_type
++
++ all user home files
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the oddjob_mkhomedir_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the oddjob_mkhomedir_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), oddjob_mkhomedir(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, oddjob_selinux(8), oddjob_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/oddjob_selinux.8 b/man/man8/oddjob_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..da2bce8
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/oddjob_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,154 @@
++.TH "oddjob_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "oddjob" "SELinux Policy documentation for oddjob"
++.SH "NAME"
++oddjob_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the oddjob processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the oddjob processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The oddjob processes execute with the oddjob_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep oddjob_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The oddjob_t SELinux type can be entered via the "oddjob_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the oddjob_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/sbin/oddjobd
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux oddjob policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their oddjob processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for oddjob:
++
++.EX
++.B oddjob_mkhomedir_t, oddjob_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH BOOLEANS
++SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. oddjob policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run oddjob with the tightest access possible.
++
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow httpd to communicate with oddjob to start up a service, you must turn on the httpd_use_oddjob boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P httpd_use_oddjob 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow httpd to communicate with oddjob to start up a service, you must turn on the httpd_use_oddjob boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P httpd_use_oddjob 1
++.EE
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux oddjob policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their oddjob processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for oddjob:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B oddjob_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the oddjob_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the oddjob_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B oddjob_mkhomedir_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the oddjob_mkhomedir_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the oddjob_mkhomedir_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B oddjob_var_run_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the oddjob_var_run_t type, if you want to store the oddjob files under the /run directory.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type oddjob_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B oddjob_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/oddjobd\.pid
++.br
++
++.br
++.B security_t
++
++ /selinux
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the oddjob_mkhomedir_t, oddjob_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the oddjob_mkhomedir_t, oddjob_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.B semanage boolean
++can also be used to manipulate the booleans
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), oddjob(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, setsebool(8), oddjob_mkhomedir_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/openct_selinux.8 b/man/man8/openct_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..7a5ded1
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/openct_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
++.TH "openct_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "openct" "SELinux Policy documentation for openct"
++.SH "NAME"
++openct_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the openct processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the openct processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The openct processes execute with the openct_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep openct_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The openct_t SELinux type can be entered via the "openct_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the openct_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/sbin/ifdhandler, /usr/sbin/openct-control
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux openct policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their openct processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for openct:
++
++.EX
++.B openct_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux openct policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their openct processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for openct:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B openct_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the openct_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the openct_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B openct_var_run_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the openct_var_run_t type, if you want to store the openct files under the /run directory.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type openct_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B openct_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/openct(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B usbfs_t
++
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), openct(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/openshift_cgroup_read_selinux.8 b/man/man8/openshift_cgroup_read_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..535b556
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/openshift_cgroup_read_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
++.TH "openshift_cgroup_read_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "openshift_cgroup_read" "SELinux Policy documentation for openshift_cgroup_read"
++.SH "NAME"
++openshift_cgroup_read_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the openshift_cgroup_read processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the openshift_cgroup_read processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The openshift_cgroup_read processes execute with the openshift_cgroup_read_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep openshift_cgroup_read_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The openshift_cgroup_read_t SELinux type can be entered via the "openshift_cgroup_read_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the openshift_cgroup_read_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/bin/(oo|rhc)-cgroup-read
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux openshift_cgroup_read policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their openshift_cgroup_read processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for openshift_cgroup_read:
++
++.EX
++.B openshift_cgroup_read_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux openshift_cgroup_read policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their openshift_cgroup_read processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for openshift_cgroup_read:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B openshift_cgroup_read_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the openshift_cgroup_read_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the openshift_cgroup_read_t domain.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), openshift_cgroup_read(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, openshift_initrc_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/openshift_initrc_selinux.8 b/man/man8/openshift_initrc_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..43101f1
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/openshift_initrc_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,105 @@
++.TH "openshift_initrc_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "openshift_initrc" "SELinux Policy documentation for openshift_initrc"
++.SH "NAME"
++openshift_initrc_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the openshift_initrc processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the openshift_initrc processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The openshift_initrc processes execute with the openshift_initrc_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep openshift_initrc_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The openshift_initrc_t SELinux type can be entered via the "filesystem_type,openshift_initrc_exec_t,unlabeled_t,proc_type,mtrr_device_t,sysctl_type,file_type" file types. The default entrypoint paths for the openshift_initrc_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/bin/(oo|rhc)-restorer, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/libra, /usr/sbin/mcollectived, /usr/bin/oo-admin-ctl-gears, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/mcollective, /dev/cpu/mtrr, all files on the system
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux openshift_initrc policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their openshift_initrc processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for openshift_initrc:
++
++.EX
++.B openshift_initrc_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux openshift_initrc policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their openshift_initrc processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for openshift_initrc:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B openshift_initrc_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the openshift_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the openshift_initrc_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B openshift_initrc_tmp_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the openshift_initrc_tmp_t type, if you want to store openshift initrc temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type openshift_initrc_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B file_type
++
++ all files on the system
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), openshift_initrc(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, openshift_cgroup_read_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/openvpn_selinux.8 b/man/man8/openvpn_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..266266d
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/openvpn_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,314 @@
++.TH "openvpn_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "openvpn" "SELinux Policy documentation for openvpn"
++.SH "NAME"
++openvpn_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the openvpn processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the openvpn processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The openvpn processes execute with the openvpn_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep openvpn_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The openvpn_t SELinux type can be entered via the "openvpn_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the openvpn_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/sbin/openvpn
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux openvpn policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their openvpn processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for openvpn:
++
++.EX
++.B openvpn_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH BOOLEANS
++SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. openvpn policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run openvpn with the tightest access possible.
++
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow openvpn to read home directories, you must turn on the openvpn_enable_homedirs boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P openvpn_enable_homedirs 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow openvpn to read home directories, you must turn on the openvpn_enable_homedirs boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P openvpn_enable_homedirs 1
++.EE
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux openvpn policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their openvpn processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for openvpn:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B openvpn_etc_rw_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the openvpn_etc_rw_t type, if you want to treat the files as openvpn etc read/write content.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B openvpn_etc_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the openvpn_etc_t type, if you want to store openvpn files in the /etc directories.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B openvpn_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the openvpn_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the openvpn_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B openvpn_initrc_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the openvpn_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the openvpn_initrc_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B openvpn_tmp_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the openvpn_tmp_t type, if you want to store openvpn temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B openvpn_var_log_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the openvpn_var_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as openvpn var log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B openvpn_var_run_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the openvpn_var_run_t type, if you want to store the openvpn files under the /run directory.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH PORT TYPES
++SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
++.PP
++You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
++
++.B semanage port -l
++
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
++SELinux openvpn policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their openvpn processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following port types are defined for openvpn:
++
++.EX
++.TP 5
++.B openvpn_port_t
++.TP 10
++.EE
++
++
++Default Defined Ports:
++tcp 1194
++.EE
++udp 1194
++.EE
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type openvpn_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B faillog_t
++
++ /var/log/btmp.*
++.br
++ /var/run/faillock(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/log/faillog
++.br
++ /var/log/tallylog
++.br
++
++.br
++.B krb5_host_rcache_t
++
++ /var/cache/krb5rcache(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/tmp/nfs_0
++.br
++ /var/tmp/DNS_25
++.br
++ /var/tmp/host_0
++.br
++ /var/tmp/imap_0
++.br
++ /var/tmp/HTTP_23
++.br
++ /var/tmp/HTTP_48
++.br
++ /var/tmp/ldap_55
++.br
++ /var/tmp/ldap_487
++.br
++ /var/tmp/ldapmap1_0
++.br
++
++.br
++.B lastlog_t
++
++ /var/log/lastlog
++.br
++
++.br
++.B net_conf_t
++
++ /etc/ntpd?\.conf.*
++.br
++ /etc/hosts[^/]*
++.br
++ /etc/yp\.conf.*
++.br
++ /etc/denyhosts.*
++.br
++ /etc/hosts\.deny.*
++.br
++ /etc/resolv\.conf.*
++.br
++ /etc/ntp/step-tickers.*
++.br
++ /etc/sysconfig/networking(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/sysconfig/network-scripts(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/sysconfig/network-scripts/.*resolv\.conf
++.br
++ /etc/ethers
++.br
++
++.br
++.B openvpn_etc_rw_t
++
++ /etc/openvpn/ipp.txt
++.br
++
++.br
++.B openvpn_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B openvpn_var_log_t
++
++ /var/log/openvpn.*
++.br
++
++.br
++.B openvpn_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/openvpn(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/openvpn\.client.*
++.br
++
++.br
++.B pcscd_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/pcscd(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/pcscd\.events(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/pcscd\.pid
++.br
++ /var/run/pcscd\.pub
++.br
++ /var/run/pcscd\.comm
++.br
++
++.br
++.B security_t
++
++ /selinux
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the openvpn_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the openvpn_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.B semanage port
++can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
++
++.B semanage boolean
++can also be used to manipulate the booleans
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), openvpn(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, setsebool(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/pacemaker_selinux.8 b/man/man8/pacemaker_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..30da0ee
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/pacemaker_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,150 @@
++.TH "pacemaker_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "pacemaker" "SELinux Policy documentation for pacemaker"
++.SH "NAME"
++pacemaker_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the pacemaker processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the pacemaker processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The pacemaker processes execute with the pacemaker_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep pacemaker_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The pacemaker_t SELinux type can be entered via the "pacemaker_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the pacemaker_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/sbin/pacemakerd
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux pacemaker policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their pacemaker processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for pacemaker:
++
++.EX
++.B pacemaker_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux pacemaker policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their pacemaker processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for pacemaker:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B pacemaker_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the pacemaker_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the pacemaker_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B pacemaker_initrc_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the pacemaker_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the pacemaker_initrc_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B pacemaker_unit_file_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the pacemaker_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as pacemaker unit content.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B pacemaker_var_lib_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the pacemaker_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the pacemaker files under the /var/lib directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B pacemaker_var_run_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the pacemaker_var_run_t type, if you want to store the pacemaker files under the /run directory.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type pacemaker_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B pacemaker_var_lib_t
++
++ /var/lib/pengine(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/heartbeat/crm(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B pacemaker_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/crm(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the pacemaker_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the pacemaker_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), pacemaker(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/pads_selinux.8 b/man/man8/pads_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..4402702
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/pads_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,140 @@
++.TH "pads_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "pads" "SELinux Policy documentation for pads"
++.SH "NAME"
++pads_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the pads processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the pads processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The pads processes execute with the pads_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep pads_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The pads_t SELinux type can be entered via the "pads_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the pads_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/bin/pads
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux pads policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their pads processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for pads:
++
++.EX
++.B pads_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux pads policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their pads processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for pads:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B pads_config_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the pads_config_t type, if you want to treat the files as pads configuration data, usually stored under the /etc directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B pads_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the pads_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the pads_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B pads_initrc_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the pads_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the pads_initrc_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B pads_var_run_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the pads_var_run_t type, if you want to store the pads files under the /run directory.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type pads_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B pads_config_t
++
++ /etc/pads-assets.csv
++.br
++ /etc/pads\.conf
++.br
++ /etc/pads-ether-codes
++.br
++ /etc/pads-signature-list
++.br
++
++.br
++.B pads_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/pads\.pid
++.br
++
++.br
++.B prelude_spool_t
++
++ /var/spool/prelude(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/spool/prelude-manager(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), pads(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/pam_console_selinux.8 b/man/man8/pam_console_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..efb2cc6
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/pam_console_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
++.TH "pam_console_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "pam_console" "SELinux Policy documentation for pam_console"
++.SH "NAME"
++pam_console_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the pam_console processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the pam_console processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The pam_console processes execute with the pam_console_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep pam_console_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The pam_console_t SELinux type can be entered via the "pam_console_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the pam_console_t domain are the following:"
++
++/sbin/pam_console_apply, /usr/sbin/pam_console_apply
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux pam_console policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their pam_console processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for pam_console:
++
++.EX
++.B pam_console_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux pam_console policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their pam_console processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for pam_console:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B pam_console_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the pam_console_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the pam_console_t domain.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the pam_console_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the pam_console_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), pam_console(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, pam_timestamp_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/pam_timestamp_selinux.8 b/man/man8/pam_timestamp_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..b2e35ab
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/pam_timestamp_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,117 @@
++.TH "pam_timestamp_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "pam_timestamp" "SELinux Policy documentation for pam_timestamp"
++.SH "NAME"
++pam_timestamp_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the pam_timestamp processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the pam_timestamp processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The pam_timestamp processes execute with the pam_timestamp_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep pam_timestamp_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The pam_timestamp_t SELinux type can be entered via the "pam_timestamp_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the pam_timestamp_t domain are the following:"
++
++/sbin/pam_timestamp_check, /usr/sbin/pam_timestamp_check
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux pam_timestamp policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their pam_timestamp processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for pam_timestamp:
++
++.EX
++.B pam_timestamp_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux pam_timestamp policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their pam_timestamp processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for pam_timestamp:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B pam_timestamp_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the pam_timestamp_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the pam_timestamp_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B pam_timestamp_tmp_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the pam_timestamp_tmp_t type, if you want to store pam timestamp temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type pam_timestamp_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B pam_timestamp_tmp_t
++
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the pam_timestamp_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the pam_timestamp_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), pam_timestamp(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, pam_console_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/passenger_selinux.8 b/man/man8/passenger_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..c07e89a
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/passenger_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,166 @@
++.TH "passenger_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "passenger" "SELinux Policy documentation for passenger"
++.SH "NAME"
++passenger_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the passenger processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the passenger processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The passenger processes execute with the passenger_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep passenger_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The passenger_t SELinux type can be entered via the "passenger_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the passenger_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/lib/gems/.*/Passenger.*, /usr/lib/gems/.*/ApplicationPoolServerExecutable, /usr/share/gems/.*/Passenger.*, /usr/share/gems/.*/ApplicationPoolServerExecutable
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux passenger policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their passenger processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for passenger:
++
++.EX
++.B passenger_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux passenger policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their passenger processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for passenger:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B passenger_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the passenger_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the passenger_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B passenger_log_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the passenger_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as passenger log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B passenger_tmp_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the passenger_tmp_t type, if you want to store passenger temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B passenger_var_lib_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the passenger_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the passenger files under the /var/lib directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B passenger_var_run_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the passenger_var_run_t type, if you want to store the passenger files under the /run directory.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type passenger_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B passenger_log_t
++
++ /var/log/passenger.*
++.br
++ /var/log/passenger(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B passenger_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B passenger_var_lib_t
++
++ /var/lib/passenger(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B passenger_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/passenger(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B puppet_var_lib_t
++
++ /var/lib/puppet(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the passenger_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the passenger_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), passenger(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/passwd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/passwd_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..af4b9b1
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/passwd_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,208 @@
++.TH "passwd_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "passwd" "SELinux Policy documentation for passwd"
++.SH "NAME"
++passwd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the passwd processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the passwd processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The passwd processes execute with the passwd_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep passwd_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The passwd_t SELinux type can be entered via the "passwd_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the passwd_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/bin/chage, /usr/bin/passwd
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux passwd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their passwd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for passwd:
++
++.EX
++.B passwd_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux passwd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their passwd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for passwd:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B passwd_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the passwd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the passwd_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B passwd_file_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the passwd_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as passwd content.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type passwd_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B faillog_t
++
++ /var/log/btmp.*
++.br
++ /var/run/faillock(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/log/faillog
++.br
++ /var/log/tallylog
++.br
++
++.br
++.B krb5_host_rcache_t
++
++ /var/cache/krb5rcache(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/tmp/nfs_0
++.br
++ /var/tmp/DNS_25
++.br
++ /var/tmp/host_0
++.br
++ /var/tmp/imap_0
++.br
++ /var/tmp/HTTP_23
++.br
++ /var/tmp/HTTP_48
++.br
++ /var/tmp/ldap_55
++.br
++ /var/tmp/ldap_487
++.br
++ /var/tmp/ldapmap1_0
++.br
++
++.br
++.B lastlog_t
++
++ /var/log/lastlog
++.br
++
++.br
++.B passwd_file_t
++
++ /etc/group[-\+]?
++.br
++ /etc/passwd[-\+]?
++.br
++ /etc/passwd\.adjunct.*
++.br
++ /etc/ptmptmp
++.br
++ /etc/\.pwd\.lock
++.br
++ /etc/group\.lock
++.br
++ /etc/passwd\.OLD
++.br
++ /etc/passwd\.lock
++.br
++
++.br
++.B pcscd_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/pcscd(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/pcscd\.events(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/pcscd\.pid
++.br
++ /var/run/pcscd\.pub
++.br
++ /var/run/pcscd\.comm
++.br
++
++.br
++.B security_t
++
++ /selinux
++.br
++
++.br
++.B shadow_t
++
++ /etc/shadow.*
++.br
++ /etc/gshadow.*
++.br
++ /var/db/shadow.*
++.br
++ /etc/security/opasswd
++.br
++ /etc/security/opasswd\.old
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the passwd_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the passwd_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), passwd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/pcscd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/pcscd_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..41e4f5f
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/pcscd_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,116 @@
++.TH "pcscd_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "pcscd" "SELinux Policy documentation for pcscd"
++.SH "NAME"
++pcscd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the pcscd processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the pcscd processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The pcscd processes execute with the pcscd_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep pcscd_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The pcscd_t SELinux type can be entered via the "pcscd_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the pcscd_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/sbin/pcscd
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux pcscd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their pcscd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for pcscd:
++
++.EX
++.B pcscd_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux pcscd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their pcscd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for pcscd:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B pcscd_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the pcscd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the pcscd_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B pcscd_var_run_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the pcscd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the pcscd files under the /run directory.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type pcscd_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B pcscd_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/pcscd(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/pcscd\.events(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/pcscd\.pid
++.br
++ /var/run/pcscd\.pub
++.br
++ /var/run/pcscd\.comm
++.br
++
++.br
++.B usbfs_t
++
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), pcscd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/pegasus_selinux.8 b/man/man8/pegasus_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..39479f4
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/pegasus_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,279 @@
++.TH "pegasus_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "pegasus" "SELinux Policy documentation for pegasus"
++.SH "NAME"
++pegasus_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the pegasus processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the pegasus processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The pegasus processes execute with the pegasus_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep pegasus_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The pegasus_t SELinux type can be entered via the "pegasus_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the pegasus_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/sbin/cimserver, /usr/sbin/init_repository
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux pegasus policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their pegasus processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for pegasus:
++
++.EX
++.B pegasus_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux pegasus policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their pegasus processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for pegasus:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B pegasus_cache_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the pegasus_cache_t type, if you want to store the files under the /var/cache directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B pegasus_conf_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the pegasus_conf_t type, if you want to treat the files as pegasus configuration data, usually stored under the /etc directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B pegasus_data_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the pegasus_data_t type, if you want to treat the files as pegasus content.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B pegasus_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the pegasus_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the pegasus_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B pegasus_mof_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the pegasus_mof_t type, if you want to treat the files as pegasus mof data.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B pegasus_tmp_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the pegasus_tmp_t type, if you want to store pegasus temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B pegasus_var_run_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the pegasus_var_run_t type, if you want to store the pegasus files under the /run directory.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH PORT TYPES
++SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
++.PP
++You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
++
++.B semanage port -l
++
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
++SELinux pegasus policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their pegasus processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following port types are defined for pegasus:
++
++.EX
++.TP 5
++.B pegasus_http_port_t
++.TP 10
++.EE
++
++
++Default Defined Ports:
++tcp 5988
++.EE
++
++.EX
++.TP 5
++.B pegasus_https_port_t
++.TP 10
++.EE
++
++
++Default Defined Ports:
++tcp 5989
++.EE
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type pegasus_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B faillog_t
++
++ /var/log/btmp.*
++.br
++ /var/run/faillock(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/log/faillog
++.br
++ /var/log/tallylog
++.br
++
++.br
++.B initrc_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/utmp
++.br
++ /var/run/random-seed
++.br
++ /var/run/runlevel\.dir
++.br
++ /var/run/setmixer_flag
++.br
++
++.br
++.B pcscd_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/pcscd(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/pcscd\.events(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/pcscd\.pid
++.br
++ /var/run/pcscd\.pub
++.br
++ /var/run/pcscd\.comm
++.br
++
++.br
++.B pegasus_cache_t
++
++
++.br
++.B pegasus_data_t
++
++ /var/lib/Pegasus(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/Pegasus/pegasus_current\.conf
++.br
++
++.br
++.B pegasus_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B pegasus_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/tog-pegasus(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B samba_etc_t
++
++ /etc/samba(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B virt_etc_rw_t
++
++ /etc/xen/.*/.*
++.br
++ /etc/xen/[^/]*
++.br
++ /etc/libvirt/.*/.*
++.br
++ /etc/libvirt/[^/]*
++.br
++
++.br
++.B virt_etc_t
++
++ /etc/xen/[^/]*
++.br
++ /etc/libvirt/[^/]*
++.br
++ /etc/xen
++.br
++ /etc/libvirt
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the pegasus_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the pegasus_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.B semanage port
++can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), pegasus(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/phpfpm_selinux.8 b/man/man8/phpfpm_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..ae94dbd
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/phpfpm_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,140 @@
++.TH "phpfpm_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "phpfpm" "SELinux Policy documentation for phpfpm"
++.SH "NAME"
++phpfpm_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the phpfpm processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the phpfpm processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The phpfpm processes execute with the phpfpm_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep phpfpm_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The phpfpm_t SELinux type can be entered via the "phpfpm_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the phpfpm_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/sbin/php-fpm
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux phpfpm policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their phpfpm processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for phpfpm:
++
++.EX
++.B phpfpm_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux phpfpm policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their phpfpm processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for phpfpm:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B phpfpm_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the phpfpm_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the phpfpm_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B phpfpm_log_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the phpfpm_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as phpfpm log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B phpfpm_unit_file_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the phpfpm_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as phpfpm unit content.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B phpfpm_var_run_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the phpfpm_var_run_t type, if you want to store the phpfpm files under the /run directory.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type phpfpm_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B phpfpm_log_t
++
++ /var/log/php-fpm(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B phpfpm_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/php-fpm(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the phpfpm_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the phpfpm_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), phpfpm(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/ping_selinux.8 b/man/man8/ping_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..7210530
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/ping_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,180 @@
++.TH "ping_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "ping" "SELinux Policy documentation for ping"
++.SH "NAME"
++ping_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the ping processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the ping processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The ping processes execute with the ping_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep ping_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The ping_t SELinux type can be entered via the "ping_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the ping_t domain are the following:"
++
++/bin/ping.*, /usr/bin/ping.*, /usr/sbin/fping.*, /usr/sbin/hping2, /usr/sbin/send_arp
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux ping policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ping processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for ping:
++
++.EX
++.B ping_t, pingd_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH BOOLEANS
++SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. ping policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run ping with the tightest access possible.
++
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined users the ability to execute the ping and traceroute commands, you must turn on the selinuxuser_ping boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P selinuxuser_ping 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined users the ability to execute the ping and traceroute commands, you must turn on the selinuxuser_ping boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P selinuxuser_ping 1
++.EE
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux ping policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ping processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for ping:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B ping_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the ping_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ping_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B pingd_etc_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the pingd_etc_t type, if you want to store pingd files in the /etc directories.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B pingd_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the pingd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the pingd_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B pingd_initrc_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the pingd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the pingd_initrc_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B pingd_modules_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the pingd_modules_t type, if you want to treat the files as pingd modules.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH PORT TYPES
++SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
++.PP
++You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
++
++.B semanage port -l
++
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
++SELinux ping policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ping processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following port types are defined for ping:
++
++.EX
++.TP 5
++.B pingd_port_t
++.TP 10
++.EE
++
++
++Default Defined Ports:
++tcp 9125
++.EE
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the pingd_t, ping_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the pingd_t, ping_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.B semanage port
++can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
++
++.B semanage boolean
++can also be used to manipulate the booleans
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), ping(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, setsebool(8), pingd_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/pingd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/pingd_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..4fc7233
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/pingd_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,172 @@
++.TH "pingd_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "pingd" "SELinux Policy documentation for pingd"
++.SH "NAME"
++pingd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the pingd processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the pingd processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The pingd processes execute with the pingd_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep pingd_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The pingd_t SELinux type can be entered via the "pingd_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the pingd_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/sbin/pingd
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux pingd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their pingd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for pingd:
++
++.EX
++.B ping_t, pingd_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH BOOLEANS
++SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. pingd policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run pingd with the tightest access possible.
++
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined users the ability to execute the ping and traceroute commands, you must turn on the selinuxuser_ping boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P selinuxuser_ping 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined users the ability to execute the ping and traceroute commands, you must turn on the selinuxuser_ping boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P selinuxuser_ping 1
++.EE
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux pingd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their pingd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for pingd:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B pingd_etc_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the pingd_etc_t type, if you want to store pingd files in the /etc directories.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B pingd_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the pingd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the pingd_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B pingd_initrc_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the pingd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the pingd_initrc_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B pingd_modules_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the pingd_modules_t type, if you want to treat the files as pingd modules.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH PORT TYPES
++SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
++.PP
++You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
++
++.B semanage port -l
++
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
++SELinux pingd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their pingd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following port types are defined for pingd:
++
++.EX
++.TP 5
++.B pingd_port_t
++.TP 10
++.EE
++
++
++Default Defined Ports:
++tcp 9125
++.EE
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the pingd_t, ping_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the pingd_t, ping_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.B semanage port
++can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
++
++.B semanage boolean
++can also be used to manipulate the booleans
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), pingd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, setsebool(8), ping_selinux(8), ping_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/piranha_fos_selinux.8 b/man/man8/piranha_fos_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..99093e6
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/piranha_fos_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,119 @@
++.TH "piranha_fos_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "piranha_fos" "SELinux Policy documentation for piranha_fos"
++.SH "NAME"
++piranha_fos_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the piranha_fos processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the piranha_fos processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The piranha_fos processes execute with the piranha_fos_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep piranha_fos_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The piranha_fos_t SELinux type can be entered via the "piranha_fos_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the piranha_fos_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/sbin/fos
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux piranha_fos policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their piranha_fos processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for piranha_fos:
++
++.EX
++.B piranha_fos_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux piranha_fos policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their piranha_fos processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for piranha_fos:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B piranha_fos_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the piranha_fos_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the piranha_fos_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B piranha_fos_var_run_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the piranha_fos_var_run_t type, if you want to store the piranha fos files under the /run directory.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type piranha_fos_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B piranha_fos_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/fos\.pid
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the piranha_fos_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the piranha_fos_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), piranha_fos(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, piranha_lvs_selinux(8), piranha_pulse_selinux(8), piranha_web_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/piranha_lvs_selinux.8 b/man/man8/piranha_lvs_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..4792eec
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/piranha_lvs_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,140 @@
++.TH "piranha_lvs_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "piranha_lvs" "SELinux Policy documentation for piranha_lvs"
++.SH "NAME"
++piranha_lvs_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the piranha_lvs processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the piranha_lvs processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The piranha_lvs processes execute with the piranha_lvs_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep piranha_lvs_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The piranha_lvs_t SELinux type can be entered via the "piranha_lvs_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the piranha_lvs_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/sbin/lvsd
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux piranha_lvs policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their piranha_lvs processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for piranha_lvs:
++
++.EX
++.B piranha_lvs_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH BOOLEANS
++SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. piranha_lvs policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run piranha_lvs with the tightest access possible.
++
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow piranha-lvs domain to connect to the network using TCP, you must turn on the piranha_lvs_can_network_connect boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P piranha_lvs_can_network_connect 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow piranha-lvs domain to connect to the network using TCP, you must turn on the piranha_lvs_can_network_connect boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P piranha_lvs_can_network_connect 1
++.EE
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux piranha_lvs policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their piranha_lvs processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for piranha_lvs:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B piranha_lvs_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the piranha_lvs_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the piranha_lvs_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B piranha_lvs_var_run_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the piranha_lvs_var_run_t type, if you want to store the piranha lvs files under the /run directory.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type piranha_lvs_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B piranha_lvs_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/lvs\.pid
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the piranha_lvs_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the piranha_lvs_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.B semanage boolean
++can also be used to manipulate the booleans
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), piranha_lvs(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, setsebool(8), piranha_fos_selinux(8), piranha_pulse_selinux(8), piranha_web_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/piranha_pulse_selinux.8 b/man/man8/piranha_pulse_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..2c470f5
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/piranha_pulse_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,151 @@
++.TH "piranha_pulse_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "piranha_pulse" "SELinux Policy documentation for piranha_pulse"
++.SH "NAME"
++piranha_pulse_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the piranha_pulse processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the piranha_pulse processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The piranha_pulse processes execute with the piranha_pulse_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep piranha_pulse_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The piranha_pulse_t SELinux type can be entered via the "piranha_pulse_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the piranha_pulse_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/sbin/pulse
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux piranha_pulse policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their piranha_pulse processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for piranha_pulse:
++
++.EX
++.B piranha_pulse_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux piranha_pulse policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their piranha_pulse processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for piranha_pulse:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B piranha_pulse_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the piranha_pulse_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the piranha_pulse_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B piranha_pulse_initrc_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the piranha_pulse_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the piranha_pulse_initrc_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B piranha_pulse_var_run_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the piranha_pulse_var_run_t type, if you want to store the piranha pulse files under the /run directory.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type piranha_pulse_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B piranha_pulse_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/pulse\.pid
++.br
++
++.br
++.B samba_etc_t
++
++ /etc/samba(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B samba_var_t
++
++ /var/lib/samba(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/cache/samba(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/spool/samba(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B systemd_passwd_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/systemd/ask-password(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/systemd/ask-password-block(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the piranha_pulse_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the piranha_pulse_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), piranha_pulse(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, piranha_fos_selinux(8), piranha_lvs_selinux(8), piranha_web_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/piranha_web_selinux.8 b/man/man8/piranha_web_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..c0ce2c7
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/piranha_web_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,177 @@
++.TH "piranha_web_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "piranha_web" "SELinux Policy documentation for piranha_web"
++.SH "NAME"
++piranha_web_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the piranha_web processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the piranha_web processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The piranha_web processes execute with the piranha_web_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep piranha_web_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The piranha_web_t SELinux type can be entered via the "piranha_web_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the piranha_web_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/sbin/piranha_gui
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux piranha_web policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their piranha_web processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for piranha_web:
++
++.EX
++.B piranha_web_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux piranha_web policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their piranha_web processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for piranha_web:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B piranha_web_conf_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the piranha_web_conf_t type, if you want to treat the files as piranha web configuration data, usually stored under the /etc directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B piranha_web_data_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the piranha_web_data_t type, if you want to treat the files as piranha web content.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B piranha_web_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the piranha_web_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the piranha_web_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B piranha_web_tmp_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the piranha_web_tmp_t type, if you want to store piranha web temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B piranha_web_tmpfs_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the piranha_web_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store piranha web files on a tmpfs file system.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B piranha_web_var_run_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the piranha_web_var_run_t type, if you want to store the piranha web files under the /run directory.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type piranha_web_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B piranha_etc_rw_t
++
++ /etc/piranha/lvs\.cf
++.br
++
++.br
++.B piranha_log_t
++
++ /var/log/piranha(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B piranha_web_data_t
++
++ /var/lib/luci(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B piranha_web_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B piranha_web_tmpfs_t
++
++
++.br
++.B piranha_web_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/piranha-httpd\.pid
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the piranha_web_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the piranha_web_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), piranha_web(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, piranha_fos_selinux(8), piranha_lvs_selinux(8), piranha_pulse_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/pkcsslotd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/pkcsslotd_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..a7bf1c6
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/pkcsslotd_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,148 @@
++.TH "pkcsslotd_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "pkcsslotd" "SELinux Policy documentation for pkcsslotd"
++.SH "NAME"
++pkcsslotd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the pkcsslotd processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the pkcsslotd processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The pkcsslotd processes execute with the pkcsslotd_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep pkcsslotd_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The pkcsslotd_t SELinux type can be entered via the "pkcsslotd_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the pkcsslotd_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/sbin/pkcsslotd
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux pkcsslotd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their pkcsslotd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for pkcsslotd:
++
++.EX
++.B pkcsslotd_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux pkcsslotd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their pkcsslotd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for pkcsslotd:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B pkcsslotd_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the pkcsslotd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the pkcsslotd_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B pkcsslotd_tmp_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the pkcsslotd_tmp_t type, if you want to store pkcsslotd temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B pkcsslotd_tmpfs_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the pkcsslotd_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store pkcsslotd files on a tmpfs file system.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B pkcsslotd_unit_file_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the pkcsslotd_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as pkcsslotd unit content.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B pkcsslotd_var_lib_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the pkcsslotd_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the pkcsslotd files under the /var/lib directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B pkcsslotd_var_run_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the pkcsslotd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the pkcsslotd files under the /run directory.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type pkcsslotd_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B pkcsslotd_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B pkcsslotd_tmpfs_t
++
++
++.br
++.B pkcsslotd_var_lib_t
++
++ /var/lib/opencryptoki(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B pkcsslotd_var_run_t
++
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), pkcsslotd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/pki_ra_selinux.8 b/man/man8/pki_ra_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..565c3d5
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/pki_ra_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,241 @@
++.TH "pki_ra_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "pki_ra" "SELinux Policy documentation for pki_ra"
++.SH "NAME"
++pki_ra_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the pki_ra processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the pki_ra processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The pki_ra processes execute with the pki_ra_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep pki_ra_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The pki_ra_t SELinux type can be entered via the "httpd_exec_t,pki_ra_exec_t" file types. The default entrypoint paths for the pki_ra_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/sbin/httpd(\.worker)?, /usr/sbin/apache(2)?, /usr/lib/apache-ssl/.+, /usr/sbin/apache-ssl(2)?, /usr/share/jetty/bin/jetty.sh, /usr/sbin/cherokee, /usr/sbin/lighttpd, /usr/sbin/httpd\.event, /usr/bin/mongrel_rails, /var/lib/pki-ra/pki-ra
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux pki_ra policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their pki_ra processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for pki_ra:
++
++.EX
++.B pki_ra_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux pki_ra policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their pki_ra processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for pki_ra:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B pki_ra_etc_rw_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the pki_ra_etc_rw_t type, if you want to treat the files as pki ra etc read/write content.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B pki_ra_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the pki_ra_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the pki_ra_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B pki_ra_lock_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the pki_ra_lock_t type, if you want to treat the files as pki ra lock data, stored under the /var/lock directory
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B pki_ra_log_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the pki_ra_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as pki ra log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B pki_ra_script_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the pki_ra_script_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the pki_ra_script_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B pki_ra_tomcat_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the pki_ra_tomcat_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the pki_ra_tomcat_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B pki_ra_var_lib_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the pki_ra_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the pki ra files under the /var/lib directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B pki_ra_var_run_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the pki_ra_var_run_t type, if you want to store the pki ra files under the /run directory.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH PORT TYPES
++SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
++.PP
++You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
++
++.B semanage port -l
++
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
++SELinux pki_ra policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their pki_ra processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following port types are defined for pki_ra:
++
++.EX
++.TP 5
++.B pki_ra_port_t
++.TP 10
++.EE
++
++
++Default Defined Ports:
++tcp 12888-12889
++.EE
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type pki_ra_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B mail_spool_t
++
++ /var/mail(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/spool/imap(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/spool/mail(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B mqueue_spool_t
++
++ /var/spool/(client)?mqueue(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/spool/mqueue\.in(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B pki_common_t
++
++ /opt/nfast(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B pki_ra_etc_rw_t
++
++ /etc/pki-ra(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/sysconfig/pki/ra(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B pki_ra_lock_t
++
++
++.br
++.B pki_ra_log_t
++
++ /var/log/pki-ra(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B pki_ra_var_lib_t
++
++ /var/lib/pki-ra(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B pki_ra_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/pki/ra(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the pki_ra_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the pki_ra_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.B semanage port
++can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), pki_ra(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, pki_tomcat_selinux(8), pki_tps_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/pki_tomcat_selinux.8 b/man/man8/pki_tomcat_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..47e7c89
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/pki_tomcat_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,273 @@
++.TH "pki_tomcat_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "pki_tomcat" "SELinux Policy documentation for pki_tomcat"
++.SH "NAME"
++pki_tomcat_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the pki_tomcat processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the pki_tomcat processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The pki_tomcat processes execute with the pki_tomcat_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep pki_tomcat_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The pki_tomcat_t SELinux type can be entered via the "pki_tomcat_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the pki_tomcat_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/bin/pkidaemon
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux pki_tomcat policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their pki_tomcat processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for pki_tomcat:
++
++.EX
++.B pki_tomcat_t, pki_tomcat_script_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux pki_tomcat policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their pki_tomcat processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for pki_tomcat:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B pki_tomcat_cache_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the pki_tomcat_cache_t type, if you want to store the files under the /var/cache directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B pki_tomcat_cert_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the pki_tomcat_cert_t type, if you want to treat the files as pki tomcat certificate data.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B pki_tomcat_etc_rw_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the pki_tomcat_etc_rw_t type, if you want to treat the files as pki tomcat etc read/write content.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B pki_tomcat_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the pki_tomcat_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the pki_tomcat_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B pki_tomcat_lock_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the pki_tomcat_lock_t type, if you want to treat the files as pki tomcat lock data, stored under the /var/lock directory
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B pki_tomcat_log_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the pki_tomcat_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as pki tomcat log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B pki_tomcat_tmp_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the pki_tomcat_tmp_t type, if you want to store pki tomcat temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B pki_tomcat_unit_file_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the pki_tomcat_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as pki tomcat unit content.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B pki_tomcat_var_lib_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the pki_tomcat_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the pki tomcat files under the /var/lib directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B pki_tomcat_var_run_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the pki_tomcat_var_run_t type, if you want to store the pki tomcat files under the /run directory.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type pki_tomcat_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B dirsrv_var_lib_t
++
++ /var/lib/dirsrv(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B pki_common_t
++
++ /opt/nfast(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B pki_tomcat_cache_t
++
++
++.br
++.B pki_tomcat_cert_t
++
++ /var/lib/pki-ca/alias(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/pki-kra/alias(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/pki-tks/alias(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/pki-ocsp/alias(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/pki/pki-tomcat/alias(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B pki_tomcat_etc_rw_t
++
++ /etc/pki-ca(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/pki-kra(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/pki-tks(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/pki-ocsp(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/pki/pki-tomcat(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/sysconfig/pki/tomcat(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B pki_tomcat_lock_t
++
++ /var/lock/subsys/pkidaemon
++.br
++
++.br
++.B pki_tomcat_log_t
++
++ /var/log/pki-ca(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/log/pki-kra(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/log/pki-tks(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/log/pki-ocsp(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/log/pki/pki-tomcat(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B pki_tomcat_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B pki_tomcat_var_lib_t
++
++ /var/lib/pki-ca(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/pki-kra(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/pki-tks(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/pki-ocsp(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/pki/pki-tomcat(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B pki_tomcat_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/pki-ca.pid
++.br
++ /var/run/pki-kra.pid
++.br
++ /var/run/pki-tks.pid
++.br
++ /var/run/pki-ocsp.pid
++.br
++ /var/run/pki/tomcat(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B user_tmp_t
++
++ /var/run/user(/.*)?
++.br
++ /tmp/gconfd-.*
++.br
++ /tmp/gconfd-dwalsh
++.br
++ /tmp/gconfd-xguest
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), pki_tomcat(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, pki_ra_selinux(8), pki_tps_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/pki_tps_selinux.8 b/man/man8/pki_tps_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..8fecac8
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/pki_tps_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,223 @@
++.TH "pki_tps_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "pki_tps" "SELinux Policy documentation for pki_tps"
++.SH "NAME"
++pki_tps_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the pki_tps processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the pki_tps processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The pki_tps processes execute with the pki_tps_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep pki_tps_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The pki_tps_t SELinux type can be entered via the "httpd_exec_t,pki_tps_exec_t" file types. The default entrypoint paths for the pki_tps_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/sbin/httpd(\.worker)?, /usr/sbin/apache(2)?, /usr/lib/apache-ssl/.+, /usr/sbin/apache-ssl(2)?, /usr/share/jetty/bin/jetty.sh, /usr/sbin/cherokee, /usr/sbin/lighttpd, /usr/sbin/httpd\.event, /usr/bin/mongrel_rails, /var/lib/pki-tps/pki-tps
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux pki_tps policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their pki_tps processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for pki_tps:
++
++.EX
++.B pki_tps_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux pki_tps policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their pki_tps processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for pki_tps:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B pki_tps_etc_rw_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the pki_tps_etc_rw_t type, if you want to treat the files as pki tps etc read/write content.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B pki_tps_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the pki_tps_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the pki_tps_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B pki_tps_lock_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the pki_tps_lock_t type, if you want to treat the files as pki tps lock data, stored under the /var/lock directory
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B pki_tps_log_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the pki_tps_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as pki tps log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B pki_tps_script_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the pki_tps_script_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the pki_tps_script_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B pki_tps_tomcat_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the pki_tps_tomcat_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the pki_tps_tomcat_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B pki_tps_var_lib_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the pki_tps_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the pki tps files under the /var/lib directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B pki_tps_var_run_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the pki_tps_var_run_t type, if you want to store the pki tps files under the /run directory.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH PORT TYPES
++SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
++.PP
++You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
++
++.B semanage port -l
++
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
++SELinux pki_tps policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their pki_tps processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following port types are defined for pki_tps:
++
++.EX
++.TP 5
++.B pki_tps_port_t
++.TP 10
++.EE
++
++
++Default Defined Ports:
++tcp 7888-7889
++.EE
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type pki_tps_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B pki_common_t
++
++ /opt/nfast(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B pki_tps_etc_rw_t
++
++ /etc/pki-tps(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/sysconfig/pki/tps(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B pki_tps_lock_t
++
++
++.br
++.B pki_tps_log_t
++
++ /var/log/pki-tps(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B pki_tps_var_lib_t
++
++ /var/lib/pki-tps(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B pki_tps_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/pki/tps(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the pki_tps_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the pki_tps_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.B semanage port
++can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), pki_tps(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, pki_ra_selinux(8), pki_tomcat_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/plymouth_selinux.8 b/man/man8/plymouth_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..fd43c97
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/plymouth_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,127 @@
++.TH "plymouth_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "plymouth" "SELinux Policy documentation for plymouth"
++.SH "NAME"
++plymouth_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the plymouth processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the plymouth processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The plymouth processes execute with the plymouth_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep plymouth_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The plymouth_t SELinux type can be entered via the "plymouth_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the plymouth_t domain are the following:"
++
++/bin/plymouth, /usr/bin/plymouth
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux plymouth policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their plymouth processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for plymouth:
++
++.EX
++.B plymouth_t, plymouthd_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux plymouth policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their plymouth processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for plymouth:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B plymouth_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the plymouth_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the plymouth_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B plymouthd_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the plymouthd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the plymouthd_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B plymouthd_spool_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the plymouthd_spool_t type, if you want to store the plymouthd files under the /var/spool directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B plymouthd_var_lib_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the plymouthd_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the plymouthd files under the /var/lib directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B plymouthd_var_log_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the plymouthd_var_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as plymouthd var log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B plymouthd_var_run_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the plymouthd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the plymouthd files under the /run directory.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), plymouth(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, plymouthd_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/plymouthd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/plymouthd_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..8ddb343
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/plymouthd_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,159 @@
++.TH "plymouthd_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "plymouthd" "SELinux Policy documentation for plymouthd"
++.SH "NAME"
++plymouthd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the plymouthd processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the plymouthd processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The plymouthd processes execute with the plymouthd_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep plymouthd_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The plymouthd_t SELinux type can be entered via the "plymouthd_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the plymouthd_t domain are the following:"
++
++/sbin/plymouthd, /usr/sbin/plymouthd
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux plymouthd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their plymouthd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for plymouthd:
++
++.EX
++.B plymouth_t, plymouthd_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux plymouthd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their plymouthd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for plymouthd:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B plymouthd_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the plymouthd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the plymouthd_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B plymouthd_spool_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the plymouthd_spool_t type, if you want to store the plymouthd files under the /var/spool directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B plymouthd_var_lib_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the plymouthd_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the plymouthd files under the /var/lib directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B plymouthd_var_log_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the plymouthd_var_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as plymouthd var log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B plymouthd_var_run_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the plymouthd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the plymouthd files under the /run directory.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type plymouthd_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B fonts_cache_t
++
++ /var/cache/fontconfig(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B plymouthd_spool_t
++
++ /var/spool/plymouth(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B plymouthd_var_lib_t
++
++ /var/lib/plymouth(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B plymouthd_var_log_t
++
++ /var/log/boot\.log
++.br
++
++.br
++.B plymouthd_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/plymouth(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B xdm_spool_t
++
++ /var/spool/[mg]dm(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), plymouthd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, plymouth_selinux(8), plymouth_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/podsleuth_selinux.8 b/man/man8/podsleuth_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..5da1a9f
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/podsleuth_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,128 @@
++.TH "podsleuth_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "podsleuth" "SELinux Policy documentation for podsleuth"
++.SH "NAME"
++podsleuth_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the podsleuth processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the podsleuth processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The podsleuth processes execute with the podsleuth_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep podsleuth_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The podsleuth_t SELinux type can be entered via the "podsleuth_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the podsleuth_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/bin/podsleuth, /usr/libexec/hal-podsleuth
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux podsleuth policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their podsleuth processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for podsleuth:
++
++.EX
++.B podsleuth_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux podsleuth policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their podsleuth processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for podsleuth:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B podsleuth_cache_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the podsleuth_cache_t type, if you want to store the files under the /var/cache directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B podsleuth_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the podsleuth_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the podsleuth_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B podsleuth_tmp_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the podsleuth_tmp_t type, if you want to store podsleuth temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B podsleuth_tmpfs_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the podsleuth_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store podsleuth files on a tmpfs file system.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type podsleuth_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B podsleuth_cache_t
++
++ /var/cache/podsleuth(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B podsleuth_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B podsleuth_tmpfs_t
++
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), podsleuth(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/policykit_auth_selinux.8 b/man/man8/policykit_auth_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..8e1e635
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/policykit_auth_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,207 @@
++.TH "policykit_auth_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "policykit_auth" "SELinux Policy documentation for policykit_auth"
++.SH "NAME"
++policykit_auth_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the policykit_auth processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the policykit_auth processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The policykit_auth processes execute with the policykit_auth_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep policykit_auth_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The policykit_auth_t SELinux type can be entered via the "policykit_auth_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the policykit_auth_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/libexec/polkit-read-auth-helper, /usr/lib/polkit-1/polkit-agent-helper-1, /usr/lib/policykit/polkit-read-auth-helper, /usr/libexec/polkit-1/polkit-agent-helper-1
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux policykit_auth policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their policykit_auth processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for policykit_auth:
++
++.EX
++.B policykit_auth_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux policykit_auth policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their policykit_auth processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for policykit_auth:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B policykit_auth_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the policykit_auth_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the policykit_auth_t domain.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type policykit_auth_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B faillog_t
++
++ /var/log/btmp.*
++.br
++ /var/run/faillock(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/log/faillog
++.br
++ /var/log/tallylog
++.br
++
++.br
++.B krb5_host_rcache_t
++
++ /var/cache/krb5rcache(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/tmp/nfs_0
++.br
++ /var/tmp/DNS_25
++.br
++ /var/tmp/host_0
++.br
++ /var/tmp/imap_0
++.br
++ /var/tmp/HTTP_23
++.br
++ /var/tmp/HTTP_48
++.br
++ /var/tmp/ldap_55
++.br
++ /var/tmp/ldap_487
++.br
++ /var/tmp/ldapmap1_0
++.br
++
++.br
++.B pcscd_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/pcscd(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/pcscd\.events(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/pcscd\.pid
++.br
++ /var/run/pcscd\.pub
++.br
++ /var/run/pcscd\.comm
++.br
++
++.br
++.B policykit_reload_t
++
++ /var/lib/misc/PolicyKit.reload
++.br
++
++.br
++.B policykit_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B policykit_var_lib_t
++
++ /var/lib/polkit-1(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/PolicyKit(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/PolicyKit-public(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B policykit_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/PolicyKit(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B security_t
++
++ /selinux
++.br
++
++.br
++.B var_auth_t
++
++ /var/ace(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/rsa(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/abl(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/rsa(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/pam_ssh(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/pam_ssh(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/pam_shield(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/google-authenticator(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the policykit_auth_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the policykit_auth_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), policykit_auth(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, policykit_selinux(8), policykit_selinux(8), policykit_grant_selinux(8), policykit_resolve_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/policykit_grant_selinux.8 b/man/man8/policykit_grant_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..236cec7
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/policykit_grant_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,157 @@
++.TH "policykit_grant_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "policykit_grant" "SELinux Policy documentation for policykit_grant"
++.SH "NAME"
++policykit_grant_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the policykit_grant processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the policykit_grant processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The policykit_grant processes execute with the policykit_grant_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep policykit_grant_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The policykit_grant_t SELinux type can be entered via the "policykit_grant_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the policykit_grant_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/libexec/polkit-grant-helper.*, /usr/lib/policykit/polkit-grant-helper.*
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux policykit_grant policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their policykit_grant processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for policykit_grant:
++
++.EX
++.B policykit_grant_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux policykit_grant policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their policykit_grant processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for policykit_grant:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B policykit_grant_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the policykit_grant_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the policykit_grant_t domain.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type policykit_grant_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B faillog_t
++
++ /var/log/btmp.*
++.br
++ /var/run/faillock(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/log/faillog
++.br
++ /var/log/tallylog
++.br
++
++.br
++.B pcscd_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/pcscd(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/pcscd\.events(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/pcscd\.pid
++.br
++ /var/run/pcscd\.pub
++.br
++ /var/run/pcscd\.comm
++.br
++
++.br
++.B policykit_reload_t
++
++ /var/lib/misc/PolicyKit.reload
++.br
++
++.br
++.B policykit_var_lib_t
++
++ /var/lib/polkit-1(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/PolicyKit(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/PolicyKit-public(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B policykit_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/PolicyKit(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B system_cronjob_var_lib_t
++
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the policykit_grant_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the policykit_grant_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), policykit_grant(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, policykit_selinux(8), policykit_selinux(8), policykit_auth_selinux(8), policykit_resolve_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/policykit_resolve_selinux.8 b/man/man8/policykit_resolve_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..103c687
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/policykit_resolve_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
++.TH "policykit_resolve_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "policykit_resolve" "SELinux Policy documentation for policykit_resolve"
++.SH "NAME"
++policykit_resolve_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the policykit_resolve processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the policykit_resolve processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The policykit_resolve processes execute with the policykit_resolve_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep policykit_resolve_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The policykit_resolve_t SELinux type can be entered via the "policykit_resolve_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the policykit_resolve_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/libexec/polkit-resolve-exe-helper.*, /usr/lib/policykit/polkit-resolve-exe-helper.*
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux policykit_resolve policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their policykit_resolve processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for policykit_resolve:
++
++.EX
++.B policykit_resolve_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux policykit_resolve policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their policykit_resolve processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for policykit_resolve:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B policykit_resolve_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the policykit_resolve_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the policykit_resolve_t domain.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the policykit_resolve_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the policykit_resolve_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), policykit_resolve(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, policykit_selinux(8), policykit_selinux(8), policykit_auth_selinux(8), policykit_grant_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/policykit_selinux.8 b/man/man8/policykit_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..62bd2e6
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/policykit_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,213 @@
++.TH "policykit_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "policykit" "SELinux Policy documentation for policykit"
++.SH "NAME"
++policykit_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the policykit processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the policykit processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The policykit processes execute with the policykit_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep policykit_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The policykit_t SELinux type can be entered via the "policykit_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the policykit_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/libexec/polkitd.*, /usr/libexec/polkit-1/polkitd.*, /usr/lib/polkit-1/polkitd, /usr/lib/policykit/polkitd
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux policykit policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their policykit processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for policykit:
++
++.EX
++.B policykit_grant_t, policykit_auth_t, policykit_t, policykit_resolve_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux policykit policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their policykit processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for policykit:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B policykit_auth_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the policykit_auth_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the policykit_auth_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B policykit_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the policykit_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the policykit_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B policykit_grant_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the policykit_grant_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the policykit_grant_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B policykit_reload_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the policykit_reload_t type, if you want to treat the files as policykit reload data.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B policykit_resolve_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the policykit_resolve_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the policykit_resolve_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B policykit_tmp_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the policykit_tmp_t type, if you want to store policykit temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B policykit_var_lib_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the policykit_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the policykit files under the /var/lib directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B policykit_var_run_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the policykit_var_run_t type, if you want to store the policykit files under the /run directory.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type policykit_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B krb5_host_rcache_t
++
++ /var/cache/krb5rcache(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/tmp/nfs_0
++.br
++ /var/tmp/DNS_25
++.br
++ /var/tmp/host_0
++.br
++ /var/tmp/imap_0
++.br
++ /var/tmp/HTTP_23
++.br
++ /var/tmp/HTTP_48
++.br
++ /var/tmp/ldap_55
++.br
++ /var/tmp/ldap_487
++.br
++ /var/tmp/ldapmap1_0
++.br
++
++.br
++.B policykit_reload_t
++
++ /var/lib/misc/PolicyKit.reload
++.br
++
++.br
++.B policykit_var_lib_t
++
++ /var/lib/polkit-1(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/PolicyKit(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/PolicyKit-public(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B policykit_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/PolicyKit(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B security_t
++
++ /selinux
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the policykit_grant_t, policykit_auth_t, policykit_t, policykit_resolve_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the policykit_grant_t, policykit_auth_t, policykit_t, policykit_resolve_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), policykit(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, policykit_auth_selinux(8), policykit_grant_selinux(8), policykit_resolve_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/polipo_selinux.8 b/man/man8/polipo_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..47a11ed
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/polipo_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,264 @@
++.TH "polipo_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "polipo" "SELinux Policy documentation for polipo"
++.SH "NAME"
++polipo_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the polipo processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the polipo processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The polipo processes execute with the polipo_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep polipo_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The polipo_t SELinux type can be entered via the "polipo_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the polipo_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/bin/polipo
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux polipo policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their polipo processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for polipo:
++
++.EX
++.B polipo_t, polipo_session_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH BOOLEANS
++SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. polipo policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run polipo with the tightest access possible.
++
++
++.PP
++If you want to determine whether calling user domains can execute Polipo daemon in the polipo_session_t domain, you must turn on the polipo_session_users boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P polipo_session_users 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to determine whether Polipo can access nfs file systems, you must turn on the polipo_use_nfs boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P polipo_use_nfs 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to determine whether polipo can access cifs file systems, you must turn on the polipo_use_cifs boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P polipo_use_cifs 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to determine whether Polipo session daemon can bind tcp sockets to all unreserved ports, you must turn on the polipo_session_bind_all_unreserved_ports boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P polipo_session_bind_all_unreserved_ports 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow polipo to connect to all ports > 1023, you must turn on the polipo_connect_all_unreserved boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P polipo_connect_all_unreserved 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to determine whether calling user domains can execute Polipo daemon in the polipo_session_t domain, you must turn on the polipo_session_users boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P polipo_session_users 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to determine whether Polipo can access nfs file systems, you must turn on the polipo_use_nfs boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P polipo_use_nfs 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to determine whether polipo can access cifs file systems, you must turn on the polipo_use_cifs boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P polipo_use_cifs 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to determine whether Polipo session daemon can bind tcp sockets to all unreserved ports, you must turn on the polipo_session_bind_all_unreserved_ports boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P polipo_session_bind_all_unreserved_ports 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow polipo to connect to all ports > 1023, you must turn on the polipo_connect_all_unreserved boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P polipo_connect_all_unreserved 1
++.EE
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux polipo policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their polipo processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for polipo:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B polipo_cache_home_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the polipo_cache_home_t type, if you want to store polipo cache files in the users home directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B polipo_cache_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the polipo_cache_t type, if you want to store the files under the /var/cache directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B polipo_config_home_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the polipo_config_home_t type, if you want to store polipo config files in the users home directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B polipo_etc_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the polipo_etc_t type, if you want to store polipo files in the /etc directories.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B polipo_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the polipo_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the polipo_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B polipo_initrc_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the polipo_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the polipo_initrc_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B polipo_log_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the polipo_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as polipo log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B polipo_pid_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the polipo_pid_t type, if you want to store the polipo files under the /run directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B polipo_unit_file_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the polipo_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as polipo unit content.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type polipo_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B polipo_cache_t
++
++ /var/cache/polipo(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B polipo_log_t
++
++ /var/log/polipo.*
++.br
++
++.br
++.B polipo_pid_t
++
++ /var/run/polipo(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the polipo_t, polipo_session_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the polipo_t, polipo_session_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.B semanage boolean
++can also be used to manipulate the booleans
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), polipo(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, setsebool(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/portmap_helper_selinux.8 b/man/man8/portmap_helper_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..8e59c47
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/portmap_helper_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,125 @@
++.TH "portmap_helper_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "portmap_helper" "SELinux Policy documentation for portmap_helper"
++.SH "NAME"
++portmap_helper_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the portmap_helper processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the portmap_helper processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The portmap_helper processes execute with the portmap_helper_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep portmap_helper_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The portmap_helper_t SELinux type can be entered via the "portmap_helper_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the portmap_helper_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/sbin/pmap_set, /usr/sbin/pmap_dump
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux portmap_helper policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their portmap_helper processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for portmap_helper:
++
++.EX
++.B portmap_helper_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux portmap_helper policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their portmap_helper processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for portmap_helper:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B portmap_helper_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the portmap_helper_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the portmap_helper_t domain.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type portmap_helper_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B initrc_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/utmp
++.br
++ /var/run/random-seed
++.br
++ /var/run/runlevel\.dir
++.br
++ /var/run/setmixer_flag
++.br
++
++.br
++.B portmap_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/portmap\.upgrade-state
++.br
++
++.br
++.B var_run_t
++
++ /run/.*
++.br
++ /var/run/.*
++.br
++ /run
++.br
++ /var/run
++.br
++ /var/run
++.br
++ /var/spool/postfix/pid
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), portmap_helper(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, portmap_selinux(8), portmap_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/portmap_selinux.8 b/man/man8/portmap_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..6c4bbc4
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/portmap_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,188 @@
++.TH "portmap_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "portmap" "SELinux Policy documentation for portmap"
++.SH "NAME"
++portmap_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the portmap processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the portmap processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The portmap processes execute with the portmap_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep portmap_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The portmap_t SELinux type can be entered via the "portmap_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the portmap_t domain are the following:"
++
++/sbin/portmap, /usr/sbin/portmap
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux portmap policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their portmap processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for portmap:
++
++.EX
++.B portmap_helper_t, portmap_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH BOOLEANS
++SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. portmap policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run portmap with the tightest access possible.
++
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow samba to act as a portmapper, you must turn on the samba_portmapper boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P samba_portmapper 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow samba to act as a portmapper, you must turn on the samba_portmapper boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P samba_portmapper 1
++.EE
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux portmap policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their portmap processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for portmap:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B portmap_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the portmap_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the portmap_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B portmap_helper_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the portmap_helper_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the portmap_helper_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B portmap_tmp_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the portmap_tmp_t type, if you want to store portmap temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B portmap_var_run_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the portmap_var_run_t type, if you want to store the portmap files under the /run directory.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH PORT TYPES
++SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
++.PP
++You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
++
++.B semanage port -l
++
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
++SELinux portmap policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their portmap processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following port types are defined for portmap:
++
++.EX
++.TP 5
++.B portmap_port_t
++.TP 10
++.EE
++
++
++Default Defined Ports:
++tcp 111
++.EE
++udp 111
++.EE
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type portmap_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B portmap_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B portmap_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/portmap\.upgrade-state
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the portmap_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the portmap_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.B semanage port
++can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
++
++.B semanage boolean
++can also be used to manipulate the booleans
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), portmap(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, setsebool(8), portmap_helper_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/portreserve_selinux.8 b/man/man8/portreserve_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..af478cb
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/portreserve_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,120 @@
++.TH "portreserve_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "portreserve" "SELinux Policy documentation for portreserve"
++.SH "NAME"
++portreserve_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the portreserve processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the portreserve processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The portreserve processes execute with the portreserve_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep portreserve_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The portreserve_t SELinux type can be entered via the "portreserve_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the portreserve_t domain are the following:"
++
++/sbin/portreserve, /usr/sbin/portreserve
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux portreserve policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their portreserve processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for portreserve:
++
++.EX
++.B portreserve_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux portreserve policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their portreserve processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for portreserve:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B portreserve_etc_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the portreserve_etc_t type, if you want to store portreserve files in the /etc directories.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B portreserve_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the portreserve_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the portreserve_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B portreserve_initrc_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the portreserve_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the portreserve_initrc_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B portreserve_var_run_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the portreserve_var_run_t type, if you want to store the portreserve files under the /run directory.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type portreserve_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B portreserve_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/portreserve(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), portreserve(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/postfix_bounce_selinux.8 b/man/man8/postfix_bounce_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..c0a0f25
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/postfix_bounce_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,149 @@
++.TH "postfix_bounce_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "postfix_bounce" "SELinux Policy documentation for postfix_bounce"
++.SH "NAME"
++postfix_bounce_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the postfix_bounce processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the postfix_bounce processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The postfix_bounce processes execute with the postfix_bounce_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep postfix_bounce_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The postfix_bounce_t SELinux type can be entered via the "postfix_bounce_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the postfix_bounce_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/libexec/postfix/bounce
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux postfix_bounce policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their postfix_bounce processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for postfix_bounce:
++
++.EX
++.B postfix_bounce_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux postfix_bounce policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their postfix_bounce processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for postfix_bounce:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B postfix_bounce_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the postfix_bounce_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the postfix_bounce_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B postfix_bounce_tmp_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the postfix_bounce_tmp_t type, if you want to store postfix bounce temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type postfix_bounce_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B anon_inodefs_t
++
++
++.br
++.B postfix_bounce_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B postfix_spool_bounce_t
++
++ /var/spool/postfix/bounce(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B postfix_spool_maildrop_t
++
++ /var/spool/postfix/defer(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/spool/postfix/deferred(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/spool/postfix/maildrop(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B postfix_spool_t
++
++ /var/spool/postfix.*
++.br
++
++.br
++.B postfix_var_run_t
++
++ /var/spool/postfix/pid/.*
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the postfix_bounce_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the postfix_bounce_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), postfix_bounce(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, postfix_cleanup_selinux(8), postfix_local_selinux(8), postfix_map_selinux(8), postfix_master_selinux(8), postfix_pickup_selinux(8), postfix_pipe_selinux(8), postfix_postdrop_selinux(8), postfix_postqueue_selinux(8), postfix_qmgr_selinux(8), postfix_showq_selinux(8), postfix_smtp_selinux(8), postfix_smtpd_selinux(8), postfix_virtual_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/postfix_cleanup_selinux.8 b/man/man8/postfix_cleanup_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..615ab43
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/postfix_cleanup_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,133 @@
++.TH "postfix_cleanup_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "postfix_cleanup" "SELinux Policy documentation for postfix_cleanup"
++.SH "NAME"
++postfix_cleanup_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the postfix_cleanup processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the postfix_cleanup processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The postfix_cleanup processes execute with the postfix_cleanup_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep postfix_cleanup_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The postfix_cleanup_t SELinux type can be entered via the "postfix_cleanup_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the postfix_cleanup_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/libexec/postfix/cleanup
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux postfix_cleanup policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their postfix_cleanup processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for postfix_cleanup:
++
++.EX
++.B postfix_cleanup_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux postfix_cleanup policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their postfix_cleanup processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for postfix_cleanup:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B postfix_cleanup_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the postfix_cleanup_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the postfix_cleanup_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B postfix_cleanup_tmp_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the postfix_cleanup_tmp_t type, if you want to store postfix cleanup temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type postfix_cleanup_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B anon_inodefs_t
++
++
++.br
++.B postfix_cleanup_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B postfix_spool_t
++
++ /var/spool/postfix.*
++.br
++
++.br
++.B postfix_var_run_t
++
++ /var/spool/postfix/pid/.*
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the postfix_cleanup_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the postfix_cleanup_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), postfix_cleanup(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, postfix_bounce_selinux(8), postfix_local_selinux(8), postfix_map_selinux(8), postfix_master_selinux(8), postfix_pickup_selinux(8), postfix_pipe_selinux(8), postfix_postdrop_selinux(8), postfix_postqueue_selinux(8), postfix_qmgr_selinux(8), postfix_showq_selinux(8), postfix_smtp_selinux(8), postfix_smtpd_selinux(8), postfix_virtual_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/postfix_local_selinux.8 b/man/man8/postfix_local_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..6e24730
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/postfix_local_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,212 @@
++.TH "postfix_local_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "postfix_local" "SELinux Policy documentation for postfix_local"
++.SH "NAME"
++postfix_local_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the postfix_local processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the postfix_local processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The postfix_local processes execute with the postfix_local_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep postfix_local_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The postfix_local_t SELinux type can be entered via the "postfix_local_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the postfix_local_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/libexec/postfix/local
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux postfix_local policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their postfix_local processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for postfix_local:
++
++.EX
++.B postfix_local_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH BOOLEANS
++SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. postfix_local policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run postfix_local with the tightest access possible.
++
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow postfix_local domain full write access to mail_spool directories, you must turn on the postfix_local_write_mail_spool boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P postfix_local_write_mail_spool 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow postfix_local domain full write access to mail_spool directories, you must turn on the postfix_local_write_mail_spool boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P postfix_local_write_mail_spool 1
++.EE
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux postfix_local policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their postfix_local processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for postfix_local:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B postfix_local_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the postfix_local_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the postfix_local_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B postfix_local_tmp_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the postfix_local_tmp_t type, if you want to store postfix local temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type postfix_local_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B anon_inodefs_t
++
++
++.br
++.B dovecot_spool_t
++
++ /var/spool/dovecot(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B mail_home_rw_t
++
++ /root/Maildir(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/Maildir(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/Maildir(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/Maildir(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B mail_spool_t
++
++ /var/mail(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/spool/imap(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/spool/mail(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B mailman_data_t
++
++ /etc/mailman.*
++.br
++ /var/lib/mailman.*
++.br
++ /var/spool/mailman.*
++.br
++
++.br
++.B postfix_local_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B postfix_spool_maildrop_t
++
++ /var/spool/postfix/defer(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/spool/postfix/deferred(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/spool/postfix/maildrop(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B postfix_spool_t
++
++ /var/spool/postfix.*
++.br
++
++.br
++.B postfix_var_run_t
++
++ /var/spool/postfix/pid/.*
++.br
++
++.br
++.B user_home_t
++
++ /home/[^/]*/.+
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/.+
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/.+
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the postfix_local_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the postfix_local_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.B semanage boolean
++can also be used to manipulate the booleans
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), postfix_local(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, setsebool(8), postfix_bounce_selinux(8), postfix_cleanup_selinux(8), postfix_map_selinux(8), postfix_master_selinux(8), postfix_pickup_selinux(8), postfix_pipe_selinux(8), postfix_postdrop_selinux(8), postfix_postqueue_selinux(8), postfix_qmgr_selinux(8), postfix_showq_selinux(8), postfix_smtp_selinux(8), postfix_smtpd_selinux(8), postfix_virtual_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/postfix_map_selinux.8 b/man/man8/postfix_map_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..f1b2f03
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/postfix_map_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,133 @@
++.TH "postfix_map_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "postfix_map" "SELinux Policy documentation for postfix_map"
++.SH "NAME"
++postfix_map_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the postfix_map processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the postfix_map processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The postfix_map processes execute with the postfix_map_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep postfix_map_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The postfix_map_t SELinux type can be entered via the "postfix_map_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the postfix_map_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/sbin/postmap
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux postfix_map policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their postfix_map processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for postfix_map:
++
++.EX
++.B postfix_map_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux postfix_map policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their postfix_map processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for postfix_map:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B postfix_map_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the postfix_map_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the postfix_map_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B postfix_map_tmp_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the postfix_map_tmp_t type, if you want to store postfix map temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type postfix_map_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B mailman_data_t
++
++ /etc/mailman.*
++.br
++ /var/lib/mailman.*
++.br
++ /var/spool/mailman.*
++.br
++
++.br
++.B postfix_etc_t
++
++ /etc/postfix.*
++.br
++
++.br
++.B postfix_map_tmp_t
++
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the postfix_map_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the postfix_map_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), postfix_map(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, postfix_bounce_selinux(8), postfix_cleanup_selinux(8), postfix_local_selinux(8), postfix_master_selinux(8), postfix_pickup_selinux(8), postfix_pipe_selinux(8), postfix_postdrop_selinux(8), postfix_postqueue_selinux(8), postfix_qmgr_selinux(8), postfix_showq_selinux(8), postfix_smtp_selinux(8), postfix_smtpd_selinux(8), postfix_virtual_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/postfix_master_selinux.8 b/man/man8/postfix_master_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..feb9a1e
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/postfix_master_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,177 @@
++.TH "postfix_master_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "postfix_master" "SELinux Policy documentation for postfix_master"
++.SH "NAME"
++postfix_master_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the postfix_master processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the postfix_master processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The postfix_master processes execute with the postfix_master_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep postfix_master_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The postfix_master_t SELinux type can be entered via the "postfix_master_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the postfix_master_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/sbin/postcat, /usr/sbin/postfix, /usr/sbin/postlog, /usr/sbin/postkick, /usr/sbin/postlock, /usr/sbin/postalias, /usr/sbin/postsuper, /usr/libexec/postfix/master
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux postfix_master policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their postfix_master processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for postfix_master:
++
++.EX
++.B postfix_master_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux postfix_master policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their postfix_master processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for postfix_master:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B postfix_master_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the postfix_master_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the postfix_master_t domain.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type postfix_master_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B anon_inodefs_t
++
++
++.br
++.B etc_aliases_t
++
++ /etc/mail/aliases.*
++.br
++ /etc/postfix/aliases.*
++.br
++ /etc/aliases
++.br
++ /etc/aliases\.db
++.br
++
++.br
++.B mailman_data_t
++
++ /etc/mailman.*
++.br
++ /var/lib/mailman.*
++.br
++ /var/spool/mailman.*
++.br
++
++.br
++.B postfix_data_t
++
++ /var/lib/postfix.*
++.br
++
++.br
++.B postfix_etc_t
++
++ /etc/postfix.*
++.br
++
++.br
++.B postfix_prng_t
++
++ /etc/postfix/prng_exch
++.br
++
++.br
++.B postfix_spool_flush_t
++
++ /var/spool/postfix/flush(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B postfix_spool_maildrop_t
++
++ /var/spool/postfix/defer(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/spool/postfix/deferred(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/spool/postfix/maildrop(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B postfix_spool_t
++
++ /var/spool/postfix.*
++.br
++
++.br
++.B postfix_var_run_t
++
++ /var/spool/postfix/pid/.*
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the postfix_master_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the postfix_master_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), postfix_master(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, postfix_bounce_selinux(8), postfix_cleanup_selinux(8), postfix_local_selinux(8), postfix_map_selinux(8), postfix_pickup_selinux(8), postfix_pipe_selinux(8), postfix_postdrop_selinux(8), postfix_postqueue_selinux(8), postfix_qmgr_selinux(8), postfix_showq_selinux(8), postfix_smtp_selinux(8), postfix_smtpd_selinux(8), postfix_virtual_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/postfix_pickup_selinux.8 b/man/man8/postfix_pickup_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..4db315f
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/postfix_pickup_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,127 @@
++.TH "postfix_pickup_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "postfix_pickup" "SELinux Policy documentation for postfix_pickup"
++.SH "NAME"
++postfix_pickup_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the postfix_pickup processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the postfix_pickup processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The postfix_pickup processes execute with the postfix_pickup_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep postfix_pickup_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The postfix_pickup_t SELinux type can be entered via the "postfix_pickup_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the postfix_pickup_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/libexec/postfix/pickup
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux postfix_pickup policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their postfix_pickup processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for postfix_pickup:
++
++.EX
++.B postfix_pickup_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux postfix_pickup policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their postfix_pickup processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for postfix_pickup:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B postfix_pickup_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the postfix_pickup_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the postfix_pickup_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B postfix_pickup_tmp_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the postfix_pickup_tmp_t type, if you want to store postfix pickup temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type postfix_pickup_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B anon_inodefs_t
++
++
++.br
++.B postfix_pickup_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B postfix_var_run_t
++
++ /var/spool/postfix/pid/.*
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the postfix_pickup_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the postfix_pickup_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), postfix_pickup(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, postfix_bounce_selinux(8), postfix_cleanup_selinux(8), postfix_local_selinux(8), postfix_map_selinux(8), postfix_master_selinux(8), postfix_pipe_selinux(8), postfix_postdrop_selinux(8), postfix_postqueue_selinux(8), postfix_qmgr_selinux(8), postfix_showq_selinux(8), postfix_smtp_selinux(8), postfix_smtpd_selinux(8), postfix_virtual_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/postfix_pipe_selinux.8 b/man/man8/postfix_pipe_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..0fc0351
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/postfix_pipe_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,143 @@
++.TH "postfix_pipe_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "postfix_pipe" "SELinux Policy documentation for postfix_pipe"
++.SH "NAME"
++postfix_pipe_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the postfix_pipe processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the postfix_pipe processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The postfix_pipe processes execute with the postfix_pipe_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep postfix_pipe_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The postfix_pipe_t SELinux type can be entered via the "postfix_pipe_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the postfix_pipe_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/libexec/postfix/pipe
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux postfix_pipe policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their postfix_pipe processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for postfix_pipe:
++
++.EX
++.B postfix_pipe_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux postfix_pipe policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their postfix_pipe processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for postfix_pipe:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B postfix_pipe_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the postfix_pipe_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the postfix_pipe_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B postfix_pipe_tmp_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the postfix_pipe_tmp_t type, if you want to store postfix pipe temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type postfix_pipe_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B anon_inodefs_t
++
++
++.br
++.B mail_spool_t
++
++ /var/mail(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/spool/imap(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/spool/mail(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B postfix_pipe_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B postfix_spool_t
++
++ /var/spool/postfix.*
++.br
++
++.br
++.B postfix_var_run_t
++
++ /var/spool/postfix/pid/.*
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the postfix_pipe_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the postfix_pipe_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), postfix_pipe(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, postfix_bounce_selinux(8), postfix_cleanup_selinux(8), postfix_local_selinux(8), postfix_map_selinux(8), postfix_master_selinux(8), postfix_pickup_selinux(8), postfix_postdrop_selinux(8), postfix_postqueue_selinux(8), postfix_qmgr_selinux(8), postfix_showq_selinux(8), postfix_smtp_selinux(8), postfix_smtpd_selinux(8), postfix_virtual_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/postfix_postdrop_selinux.8 b/man/man8/postfix_postdrop_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..e6877f7
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/postfix_postdrop_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,137 @@
++.TH "postfix_postdrop_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "postfix_postdrop" "SELinux Policy documentation for postfix_postdrop"
++.SH "NAME"
++postfix_postdrop_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the postfix_postdrop processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the postfix_postdrop processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The postfix_postdrop processes execute with the postfix_postdrop_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep postfix_postdrop_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The postfix_postdrop_t SELinux type can be entered via the "postfix_postdrop_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the postfix_postdrop_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/sbin/postdrop
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux postfix_postdrop policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their postfix_postdrop processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for postfix_postdrop:
++
++.EX
++.B postfix_postdrop_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux postfix_postdrop policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their postfix_postdrop processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for postfix_postdrop:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B postfix_postdrop_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the postfix_postdrop_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the postfix_postdrop_t domain.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type postfix_postdrop_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B anon_inodefs_t
++
++
++.br
++.B arpwatch_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B postfix_spool_maildrop_t
++
++ /var/spool/postfix/defer(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/spool/postfix/deferred(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/spool/postfix/maildrop(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B postfix_var_run_t
++
++ /var/spool/postfix/pid/.*
++.br
++
++.br
++.B uucpd_spool_t
++
++ /var/spool/uucp(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/spool/uucppublic(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the postfix_postdrop_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the postfix_postdrop_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), postfix_postdrop(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, postfix_bounce_selinux(8), postfix_cleanup_selinux(8), postfix_local_selinux(8), postfix_map_selinux(8), postfix_master_selinux(8), postfix_pickup_selinux(8), postfix_pipe_selinux(8), postfix_postqueue_selinux(8), postfix_qmgr_selinux(8), postfix_showq_selinux(8), postfix_smtp_selinux(8), postfix_smtpd_selinux(8), postfix_virtual_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/postfix_postqueue_selinux.8 b/man/man8/postfix_postqueue_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..7b40ff1
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/postfix_postqueue_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,119 @@
++.TH "postfix_postqueue_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "postfix_postqueue" "SELinux Policy documentation for postfix_postqueue"
++.SH "NAME"
++postfix_postqueue_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the postfix_postqueue processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the postfix_postqueue processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The postfix_postqueue processes execute with the postfix_postqueue_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep postfix_postqueue_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The postfix_postqueue_t SELinux type can be entered via the "postfix_postqueue_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the postfix_postqueue_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/sbin/postqueue
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux postfix_postqueue policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their postfix_postqueue processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for postfix_postqueue:
++
++.EX
++.B postfix_postqueue_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux postfix_postqueue policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their postfix_postqueue processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for postfix_postqueue:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B postfix_postqueue_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the postfix_postqueue_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the postfix_postqueue_t domain.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type postfix_postqueue_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B anon_inodefs_t
++
++
++.br
++.B arpwatch_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B postfix_var_run_t
++
++ /var/spool/postfix/pid/.*
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the postfix_postqueue_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the postfix_postqueue_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), postfix_postqueue(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, postfix_bounce_selinux(8), postfix_cleanup_selinux(8), postfix_local_selinux(8), postfix_map_selinux(8), postfix_master_selinux(8), postfix_pickup_selinux(8), postfix_pipe_selinux(8), postfix_postdrop_selinux(8), postfix_qmgr_selinux(8), postfix_showq_selinux(8), postfix_smtp_selinux(8), postfix_smtpd_selinux(8), postfix_virtual_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/postfix_qmgr_selinux.8 b/man/man8/postfix_qmgr_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..0cdebf4
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/postfix_qmgr_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,143 @@
++.TH "postfix_qmgr_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "postfix_qmgr" "SELinux Policy documentation for postfix_qmgr"
++.SH "NAME"
++postfix_qmgr_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the postfix_qmgr processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the postfix_qmgr processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The postfix_qmgr processes execute with the postfix_qmgr_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep postfix_qmgr_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The postfix_qmgr_t SELinux type can be entered via the "postfix_qmgr_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the postfix_qmgr_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/libexec/postfix/(n)?qmgr
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux postfix_qmgr policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their postfix_qmgr processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for postfix_qmgr:
++
++.EX
++.B postfix_qmgr_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux postfix_qmgr policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their postfix_qmgr processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for postfix_qmgr:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B postfix_qmgr_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the postfix_qmgr_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the postfix_qmgr_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B postfix_qmgr_tmp_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the postfix_qmgr_tmp_t type, if you want to store postfix qmgr temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type postfix_qmgr_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B anon_inodefs_t
++
++
++.br
++.B postfix_qmgr_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B postfix_spool_maildrop_t
++
++ /var/spool/postfix/defer(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/spool/postfix/deferred(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/spool/postfix/maildrop(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B postfix_spool_t
++
++ /var/spool/postfix.*
++.br
++
++.br
++.B postfix_var_run_t
++
++ /var/spool/postfix/pid/.*
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the postfix_qmgr_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the postfix_qmgr_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), postfix_qmgr(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, postfix_bounce_selinux(8), postfix_cleanup_selinux(8), postfix_local_selinux(8), postfix_map_selinux(8), postfix_master_selinux(8), postfix_pickup_selinux(8), postfix_pipe_selinux(8), postfix_postdrop_selinux(8), postfix_postqueue_selinux(8), postfix_showq_selinux(8), postfix_smtp_selinux(8), postfix_smtpd_selinux(8), postfix_virtual_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/postfix_showq_selinux.8 b/man/man8/postfix_showq_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..06cde29
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/postfix_showq_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,115 @@
++.TH "postfix_showq_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "postfix_showq" "SELinux Policy documentation for postfix_showq"
++.SH "NAME"
++postfix_showq_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the postfix_showq processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the postfix_showq processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The postfix_showq processes execute with the postfix_showq_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep postfix_showq_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The postfix_showq_t SELinux type can be entered via the "postfix_showq_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the postfix_showq_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/libexec/postfix/showq
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux postfix_showq policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their postfix_showq processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for postfix_showq:
++
++.EX
++.B postfix_showq_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux postfix_showq policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their postfix_showq processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for postfix_showq:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B postfix_showq_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the postfix_showq_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the postfix_showq_t domain.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type postfix_showq_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B anon_inodefs_t
++
++
++.br
++.B postfix_var_run_t
++
++ /var/spool/postfix/pid/.*
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the postfix_showq_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the postfix_showq_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), postfix_showq(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, postfix_bounce_selinux(8), postfix_cleanup_selinux(8), postfix_local_selinux(8), postfix_map_selinux(8), postfix_master_selinux(8), postfix_pickup_selinux(8), postfix_pipe_selinux(8), postfix_postdrop_selinux(8), postfix_postqueue_selinux(8), postfix_qmgr_selinux(8), postfix_smtp_selinux(8), postfix_smtpd_selinux(8), postfix_virtual_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/postfix_smtp_selinux.8 b/man/man8/postfix_smtp_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..d10b079
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/postfix_smtp_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,165 @@
++.TH "postfix_smtp_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "postfix_smtp" "SELinux Policy documentation for postfix_smtp"
++.SH "NAME"
++postfix_smtp_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the postfix_smtp processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the postfix_smtp processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The postfix_smtp processes execute with the postfix_smtp_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep postfix_smtp_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The postfix_smtp_t SELinux type can be entered via the "postfix_smtp_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the postfix_smtp_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/libexec/postfix/lmtp, /usr/libexec/postfix/smtp, /usr/libexec/postfix/scache
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux postfix_smtp policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their postfix_smtp processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for postfix_smtp:
++
++.EX
++.B postfix_smtpd_t, postfix_smtp_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux postfix_smtp policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their postfix_smtp processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for postfix_smtp:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B postfix_smtp_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the postfix_smtp_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the postfix_smtp_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B postfix_smtp_tmp_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the postfix_smtp_tmp_t type, if you want to store postfix smtp temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B postfix_smtpd_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the postfix_smtpd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the postfix_smtpd_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B postfix_smtpd_tmp_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the postfix_smtpd_tmp_t type, if you want to store postfix smtpd temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type postfix_smtp_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B anon_inodefs_t
++
++
++.br
++.B postfix_prng_t
++
++ /etc/postfix/prng_exch
++.br
++
++.br
++.B postfix_smtp_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B postfix_spool_maildrop_t
++
++ /var/spool/postfix/defer(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/spool/postfix/deferred(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/spool/postfix/maildrop(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B postfix_spool_t
++
++ /var/spool/postfix.*
++.br
++
++.br
++.B postfix_var_run_t
++
++ /var/spool/postfix/pid/.*
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the postfix_smtpd_t, postfix_smtp_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the postfix_smtpd_t, postfix_smtp_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), postfix_smtp(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, postfix_bounce_selinux(8), postfix_cleanup_selinux(8), postfix_local_selinux(8), postfix_map_selinux(8), postfix_master_selinux(8), postfix_pickup_selinux(8), postfix_pipe_selinux(8), postfix_postdrop_selinux(8), postfix_postqueue_selinux(8), postfix_qmgr_selinux(8), postfix_showq_selinux(8), postfix_smtpd_selinux(8), postfix_virtual_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/postfix_smtpd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/postfix_smtpd_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..45ad26e
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/postfix_smtpd_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,139 @@
++.TH "postfix_smtpd_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "postfix_smtpd" "SELinux Policy documentation for postfix_smtpd"
++.SH "NAME"
++postfix_smtpd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the postfix_smtpd processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the postfix_smtpd processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The postfix_smtpd processes execute with the postfix_smtpd_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep postfix_smtpd_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The postfix_smtpd_t SELinux type can be entered via the "postfix_smtpd_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the postfix_smtpd_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/libexec/postfix/smtpd
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux postfix_smtpd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their postfix_smtpd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for postfix_smtpd:
++
++.EX
++.B postfix_smtpd_t, postfix_smtp_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux postfix_smtpd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their postfix_smtpd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for postfix_smtpd:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B postfix_smtpd_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the postfix_smtpd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the postfix_smtpd_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B postfix_smtpd_tmp_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the postfix_smtpd_tmp_t type, if you want to store postfix smtpd temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type postfix_smtpd_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B anon_inodefs_t
++
++
++.br
++.B postfix_prng_t
++
++ /etc/postfix/prng_exch
++.br
++
++.br
++.B postfix_smtpd_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B postfix_spool_t
++
++ /var/spool/postfix.*
++.br
++
++.br
++.B postfix_var_run_t
++
++ /var/spool/postfix/pid/.*
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the postfix_smtpd_t, postfix_smtp_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the postfix_smtpd_t, postfix_smtp_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), postfix_smtpd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, postfix_bounce_selinux(8), postfix_cleanup_selinux(8), postfix_local_selinux(8), postfix_map_selinux(8), postfix_master_selinux(8), postfix_pickup_selinux(8), postfix_pipe_selinux(8), postfix_postdrop_selinux(8), postfix_postqueue_selinux(8), postfix_qmgr_selinux(8), postfix_showq_selinux(8), postfix_smtp_selinux(8), postfix_smtp_selinux(8), postfix_virtual_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/postfix_virtual_selinux.8 b/man/man8/postfix_virtual_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..c58fbd2
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/postfix_virtual_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,165 @@
++.TH "postfix_virtual_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "postfix_virtual" "SELinux Policy documentation for postfix_virtual"
++.SH "NAME"
++postfix_virtual_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the postfix_virtual processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the postfix_virtual processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The postfix_virtual processes execute with the postfix_virtual_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep postfix_virtual_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The postfix_virtual_t SELinux type can be entered via the "postfix_virtual_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the postfix_virtual_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/libexec/postfix/virtual
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux postfix_virtual policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their postfix_virtual processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for postfix_virtual:
++
++.EX
++.B postfix_virtual_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux postfix_virtual policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their postfix_virtual processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for postfix_virtual:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B postfix_virtual_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the postfix_virtual_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the postfix_virtual_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B postfix_virtual_tmp_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the postfix_virtual_tmp_t type, if you want to store postfix virtual temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type postfix_virtual_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B anon_inodefs_t
++
++
++.br
++.B dovecot_spool_t
++
++ /var/spool/dovecot(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B mail_spool_t
++
++ /var/mail(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/spool/imap(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/spool/mail(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B postfix_spool_t
++
++ /var/spool/postfix.*
++.br
++
++.br
++.B postfix_var_run_t
++
++ /var/spool/postfix/pid/.*
++.br
++
++.br
++.B postfix_virtual_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B user_home_t
++
++ /home/[^/]*/.+
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/.+
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/.+
++.br
++
++.br
++.B user_home_type
++
++ all user home files
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the postfix_virtual_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the postfix_virtual_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), postfix_virtual(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, postfix_bounce_selinux(8), postfix_cleanup_selinux(8), postfix_local_selinux(8), postfix_map_selinux(8), postfix_master_selinux(8), postfix_pickup_selinux(8), postfix_pipe_selinux(8), postfix_postdrop_selinux(8), postfix_postqueue_selinux(8), postfix_qmgr_selinux(8), postfix_showq_selinux(8), postfix_smtp_selinux(8), postfix_smtpd_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/postgresql_selinux.8 b/man/man8/postgresql_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..375c37b
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/postgresql_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,382 @@
++.TH "postgresql_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "postgresql" "SELinux Policy documentation for postgresql"
++.SH "NAME"
++postgresql_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the postgresql processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the postgresql processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The postgresql processes execute with the postgresql_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep postgresql_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The postgresql_t SELinux type can be entered via the "postgresql_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the postgresql_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/bin/(se)?postgres, /usr/bin/initdb(\.sepgsql)?, /usr/lib/postgresql/bin/.*, /usr/lib/pgsql/test/regress/pg_regress
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux postgresql policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their postgresql processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for postgresql:
++
++.EX
++.B postgresql_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH BOOLEANS
++SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. postgresql policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run postgresql with the tightest access possible.
++
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow transmit client label to foreign database, you must turn on the postgresql_selinux_transmit_client_label boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P postgresql_selinux_transmit_client_label 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow database admins to execute DML statement, you must turn on the postgresql_selinux_unconfined_dbadm boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P postgresql_selinux_unconfined_dbadm 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow postgresql to use ssh and rsync for point-in-time recovery, you must turn on the postgresql_can_rsync boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P postgresql_can_rsync 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to connect to PostgreSQL, you must turn on the selinuxuser_postgresql_connect_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P selinuxuser_postgresql_connect_enabled 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow unprivileged users to execute DDL statement, you must turn on the postgresql_selinux_users_ddl boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P postgresql_selinux_users_ddl 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow transmit client label to foreign database, you must turn on the postgresql_selinux_transmit_client_label boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P postgresql_selinux_transmit_client_label 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow database admins to execute DML statement, you must turn on the postgresql_selinux_unconfined_dbadm boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P postgresql_selinux_unconfined_dbadm 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow postgresql to use ssh and rsync for point-in-time recovery, you must turn on the postgresql_can_rsync boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P postgresql_can_rsync 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to connect to PostgreSQL, you must turn on the selinuxuser_postgresql_connect_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P selinuxuser_postgresql_connect_enabled 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow unprivileged users to execute DDL statement, you must turn on the postgresql_selinux_users_ddl boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P postgresql_selinux_users_ddl 1
++.EE
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux postgresql policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their postgresql processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for postgresql:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B postgresql_db_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the postgresql_db_t type, if you want to treat the files as postgresql database content.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B postgresql_etc_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the postgresql_etc_t type, if you want to store postgresql files in the /etc directories.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B postgresql_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the postgresql_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the postgresql_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B postgresql_initrc_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the postgresql_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the postgresql_initrc_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B postgresql_lock_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the postgresql_lock_t type, if you want to treat the files as postgresql lock data, stored under the /var/lock directory
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B postgresql_log_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the postgresql_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as postgresql log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B postgresql_tmp_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the postgresql_tmp_t type, if you want to store postgresql temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B postgresql_var_run_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the postgresql_var_run_t type, if you want to store the postgresql files under the /run directory.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH PORT TYPES
++SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
++.PP
++You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
++
++.B semanage port -l
++
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
++SELinux postgresql policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their postgresql processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following port types are defined for postgresql:
++
++.EX
++.TP 5
++.B postgresql_port_t
++.TP 10
++.EE
++
++
++Default Defined Ports:
++tcp 5432
++.EE
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type postgresql_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B faillog_t
++
++ /var/log/btmp.*
++.br
++ /var/run/faillock(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/log/faillog
++.br
++ /var/log/tallylog
++.br
++
++.br
++.B hugetlbfs_t
++
++ /dev/hugepages
++.br
++ /lib/udev/devices/hugepages
++.br
++ /usr/lib/udev/devices/hugepages
++.br
++
++.br
++.B krb5_host_rcache_t
++
++ /var/cache/krb5rcache(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/tmp/nfs_0
++.br
++ /var/tmp/DNS_25
++.br
++ /var/tmp/host_0
++.br
++ /var/tmp/imap_0
++.br
++ /var/tmp/HTTP_23
++.br
++ /var/tmp/HTTP_48
++.br
++ /var/tmp/ldap_55
++.br
++ /var/tmp/ldap_487
++.br
++ /var/tmp/ldapmap1_0
++.br
++
++.br
++.B lastlog_t
++
++ /var/log/lastlog
++.br
++
++.br
++.B pcscd_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/pcscd(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/pcscd\.events(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/pcscd\.pid
++.br
++ /var/run/pcscd\.pub
++.br
++ /var/run/pcscd\.comm
++.br
++
++.br
++.B postgresql_db_t
++
++ /var/lib/pgsql(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/sepgsql(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/postgres(ql)?(/.*)?
++.br
++ /usr/share/jonas/pgsql(/.*)?
++.br
++ /usr/lib/pgsql/test/regress(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B postgresql_lock_t
++
++
++.br
++.B postgresql_log_t
++
++ /var/lib/pgsql/.*\.log
++.br
++ /var/log/rhdb/rhdb(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/log/postgresql(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/log/postgres\.log.*
++.br
++ /var/lib/pgsql/logfile(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/log/sepostgresql\.log.*
++.br
++ /var/lib/sepgsql/pgstartup\.log
++.br
++
++.br
++.B postgresql_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B postgresql_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/postgresql(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B security_t
++
++ /selinux
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the postgresql_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the postgresql_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.B semanage port
++can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
++
++.B semanage boolean
++can also be used to manipulate the booleans
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), postgresql(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, setsebool(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/postgrey_selinux.8 b/man/man8/postgrey_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..0959a17
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/postgrey_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,180 @@
++.TH "postgrey_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "postgrey" "SELinux Policy documentation for postgrey"
++.SH "NAME"
++postgrey_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the postgrey processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the postgrey processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The postgrey processes execute with the postgrey_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep postgrey_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The postgrey_t SELinux type can be entered via the "postgrey_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the postgrey_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/sbin/postgrey
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux postgrey policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their postgrey processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for postgrey:
++
++.EX
++.B postgrey_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux postgrey policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their postgrey processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for postgrey:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B postgrey_etc_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the postgrey_etc_t type, if you want to store postgrey files in the /etc directories.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B postgrey_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the postgrey_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the postgrey_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B postgrey_initrc_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the postgrey_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the postgrey_initrc_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B postgrey_spool_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the postgrey_spool_t type, if you want to store the postgrey files under the /var/spool directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B postgrey_var_lib_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the postgrey_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the postgrey files under the /var/lib directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B postgrey_var_run_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the postgrey_var_run_t type, if you want to store the postgrey files under the /run directory.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH PORT TYPES
++SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
++.PP
++You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
++
++.B semanage port -l
++
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
++SELinux postgrey policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their postgrey processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following port types are defined for postgrey:
++
++.EX
++.TP 5
++.B postgrey_port_t
++.TP 10
++.EE
++
++
++Default Defined Ports:
++tcp 60000
++.EE
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type postgrey_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B postfix_spool_type
++
++
++.br
++.B postgrey_spool_t
++
++ /var/spool/postfix/postgrey(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B postgrey_var_lib_t
++
++ /var/lib/postgrey(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B postgrey_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/postgrey(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/postgrey\.pid
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.B semanage port
++can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), postgrey(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/pppd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/pppd_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..be38983
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/pppd_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,362 @@
++.TH "pppd_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "pppd" "SELinux Policy documentation for pppd"
++.SH "NAME"
++pppd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the pppd processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the pppd processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The pppd processes execute with the pppd_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep pppd_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The pppd_t SELinux type can be entered via the "pppd_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the pppd_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/sbin/pppd, /sbin/ppp-watch, /usr/sbin/ipppd, /sbin/pppoe-server, /usr/sbin/ppp-watch, /usr/sbin/pppoe-server
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux pppd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their pppd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for pppd:
++
++.EX
++.B pppd_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH BOOLEANS
++SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. pppd policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run pppd with the tightest access possible.
++
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow pppd to load kernel modules for certain modems, you must turn on the pppd_can_insmod boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P pppd_can_insmod 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow pppd to be run for a regular user, you must turn on the pppd_for_user boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P pppd_for_user 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow pppd to load kernel modules for certain modems, you must turn on the pppd_can_insmod boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P pppd_can_insmod 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow pppd to be run for a regular user, you must turn on the pppd_for_user boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P pppd_for_user 1
++.EE
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux pppd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their pppd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for pppd:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B pppd_etc_rw_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the pppd_etc_rw_t type, if you want to treat the files as pppd etc read/write content.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B pppd_etc_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the pppd_etc_t type, if you want to store pppd files in the /etc directories.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B pppd_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the pppd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the pppd_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B pppd_initrc_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the pppd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the pppd_initrc_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B pppd_lock_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the pppd_lock_t type, if you want to treat the files as pppd lock data, stored under the /var/lock directory
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B pppd_log_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the pppd_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as pppd log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B pppd_secret_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the pppd_secret_t type, if you want to treat the files as pppd se secret data.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B pppd_tmp_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the pppd_tmp_t type, if you want to store pppd temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B pppd_unit_file_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the pppd_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as pppd unit content.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B pppd_var_run_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the pppd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the pppd files under the /run directory.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type pppd_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B etc_runtime_t
++
++ /[^/]+
++.br
++ /etc/mtab.*
++.br
++ /etc/blkid(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/nologin.*
++.br
++ /etc/\.fstab\.hal\..+
++.br
++ /halt
++.br
++ /fastboot
++.br
++ /poweroff
++.br
++ /etc/cmtab
++.br
++ /\.autofsck
++.br
++ /forcefsck
++.br
++ /\.suspended
++.br
++ /fsckoptions
++.br
++ /\.autorelabel
++.br
++ /etc/securetty
++.br
++ /etc/killpower
++.br
++ /etc/nohotplug
++.br
++ /etc/ioctl\.save
++.br
++ /etc/fstab\.REVOKE
++.br
++ /etc/network/ifstate
++.br
++ /etc/sysconfig/hwconf
++.br
++ /etc/ptal/ptal-printd-like
++.br
++ /etc/sysconfig/iptables\.save
++.br
++ /etc/xorg\.conf\.d/00-system-setup-keyboard\.conf
++.br
++ /etc/X11/xorg\.conf\.d/00-system-setup-keyboard\.conf
++.br
++
++.br
++.B faillog_t
++
++ /var/log/btmp.*
++.br
++ /var/run/faillock(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/log/faillog
++.br
++ /var/log/tallylog
++.br
++
++.br
++.B net_conf_t
++
++ /etc/ntpd?\.conf.*
++.br
++ /etc/hosts[^/]*
++.br
++ /etc/yp\.conf.*
++.br
++ /etc/denyhosts.*
++.br
++ /etc/hosts\.deny.*
++.br
++ /etc/resolv\.conf.*
++.br
++ /etc/ntp/step-tickers.*
++.br
++ /etc/sysconfig/networking(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/sysconfig/network-scripts(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/sysconfig/network-scripts/.*resolv\.conf
++.br
++ /etc/ethers
++.br
++
++.br
++.B pcscd_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/pcscd(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/pcscd\.events(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/pcscd\.pid
++.br
++ /var/run/pcscd\.pub
++.br
++ /var/run/pcscd\.comm
++.br
++
++.br
++.B pppd_etc_rw_t
++
++ /etc/ppp(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/ppp/peers(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/ppp/resolv\.conf
++.br
++
++.br
++.B pppd_lock_t
++
++ /var/lock/ppp(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B pppd_log_t
++
++ /var/log/ppp(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/log/ppp-connect-errors.*
++.br
++
++.br
++.B pppd_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B pppd_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/(i)?ppp.*pid[^/]*
++.br
++ /var/run/ppp(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/pppd[0-9]*\.tdb
++.br
++
++.br
++.B wtmp_t
++
++ /var/log/wtmp.*
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the pppd_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the pppd_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.B semanage boolean
++can also be used to manipulate the booleans
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), pppd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, setsebool(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/pptp_selinux.8 b/man/man8/pptp_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..ff95294
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/pptp_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,158 @@
++.TH "pptp_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "pptp" "SELinux Policy documentation for pptp"
++.SH "NAME"
++pptp_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the pptp processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the pptp processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The pptp processes execute with the pptp_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep pptp_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The pptp_t SELinux type can be entered via the "pptp_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the pptp_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/sbin/pptp
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux pptp policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their pptp processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for pptp:
++
++.EX
++.B pptp_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux pptp policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their pptp processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for pptp:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B pptp_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the pptp_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the pptp_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B pptp_log_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the pptp_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as pptp log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B pptp_var_run_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the pptp_var_run_t type, if you want to store the pptp files under the /run directory.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH PORT TYPES
++SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
++.PP
++You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
++
++.B semanage port -l
++
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
++SELinux pptp policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their pptp processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following port types are defined for pptp:
++
++.EX
++.TP 5
++.B pptp_port_t
++.TP 10
++.EE
++
++
++Default Defined Ports:
++tcp 1723
++.EE
++udp 1723
++.EE
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type pptp_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B pptp_log_t
++
++
++.br
++.B pptp_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/pptp(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the pptp_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the pptp_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.B semanage port
++can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), pptp(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/prelink_cron_system_selinux.8 b/man/man8/prelink_cron_system_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..b622f23
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/prelink_cron_system_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,129 @@
++.TH "prelink_cron_system_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "prelink_cron_system" "SELinux Policy documentation for prelink_cron_system"
++.SH "NAME"
++prelink_cron_system_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the prelink_cron_system processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the prelink_cron_system processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The prelink_cron_system processes execute with the prelink_cron_system_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep prelink_cron_system_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The prelink_cron_system_t SELinux type can be entered via the "prelink_cron_system_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the prelink_cron_system_t domain are the following:"
++
++/etc/cron\.daily/prelink
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux prelink_cron_system policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their prelink_cron_system processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for prelink_cron_system:
++
++.EX
++.B prelink_cron_system_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux prelink_cron_system policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their prelink_cron_system processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for prelink_cron_system:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B prelink_cron_system_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the prelink_cron_system_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the prelink_cron_system_t domain.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type prelink_cron_system_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B prelink_log_t
++
++ /var/log/prelink(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/log/prelink\.log.*
++.br
++
++.br
++.B prelink_var_lib_t
++
++ /var/lib/prelink(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/misc/prelink.*
++.br
++
++.br
++.B systemd_passwd_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/systemd/ask-password(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/systemd/ask-password-block(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the prelink_cron_system_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the prelink_cron_system_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), prelink_cron_system(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, prelink_selinux(8), prelink_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/prelink_selinux.8 b/man/man8/prelink_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..9c74265
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/prelink_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,765 @@
++.TH "prelink_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "prelink" "SELinux Policy documentation for prelink"
++.SH "NAME"
++prelink_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the prelink processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the prelink processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The prelink processes execute with the prelink_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep prelink_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The prelink_t SELinux type can be entered via the "prelink_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the prelink_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/sbin/prelink(\.bin)?
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux prelink policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their prelink processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for prelink:
++
++.EX
++.B prelink_cron_system_t, prelink_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux prelink policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their prelink processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for prelink:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B prelink_cache_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the prelink_cache_t type, if you want to store the files under the /var/cache directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B prelink_cron_system_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the prelink_cron_system_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the prelink_cron_system_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B prelink_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the prelink_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the prelink_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B prelink_log_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the prelink_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as prelink log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B prelink_tmp_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the prelink_tmp_t type, if you want to store prelink temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B prelink_tmpfs_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the prelink_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store prelink files on a tmpfs file system.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B prelink_var_lib_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the prelink_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the prelink files under the /var/lib directory.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type prelink_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B exec_type
++
++
++.br
++.B ld_so_t
++
++ /usr/(.*/)?lib(/.*)?/ld-[^/]*\.so(\.[^/]*)*
++.br
++ /lib/ld-[^/]*\.so(\.[^/]*)*
++.br
++ /usr/lib/ld-[^/]*\.so(\.[^/]*)*
++.br
++ /var/ftp/lib/ld[^/]*\.so(\.[^/]*)*
++.br
++ /emul/ia32-linux/lib(/.*)?/ld-[^/]*\.so(\.[^/]*)*
++.br
++ /emul/ia32-linux/usr(/.*)?/lib(/.*)?/ld-[^/]*\.so(\.[^/]*)*
++.br
++ /var/spool/postfix/lib/ld.*\.so.*
++.br
++
++.br
++.B lib_t
++
++ /lib/.*
++.br
++ /opt/.*\.so(\.[^/]*)*
++.br
++ /usr/.*\.so(\.[^/]*)*
++.br
++ /opt/(.*/)?lib(/.*)?
++.br
++ /usr/(.*/)?lib(/.*)?
++.br
++ /opt/(.*/)?jre/.+\.jar
++.br
++ /opt/(.*/)?java/.+\.jar
++.br
++ /usr/(.*/)?java/.+\.jar
++.br
++ /usr/(.*/)?java/.+\.jsa
++.br
++ /usr/lib/.*
++.br
++ /usr/lib/.*/program(/.*)?\.so
++.br
++ /var/ftp/lib(/.*)?
++.br
++ /opt/Acrobat[5-9]/Reader/intellinux/plugins/.*\.api
++.br
++ /opt/ibm/java.*/jre/.+\.jar
++.br
++ /usr/lib/pgsql/.*\.so.*
++.br
++ /usr/lib/xfce4/.*\.so.*
++.br
++ /opt/Adobe/Reader.?/Reader/intellinux/SPPlugins/.*\.ap[il]
++.br
++ /emul/ia32-linux/lib(/.*)?
++.br
++ /emul/ia32-linux/usr(/.*)?/lib(/.*)?
++.br
++ /emul/ia32-linux/usr(/.*)?/java/.*\.jar
++.br
++ /emul/ia32-linux/usr(/.*)?/java/.*\.jsa
++.br
++ /emul/ia32-linux/usr(/.*)?/java/.+\.so(\.[^/]*)*
++.br
++ /var/spool/postfix/lib(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/spool/postfix/usr(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/mailman/pythonlib(/.*)?/.+\.so(\..*)?
++.br
++ /var/spool/postfix/lib64(/.*)?
++.br
++ /usr/lib/nspluginwrapper/np.*\.so
++.br
++ /usr/lib/pgsql/test/regress/.*\.so.*
++.br
++ /usr/share/hplip/prnt/plugins(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/spamassassin/compiled/.*\.so.*
++.br
++ /lib
++.br
++ /lib64
++.br
++ /usr/lib
++.br
++ /etc/ppp/plugins/rp-pppoe\.so
++.br
++ /usr/share/rhn/rhn_applet/eggtrayiconmodule\.so
++.br
++
++.br
++.B mozilla_plugin_rw_t
++
++ /usr/lib/mozilla/plugins-wrapped(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B prelink_cache_t
++
++ /etc/prelink\.cache
++.br
++
++.br
++.B prelink_object
++
++
++.br
++.B prelink_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B prelink_tmpfs_t
++
++
++.br
++.B prelink_var_lib_t
++
++ /var/lib/prelink(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/misc/prelink.*
++.br
++
++.br
++.B rpm_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B textrel_shlib_t
++
++ /usr/(.*/)?nprhapengine\.so.*
++.br
++ /usr/(.*/)?nvidia/.+\.so(\..*)?
++.br
++ /usr/(.*/)?java/.+\.so(\.[^/]*)*
++.br
++ /opt/(.*/)?jre.*/.+\.so(\.[^/]*)*
++.br
++ /usr/(.*/)?jre.*/.*\.so(\.[^/]*)*
++.br
++ /opt/(.*/)?oracle/(.*/)?libnnz.*\.so
++.br
++ /opt/(.*/)?/RealPlayer/.+\.so(\.[^/]*)*
++.br
++ /usr/(.*/)?/RealPlayer/.+\.so(\.[^/]*)*
++.br
++ /usr/(.*/)?/HelixPlayer/.+\.so(\.[^/]*)*
++.br
++ /usr/(.*/)?lib(64)?(/.*)?/nvidia/.+\.so(\..*)?
++.br
++ /usr/(.*/)?intellinux/SPPlugins/ADMPlugin\.apl
++.br
++ /usr/(.*/)?pcsc/drivers(/.*)?/lib(cm2020|cm4000|SCR24x)\.so(\.[^/]*)*
++.br
++ /opt/cx.*/lib/wine/.+\.so
++.br
++ /usr/lib.*/libmpg123\.so(\.[^/]*)*
++.br
++ /usr/lib(/.*)?/nvidia/.+\.so(\..*)?
++.br
++ /usr/lib(/.*)?/libnvidia.+\.so(\.[^/]*)*
++.br
++ /usr/lib(/.*)?/nvidia_drv.*\.so(\.[^/]*)*
++.br
++ /usr/lib/.*/nprhapengine\.so.*
++.br
++ /usr/lib/.*/libflashplayer\.so.*
++.br
++ /usr/lib/(sse2/)?libfame-.*\.so.*
++.br
++ /usr/lib/.*/program/libsoffice\.so
++.br
++ /usr/lib/.*/program/libsts645li\.so
++.br
++ /usr/lib/.*/program/libwrp645li\.so
++.br
++ /usr/lib/.*/program/libswd680li\.so
++.br
++ /usr/lib/.*/program/libsvx680li\.so
++.br
++ /usr/lib/.*/program/libicudata\.so.*
++.br
++ /usr/lib/(.*/)?jre.*/.*\.so(\.[^/]*)*
++.br
++ /usr/lib/.*/program/librecentfile\.so
++.br
++ /usr/lib/.*/program/libcomphelp4gcc3\.so
++.br
++ /usr/lib/.*/program/libvclplug_gen645li\.so
++.br
++ /usr/lib/(virtualbox(-ose)?/)?(components/)?VBox.*\.so
++.br
++ /opt/Adobe.*/libcurl\.so
++.br
++ /opt/Adobe(/.*?)/nppdf\.so
++.br
++ /usr/Adobe/.*\.api
++.br
++ /opt/matlab.*\.so(\.[^/]*)*
++.br
++ /usr/matlab.*\.so(\.[^/]*)*
++.br
++ /usr/Adobe/(.*/)?intellinux/nppdf\.so
++.br
++ /usr/Adobe/(.*/)?intellinux/sidecars/*
++.br
++ /usr/Adobe/(.*/)?lib/[^/]*\.so(\.[^/]*)*
++.br
++ /usr/matlab.*/bin/glnx86/libmwlapack\.so
++.br
++ /usr/matlab.*/sys/os/glnx86/libtermcap\.so
++.br
++ /usr/matlab.*/bin/glnx86/(libmw(lapack|mathutil|services)|lapack|libmkl)\.so
++.br
++ /opt/google/.*\.so.*
++.br
++ /opt/altera9.1/quartus/linux/libccl_err\.so
++.br
++ /usr/lib/dri/.+\.so
++.br
++ /usr/lib/nsr/(.*/)?.*\.so
++.br
++ /opt/ibm/java.*/jre/.+\.so(\.[^/]*)*
++.br
++ /opt/ibm/java.*/jre/bin/.+\.so(\.[^/]*)*
++.br
++ /opt/netbeans(.*/)?jdk.*/linux/.+\.so(\.[^/]*)*
++.br
++ /usr/lib/wine/.+\.so
++.br
++ /usr/lib/sse2/.*\.so.*
++.br
++ /usr/lib/i686/.*\.so.*
++.br
++ /usr/lib/libav.*\.so(\.[^/]*)*
++.br
++ /usr/acroread/(.*/)?intellinux/nppdf\.so
++.br
++ /usr/acroread/(.*/)?lib/[^/]*\.so(\.[^/]*)*
++.br
++ /usr/lib/libADM.*\.so.*
++.br
++ /opt/lampp/lib/.*\.so.*
++.br
++ /usr/lib/libGTL.*\.so.*
++.br
++ /usr/lib/win32/.*\.so(\.[^/]*)*
++.br
++ /usr/lib/fglrx/.*\.so(\.[^/]*)*
++.br
++ /usr/lib/nvidia.*\.so(\.[^/]*)*
++.br
++ /opt/VirtualBox(/.*)?/VBox.*\.so
++.br
++ /usr/lib/python.*/site-packages/pymedia/muxer\.so
++.br
++ /usr/lib/libmyth[^/]+\.so.*
++.br
++ /usr/lib/midori/.*\.so(\.[^/]*)*
++.br
++ /usr/lib/cedega/.+\.so(\.[^/]*)*
++.br
++ /usr/lib/libADM5.*\.so(\.[^/]*)*
++.br
++ /usr/lib/vmware/(.*/)?VmPerl\.so
++.br
++ /usr/lib/oracle/.*/lib/libnnz10\.so
++.br
++ /usr/lib/oracle/.*/lib/libnnz.*\.so
++.br
++ /usr/lib/oracle/.*/lib/libclntsh\.so(\.[^/]*)*
++.br
++ /usr/lib/python2.4/site-packages/M2Crypto/__m2crypto\.so
++.br
++ /usr/lib/libjs\.so.*
++.br
++ /usr/lib/libGL\.so(\.[^/]*)*
++.br
++ /usr/libmpg123\.so(\.[^/]*)*
++.br
++ /usr/lib/libnnz11.so(\.[^/]*)*
++.br
++ /opt/local/matlab.*\.so(\.[^/]*)*
++.br
++ /opt/lgtonmc/bin/.*\.so(\.[0-9])?
++.br
++ /usr/lib/allegro/(.*/)?alleg-vga\.so
++.br
++ /usr/lib/jvm/java(.*/)bin(/.*)?/.*\.so
++.br
++ /usr/lib/firefox-[^/]*/plugins/nppdf.so
++.br
++ /opt/Adobe/Reader.?/Reader/intellinux/plug_ins/.*\.api
++.br
++ /usr/lib/firefox-[^/]*/extensions(/.*)?/libqfaservices.so
++.br
++ /usr/lib/acroread/.+\.api
++.br
++ /usr/google-earth/.*\.so.*
++.br
++ /opt/google-earth/.*\.so.*
++.br
++ /usr/lib/acroread/(.*/)?nppdf\.so
++.br
++ /usr/lib/acroread/(.*/)?sidecars/*
++.br
++ /usr/lib/acroread/(.*/)?ADMPlugin\.apl
++.br
++ /usr/lib/acroread/(.*/)?lib/[^/]*\.so(\.[^/]*)*
++.br
++ /usr/lib/libFLAC\.so.*
++.br
++ /usr/lib/libgpac\.so.*
++.br
++ /opt/google/picasa/.*\.dll
++.br
++ /opt/google/picasa/.*\.yti
++.br
++ /opt/google/chrome/.*\.so.*
++.br
++ /usr/lib/libzvbi\.so(\.[^/]*)*
++.br
++ /usr/lib/libx264\.so(\.[^/]*)*
++.br
++ /usr/lib/ati-fglrx/.+\.so(\..*)?
++.br
++ /usr/lib/gstreamer-.*/[^/]*\.so.*
++.br
++ /usr/lib/ICAClient/.*\.so(\.[^/]*)*
++.br
++ /usr/lib/vmware/lib(/.*)?/HConfig\.so
++.br
++ /usr/lib/codecs/drv[1-9c]\.so(\.[^/]*)*
++.br
++ /usr/lib/vmware/lib(/.*)?/libgdk-x11-.*\.so.*
++.br
++ /usr/lib/vmware/lib(/.*)?/libvmware-gksu.*\.so.*
++.br
++ /usr/lib/libmpeg2\.so.*
++.br
++ /usr/lib/valgrind/vg.*\.so
++.br
++ /usr/lib/virtualbox/.*\.so
++.br
++ /usr/lib/libglide3-v[0-9]*\.so.*
++.br
++ /usr/lib/libglide3\.so.*
++.br
++ /usr/lib/libHermes\.so.*
++.br
++ /usr/lib/libdvdcss\.so.*
++.br
++ /usr/lib/libGLcore\.so.*
++.br
++ /usr/lib/googleearth/.*\.so.*
++.br
++ /usr/NX/lib/libjpeg\.so.*
++.br
++ /usr/lib/nx/libjpeg\.so.*
++.br
++ /usr/lib/libswscale\.so.*
++.br
++ /usr/lib/libmp3lame\.so.*
++.br
++ /usr/lib/nmm/liba52\.so.*
++.br
++ /usr/lib/dri/fglrx_dri.so.*
++.br
++ /usr/lib/xine/plugins/.+\.so
++.br
++ /usr/lib/google-earth/.*\.so.*
++.br
++ /usr/lib/helix/codecs/[^/]*\.so
++.br
++ /usr/lib/xorg/libGL\.so(\.[^/]*)*
++.br
++ /usr/X11R6/lib/libGL\.so.*
++.br
++ /usr/NX/lib/libXcomp\.so.*
++.br
++ /usr/lib/nx/libXcomp\.so.*
++.br
++ /usr/lib/libxvidcore\.so.*
++.br
++ /usr/lib/libpostproc\.so.*
++.br
++ /opt/lampp/lib/libct\.so.*
++.br
++ /opt/google/talkplugin/.*\.so.*
++.br
++ /usr/lib/helix/plugins/[^/]*\.so
++.br
++ /usr/lib/libatiadlxx\.so(\.[^/]*)*
++.br
++ /opt/VBoxGuestAdditions.*/lib/VBox.*\.so
++.br
++ /usr/lib/mythtv/filters/.*\.so.*
++.br
++ /usr/lib/libtfmessbsp\.so(\.[^/]*)*
++.br
++ /usr/lib/sse2/libx264\.so(\.[^/]*)*
++.br
++ /usr/lib/nvidia-graphics(-[^/]*/)?libXvMCNVIDIA\.so.*
++.br
++ /usr/lib/nvidia-graphics(-[^/]*/)?libnvidia.*\.so(\.[^/]*)*
++.br
++ /usr/lib/nvidia-graphics(-[^/]*/)?libGL(core)?\.so(\.[^/]*)*
++.br
++ /usr/lib/libsipphoneapi\.so.*
++.br
++ /usr/lib/libfglrx_gamma\.so.*
++.br
++ /usr/lib/xorg/modules/dri/.+\.so
++.br
++ /usr/lib/chromium-browser/.*\.so
++.br
++ /usr/lib/catalyst/libGL\.so(\.[^/]*)*
++.br
++ /usr/lib/yafaray/libDarkSky.so
++.br
++ /usr/X11R6/lib/modules/dri/.+\.so
++.br
++ /opt/real/RealPlayer/codecs(/.*)?
++.br
++ /usr/lib/libcncpmslld328\.so(\.[^/]*)*
++.br
++ /opt/real/RealPlayer/plugins(/.*)?
++.br
++ /usr/lib/libkmplayercommon\.so.*
++.br
++ /usr/lib/libjavascriptcoregtk[^/]*\.so.*
++.br
++ /usr/games/darwinia/lib/libSDL.*\.so.*
++.br
++ /usr/lib/altivec/libavcodec\.so(\.[^/]*)*
++.br
++ /usr/lib/xorg/modules/glesx\.so(\.[^/]*)*
++.br
++ /usr/X11R6/lib/libXvMCNVIDIA\.so.*
++.br
++ /usr/lib/sane/libsane-epkowa\.so.*
++.br
++ /opt/AutoScan/usr/lib/libvte\.so.*
++.br
++ /usr/X11R6/lib/libfglrx_gamma\.so.*
++.br
++ /usr/lib/nero/plug-ins/libMP3\.so(\.[^/]*)*
++.br
++ /usr/lib/vdpau/libvdpau_nvidia\.so.*
++.br
++ /usr/lib/ADM_plugins/videoFilter/.*\.so(\.[^/]*)*
++.br
++ /opt/Unify/SQLBase/libgptsblmsui11\.so.*
++.br
++ /usr/share/squeezeboxserver/CPAN/arch/.+\.so
++.br
++ /opt/f-secure/fspms/libexec/librapi\.so(\.[^/]*)*
++.br
++ /usr/lib/xorg/modules/extensions/nvidia(-[^/]*)?/libglx\.so(\.[^/]*)*
++.br
++ /opt/Komodo-Edit-5/lib/python/lib/python2.6/lib-dynload/.*\.so(\.[^/]*)*
++.br
++ /usr/lib/xorg/modules/drivers/fglrx_drv\.so(\.[^/]*)*
++.br
++ /usr/lib/xorg/modules/extensions/libglx\.so(\.[^/]*)*
++.br
++ /usr/x11R6/lib/modules/extensions/libglx\.so(\.[^/]*)*
++.br
++ /usr/bin/bsnes
++.br
++ /usr/lib/VBoxVMM\.so
++.br
++ /usr/lib/valgrind/hp2ps
++.br
++ /usr/lib/libmlib_jai\.so
++.br
++ /usr/lib/valgrind/stage2
++.br
++ /lib/security/pam_poldi\.so
++.br
++ /usr/lib/libg\+\+\.so\.2\.7\.2\.8
++.br
++ /usr/lib/ladspa/gsm_1215\.so
++.br
++ /usr/lib/ladspa/sc1_1425\.so
++.br
++ /usr/lib/ladspa/sc2_1426\.so
++.br
++ /usr/lib/ladspa/sc3_1427\.so
++.br
++ /usr/lib/ladspa/sc4_1882\.so
++.br
++ /usr/lib/ladspa/se4_1883\.so
++.br
++ /usr/lib/libdivxdecore\.so\.0
++.br
++ /usr/lib/libdivxencore\.so\.0
++.br
++ /usr/lib/libstdc\+\+\.so\.2\.7\.2\.8
++.br
++ /usr/lib/ladspa/gverb_1216\.so
++.br
++ /usr/lib/security/pam_poldi\.so
++.br
++ /usr/lib/ladspa/fm_osc_1415\.so
++.br
++ /usr/zend/lib/apache2/libphp5\.so
++.br
++ /usr/lib/mozilla/plugins/nppdf\.so
++.br
++ /usr/lib/ladspa/notch_iir_1894\.so
++.br
++ /usr/lib/xchat/plugins/systray\.so
++.br
++ /usr/lib/ocaml/stublibs/dllnums\.so
++.br
++ /usr/lib/vlc/codec/libdmo_plugin\.so
++.br
++ /usr/lib/ladspa/butterworth_1902\.so
++.br
++ /usr/lib/ladspa/lowpass_iir_1891\.so
++.br
++ /usr/lib/ladspa/pitch_scale_1193\.so
++.br
++ /usr/lib/ladspa/pitch_scale_1194\.so
++.br
++ /usr/lib/ladspa/analogue_osc_1416\.so
++.br
++ /usr/lib/ladspa/bandpass_iir_1892\.so
++.br
++ /usr/lib/ladspa/highpass_iir_1890\.so
++.br
++ /usr/Zend/lib/ZendExtensionManager\.so
++.br
++ /opt/cisco-vpnclient/lib/libvpnapi\.so
++.br
++ /usr/lib/firefox/plugins/libractrl\.so
++.br
++ /usr/lib/ladspa/hermes_filter_1200\.so
++.br
++ /usr/lib/ladspa/bandpass_a_iir_1893\.so
++.br
++ /usr/lib/octagaplayer/libapplication\.so
++.br
++ /usr/lib/mozilla/plugins/libvlcplugin\.so
++.br
++ /usr/lib/vlc/codec/librealvideo_plugin\.so
++.br
++ /usr/lib/vlc/codec/librealaudio_plugin\.so
++.br
++ /usr/lib/xorg/modules/drivers/nvidia_drv\.o
++.br
++ /opt/novell/groupwise/client/lib/libgwapijni\.so\.1
++.br
++ /usr/lib/vlc/video_chroma/libi420_rgb_mmx_plugin\.so
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/.*/plugins/nppdf\.so.*
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/.*/plugins/nppdf\.so.*
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/.*/plugins/nppdf\.so.*
++.br
++
++.br
++.B user_home_type
++
++ all user home files
++.br
++
++.br
++.B usr_t
++
++ /usr/.*
++.br
++ /opt/.*
++.br
++ /emul/.*
++.br
++ /export(/.*)?
++.br
++ /usr/doc(/.*)?/lib(/.*)?
++.br
++ /usr/inclu.e(/.*)?
++.br
++ /usr/share/doc(/.*)?/README.*
++.br
++ /usr
++.br
++ /opt
++.br
++ /emul
++.br
++
++.br
++.B var_t
++
++ /nsr(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/.*
++.br
++ /srv/.*
++.br
++ /var
++.br
++ /srv
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the prelink_cron_system_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the prelink_cron_system_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), prelink(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, prelink_cron_system_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/prelude_audisp_selinux.8 b/man/man8/prelude_audisp_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..18ba823
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/prelude_audisp_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,107 @@
++.TH "prelude_audisp_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "prelude_audisp" "SELinux Policy documentation for prelude_audisp"
++.SH "NAME"
++prelude_audisp_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the prelude_audisp processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the prelude_audisp processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The prelude_audisp processes execute with the prelude_audisp_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep prelude_audisp_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The prelude_audisp_t SELinux type can be entered via the "prelude_audisp_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the prelude_audisp_t domain are the following:"
++
++/sbin/audisp-prelude, /usr/sbin/audisp-prelude
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux prelude_audisp policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their prelude_audisp processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for prelude_audisp:
++
++.EX
++.B prelude_audisp_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux prelude_audisp policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their prelude_audisp processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for prelude_audisp:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B prelude_audisp_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the prelude_audisp_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the prelude_audisp_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B prelude_audisp_var_run_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the prelude_audisp_var_run_t type, if you want to store the prelude audisp files under the /run directory.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type prelude_audisp_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B prelude_spool_t
++
++ /var/spool/prelude(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/spool/prelude-manager(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), prelude_audisp(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, prelude_selinux(8), prelude_selinux(8), prelude_correlator_selinux(8), prelude_lml_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/prelude_correlator_selinux.8 b/man/man8/prelude_correlator_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..54cfb46
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/prelude_correlator_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,107 @@
++.TH "prelude_correlator_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "prelude_correlator" "SELinux Policy documentation for prelude_correlator"
++.SH "NAME"
++prelude_correlator_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the prelude_correlator processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the prelude_correlator processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The prelude_correlator processes execute with the prelude_correlator_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep prelude_correlator_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The prelude_correlator_t SELinux type can be entered via the "prelude_correlator_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the prelude_correlator_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/bin/prelude-correlator
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux prelude_correlator policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their prelude_correlator processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for prelude_correlator:
++
++.EX
++.B prelude_correlator_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux prelude_correlator policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their prelude_correlator processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for prelude_correlator:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B prelude_correlator_config_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the prelude_correlator_config_t type, if you want to treat the files as prelude correlator configuration data, usually stored under the /etc directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B prelude_correlator_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the prelude_correlator_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the prelude_correlator_t domain.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type prelude_correlator_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B prelude_spool_t
++
++ /var/spool/prelude(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/spool/prelude-manager(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), prelude_correlator(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, prelude_selinux(8), prelude_selinux(8), prelude_audisp_selinux(8), prelude_lml_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/prelude_lml_selinux.8 b/man/man8/prelude_lml_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..9d345c5
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/prelude_lml_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,149 @@
++.TH "prelude_lml_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "prelude_lml" "SELinux Policy documentation for prelude_lml"
++.SH "NAME"
++prelude_lml_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the prelude_lml processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the prelude_lml processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The prelude_lml processes execute with the prelude_lml_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep prelude_lml_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The prelude_lml_t SELinux type can be entered via the "prelude_lml_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the prelude_lml_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/bin/prelude-lml
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux prelude_lml policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their prelude_lml processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for prelude_lml:
++
++.EX
++.B prelude_lml_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux prelude_lml policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their prelude_lml processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for prelude_lml:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B prelude_lml_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the prelude_lml_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the prelude_lml_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B prelude_lml_tmp_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the prelude_lml_tmp_t type, if you want to store prelude lml temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B prelude_lml_var_run_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the prelude_lml_var_run_t type, if you want to store the prelude lml files under the /run directory.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type prelude_lml_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B anon_inodefs_t
++
++
++.br
++.B prelude_lml_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B prelude_lml_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/prelude-lml.pid
++.br
++
++.br
++.B prelude_spool_t
++
++ /var/spool/prelude(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/spool/prelude-manager(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B prelude_var_lib_t
++
++ /var/lib/prelude-lml(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the prelude_lml_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the prelude_lml_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), prelude_lml(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, prelude_selinux(8), prelude_selinux(8), prelude_audisp_selinux(8), prelude_correlator_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/prelude_selinux.8 b/man/man8/prelude_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..8ad755d
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/prelude_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,259 @@
++.TH "prelude_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "prelude" "SELinux Policy documentation for prelude"
++.SH "NAME"
++prelude_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the prelude processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the prelude processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The prelude processes execute with the prelude_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep prelude_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The prelude_t SELinux type can be entered via the "prelude_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the prelude_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/bin/prelude-manager
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux prelude policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their prelude processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for prelude:
++
++.EX
++.B prelude_lml_t, prelude_t, prelude_audisp_t, prelude_correlator_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux prelude policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their prelude processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for prelude:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B prelude_audisp_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the prelude_audisp_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the prelude_audisp_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B prelude_audisp_var_run_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the prelude_audisp_var_run_t type, if you want to store the prelude audisp files under the /run directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B prelude_correlator_config_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the prelude_correlator_config_t type, if you want to treat the files as prelude correlator configuration data, usually stored under the /etc directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B prelude_correlator_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the prelude_correlator_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the prelude_correlator_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B prelude_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the prelude_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the prelude_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B prelude_initrc_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the prelude_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the prelude_initrc_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B prelude_lml_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the prelude_lml_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the prelude_lml_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B prelude_lml_tmp_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the prelude_lml_tmp_t type, if you want to store prelude lml temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B prelude_lml_var_run_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the prelude_lml_var_run_t type, if you want to store the prelude lml files under the /run directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B prelude_log_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the prelude_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as prelude log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B prelude_spool_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the prelude_spool_t type, if you want to store the prelude files under the /var/spool directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B prelude_var_lib_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the prelude_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the prelude files under the /var/lib directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B prelude_var_run_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the prelude_var_run_t type, if you want to store the prelude files under the /run directory.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH PORT TYPES
++SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
++.PP
++You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
++
++.B semanage port -l
++
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
++SELinux prelude policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their prelude processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following port types are defined for prelude:
++
++.EX
++.TP 5
++.B prelude_port_t
++.TP 10
++.EE
++
++
++Default Defined Ports:
++tcp 4690
++.EE
++udp 4690
++.EE
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type prelude_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B anon_inodefs_t
++
++
++.br
++.B prelude_log_t
++
++ /var/log/prelude.*
++.br
++
++.br
++.B prelude_spool_t
++
++ /var/spool/prelude(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/spool/prelude-manager(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B prelude_var_lib_t
++
++ /var/lib/prelude-lml(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B prelude_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/prelude-manager(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the prelude_lml_t, prelude_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the prelude_lml_t, prelude_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.B semanage port
++can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), prelude(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, prelude_audisp_selinux(8), prelude_correlator_selinux(8), prelude_lml_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/privoxy_selinux.8 b/man/man8/privoxy_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..f7a88d0
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/privoxy_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,174 @@
++.TH "privoxy_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "privoxy" "SELinux Policy documentation for privoxy"
++.SH "NAME"
++privoxy_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the privoxy processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the privoxy processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The privoxy processes execute with the privoxy_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep privoxy_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The privoxy_t SELinux type can be entered via the "privoxy_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the privoxy_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/sbin/privoxy
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux privoxy policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their privoxy processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for privoxy:
++
++.EX
++.B privoxy_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH BOOLEANS
++SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. privoxy policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run privoxy with the tightest access possible.
++
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow privoxy to connect to all ports, not just HTTP, FTP, and Gopher ports, you must turn on the privoxy_connect_any boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P privoxy_connect_any 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow privoxy to connect to all ports, not just HTTP, FTP, and Gopher ports, you must turn on the privoxy_connect_any boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P privoxy_connect_any 1
++.EE
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux privoxy policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their privoxy processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for privoxy:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B privoxy_etc_rw_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the privoxy_etc_rw_t type, if you want to treat the files as privoxy etc read/write content.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B privoxy_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the privoxy_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the privoxy_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B privoxy_initrc_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the privoxy_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the privoxy_initrc_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B privoxy_log_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the privoxy_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as privoxy log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B privoxy_var_run_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the privoxy_var_run_t type, if you want to store the privoxy files under the /run directory.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type privoxy_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B privoxy_etc_rw_t
++
++ /etc/privoxy/[^/]*\.action
++.br
++
++.br
++.B privoxy_log_t
++
++ /var/log/privoxy(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B privoxy_var_run_t
++
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the privoxy_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the privoxy_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.B semanage boolean
++can also be used to manipulate the booleans
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), privoxy(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, setsebool(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/procmail_selinux.8 b/man/man8/procmail_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..12bd0d0
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/procmail_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,180 @@
++.TH "procmail_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "procmail" "SELinux Policy documentation for procmail"
++.SH "NAME"
++procmail_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the procmail processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the procmail processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The procmail processes execute with the procmail_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep procmail_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The procmail_t SELinux type can be entered via the "procmail_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the procmail_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/bin/procmail
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux procmail policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their procmail processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for procmail:
++
++.EX
++.B procmail_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux procmail policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their procmail processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for procmail:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B procmail_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the procmail_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the procmail_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B procmail_home_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the procmail_home_t type, if you want to store procmail files in the users home directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B procmail_log_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the procmail_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as procmail log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B procmail_tmp_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the procmail_tmp_t type, if you want to store procmail temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type procmail_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B anon_inodefs_t
++
++
++.br
++.B data_home_t
++
++ /root/\.local/share(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.local/share(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.local/share(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.local/share(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B mail_home_rw_t
++
++ /root/Maildir(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/Maildir(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/Maildir(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/Maildir(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B mail_spool_t
++
++ /var/mail(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/spool/imap(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/spool/mail(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B procmail_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B user_home_t
++
++ /home/[^/]*/.+
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/.+
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/.+
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the procmail_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the procmail_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), procmail(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/psad_selinux.8 b/man/man8/psad_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..ce2de13
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/psad_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,168 @@
++.TH "psad_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "psad" "SELinux Policy documentation for psad"
++.SH "NAME"
++psad_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the psad processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the psad processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The psad processes execute with the psad_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep psad_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The psad_t SELinux type can be entered via the "psad_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the psad_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/sbin/psad
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux psad policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their psad processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for psad:
++
++.EX
++.B psad_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux psad policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their psad processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for psad:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B psad_etc_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the psad_etc_t type, if you want to store psad files in the /etc directories.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B psad_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the psad_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the psad_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B psad_initrc_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the psad_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the psad_initrc_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B psad_tmp_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the psad_tmp_t type, if you want to store psad temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B psad_var_lib_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the psad_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the psad files under the /var/lib directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B psad_var_log_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the psad_var_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as psad var log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B psad_var_run_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the psad_var_run_t type, if you want to store the psad files under the /run directory.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type psad_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B psad_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B psad_var_log_t
++
++ /var/log/psad(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B psad_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/psad(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the psad_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the psad_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), psad(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/ptal_selinux.8 b/man/man8/ptal_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..aa2365a
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/ptal_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,140 @@
++.TH "ptal_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "ptal" "SELinux Policy documentation for ptal"
++.SH "NAME"
++ptal_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the ptal processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the ptal processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The ptal processes execute with the ptal_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep ptal_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The ptal_t SELinux type can be entered via the "ptal_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the ptal_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/sbin/ptal-mlcd, /usr/sbin/ptal-printd, /usr/sbin/ptal-photod
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux ptal policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ptal processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for ptal:
++
++.EX
++.B ptal_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux ptal policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ptal processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for ptal:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B ptal_etc_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the ptal_etc_t type, if you want to store ptal files in the /etc directories.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B ptal_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the ptal_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ptal_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B ptal_var_run_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the ptal_var_run_t type, if you want to store the ptal files under the /run directory.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH PORT TYPES
++SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
++.PP
++You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
++
++.B semanage port -l
++
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
++SELinux ptal policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ptal processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following port types are defined for ptal:
++
++.EX
++.TP 5
++.B ptal_port_t
++.TP 10
++.EE
++
++
++Default Defined Ports:
++tcp 5703
++.EE
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type ptal_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B ptal_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/ptal-mlcd(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/ptal-printd(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.B semanage port
++can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), ptal(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/ptchown_selinux.8 b/man/man8/ptchown_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..31e96e1
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/ptchown_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
++.TH "ptchown_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "ptchown" "SELinux Policy documentation for ptchown"
++.SH "NAME"
++ptchown_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the ptchown processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the ptchown processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The ptchown processes execute with the ptchown_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep ptchown_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The ptchown_t SELinux type can be entered via the "ptchown_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the ptchown_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/libexec/pt_chown
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux ptchown policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ptchown processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for ptchown:
++
++.EX
++.B ptchown_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux ptchown policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ptchown processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for ptchown:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B ptchown_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the ptchown_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ptchown_t domain.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type ptchown_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B anon_inodefs_t
++
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), ptchown(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/publicfile_selinux.8 b/man/man8/publicfile_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..6021aa7
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/publicfile_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
++.TH "publicfile_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "publicfile" "SELinux Policy documentation for publicfile"
++.SH "NAME"
++publicfile_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the publicfile processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the publicfile processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The publicfile processes execute with the publicfile_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep publicfile_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The publicfile_t SELinux type can be entered via the "publicfile_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the publicfile_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/bin/ftpd, /usr/bin/httpd
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux publicfile policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their publicfile processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for publicfile:
++
++.EX
++.B publicfile_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux publicfile policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their publicfile processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for publicfile:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B publicfile_content_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the publicfile_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as publicfile content.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B publicfile_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the publicfile_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the publicfile_t domain.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), publicfile(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/pulseaudio_selinux.8 b/man/man8/pulseaudio_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..f889102
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/pulseaudio_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,300 @@
++.TH "pulseaudio_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "pulseaudio" "SELinux Policy documentation for pulseaudio"
++.SH "NAME"
++pulseaudio_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the pulseaudio processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the pulseaudio processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The pulseaudio processes execute with the pulseaudio_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep pulseaudio_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The pulseaudio_t SELinux type can be entered via the "pulseaudio_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the pulseaudio_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/bin/pulseaudio
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux pulseaudio policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their pulseaudio processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for pulseaudio:
++
++.EX
++.B pulseaudio_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux pulseaudio policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their pulseaudio processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for pulseaudio:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B pulseaudio_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the pulseaudio_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the pulseaudio_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B pulseaudio_home_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the pulseaudio_home_t type, if you want to store pulseaudio files in the users home directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B pulseaudio_tmpfs_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the pulseaudio_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store pulseaudio files on a tmpfs file system.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B pulseaudio_var_lib_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the pulseaudio_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the pulseaudio files under the /var/lib directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B pulseaudio_var_run_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the pulseaudio_var_run_t type, if you want to store the pulseaudio files under the /run directory.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH PORT TYPES
++SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
++.PP
++You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
++
++.B semanage port -l
++
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
++SELinux pulseaudio policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their pulseaudio processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following port types are defined for pulseaudio:
++
++.EX
++.TP 5
++.B pulseaudio_port_t
++.TP 10
++.EE
++
++
++Default Defined Ports:
++tcp 4713
++.EE
++udp 4713
++.EE
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type pulseaudio_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B anon_inodefs_t
++
++
++.br
++.B gstreamer_home_t
++
++ /var/run/user/[^/]*/\.orc(/.*)?
++.br
++ /root/\.gstreamer-.*
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.orc(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.gstreamer-.*
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.grl-bookmarks
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.grl-bookmarks
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.grl-metadata-store
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.orc(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.gstreamer-.*
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.grl-bookmarks
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.grl-bookmarks
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.grl-metadata-store
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.orc(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.gstreamer-.*
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.grl-bookmarks
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.grl-bookmarks
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.grl-metadata-store
++.br
++
++.br
++.B pulseaudio_home_t
++
++ /root/\.pulse(/.*)?
++.br
++ /root/\.esd_auth
++.br
++ /root/\.pulse-cookie
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.pulse(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.esd_auth
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.pulse-cookie
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.pulse(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.esd_auth
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.pulse-cookie
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.pulse(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.esd_auth
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.pulse-cookie
++.br
++
++.br
++.B pulseaudio_var_lib_t
++
++ /var/lib/pulse(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B pulseaudio_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/pulse(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B user_fonts_cache_t
++
++ /root/\.fontconfig(/.*)?
++.br
++ /root/\.fonts/auto(/.*)?
++.br
++ /root/\.fonts\.cache-.*
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.fontconfig(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.fonts/auto(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.fonts\.cache-.*
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.fontconfig(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.fonts/auto(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.fonts\.cache-.*
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.fontconfig(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.fonts/auto(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.fonts\.cache-.*
++.br
++
++.br
++.B user_tmp_type
++
++ all user tmp files
++.br
++
++.br
++.B user_tmpfs_type
++
++ all user content in tmpfs file systems
++.br
++
++.br
++.B virt_tmpfs_type
++
++
++.br
++.B xdm_tmp_t
++
++ /tmp/\.X11-unix(/.*)?
++.br
++ /tmp/\.ICE-unix(/.*)?
++.br
++ /tmp/\.X0-lock
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the pulseaudio_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the pulseaudio_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.B semanage port
++can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), pulseaudio(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/puppet_selinux.8 b/man/man8/puppet_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..1e449cb
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/puppet_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,368 @@
++.TH "puppet_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "puppet" "SELinux Policy documentation for puppet"
++.SH "NAME"
++puppet_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the puppet processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the puppet processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The puppet processes execute with the puppet_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep puppet_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The puppet_t SELinux type can be entered via the "puppet_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the puppet_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/sbin/puppetd
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux puppet policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their puppet processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for puppet:
++
++.EX
++.B puppet_t, puppetmaster_t, puppetca_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH BOOLEANS
++SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. puppet policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run puppet with the tightest access possible.
++
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow Puppet master to use connect to MySQL and PostgreSQL database, you must turn on the puppetmaster_use_db boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P puppetmaster_use_db 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow Puppet client to manage all file types, you must turn on the puppet_manage_all_files boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P puppet_manage_all_files 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow Puppet master to use connect to MySQL and PostgreSQL database, you must turn on the puppetmaster_use_db boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P puppetmaster_use_db 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow Puppet client to manage all file types, you must turn on the puppet_manage_all_files boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P puppet_manage_all_files 1
++.EE
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux puppet policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their puppet processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for puppet:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B puppet_etc_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the puppet_etc_t type, if you want to store puppet files in the /etc directories.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B puppet_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the puppet_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the puppet_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B puppet_initrc_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the puppet_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the puppet_initrc_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B puppet_log_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the puppet_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as puppet log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B puppet_tmp_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the puppet_tmp_t type, if you want to store puppet temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B puppet_var_lib_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the puppet_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the puppet files under the /var/lib directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B puppet_var_run_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the puppet_var_run_t type, if you want to store the puppet files under the /run directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B puppetca_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the puppetca_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the puppetca_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B puppetmaster_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the puppetmaster_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the puppetmaster_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B puppetmaster_initrc_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the puppetmaster_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the puppetmaster_initrc_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B puppetmaster_tmp_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the puppetmaster_tmp_t type, if you want to store puppetmaster temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH PORT TYPES
++SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
++.PP
++You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
++
++.B semanage port -l
++
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
++SELinux puppet policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their puppet processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following port types are defined for puppet:
++
++.EX
++.TP 5
++.B puppet_port_t
++.TP 10
++.EE
++
++
++Default Defined Ports:
++tcp 8140
++.EE
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type puppet_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B boolean_type
++
++
++.br
++.B configfile
++
++
++.br
++.B etc_t
++
++ /etc/.*
++.br
++ /var/db/.*\.db
++.br
++ /usr/etc(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/ftp/etc(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/openshift/.limits.d(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/openshift/.openshift-proxy.d(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/openshift/.stickshift-proxy.d(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/stickshift/.limits.d(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/stickshift/.stickshift-proxy.d(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/named/chroot/etc(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/ipsec\.d/examples(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/spool/postfix/etc(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc
++.br
++ /etc/cups/client\.conf
++.br
++
++.br
++.B krb5_host_rcache_t
++
++ /var/cache/krb5rcache(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/tmp/nfs_0
++.br
++ /var/tmp/DNS_25
++.br
++ /var/tmp/host_0
++.br
++ /var/tmp/imap_0
++.br
++ /var/tmp/HTTP_23
++.br
++ /var/tmp/HTTP_48
++.br
++ /var/tmp/ldap_55
++.br
++ /var/tmp/ldap_487
++.br
++ /var/tmp/ldapmap1_0
++.br
++
++.br
++.B krb5_keytab_t
++
++ /etc/krb5\.keytab
++.br
++ /etc/krb5kdc/kadm5\.keytab
++.br
++ /var/kerberos/krb5kdc/kadm5\.keytab
++.br
++
++.br
++.B puppet_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B puppet_var_lib_t
++
++ /var/lib/puppet(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B puppet_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/puppet(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B rpm_log_t
++
++ /var/log/yum\.log.*
++.br
++
++.br
++.B rpm_var_lib_t
++
++ /var/lib/rpm(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/yum(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/PackageKit(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/alternatives(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B var_t
++
++ /nsr(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/.*
++.br
++ /srv/.*
++.br
++ /var
++.br
++ /srv
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the puppetmaster_t, puppet_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the puppetmaster_t, puppet_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.B semanage port
++can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
++
++.B semanage boolean
++can also be used to manipulate the booleans
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), puppet(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, setsebool(8), puppetca_selinux(8), puppetmaster_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/puppetca_selinux.8 b/man/man8/puppetca_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..b0b4381
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/puppetca_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
++.TH "puppetca_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "puppetca" "SELinux Policy documentation for puppetca"
++.SH "NAME"
++puppetca_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the puppetca processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the puppetca processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The puppetca processes execute with the puppetca_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep puppetca_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The puppetca_t SELinux type can be entered via the "puppetca_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the puppetca_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/sbin/puppetca
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux puppetca policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their puppetca processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for puppetca:
++
++.EX
++.B puppetca_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux puppetca policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their puppetca processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for puppetca:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B puppetca_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the puppetca_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the puppetca_t domain.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type puppetca_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B puppet_var_lib_t
++
++ /var/lib/puppet(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B security_t
++
++ /selinux
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), puppetca(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, puppet_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/puppetmaster_selinux.8 b/man/man8/puppetmaster_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..83d8f60
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/puppetmaster_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,170 @@
++.TH "puppetmaster_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "puppetmaster" "SELinux Policy documentation for puppetmaster"
++.SH "NAME"
++puppetmaster_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the puppetmaster processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the puppetmaster processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The puppetmaster processes execute with the puppetmaster_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep puppetmaster_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The puppetmaster_t SELinux type can be entered via the "puppetmaster_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the puppetmaster_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/sbin/puppetmasterd
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux puppetmaster policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their puppetmaster processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for puppetmaster:
++
++.EX
++.B puppetmaster_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH BOOLEANS
++SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. puppetmaster policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run puppetmaster with the tightest access possible.
++
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow Puppet master to use connect to MySQL and PostgreSQL database, you must turn on the puppetmaster_use_db boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P puppetmaster_use_db 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow Puppet master to use connect to MySQL and PostgreSQL database, you must turn on the puppetmaster_use_db boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P puppetmaster_use_db 1
++.EE
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux puppetmaster policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their puppetmaster processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for puppetmaster:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B puppetmaster_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the puppetmaster_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the puppetmaster_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B puppetmaster_initrc_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the puppetmaster_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the puppetmaster_initrc_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B puppetmaster_tmp_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the puppetmaster_tmp_t type, if you want to store puppetmaster temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type puppetmaster_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B puppet_log_t
++
++ /var/log/puppet(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B puppet_var_lib_t
++
++ /var/lib/puppet(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B puppet_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/puppet(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B puppetmaster_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B security_t
++
++ /selinux
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the puppetmaster_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the puppetmaster_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.B semanage boolean
++can also be used to manipulate the booleans
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), puppetmaster(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, setsebool(8), puppet_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/pwauth_selinux.8 b/man/man8/pwauth_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..ce82d8a
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/pwauth_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,118 @@
++.TH "pwauth_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "pwauth" "SELinux Policy documentation for pwauth"
++.SH "NAME"
++pwauth_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the pwauth processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the pwauth processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The pwauth processes execute with the pwauth_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep pwauth_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The pwauth_t SELinux type can be entered via the "pwauth_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the pwauth_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/bin/pwauth
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux pwauth policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their pwauth processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for pwauth:
++
++.EX
++.B pwauth_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux pwauth policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their pwauth processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for pwauth:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B pwauth_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the pwauth_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the pwauth_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B pwauth_var_run_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the pwauth_var_run_t type, if you want to store the pwauth files under the /run directory.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type pwauth_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B pwauth_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/pwauth.lock
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the pwauth_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the pwauth_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), pwauth(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/pyicqt_selinux.8 b/man/man8/pyicqt_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..d92e759
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/pyicqt_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,146 @@
++.TH "pyicqt_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "pyicqt" "SELinux Policy documentation for pyicqt"
++.SH "NAME"
++pyicqt_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the pyicqt processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the pyicqt processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The pyicqt processes execute with the pyicqt_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep pyicqt_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The pyicqt_t SELinux type can be entered via the "pyicqt_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the pyicqt_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/share/pyicq-t/PyICQt\.py
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux pyicqt policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their pyicqt processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for pyicqt:
++
++.EX
++.B pyicqt_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux pyicqt policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their pyicqt processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for pyicqt:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B pyicqt_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the pyicqt_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the pyicqt_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B pyicqt_log_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the pyicqt_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as pyicqt log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B pyicqt_var_run_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the pyicqt_var_run_t type, if you want to store the pyicqt files under the /run directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B pyicqt_var_spool_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the pyicqt_var_spool_t type, if you want to store the pyicqt var files under the /var/spool directory.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type pyicqt_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B pyicqt_log_t
++
++ /var/log/pyicq-t\.log.*
++.br
++
++.br
++.B pyicqt_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/pyicq-t(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B pyicqt_var_spool_t
++
++ /var/spool/pyicq-t(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the pyicqt_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the pyicqt_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), pyicqt(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/qdiskd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/qdiskd_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..e6e2867
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/qdiskd_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,164 @@
++.TH "qdiskd_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "qdiskd" "SELinux Policy documentation for qdiskd"
++.SH "NAME"
++qdiskd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the qdiskd processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the qdiskd processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The qdiskd processes execute with the qdiskd_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep qdiskd_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The qdiskd_t SELinux type can be entered via the "qdiskd_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the qdiskd_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/sbin/qdiskd
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux qdiskd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their qdiskd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for qdiskd:
++
++.EX
++.B qdiskd_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux qdiskd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their qdiskd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for qdiskd:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B qdiskd_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the qdiskd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the qdiskd_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B qdiskd_tmpfs_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the qdiskd_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store qdiskd files on a tmpfs file system.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B qdiskd_var_lib_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the qdiskd_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the qdiskd files under the /var/lib directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B qdiskd_var_log_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the qdiskd_var_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as qdiskd var log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B qdiskd_var_run_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the qdiskd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the qdiskd files under the /run directory.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type qdiskd_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B cluster_var_lib_t
++
++ /var/lib/cluster(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B qdiskd_tmpfs_t
++
++
++.br
++.B qdiskd_var_lib_t
++
++ /var/lib/qdiskd(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B qdiskd_var_log_t
++
++ /var/log/cluster/qdiskd\.log.*
++.br
++
++.br
++.B qdiskd_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/qdiskd\.pid
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the qdiskd_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the qdiskd_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), qdiskd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/qemu_dm_selinux.8 b/man/man8/qemu_dm_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..a367e12
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/qemu_dm_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
++.TH "qemu_dm_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "qemu_dm" "SELinux Policy documentation for qemu_dm"
++.SH "NAME"
++qemu_dm_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the qemu_dm processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the qemu_dm processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The qemu_dm processes execute with the qemu_dm_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep qemu_dm_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The qemu_dm_t SELinux type can be entered via the "qemu_dm_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the qemu_dm_t domain are the following:"
++
++
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux qemu_dm policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their qemu_dm processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for qemu_dm:
++
++.EX
++.B qemu_dm_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux qemu_dm policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their qemu_dm processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for qemu_dm:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B qemu_dm_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the qemu_dm_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the qemu_dm_t domain.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type qemu_dm_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B xenfs_t
++
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), qemu_dm(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/qmail_clean_selinux.8 b/man/man8/qmail_clean_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..4688dbf
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/qmail_clean_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
++.TH "qmail_clean_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "qmail_clean" "SELinux Policy documentation for qmail_clean"
++.SH "NAME"
++qmail_clean_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the qmail_clean processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the qmail_clean processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The qmail_clean processes execute with the qmail_clean_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep qmail_clean_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The qmail_clean_t SELinux type can be entered via the "qmail_clean_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the qmail_clean_t domain are the following:"
++
++/var/qmail/bin/qmail-clean
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux qmail_clean policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their qmail_clean processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for qmail_clean:
++
++.EX
++.B qmail_clean_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux qmail_clean policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their qmail_clean processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for qmail_clean:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B qmail_clean_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the qmail_clean_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the qmail_clean_t domain.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), qmail_clean(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, qmail_inject_selinux(8), qmail_local_selinux(8), qmail_lspawn_selinux(8), qmail_queue_selinux(8), qmail_remote_selinux(8), qmail_rspawn_selinux(8), qmail_send_selinux(8), qmail_smtpd_selinux(8), qmail_splogger_selinux(8), qmail_start_selinux(8), qmail_tcp_env_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/qmail_inject_selinux.8 b/man/man8/qmail_inject_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..b61fe99
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/qmail_inject_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
++.TH "qmail_inject_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "qmail_inject" "SELinux Policy documentation for qmail_inject"
++.SH "NAME"
++qmail_inject_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the qmail_inject processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the qmail_inject processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The qmail_inject processes execute with the qmail_inject_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep qmail_inject_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The qmail_inject_t SELinux type can be entered via the "qmail_inject_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the qmail_inject_t domain are the following:"
++
++/var/qmail/bin/qmail-inject
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux qmail_inject policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their qmail_inject processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for qmail_inject:
++
++.EX
++.B qmail_inject_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux qmail_inject policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their qmail_inject processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for qmail_inject:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B qmail_inject_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the qmail_inject_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the qmail_inject_t domain.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type qmail_inject_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B arpwatch_tmp_t
++
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), qmail_inject(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, qmail_clean_selinux(8), qmail_local_selinux(8), qmail_lspawn_selinux(8), qmail_queue_selinux(8), qmail_remote_selinux(8), qmail_rspawn_selinux(8), qmail_send_selinux(8), qmail_smtpd_selinux(8), qmail_splogger_selinux(8), qmail_start_selinux(8), qmail_tcp_env_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/qmail_local_selinux.8 b/man/man8/qmail_local_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..923074e
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/qmail_local_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,151 @@
++.TH "qmail_local_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "qmail_local" "SELinux Policy documentation for qmail_local"
++.SH "NAME"
++qmail_local_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the qmail_local processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the qmail_local processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The qmail_local processes execute with the qmail_local_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep qmail_local_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The qmail_local_t SELinux type can be entered via the "qmail_local_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the qmail_local_t domain are the following:"
++
++/var/qmail/bin/qmail-local
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux qmail_local policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their qmail_local processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for qmail_local:
++
++.EX
++.B qmail_local_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux qmail_local policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their qmail_local processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for qmail_local:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B qmail_local_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the qmail_local_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the qmail_local_t domain.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type qmail_local_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B dovecot_spool_t
++
++ /var/spool/dovecot(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B mail_home_rw_t
++
++ /root/Maildir(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/Maildir(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/Maildir(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/Maildir(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B mail_spool_t
++
++ /var/mail(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/spool/imap(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/spool/mail(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B qmail_alias_home_t
++
++ /var/qmail/alias(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/qmail/alias
++.br
++
++.br
++.B user_home_t
++
++ /home/[^/]*/.+
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/.+
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/.+
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the qmail_local_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the qmail_local_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), qmail_local(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, qmail_clean_selinux(8), qmail_inject_selinux(8), qmail_lspawn_selinux(8), qmail_queue_selinux(8), qmail_remote_selinux(8), qmail_rspawn_selinux(8), qmail_send_selinux(8), qmail_smtpd_selinux(8), qmail_splogger_selinux(8), qmail_start_selinux(8), qmail_tcp_env_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/qmail_lspawn_selinux.8 b/man/man8/qmail_lspawn_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..7ac2a16
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/qmail_lspawn_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,119 @@
++.TH "qmail_lspawn_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "qmail_lspawn" "SELinux Policy documentation for qmail_lspawn"
++.SH "NAME"
++qmail_lspawn_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the qmail_lspawn processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the qmail_lspawn processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The qmail_lspawn processes execute with the qmail_lspawn_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep qmail_lspawn_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The qmail_lspawn_t SELinux type can be entered via the "qmail_lspawn_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the qmail_lspawn_t domain are the following:"
++
++/var/qmail/bin/qmail-lspawn
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux qmail_lspawn policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their qmail_lspawn processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for qmail_lspawn:
++
++.EX
++.B qmail_lspawn_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux qmail_lspawn policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their qmail_lspawn processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for qmail_lspawn:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B qmail_lspawn_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the qmail_lspawn_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the qmail_lspawn_t domain.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type qmail_lspawn_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B dovecot_spool_t
++
++ /var/spool/dovecot(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B mail_home_rw_t
++
++ /root/Maildir(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/Maildir(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/Maildir(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/Maildir(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B user_home_t
++
++ /home/[^/]*/.+
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/.+
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/.+
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), qmail_lspawn(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, qmail_clean_selinux(8), qmail_inject_selinux(8), qmail_local_selinux(8), qmail_queue_selinux(8), qmail_remote_selinux(8), qmail_rspawn_selinux(8), qmail_send_selinux(8), qmail_smtpd_selinux(8), qmail_splogger_selinux(8), qmail_start_selinux(8), qmail_tcp_env_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/qmail_queue_selinux.8 b/man/man8/qmail_queue_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..473dcd0
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/qmail_queue_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
++.TH "qmail_queue_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "qmail_queue" "SELinux Policy documentation for qmail_queue"
++.SH "NAME"
++qmail_queue_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the qmail_queue processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the qmail_queue processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The qmail_queue processes execute with the qmail_queue_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep qmail_queue_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The qmail_queue_t SELinux type can be entered via the "qmail_queue_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the qmail_queue_t domain are the following:"
++
++/var/qmail/bin/qmail-queue
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux qmail_queue policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their qmail_queue processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for qmail_queue:
++
++.EX
++.B qmail_queue_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux qmail_queue policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their qmail_queue processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for qmail_queue:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B qmail_queue_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the qmail_queue_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the qmail_queue_t domain.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type qmail_queue_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B arpwatch_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B qmail_spool_t
++
++ /var/qmail/queue(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), qmail_queue(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, qmail_clean_selinux(8), qmail_inject_selinux(8), qmail_local_selinux(8), qmail_lspawn_selinux(8), qmail_remote_selinux(8), qmail_rspawn_selinux(8), qmail_send_selinux(8), qmail_smtpd_selinux(8), qmail_splogger_selinux(8), qmail_start_selinux(8), qmail_tcp_env_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/qmail_remote_selinux.8 b/man/man8/qmail_remote_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..0760c51
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/qmail_remote_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
++.TH "qmail_remote_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "qmail_remote" "SELinux Policy documentation for qmail_remote"
++.SH "NAME"
++qmail_remote_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the qmail_remote processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the qmail_remote processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The qmail_remote processes execute with the qmail_remote_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep qmail_remote_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The qmail_remote_t SELinux type can be entered via the "qmail_remote_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the qmail_remote_t domain are the following:"
++
++/var/qmail/bin/qmail-remote
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux qmail_remote policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their qmail_remote processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for qmail_remote:
++
++.EX
++.B qmail_remote_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux qmail_remote policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their qmail_remote processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for qmail_remote:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B qmail_remote_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the qmail_remote_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the qmail_remote_t domain.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type qmail_remote_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B qmail_spool_t
++
++ /var/qmail/queue(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), qmail_remote(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, qmail_clean_selinux(8), qmail_inject_selinux(8), qmail_local_selinux(8), qmail_lspawn_selinux(8), qmail_queue_selinux(8), qmail_rspawn_selinux(8), qmail_send_selinux(8), qmail_smtpd_selinux(8), qmail_splogger_selinux(8), qmail_start_selinux(8), qmail_tcp_env_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/qmail_rspawn_selinux.8 b/man/man8/qmail_rspawn_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..5c8ef31
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/qmail_rspawn_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
++.TH "qmail_rspawn_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "qmail_rspawn" "SELinux Policy documentation for qmail_rspawn"
++.SH "NAME"
++qmail_rspawn_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the qmail_rspawn processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the qmail_rspawn processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The qmail_rspawn processes execute with the qmail_rspawn_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep qmail_rspawn_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The qmail_rspawn_t SELinux type can be entered via the "qmail_rspawn_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the qmail_rspawn_t domain are the following:"
++
++/var/qmail/bin/qmail-rspawn
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux qmail_rspawn policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their qmail_rspawn processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for qmail_rspawn:
++
++.EX
++.B qmail_rspawn_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux qmail_rspawn policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their qmail_rspawn processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for qmail_rspawn:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B qmail_rspawn_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the qmail_rspawn_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the qmail_rspawn_t domain.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type qmail_rspawn_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B qmail_spool_t
++
++ /var/qmail/queue(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), qmail_rspawn(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, qmail_clean_selinux(8), qmail_inject_selinux(8), qmail_local_selinux(8), qmail_lspawn_selinux(8), qmail_queue_selinux(8), qmail_remote_selinux(8), qmail_send_selinux(8), qmail_smtpd_selinux(8), qmail_splogger_selinux(8), qmail_start_selinux(8), qmail_tcp_env_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/qmail_send_selinux.8 b/man/man8/qmail_send_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..2dd46dd
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/qmail_send_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
++.TH "qmail_send_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "qmail_send" "SELinux Policy documentation for qmail_send"
++.SH "NAME"
++qmail_send_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the qmail_send processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the qmail_send processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The qmail_send processes execute with the qmail_send_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep qmail_send_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The qmail_send_t SELinux type can be entered via the "qmail_send_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the qmail_send_t domain are the following:"
++
++/var/qmail/bin/qmail-send
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux qmail_send policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their qmail_send processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for qmail_send:
++
++.EX
++.B qmail_send_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux qmail_send policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their qmail_send processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for qmail_send:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B qmail_send_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the qmail_send_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the qmail_send_t domain.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type qmail_send_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B qmail_spool_t
++
++ /var/qmail/queue(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), qmail_send(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, qmail_clean_selinux(8), qmail_inject_selinux(8), qmail_local_selinux(8), qmail_lspawn_selinux(8), qmail_queue_selinux(8), qmail_remote_selinux(8), qmail_rspawn_selinux(8), qmail_smtpd_selinux(8), qmail_splogger_selinux(8), qmail_start_selinux(8), qmail_tcp_env_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/qmail_smtpd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/qmail_smtpd_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..9e7c3d8
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/qmail_smtpd_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
++.TH "qmail_smtpd_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "qmail_smtpd" "SELinux Policy documentation for qmail_smtpd"
++.SH "NAME"
++qmail_smtpd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the qmail_smtpd processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the qmail_smtpd processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The qmail_smtpd processes execute with the qmail_smtpd_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep qmail_smtpd_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The qmail_smtpd_t SELinux type can be entered via the "qmail_smtpd_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the qmail_smtpd_t domain are the following:"
++
++/var/qmail/bin/qmail-smtpd
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux qmail_smtpd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their qmail_smtpd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for qmail_smtpd:
++
++.EX
++.B qmail_smtpd_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux qmail_smtpd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their qmail_smtpd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for qmail_smtpd:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B qmail_smtpd_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the qmail_smtpd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the qmail_smtpd_t domain.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), qmail_smtpd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, qmail_clean_selinux(8), qmail_inject_selinux(8), qmail_local_selinux(8), qmail_lspawn_selinux(8), qmail_queue_selinux(8), qmail_remote_selinux(8), qmail_rspawn_selinux(8), qmail_send_selinux(8), qmail_splogger_selinux(8), qmail_start_selinux(8), qmail_tcp_env_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/qmail_splogger_selinux.8 b/man/man8/qmail_splogger_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..4598efb
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/qmail_splogger_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
++.TH "qmail_splogger_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "qmail_splogger" "SELinux Policy documentation for qmail_splogger"
++.SH "NAME"
++qmail_splogger_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the qmail_splogger processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the qmail_splogger processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The qmail_splogger processes execute with the qmail_splogger_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep qmail_splogger_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The qmail_splogger_t SELinux type can be entered via the "qmail_splogger_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the qmail_splogger_t domain are the following:"
++
++/var/qmail/bin/splogger
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux qmail_splogger policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their qmail_splogger processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for qmail_splogger:
++
++.EX
++.B qmail_splogger_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux qmail_splogger policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their qmail_splogger processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for qmail_splogger:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B qmail_splogger_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the qmail_splogger_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the qmail_splogger_t domain.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), qmail_splogger(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, qmail_clean_selinux(8), qmail_inject_selinux(8), qmail_local_selinux(8), qmail_lspawn_selinux(8), qmail_queue_selinux(8), qmail_remote_selinux(8), qmail_rspawn_selinux(8), qmail_send_selinux(8), qmail_smtpd_selinux(8), qmail_start_selinux(8), qmail_tcp_env_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/qmail_start_selinux.8 b/man/man8/qmail_start_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..ff8236b
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/qmail_start_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
++.TH "qmail_start_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "qmail_start" "SELinux Policy documentation for qmail_start"
++.SH "NAME"
++qmail_start_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the qmail_start processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the qmail_start processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The qmail_start processes execute with the qmail_start_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep qmail_start_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The qmail_start_t SELinux type can be entered via the "qmail_start_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the qmail_start_t domain are the following:"
++
++/var/qmail/bin/qmail-start
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux qmail_start policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their qmail_start processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for qmail_start:
++
++.EX
++.B qmail_start_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux qmail_start policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their qmail_start processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for qmail_start:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B qmail_start_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the qmail_start_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the qmail_start_t domain.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), qmail_start(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, qmail_clean_selinux(8), qmail_inject_selinux(8), qmail_local_selinux(8), qmail_lspawn_selinux(8), qmail_queue_selinux(8), qmail_remote_selinux(8), qmail_rspawn_selinux(8), qmail_send_selinux(8), qmail_smtpd_selinux(8), qmail_splogger_selinux(8), qmail_tcp_env_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/qmail_tcp_env_selinux.8 b/man/man8/qmail_tcp_env_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..86b82a0
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/qmail_tcp_env_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
++.TH "qmail_tcp_env_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "qmail_tcp_env" "SELinux Policy documentation for qmail_tcp_env"
++.SH "NAME"
++qmail_tcp_env_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the qmail_tcp_env processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the qmail_tcp_env processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The qmail_tcp_env processes execute with the qmail_tcp_env_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep qmail_tcp_env_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The qmail_tcp_env_t SELinux type can be entered via the "qmail_tcp_env_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the qmail_tcp_env_t domain are the following:"
++
++/var/qmail/bin/tcp-env
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux qmail_tcp_env policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their qmail_tcp_env processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for qmail_tcp_env:
++
++.EX
++.B qmail_tcp_env_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux qmail_tcp_env policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their qmail_tcp_env processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for qmail_tcp_env:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B qmail_tcp_env_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the qmail_tcp_env_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the qmail_tcp_env_t domain.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), qmail_tcp_env(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, qmail_clean_selinux(8), qmail_inject_selinux(8), qmail_local_selinux(8), qmail_lspawn_selinux(8), qmail_queue_selinux(8), qmail_remote_selinux(8), qmail_rspawn_selinux(8), qmail_send_selinux(8), qmail_smtpd_selinux(8), qmail_splogger_selinux(8), qmail_start_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/qpidd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/qpidd_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..0d185be
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/qpidd_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,140 @@
++.TH "qpidd_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "qpidd" "SELinux Policy documentation for qpidd"
++.SH "NAME"
++qpidd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the qpidd processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the qpidd processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The qpidd processes execute with the qpidd_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep qpidd_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The qpidd_t SELinux type can be entered via the "qpidd_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the qpidd_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/sbin/qpidd
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux qpidd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their qpidd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for qpidd:
++
++.EX
++.B qpidd_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux qpidd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their qpidd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for qpidd:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B qpidd_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the qpidd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the qpidd_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B qpidd_initrc_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the qpidd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the qpidd_initrc_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B qpidd_tmpfs_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the qpidd_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store qpidd files on a tmpfs file system.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B qpidd_var_lib_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the qpidd_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the qpidd files under the /var/lib directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B qpidd_var_run_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the qpidd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the qpidd files under the /run directory.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type qpidd_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B qpidd_tmpfs_t
++
++
++.br
++.B qpidd_var_lib_t
++
++ /var/lib/qpidd(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B qpidd_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/qpidd(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/qpidd\.pid
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), qpidd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/quantum_selinux.8 b/man/man8/quantum_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..7ccd16b
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/quantum_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,178 @@
++.TH "quantum_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "quantum" "SELinux Policy documentation for quantum"
++.SH "NAME"
++quantum_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the quantum processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the quantum processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The quantum processes execute with the quantum_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep quantum_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The quantum_t SELinux type can be entered via the "quantum_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the quantum_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/bin/quantum-server, /usr/bin/quantum-ryu-agent, /usr/bin/quantum-openvswitch-agent, /usr/bin/quantum-linuxbridge-agent
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux quantum policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their quantum processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for quantum:
++
++.EX
++.B quantum_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux quantum policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their quantum processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for quantum:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B quantum_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the quantum_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the quantum_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B quantum_log_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the quantum_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as quantum log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B quantum_tmp_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the quantum_tmp_t type, if you want to store quantum temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B quantum_unit_file_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the quantum_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as quantum unit content.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B quantum_var_lib_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the quantum_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the quantum files under the /var/lib directory.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH PORT TYPES
++SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
++.PP
++You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
++
++.B semanage port -l
++
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
++SELinux quantum policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their quantum processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following port types are defined for quantum:
++
++.EX
++.TP 5
++.B quantum_port_t
++.TP 10
++.EE
++
++
++Default Defined Ports:
++tcp 9696
++.EE
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type quantum_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B quantum_log_t
++
++ /var/log/quantum(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B quantum_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B quantum_var_lib_t
++
++ /var/lib/quantum(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the quantum_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the quantum_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.B semanage port
++can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), quantum(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/quota_nld_selinux.8 b/man/man8/quota_nld_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..e8c53e4
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/quota_nld_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,119 @@
++.TH "quota_nld_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "quota_nld" "SELinux Policy documentation for quota_nld"
++.SH "NAME"
++quota_nld_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the quota_nld processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the quota_nld processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The quota_nld processes execute with the quota_nld_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep quota_nld_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The quota_nld_t SELinux type can be entered via the "quota_nld_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the quota_nld_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/sbin/quota_nld
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux quota_nld policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their quota_nld processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for quota_nld:
++
++.EX
++.B quota_nld_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux quota_nld policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their quota_nld processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for quota_nld:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B quota_nld_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the quota_nld_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the quota_nld_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B quota_nld_var_run_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the quota_nld_var_run_t type, if you want to store the quota nld files under the /run directory.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type quota_nld_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B quota_nld_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/quota_nld\.pid
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the quota_nld_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the quota_nld_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), quota_nld(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, quota_selinux(8), quota_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/quota_selinux.8 b/man/man8/quota_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..f6b1bff
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/quota_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,163 @@
++.TH "quota_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "quota" "SELinux Policy documentation for quota"
++.SH "NAME"
++quota_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the quota processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the quota processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The quota processes execute with the quota_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep quota_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The quota_t SELinux type can be entered via the "quota_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the quota_t domain are the following:"
++
++/sbin/quota(check|on), /usr/sbin/quota(check|on), /usr/sbin/convertquota
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux quota policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their quota processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for quota:
++
++.EX
++.B quota_t, quota_nld_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux quota policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their quota processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for quota:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B quota_db_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the quota_db_t type, if you want to treat the files as quota database content.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B quota_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the quota_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the quota_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B quota_flag_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the quota_flag_t type, if you want to treat the files as quota flag data.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B quota_nld_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the quota_nld_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the quota_nld_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B quota_nld_var_run_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the quota_nld_var_run_t type, if you want to store the quota nld files under the /run directory.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type quota_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B quota_db_t
++
++ /a?quota\.(user|group)
++.br
++ /etc/a?quota\.(user|group)
++.br
++ /var/a?quota\.(user|group)
++.br
++ /boot/a?quota\.(user|group)
++.br
++ /var/spool/(.*/)?a?quota\.(user|group)
++.br
++ /var/lib/openshift/a?quota\.(user|group)
++.br
++ /var/lib/stickshift/a?quota\.(user|group)
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/a?quota\.(user|group)
++.br
++ /home/a?quota\.(user|group)
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/a?quota\.(user|group)
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/a?quota\.(user|group)
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the quota_nld_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the quota_nld_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), quota(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, quota_nld_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/rabbitmq_beam_selinux.8 b/man/man8/rabbitmq_beam_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..01bdf1a
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/rabbitmq_beam_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
++.TH "rabbitmq_beam_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "rabbitmq_beam" "SELinux Policy documentation for rabbitmq_beam"
++.SH "NAME"
++rabbitmq_beam_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the rabbitmq_beam processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the rabbitmq_beam processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The rabbitmq_beam processes execute with the rabbitmq_beam_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep rabbitmq_beam_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The rabbitmq_beam_t SELinux type can be entered via the "rabbitmq_beam_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the rabbitmq_beam_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/lib64/erlang/erts-5.8.5/bin/beam.*
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux rabbitmq_beam policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their rabbitmq_beam processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for rabbitmq_beam:
++
++.EX
++.B rabbitmq_beam_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux rabbitmq_beam policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their rabbitmq_beam processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for rabbitmq_beam:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B rabbitmq_beam_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the rabbitmq_beam_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the rabbitmq_beam_t domain.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type rabbitmq_beam_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B rabbitmq_var_lib_t
++
++ /var/lib/rabbitmq(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B rabbitmq_var_log_t
++
++ /var/log/rabbitmq(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), rabbitmq_beam(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, rabbitmq_epmd_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/rabbitmq_epmd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/rabbitmq_epmd_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..5151b32
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/rabbitmq_epmd_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
++.TH "rabbitmq_epmd_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "rabbitmq_epmd" "SELinux Policy documentation for rabbitmq_epmd"
++.SH "NAME"
++rabbitmq_epmd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the rabbitmq_epmd processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the rabbitmq_epmd processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The rabbitmq_epmd processes execute with the rabbitmq_epmd_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep rabbitmq_epmd_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The rabbitmq_epmd_t SELinux type can be entered via the "rabbitmq_epmd_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the rabbitmq_epmd_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/lib64/erlang/erts-5.8.5/bin/epmd
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux rabbitmq_epmd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their rabbitmq_epmd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for rabbitmq_epmd:
++
++.EX
++.B rabbitmq_epmd_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux rabbitmq_epmd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their rabbitmq_epmd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for rabbitmq_epmd:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B rabbitmq_epmd_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the rabbitmq_epmd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the rabbitmq_epmd_t domain.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type rabbitmq_epmd_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B rabbitmq_var_log_t
++
++ /var/log/rabbitmq(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), rabbitmq_epmd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, rabbitmq_beam_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/racoon_selinux.8 b/man/man8/racoon_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..58f53af
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/racoon_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,210 @@
++.TH "racoon_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "racoon" "SELinux Policy documentation for racoon"
++.SH "NAME"
++racoon_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the racoon processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the racoon processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The racoon processes execute with the racoon_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep racoon_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The racoon_t SELinux type can be entered via the "racoon_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the racoon_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/sbin/racoon
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux racoon policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their racoon processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for racoon:
++
++.EX
++.B racoon_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH BOOLEANS
++SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. racoon policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run racoon with the tightest access possible.
++
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow racoon to read shadow, you must turn on the racoon_read_shadow boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P racoon_read_shadow 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow racoon to read shadow, you must turn on the racoon_read_shadow boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P racoon_read_shadow 1
++.EE
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux racoon policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their racoon processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for racoon:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B racoon_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the racoon_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the racoon_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B racoon_tmp_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the racoon_tmp_t type, if you want to store racoon temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type racoon_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B faillog_t
++
++ /var/log/btmp.*
++.br
++ /var/run/faillock(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/log/faillog
++.br
++ /var/log/tallylog
++.br
++
++.br
++.B ipsec_var_run_t
++
++ /var/racoon(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/pluto(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/racoon\.pid
++.br
++
++.br
++.B krb5_host_rcache_t
++
++ /var/cache/krb5rcache(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/tmp/nfs_0
++.br
++ /var/tmp/DNS_25
++.br
++ /var/tmp/host_0
++.br
++ /var/tmp/imap_0
++.br
++ /var/tmp/HTTP_23
++.br
++ /var/tmp/HTTP_48
++.br
++ /var/tmp/ldap_55
++.br
++ /var/tmp/ldap_487
++.br
++ /var/tmp/ldapmap1_0
++.br
++
++.br
++.B lastlog_t
++
++ /var/log/lastlog
++.br
++
++.br
++.B pcscd_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/pcscd(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/pcscd\.events(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/pcscd\.pid
++.br
++ /var/run/pcscd\.pub
++.br
++ /var/run/pcscd\.comm
++.br
++
++.br
++.B racoon_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B security_t
++
++ /selinux
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the racoon_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the racoon_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.B semanage boolean
++can also be used to manipulate the booleans
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), racoon(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, setsebool(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/radiusd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/radiusd_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..2a14d47
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/radiusd_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,264 @@
++.TH "radiusd_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "radiusd" "SELinux Policy documentation for radiusd"
++.SH "NAME"
++radiusd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the radiusd processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the radiusd processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The radiusd processes execute with the radiusd_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep radiusd_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The radiusd_t SELinux type can be entered via the "radiusd_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the radiusd_t domain are the following:"
++
++/etc/cron\.(daily|monthly)/radiusd, /etc/cron\.(daily|weekly|monthly)/freeradius, /usr/sbin/radiusd, /usr/sbin/freeradius
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux radiusd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their radiusd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for radiusd:
++
++.EX
++.B radiusd_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH BOOLEANS
++SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. radiusd policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run radiusd with the tightest access possible.
++
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to login using a radius server, you must turn on the authlogin_radius boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_radius 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to login using a radius server, you must turn on the authlogin_radius boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_radius 1
++.EE
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux radiusd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their radiusd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for radiusd:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B radiusd_etc_rw_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the radiusd_etc_rw_t type, if you want to treat the files as radiusd etc read/write content.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B radiusd_etc_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the radiusd_etc_t type, if you want to store radiusd files in the /etc directories.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B radiusd_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the radiusd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the radiusd_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B radiusd_initrc_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the radiusd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the radiusd_initrc_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B radiusd_log_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the radiusd_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as radiusd log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B radiusd_var_lib_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the radiusd_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the radiusd files under the /var/lib directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B radiusd_var_run_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the radiusd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the radiusd files under the /run directory.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH PORT TYPES
++SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
++.PP
++You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
++
++.B semanage port -l
++
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
++SELinux radiusd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their radiusd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following port types are defined for radiusd:
++
++.EX
++.TP 5
++.B radius_port_t
++.TP 10
++.EE
++
++
++Default Defined Ports:
++udp 1645,1812
++.EE
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type radiusd_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B faillog_t
++
++ /var/log/btmp.*
++.br
++ /var/run/faillock(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/log/faillog
++.br
++ /var/log/tallylog
++.br
++
++.br
++.B pcscd_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/pcscd(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/pcscd\.events(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/pcscd\.pid
++.br
++ /var/run/pcscd\.pub
++.br
++ /var/run/pcscd\.comm
++.br
++
++.br
++.B radiusd_etc_rw_t
++
++ /etc/raddb/db\.daily
++.br
++
++.br
++.B radiusd_log_t
++
++ /var/log/radius(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/log/radwtmp.*
++.br
++ /var/log/radacct(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/log/radius\.log.*
++.br
++ /var/log/freeradius(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/log/radiusd-freeradius(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/log/radutmp
++.br
++
++.br
++.B radiusd_var_lib_t
++
++ /var/lib/radiousd(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B radiusd_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/radiusd(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/radiusd\.pid
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the radiusd_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the radiusd_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.B semanage port
++can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
++
++.B semanage boolean
++can also be used to manipulate the booleans
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), radiusd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, setsebool(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/radvd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/radvd_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..1fba22f
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/radvd_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,136 @@
++.TH "radvd_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "radvd" "SELinux Policy documentation for radvd"
++.SH "NAME"
++radvd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the radvd processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the radvd processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The radvd processes execute with the radvd_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep radvd_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The radvd_t SELinux type can be entered via the "radvd_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the radvd_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/sbin/radvd
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux radvd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their radvd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for radvd:
++
++.EX
++.B radvd_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux radvd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their radvd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for radvd:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B radvd_etc_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the radvd_etc_t type, if you want to store radvd files in the /etc directories.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B radvd_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the radvd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the radvd_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B radvd_initrc_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the radvd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the radvd_initrc_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B radvd_var_run_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the radvd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the radvd files under the /run directory.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type radvd_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B radvd_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/radvd(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/radvd\.pid
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the radvd_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the radvd_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), radvd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/rdisc_selinux.8 b/man/man8/rdisc_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..436b9f8
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/rdisc_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
++.TH "rdisc_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "rdisc" "SELinux Policy documentation for rdisc"
++.SH "NAME"
++rdisc_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the rdisc processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the rdisc processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The rdisc processes execute with the rdisc_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep rdisc_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The rdisc_t SELinux type can be entered via the "rdisc_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the rdisc_t domain are the following:"
++
++/sbin/rdisc, /usr/sbin/rdisc
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux rdisc policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their rdisc processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for rdisc:
++
++.EX
++.B rdisc_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux rdisc policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their rdisc processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for rdisc:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B rdisc_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the rdisc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the rdisc_t domain.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), rdisc(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/readahead_selinux.8 b/man/man8/readahead_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..56587b5
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/readahead_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,180 @@
++.TH "readahead_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "readahead" "SELinux Policy documentation for readahead"
++.SH "NAME"
++readahead_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the readahead processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the readahead processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The readahead processes execute with the readahead_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep readahead_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The readahead_t SELinux type can be entered via the "readahead_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the readahead_t domain are the following:"
++
++/sbin/readahead.*, /usr/sbin/readahead.*, /usr/lib/systemd/systemd-readahead.*
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux readahead policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their readahead processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for readahead:
++
++.EX
++.B readahead_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux readahead policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their readahead processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for readahead:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B readahead_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the readahead_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the readahead_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B readahead_var_lib_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the readahead_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the readahead files under the /var/lib directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B readahead_var_run_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the readahead_var_run_t type, if you want to store the readahead files under the /run directory.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type readahead_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B etc_runtime_t
++
++ /[^/]+
++.br
++ /etc/mtab.*
++.br
++ /etc/blkid(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/nologin.*
++.br
++ /etc/\.fstab\.hal\..+
++.br
++ /halt
++.br
++ /fastboot
++.br
++ /poweroff
++.br
++ /etc/cmtab
++.br
++ /\.autofsck
++.br
++ /forcefsck
++.br
++ /\.suspended
++.br
++ /fsckoptions
++.br
++ /\.autorelabel
++.br
++ /etc/securetty
++.br
++ /etc/killpower
++.br
++ /etc/nohotplug
++.br
++ /etc/ioctl\.save
++.br
++ /etc/fstab\.REVOKE
++.br
++ /etc/network/ifstate
++.br
++ /etc/sysconfig/hwconf
++.br
++ /etc/ptal/ptal-printd-like
++.br
++ /etc/sysconfig/iptables\.save
++.br
++ /etc/xorg\.conf\.d/00-system-setup-keyboard\.conf
++.br
++ /etc/X11/xorg\.conf\.d/00-system-setup-keyboard\.conf
++.br
++
++.br
++.B readahead_var_lib_t
++
++ /var/lib/readahead(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B readahead_var_run_t
++
++ /dev/\.systemd/readahead(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/systemd/readahead(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B sysfs_t
++
++ /sys(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), readahead(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/realmd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/realmd_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..926344d
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/realmd_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,166 @@
++.TH "realmd_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "realmd" "SELinux Policy documentation for realmd"
++.SH "NAME"
++realmd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the realmd processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the realmd processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The realmd processes execute with the realmd_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep realmd_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The realmd_t SELinux type can be entered via the "realmd_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the realmd_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/lib/realmd/realmd
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux realmd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their realmd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for realmd:
++
++.EX
++.B realmd_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux realmd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their realmd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for realmd:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B realmd_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the realmd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the realmd_t domain.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type realmd_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B cache_home_t
++
++ /root/\.cache(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.nv(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.cache(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.nv(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.cache(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.nv(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.cache(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B krb5_keytab_t
++
++ /etc/krb5\.keytab
++.br
++ /etc/krb5kdc/kadm5\.keytab
++.br
++ /var/kerberos/krb5kdc/kadm5\.keytab
++.br
++
++.br
++.B samba_etc_t
++
++ /etc/samba(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B sssd_conf_t
++
++ /etc/sssd(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B sssd_public_t
++
++ /var/lib/sss/mc(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/sss/pubconf(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B sssd_var_lib_t
++
++ /var/lib/sss(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B systemd_passwd_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/systemd/ask-password(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/systemd/ask-password-block(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the realmd_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the realmd_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), realmd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/regex_milter_selinux.8 b/man/man8/regex_milter_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..6b0d3db
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/regex_milter_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,118 @@
++.TH "regex_milter_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "regex_milter" "SELinux Policy documentation for regex_milter"
++.SH "NAME"
++regex_milter_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the regex_milter processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the regex_milter processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The regex_milter processes execute with the regex_milter_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep regex_milter_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The regex_milter_t SELinux type can be entered via the "regex_milter_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the regex_milter_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/sbin/milter-regex
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux regex_milter policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their regex_milter processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for regex_milter:
++
++.EX
++.B regex_milter_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux regex_milter policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their regex_milter processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for regex_milter:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B regex_milter_data_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the regex_milter_data_t type, if you want to treat the files as regex milter content.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B regex_milter_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the regex_milter_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the regex_milter_t domain.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type regex_milter_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B regex_milter_data_t
++
++ /var/spool/milter-regex(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the regex_milter_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the regex_milter_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), regex_milter(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/restorecond_selinux.8 b/man/man8/restorecond_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..0810458
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/restorecond_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,124 @@
++.TH "restorecond_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "restorecond" "SELinux Policy documentation for restorecond"
++.SH "NAME"
++restorecond_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the restorecond processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the restorecond processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The restorecond processes execute with the restorecond_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep restorecond_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The restorecond_t SELinux type can be entered via the "restorecond_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the restorecond_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/sbin/restorecond
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux restorecond policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their restorecond processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for restorecond:
++
++.EX
++.B restorecond_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux restorecond policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their restorecond processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for restorecond:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B restorecond_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the restorecond_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the restorecond_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B restorecond_var_run_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the restorecond_var_run_t type, if you want to store the restorecond files under the /run directory.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type restorecond_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B restorecond_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/restorecond\.pid
++.br
++
++.br
++.B security_t
++
++ /selinux
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the restorecond_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the restorecond_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), restorecond(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/rgmanager_selinux.8 b/man/man8/rgmanager_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..feb0254
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/rgmanager_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,276 @@
++.TH "rgmanager_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "rgmanager" "SELinux Policy documentation for rgmanager"
++.SH "NAME"
++rgmanager_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the rgmanager processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the rgmanager processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The rgmanager processes execute with the rgmanager_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep rgmanager_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The rgmanager_t SELinux type can be entered via the "rgmanager_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the rgmanager_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/lib(64)?/heartbeat/heartbeat, /usr/sbin/cpglockd, /usr/sbin/rgmanager
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux rgmanager policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their rgmanager processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for rgmanager:
++
++.EX
++.B rgmanager_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH BOOLEANS
++SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. rgmanager policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run rgmanager with the tightest access possible.
++
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow rgmanager domain to connect to the network using TCP, you must turn on the rgmanager_can_network_connect boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P rgmanager_can_network_connect 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow rgmanager domain to connect to the network using TCP, you must turn on the rgmanager_can_network_connect boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P rgmanager_can_network_connect 1
++.EE
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux rgmanager policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their rgmanager processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for rgmanager:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B rgmanager_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the rgmanager_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the rgmanager_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B rgmanager_initrc_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the rgmanager_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the rgmanager_initrc_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B rgmanager_tmp_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the rgmanager_tmp_t type, if you want to store rgmanager temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B rgmanager_tmpfs_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the rgmanager_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store rgmanager files on a tmpfs file system.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B rgmanager_var_lib_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the rgmanager_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the rgmanager files under the /var/lib directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B rgmanager_var_log_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the rgmanager_var_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as rgmanager var log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B rgmanager_var_run_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the rgmanager_var_run_t type, if you want to store the rgmanager files under the /run directory.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type rgmanager_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B cluster_conf_t
++
++ /etc/cluster(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B file_t
++
++
++.br
++.B mnt_t
++
++ /mnt(/[^/]*)
++.br
++ /mnt(/[^/]*)?
++.br
++ /rhev(/[^/]*)?
++.br
++ /media(/[^/]*)
++.br
++ /media(/[^/]*)?
++.br
++ /media/\.hal-.*
++.br
++ /var/run/media(/[^/]*)?
++.br
++ /net
++.br
++ /afs
++.br
++ /rhev
++.br
++ /misc
++.br
++
++.br
++.B rgmanager_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B rgmanager_tmpfs_t
++
++
++.br
++.B rgmanager_var_lib_t
++
++ /usr/lib(64)?/heartbeat(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/heartbeat(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B rgmanager_var_log_t
++
++ /var/log/cluster/cpglockd\.log.*
++.br
++ /var/log/cluster/rgmanager\.log.*
++.br
++
++.br
++.B rgmanager_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/heartbeat(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/cpglockd\.pid
++.br
++ /var/run/rgmanager\.pid
++.br
++ /var/run/cluster/rgmanager\.sk
++.br
++
++.br
++.B samba_etc_t
++
++ /etc/samba(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B samba_var_t
++
++ /var/lib/samba(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/cache/samba(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/spool/samba(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B systemd_passwd_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/systemd/ask-password(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/systemd/ask-password-block(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B var_lib_nfs_t
++
++ /var/lib/nfs(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the rgmanager_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the rgmanager_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.B semanage boolean
++can also be used to manipulate the booleans
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), rgmanager(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, setsebool(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/rhev_agentd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/rhev_agentd_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..5550bd3
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/rhev_agentd_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,152 @@
++.TH "rhev_agentd_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "rhev_agentd" "SELinux Policy documentation for rhev_agentd"
++.SH "NAME"
++rhev_agentd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the rhev_agentd processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the rhev_agentd processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The rhev_agentd processes execute with the rhev_agentd_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep rhev_agentd_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The rhev_agentd_t SELinux type can be entered via the "rhev_agentd_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the rhev_agentd_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/share/ovirt-guest-agent, /usr/share/rhev-agent/rhev-agentd\.py
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux rhev_agentd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their rhev_agentd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for rhev_agentd:
++
++.EX
++.B rhev_agentd_t, rhev_agentd_consolehelper_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux rhev_agentd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their rhev_agentd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for rhev_agentd:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B rhev_agentd_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the rhev_agentd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the rhev_agentd_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B rhev_agentd_log_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the rhev_agentd_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as rhev agentd log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B rhev_agentd_tmp_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the rhev_agentd_tmp_t type, if you want to store rhev agentd temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B rhev_agentd_unit_file_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the rhev_agentd_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as rhev agentd unit content.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B rhev_agentd_var_run_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the rhev_agentd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the rhev agentd files under the /run directory.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type rhev_agentd_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B rhev_agentd_log_t
++
++ /var/log/rhev-agent(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B rhev_agentd_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B rhev_agentd_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/rhev-agentd\.pid
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the rhev_agentd_t, rhev_agentd_consolehelper_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the rhev_agentd_t, rhev_agentd_consolehelper_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), rhev_agentd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/rhgb_selinux.8 b/man/man8/rhgb_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..a384089
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/rhgb_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
++.TH "rhgb_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "rhgb" "SELinux Policy documentation for rhgb"
++.SH "NAME"
++rhgb_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the rhgb processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the rhgb processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The rhgb processes execute with the rhgb_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep rhgb_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The rhgb_t SELinux type can be entered via the "rhgb_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the rhgb_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/bin/rhgb
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux rhgb policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their rhgb processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for rhgb:
++
++.EX
++.B rhgb_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux rhgb policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their rhgb processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for rhgb:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B rhgb_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the rhgb_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the rhgb_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B rhgb_tmpfs_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the rhgb_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store rhgb files on a tmpfs file system.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type rhgb_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B ramfs_t
++
++
++.br
++.B rhgb_tmpfs_t
++
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), rhgb(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/rhsmcertd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/rhsmcertd_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..7350aa2
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/rhsmcertd_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,164 @@
++.TH "rhsmcertd_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "rhsmcertd" "SELinux Policy documentation for rhsmcertd"
++.SH "NAME"
++rhsmcertd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the rhsmcertd processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the rhsmcertd processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The rhsmcertd processes execute with the rhsmcertd_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep rhsmcertd_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The rhsmcertd_t SELinux type can be entered via the "rhsmcertd_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the rhsmcertd_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/bin/rhsmcertd
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux rhsmcertd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their rhsmcertd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for rhsmcertd:
++
++.EX
++.B rhsmcertd_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux rhsmcertd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their rhsmcertd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for rhsmcertd:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B rhsmcertd_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the rhsmcertd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the rhsmcertd_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B rhsmcertd_initrc_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the rhsmcertd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the rhsmcertd_initrc_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B rhsmcertd_lock_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the rhsmcertd_lock_t type, if you want to treat the files as rhsmcertd lock data, stored under the /var/lock directory
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B rhsmcertd_log_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the rhsmcertd_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as rhsmcertd log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B rhsmcertd_var_lib_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the rhsmcertd_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the rhsmcertd files under the /var/lib directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B rhsmcertd_var_run_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the rhsmcertd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the rhsmcertd files under the /run directory.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type rhsmcertd_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B rhsmcertd_lock_t
++
++ /var/lock/subsys/rhsmcertd
++.br
++
++.br
++.B rhsmcertd_log_t
++
++ /var/log/rhsm(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B rhsmcertd_var_lib_t
++
++ /var/lib/rhsm(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B rhsmcertd_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/rhsm(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B var_lock_t
++
++ /var/lock(/.*)?
++.br
++ /run/lock(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lock
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), rhsmcertd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/ricci_modcluster_selinux.8 b/man/man8/ricci_modcluster_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..bbe6e5e
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/ricci_modcluster_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,187 @@
++.TH "ricci_modcluster_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "ricci_modcluster" "SELinux Policy documentation for ricci_modcluster"
++.SH "NAME"
++ricci_modcluster_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the ricci_modcluster processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the ricci_modcluster processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The ricci_modcluster processes execute with the ricci_modcluster_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep ricci_modcluster_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The ricci_modcluster_t SELinux type can be entered via the "ricci_modcluster_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the ricci_modcluster_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/libexec/modcluster
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux ricci_modcluster policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ricci_modcluster processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for ricci_modcluster:
++
++.EX
++.B ricci_modclusterd_t, ricci_modcluster_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux ricci_modcluster policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ricci_modcluster processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for ricci_modcluster:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B ricci_modcluster_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the ricci_modcluster_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ricci_modcluster_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B ricci_modcluster_var_lib_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the ricci_modcluster_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the ricci modcluster files under the /var/lib directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B ricci_modcluster_var_log_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the ricci_modcluster_var_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as ricci modcluster var log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B ricci_modcluster_var_run_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the ricci_modcluster_var_run_t type, if you want to store the ricci modcluster files under the /run directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B ricci_modclusterd_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the ricci_modclusterd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ricci_modclusterd_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B ricci_modclusterd_tmpfs_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the ricci_modclusterd_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store ricci modclusterd files on a tmpfs file system.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH PORT TYPES
++SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
++.PP
++You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
++
++.B semanage port -l
++
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
++SELinux ricci_modcluster policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ricci_modcluster processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following port types are defined for ricci_modcluster:
++
++.EX
++.TP 5
++.B ricci_modcluster_port_t
++.TP 10
++.EE
++
++
++Default Defined Ports:
++tcp 16851
++.EE
++udp 16851
++.EE
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type ricci_modcluster_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B cluster_conf_t
++
++ /etc/cluster(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B systemd_passwd_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/systemd/ask-password(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/systemd/ask-password-block(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the ricci_modcluster_t, ricci_modclusterd_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the ricci_modcluster_t, ricci_modclusterd_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.B semanage port
++can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), ricci_modcluster(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, ricci_selinux(8), ricci_selinux(8), ricci_modclusterd_selinux(8), ricci_modlog_selinux(8), ricci_modrpm_selinux(8), ricci_modservice_selinux(8), ricci_modstorage_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/ricci_modclusterd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/ricci_modclusterd_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..7d43326
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/ricci_modclusterd_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,159 @@
++.TH "ricci_modclusterd_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "ricci_modclusterd" "SELinux Policy documentation for ricci_modclusterd"
++.SH "NAME"
++ricci_modclusterd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the ricci_modclusterd processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the ricci_modclusterd processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The ricci_modclusterd processes execute with the ricci_modclusterd_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep ricci_modclusterd_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The ricci_modclusterd_t SELinux type can be entered via the "ricci_modclusterd_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the ricci_modclusterd_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/sbin/modclusterd
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux ricci_modclusterd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ricci_modclusterd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for ricci_modclusterd:
++
++.EX
++.B ricci_modclusterd_t, ricci_modcluster_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux ricci_modclusterd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ricci_modclusterd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for ricci_modclusterd:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B ricci_modclusterd_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the ricci_modclusterd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ricci_modclusterd_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B ricci_modclusterd_tmpfs_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the ricci_modclusterd_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store ricci modclusterd files on a tmpfs file system.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH PORT TYPES
++SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
++.PP
++You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
++
++.B semanage port -l
++
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
++SELinux ricci_modclusterd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ricci_modclusterd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following port types are defined for ricci_modclusterd:
++
++.EX
++.TP 5
++.B ricci_modcluster_port_t
++.TP 10
++.EE
++
++
++Default Defined Ports:
++tcp 16851
++.EE
++udp 16851
++.EE
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type ricci_modclusterd_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B ricci_modcluster_var_log_t
++
++ /var/log/clumond\.log.*
++.br
++
++.br
++.B ricci_modcluster_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/clumond\.sock
++.br
++ /var/run/modclusterd\.pid
++.br
++
++.br
++.B ricci_modclusterd_tmpfs_t
++
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the ricci_modcluster_t, ricci_modclusterd_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the ricci_modcluster_t, ricci_modclusterd_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.B semanage port
++can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), ricci_modclusterd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, ricci_selinux(8), ricci_selinux(8), ricci_modcluster_selinux(8), ricci_modcluster_selinux(8), ricci_modlog_selinux(8), ricci_modrpm_selinux(8), ricci_modservice_selinux(8), ricci_modstorage_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/ricci_modlog_selinux.8 b/man/man8/ricci_modlog_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..f0ca4e5
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/ricci_modlog_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
++.TH "ricci_modlog_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "ricci_modlog" "SELinux Policy documentation for ricci_modlog"
++.SH "NAME"
++ricci_modlog_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the ricci_modlog processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the ricci_modlog processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The ricci_modlog processes execute with the ricci_modlog_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep ricci_modlog_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The ricci_modlog_t SELinux type can be entered via the "ricci_modlog_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the ricci_modlog_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/libexec/ricci-modlog
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux ricci_modlog policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ricci_modlog processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for ricci_modlog:
++
++.EX
++.B ricci_modlog_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux ricci_modlog policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ricci_modlog processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for ricci_modlog:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B ricci_modlog_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the ricci_modlog_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ricci_modlog_t domain.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), ricci_modlog(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, ricci_selinux(8), ricci_selinux(8), ricci_modcluster_selinux(8), ricci_modclusterd_selinux(8), ricci_modrpm_selinux(8), ricci_modservice_selinux(8), ricci_modstorage_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/ricci_modrpm_selinux.8 b/man/man8/ricci_modrpm_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..123f519
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/ricci_modrpm_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
++.TH "ricci_modrpm_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "ricci_modrpm" "SELinux Policy documentation for ricci_modrpm"
++.SH "NAME"
++ricci_modrpm_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the ricci_modrpm processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the ricci_modrpm processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The ricci_modrpm processes execute with the ricci_modrpm_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep ricci_modrpm_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The ricci_modrpm_t SELinux type can be entered via the "ricci_modrpm_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the ricci_modrpm_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/libexec/ricci-modrpm
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux ricci_modrpm policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ricci_modrpm processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for ricci_modrpm:
++
++.EX
++.B ricci_modrpm_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux ricci_modrpm policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ricci_modrpm processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for ricci_modrpm:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B ricci_modrpm_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the ricci_modrpm_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ricci_modrpm_t domain.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), ricci_modrpm(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, ricci_selinux(8), ricci_selinux(8), ricci_modcluster_selinux(8), ricci_modclusterd_selinux(8), ricci_modlog_selinux(8), ricci_modservice_selinux(8), ricci_modstorage_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/ricci_modservice_selinux.8 b/man/man8/ricci_modservice_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..4c964e3
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/ricci_modservice_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
++.TH "ricci_modservice_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "ricci_modservice" "SELinux Policy documentation for ricci_modservice"
++.SH "NAME"
++ricci_modservice_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the ricci_modservice processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the ricci_modservice processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The ricci_modservice processes execute with the ricci_modservice_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep ricci_modservice_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The ricci_modservice_t SELinux type can be entered via the "ricci_modservice_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the ricci_modservice_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/libexec/ricci-modservice
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux ricci_modservice policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ricci_modservice processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for ricci_modservice:
++
++.EX
++.B ricci_modservice_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux ricci_modservice policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ricci_modservice processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for ricci_modservice:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B ricci_modservice_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the ricci_modservice_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ricci_modservice_t domain.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), ricci_modservice(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, ricci_selinux(8), ricci_selinux(8), ricci_modcluster_selinux(8), ricci_modclusterd_selinux(8), ricci_modlog_selinux(8), ricci_modrpm_selinux(8), ricci_modstorage_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/ricci_modstorage_selinux.8 b/man/man8/ricci_modstorage_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..d9a4baa
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/ricci_modstorage_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,157 @@
++.TH "ricci_modstorage_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "ricci_modstorage" "SELinux Policy documentation for ricci_modstorage"
++.SH "NAME"
++ricci_modstorage_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the ricci_modstorage processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the ricci_modstorage processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The ricci_modstorage processes execute with the ricci_modstorage_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep ricci_modstorage_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The ricci_modstorage_t SELinux type can be entered via the "ricci_modstorage_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the ricci_modstorage_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/libexec/ricci-modstorage
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux ricci_modstorage policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ricci_modstorage processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for ricci_modstorage:
++
++.EX
++.B ricci_modstorage_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux ricci_modstorage policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ricci_modstorage processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for ricci_modstorage:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B ricci_modstorage_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the ricci_modstorage_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ricci_modstorage_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B ricci_modstorage_lock_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the ricci_modstorage_lock_t type, if you want to treat the files as ricci modstorage lock data, stored under the /var/lock directory
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type ricci_modstorage_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B default_t
++
++ /.*
++.br
++
++.br
++.B etc_t
++
++ /etc/.*
++.br
++ /var/db/.*\.db
++.br
++ /usr/etc(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/ftp/etc(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/openshift/.limits.d(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/openshift/.openshift-proxy.d(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/openshift/.stickshift-proxy.d(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/stickshift/.limits.d(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/stickshift/.stickshift-proxy.d(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/named/chroot/etc(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/ipsec\.d/examples(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/spool/postfix/etc(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc
++.br
++ /etc/cups/client\.conf
++.br
++
++.br
++.B lvm_etc_t
++
++ /etc/lvm(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the ricci_modstorage_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the ricci_modstorage_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), ricci_modstorage(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, ricci_selinux(8), ricci_selinux(8), ricci_modcluster_selinux(8), ricci_modclusterd_selinux(8), ricci_modlog_selinux(8), ricci_modrpm_selinux(8), ricci_modservice_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/ricci_selinux.8 b/man/man8/ricci_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..77e1008
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/ricci_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,394 @@
++.TH "ricci_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "ricci" "SELinux Policy documentation for ricci"
++.SH "NAME"
++ricci_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the ricci processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the ricci processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The ricci processes execute with the ricci_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep ricci_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The ricci_t SELinux type can be entered via the "ricci_exec_t,bin_t" file types. The default entrypoint paths for the ricci_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/sbin/ricci, /bin/.*, /opt/(.*/)?bin(/.*)?, /usr/(.*/)?Bin(/.*)?, /usr/(.*/)?bin(/.*)?, /usr/(.*/)?sbin(/.*)?, /opt/(.*/)?sbin(/.*)?, /opt/(.*/)?libexec(/.*)?, /sbin/.*, /usr/lib(.*/)?bin(/.*)?, /usr/lib(.*/)?sbin(/.*)?, /etc/gdm/[^/]+, /root/bin(/.*)?, /etc/gdm/[^/]+/.*, /etc/cron.daily(/.*)?, /etc/cron.weekly(/.*)?, /etc/cron.hourly(/.*)?, /etc/cron.monthly(/.*)?, /usr/lib/.*/program(/.*)?, /usr/lib/.*/scripts(/.*)?, /usr/lib/[^/]*/run-mozilla\.sh, /usr/lib/[^/]*/mozilla-xremote-client, /usr/lib/[^/]*thunderbird[^/]*/thunderbird, /usr/lib/[^/]*thunderbird[^/]*/open-browser\.sh, /usr/lib/[^/]*thunderbird[^/]*/thunderbird-bin, /lib/udev/[^/]*, /etc/auto\.[^/]*, /etc/avahi/.*\.action, /usr/lib/qt.*/bin(/.*)?, /usr/lib/yp/.+, /var/ftp/bin(/.*)?, /usr/Brother(/.*)?, /usr/Printer(/.*)?, /usr/libexec(/.*)?, /lib/upstart(/.*)?, /etc/kde/env(/.*)?, /etc/profile.d(/.*)?, /var/mailman.*/bin(/.*)?, /etc/lxdm/Pre.*, /etc/hotplug/.*rc, /usr/lib/cups(/.*)?, /etc/hotplug/.*agent, /us
r/Brother/(.*/)?inf/setup.*, /usr/Brother/(.*/)?inf/brprintconf.*, /usr/lib/dpkg/.+, /etc/lxdm/Post.*, /usr/lib/udev/[^/]*, /var/qmail/bin(/.*)?, /usr/lib/xfce4(/.*)?, /usr/lib/fence(/.*)?, /etc/X11/xinit(/.*)?, /lib/readahead(/.*)?, /etc/netplug\.d(/.*)?, /usr/lib/gimp/.*/plug-ins(/.*)?, /usr/lib/ipsec/.*, /etc/ppp/ip-up\..*, /usr/bin/pingus.*, /etc/cipe/ip-up.*, /usr/lib/dracut(/.*)?, /etc/pm/power\.d(/.*)?, /etc/pm/sleep\.d(/.*)?, /etc/redhat-lsb(/.*)?, /usr/lib/tuned/.*/.*\.sh, /usr/lib/xen/bin(/.*)?, /usr/lib/upstart(/.*)?, /usr/lib/courier(/.*)?, /etc/xen/scripts(/.*)?, /usr/share/tucan.*/tucan.py, /usr/lib/mailman.*/bin(/.*)?, /usr/lib/mailman.*/mail(/.*)?, /etc/ppp/ipv6-up\..*, /etc/ppp/ip-down\..*, /etc/cipe/ip-down.*, /usr/share/hplip/[^/]*, /usr/lib/news/bin(/.*)?, /usr/lib/pm-utils(/.*)?, /etc/vmware-tools(/.*)?, /etc/kde/shutdown(/.*)?, /etc/acpi/actions(/.*)?, /etc/pki/tls/misc(/.*)?, /usr/lib/jvm/java(.*/)bin(/.*), /usr/lib/tumbler-[^/]*/tumblerd, /usr/lib/rea
dahead(/.*)?, /opt/google/chrome(/.*)?, /etc/munin/plugins(/.*)?, /usr/lib/bluetooth(/.*)?, /usr/lib/debug/bin(/.*)?, /usr/lib/xulrunner[^/]*/updater, /usr/lib/xulrunner[^/]*/crashreporter, /usr/lib/xulrunner[^/]*/xulrunner[^/]*, /usr/lib/ruby/gems(/.*)?/helper-scripts(/.*)?, /usr/share/debconf/.+, /etc/ppp/ipv6-down\..*, /usr/share/cluster/.*\.sh, /usr/share/sectool/.*\.py, /usr/share/ssl/misc(/.*)?, /usr/share/e16/misc(/.*)?, /usr/lib/ccache/bin(/.*)?, /etc/racoon/scripts(/.*)?, /usr/lib/debug/sbin(/.*)?, /usr/lib/ruby/gems/.*/agents(/.*)?, /usr/share/mc/extfs/.*, /usr/lib/apt/methods.+, /usr/lib/portage/bin(/.*)?, /usr/lib/MailScanner(/.*)?, /etc/mcelog/triggers(/.*)?, /etc/dhcp/dhclient\.d(/.*)?, /emul/ia32-linux/bin(/.*)?, /usr/lib/libreoffice(/.*)?/bin(/.*)?, /emul/ia32-linux/usr(/.*)?/bin(/.*)?, /emul/ia32-linux/usr(/.*)?/Bin(/.*)?, /emul/ia32-linux/usr(/.*)?/sbin(/.*)?, /usr/lib/thunderbird.*/mozilla-xremote-client, /usr/lib/cyrus-imapd/.*, /usr/share/createrepo(/.*)
?, /emul/ia32-linux/sbin(/.*)?, /usr/share/virtualbox/.*\.sh, /usr/share/wicd/daemon(/.*)?, /usr/share/hal/scripts(/.*)?, /lib/security/pam_krb5(/.*)?, /opt/google/talkplugin(/.*)?, /etc/PackageKit/events(/.*)?, /usr/lib/debug/usr/bin(/.*)?, /usr/lib/vmware-tools/(s)?bin64(/.*)?, /usr/lib/vmware-tools/(s)?bin32(/.*)?, /etc/gdm/XKeepsCrashing[^/]*, /usr/lib/oracle/xe/apps(/.*)?, /usr/share/Modules/init(/.*)?, /usr/share/smolt/client(/.*)?, /usr/lib/nagios/plugins(/.*)?, /usr/lib/debug/usr/sbin(/.*)?, /usr/share/apr-0/build/[^/]+\.sh, /usr/lib/emacsen-common/.*, /usr/share/ajaxterm/qweb.py.*, /var/lib/asterisk/agi-bin(/.*)?, /usr/share/shorewall-perl(/.*)?, /usr/share/shorewall-lite(/.*)?, /usr/linuxprinter/filters(/.*)?, /usr/lib/netsaint/plugins(/.*)?, /usr/lib/chromium-browser(/.*)?, /usr/share/turboprint/lib(/.*)?, /usr/lib/nfs-utils/scripts(/.*)?, /usr/share/shorewall6-lite(/.*)?, /usr/share/shorewall-shell(/.*)?, /usr/share/vhostmd/scripts(/.*)?, /usr/lib/debug/usr/libex
ec(/.*)?, /etc/ConsoleKit/run-seat\.d(/.*)?, /usr/lib/nspluginwrapper/np.*, /usr/share/sandbox/sandboxX.sh, /usr/lib/ConsoleKit/scripts(/.*)?, /usr/share/ajaxterm/ajaxterm.py.*, /usr/lib/pgsql/test/regress/.*\.sh, /usr/share/denyhosts/scripts(/.*)?, /usr/share/denyhosts/plugins(/.*)?, /emul/ia32-linux/usr/libexec(/.*)?, /usr/lib/mediawiki/math/texvc.*, /usr/share/PackageKit/helpers(/.*)?, /etc/ConsoleKit/run-session\.d(/.*)?, /etc/hotplug\.d/default/default.*, /usr/lib/systemd/system-sleep/(.*)?, /opt/gutenprint/cups/lib/filter(/.*)?, /usr/share/system-config-network(/netconfig)?/[^/]+\.py, /usr/lib/ConsoleKit/run-session\.d(/.*)?, /etc/sysconfig/network-scripts/net.*, /etc/sysconfig/network-scripts/ifup.*, /etc/sysconfig/network-scripts/init.*, /usr/share/kde4/apps/kajongg/kajongg.py, /etc/sysconfig/network-scripts/ifdown.*, /opt/OpenPrinting-Gutenprint/cups/lib/filter(/.*)?, /usr/share/gedit-2/plugins/externaltools/tools(/.*)?, /bin, /sbin, /usr/bin, /dev/MAKEDEV, /var/qma
il/rc, /var/qmail/bin, /etc/mail/make, /bin/mountpoint, /usr/lib/rpm/rpmq, /usr/lib/rpm/rpmv, /usr/lib/rpm/rpmd, /usr/lib/rpm/rpmk, /lib/udev/scsi_id, /sbin/mkfs\.cramfs, /etc/xen/qemu-ifup, /etc/lxdm/Xsession, /etc/sysconfig/init, /usr/bin/mountpoint, /etc/apcupsd/commok, /usr/lib/sftp-server, /etc/sysconfig/crond, /etc/lxdm/LoginReady, /usr/sbin/mkfs\.cramfs, /usr/lib/udev/scsi_id, /etc/X11/xdm/Xsetup_0, /etc/init\.d/functions, /etc/apcupsd/changeme, /usr/lib/iscan/network, /etc/apcupsd/onbattery, /usr/lib/yaboot/addnote, /etc/sysconfig/libvirtd, /etc/apcupsd/apccontrol, /etc/apcupsd/offbattery, /usr/lib/wicd/monitor\.py, /etc/X11/xdm/TakeConsole, /etc/X11/xdm/GiveConsole, /etc/apcupsd/commfailure, /usr/lib/misc/sftp-server, /etc/sysconfig/netconsole, /lib/udev/devices/MAKEDEV, /var/lib/iscan/interpreter, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/functions, /etc/apcupsd/masterconnect, /etc/apcupsd/mastertimeout, /usr/share/pydict/pydict\.py, /usr/share/clamav/clamd-gen, /sbin/insmod_ksymoops_cle
an, /etc/mgetty\+sendfax/new_fax, /usr/lib/xfce4/panel/migrate, /usr/lib/xfce4/panel/wrapper, /etc/sysconfig/readonly-root, /usr/lib/vte/gnome-pty-helper, /usr/lib/udev/devices/MAKEDEV, /usr/lib/xfce4/xfconf/xfconfd, /usr/share/cvs/contrib/rcs2log, /usr/share/hwbrowser/hwbrowser, /usr/X11R6/lib/X11/xkb/xkbcomp, /usr/lib/virtualbox/VBoxManage, /usr/share/cluster/SAPInstance, /usr/share/cluster/checkquorum, /usr/share/shorewall/getparams, /usr/share/apr-0/build/libtool, /usr/share/cluster/SAPDatabase, /etc/hotplug/hotplug\.functions, /usr/share/texmf/web2c/mktexdir, /usr/share/texmf/web2c/mktexnam, /usr/share/texmf/web2c/mktexupd, /usr/share/shorewall/configpath, /usr/sbin/insmod_ksymoops_clean, /etc/mcelog/cache-error-trigger, /usr/share/shorewall/compiler\.pl, /usr/share/dayplanner/dayplanner, /usr/libexec/openssh/sftp-server, /usr/share/texmf/texconfig/tcfmgr, /usr/share/clamav/freshclam-sleep, /usr/share/cluster/svclib_nfslock, /usr/share/cluster/ocf-shellfuncs, /usr/lib/x
fce4/exo-1/exo-helper-1, /usr/share/pwlib/make/ptlib-config, /usr/share/fedora-usermgmt/wrapper, /usr/share/printconf/util/print\.py, /usr/lib/xfce4/xfwm4/helper-dialog, /etc/pki/tls/certs/make-dummy-cert, /usr/share/rhn/rhn_applet/applet\.py, /usr/share/authconfig/authconfig\.py, /usr/share/spamassassin/sa-update\.cron, /usr/share/gnucash/finance-quote-check, /usr/share/cluster/fence_scsi_check\.pl, /usr/share/selinux/devel/policygentool, /usr/share/switchdesk/switchdesk-gui\.py, /usr/share/authconfig/authconfig-tui\.py, /usr/share/authconfig/authconfig-gtk\.py, /usr/share/gnucash/finance-quote-helper, /usr/share/gitolite/hooks/common/update, /usr/lib/xfce4/exo-1/exo-compose-mail-1, /usr/share/system-config-services/gui\.py, /lib/security/pam_krb5/pam_krb5_storetmp, /usr/share/system-config-netboot/pxeos\.py, /usr/lib/xfce4/session/balou-export-theme, /usr/share/system-config-selinux/polgen\.py, /usr/share/system-config-nfs/nfs-export\.py, /usr/share/system-config-printer/a
pplet\.py, /usr/share/PackageKit/pk-upgrade-distro\.sh, /usr/lib/xfce4/session/balou-install-theme, /usr/share/system-config-netboot/pxeboot\.py, /usr/lib/xfce4/session/xfsm-shutdown-helper, /usr/share/rhn/rhn_applet/needed-packages\.py, /usr/lib/security/pam_krb5/pam_krb5_storetmp, /usr/share/system-logviewer/system-logviewer\.py, /usr/share/system-config-network/neat-control\.py, /usr/share/system-config-services/serviceconf\.py, /usr/share/hal/device-manager/hal-device-manager, /usr/share/system-config-lvm/system-config-lvm\.py, /usr/share/system-config-nfs/system-config-nfs\.py, /usr/share/system-config-mouse/system-config-mouse, /usr/share/system-config-httpd/system-config-httpd, /usr/share/system-config-users/system-config-users, /usr/share/system-config-date/system-config-date\.py, /usr/share/doc/ghc/html/libraries/gen_contents_index, /usr/share/gitolite/hooks/gitolite-admin/post-update, /usr/share/system-config-samba/system-config-samba\.py, /usr/share/system-config-
display/system-config-display, /usr/share/system-config-keyboard/system-config-keyboard, /usr/share/system-config-language/system-config-language, /usr/share/system-config-services/system-config-services, /usr/share/system-config-selinux/system-config-selinux\.py, /usr/share/system-config-netboot/system-config-netboot\.py, /usr/share/system-config-soundcard/system-config-soundcard, /usr/share/system-config-rootpassword/system-config-rootpassword, /usr/share/system-config-securitylevel/system-config-securitylevel\.py
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux ricci policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ricci processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for ricci:
++
++.EX
++.B ricci_t, ricci_modservice_t, ricci_modstorage_t, ricci_modclusterd_t, ricci_modlog_t, ricci_modrpm_t, ricci_modcluster_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux ricci policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ricci processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for ricci:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B ricci_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the ricci_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ricci_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B ricci_initrc_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the ricci_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ricci_initrc_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B ricci_modcluster_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the ricci_modcluster_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ricci_modcluster_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B ricci_modcluster_var_lib_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the ricci_modcluster_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the ricci modcluster files under the /var/lib directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B ricci_modcluster_var_log_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the ricci_modcluster_var_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as ricci modcluster var log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B ricci_modcluster_var_run_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the ricci_modcluster_var_run_t type, if you want to store the ricci modcluster files under the /run directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B ricci_modclusterd_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the ricci_modclusterd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ricci_modclusterd_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B ricci_modclusterd_tmpfs_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the ricci_modclusterd_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store ricci modclusterd files on a tmpfs file system.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B ricci_modlog_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the ricci_modlog_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ricci_modlog_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B ricci_modrpm_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the ricci_modrpm_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ricci_modrpm_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B ricci_modservice_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the ricci_modservice_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ricci_modservice_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B ricci_modstorage_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the ricci_modstorage_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ricci_modstorage_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B ricci_modstorage_lock_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the ricci_modstorage_lock_t type, if you want to treat the files as ricci modstorage lock data, stored under the /var/lock directory
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B ricci_tmp_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the ricci_tmp_t type, if you want to store ricci temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B ricci_var_lib_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the ricci_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the ricci files under the /var/lib directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B ricci_var_log_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the ricci_var_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as ricci var log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B ricci_var_run_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the ricci_var_run_t type, if you want to store the ricci files under the /run directory.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH PORT TYPES
++SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
++.PP
++You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
++
++.B semanage port -l
++
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
++SELinux ricci policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ricci processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following port types are defined for ricci:
++
++.EX
++.TP 5
++.B ricci_modcluster_port_t
++.TP 10
++.EE
++
++
++Default Defined Ports:
++tcp 16851
++.EE
++udp 16851
++.EE
++
++.EX
++.TP 5
++.B ricci_port_t
++.TP 10
++.EE
++
++
++Default Defined Ports:
++tcp 11111
++.EE
++udp 11111
++.EE
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type ricci_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B etc_runtime_t
++
++ /[^/]+
++.br
++ /etc/mtab.*
++.br
++ /etc/blkid(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/nologin.*
++.br
++ /etc/\.fstab\.hal\..+
++.br
++ /halt
++.br
++ /fastboot
++.br
++ /poweroff
++.br
++ /etc/cmtab
++.br
++ /\.autofsck
++.br
++ /forcefsck
++.br
++ /\.suspended
++.br
++ /fsckoptions
++.br
++ /\.autorelabel
++.br
++ /etc/securetty
++.br
++ /etc/killpower
++.br
++ /etc/nohotplug
++.br
++ /etc/ioctl\.save
++.br
++ /etc/fstab\.REVOKE
++.br
++ /etc/network/ifstate
++.br
++ /etc/sysconfig/hwconf
++.br
++ /etc/ptal/ptal-printd-like
++.br
++ /etc/sysconfig/iptables\.save
++.br
++ /etc/xorg\.conf\.d/00-system-setup-keyboard\.conf
++.br
++ /etc/X11/xorg\.conf\.d/00-system-setup-keyboard\.conf
++.br
++
++.br
++.B faillog_t
++
++ /var/log/btmp.*
++.br
++ /var/run/faillock(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/log/faillog
++.br
++ /var/log/tallylog
++.br
++
++.br
++.B initrc_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/utmp
++.br
++ /var/run/random-seed
++.br
++ /var/run/runlevel\.dir
++.br
++ /var/run/setmixer_flag
++.br
++
++.br
++.B pcscd_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/pcscd(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/pcscd\.events(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/pcscd\.pid
++.br
++ /var/run/pcscd\.pub
++.br
++ /var/run/pcscd\.comm
++.br
++
++.br
++.B ricci_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B ricci_var_lib_t
++
++ /var/lib/ricci(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B ricci_var_log_t
++
++
++.br
++.B ricci_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/ricci\.pid
++.br
++
++.br
++.B systemd_passwd_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/systemd/ask-password(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/systemd/ask-password-block(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the ricci_modstorage_t, ricci_modcluster_t, ricci_modclusterd_t, ricci_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the ricci_modstorage_t, ricci_modcluster_t, ricci_modclusterd_t, ricci_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.B semanage port
++can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), ricci(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, ricci_modcluster_selinux(8), ricci_modclusterd_selinux(8), ricci_modlog_selinux(8), ricci_modrpm_selinux(8), ricci_modservice_selinux(8), ricci_modstorage_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/rlogind_selinux.8 b/man/man8/rlogind_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..436ab6e
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/rlogind_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,328 @@
++.TH "rlogind_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "rlogind" "SELinux Policy documentation for rlogind"
++.SH "NAME"
++rlogind_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the rlogind processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the rlogind processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The rlogind processes execute with the rlogind_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep rlogind_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The rlogind_t SELinux type can be entered via the "rlogind_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the rlogind_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/lib/telnetlogin, /usr/sbin/in\.rlogind, /usr/kerberos/sbin/klogind
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux rlogind policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their rlogind processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for rlogind:
++
++.EX
++.B rlogind_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux rlogind policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their rlogind processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for rlogind:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B rlogind_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the rlogind_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the rlogind_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B rlogind_home_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the rlogind_home_t type, if you want to store rlogind files in the users home directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B rlogind_keytab_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the rlogind_keytab_t type, if you want to treat the files as kerberos keytab files.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B rlogind_tmp_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the rlogind_tmp_t type, if you want to store rlogind temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B rlogind_var_run_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the rlogind_var_run_t type, if you want to store the rlogind files under the /run directory.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH PORT TYPES
++SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
++.PP
++You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
++
++.B semanage port -l
++
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
++SELinux rlogind policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their rlogind processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following port types are defined for rlogind:
++
++.EX
++.TP 5
++.B rlogind_port_t
++.TP 10
++.EE
++
++
++Default Defined Ports:
++tcp 513
++.EE
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type rlogind_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B auth_cache_t
++
++ /var/cache/coolkey(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B auth_home_t
++
++ /root/\.google_authenticator
++.br
++ /root/\.google_authenticator~
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.google_authenticator
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.google_authenticator~
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.google_authenticator
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.google_authenticator~
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.google_authenticator
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.google_authenticator~
++.br
++
++.br
++.B cgroup_t
++
++ /cgroup
++.br
++ /sys/fs/cgroup
++.br
++
++.br
++.B faillog_t
++
++ /var/log/btmp.*
++.br
++ /var/run/faillock(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/log/faillog
++.br
++ /var/log/tallylog
++.br
++
++.br
++.B initrc_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/utmp
++.br
++ /var/run/random-seed
++.br
++ /var/run/runlevel\.dir
++.br
++ /var/run/setmixer_flag
++.br
++
++.br
++.B krb5_host_rcache_t
++
++ /var/cache/krb5rcache(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/tmp/nfs_0
++.br
++ /var/tmp/DNS_25
++.br
++ /var/tmp/host_0
++.br
++ /var/tmp/imap_0
++.br
++ /var/tmp/HTTP_23
++.br
++ /var/tmp/HTTP_48
++.br
++ /var/tmp/ldap_55
++.br
++ /var/tmp/ldap_487
++.br
++ /var/tmp/ldapmap1_0
++.br
++
++.br
++.B lastlog_t
++
++ /var/log/lastlog
++.br
++
++.br
++.B pam_var_run_t
++
++ /var/(db|lib|adm)/sudo(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/sudo(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/sepermit(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/pam_mount(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B pcscd_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/pcscd(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/pcscd\.events(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/pcscd\.pid
++.br
++ /var/run/pcscd\.pub
++.br
++ /var/run/pcscd\.comm
++.br
++
++.br
++.B rlogind_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B rlogind_var_run_t
++
++
++.br
++.B security_t
++
++ /selinux
++.br
++
++.br
++.B user_tmp_t
++
++ /var/run/user(/.*)?
++.br
++ /tmp/gconfd-.*
++.br
++ /tmp/gconfd-dwalsh
++.br
++ /tmp/gconfd-xguest
++.br
++
++.br
++.B var_auth_t
++
++ /var/ace(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/rsa(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/abl(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/rsa(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/pam_ssh(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/pam_ssh(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/pam_shield(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/google-authenticator(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B wtmp_t
++
++ /var/log/wtmp.*
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the rlogind_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the rlogind_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.B semanage port
++can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), rlogind(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/rngd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/rngd_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..bd28b6f
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/rngd_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,102 @@
++.TH "rngd_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "rngd" "SELinux Policy documentation for rngd"
++.SH "NAME"
++rngd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the rngd processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the rngd processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The rngd processes execute with the rngd_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep rngd_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The rngd_t SELinux type can be entered via the "rngd_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the rngd_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/sbin/rngd
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux rngd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their rngd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for rngd:
++
++.EX
++.B rngd_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux rngd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their rngd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for rngd:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B rngd_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the rngd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the rngd_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B rngd_initrc_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the rngd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the rngd_initrc_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B rngd_unit_file_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the rngd_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as rngd unit content.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), rngd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/roundup_selinux.8 b/man/man8/roundup_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..22ad9ee
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/roundup_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,124 @@
++.TH "roundup_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "roundup" "SELinux Policy documentation for roundup"
++.SH "NAME"
++roundup_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the roundup processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the roundup processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The roundup processes execute with the roundup_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep roundup_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The roundup_t SELinux type can be entered via the "roundup_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the roundup_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/bin/roundup-server
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux roundup policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their roundup processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for roundup:
++
++.EX
++.B roundup_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux roundup policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their roundup processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for roundup:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B roundup_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the roundup_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the roundup_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B roundup_initrc_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the roundup_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the roundup_initrc_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B roundup_var_lib_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the roundup_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the roundup files under the /var/lib directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B roundup_var_run_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the roundup_var_run_t type, if you want to store the roundup files under the /run directory.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type roundup_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B roundup_var_lib_t
++
++ /var/lib/roundup(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B roundup_var_run_t
++
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), roundup(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/rpcbind_selinux.8 b/man/man8/rpcbind_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..9f38f73
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/rpcbind_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,130 @@
++.TH "rpcbind_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "rpcbind" "SELinux Policy documentation for rpcbind"
++.SH "NAME"
++rpcbind_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the rpcbind processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the rpcbind processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The rpcbind processes execute with the rpcbind_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep rpcbind_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The rpcbind_t SELinux type can be entered via the "rpcbind_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the rpcbind_t domain are the following:"
++
++/sbin/rpcbind, /usr/sbin/rpcbind
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux rpcbind policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their rpcbind processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for rpcbind:
++
++.EX
++.B rpcbind_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux rpcbind policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their rpcbind processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for rpcbind:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B rpcbind_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the rpcbind_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the rpcbind_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B rpcbind_initrc_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the rpcbind_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the rpcbind_initrc_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B rpcbind_var_lib_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the rpcbind_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the rpcbind files under the /var/lib directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B rpcbind_var_run_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the rpcbind_var_run_t type, if you want to store the rpcbind files under the /run directory.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type rpcbind_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B rpcbind_var_lib_t
++
++ /var/lib/rpcbind(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/cache/rpcbind(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B rpcbind_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/rpc.statd\.pid
++.br
++ /var/run/rpcbind.*
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), rpcbind(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/rpcd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/rpcd_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..054ef5a
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/rpcd_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,181 @@
++.TH "rpcd_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "rpcd" "SELinux Policy documentation for rpcd"
++.SH "NAME"
++rpcd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the rpcd processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the rpcd processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The rpcd processes execute with the rpcd_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep rpcd_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The rpcd_t SELinux type can be entered via the "rpcd_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the rpcd_t domain are the following:"
++
++/sbin/rpc\..*, /usr/sbin/rpc\..*, /sbin/sm-notify, /usr/sbin/sm-notify, /usr/sbin/rpc\.idmapd, /usr/sbin/rpc\.rquotad
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux rpcd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their rpcd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for rpcd:
++
++.EX
++.B rpcd_t, rpcbind_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux rpcd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their rpcd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for rpcd:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B rpcd_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the rpcd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the rpcd_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B rpcd_initrc_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the rpcd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the rpcd_initrc_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B rpcd_unit_file_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the rpcd_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as rpcd unit content.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B rpcd_var_run_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the rpcd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the rpcd files under the /run directory.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type rpcd_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B quota_db_t
++
++ /a?quota\.(user|group)
++.br
++ /etc/a?quota\.(user|group)
++.br
++ /var/a?quota\.(user|group)
++.br
++ /boot/a?quota\.(user|group)
++.br
++ /var/spool/(.*/)?a?quota\.(user|group)
++.br
++ /var/lib/openshift/a?quota\.(user|group)
++.br
++ /var/lib/stickshift/a?quota\.(user|group)
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/a?quota\.(user|group)
++.br
++ /home/a?quota\.(user|group)
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/a?quota\.(user|group)
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/a?quota\.(user|group)
++.br
++
++.br
++.B rgmanager_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B rpcd_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/rpc\.statd(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/rpc\.statd\.pid
++.br
++
++.br
++.B var_lib_nfs_t
++
++ /var/lib/nfs(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B var_lib_t
++
++ /opt/(.*/)?var/lib(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the rpcd_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the rpcd_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), rpcd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, rpcbind_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/rpm_script_selinux.8 b/man/man8/rpm_script_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..3a3d1db
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/rpm_script_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,127 @@
++.TH "rpm_script_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "rpm_script" "SELinux Policy documentation for rpm_script"
++.SH "NAME"
++rpm_script_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the rpm_script processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the rpm_script processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The rpm_script processes execute with the rpm_script_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep rpm_script_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The rpm_script_t SELinux type can be entered via the "filesystem_type,unlabeled_t,proc_type,bin_t,ldconfig_exec_t,mtrr_device_t,shell_exec_t,sysctl_type,file_type" file types. The default entrypoint paths for the rpm_script_t domain are the following:"
++
++/bin/.*, /opt/(.*/)?bin(/.*)?, /usr/(.*/)?Bin(/.*)?, /usr/(.*/)?bin(/.*)?, /usr/(.*/)?sbin(/.*)?, /opt/(.*/)?sbin(/.*)?, /opt/(.*/)?libexec(/.*)?, /sbin/.*, /usr/lib(.*/)?bin(/.*)?, /usr/lib(.*/)?sbin(/.*)?, /etc/gdm/[^/]+, /root/bin(/.*)?, /etc/gdm/[^/]+/.*, /etc/cron.daily(/.*)?, /etc/cron.weekly(/.*)?, /etc/cron.hourly(/.*)?, /etc/cron.monthly(/.*)?, /usr/lib/.*/program(/.*)?, /usr/lib/.*/scripts(/.*)?, /usr/lib/[^/]*/run-mozilla\.sh, /usr/lib/[^/]*/mozilla-xremote-client, /usr/lib/[^/]*thunderbird[^/]*/thunderbird, /usr/lib/[^/]*thunderbird[^/]*/open-browser\.sh, /usr/lib/[^/]*thunderbird[^/]*/thunderbird-bin, /lib/udev/[^/]*, /etc/auto\.[^/]*, /etc/avahi/.*\.action, /usr/lib/qt.*/bin(/.*)?, /usr/lib/yp/.+, /var/ftp/bin(/.*)?, /usr/Brother(/.*)?, /usr/Printer(/.*)?, /usr/libexec(/.*)?, /lib/upstart(/.*)?, /etc/kde/env(/.*)?, /etc/profile.d(/.*)?, /var/mailman.*/bin(/.*)?, /etc/lxdm/Pre.*, /etc/hotplug/.*rc, /usr/lib/cups(/.*)?, /etc/hotplug/.*agent, /usr/Brother/(.*/)?i
nf/setup.*, /usr/Brother/(.*/)?inf/brprintconf.*, /usr/lib/dpkg/.+, /etc/lxdm/Post.*, /usr/lib/udev/[^/]*, /var/qmail/bin(/.*)?, /usr/lib/xfce4(/.*)?, /usr/lib/fence(/.*)?, /etc/X11/xinit(/.*)?, /lib/readahead(/.*)?, /etc/netplug\.d(/.*)?, /usr/lib/gimp/.*/plug-ins(/.*)?, /usr/lib/ipsec/.*, /etc/ppp/ip-up\..*, /usr/bin/pingus.*, /etc/cipe/ip-up.*, /usr/lib/dracut(/.*)?, /etc/pm/power\.d(/.*)?, /etc/pm/sleep\.d(/.*)?, /etc/redhat-lsb(/.*)?, /usr/lib/tuned/.*/.*\.sh, /usr/lib/xen/bin(/.*)?, /usr/lib/upstart(/.*)?, /usr/lib/courier(/.*)?, /etc/xen/scripts(/.*)?, /usr/share/tucan.*/tucan.py, /usr/lib/mailman.*/bin(/.*)?, /usr/lib/mailman.*/mail(/.*)?, /etc/ppp/ipv6-up\..*, /etc/ppp/ip-down\..*, /etc/cipe/ip-down.*, /usr/share/hplip/[^/]*, /usr/lib/news/bin(/.*)?, /usr/lib/pm-utils(/.*)?, /etc/vmware-tools(/.*)?, /etc/kde/shutdown(/.*)?, /etc/acpi/actions(/.*)?, /etc/pki/tls/misc(/.*)?, /usr/lib/jvm/java(.*/)bin(/.*), /usr/lib/tumbler-[^/]*/tumblerd, /usr/lib/readahead(/.*)?, /op
t/google/chrome(/.*)?, /etc/munin/plugins(/.*)?, /usr/lib/bluetooth(/.*)?, /usr/lib/debug/bin(/.*)?, /usr/lib/xulrunner[^/]*/updater, /usr/lib/xulrunner[^/]*/crashreporter, /usr/lib/xulrunner[^/]*/xulrunner[^/]*, /usr/lib/ruby/gems(/.*)?/helper-scripts(/.*)?, /usr/share/debconf/.+, /etc/ppp/ipv6-down\..*, /usr/share/cluster/.*\.sh, /usr/share/sectool/.*\.py, /usr/share/ssl/misc(/.*)?, /usr/share/e16/misc(/.*)?, /usr/lib/ccache/bin(/.*)?, /etc/racoon/scripts(/.*)?, /usr/lib/debug/sbin(/.*)?, /usr/lib/ruby/gems/.*/agents(/.*)?, /usr/share/mc/extfs/.*, /usr/lib/apt/methods.+, /usr/lib/portage/bin(/.*)?, /usr/lib/MailScanner(/.*)?, /etc/mcelog/triggers(/.*)?, /etc/dhcp/dhclient\.d(/.*)?, /emul/ia32-linux/bin(/.*)?, /usr/lib/libreoffice(/.*)?/bin(/.*)?, /emul/ia32-linux/usr(/.*)?/bin(/.*)?, /emul/ia32-linux/usr(/.*)?/Bin(/.*)?, /emul/ia32-linux/usr(/.*)?/sbin(/.*)?, /usr/lib/thunderbird.*/mozilla-xremote-client, /usr/lib/cyrus-imapd/.*, /usr/share/createrepo(/.*)?, /emul/ia32-lin
ux/sbin(/.*)?, /usr/share/virtualbox/.*\.sh, /usr/share/wicd/daemon(/.*)?, /usr/share/hal/scripts(/.*)?, /lib/security/pam_krb5(/.*)?, /opt/google/talkplugin(/.*)?, /etc/PackageKit/events(/.*)?, /usr/lib/debug/usr/bin(/.*)?, /usr/lib/vmware-tools/(s)?bin64(/.*)?, /usr/lib/vmware-tools/(s)?bin32(/.*)?, /etc/gdm/XKeepsCrashing[^/]*, /usr/lib/oracle/xe/apps(/.*)?, /usr/share/Modules/init(/.*)?, /usr/share/smolt/client(/.*)?, /usr/lib/nagios/plugins(/.*)?, /usr/lib/debug/usr/sbin(/.*)?, /usr/share/apr-0/build/[^/]+\.sh, /usr/lib/emacsen-common/.*, /usr/share/ajaxterm/qweb.py.*, /var/lib/asterisk/agi-bin(/.*)?, /usr/share/shorewall-perl(/.*)?, /usr/share/shorewall-lite(/.*)?, /usr/linuxprinter/filters(/.*)?, /usr/lib/netsaint/plugins(/.*)?, /usr/lib/chromium-browser(/.*)?, /usr/share/turboprint/lib(/.*)?, /usr/lib/nfs-utils/scripts(/.*)?, /usr/share/shorewall6-lite(/.*)?, /usr/share/shorewall-shell(/.*)?, /usr/share/vhostmd/scripts(/.*)?, /usr/lib/debug/usr/libexec(/.*)?, /etc/Co
nsoleKit/run-seat\.d(/.*)?, /usr/lib/nspluginwrapper/np.*, /usr/share/sandbox/sandboxX.sh, /usr/lib/ConsoleKit/scripts(/.*)?, /usr/share/ajaxterm/ajaxterm.py.*, /usr/lib/pgsql/test/regress/.*\.sh, /usr/share/denyhosts/scripts(/.*)?, /usr/share/denyhosts/plugins(/.*)?, /emul/ia32-linux/usr/libexec(/.*)?, /usr/lib/mediawiki/math/texvc.*, /usr/share/PackageKit/helpers(/.*)?, /etc/ConsoleKit/run-session\.d(/.*)?, /etc/hotplug\.d/default/default.*, /usr/lib/systemd/system-sleep/(.*)?, /opt/gutenprint/cups/lib/filter(/.*)?, /usr/share/system-config-network(/netconfig)?/[^/]+\.py, /usr/lib/ConsoleKit/run-session\.d(/.*)?, /etc/sysconfig/network-scripts/net.*, /etc/sysconfig/network-scripts/ifup.*, /etc/sysconfig/network-scripts/init.*, /usr/share/kde4/apps/kajongg/kajongg.py, /etc/sysconfig/network-scripts/ifdown.*, /opt/OpenPrinting-Gutenprint/cups/lib/filter(/.*)?, /usr/share/gedit-2/plugins/externaltools/tools(/.*)?, /bin, /sbin, /usr/bin, /dev/MAKEDEV, /var/qmail/rc, /var/qmail
/bin, /etc/mail/make, /bin/mountpoint, /usr/lib/rpm/rpmq, /usr/lib/rpm/rpmv, /usr/lib/rpm/rpmd, /usr/lib/rpm/rpmk, /lib/udev/scsi_id, /sbin/mkfs\.cramfs, /etc/xen/qemu-ifup, /etc/lxdm/Xsession, /etc/sysconfig/init, /usr/bin/mountpoint, /etc/apcupsd/commok, /usr/lib/sftp-server, /etc/sysconfig/crond, /etc/lxdm/LoginReady, /usr/sbin/mkfs\.cramfs, /usr/lib/udev/scsi_id, /etc/X11/xdm/Xsetup_0, /etc/init\.d/functions, /etc/apcupsd/changeme, /usr/lib/iscan/network, /etc/apcupsd/onbattery, /usr/lib/yaboot/addnote, /etc/sysconfig/libvirtd, /etc/apcupsd/apccontrol, /etc/apcupsd/offbattery, /usr/lib/wicd/monitor\.py, /etc/X11/xdm/TakeConsole, /etc/X11/xdm/GiveConsole, /etc/apcupsd/commfailure, /usr/lib/misc/sftp-server, /etc/sysconfig/netconsole, /lib/udev/devices/MAKEDEV, /var/lib/iscan/interpreter, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/functions, /etc/apcupsd/masterconnect, /etc/apcupsd/mastertimeout, /usr/share/pydict/pydict\.py, /usr/share/clamav/clamd-gen, /sbin/insmod_ksymoops_clean, /etc/mgetty\+
sendfax/new_fax, /usr/lib/xfce4/panel/migrate, /usr/lib/xfce4/panel/wrapper, /etc/sysconfig/readonly-root, /usr/lib/vte/gnome-pty-helper, /usr/lib/udev/devices/MAKEDEV, /usr/lib/xfce4/xfconf/xfconfd, /usr/share/cvs/contrib/rcs2log, /usr/share/hwbrowser/hwbrowser, /usr/X11R6/lib/X11/xkb/xkbcomp, /usr/lib/virtualbox/VBoxManage, /usr/share/cluster/SAPInstance, /usr/share/cluster/checkquorum, /usr/share/shorewall/getparams, /usr/share/apr-0/build/libtool, /usr/share/cluster/SAPDatabase, /etc/hotplug/hotplug\.functions, /usr/share/texmf/web2c/mktexdir, /usr/share/texmf/web2c/mktexnam, /usr/share/texmf/web2c/mktexupd, /usr/share/shorewall/configpath, /usr/sbin/insmod_ksymoops_clean, /etc/mcelog/cache-error-trigger, /usr/share/shorewall/compiler\.pl, /usr/share/dayplanner/dayplanner, /usr/libexec/openssh/sftp-server, /usr/share/texmf/texconfig/tcfmgr, /usr/share/clamav/freshclam-sleep, /usr/share/cluster/svclib_nfslock, /usr/share/cluster/ocf-shellfuncs, /usr/lib/xfce4/exo-1/exo-he
lper-1, /usr/share/pwlib/make/ptlib-config, /usr/share/fedora-usermgmt/wrapper, /usr/share/printconf/util/print\.py, /usr/lib/xfce4/xfwm4/helper-dialog, /etc/pki/tls/certs/make-dummy-cert, /usr/share/rhn/rhn_applet/applet\.py, /usr/share/authconfig/authconfig\.py, /usr/share/spamassassin/sa-update\.cron, /usr/share/gnucash/finance-quote-check, /usr/share/cluster/fence_scsi_check\.pl, /usr/share/selinux/devel/policygentool, /usr/share/switchdesk/switchdesk-gui\.py, /usr/share/authconfig/authconfig-tui\.py, /usr/share/authconfig/authconfig-gtk\.py, /usr/share/gnucash/finance-quote-helper, /usr/share/gitolite/hooks/common/update, /usr/lib/xfce4/exo-1/exo-compose-mail-1, /usr/share/system-config-services/gui\.py, /lib/security/pam_krb5/pam_krb5_storetmp, /usr/share/system-config-netboot/pxeos\.py, /usr/lib/xfce4/session/balou-export-theme, /usr/share/system-config-selinux/polgen\.py, /usr/share/system-config-nfs/nfs-export\.py, /usr/share/system-config-printer/applet\.py, /usr/s
hare/PackageKit/pk-upgrade-distro\.sh, /usr/lib/xfce4/session/balou-install-theme, /usr/share/system-config-netboot/pxeboot\.py, /usr/lib/xfce4/session/xfsm-shutdown-helper, /usr/share/rhn/rhn_applet/needed-packages\.py, /usr/lib/security/pam_krb5/pam_krb5_storetmp, /usr/share/system-logviewer/system-logviewer\.py, /usr/share/system-config-network/neat-control\.py, /usr/share/system-config-services/serviceconf\.py, /usr/share/hal/device-manager/hal-device-manager, /usr/share/system-config-lvm/system-config-lvm\.py, /usr/share/system-config-nfs/system-config-nfs\.py, /usr/share/system-config-mouse/system-config-mouse, /usr/share/system-config-httpd/system-config-httpd, /usr/share/system-config-users/system-config-users, /usr/share/system-config-date/system-config-date\.py, /usr/share/doc/ghc/html/libraries/gen_contents_index, /usr/share/gitolite/hooks/gitolite-admin/post-update, /usr/share/system-config-samba/system-config-samba\.py, /usr/share/system-config-display/system-co
nfig-display, /usr/share/system-config-keyboard/system-config-keyboard, /usr/share/system-config-language/system-config-language, /usr/share/system-config-services/system-config-services, /usr/share/system-config-selinux/system-config-selinux\.py, /usr/share/system-config-netboot/system-config-netboot\.py, /usr/share/system-config-soundcard/system-config-soundcard, /usr/share/system-config-rootpassword/system-config-rootpassword, /usr/share/system-config-securitylevel/system-config-securitylevel\.py, /sbin/ldconfig, /usr/sbin/ldconfig, /dev/cpu/mtrr, /bin/d?ash, /bin/zsh.*, /bin/ksh.*, /usr/bin/d?ash, /usr/bin/ksh.*, /usr/bin/zsh.*, /bin/esh, /bin/mksh, /bin/sash, /bin/tcsh, /bin/yash, /bin/bash, /bin/fish, /bin/bash2, /usr/bin/esh, /usr/bin/mksh, /usr/bin/sash, /usr/bin/bash, /usr/bin/fish, /usr/bin/tcsh, /usr/bin/yash, /sbin/nologin, /usr/sbin/sesh, /usr/bin/bash2, /usr/sbin/smrsh, /usr/bin/scponly, /usr/sbin/nologin, /usr/libexec/sesh, /usr/sbin/scponlyc, /usr/bin/git-she
ll, /usr/libexec/git-core/git-shell, all files on the system
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux rpm_script policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their rpm_script processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for rpm_script:
++
++.EX
++.B rpm_script_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux rpm_script policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their rpm_script processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for rpm_script:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B rpm_script_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the rpm_script_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the rpm_script_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B rpm_script_tmp_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the rpm_script_tmp_t type, if you want to store rpm script temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B rpm_script_tmpfs_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the rpm_script_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store rpm script files on a tmpfs file system.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type rpm_script_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B file_type
++
++ all files on the system
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the rpm_script_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the rpm_script_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), rpm_script(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, rpm_selinux(8), rpm_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/rpm_selinux.8 b/man/man8/rpm_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..0b6f8e2
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/rpm_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,191 @@
++.TH "rpm_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "rpm" "SELinux Policy documentation for rpm"
++.SH "NAME"
++rpm_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the rpm processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the rpm processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The rpm processes execute with the rpm_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep rpm_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The rpm_t SELinux type can be entered via the "rpm_exec_t,debuginfo_exec_t,filesystem_type,rpm_script_exec_t,unlabeled_t,proc_type,mtrr_device_t,sysctl_type,file_type" file types. The default entrypoint paths for the rpm_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/libexec/yumDBUSBackend.py, /bin/rpm, /usr/bin/dnf, /usr/bin/rpm, /usr/bin/yum, /usr/bin/zif, /usr/sbin/pup, /usr/bin/smart, /usr/sbin/bcfg2, /usr/sbin/pirut, /usr/bin/apt-get, /usr/sbin/up2date, /usr/sbin/synaptic, /usr/bin/apt-shell, /usr/sbin/rhn_check, /usr/sbin/rhnreg_ks, /usr/sbin/packagekitd, /usr/sbin/yum-updatesd, /usr/libexec/packagekitd, /usr/bin/package-cleanup, /usr/bin/fedora-rmdevelrpms, /usr/bin/rpmdev-rmdevelrpms, /usr/sbin/system-install-packages, /usr/share/yumex/yum_childtask\.py, /usr/sbin/yum-complete-transaction, /usr/share/yumex/yumex-yum-backend, /usr/bin/debuginfo-install, /dev/cpu/mtrr, all files on the system
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux rpm policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their rpm processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for rpm:
++
++.EX
++.B rpm_t, rpm_script_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux rpm policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their rpm processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for rpm:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B rpm_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the rpm_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the rpm_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B rpm_file_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the rpm_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as rpm content.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B rpm_log_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the rpm_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as rpm log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B rpm_script_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the rpm_script_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the rpm_script_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B rpm_script_tmp_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the rpm_script_tmp_t type, if you want to store rpm script temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B rpm_script_tmpfs_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the rpm_script_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store rpm script files on a tmpfs file system.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B rpm_tmp_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the rpm_tmp_t type, if you want to store rpm temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B rpm_tmpfs_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the rpm_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store rpm files on a tmpfs file system.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B rpm_var_cache_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the rpm_var_cache_t type, if you want to store the files under the /var/cache directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B rpm_var_lib_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the rpm_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the rpm files under the /var/lib directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B rpm_var_run_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the rpm_var_run_t type, if you want to store the rpm files under the /run directory.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type rpm_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B file_type
++
++ all files on the system
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the rpm_script_t, rpm_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the rpm_script_t, rpm_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), rpm(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, rpm_script_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/rshd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/rshd_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..8958739
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/rshd_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,302 @@
++.TH "rshd_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "rshd" "SELinux Policy documentation for rshd"
++.SH "NAME"
++rshd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the rshd processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the rshd processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The rshd processes execute with the rshd_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep rshd_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The rshd_t SELinux type can be entered via the "rshd_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the rshd_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/sbin/in\.rshd, /usr/sbin/in\.rexecd, /usr/kerberos/sbin/kshd
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux rshd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their rshd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for rshd:
++
++.EX
++.B rshd_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux rshd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their rshd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for rshd:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B rshd_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the rshd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the rshd_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B rshd_keytab_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the rshd_keytab_t type, if you want to treat the files as kerberos keytab files.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH PORT TYPES
++SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
++.PP
++You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
++
++.B semanage port -l
++
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
++SELinux rshd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their rshd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following port types are defined for rshd:
++
++.EX
++.TP 5
++.B rsh_port_t
++.TP 10
++.EE
++
++
++Default Defined Ports:
++tcp 514
++.EE
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type rshd_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B auth_cache_t
++
++ /var/cache/coolkey(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B auth_home_t
++
++ /root/\.google_authenticator
++.br
++ /root/\.google_authenticator~
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.google_authenticator
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.google_authenticator~
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.google_authenticator
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.google_authenticator~
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.google_authenticator
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.google_authenticator~
++.br
++
++.br
++.B cgroup_t
++
++ /cgroup
++.br
++ /sys/fs/cgroup
++.br
++
++.br
++.B faillog_t
++
++ /var/log/btmp.*
++.br
++ /var/run/faillock(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/log/faillog
++.br
++ /var/log/tallylog
++.br
++
++.br
++.B initrc_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/utmp
++.br
++ /var/run/random-seed
++.br
++ /var/run/runlevel\.dir
++.br
++ /var/run/setmixer_flag
++.br
++
++.br
++.B krb5_host_rcache_t
++
++ /var/cache/krb5rcache(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/tmp/nfs_0
++.br
++ /var/tmp/DNS_25
++.br
++ /var/tmp/host_0
++.br
++ /var/tmp/imap_0
++.br
++ /var/tmp/HTTP_23
++.br
++ /var/tmp/HTTP_48
++.br
++ /var/tmp/ldap_55
++.br
++ /var/tmp/ldap_487
++.br
++ /var/tmp/ldapmap1_0
++.br
++
++.br
++.B lastlog_t
++
++ /var/log/lastlog
++.br
++
++.br
++.B pam_var_run_t
++
++ /var/(db|lib|adm)/sudo(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/sudo(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/sepermit(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/pam_mount(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B pcscd_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/pcscd(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/pcscd\.events(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/pcscd\.pid
++.br
++ /var/run/pcscd\.pub
++.br
++ /var/run/pcscd\.comm
++.br
++
++.br
++.B security_t
++
++ /selinux
++.br
++
++.br
++.B user_tmp_t
++
++ /var/run/user(/.*)?
++.br
++ /tmp/gconfd-.*
++.br
++ /tmp/gconfd-dwalsh
++.br
++ /tmp/gconfd-xguest
++.br
++
++.br
++.B user_tmp_type
++
++ all user tmp files
++.br
++
++.br
++.B var_auth_t
++
++ /var/ace(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/rsa(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/abl(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/rsa(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/pam_ssh(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/pam_ssh(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/pam_shield(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/google-authenticator(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B wtmp_t
++
++ /var/log/wtmp.*
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the rshd_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the rshd_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.B semanage port
++can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), rshd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/rssh_chroot_helper_selinux.8 b/man/man8/rssh_chroot_helper_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..42e38a6
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/rssh_chroot_helper_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
++.TH "rssh_chroot_helper_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "rssh_chroot_helper" "SELinux Policy documentation for rssh_chroot_helper"
++.SH "NAME"
++rssh_chroot_helper_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the rssh_chroot_helper processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the rssh_chroot_helper processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The rssh_chroot_helper processes execute with the rssh_chroot_helper_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep rssh_chroot_helper_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The rssh_chroot_helper_t SELinux type can be entered via the "rssh_chroot_helper_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the rssh_chroot_helper_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/libexec/rssh_chroot_helper
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux rssh_chroot_helper policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their rssh_chroot_helper processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for rssh_chroot_helper:
++
++.EX
++.B rssh_chroot_helper_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux rssh_chroot_helper policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their rssh_chroot_helper processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for rssh_chroot_helper:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B rssh_chroot_helper_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the rssh_chroot_helper_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the rssh_chroot_helper_t domain.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the rssh_chroot_helper_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the rssh_chroot_helper_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), rssh_chroot_helper(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, rssh_selinux(8), rssh_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/rssh_selinux.8 b/man/man8/rssh_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..f418ac6
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/rssh_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,133 @@
++.TH "rssh_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "rssh" "SELinux Policy documentation for rssh"
++.SH "NAME"
++rssh_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the rssh processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the rssh processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The rssh processes execute with the rssh_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep rssh_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The rssh_t SELinux type can be entered via the "rssh_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the rssh_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/bin/rssh
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux rssh policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their rssh processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for rssh:
++
++.EX
++.B rssh_t, rssh_chroot_helper_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux rssh policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their rssh processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for rssh:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B rssh_chroot_helper_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the rssh_chroot_helper_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the rssh_chroot_helper_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B rssh_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the rssh_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the rssh_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B rssh_ro_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the rssh_ro_t type, if you want to treat the files as rssh read/only content.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B rssh_rw_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the rssh_rw_t type, if you want to treat the files as rssh read/write content.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type rssh_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B rssh_rw_t
++
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the rssh_chroot_helper_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the rssh_chroot_helper_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), rssh(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, rssh_chroot_helper_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/rsync_selinux.8 b/man/man8/rsync_selinux.8
+index ad9ccf5..bf0928c 100644
+--- a/man/man8/rsync_selinux.8
++++ b/man/man8/rsync_selinux.8
+@@ -1,52 +1,299 @@
+-.TH "rsync_selinux" "8" "17 Jan 2005" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "rsync Selinux Policy documentation"
+-.de EX
+-.nf
+-.ft CW
+-..
+-.de EE
+-.ft R
+-.fi
+-..
++.TH "rsync_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "rsync" "SELinux Policy documentation for rsync"
+ .SH "NAME"
+-rsync_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the rsync daemon
++rsync_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the rsync processes
+ .SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
+-Security-Enhanced Linux secures the rsync server via flexible mandatory access
+-control.
+-.SH FILE_CONTEXTS
+-SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+-Policy governs the access daemons have to these files.
+-If you want to share files using the rsync daemon, you must label the files and directories public_content_t. So if you created a special directory /var/rsync, you
+-would need to label the directory with the chcon tool.
+-.TP
+-chcon -t public_content_t /var/rsync
+-.TP
+-.TP
+-To make this change permanent (survive a relabel), use the semanage command to add the change to file context configuration:
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the rsync processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The rsync processes execute with the rsync_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep rsync_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The rsync_t SELinux type can be entered via the "rsync_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the rsync_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/bin/rsync
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux rsync policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their rsync processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for rsync:
++
++.EX
++.B rsync_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH BOOLEANS
++SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. rsync policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run rsync with the tightest access possible.
++
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow postgresql to use ssh and rsync for point-in-time recovery, you must turn on the postgresql_can_rsync boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P postgresql_can_rsync 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow rsync to export any files/directories read only, you must turn on the rsync_export_all_ro boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P rsync_export_all_ro 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow rsync servers to share nfs files systems, you must turn on the rsync_use_nfs boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P rsync_use_nfs 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow rsync servers to share cifs files systems, you must turn on the rsync_use_cifs boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P rsync_use_cifs 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow rsync to run as a client, you must turn on the rsync_client boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P rsync_client 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow postgresql to use ssh and rsync for point-in-time recovery, you must turn on the postgresql_can_rsync boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P postgresql_can_rsync 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow rsync to export any files/directories read only, you must turn on the rsync_export_all_ro boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P rsync_export_all_ro 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow rsync servers to share nfs files systems, you must turn on the rsync_use_nfs boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P rsync_use_nfs 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow rsync servers to share cifs files systems, you must turn on the rsync_use_cifs boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P rsync_use_cifs 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow rsync to run as a client, you must turn on the rsync_client boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P rsync_client 1
++.EE
++
++.SH SHARING FILES
++If you want to share files with multiple domains (Apache, FTP, rsync, Samba), you can set a file context of public_content_t and public_content_rw_t. These context allow any of the above domains to read the content. If you want a particular domain to write to the public_content_rw_t domain, you must set the appropriate boolean.
+ .TP
++Allow rsync servers to read the /var/rsync directory by adding the public_content_t file type to the directory and by restoring the file type.
++.PP
++.B
+ semanage fcontext -a -t public_content_t "/var/rsync(/.*)?"
++.br
++.B restorecon -F -R -v /var/rsync
++.pp
+ .TP
+-This command adds the following entry to /etc/selinux/POLICYTYPE/contexts/files/file_contexts.local:
+-.TP
+-/var/rsync(/.*)? system_u:object_r:publix_content_t:s0
+-.TP
+-Run the restorecon command to apply the changes:
+-.TP
+-restorecon -R -v /var/rsync/
++Allow rsync servers to read and write /var/tmp/incoming by adding the public_content_rw_t type to the directory and by restoring the file type. This also requires the allow_rsyncd_anon_write boolean to be set.
++.PP
++.B
++semanage fcontext -a -t public_content_rw_t "/var/rsync/incoming(/.*)?"
++.br
++.B restorecon -F -R -v /var/rsync/incoming
++
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow rsync to modify public files used for public file transfer services. Files/Directories must be labeled public_content_rw_t., you must turn on the rsync_anon_write boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P rsync_anon_write 1
+ .EE
+
+-.SH SHARING FILES
+-If you want to share files with multiple domains (Apache, FTP, rsync, Samba), you can set a file context of public_content_t and public_content_rw_t. These context allow any of the above domains to read the content. If you want a particular domain to write to the public_content_rw_t domain, you must set the appropriate boolean. allow_DOMAIN_anon_write. So for rsync you would execute:
++.PP
++If you want to allow rsync to modify public files used for public file transfer services. Files/Directories must be labeled public_content_rw_t., you must turn on the rsync_anon_write boolean.
+
+ .EX
+-setsebool -P allow_rsync_anon_write=1
++.B setsebool -P rsync_anon_write 1
+ .EE
+
+-.SH BOOLEANS
+-.TP
+-system-config-selinux is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+-.SH AUTHOR
+-This manual page was written by Dan Walsh <dwalsh at redhat.com>.
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux rsync policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their rsync processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for rsync:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B rsync_data_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the rsync_data_t type, if you want to treat the files as rsync content.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B rsync_etc_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the rsync_etc_t type, if you want to store rsync files in the /etc directories.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B rsync_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the rsync_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the rsync_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B rsync_log_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the rsync_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as rsync log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B rsync_tmp_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the rsync_tmp_t type, if you want to store rsync temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B rsync_var_run_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the rsync_var_run_t type, if you want to store the rsync files under the /run directory.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH PORT TYPES
++SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
++.PP
++You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
++
++.B semanage port -l
++
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
++SELinux rsync policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their rsync processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following port types are defined for rsync:
++
++.EX
++.TP 5
++.B rsync_port_t
++.TP 10
++.EE
++
++
++Default Defined Ports:
++tcp 873
++.EE
++udp 873
++.EE
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type rsync_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B rsync_log_t
++
++ /var/log/rsync\.log.*
++.br
++
++.br
++.B rsync_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B rsync_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/rsyncd\.lock
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the rsync_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the rsync_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.B semanage port
++can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
++
++.B semanage boolean
++can also be used to manipulate the booleans
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+ .SH "SEE ALSO"
+-selinux(8), rsync(1), chcon(1), setsebool(8), semanage(8)
++selinux(8), rsync(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, setsebool(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/rtkit_daemon_selinux.8 b/man/man8/rtkit_daemon_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..0e3bbbc
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/rtkit_daemon_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
++.TH "rtkit_daemon_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "rtkit_daemon" "SELinux Policy documentation for rtkit_daemon"
++.SH "NAME"
++rtkit_daemon_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the rtkit_daemon processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the rtkit_daemon processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The rtkit_daemon processes execute with the rtkit_daemon_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep rtkit_daemon_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The rtkit_daemon_t SELinux type can be entered via the "rtkit_daemon_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the rtkit_daemon_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/libexec/rtkit-daemon
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux rtkit_daemon policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their rtkit_daemon processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for rtkit_daemon:
++
++.EX
++.B rtkit_daemon_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux rtkit_daemon policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their rtkit_daemon processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for rtkit_daemon:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B rtkit_daemon_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the rtkit_daemon_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the rtkit_daemon_t domain.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type rtkit_daemon_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B anon_inodefs_t
++
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the rtkit_daemon_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the rtkit_daemon_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), rtkit_daemon(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/run_init_selinux.8 b/man/man8/run_init_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..69e4288
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/run_init_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,148 @@
++.TH "run_init_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "run_init" "SELinux Policy documentation for run_init"
++.SH "NAME"
++run_init_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the run_init processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the run_init processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The run_init processes execute with the run_init_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep run_init_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The run_init_t SELinux type can be entered via the "run_init_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the run_init_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/sbin/run_init
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux run_init policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their run_init processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for run_init:
++
++.EX
++.B run_init_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux run_init policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their run_init processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for run_init:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B run_init_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the run_init_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the run_init_t domain.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type run_init_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B faillog_t
++
++ /var/log/btmp.*
++.br
++ /var/run/faillock(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/log/faillog
++.br
++ /var/log/tallylog
++.br
++
++.br
++.B initrc_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/utmp
++.br
++ /var/run/random-seed
++.br
++ /var/run/runlevel\.dir
++.br
++ /var/run/setmixer_flag
++.br
++
++.br
++.B pcscd_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/pcscd(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/pcscd\.events(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/pcscd\.pid
++.br
++ /var/run/pcscd\.pub
++.br
++ /var/run/pcscd\.comm
++.br
++
++.br
++.B security_t
++
++ /selinux
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the run_init_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the run_init_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), run_init(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/rwho_selinux.8 b/man/man8/rwho_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..6044f11
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/rwho_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,152 @@
++.TH "rwho_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "rwho" "SELinux Policy documentation for rwho"
++.SH "NAME"
++rwho_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the rwho processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the rwho processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The rwho processes execute with the rwho_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep rwho_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The rwho_t SELinux type can be entered via the "rwho_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the rwho_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/sbin/rwhod
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux rwho policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their rwho processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for rwho:
++
++.EX
++.B rwho_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux rwho policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their rwho processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for rwho:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B rwho_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the rwho_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the rwho_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B rwho_initrc_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the rwho_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the rwho_initrc_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B rwho_log_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the rwho_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as rwho log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B rwho_spool_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the rwho_spool_t type, if you want to store the rwho files under the /var/spool directory.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH PORT TYPES
++SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
++.PP
++You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
++
++.B semanage port -l
++
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
++SELinux rwho policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their rwho processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following port types are defined for rwho:
++
++.EX
++.TP 5
++.B rwho_port_t
++.TP 10
++.EE
++
++
++Default Defined Ports:
++udp 513
++.EE
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type rwho_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B rwho_log_t
++
++ /var/log/rwhod(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B rwho_spool_t
++
++ /var/spool/rwho(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.B semanage port
++can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), rwho(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/samba_net_selinux.8 b/man/man8/samba_net_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..2b5c346
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/samba_net_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,155 @@
++.TH "samba_net_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "samba_net" "SELinux Policy documentation for samba_net"
++.SH "NAME"
++samba_net_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the samba_net processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the samba_net processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The samba_net processes execute with the samba_net_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep samba_net_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The samba_net_t SELinux type can be entered via the "samba_net_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the samba_net_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/bin/net
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux samba_net policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their samba_net processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for samba_net:
++
++.EX
++.B samba_net_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux samba_net policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their samba_net processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for samba_net:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B samba_net_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the samba_net_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the samba_net_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B samba_net_tmp_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the samba_net_tmp_t type, if you want to store samba net temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type samba_net_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B auth_cache_t
++
++ /var/cache/coolkey(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B krb5_keytab_t
++
++ /etc/krb5\.keytab
++.br
++ /etc/krb5kdc/kadm5\.keytab
++.br
++ /var/kerberos/krb5kdc/kadm5\.keytab
++.br
++
++.br
++.B samba_net_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B samba_secrets_t
++
++ /etc/samba/smbpasswd
++.br
++ /etc/samba/passdb\.tdb
++.br
++ /etc/samba/MACHINE\.SID
++.br
++ /etc/samba/secrets\.tdb
++.br
++
++.br
++.B samba_var_t
++
++ /var/lib/samba(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/cache/samba(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/spool/samba(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the samba_net_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the samba_net_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), samba_net(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, samba_unconfined_script_selinux(8), sambagui_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/samba_selinux.8 b/man/man8/samba_selinux.8
+index ca702c7..234a9c7 100644
+--- a/man/man8/samba_selinux.8
++++ b/man/man8/samba_selinux.8
+@@ -1,56 +1 @@
+-.TH "samba_selinux" "8" "17 Jan 2005" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "Samba Selinux Policy documentation"
+-.SH "NAME"
+-samba_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for Samba
+-.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+-
+-Security-Enhanced Linux secures the Samba server via flexible mandatory access
+-control.
+-.SH FILE_CONTEXTS
+-SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+-Policy governs the access daemons have to these files.
+-If you want to share files other than home directories, those files must be
+-labeled samba_share_t. So if you created a special directory /var/eng, you
+-would need to label the directory with the chcon tool.
+-.TP
+-chcon -t samba_share_t /var/eng
+-.TP
+-To make this change permanent (survive a relabel), use the semanage command to add the change to file context configuration:
+-.TP
+-semanage fcontext -a -t samba_share_t "/var/eng(/.*)?"
+-.TP
+-This command adds the following entry to /etc/selinux/POLICYTYPE/contexts/files/file_contexts.local:
+-.TP
+-/var/eng(/.*)? system_u:object_r:samba_share_t:s0
+-.TP
+-Run the restorecon command to apply the changes:
+-.TP
+-restorecon -R -v /var/eng/
+-
+-.SH SHARING FILES
+-If you want to share files with multiple domains (Apache, FTP, rsync, Samba), you can set a file context of public_content_t and public_content_rw_t. These context allow any of the above domains to read the content. If you want a particular domain to write to the public_content_rw_t domain, you must set the appropriate boolean. allow_DOMAIN_anon_write. So for samba you would execute:
+-
+-setsebool -P allow_smbd_anon_write=1
+-
+-.SH BOOLEANS
+-.br
+-SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. So by
+-default SELinux policy turns off SELinux sharing of home directories and
+-the use of Samba shares from a remote machine as a home directory.
+-.TP
+-If you are setting up this machine as a Samba server and wish to share the home directories, you need to set the samba_enable_home_dirs boolean.
+-.br
+-
+-setsebool -P samba_enable_home_dirs 1
+-.TP
+-If you want to use a remote Samba server for the home directories on this machine, you must set the use_samba_home_dirs boolean.
+-.br
+-
+-setsebool -P use_samba_home_dirs 1
+-.TP
+-system-config-selinux is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+-
+-.SH AUTHOR
+-This manual page was written by Dan Walsh <dwalsh at redhat.com>.
+-
+-.SH "SEE ALSO"
+-selinux(8), samba(7), chcon(1), setsebool(8), semanage(8)
++.so man8/smbd_selinux.8
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/samba_unconfined_script_selinux.8 b/man/man8/samba_unconfined_script_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..293e93e
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/samba_unconfined_script_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
++.TH "samba_unconfined_script_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "samba_unconfined_script" "SELinux Policy documentation for samba_unconfined_script"
++.SH "NAME"
++samba_unconfined_script_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the samba_unconfined_script processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the samba_unconfined_script processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The samba_unconfined_script processes execute with the samba_unconfined_script_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep samba_unconfined_script_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The samba_unconfined_script_t SELinux type can be entered via the "shell_exec_t,samba_unconfined_script_exec_t" file types. The default entrypoint paths for the samba_unconfined_script_t domain are the following:"
++
++/bin/d?ash, /bin/zsh.*, /bin/ksh.*, /usr/bin/d?ash, /usr/bin/ksh.*, /usr/bin/zsh.*, /bin/esh, /bin/mksh, /bin/sash, /bin/tcsh, /bin/yash, /bin/bash, /bin/fish, /bin/bash2, /usr/bin/esh, /usr/bin/mksh, /usr/bin/sash, /usr/bin/bash, /usr/bin/fish, /usr/bin/tcsh, /usr/bin/yash, /sbin/nologin, /usr/sbin/sesh, /usr/bin/bash2, /usr/sbin/smrsh, /usr/bin/scponly, /usr/sbin/nologin, /usr/libexec/sesh, /usr/sbin/scponlyc, /usr/bin/git-shell, /usr/libexec/git-core/git-shell, /var/lib/samba/scripts(/.*)?
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux samba_unconfined_script policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their samba_unconfined_script processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for samba_unconfined_script:
++
++.EX
++.B samba_unconfined_script_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux samba_unconfined_script policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their samba_unconfined_script processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for samba_unconfined_script:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B samba_unconfined_script_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the samba_unconfined_script_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the samba_unconfined_script_t domain.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), samba_unconfined_script(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, samba_net_selinux(8), sambagui_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/sambagui_selinux.8 b/man/man8/sambagui_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..3c17297
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/sambagui_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,128 @@
++.TH "sambagui_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "sambagui" "SELinux Policy documentation for sambagui"
++.SH "NAME"
++sambagui_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the sambagui processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the sambagui processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The sambagui processes execute with the sambagui_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep sambagui_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The sambagui_t SELinux type can be entered via the "sambagui_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the sambagui_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/share/system-config-samba/system-config-samba-mechanism.py
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux sambagui policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their sambagui processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for sambagui:
++
++.EX
++.B sambagui_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux sambagui policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their sambagui processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for sambagui:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B sambagui_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the sambagui_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the sambagui_t domain.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type sambagui_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B samba_etc_t
++
++ /etc/samba(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B samba_var_t
++
++ /var/lib/samba(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/cache/samba(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/spool/samba(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B systemd_passwd_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/systemd/ask-password(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/systemd/ask-password-block(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the sambagui_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the sambagui_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), sambagui(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/sandbox_selinux.8 b/man/man8/sandbox_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..ee32f27
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/sandbox_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,192 @@
++.TH "sandbox_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "sandbox" "SELinux Policy documentation for sandbox"
++.SH "NAME"
++sandbox_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the sandbox processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the sandbox processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The sandbox processes execute with the sandbox_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep sandbox_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The sandbox_t SELinux type can be entered via the "file_type" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the sandbox_t domain are the following:"
++
++all files on the system
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux sandbox policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their sandbox processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for sandbox:
++
++.EX
++.B sandbox_x_client_t, sandbox_net_client_t, sandbox_xserver_t, sandbox_x_t, sandbox_web_client_t, sandbox_min_t, sandbox_net_t, sandbox_web_t, sandbox_min_client_t, sandbox_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH BOOLEANS
++SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. sandbox policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run sandbox with the tightest access possible.
++
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow unconfined users to transition to the chrome sandbox domains when running chrome-sandbox, you must turn on the unconfined_chrome_sandbox_transition boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P unconfined_chrome_sandbox_transition 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow unconfined users to transition to the chrome sandbox domains when running chrome-sandbox, you must turn on the unconfined_chrome_sandbox_transition boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P unconfined_chrome_sandbox_transition 1
++.EE
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux sandbox policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their sandbox processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for sandbox:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B sandbox_devpts_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the sandbox_devpts_t type, if you want to treat the files as sandbox devpts data.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B sandbox_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the sandbox_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the sandbox_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B sandbox_file_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the sandbox_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as sandbox content.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B sandbox_min_client_tmpfs_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the sandbox_min_client_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store sandbox min client files on a tmpfs file system.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B sandbox_net_client_tmpfs_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the sandbox_net_client_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store sandbox net client files on a tmpfs file system.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B sandbox_web_client_tmpfs_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the sandbox_web_client_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store sandbox web client files on a tmpfs file system.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B sandbox_x_client_tmpfs_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the sandbox_x_client_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store sandbox x client files on a tmpfs file system.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B sandbox_xserver_tmpfs_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the sandbox_xserver_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store sandbox xserver files on a tmpfs file system.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type sandbox_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B sandbox_file_t
++
++
++.br
++.B sandbox_tmpfs_type
++
++ all sandbox content in tmpfs file systems
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the sandbox_min_t, sandbox_net_t, sandbox_web_client_t, sandbox_xserver_t, sandbox_web_t, sandbox_x_client_t, sandbox_x_t, sandbox_net_client_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the sandbox_min_t, sandbox_net_t, sandbox_web_client_t, sandbox_xserver_t, sandbox_web_t, sandbox_x_client_t, sandbox_x_t, sandbox_net_client_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.B semanage boolean
++can also be used to manipulate the booleans
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), sandbox(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, setsebool(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/sanlock_selinux.8 b/man/man8/sanlock_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..91bbc31
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/sanlock_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,220 @@
++.TH "sanlock_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "sanlock" "SELinux Policy documentation for sanlock"
++.SH "NAME"
++sanlock_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the sanlock processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the sanlock processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The sanlock processes execute with the sanlock_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep sanlock_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The sanlock_t SELinux type can be entered via the "sanlock_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the sanlock_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/sbin/sanlock
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux sanlock policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their sanlock processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for sanlock:
++
++.EX
++.B sanlock_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH BOOLEANS
++SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. sanlock policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run sanlock with the tightest access possible.
++
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow sanlock to read/write fuse files, you must turn on the sanlock_use_fusefs boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P sanlock_use_fusefs 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow sanlock to manage cifs files, you must turn on the sanlock_use_samba boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P sanlock_use_samba 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined virtual guests to interact with the sanlock, you must turn on the virt_use_sanlock boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P virt_use_sanlock 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow sanlock to manage nfs files, you must turn on the sanlock_use_nfs boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P sanlock_use_nfs 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow sanlock to read/write fuse files, you must turn on the sanlock_use_fusefs boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P sanlock_use_fusefs 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow sanlock to manage cifs files, you must turn on the sanlock_use_samba boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P sanlock_use_samba 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined virtual guests to interact with the sanlock, you must turn on the virt_use_sanlock boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P virt_use_sanlock 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow sanlock to manage nfs files, you must turn on the sanlock_use_nfs boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P sanlock_use_nfs 1
++.EE
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux sanlock policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their sanlock processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for sanlock:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B sanlock_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the sanlock_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the sanlock_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B sanlock_initrc_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the sanlock_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the sanlock_initrc_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B sanlock_log_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the sanlock_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as sanlock log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B sanlock_unit_file_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the sanlock_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as sanlock unit content.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B sanlock_var_run_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the sanlock_var_run_t type, if you want to store the sanlock files under the /run directory.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type sanlock_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B sanlock_log_t
++
++ /var/log/sanlock\.log.*
++.br
++
++.br
++.B sanlock_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/sanlock(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B virt_var_lib_t
++
++ /var/lib/oz(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/libvirt(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the sanlock_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the sanlock_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.B semanage boolean
++can also be used to manipulate the booleans
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), sanlock(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, setsebool(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/saslauthd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/saslauthd_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..da990ec
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/saslauthd_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,220 @@
++.TH "saslauthd_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "saslauthd" "SELinux Policy documentation for saslauthd"
++.SH "NAME"
++saslauthd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the saslauthd processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the saslauthd processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The saslauthd processes execute with the saslauthd_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep saslauthd_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The saslauthd_t SELinux type can be entered via the "saslauthd_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the saslauthd_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/sbin/saslauthd
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux saslauthd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their saslauthd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for saslauthd:
++
++.EX
++.B saslauthd_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH BOOLEANS
++SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. saslauthd policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run saslauthd with the tightest access possible.
++
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow sasl to read shadow, you must turn on the saslauthd_read_shadow boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P saslauthd_read_shadow 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow sasl to read shadow, you must turn on the saslauthd_read_shadow boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P saslauthd_read_shadow 1
++.EE
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux saslauthd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their saslauthd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for saslauthd:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B saslauthd_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the saslauthd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the saslauthd_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B saslauthd_initrc_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the saslauthd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the saslauthd_initrc_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B saslauthd_keytab_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the saslauthd_keytab_t type, if you want to treat the files as kerberos keytab files.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B saslauthd_var_run_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the saslauthd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the saslauthd files under the /run directory.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type saslauthd_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B faillog_t
++
++ /var/log/btmp.*
++.br
++ /var/run/faillock(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/log/faillog
++.br
++ /var/log/tallylog
++.br
++
++.br
++.B krb5_host_rcache_t
++
++ /var/cache/krb5rcache(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/tmp/nfs_0
++.br
++ /var/tmp/DNS_25
++.br
++ /var/tmp/host_0
++.br
++ /var/tmp/imap_0
++.br
++ /var/tmp/HTTP_23
++.br
++ /var/tmp/HTTP_48
++.br
++ /var/tmp/ldap_55
++.br
++ /var/tmp/ldap_487
++.br
++ /var/tmp/ldapmap1_0
++.br
++
++.br
++.B lastlog_t
++
++ /var/log/lastlog
++.br
++
++.br
++.B pcscd_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/pcscd(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/pcscd\.events(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/pcscd\.pid
++.br
++ /var/run/pcscd\.pub
++.br
++ /var/run/pcscd\.comm
++.br
++
++.br
++.B saslauthd_var_run_t
++
++ /var/lib/sasl2(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/saslauthd(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B security_t
++
++ /selinux
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the saslauthd_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the saslauthd_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.B semanage boolean
++can also be used to manipulate the booleans
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), saslauthd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, setsebool(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/sblim_gatherd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/sblim_gatherd_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..85b84c9
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/sblim_gatherd_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
++.TH "sblim_gatherd_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "sblim_gatherd" "SELinux Policy documentation for sblim_gatherd"
++.SH "NAME"
++sblim_gatherd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the sblim_gatherd processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the sblim_gatherd processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The sblim_gatherd processes execute with the sblim_gatherd_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep sblim_gatherd_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The sblim_gatherd_t SELinux type can be entered via the "sblim_gatherd_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the sblim_gatherd_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/sbin/gatherd
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux sblim_gatherd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their sblim_gatherd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for sblim_gatherd:
++
++.EX
++.B sblim_gatherd_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux sblim_gatherd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their sblim_gatherd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for sblim_gatherd:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B sblim_gatherd_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the sblim_gatherd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the sblim_gatherd_t domain.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type sblim_gatherd_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B sblim_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/gather(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), sblim_gatherd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, sblim_reposd_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/sblim_reposd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/sblim_reposd_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..10407e3
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/sblim_reposd_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
++.TH "sblim_reposd_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "sblim_reposd" "SELinux Policy documentation for sblim_reposd"
++.SH "NAME"
++sblim_reposd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the sblim_reposd processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the sblim_reposd processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The sblim_reposd processes execute with the sblim_reposd_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep sblim_reposd_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The sblim_reposd_t SELinux type can be entered via the "sblim_reposd_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the sblim_reposd_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/sbin/reposd
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux sblim_reposd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their sblim_reposd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for sblim_reposd:
++
++.EX
++.B sblim_reposd_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux sblim_reposd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their sblim_reposd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for sblim_reposd:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B sblim_reposd_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the sblim_reposd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the sblim_reposd_t domain.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type sblim_reposd_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B sblim_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/gather(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), sblim_reposd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, sblim_gatherd_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/secadm_selinux.8 b/man/man8/secadm_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..bb8258d
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/secadm_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,332 @@
++.TH "secadm_selinux" "8" "secadm" "mgrepl at redhat.com" "secadm SELinux Policy documentation"
++.SH "NAME"
++secadm_r \- \fBSecurity administrator role\fP - Security Enhanced Linux Policy
++
++.SH DESCRIPTION
++
++SELinux supports Roles Based Access Control (RBAC), some Linux roles are login roles, while other roles need to be transition into.
++
++.I Note:
++Examples in this man page will use the
++.B staff_u
++SELinux user.
++
++Non login roles are usually used for administrative tasks. For example, tasks that require root privileges. Roles control which types a user can run processes with. Roles often have default types assigned to them.
++
++The default type for the secadm_r role is secadm_t.
++
++The
++.B newrole
++program to transition directly to this role.
++
++.B newrole -r secadm_r -t secadm_t
++
++.B sudo
++is the preferred method to do transition from one role to another. You setup sudo to transition to secadm_r by adding a similar line to the /etc/sudoers file.
++
++USERNAME ALL=(ALL) ROLE=secadm_r TYPE=secadm_t COMMAND
++
++.br
++sudo will run COMMAND as staff_u:secadm_r:secadm_t:LEVEL
++
++When using a a non login role, you need to setup SELinux so that your SELinux user can reach secadm_r role.
++
++Execute the following to see all of the assigned SELinux roles:
++
++.B semanage user -l
++
++You need to add secadm_r to the staff_u user. You could setup the staff_u user to be able to use the secadm_r role with a command like:
++
++.B $ semanage user -m -R 'staff_r system_r secadm_r' staff_u
++
++
++
++SELinux policy also controls which roles can transition to a different role.
++You can list these rules using the following command.
++
++.B search --role_allow
++
++SELinux policy allows the sysadm_r, staff_r, auditadm_r roles can transition to the secadm_r role.
++
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type secadm_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B anon_inodefs_t
++
++
++.br
++.B auth_cache_t
++
++ /var/cache/coolkey(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B boolean_type
++
++
++.br
++.B cgroup_t
++
++ /cgroup
++.br
++ /sys/fs/cgroup
++.br
++
++.br
++.B chrome_sandbox_tmpfs_t
++
++
++.br
++.B default_context_t
++
++ /etc/selinux/([^/]*/)?contexts(/.*)?
++.br
++ /root/\.default_contexts
++.br
++
++.br
++.B etc_runtime_t
++
++ /[^/]+
++.br
++ /etc/mtab.*
++.br
++ /etc/blkid(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/nologin.*
++.br
++ /etc/\.fstab\.hal\..+
++.br
++ /halt
++.br
++ /fastboot
++.br
++ /poweroff
++.br
++ /etc/cmtab
++.br
++ /\.autofsck
++.br
++ /forcefsck
++.br
++ /\.suspended
++.br
++ /fsckoptions
++.br
++ /\.autorelabel
++.br
++ /etc/securetty
++.br
++ /etc/killpower
++.br
++ /etc/nohotplug
++.br
++ /etc/ioctl\.save
++.br
++ /etc/fstab\.REVOKE
++.br
++ /etc/network/ifstate
++.br
++ /etc/sysconfig/hwconf
++.br
++ /etc/ptal/ptal-printd-like
++.br
++ /etc/sysconfig/iptables\.save
++.br
++ /etc/xorg\.conf\.d/00-system-setup-keyboard\.conf
++.br
++ /etc/X11/xorg\.conf\.d/00-system-setup-keyboard\.conf
++.br
++
++.br
++.B file_context_t
++
++ /etc/selinux/([^/]*/)?contexts/files(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B games_data_t
++
++ /var/games(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/games(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B gpg_agent_tmp_t
++
++ /home/[^/]*/\.gnupg/log-socket
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.gnupg/log-socket
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.gnupg/log-socket
++.br
++
++.br
++.B mail_spool_t
++
++ /var/mail(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/spool/imap(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/spool/mail(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B mqueue_spool_t
++
++ /var/spool/(client)?mqueue(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/spool/mqueue\.in(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B nfsd_rw_t
++
++
++.br
++.B noxattrfs
++
++ all files on file systems which do not support extended attributes
++.br
++
++.br
++.B screen_home_t
++
++ /root/\.screen(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.screen(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.screenrc
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.screen(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.screenrc
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.screen(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.screenrc
++.br
++
++.br
++.B selinux_config_t
++
++ /etc/selinux(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/selinux/([^/]*/)?seusers
++.br
++ /etc/selinux/([^/]*/)?users(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/selinux/([^/]*/)?setrans\.conf
++.br
++
++.br
++.B selinux_login_config_t
++
++ /etc/selinux/([^/]*/)?logins(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B semanage_store_t
++
++ /etc/selinux/([^/]*/)?policy(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/selinux/([^/]*/)?modules/(active|tmp|previous)(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/share/selinux/mls(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/share/selinux/targeted(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B systemd_passwd_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/systemd/ask-password(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/systemd/ask-password-block(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B usbfs_t
++
++
++.br
++.B user_fonts_cache_t
++
++ /root/\.fontconfig(/.*)?
++.br
++ /root/\.fonts/auto(/.*)?
++.br
++ /root/\.fonts\.cache-.*
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.fontconfig(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.fonts/auto(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.fonts\.cache-.*
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.fontconfig(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.fonts/auto(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.fonts\.cache-.*
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.fontconfig(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.fonts/auto(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.fonts\.cache-.*
++.br
++
++.br
++.B user_home_type
++
++ all user home files
++.br
++
++.br
++.B user_tmp_type
++
++ all user tmp files
++.br
++
++.br
++.B user_tmpfs_type
++
++ all user content in tmpfs file systems
++.br
++
++.br
++.B xdm_tmp_t
++
++ /tmp/\.X11-unix(/.*)?
++.br
++ /tmp/\.ICE-unix(/.*)?
++.br
++ /tmp/\.X0-lock
++.br
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), secadm(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/sectoolm_selinux.8 b/man/man8/sectoolm_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..145e360
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/sectoolm_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,126 @@
++.TH "sectoolm_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "sectoolm" "SELinux Policy documentation for sectoolm"
++.SH "NAME"
++sectoolm_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the sectoolm processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the sectoolm processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The sectoolm processes execute with the sectoolm_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep sectoolm_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The sectoolm_t SELinux type can be entered via the "sectoolm_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the sectoolm_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/libexec/sectool-mechanism\.py
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux sectoolm policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their sectoolm processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for sectoolm:
++
++.EX
++.B sectoolm_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux sectoolm policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their sectoolm processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for sectoolm:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B sectoolm_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the sectoolm_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the sectoolm_t domain.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type sectoolm_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B sectool_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B sectool_var_lib_t
++
++ /var/lib/sectool(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B sectool_var_log_t
++
++ /var/log/sectool\.log.*
++.br
++
++.br
++.B security_t
++
++ /selinux
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the sectoolm_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the sectoolm_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), sectoolm(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/selinux_munin_plugin_selinux.8 b/man/man8/selinux_munin_plugin_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..d4bbce9
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/selinux_munin_plugin_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
++.TH "selinux_munin_plugin_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "selinux_munin_plugin" "SELinux Policy documentation for selinux_munin_plugin"
++.SH "NAME"
++selinux_munin_plugin_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the selinux_munin_plugin processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the selinux_munin_plugin processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The selinux_munin_plugin processes execute with the selinux_munin_plugin_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep selinux_munin_plugin_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The selinux_munin_plugin_t SELinux type can be entered via the "selinux_munin_plugin_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the selinux_munin_plugin_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/share/munin/plugins/selinux_avcstat
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux selinux_munin_plugin policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their selinux_munin_plugin processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for selinux_munin_plugin:
++
++.EX
++.B selinux_munin_plugin_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux selinux_munin_plugin policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their selinux_munin_plugin processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for selinux_munin_plugin:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B selinux_munin_plugin_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the selinux_munin_plugin_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the selinux_munin_plugin_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B selinux_munin_plugin_tmp_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the selinux_munin_plugin_tmp_t type, if you want to store selinux munin plugin temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type selinux_munin_plugin_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B munin_plugin_state_t
++
++ /var/lib/munin/plugin-state(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B selinux_munin_plugin_tmp_t
++
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), selinux_munin_plugin(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/semanage_selinux.8 b/man/man8/semanage_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..d6f6031
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/semanage_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,214 @@
++.TH "semanage_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "semanage" "SELinux Policy documentation for semanage"
++.SH "NAME"
++semanage_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the semanage processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the semanage processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The semanage processes execute with the semanage_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep semanage_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The semanage_t SELinux type can be entered via the "semanage_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the semanage_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/sbin/semanage, /usr/sbin/semodule, /usr/share/system-config-selinux/system-config-selinux-dbus\.py
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux semanage policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their semanage processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for semanage:
++
++.EX
++.B semanage_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux semanage policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their semanage processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for semanage:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B semanage_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the semanage_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the semanage_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B semanage_read_lock_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the semanage_read_lock_t type, if you want to treat the files as semanage read lock data, stored under the /var/lock directory
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B semanage_store_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the semanage_store_t type, if you want to treat the files as semanage store data.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B semanage_tmp_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the semanage_tmp_t type, if you want to store semanage temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B semanage_trans_lock_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the semanage_trans_lock_t type, if you want to treat the files as semanage trans lock data, stored under the /var/lock directory
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B semanage_var_lib_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the semanage_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the semanage files under the /var/lib directory.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type semanage_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B boolean_type
++
++
++.br
++.B default_context_t
++
++ /etc/selinux/([^/]*/)?contexts(/.*)?
++.br
++ /root/\.default_contexts
++.br
++
++.br
++.B file_context_t
++
++ /etc/selinux/([^/]*/)?contexts/files(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B mock_var_lib_t
++
++ /var/lib/mock(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B selinux_config_t
++
++ /etc/selinux(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/selinux/([^/]*/)?seusers
++.br
++ /etc/selinux/([^/]*/)?users(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/selinux/([^/]*/)?setrans\.conf
++.br
++
++.br
++.B semanage_read_lock_t
++
++ /etc/selinux/([^/]*/)?modules/semanage\.read\.LOCK
++.br
++
++.br
++.B semanage_store_t
++
++ /etc/selinux/([^/]*/)?policy(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/selinux/([^/]*/)?modules/(active|tmp|previous)(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/share/selinux/mls(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/share/selinux/targeted(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B semanage_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B semanage_trans_lock_t
++
++ /etc/selinux/([^/]*/)?modules/semanage\.trans\.LOCK
++.br
++
++.br
++.B semanage_var_lib_t
++
++ /var/lib/selinux(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the semanage_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the semanage_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), semanage(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/sendmail_selinux.8 b/man/man8/sendmail_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..b44a2e8
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/sendmail_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,290 @@
++.TH "sendmail_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "sendmail" "SELinux Policy documentation for sendmail"
++.SH "NAME"
++sendmail_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the sendmail processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the sendmail processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The sendmail processes execute with the sendmail_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep sendmail_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The sendmail_t SELinux type can be entered via the "mta_exec_type,sendmail_exec_t" file types. The default entrypoint paths for the sendmail_t domain are the following:"
++
++/bin/mail(x)?, /usr/bin/mail(x)?, /usr/sbin/sendmail(\.sendmail)?, /usr/bin/esmtp, /usr/sbin/rmail, /usr/sbin/ssmtp, /usr/lib/sendmail, /var/qmail/bin/sendmail, /usr/sbin/sendmail\.postfix, /usr/lib/courier/bin/sendmail
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux sendmail policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their sendmail processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for sendmail:
++
++.EX
++.B sendmail_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH BOOLEANS
++SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. sendmail policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run sendmail with the tightest access possible.
++
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow http daemon to send mail, you must turn on the httpd_can_sendmail boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P httpd_can_sendmail 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow gitisis daemon to send mail, you must turn on the gitosis_can_sendmail boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P gitosis_can_sendmail 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow syslogd daemon to send mail, you must turn on the logging_syslogd_can_sendmail boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P logging_syslogd_can_sendmail 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow http daemon to send mail, you must turn on the httpd_can_sendmail boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P httpd_can_sendmail 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow gitisis daemon to send mail, you must turn on the gitosis_can_sendmail boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P gitosis_can_sendmail 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow syslogd daemon to send mail, you must turn on the logging_syslogd_can_sendmail boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P logging_syslogd_can_sendmail 1
++.EE
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux sendmail policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their sendmail processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for sendmail:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B sendmail_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the sendmail_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the sendmail_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B sendmail_initrc_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the sendmail_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the sendmail_initrc_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B sendmail_keytab_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the sendmail_keytab_t type, if you want to treat the files as kerberos keytab files.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B sendmail_log_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the sendmail_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as sendmail log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B sendmail_tmp_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the sendmail_tmp_t type, if you want to store sendmail temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B sendmail_var_run_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the sendmail_var_run_t type, if you want to store the sendmail files under the /run directory.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type sendmail_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B anon_inodefs_t
++
++
++.br
++.B dovecot_spool_t
++
++ /var/spool/dovecot(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B etc_aliases_t
++
++ /etc/mail/aliases.*
++.br
++ /etc/postfix/aliases.*
++.br
++ /etc/aliases
++.br
++ /etc/aliases\.db
++.br
++
++.br
++.B exim_spool_t
++
++ /var/spool/exim[0-9]?(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B initrc_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B mail_home_rw_t
++
++ /root/Maildir(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/Maildir(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/Maildir(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/Maildir(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B mail_spool_t
++
++ /var/mail(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/spool/imap(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/spool/mail(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B mqueue_spool_t
++
++ /var/spool/(client)?mqueue(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/spool/mqueue\.in(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B procmail_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B sendmail_log_t
++
++ /var/log/mail(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/log/sendmail\.st
++.br
++
++.br
++.B sendmail_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B sendmail_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/sendmail\.pid
++.br
++ /var/run/sm-client\.pid
++.br
++
++.br
++.B user_home_t
++
++ /home/[^/]*/.+
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/.+
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/.+
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the sendmail_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the sendmail_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.B semanage boolean
++can also be used to manipulate the booleans
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), sendmail(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, setsebool(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/sensord_selinux.8 b/man/man8/sensord_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..8969289
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/sensord_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,112 @@
++.TH "sensord_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "sensord" "SELinux Policy documentation for sensord"
++.SH "NAME"
++sensord_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the sensord processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the sensord processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The sensord processes execute with the sensord_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep sensord_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The sensord_t SELinux type can be entered via the "sensord_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the sensord_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/sbin/sensord
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux sensord policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their sensord processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for sensord:
++
++.EX
++.B sensord_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux sensord policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their sensord processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for sensord:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B sensord_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the sensord_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the sensord_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B sensord_unit_file_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the sensord_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as sensord unit content.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B sensord_var_run_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the sensord_var_run_t type, if you want to store the sensord files under the /run directory.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type sensord_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B sensord_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/sensord\.pid
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), sensord(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/services_munin_plugin_selinux.8 b/man/man8/services_munin_plugin_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..6e5c075
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/services_munin_plugin_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
++.TH "services_munin_plugin_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "services_munin_plugin" "SELinux Policy documentation for services_munin_plugin"
++.SH "NAME"
++services_munin_plugin_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the services_munin_plugin processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the services_munin_plugin processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The services_munin_plugin processes execute with the services_munin_plugin_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep services_munin_plugin_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The services_munin_plugin_t SELinux type can be entered via the "services_munin_plugin_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the services_munin_plugin_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/share/munin/plugins/nut.*, /usr/share/munin/plugins/ntp_.*, /usr/share/munin/plugins/snmp_.*, /usr/share/munin/plugins/mysql_.*, /usr/share/munin/plugins/slapd_.*, /usr/share/munin/plugins/squid_.*, /usr/share/munin/plugins/apache_.*, /usr/share/munin/plugins/tomcat_.*, /usr/share/munin/plugins/varnish_.*, /usr/share/munin/plugins/asterisk_.*, /usr/share/munin/plugins/postgres_.*, /usr/share/munin/plugins/named, /usr/share/munin/plugins/ping_, /usr/share/munin/plugins/samba, /usr/share/munin/plugins/lpstat, /usr/share/munin/plugins/openvpn, /usr/share/munin/plugins/fail2ban, /usr/share/munin/plugins/http_loadtime
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux services_munin_plugin policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their services_munin_plugin processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for services_munin_plugin:
++
++.EX
++.B services_munin_plugin_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux services_munin_plugin policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their services_munin_plugin processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for services_munin_plugin:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B services_munin_plugin_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the services_munin_plugin_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the services_munin_plugin_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B services_munin_plugin_tmp_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the services_munin_plugin_tmp_t type, if you want to store services munin plugin temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type services_munin_plugin_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B munin_plugin_state_t
++
++ /var/lib/munin/plugin-state(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B services_munin_plugin_tmp_t
++
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), services_munin_plugin(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/setfiles_selinux.8 b/man/man8/setfiles_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..19b8e3f
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/setfiles_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,102 @@
++.TH "setfiles_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "setfiles" "SELinux Policy documentation for setfiles"
++.SH "NAME"
++setfiles_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the setfiles processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the setfiles processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The setfiles processes execute with the setfiles_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep setfiles_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The setfiles_t SELinux type can be entered via the "setfiles_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the setfiles_t domain are the following:"
++
++/sbin/setfiles.*, /usr/sbin/setfiles.*, /sbin/restorecon, /usr/sbin/restorecon
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux setfiles policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their setfiles processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for setfiles:
++
++.EX
++.B setfiles_mac_t, setfiles_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux setfiles policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their setfiles processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for setfiles:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B setfiles_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the setfiles_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the setfiles_t domain.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type setfiles_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B security_t
++
++ /selinux
++.br
++
++.br
++.B user_home_type
++
++ all user home files
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), setfiles(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/setkey_selinux.8 b/man/man8/setkey_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..d2623ac
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/setkey_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
++.TH "setkey_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "setkey" "SELinux Policy documentation for setkey"
++.SH "NAME"
++setkey_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the setkey processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the setkey processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The setkey processes execute with the setkey_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep setkey_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The setkey_t SELinux type can be entered via the "setkey_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the setkey_t domain are the following:"
++
++/sbin/setkey, /usr/sbin/setkey
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux setkey policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their setkey processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for setkey:
++
++.EX
++.B setkey_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux setkey policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their setkey processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for setkey:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B setkey_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the setkey_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the setkey_t domain.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), setkey(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/setrans_selinux.8 b/man/man8/setrans_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..e0a6cbb
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/setrans_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,120 @@
++.TH "setrans_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "setrans" "SELinux Policy documentation for setrans"
++.SH "NAME"
++setrans_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the setrans processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the setrans processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The setrans processes execute with the setrans_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep setrans_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The setrans_t SELinux type can be entered via the "setrans_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the setrans_t domain are the following:"
++
++/sbin/mcstransd, /usr/sbin/mcstransd
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux setrans policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their setrans processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for setrans:
++
++.EX
++.B setrans_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux setrans policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their setrans processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for setrans:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B setrans_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the setrans_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the setrans_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B setrans_initrc_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the setrans_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the setrans_initrc_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B setrans_var_run_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the setrans_var_run_t type, if you want to store the setrans files under the /run directory.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type setrans_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B security_t
++
++ /selinux
++.br
++
++.br
++.B setrans_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/setrans(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/mcstransd\.pid
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), setrans(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/setroubleshoot_fixit_selinux.8 b/man/man8/setroubleshoot_fixit_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..a0089bb
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/setroubleshoot_fixit_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
++.TH "setroubleshoot_fixit_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "setroubleshoot_fixit" "SELinux Policy documentation for setroubleshoot_fixit"
++.SH "NAME"
++setroubleshoot_fixit_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the setroubleshoot_fixit processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the setroubleshoot_fixit processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The setroubleshoot_fixit processes execute with the setroubleshoot_fixit_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep setroubleshoot_fixit_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The setroubleshoot_fixit_t SELinux type can be entered via the "setroubleshoot_fixit_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the setroubleshoot_fixit_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/share/setroubleshoot/SetroubleshootFixit\.py*
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux setroubleshoot_fixit policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their setroubleshoot_fixit processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for setroubleshoot_fixit:
++
++.EX
++.B setroubleshoot_fixit_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux setroubleshoot_fixit policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their setroubleshoot_fixit processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for setroubleshoot_fixit:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B setroubleshoot_fixit_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the setroubleshoot_fixit_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the setroubleshoot_fixit_t domain.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the setroubleshoot_fixit_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the setroubleshoot_fixit_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), setroubleshoot_fixit(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, setroubleshootd_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/setroubleshootd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/setroubleshootd_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..66279d7
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/setroubleshootd_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,129 @@
++.TH "setroubleshootd_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "setroubleshootd" "SELinux Policy documentation for setroubleshootd"
++.SH "NAME"
++setroubleshootd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the setroubleshootd processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the setroubleshootd processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The setroubleshootd processes execute with the setroubleshootd_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep setroubleshootd_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The setroubleshootd_t SELinux type can be entered via the "setroubleshootd_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the setroubleshootd_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/sbin/setroubleshootd
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux setroubleshootd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their setroubleshootd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for setroubleshootd:
++
++.EX
++.B setroubleshoot_fixit_t, setroubleshootd_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux setroubleshootd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their setroubleshootd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for setroubleshootd:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B setroubleshootd_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the setroubleshootd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the setroubleshootd_t domain.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type setroubleshootd_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B security_t
++
++ /selinux
++.br
++
++.br
++.B setroubleshoot_var_lib_t
++
++ /var/lib/setroubleshoot(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B setroubleshoot_var_log_t
++
++ /var/log/setroubleshoot(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B setroubleshoot_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/setroubleshoot(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the setroubleshootd_t, setroubleshoot_fixit_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the setroubleshootd_t, setroubleshoot_fixit_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), setroubleshootd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, setroubleshoot_fixit_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/setsebool_selinux.8 b/man/man8/setsebool_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..f7ac281
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/setsebool_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,162 @@
++.TH "setsebool_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "setsebool" "SELinux Policy documentation for setsebool"
++.SH "NAME"
++setsebool_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the setsebool processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the setsebool processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The setsebool processes execute with the setsebool_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep setsebool_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The setsebool_t SELinux type can be entered via the "setsebool_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the setsebool_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/sbin/setsebool
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux setsebool policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their setsebool processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for setsebool:
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux setsebool policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their setsebool processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for setsebool:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B setsebool_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the setsebool_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the setsebool_t domain.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type setsebool_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B boolean_type
++
++
++.br
++.B default_context_t
++
++ /etc/selinux/([^/]*/)?contexts(/.*)?
++.br
++ /root/\.default_contexts
++.br
++
++.br
++.B file_context_t
++
++ /etc/selinux/([^/]*/)?contexts/files(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B selinux_config_t
++
++ /etc/selinux(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/selinux/([^/]*/)?seusers
++.br
++ /etc/selinux/([^/]*/)?users(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/selinux/([^/]*/)?setrans\.conf
++.br
++
++.br
++.B semanage_read_lock_t
++
++ /etc/selinux/([^/]*/)?modules/semanage\.read\.LOCK
++.br
++
++.br
++.B semanage_store_t
++
++ /etc/selinux/([^/]*/)?policy(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/selinux/([^/]*/)?modules/(active|tmp|previous)(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/share/selinux/mls(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/share/selinux/targeted(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B semanage_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B semanage_trans_lock_t
++
++ /etc/selinux/([^/]*/)?modules/semanage\.trans\.LOCK
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the setsebool_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the setsebool_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), setsebool(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/sge_execd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/sge_execd_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..169d466
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/sge_execd_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,115 @@
++.TH "sge_execd_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "sge_execd" "SELinux Policy documentation for sge_execd"
++.SH "NAME"
++sge_execd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the sge_execd processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the sge_execd processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The sge_execd processes execute with the sge_execd_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep sge_execd_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The sge_execd_t SELinux type can be entered via the "sge_execd_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the sge_execd_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/bin/sge_execd
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux sge_execd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their sge_execd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for sge_execd:
++
++.EX
++.B sge_execd_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux sge_execd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their sge_execd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for sge_execd:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B sge_execd_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the sge_execd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the sge_execd_t domain.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type sge_execd_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B sge_spool_t
++
++ /var/spool/gridengine(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B sge_tmp_t
++
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the sge_execd_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the sge_execd_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), sge_execd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, sge_job_selinux(8), sge_shepherd_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/sge_job_selinux.8 b/man/man8/sge_job_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..e017c54
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/sge_job_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,147 @@
++.TH "sge_job_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "sge_job" "SELinux Policy documentation for sge_job"
++.SH "NAME"
++sge_job_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the sge_job processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the sge_job processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The sge_job processes execute with the sge_job_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep sge_job_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The sge_job_t SELinux type can be entered via the "shell_exec_t,sge_job_exec_t" file types. The default entrypoint paths for the sge_job_t domain are the following:"
++
++/bin/d?ash, /bin/zsh.*, /bin/ksh.*, /usr/bin/d?ash, /usr/bin/ksh.*, /usr/bin/zsh.*, /bin/esh, /bin/mksh, /bin/sash, /bin/tcsh, /bin/yash, /bin/bash, /bin/fish, /bin/bash2, /usr/bin/esh, /usr/bin/mksh, /usr/bin/sash, /usr/bin/bash, /usr/bin/fish, /usr/bin/tcsh, /usr/bin/yash, /sbin/nologin, /usr/sbin/sesh, /usr/bin/bash2, /usr/sbin/smrsh, /usr/bin/scponly, /usr/sbin/nologin, /usr/libexec/sesh, /usr/sbin/scponlyc, /usr/bin/git-shell, /usr/libexec/git-core/git-shell
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux sge_job policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their sge_job processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for sge_job:
++
++.EX
++.B sge_job_ssh_t, sge_job_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux sge_job policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their sge_job processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for sge_job:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B sge_job_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the sge_job_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the sge_job_t domain.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type sge_job_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B sge_spool_t
++
++ /var/spool/gridengine(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B sge_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B ssh_home_t
++
++ /root/\.ssh(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/openshift/[^/]+/\.ssh(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/amanda/\.ssh(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/stickshift/[^/]+/\.ssh(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/gitolite/\.ssh(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/nocpulse/\.ssh(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/gitolite3/\.ssh(/.*)?
++.br
++ /root/\.shosts
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.ssh(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.shosts
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.ssh(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.shosts
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.ssh(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.shosts
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the sge_job_ssh_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the sge_job_ssh_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), sge_job(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, sge_execd_selinux(8), sge_shepherd_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/sge_shepherd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/sge_shepherd_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..9a14e7d
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/sge_shepherd_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
++.TH "sge_shepherd_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "sge_shepherd" "SELinux Policy documentation for sge_shepherd"
++.SH "NAME"
++sge_shepherd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the sge_shepherd processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the sge_shepherd processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The sge_shepherd processes execute with the sge_shepherd_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep sge_shepherd_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The sge_shepherd_t SELinux type can be entered via the "sge_shepherd_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the sge_shepherd_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/bin/sge_shepherd
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux sge_shepherd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their sge_shepherd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for sge_shepherd:
++
++.EX
++.B sge_shepherd_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux sge_shepherd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their sge_shepherd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for sge_shepherd:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B sge_shepherd_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the sge_shepherd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the sge_shepherd_t domain.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type sge_shepherd_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B sge_spool_t
++
++ /var/spool/gridengine(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B sge_tmp_t
++
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), sge_shepherd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, sge_execd_selinux(8), sge_job_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/shorewall_selinux.8 b/man/man8/shorewall_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..ef276fc
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/shorewall_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,190 @@
++.TH "shorewall_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "shorewall" "SELinux Policy documentation for shorewall"
++.SH "NAME"
++shorewall_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the shorewall processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the shorewall processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The shorewall processes execute with the shorewall_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep shorewall_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The shorewall_t SELinux type can be entered via the "shorewall_var_lib_t,shorewall_exec_t" file types. The default entrypoint paths for the shorewall_t domain are the following:"
++
++/var/lib/shorewall(/.*)?, /var/lib/shorewall6(/.*)?, /var/lib/shorewall-lite(/.*)?, /sbin/shorewall6?, /usr/sbin/shorewall6?, /sbin/shorewall-lite, /usr/sbin/shorewall-lite
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux shorewall policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their shorewall processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for shorewall:
++
++.EX
++.B shorewall_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux shorewall policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their shorewall processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for shorewall:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B shorewall_etc_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the shorewall_etc_t type, if you want to store shorewall files in the /etc directories.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B shorewall_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the shorewall_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the shorewall_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B shorewall_initrc_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the shorewall_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the shorewall_initrc_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B shorewall_lock_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the shorewall_lock_t type, if you want to treat the files as shorewall lock data, stored under the /var/lock directory
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B shorewall_log_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the shorewall_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as shorewall log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B shorewall_tmp_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the shorewall_tmp_t type, if you want to store shorewall temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B shorewall_var_lib_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the shorewall_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the shorewall files under the /var/lib directory.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type shorewall_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B initrc_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/utmp
++.br
++ /var/run/random-seed
++.br
++ /var/run/runlevel\.dir
++.br
++ /var/run/setmixer_flag
++.br
++
++.br
++.B shorewall_lock_t
++
++ /var/lock/subsys/shorewall
++.br
++
++.br
++.B shorewall_log_t
++
++ /var/log/shorewall.*
++.br
++
++.br
++.B shorewall_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B shorewall_var_lib_t
++
++ /var/lib/shorewall(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/shorewall6(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/shorewall-lite(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the shorewall_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the shorewall_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), shorewall(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/showmount_selinux.8 b/man/man8/showmount_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..906e450
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/showmount_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
++.TH "showmount_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "showmount" "SELinux Policy documentation for showmount"
++.SH "NAME"
++showmount_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the showmount processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the showmount processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The showmount processes execute with the showmount_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep showmount_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The showmount_t SELinux type can be entered via the "showmount_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the showmount_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/sbin/showmount
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux showmount policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their showmount processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for showmount:
++
++.EX
++.B showmount_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux showmount policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their showmount processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for showmount:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B showmount_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the showmount_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the showmount_t domain.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), showmount(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/shutdown_selinux.8 b/man/man8/shutdown_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..f54ff0c
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/shutdown_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,180 @@
++.TH "shutdown_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "shutdown" "SELinux Policy documentation for shutdown"
++.SH "NAME"
++shutdown_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the shutdown processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the shutdown processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The shutdown processes execute with the shutdown_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep shutdown_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The shutdown_t SELinux type can be entered via the "shutdown_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the shutdown_t domain are the following:"
++
++/sbin/shutdown, /usr/sbin/shutdown, /lib/upstart/shutdown, /usr/lib/upstart/shutdown
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux shutdown policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their shutdown processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for shutdown:
++
++.EX
++.B shutdown_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH BOOLEANS
++SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. shutdown policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run shutdown with the tightest access possible.
++
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow HTTPD to connect to port 80 for graceful shutdown, you must turn on the httpd_graceful_shutdown boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P httpd_graceful_shutdown 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow HTTPD to connect to port 80 for graceful shutdown, you must turn on the httpd_graceful_shutdown boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P httpd_graceful_shutdown 1
++.EE
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux shutdown policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their shutdown processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for shutdown:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B shutdown_etc_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the shutdown_etc_t type, if you want to store shutdown files in the /etc directories.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B shutdown_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the shutdown_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the shutdown_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B shutdown_var_run_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the shutdown_var_run_t type, if you want to store the shutdown files under the /run directory.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type shutdown_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B initrc_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/utmp
++.br
++ /var/run/random-seed
++.br
++ /var/run/runlevel\.dir
++.br
++ /var/run/setmixer_flag
++.br
++
++.br
++.B shutdown_etc_t
++
++ /etc/nologin
++.br
++
++.br
++.B shutdown_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/shutdown\.pid
++.br
++
++.br
++.B systemd_passwd_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/systemd/ask-password(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/systemd/ask-password-block(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B wtmp_t
++
++ /var/log/wtmp.*
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the shutdown_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the shutdown_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.B semanage boolean
++can also be used to manipulate the booleans
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), shutdown(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, setsebool(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/slapd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/slapd_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..b4a9ee2
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/slapd_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,274 @@
++.TH "slapd_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "slapd" "SELinux Policy documentation for slapd"
++.SH "NAME"
++slapd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the slapd processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the slapd processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The slapd processes execute with the slapd_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep slapd_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The slapd_t SELinux type can be entered via the "slapd_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the slapd_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/sbin/slapd
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux slapd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their slapd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for slapd:
++
++.EX
++.B slapd_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux slapd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their slapd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for slapd:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B slapd_cert_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the slapd_cert_t type, if you want to treat the files as slapd certificate data.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B slapd_db_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the slapd_db_t type, if you want to treat the files as slapd database content.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B slapd_etc_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the slapd_etc_t type, if you want to store slapd files in the /etc directories.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B slapd_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the slapd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the slapd_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B slapd_initrc_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the slapd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the slapd_initrc_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B slapd_keytab_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the slapd_keytab_t type, if you want to treat the files as kerberos keytab files.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B slapd_lock_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the slapd_lock_t type, if you want to treat the files as slapd lock data, stored under the /var/lock directory
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B slapd_log_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the slapd_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as slapd log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B slapd_replog_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the slapd_replog_t type, if you want to treat the files as slapd replog data.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B slapd_tmp_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the slapd_tmp_t type, if you want to store slapd temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B slapd_tmpfs_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the slapd_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store slapd files on a tmpfs file system.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B slapd_unit_file_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the slapd_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as slapd unit content.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B slapd_var_run_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the slapd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the slapd files under the /run directory.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type slapd_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B auth_cache_t
++
++ /var/cache/coolkey(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B krb5_host_rcache_t
++
++ /var/cache/krb5rcache(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/tmp/nfs_0
++.br
++ /var/tmp/DNS_25
++.br
++ /var/tmp/host_0
++.br
++ /var/tmp/imap_0
++.br
++ /var/tmp/HTTP_23
++.br
++ /var/tmp/HTTP_48
++.br
++ /var/tmp/ldap_55
++.br
++ /var/tmp/ldap_487
++.br
++ /var/tmp/ldapmap1_0
++.br
++
++.br
++.B slapd_db_t
++
++ /var/lib/ldap(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/openldap/slapd\.d(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B slapd_lock_t
++
++
++.br
++.B slapd_log_t
++
++
++.br
++.B slapd_replog_t
++
++ /var/lib/ldap/replog(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B slapd_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B slapd_tmpfs_t
++
++
++.br
++.B slapd_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/slapd.*
++.br
++ /var/run/openldap(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/ldapi
++.br
++ /var/run/slapd\.pid
++.br
++ /var/run/slapd\.args
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the slapd_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the slapd_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), slapd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/slpd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/slpd_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..0387935
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/slpd_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,140 @@
++.TH "slpd_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "slpd" "SELinux Policy documentation for slpd"
++.SH "NAME"
++slpd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the slpd processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the slpd processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The slpd processes execute with the slpd_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep slpd_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The slpd_t SELinux type can be entered via the "slpd_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the slpd_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/sbin/slpd
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux slpd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their slpd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for slpd:
++
++.EX
++.B slpd_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux slpd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their slpd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for slpd:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B slpd_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the slpd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the slpd_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B slpd_initrc_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the slpd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the slpd_initrc_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B slpd_var_log_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the slpd_var_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as slpd var log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B slpd_var_run_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the slpd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the slpd files under the /run directory.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type slpd_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B slpd_var_log_t
++
++ /var/log/slpd\.log
++.br
++
++.br
++.B slpd_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/slpd\.pid
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the slpd_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the slpd_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), slpd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/smbcontrol_selinux.8 b/man/man8/smbcontrol_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..1b75541
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/smbcontrol_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
++.TH "smbcontrol_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "smbcontrol" "SELinux Policy documentation for smbcontrol"
++.SH "NAME"
++smbcontrol_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the smbcontrol processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the smbcontrol processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The smbcontrol processes execute with the smbcontrol_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep smbcontrol_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The smbcontrol_t SELinux type can be entered via the "smbcontrol_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the smbcontrol_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/bin/smbcontrol
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux smbcontrol policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their smbcontrol processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for smbcontrol:
++
++.EX
++.B smbcontrol_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux smbcontrol policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their smbcontrol processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for smbcontrol:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B smbcontrol_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the smbcontrol_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the smbcontrol_t domain.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type smbcontrol_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B samba_var_t
++
++ /var/lib/samba(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/cache/samba(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/spool/samba(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), smbcontrol(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/smbd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/smbd_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..9794fdc
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/smbd_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,421 @@
++.TH "smbd_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "smbd" "SELinux Policy documentation for smbd"
++.SH "NAME"
++smbd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the smbd processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the smbd processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The smbd processes execute with the smbd_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep smbd_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The smbd_t SELinux type can be entered via the "smbd_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the smbd_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/sbin/smbd
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux smbd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their smbd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for smbd:
++
++.EX
++.B smbcontrol_t, smbmount_t, smbd_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH BOOLEANS
++SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. smbd policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run smbd with the tightest access possible.
++
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow samba to export ntfs/fusefs volumes, you must turn on the samba_share_fusefs boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P samba_share_fusefs 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow samba to share any file/directory read only, you must turn on the samba_export_all_ro boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P samba_export_all_ro 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined virtual guests to manage cifs files, you must turn on the virt_use_samba boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P virt_use_samba 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow samba to create new home directories (e.g. via PAM), you must turn on the samba_create_home_dirs boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P samba_create_home_dirs 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow samba to share users home directories, you must turn on the samba_enable_home_dirs boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P samba_enable_home_dirs 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow samba to export NFS volumes, you must turn on the samba_share_nfs boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P samba_share_nfs 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow sanlock to manage cifs files, you must turn on the sanlock_use_samba boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P sanlock_use_samba 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow samba to run unconfined scripts, you must turn on the samba_run_unconfined boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P samba_run_unconfined 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow samba to act as the domain controller, add users, groups and change passwords, you must turn on the samba_domain_controller boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P samba_domain_controller 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow samba to share any file/directory read/write, you must turn on the samba_export_all_rw boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P samba_export_all_rw 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow samba to act as a portmapper, you must turn on the samba_portmapper boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P samba_portmapper 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to support SAMBA home directories, you must turn on the use_samba_home_dirs boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P use_samba_home_dirs 1
++.EE
++
++.SH SHARING FILES
++If you want to share files with multiple domains (Apache, FTP, rsync, Samba), you can set a file context of public_content_t and public_content_rw_t. These context allow any of the above domains to read the content. If you want a particular domain to write to the public_content_rw_t domain, you must set the appropriate boolean.
++.TP
++Allow smbd servers to read the /var/smbd directory by adding the public_content_t file type to the directory and by restoring the file type.
++.PP
++.B
++semanage fcontext -a -t public_content_t "/var/smbd(/.*)?"
++.br
++.B restorecon -F -R -v /var/smbd
++.pp
++.TP
++Allow smbd servers to read and write /var/tmp/incoming by adding the public_content_rw_t type to the directory and by restoring the file type. This also requires the allow_smbdd_anon_write boolean to be set.
++.PP
++.B
++semanage fcontext -a -t public_content_rw_t "/var/smbd/incoming(/.*)?"
++.br
++.B restorecon -F -R -v /var/smbd/incoming
++
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow samba to modify public files used for public file transfer services. Files/Directories must be labeled public_content_rw_t., you must turn on the smbd_anon_write boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P smbd_anon_write 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow samba to modify public files used for public file transfer services. Files/Directories must be labeled public_content_rw_t., you must turn on the smbd_anon_write boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P smbd_anon_write 1
++.EE
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux smbd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their smbd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for smbd:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B smbd_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the smbd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the smbd_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B smbd_keytab_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the smbd_keytab_t type, if you want to treat the files as kerberos keytab files.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B smbd_tmp_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the smbd_tmp_t type, if you want to store smbd temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B smbd_var_run_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the smbd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the smbd files under the /run directory.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH PORT TYPES
++SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
++.PP
++You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
++
++.B semanage port -l
++
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
++SELinux smbd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their smbd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following port types are defined for smbd:
++
++.EX
++.TP 5
++.B smbd_port_t
++.TP 10
++.EE
++
++
++Default Defined Ports:
++tcp 137-139,445
++.EE
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type smbd_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B auth_cache_t
++
++ /var/cache/coolkey(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B ctdbd_var_lib_t
++
++ /etc/ctdb(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/ctdb(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/ctdbd(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/ctdbd(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B faillog_t
++
++ /var/log/btmp.*
++.br
++ /var/run/faillock(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/log/faillog
++.br
++ /var/log/tallylog
++.br
++
++.br
++.B initrc_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/utmp
++.br
++ /var/run/random-seed
++.br
++ /var/run/runlevel\.dir
++.br
++ /var/run/setmixer_flag
++.br
++
++.br
++.B nmbd_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/nmbd(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/samba/nmbd(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/samba/nmbd\.pid
++.br
++ /var/run/samba/messages\.tdb
++.br
++ /var/run/samba/namelist\.debug
++.br
++ /var/run/samba/unexpected\.tdb
++.br
++
++.br
++.B pcscd_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/pcscd(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/pcscd\.events(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/pcscd\.pid
++.br
++ /var/run/pcscd\.pub
++.br
++ /var/run/pcscd\.comm
++.br
++
++.br
++.B samba_etc_t
++
++ /etc/samba(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B samba_log_t
++
++ /var/log/samba(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B samba_secrets_t
++
++ /etc/samba/smbpasswd
++.br
++ /etc/samba/passdb\.tdb
++.br
++ /etc/samba/MACHINE\.SID
++.br
++ /etc/samba/secrets\.tdb
++.br
++
++.br
++.B samba_share_t
++
++ use this label for random content that will be shared using samba
++.br
++
++.br
++.B samba_var_t
++
++ /var/lib/samba(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/cache/samba(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/spool/samba(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B smbd_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B smbd_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/samba(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/samba/smbd\.pid
++.br
++ /var/run/samba/brlock\.tdb
++.br
++ /var/run/samba/locking\.tdb
++.br
++ /var/run/samba/gencache\.tdb
++.br
++ /var/run/samba/sessionid\.tdb
++.br
++ /var/run/samba/share_info\.tdb
++.br
++ /var/run/samba/connections\.tdb
++.br
++
++.br
++.B wtmp_t
++
++ /var/log/wtmp.*
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the smbmount_t, smbd_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the smbmount_t, smbd_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.B semanage port
++can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
++
++.B semanage boolean
++can also be used to manipulate the booleans
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), smbd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, setsebool(8), smbcontrol_selinux(8), smbmount_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/smbmount_selinux.8 b/man/man8/smbmount_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..33aaac3
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/smbmount_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,186 @@
++.TH "smbmount_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "smbmount" "SELinux Policy documentation for smbmount"
++.SH "NAME"
++smbmount_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the smbmount processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the smbmount processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The smbmount processes execute with the smbmount_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep smbmount_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The smbmount_t SELinux type can be entered via the "smbmount_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the smbmount_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/bin/smbmnt, /usr/bin/smbmount
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux smbmount policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their smbmount processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for smbmount:
++
++.EX
++.B smbmount_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux smbmount policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their smbmount processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for smbmount:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B smbmount_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the smbmount_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the smbmount_t domain.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type smbmount_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B etc_runtime_t
++
++ /[^/]+
++.br
++ /etc/mtab.*
++.br
++ /etc/blkid(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/nologin.*
++.br
++ /etc/\.fstab\.hal\..+
++.br
++ /halt
++.br
++ /fastboot
++.br
++ /poweroff
++.br
++ /etc/cmtab
++.br
++ /\.autofsck
++.br
++ /forcefsck
++.br
++ /\.suspended
++.br
++ /fsckoptions
++.br
++ /\.autorelabel
++.br
++ /etc/securetty
++.br
++ /etc/killpower
++.br
++ /etc/nohotplug
++.br
++ /etc/ioctl\.save
++.br
++ /etc/fstab\.REVOKE
++.br
++ /etc/network/ifstate
++.br
++ /etc/sysconfig/hwconf
++.br
++ /etc/ptal/ptal-printd-like
++.br
++ /etc/sysconfig/iptables\.save
++.br
++ /etc/xorg\.conf\.d/00-system-setup-keyboard\.conf
++.br
++ /etc/X11/xorg\.conf\.d/00-system-setup-keyboard\.conf
++.br
++
++.br
++.B samba_log_t
++
++ /var/log/samba(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B samba_secrets_t
++
++ /etc/samba/smbpasswd
++.br
++ /etc/samba/passdb\.tdb
++.br
++ /etc/samba/MACHINE\.SID
++.br
++ /etc/samba/secrets\.tdb
++.br
++
++.br
++.B samba_var_t
++
++ /var/lib/samba(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/cache/samba(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/spool/samba(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the smbmount_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the smbmount_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), smbmount(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/smokeping_selinux.8 b/man/man8/smokeping_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..63d78f7
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/smokeping_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,140 @@
++.TH "smokeping_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "smokeping" "SELinux Policy documentation for smokeping"
++.SH "NAME"
++smokeping_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the smokeping processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the smokeping processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The smokeping processes execute with the smokeping_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep smokeping_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The smokeping_t SELinux type can be entered via the "smokeping_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the smokeping_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/sbin/smokeping
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux smokeping policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their smokeping processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for smokeping:
++
++.EX
++.B smokeping_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux smokeping policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their smokeping processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for smokeping:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B smokeping_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the smokeping_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the smokeping_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B smokeping_initrc_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the smokeping_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the smokeping_initrc_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B smokeping_var_lib_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the smokeping_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the smokeping files under the /var/lib directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B smokeping_var_run_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the smokeping_var_run_t type, if you want to store the smokeping files under the /run directory.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type smokeping_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B smokeping_var_lib_t
++
++ /var/lib/smokeping(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B smokeping_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/smokeping(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the smokeping_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the smokeping_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), smokeping(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/smoltclient_selinux.8 b/man/man8/smoltclient_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..088e814
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/smoltclient_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,116 @@
++.TH "smoltclient_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "smoltclient" "SELinux Policy documentation for smoltclient"
++.SH "NAME"
++smoltclient_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the smoltclient processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the smoltclient processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The smoltclient processes execute with the smoltclient_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep smoltclient_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The smoltclient_t SELinux type can be entered via the "smoltclient_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the smoltclient_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/share/smolt/client/sendProfile.py
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux smoltclient policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their smoltclient processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for smoltclient:
++
++.EX
++.B smoltclient_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux smoltclient policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their smoltclient processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for smoltclient:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B smoltclient_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the smoltclient_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the smoltclient_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B smoltclient_tmp_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the smoltclient_tmp_t type, if you want to store smoltclient temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type smoltclient_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B smoltclient_tmp_t
++
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the smoltclient_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the smoltclient_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), smoltclient(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/snmpd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/snmpd_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..2987987
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/snmpd_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,194 @@
++.TH "snmpd_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "snmpd" "SELinux Policy documentation for snmpd"
++.SH "NAME"
++snmpd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the snmpd processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the snmpd processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The snmpd processes execute with the snmpd_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep snmpd_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The snmpd_t SELinux type can be entered via the "snmpd_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the snmpd_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/sbin/snmp(trap)?d
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux snmpd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their snmpd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for snmpd:
++
++.EX
++.B snmpd_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux snmpd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their snmpd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for snmpd:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B snmpd_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the snmpd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the snmpd_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B snmpd_initrc_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the snmpd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the snmpd_initrc_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B snmpd_log_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the snmpd_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as snmpd log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B snmpd_var_lib_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the snmpd_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the snmpd files under the /var/lib directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B snmpd_var_run_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the snmpd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the snmpd files under the /run directory.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH PORT TYPES
++SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
++.PP
++You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
++
++.B semanage port -l
++
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
++SELinux snmpd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their snmpd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following port types are defined for snmpd:
++
++.EX
++.TP 5
++.B snmp_port_t
++.TP 10
++.EE
++
++
++Default Defined Ports:
++tcp 161-162,199,1161
++.EE
++udp 161-162
++.EE
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type snmpd_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B snmpd_log_t
++
++ /var/log/snmpd\.log.*
++.br
++
++.br
++.B snmpd_var_lib_t
++
++ /var/agentx(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/snmp(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/net-snmp(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/net-snmp(/.*)?
++.br
++ /usr/share/snmp/mibs/\.index
++.br
++
++.br
++.B snmpd_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/snmpd(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/net-snmpd(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/snmpd\.pid
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the snmpd_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the snmpd_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.B semanage port
++can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), snmpd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/snort_selinux.8 b/man/man8/snort_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..6c1bac3
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/snort_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,154 @@
++.TH "snort_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "snort" "SELinux Policy documentation for snort"
++.SH "NAME"
++snort_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the snort processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the snort processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The snort processes execute with the snort_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep snort_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The snort_t SELinux type can be entered via the "snort_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the snort_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/s?bin/snort, /usr/sbin/snort-plain
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux snort policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their snort processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for snort:
++
++.EX
++.B snort_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux snort policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their snort processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for snort:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B snort_etc_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the snort_etc_t type, if you want to store snort files in the /etc directories.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B snort_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the snort_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the snort_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B snort_initrc_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the snort_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the snort_initrc_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B snort_log_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the snort_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as snort log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B snort_tmp_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the snort_tmp_t type, if you want to store snort temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B snort_var_run_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the snort_var_run_t type, if you want to store the snort files under the /run directory.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type snort_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B prelude_spool_t
++
++ /var/spool/prelude(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/spool/prelude-manager(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B snort_log_t
++
++ /var/log/snort(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B snort_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B snort_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/snort.*
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), snort(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/sosreport_selinux.8 b/man/man8/sosreport_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..b4723c2
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/sosreport_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,206 @@
++.TH "sosreport_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "sosreport" "SELinux Policy documentation for sosreport"
++.SH "NAME"
++sosreport_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the sosreport processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the sosreport processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The sosreport processes execute with the sosreport_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep sosreport_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The sosreport_t SELinux type can be entered via the "sosreport_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the sosreport_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/sbin/sosreport
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux sosreport policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their sosreport processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for sosreport:
++
++.EX
++.B sosreport_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux sosreport policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their sosreport processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for sosreport:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B sosreport_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the sosreport_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the sosreport_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B sosreport_tmp_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the sosreport_tmp_t type, if you want to store sosreport temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B sosreport_tmpfs_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the sosreport_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store sosreport files on a tmpfs file system.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type sosreport_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B abrt_var_cache_t
++
++ /var/cache/abrt(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/spool/abrt(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/cache/abrt-di(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B abrt_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/abrt(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/abrtd?\.lock
++.br
++ /var/run/abrtd?\.socket
++.br
++ /var/run/abrt\.pid
++.br
++
++.br
++.B etc_runtime_t
++
++ /[^/]+
++.br
++ /etc/mtab.*
++.br
++ /etc/blkid(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/nologin.*
++.br
++ /etc/\.fstab\.hal\..+
++.br
++ /halt
++.br
++ /fastboot
++.br
++ /poweroff
++.br
++ /etc/cmtab
++.br
++ /\.autofsck
++.br
++ /forcefsck
++.br
++ /\.suspended
++.br
++ /fsckoptions
++.br
++ /\.autorelabel
++.br
++ /etc/securetty
++.br
++ /etc/killpower
++.br
++ /etc/nohotplug
++.br
++ /etc/ioctl\.save
++.br
++ /etc/fstab\.REVOKE
++.br
++ /etc/network/ifstate
++.br
++ /etc/sysconfig/hwconf
++.br
++ /etc/ptal/ptal-printd-like
++.br
++ /etc/sysconfig/iptables\.save
++.br
++ /etc/xorg\.conf\.d/00-system-setup-keyboard\.conf
++.br
++ /etc/X11/xorg\.conf\.d/00-system-setup-keyboard\.conf
++.br
++
++.br
++.B sosreport_tmp_t
++
++ /.ismount-test-file
++.br
++
++.br
++.B sosreport_tmpfs_t
++
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the sosreport_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the sosreport_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), sosreport(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/soundd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/soundd_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..4f05705
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/soundd_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,186 @@
++.TH "soundd_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "soundd" "SELinux Policy documentation for soundd"
++.SH "NAME"
++soundd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the soundd processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the soundd processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The soundd processes execute with the soundd_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep soundd_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The soundd_t SELinux type can be entered via the "soundd_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the soundd_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/bin/nasd, /usr/sbin/yiff, /usr/bin/gpe-soundserver
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux soundd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their soundd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for soundd:
++
++.EX
++.B soundd_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux soundd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their soundd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for soundd:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B soundd_etc_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the soundd_etc_t type, if you want to store soundd files in the /etc directories.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B soundd_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the soundd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the soundd_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B soundd_initrc_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the soundd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the soundd_initrc_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B soundd_state_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the soundd_state_t type, if you want to treat the files as soundd state data.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B soundd_tmp_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the soundd_tmp_t type, if you want to store soundd temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B soundd_tmpfs_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the soundd_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store soundd files on a tmpfs file system.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B soundd_var_run_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the soundd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the soundd files under the /run directory.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH PORT TYPES
++SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
++.PP
++You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
++
++.B semanage port -l
++
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
++SELinux soundd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their soundd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following port types are defined for soundd:
++
++.EX
++.TP 5
++.B soundd_port_t
++.TP 10
++.EE
++
++
++Default Defined Ports:
++tcp 8000,9433,16001
++.EE
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type soundd_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B soundd_state_t
++
++ /var/state/yiff(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B soundd_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B soundd_tmpfs_t
++
++
++.br
++.B soundd_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/nasd(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/yiff-[0-9]+\.pid
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.B semanage port
++can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), soundd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/spamass_milter_selinux.8 b/man/man8/spamass_milter_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..8dd4096
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/spamass_milter_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,132 @@
++.TH "spamass_milter_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "spamass_milter" "SELinux Policy documentation for spamass_milter"
++.SH "NAME"
++spamass_milter_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the spamass_milter processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the spamass_milter processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The spamass_milter processes execute with the spamass_milter_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep spamass_milter_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The spamass_milter_t SELinux type can be entered via the "spamass_milter_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the spamass_milter_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/sbin/spamass-milter
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux spamass_milter policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their spamass_milter processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for spamass_milter:
++
++.EX
++.B spamass_milter_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux spamass_milter policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their spamass_milter processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for spamass_milter:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B spamass_milter_data_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the spamass_milter_data_t type, if you want to treat the files as spamass milter content.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B spamass_milter_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the spamass_milter_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the spamass_milter_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B spamass_milter_state_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the spamass_milter_state_t type, if you want to treat the files as spamass milter state data.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type spamass_milter_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B spamass_milter_data_t
++
++ /var/run/spamass(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/spamass-milter(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/spool/postfix/spamass(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/spamass-milter\.pid
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the spamass_milter_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the spamass_milter_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), spamass_milter(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/spamc_selinux.8 b/man/man8/spamc_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..ee04299
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/spamc_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,172 @@
++.TH "spamc_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "spamc" "SELinux Policy documentation for spamc"
++.SH "NAME"
++spamc_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the spamc processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the spamc processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The spamc processes execute with the spamc_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep spamc_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The spamc_t SELinux type can be entered via the "spamc_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the spamc_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/bin/razor.*, /usr/bin/spamc, /usr/bin/pyzor, /usr/bin/sa-learn, /usr/bin/spamassassin
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux spamc policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their spamc processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for spamc:
++
++.EX
++.B spamc_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux spamc policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their spamc processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for spamc:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B spamc_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the spamc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the spamc_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B spamc_home_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the spamc_home_t type, if you want to store spamc files in the users home directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B spamc_tmp_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the spamc_tmp_t type, if you want to store spamc temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type spamc_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B amavis_spool_t
++
++ /var/spool/amavisd(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B spamass_milter_state_t
++
++ /var/lib/spamass-milter(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B spamc_home_t
++
++ /root/\.pyzor(/.*)?
++.br
++ /root/\.spamd(/.*)?
++.br
++ /root/\.razor(/.*)?
++.br
++ /root/\.spamassassin(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.pyzor(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.spamd(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.razor(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.spamassassin(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.pyzor(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.spamd(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.razor(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.spamassassin(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.pyzor(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.spamd(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.razor(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.spamassassin(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B spamc_tmp_t
++
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the spamc_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the spamc_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), spamc(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/spamd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/spamd_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..11a86c5
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/spamd_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,378 @@
++.TH "spamd_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "spamd" "SELinux Policy documentation for spamd"
++.SH "NAME"
++spamd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the spamd processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the spamd processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The spamd processes execute with the spamd_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep spamd_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The spamd_t SELinux type can be entered via the "spamd_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the spamd_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/bin/spamd, /usr/sbin/spamd, /usr/bin/pyzord, /usr/sbin/spampd, /usr/bin/mimedefang, /usr/bin/mimedefang-multiplexor
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux spamd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their spamd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for spamd:
++
++.EX
++.B spamc_t, spamd_t, spamd_update_t, spamass_milter_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH BOOLEANS
++SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. spamd policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run spamd with the tightest access possible.
++
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow user spamassassin clients to use the network, you must turn on the spamassassin_can_network boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P spamassassin_can_network 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow spamd to read/write user home directories, you must turn on the spamd_enable_home_dirs boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P spamd_enable_home_dirs 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow http daemon to check spam, you must turn on the httpd_can_check_spam boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P httpd_can_check_spam 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow user spamassassin clients to use the network, you must turn on the spamassassin_can_network boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P spamassassin_can_network 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow spamd to read/write user home directories, you must turn on the spamd_enable_home_dirs boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P spamd_enable_home_dirs 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow http daemon to check spam, you must turn on the httpd_can_check_spam boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P httpd_can_check_spam 1
++.EE
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux spamd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their spamd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for spamd:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B spamd_compiled_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the spamd_compiled_t type, if you want to treat the files as spamd compiled data.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B spamd_etc_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the spamd_etc_t type, if you want to store spamd files in the /etc directories.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B spamd_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the spamd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the spamd_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B spamd_initrc_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the spamd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the spamd_initrc_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B spamd_log_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the spamd_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as spamd log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B spamd_spool_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the spamd_spool_t type, if you want to store the spamd files under the /var/spool directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B spamd_tmp_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the spamd_tmp_t type, if you want to store spamd temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B spamd_update_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the spamd_update_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the spamd_update_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B spamd_var_lib_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the spamd_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the spamd files under the /var/lib directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B spamd_var_run_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the spamd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the spamd files under the /run directory.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH PORT TYPES
++SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
++.PP
++You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
++
++.B semanage port -l
++
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
++SELinux spamd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their spamd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following port types are defined for spamd:
++
++.EX
++.TP 5
++.B spamd_port_t
++.TP 10
++.EE
++
++
++Default Defined Ports:
++tcp 783,10026,10027
++.EE
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type spamd_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B amavis_var_lib_t
++
++ /var/amavis(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/amavis(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B exim_spool_t
++
++ /var/spool/exim[0-9]?(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B spamass_milter_state_t
++
++ /var/lib/spamass-milter(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B spamc_home_t
++
++ /root/\.pyzor(/.*)?
++.br
++ /root/\.spamd(/.*)?
++.br
++ /root/\.razor(/.*)?
++.br
++ /root/\.spamassassin(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.pyzor(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.spamd(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.razor(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.spamassassin(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.pyzor(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.spamd(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.razor(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.spamassassin(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.pyzor(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.spamd(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.razor(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.spamassassin(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B spamd_compiled_t
++
++ /var/lib/spamassassin/compiled(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B spamd_etc_t
++
++ /etc/pyzor(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/razor(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B spamd_log_t
++
++ /var/log/spamd\.log.*
++.br
++ /var/log/pyzord\.log.*
++.br
++ /var/log/razor-agent\.log.*
++.br
++ /var/log/mimedefang
++.br
++
++.br
++.B spamd_spool_t
++
++ /var/spool/spamd(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/spool/spampd(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/spool/spamassassin(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B spamd_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B spamd_var_lib_t
++
++ /var/lib/razor(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/pyzord(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/spamassassin(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B spamd_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/spamassassin(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/spool/MIMEDefang(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/spool/MD-Quarantine(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B user_home_t
++
++ /home/[^/]*/.+
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/.+
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/.+
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the spamc_t, spamd_update_t, spamd_t, spamass_milter_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the spamc_t, spamd_update_t, spamd_t, spamass_milter_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.B semanage port
++can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
++
++.B semanage boolean
++can also be used to manipulate the booleans
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), spamd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, setsebool(8), spamass_milter_selinux(8), spamc_selinux(8), spamd_update_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/spamd_update_selinux.8 b/man/man8/spamd_update_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..099d75a
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/spamd_update_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,119 @@
++.TH "spamd_update_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "spamd_update" "SELinux Policy documentation for spamd_update"
++.SH "NAME"
++spamd_update_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the spamd_update processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the spamd_update processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The spamd_update processes execute with the spamd_update_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep spamd_update_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The spamd_update_t SELinux type can be entered via the "spamd_update_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the spamd_update_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/bin/sa-update
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux spamd_update policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their spamd_update processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for spamd_update:
++
++.EX
++.B spamd_update_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux spamd_update policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their spamd_update processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for spamd_update:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B spamd_update_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the spamd_update_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the spamd_update_t domain.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type spamd_update_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B spamd_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B spamd_var_lib_t
++
++ /var/lib/razor(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/pyzord(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/spamassassin(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the spamd_update_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the spamd_update_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), spamd_update(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, spamd_selinux(8), spamd_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/squid_cron_selinux.8 b/man/man8/squid_cron_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..cf792c9
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/squid_cron_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
++.TH "squid_cron_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "squid_cron" "SELinux Policy documentation for squid_cron"
++.SH "NAME"
++squid_cron_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the squid_cron processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the squid_cron processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The squid_cron processes execute with the squid_cron_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep squid_cron_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The squid_cron_t SELinux type can be entered via the "squid_cron_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the squid_cron_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/sbin/lightparser.pl
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux squid_cron policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their squid_cron processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for squid_cron:
++
++.EX
++.B squid_cron_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux squid_cron policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their squid_cron processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for squid_cron:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B squid_cron_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the squid_cron_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the squid_cron_t domain.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type squid_cron_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B squid_cache_t
++
++ /var/squidGuard(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lightsquid(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/cache/squid(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/spool/squid(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), squid_cron(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, squid_selinux(8), squid_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/squid_selinux.8 b/man/man8/squid_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..be4c9e5
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/squid_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,316 @@
++.TH "squid_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "squid" "SELinux Policy documentation for squid"
++.SH "NAME"
++squid_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the squid processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the squid processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The squid processes execute with the squid_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep squid_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The squid_t SELinux type can be entered via the "squid_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the squid_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/sbin/squid
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux squid policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their squid processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for squid:
++
++.EX
++.B squid_t, squid_cron_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH BOOLEANS
++SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. squid policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run squid with the tightest access possible.
++
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow squid to connect to all ports, not just HTTP, FTP, and Gopher ports, you must turn on the squid_connect_any boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P squid_connect_any 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow squid to run as a transparent proxy (TPROXY), you must turn on the squid_use_tproxy boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P squid_use_tproxy 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow squid to connect to all ports, not just HTTP, FTP, and Gopher ports, you must turn on the squid_connect_any boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P squid_connect_any 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow squid to run as a transparent proxy (TPROXY), you must turn on the squid_use_tproxy boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P squid_use_tproxy 1
++.EE
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux squid policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their squid processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for squid:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B squid_cache_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the squid_cache_t type, if you want to store the files under the /var/cache directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B squid_conf_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the squid_conf_t type, if you want to treat the files as squid configuration data, usually stored under the /etc directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B squid_cron_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the squid_cron_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the squid_cron_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B squid_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the squid_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the squid_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B squid_initrc_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the squid_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the squid_initrc_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B squid_log_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the squid_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as squid log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B squid_tmp_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the squid_tmp_t type, if you want to store squid temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B squid_tmpfs_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the squid_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store squid files on a tmpfs file system.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B squid_var_run_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the squid_var_run_t type, if you want to store the squid files under the /run directory.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH PORT TYPES
++SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
++.PP
++You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
++
++.B semanage port -l
++
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
++SELinux squid policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their squid processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following port types are defined for squid:
++
++.EX
++.TP 5
++.B squid_port_t
++.TP 10
++.EE
++
++
++Default Defined Ports:
++tcp 3128,3401,4827
++.EE
++udp 3401,4827
++.EE
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type squid_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B faillog_t
++
++ /var/log/btmp.*
++.br
++ /var/run/faillock(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/log/faillog
++.br
++ /var/log/tallylog
++.br
++
++.br
++.B krb5_host_rcache_t
++
++ /var/cache/krb5rcache(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/tmp/nfs_0
++.br
++ /var/tmp/DNS_25
++.br
++ /var/tmp/host_0
++.br
++ /var/tmp/imap_0
++.br
++ /var/tmp/HTTP_23
++.br
++ /var/tmp/HTTP_48
++.br
++ /var/tmp/ldap_55
++.br
++ /var/tmp/ldap_487
++.br
++ /var/tmp/ldapmap1_0
++.br
++
++.br
++.B pcscd_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/pcscd(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/pcscd\.events(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/pcscd\.pid
++.br
++ /var/run/pcscd\.pub
++.br
++ /var/run/pcscd\.comm
++.br
++
++.br
++.B squid_cache_t
++
++ /var/squidGuard(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lightsquid(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/cache/squid(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/spool/squid(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B squid_log_t
++
++ /var/log/squid(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/log/squidGuard(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B squid_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B squid_tmpfs_t
++
++
++.br
++.B squid_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/squid\.pid
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the squid_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the squid_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.B semanage port
++can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
++
++.B semanage boolean
++can also be used to manipulate the booleans
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), squid(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, setsebool(8), squid_cron_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/srvsvcd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/srvsvcd_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..4699f35
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/srvsvcd_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,124 @@
++.TH "srvsvcd_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "srvsvcd" "SELinux Policy documentation for srvsvcd"
++.SH "NAME"
++srvsvcd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the srvsvcd processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the srvsvcd processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The srvsvcd processes execute with the srvsvcd_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep srvsvcd_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The srvsvcd_t SELinux type can be entered via the "srvsvcd_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the srvsvcd_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/sbin/srvsvcd
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux srvsvcd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their srvsvcd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for srvsvcd:
++
++.EX
++.B srvsvcd_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux srvsvcd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their srvsvcd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for srvsvcd:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B srvsvcd_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the srvsvcd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the srvsvcd_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B srvsvcd_var_lib_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the srvsvcd_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the srvsvcd files under the /var/lib directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B srvsvcd_var_run_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the srvsvcd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the srvsvcd files under the /run directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B srvsvcd_var_socket_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the srvsvcd_var_socket_t type, if you want to treat the files as srvsvcd var socket data.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type srvsvcd_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B srvsvcd_var_lib_t
++
++
++.br
++.B srvsvcd_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/srvsvcd.pid
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), srvsvcd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/ssh_keygen_selinux.8 b/man/man8/ssh_keygen_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..33a275f
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/ssh_keygen_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,155 @@
++.TH "ssh_keygen_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "ssh_keygen" "SELinux Policy documentation for ssh_keygen"
++.SH "NAME"
++ssh_keygen_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the ssh_keygen processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the ssh_keygen processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The ssh_keygen processes execute with the ssh_keygen_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep ssh_keygen_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The ssh_keygen_t SELinux type can be entered via the "ssh_keygen_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the ssh_keygen_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/bin/ssh-keygen
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux ssh_keygen policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ssh_keygen processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for ssh_keygen:
++
++.EX
++.B ssh_keygen_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux ssh_keygen policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ssh_keygen processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for ssh_keygen:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B ssh_keygen_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the ssh_keygen_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ssh_keygen_t domain.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type ssh_keygen_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B ssh_home_t
++
++ /root/\.ssh(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/openshift/[^/]+/\.ssh(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/amanda/\.ssh(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/stickshift/[^/]+/\.ssh(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/gitolite/\.ssh(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/nocpulse/\.ssh(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/gitolite3/\.ssh(/.*)?
++.br
++ /root/\.shosts
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.ssh(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.shosts
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.ssh(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.shosts
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.ssh(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.shosts
++.br
++
++.br
++.B sshd_key_t
++
++ /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key.pub
++.br
++ /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key.pub
++.br
++ /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key.pub
++.br
++ /etc/ssh/primes
++.br
++ /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key
++.br
++ /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key
++.br
++ /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the ssh_keygen_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the ssh_keygen_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), ssh_keygen(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, ssh_selinux(8), ssh_selinux(8), ssh_keysign_selinux(8), sshd_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/ssh_keysign_selinux.8 b/man/man8/ssh_keysign_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..1a657dc
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/ssh_keysign_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
++.TH "ssh_keysign_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "ssh_keysign" "SELinux Policy documentation for ssh_keysign"
++.SH "NAME"
++ssh_keysign_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the ssh_keysign processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the ssh_keysign processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The ssh_keysign processes execute with the ssh_keysign_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep ssh_keysign_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The ssh_keysign_t SELinux type can be entered via the "ssh_keysign_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the ssh_keysign_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/libexec/openssh/ssh-keysign
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux ssh_keysign policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ssh_keysign processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for ssh_keysign:
++
++.EX
++.B ssh_keysign_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH BOOLEANS
++SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. ssh_keysign policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run ssh_keysign with the tightest access possible.
++
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow host key based authentication, you must turn on the ssh_keysign boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P ssh_keysign 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow host key based authentication, you must turn on the ssh_keysign boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P ssh_keysign 1
++.EE
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux ssh_keysign policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ssh_keysign processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for ssh_keysign:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B ssh_keysign_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the ssh_keysign_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ssh_keysign_t domain.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.B semanage boolean
++can also be used to manipulate the booleans
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), ssh_keysign(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, setsebool(8), ssh_selinux(8), ssh_selinux(8), ssh_keygen_selinux(8), sshd_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/ssh_selinux.8 b/man/man8/ssh_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..4f02c5d
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/ssh_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,400 @@
++.TH "ssh_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "ssh" "SELinux Policy documentation for ssh"
++.SH "NAME"
++ssh_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the ssh processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the ssh processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The ssh processes execute with the ssh_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep ssh_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The ssh_t SELinux type can be entered via the "ssh_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the ssh_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/bin/ssh
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux ssh policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ssh processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for ssh:
++
++.EX
++.B sshd_sandbox_t, ssh_keysign_t, ssh_keygen_t, ssh_t, sshd_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH BOOLEANS
++SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. ssh policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run ssh with the tightest access possible.
++
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow user to use ssh chroot environment, you must turn on the selinuxuser_use_ssh_chroot boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P selinuxuser_use_ssh_chroot 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow host key based authentication, you must turn on the ssh_keysign boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P ssh_keysign 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow ssh with chroot env to read and write files in the user home directories, you must turn on the ssh_chroot_rw_homedirs boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P ssh_chroot_rw_homedirs 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow fenced domain to execute ssh, you must turn on the fenced_can_ssh boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P fenced_can_ssh 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow internal-sftp to read and write files in the user ssh home directories, you must turn on the sftpd_write_ssh_home boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P sftpd_write_ssh_home 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow ssh logins as sysadm_r:sysadm_t, you must turn on the ssh_sysadm_login boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P ssh_sysadm_login 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow user to use ssh chroot environment, you must turn on the selinuxuser_use_ssh_chroot boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P selinuxuser_use_ssh_chroot 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow host key based authentication, you must turn on the ssh_keysign boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P ssh_keysign 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow ssh with chroot env to read and write files in the user home directories, you must turn on the ssh_chroot_rw_homedirs boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P ssh_chroot_rw_homedirs 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow fenced domain to execute ssh, you must turn on the fenced_can_ssh boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P fenced_can_ssh 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow internal-sftp to read and write files in the user ssh home directories, you must turn on the sftpd_write_ssh_home boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P sftpd_write_ssh_home 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow ssh logins as sysadm_r:sysadm_t, you must turn on the ssh_sysadm_login boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P ssh_sysadm_login 1
++.EE
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux ssh policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ssh processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for ssh:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B ssh_agent_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the ssh_agent_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ssh_agent_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B ssh_agent_tmp_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the ssh_agent_tmp_t type, if you want to store ssh agent temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B ssh_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the ssh_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ssh_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B ssh_home_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the ssh_home_t type, if you want to store ssh files in the users home directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B ssh_keygen_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the ssh_keygen_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ssh_keygen_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B ssh_keysign_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the ssh_keysign_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ssh_keysign_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B ssh_tmpfs_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the ssh_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store ssh files on a tmpfs file system.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B sshd_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the sshd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the sshd_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B sshd_initrc_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the sshd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the sshd_initrc_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B sshd_key_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the sshd_key_t type, if you want to treat the files as sshd key data.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B sshd_keytab_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the sshd_keytab_t type, if you want to treat the files as kerberos keytab files.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B sshd_tmpfs_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the sshd_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store sshd files on a tmpfs file system.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B sshd_var_run_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the sshd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the sshd files under the /run directory.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH PORT TYPES
++SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
++.PP
++You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
++
++.B semanage port -l
++
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
++SELinux ssh policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ssh processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following port types are defined for ssh:
++
++.EX
++.TP 5
++.B ssh_port_t
++.TP 10
++.EE
++
++
++Default Defined Ports:
++tcp 22
++.EE
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type ssh_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B ssh_home_t
++
++ /root/\.ssh(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/openshift/[^/]+/\.ssh(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/amanda/\.ssh(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/stickshift/[^/]+/\.ssh(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/gitolite/\.ssh(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/nocpulse/\.ssh(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/gitolite3/\.ssh(/.*)?
++.br
++ /root/\.shosts
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.ssh(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.shosts
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.ssh(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.shosts
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.ssh(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.shosts
++.br
++
++.br
++.B ssh_tmpfs_t
++
++
++.br
++.B user_fonts_cache_t
++
++ /root/\.fontconfig(/.*)?
++.br
++ /root/\.fonts/auto(/.*)?
++.br
++ /root/\.fonts\.cache-.*
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.fontconfig(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.fonts/auto(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.fonts\.cache-.*
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.fontconfig(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.fonts/auto(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.fonts\.cache-.*
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.fontconfig(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.fonts/auto(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.fonts\.cache-.*
++.br
++
++.br
++.B user_tmp_t
++
++ /var/run/user(/.*)?
++.br
++ /tmp/gconfd-.*
++.br
++ /tmp/gconfd-dwalsh
++.br
++ /tmp/gconfd-xguest
++.br
++
++.br
++.B user_tmp_type
++
++ all user tmp files
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the ssh_keygen_t, sshd_t, ssh_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the ssh_keygen_t, sshd_t, ssh_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.B semanage port
++can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
++
++.B semanage boolean
++can also be used to manipulate the booleans
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), ssh(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, setsebool(8), ssh_keygen_selinux(8), ssh_keysign_selinux(8), sshd_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/sshd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/sshd_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..887086e
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/sshd_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,508 @@
++.TH "sshd_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "sshd" "SELinux Policy documentation for sshd"
++.SH "NAME"
++sshd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the sshd processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the sshd processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The sshd processes execute with the sshd_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep sshd_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The sshd_t SELinux type can be entered via the "sshd_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the sshd_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/sbin/sshd
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux sshd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their sshd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for sshd:
++
++.EX
++.B sshd_sandbox_t, ssh_keysign_t, ssh_keygen_t, ssh_t, sshd_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH BOOLEANS
++SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. sshd policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run sshd with the tightest access possible.
++
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow user to use ssh chroot environment, you must turn on the selinuxuser_use_ssh_chroot boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P selinuxuser_use_ssh_chroot 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow host key based authentication, you must turn on the ssh_keysign boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P ssh_keysign 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow ssh with chroot env to read and write files in the user home directories, you must turn on the ssh_chroot_rw_homedirs boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P ssh_chroot_rw_homedirs 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow fenced domain to execute ssh, you must turn on the fenced_can_ssh boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P fenced_can_ssh 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow internal-sftp to read and write files in the user ssh home directories, you must turn on the sftpd_write_ssh_home boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P sftpd_write_ssh_home 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow ssh logins as sysadm_r:sysadm_t, you must turn on the ssh_sysadm_login boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P ssh_sysadm_login 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow user to use ssh chroot environment, you must turn on the selinuxuser_use_ssh_chroot boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P selinuxuser_use_ssh_chroot 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow host key based authentication, you must turn on the ssh_keysign boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P ssh_keysign 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow ssh with chroot env to read and write files in the user home directories, you must turn on the ssh_chroot_rw_homedirs boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P ssh_chroot_rw_homedirs 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow fenced domain to execute ssh, you must turn on the fenced_can_ssh boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P fenced_can_ssh 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow internal-sftp to read and write files in the user ssh home directories, you must turn on the sftpd_write_ssh_home boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P sftpd_write_ssh_home 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow ssh logins as sysadm_r:sysadm_t, you must turn on the ssh_sysadm_login boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P ssh_sysadm_login 1
++.EE
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux sshd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their sshd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for sshd:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B sshd_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the sshd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the sshd_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B sshd_initrc_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the sshd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the sshd_initrc_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B sshd_key_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the sshd_key_t type, if you want to treat the files as sshd key data.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B sshd_keytab_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the sshd_keytab_t type, if you want to treat the files as kerberos keytab files.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B sshd_tmpfs_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the sshd_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store sshd files on a tmpfs file system.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B sshd_var_run_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the sshd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the sshd files under the /run directory.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH PORT TYPES
++SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
++.PP
++You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
++
++.B semanage port -l
++
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
++SELinux sshd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their sshd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following port types are defined for sshd:
++
++.EX
++.TP 5
++.B ssh_port_t
++.TP 10
++.EE
++
++
++Default Defined Ports:
++tcp 22
++.EE
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type sshd_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B auth_cache_t
++
++ /var/cache/coolkey(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B auth_home_t
++
++ /root/\.google_authenticator
++.br
++ /root/\.google_authenticator~
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.google_authenticator
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.google_authenticator~
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.google_authenticator
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.google_authenticator~
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.google_authenticator
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.google_authenticator~
++.br
++
++.br
++.B cgroup_t
++
++ /cgroup
++.br
++ /sys/fs/cgroup
++.br
++
++.br
++.B condor_var_lib_t
++
++ /var/lib/condor(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/condor/spool(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/condor/execute(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B faillog_t
++
++ /var/log/btmp.*
++.br
++ /var/run/faillock(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/log/faillog
++.br
++ /var/log/tallylog
++.br
++
++.br
++.B gitosis_var_lib_t
++
++ /var/lib/gitosis(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/gitolite(3)?(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B initrc_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/utmp
++.br
++ /var/run/random-seed
++.br
++ /var/run/runlevel\.dir
++.br
++ /var/run/setmixer_flag
++.br
++
++.br
++.B krb5_host_rcache_t
++
++ /var/cache/krb5rcache(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/tmp/nfs_0
++.br
++ /var/tmp/DNS_25
++.br
++ /var/tmp/host_0
++.br
++ /var/tmp/imap_0
++.br
++ /var/tmp/HTTP_23
++.br
++ /var/tmp/HTTP_48
++.br
++ /var/tmp/ldap_55
++.br
++ /var/tmp/ldap_487
++.br
++ /var/tmp/ldapmap1_0
++.br
++
++.br
++.B lastlog_t
++
++ /var/log/lastlog
++.br
++
++.br
++.B openshift_tmp_t
++
++ /var/lib/openshift/.*/\.tmp(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/openshift/.*/\.sandbox(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/stickshift/.*/\.tmp(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/stickshift/.*/\.sandbox(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B pam_var_run_t
++
++ /var/(db|lib|adm)/sudo(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/sudo(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/sepermit(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/pam_mount(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B pcscd_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/pcscd(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/pcscd\.events(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/pcscd\.pid
++.br
++ /var/run/pcscd\.pub
++.br
++ /var/run/pcscd\.comm
++.br
++
++.br
++.B security_t
++
++ /selinux
++.br
++
++.br
++.B ssh_home_t
++
++ /root/\.ssh(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/openshift/[^/]+/\.ssh(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/amanda/\.ssh(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/stickshift/[^/]+/\.ssh(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/gitolite/\.ssh(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/nocpulse/\.ssh(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/gitolite3/\.ssh(/.*)?
++.br
++ /root/\.shosts
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.ssh(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.shosts
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.ssh(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.shosts
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.ssh(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.shosts
++.br
++
++.br
++.B sshd_tmpfs_t
++
++
++.br
++.B sshd_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/sshd\.pid
++.br
++ /var/run/sshd\.init\.pid
++.br
++
++.br
++.B systemd_passwd_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/systemd/ask-password(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/systemd/ask-password-block(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B user_tmp_t
++
++ /var/run/user(/.*)?
++.br
++ /tmp/gconfd-.*
++.br
++ /tmp/gconfd-dwalsh
++.br
++ /tmp/gconfd-xguest
++.br
++
++.br
++.B user_tmp_type
++
++ all user tmp files
++.br
++
++.br
++.B var_auth_t
++
++ /var/ace(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/rsa(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/abl(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/rsa(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/pam_ssh(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/pam_ssh(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/pam_shield(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/google-authenticator(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B wtmp_t
++
++ /var/log/wtmp.*
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the ssh_keygen_t, sshd_t, ssh_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the ssh_keygen_t, sshd_t, ssh_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.B semanage port
++can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
++
++.B semanage boolean
++can also be used to manipulate the booleans
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), sshd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, setsebool(8), ssh_selinux(8), ssh_selinux(8), ssh_keygen_selinux(8), ssh_keysign_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/sssd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/sssd_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..29b2b6f
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/sssd_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,260 @@
++.TH "sssd_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "sssd" "SELinux Policy documentation for sssd"
++.SH "NAME"
++sssd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the sssd processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the sssd processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The sssd processes execute with the sssd_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep sssd_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The sssd_t SELinux type can be entered via the "sssd_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the sssd_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/sbin/sssd
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux sssd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their sssd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for sssd:
++
++.EX
++.B sssd_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux sssd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their sssd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for sssd:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B sssd_conf_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the sssd_conf_t type, if you want to treat the files as sssd configuration data, usually stored under the /etc directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B sssd_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the sssd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the sssd_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B sssd_initrc_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the sssd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the sssd_initrc_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B sssd_public_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the sssd_public_t type, if you want to treat the files as sssd public data.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B sssd_unit_file_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the sssd_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as sssd unit content.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B sssd_var_lib_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the sssd_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the sssd files under the /var/lib directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B sssd_var_log_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the sssd_var_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as sssd var log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B sssd_var_run_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the sssd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the sssd files under the /run directory.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type sssd_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B auth_cache_t
++
++ /var/cache/coolkey(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B faillog_t
++
++ /var/log/btmp.*
++.br
++ /var/run/faillock(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/log/faillog
++.br
++ /var/log/tallylog
++.br
++
++.br
++.B krb5_host_rcache_t
++
++ /var/cache/krb5rcache(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/tmp/nfs_0
++.br
++ /var/tmp/DNS_25
++.br
++ /var/tmp/host_0
++.br
++ /var/tmp/imap_0
++.br
++ /var/tmp/HTTP_23
++.br
++ /var/tmp/HTTP_48
++.br
++ /var/tmp/ldap_55
++.br
++ /var/tmp/ldap_487
++.br
++ /var/tmp/ldapmap1_0
++.br
++
++.br
++.B pcscd_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/pcscd(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/pcscd\.events(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/pcscd\.pid
++.br
++ /var/run/pcscd\.pub
++.br
++ /var/run/pcscd\.comm
++.br
++
++.br
++.B security_t
++
++ /selinux
++.br
++
++.br
++.B selinux_login_config_t
++
++ /etc/selinux/([^/]*/)?logins(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B sssd_public_t
++
++ /var/lib/sss/mc(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/sss/pubconf(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B sssd_var_lib_t
++
++ /var/lib/sss(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B sssd_var_log_t
++
++ /var/log/sssd(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B sssd_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/sssd.pid
++.br
++
++.br
++.B user_tmp_type
++
++ all user tmp files
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the sssd_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the sssd_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
++
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), sssd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/staff_selinux.8 b/man/man8/staff_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..44df6b6
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/staff_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,583 @@
++.TH "staff_selinux" "8" "staff" "mgrepl at redhat.com" "staff SELinux Policy documentation"
++.SH "NAME"
++staff_u \- \fBAdministrator's unprivileged user\fP - Security Enhanced Linux Policy
++
++.SH DESCRIPTION
++
++\fBstaff_u\fP is an SELinux User defined in the SELinux
++policy. SELinux users have default roles, \fBstaff_r\fP. The
++default role has a default type, \fBstaff_t\fP, associated with it.
++
++The SELinux user will usually login to a system with a context that looks like:
++
++.B staff_u:staff_r:staff_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023
++
++Linux users are automatically assigned an SELinux users at login.
++Login programs use the SELinux User to assign initial context to the user's shell.
++
++SELinux policy uses the context to control the user's access.
++
++By default all users are assigned to the SELinux user via the \fB__default__\fP flag
++
++On Targeted policy systems the \fB__default__\fP user is assigned to the \fBunconfined_u\fP SELinux user.
++
++You can list all Linux User to SELinux user mapping using:
++
++.B semanage login -l
++
++If you wanted to change the default user mapping to use the staff_u user, you would execute:
++
++.B semanage login -m -s staff_u __default__
++
++
++If you want to map the one Linux user (joe) to the SELinux user staff, you would execute:
++
++.B $ semanage login -a -s staff_u joe
++
++
++.SH USER DESCRIPTION
++
++The SELinux user staff_u is defined in policy as a unprivileged user. SELinux prevents unprivileged users from doing administration tasks without transitioning to a different role.
++
++.SH SUDO
++
++The SELinux user staff can execute sudo.
++
++You can set up sudo to allow staff to transition to an administrative domain:
++
++Add one or more of the following record to sudoers using visudo.
++
++
++USERNAME ALL=(ALL) ROLE=auditadm_r TYPE=auditadm_t COMMAND
++.br
++sudo will run COMMAND as staff_u:auditadm_r:auditadm_t:LEVEL
++
++You might also need to add one or more of these new roles to your SELinux user record.
++
++List the SELinux roles your SELinux user can reach by executing:
++
++.B $ semanage user -l |grep selinux_name
++
++Modify the roles list and add staff_r to this list.
++
++.B $ semanage user -m -R 'staff_r auditadm_r dbadm_r logadm_r secadm_r sysadm_r unconfined_r webadm_r' staff_u
++
++For more details you can see semanage man page.
++
++
++USERNAME ALL=(ALL) ROLE=dbadm_r TYPE=dbadm_t COMMAND
++.br
++sudo will run COMMAND as staff_u:dbadm_r:dbadm_t:LEVEL
++
++You might also need to add one or more of these new roles to your SELinux user record.
++
++List the SELinux roles your SELinux user can reach by executing:
++
++.B $ semanage user -l |grep selinux_name
++
++Modify the roles list and add staff_r to this list.
++
++.B $ semanage user -m -R 'staff_r auditadm_r dbadm_r logadm_r secadm_r sysadm_r unconfined_r webadm_r' staff_u
++
++For more details you can see semanage man page.
++
++
++USERNAME ALL=(ALL) ROLE=logadm_r TYPE=logadm_t COMMAND
++.br
++sudo will run COMMAND as staff_u:logadm_r:logadm_t:LEVEL
++
++You might also need to add one or more of these new roles to your SELinux user record.
++
++List the SELinux roles your SELinux user can reach by executing:
++
++.B $ semanage user -l |grep selinux_name
++
++Modify the roles list and add staff_r to this list.
++
++.B $ semanage user -m -R 'staff_r auditadm_r dbadm_r logadm_r secadm_r sysadm_r unconfined_r webadm_r' staff_u
++
++For more details you can see semanage man page.
++
++
++USERNAME ALL=(ALL) ROLE=secadm_r TYPE=secadm_t COMMAND
++.br
++sudo will run COMMAND as staff_u:secadm_r:secadm_t:LEVEL
++
++You might also need to add one or more of these new roles to your SELinux user record.
++
++List the SELinux roles your SELinux user can reach by executing:
++
++.B $ semanage user -l |grep selinux_name
++
++Modify the roles list and add staff_r to this list.
++
++.B $ semanage user -m -R 'staff_r auditadm_r dbadm_r logadm_r secadm_r sysadm_r unconfined_r webadm_r' staff_u
++
++For more details you can see semanage man page.
++
++
++USERNAME ALL=(ALL) ROLE=sysadm_r TYPE=sysadm_t COMMAND
++.br
++sudo will run COMMAND as staff_u:sysadm_r:sysadm_t:LEVEL
++
++You might also need to add one or more of these new roles to your SELinux user record.
++
++List the SELinux roles your SELinux user can reach by executing:
++
++.B $ semanage user -l |grep selinux_name
++
++Modify the roles list and add staff_r to this list.
++
++.B $ semanage user -m -R 'staff_r auditadm_r dbadm_r logadm_r secadm_r sysadm_r unconfined_r webadm_r' staff_u
++
++For more details you can see semanage man page.
++
++
++USERNAME ALL=(ALL) ROLE=unconfined_r TYPE=unconfined_t COMMAND
++.br
++sudo will run COMMAND as staff_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:LEVEL
++
++You might also need to add one or more of these new roles to your SELinux user record.
++
++List the SELinux roles your SELinux user can reach by executing:
++
++.B $ semanage user -l |grep selinux_name
++
++Modify the roles list and add staff_r to this list.
++
++.B $ semanage user -m -R 'staff_r auditadm_r dbadm_r logadm_r secadm_r sysadm_r unconfined_r webadm_r' staff_u
++
++For more details you can see semanage man page.
++
++
++USERNAME ALL=(ALL) ROLE=webadm_r TYPE=webadm_t COMMAND
++.br
++sudo will run COMMAND as staff_u:webadm_r:webadm_t:LEVEL
++
++You might also need to add one or more of these new roles to your SELinux user record.
++
++List the SELinux roles your SELinux user can reach by executing:
++
++.B $ semanage user -l |grep selinux_name
++
++Modify the roles list and add staff_r to this list.
++
++.B $ semanage user -m -R 'staff_r auditadm_r dbadm_r logadm_r secadm_r sysadm_r unconfined_r webadm_r' staff_u
++
++For more details you can see semanage man page.
++
++
++The SELinux type staff_t is not allowed to execute sudo.
++
++.SH X WINDOWS LOGIN
++
++The SELinux user staff_u is able to X Windows login.
++
++.SH NETWORK
++
++.TP
++The SELinux user staff_u is able to listen on the following tcp ports.
++
++.B xserver_port_t: 6000-6020
++
++.TP
++The SELinux user staff_u is able to connect to the following tcp ports.
++
++.B all ports
++
++.TP
++The SELinux user staff_u is able to listen on the following udp ports.
++
++.B ephemeral_port_t: 32768-61000
++
++.B all ports with out defined types
++
++.TP
++The SELinux user staff_u is able to connect to the following tcp ports.
++
++.B all ports
++
++.SH BOOLEANS
++SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. staff policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run staff with the tightest access possible.
++
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow staff user to create and transition to svirt domains, you must turn on the staff_use_svirt boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P staff_use_svirt 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow staff user to create and transition to svirt domains, you must turn on the staff_use_svirt boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P staff_use_svirt 1
++.EE
++
++.SH HOME_EXEC
++
++The SELinux user staff_u is able execute home content files.
++
++.SH TRANSITIONS
++
++Three things can happen when staff_t attempts to execute a program.
++
++\fB1.\fP SELinux Policy can deny staff_t from executing the program.
++
++.TP
++
++\fB2.\fP SELinux Policy can allow staff_t to execute the program in the current user type.
++
++Execute the following to see the types that the SELinux user staff_t can execute without transitioning:
++
++.B search -A -s staff_t -c file -p execute_no_trans
++
++.TP
++
++\fB3.\fP SELinux can allow staff_t to execute the program and transition to a new type.
++
++Execute the following to see the types that the SELinux user staff_t can execute and transition:
++
++.B $ search -A -s staff_t -c process -p transition
++
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type staff_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B anon_inodefs_t
++
++
++.br
++.B auth_cache_t
++
++ /var/cache/coolkey(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B bluetooth_helper_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B bluetooth_helper_tmpfs_t
++
++
++.br
++.B cgroup_t
++
++ /cgroup
++.br
++ /sys/fs/cgroup
++.br
++
++.br
++.B chrome_sandbox_tmpfs_t
++
++
++.br
++.B games_data_t
++
++ /var/games(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/games(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B gpg_agent_tmp_t
++
++ /home/[^/]*/\.gnupg/log-socket
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.gnupg/log-socket
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.gnupg/log-socket
++.br
++
++.br
++.B httpd_user_content_t
++
++ /home/[^/]*/((www)|(web)|(public_html))(/.+)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/((www)|(web)|(public_html))(/.+)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/((www)|(web)|(public_html))(/.+)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B httpd_user_htaccess_t
++
++ /home/[^/]*/((www)|(web)|(public_html))(/.*)?/\.htaccess
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/((www)|(web)|(public_html))(/.*)?/\.htaccess
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/((www)|(web)|(public_html))(/.*)?/\.htaccess
++.br
++
++.br
++.B httpd_user_ra_content_t
++
++ /home/[^/]*/((www)|(web)|(public_html))(/.*)?/logs(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/((www)|(web)|(public_html))(/.*)?/logs(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/((www)|(web)|(public_html))(/.*)?/logs(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B httpd_user_rw_content_t
++
++
++.br
++.B httpd_user_script_exec_t
++
++ /home/[^/]*/((www)|(web)|(public_html))/cgi-bin(/.+)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/((www)|(web)|(public_html))/cgi-bin(/.+)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/((www)|(web)|(public_html))/cgi-bin(/.+)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B iceauth_home_t
++
++ /root/\.DCOP.*
++.br
++ /root/\.ICEauthority.*
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.DCOP.*
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.ICEauthority.*
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.DCOP.*
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.ICEauthority.*
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.DCOP.*
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.ICEauthority.*
++.br
++
++.br
++.B mail_spool_t
++
++ /var/mail(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/spool/imap(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/spool/mail(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B mqueue_spool_t
++
++ /var/spool/(client)?mqueue(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/spool/mqueue\.in(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B nfsd_rw_t
++
++
++.br
++.B noxattrfs
++
++ all files on file systems which do not support extended attributes
++.br
++
++.br
++.B sandbox_file_t
++
++
++.br
++.B sandbox_tmpfs_type
++
++ all sandbox content in tmpfs file systems
++.br
++
++.br
++.B screen_home_t
++
++ /root/\.screen(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.screen(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.screenrc
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.screen(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.screenrc
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.screen(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.screenrc
++.br
++
++.br
++.B security_t
++
++ /selinux
++.br
++
++.br
++.B systemd_passwd_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/systemd/ask-password(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/systemd/ask-password-block(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B usbfs_t
++
++
++.br
++.B user_fonts_cache_t
++
++ /root/\.fontconfig(/.*)?
++.br
++ /root/\.fonts/auto(/.*)?
++.br
++ /root/\.fonts\.cache-.*
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.fontconfig(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.fonts/auto(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.fonts\.cache-.*
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.fontconfig(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.fonts/auto(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.fonts\.cache-.*
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.fontconfig(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.fonts/auto(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.fonts\.cache-.*
++.br
++
++.br
++.B user_fonts_t
++
++ /root/\.fonts(/.*)?
++.br
++ /tmp/\.font-unix(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.fonts(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.fonts(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.fonts(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B user_home_type
++
++ all user home files
++.br
++
++.br
++.B user_tmp_type
++
++ all user tmp files
++.br
++
++.br
++.B user_tmpfs_type
++
++ all user content in tmpfs file systems
++.br
++
++.br
++.B virt_image_type
++
++ all virtual image files
++.br
++
++.br
++.B xauth_home_t
++
++ /root/\.xauth.*
++.br
++ /root/\.Xauth.*
++.br
++ /root/\.serverauth.*
++.br
++ /root/\.Xauthority.*
++.br
++ /var/lib/pqsql/\.xauth.*
++.br
++ /var/lib/pqsql/\.Xauthority.*
++.br
++ /var/lib/nxserver/home/\.xauth.*
++.br
++ /var/lib/nxserver/home/\.Xauthority.*
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.xauth.*
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.Xauth.*
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.serverauth.*
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.Xauthority.*
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.xauth.*
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.Xauth.*
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.serverauth.*
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.Xauthority.*
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.xauth.*
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.Xauth.*
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.serverauth.*
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.Xauthority.*
+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/sbin/sm-notify, /usr/sbin/rpc\..*, /usr/sbin/rpc\.idmapd, /usr/sbin/sm-notify, /usr/sbin/rpc\.rquotad, /sbin/rpc\..*
-+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B rpcd_initrc_exec_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the rpcd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the rpcd_initrc_t domain.
+
+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/etc/rc\.d/init\.d/nfslock, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/rpcidmapd
-+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B rpcd_unit_file_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the rpcd_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as rpcd unit content.
-+
-+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B rpcd_var_run_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the rpcd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the rpcd files under the /run directory.
++.B xdm_tmp_t
+
++ /tmp/\.X11-unix(/.*)?
++.br
++ /tmp/\.ICE-unix(/.*)?
++.br
++ /tmp/\.X0-lock
+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/run/rpc\.statd(/.*)?, /var/run/rpc\.statd\.pid
-+
-+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux rpcd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their rpcd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for rpcd:
++.br
++.B xserver_tmpfs_t
+
-+.EX
-+.B rpcd_t, rpcbind_t
-+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -44121,184 +89975,152 @@ index 0000000..eee7969
+.B semanage module
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
++.B semanage boolean
++can also be used to manipulate the booleans
++
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), rpcd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/rpm_selinux.8 b/man/man8/rpm_selinux.8
++selinux(8), staff(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, setsebool(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/stapserver_selinux.8 b/man/man8/stapserver_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..c1b5773
+index 0000000..1d7061b
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/rpm_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,183 @@
-+.TH "rpm_selinux" "8" "rpm" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "rpm SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/stapserver_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,146 @@
++.TH "stapserver_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "stapserver" "SELinux Policy documentation for stapserver"
+.SH "NAME"
-+rpm_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the rpm processes
++stapserver_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the stapserver processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the rpm processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the stapserver processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The stapserver processes execute with the stapserver_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the rpm_script_t, rpm_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep stapserver_t
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
+
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The stapserver_t SELinux type can be entered via the "stapserver_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the stapserver_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/bin/stap-server
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the rpm_script_t, rpm_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux stapserver policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their stapserver processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for stapserver:
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B stapserver_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux rpm policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their rpm processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for rpm:
-+
-+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B rpm_exec_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the rpm_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the rpm_t domain.
-+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/bin/apt-get, /usr/sbin/bcfg2, /usr/sbin/rhn_check, /usr/bin/rpmdev-rmdevelrpms, /usr/sbin/synaptic, /usr/share/yumex/yumex-yum-backend, /usr/bin/apt-shell, /usr/sbin/yum-updatesd, /usr/sbin/pup, /usr/libexec/packagekitd, /usr/libexec/yumDBUSBackend.py, /usr/sbin/pirut, /usr/bin/package-cleanup, /bin/rpm, /usr/bin/yum, /usr/sbin/system-install-packages, /usr/bin/zif, /usr/bin/rpm, /usr/sbin/yum-complete-transaction, /usr/bin/smart, /usr/sbin/packagekitd, /usr/bin/fedora-rmdevelrpms, /usr/sbin/rhnreg_ks, /usr/share/yumex/yum_childtask\.py, /usr/sbin/up2date
-+
-+.EX
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux stapserver policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their stapserver processes in as secure a method as possible.
+.PP
-+.B rpm_file_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the rpm_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as rpm content.
++The following file types are defined for stapserver:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B rpm_log_t
++.B stapserver_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the rpm_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as rpm log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++- Set files with the stapserver_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the stapserver_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B rpm_script_exec_t
++.B stapserver_log_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the rpm_script_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the rpm_script_t domain.
++- Set files with the stapserver_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as stapserver log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B rpm_script_tmp_t
++.B stapserver_var_lib_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the rpm_script_tmp_t type, if you want to store rpm script temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++- Set files with the stapserver_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the stapserver files under the /var/lib directory.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B rpm_script_tmpfs_t
++.B stapserver_var_run_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the rpm_script_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store rpm script files on a tmpfs file system.
++- Set files with the stapserver_var_run_t type, if you want to store the stapserver files under the /run directory.
+
+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B rpm_tmp_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the rpm_tmp_t type, if you want to store rpm temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
+
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B rpm_tmpfs_t
-+.EE
++The SELinux process type stapserver_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
-+- Set files with the rpm_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store rpm files on a tmpfs file system.
++.br
++.B stapserver_log_t
+
++ /var/log/stap-server(/.*)?
++.br
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B rpm_var_cache_t
-+.EE
++.br
++.B stapserver_var_lib_t
+
-+- Set files with the rpm_var_cache_t type, if you want to store the files under the /var/cache directory.
++ /var/lib/stap-server(/.*)?
++.br
+
+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/cache/PackageKit(/.*)?, /var/cache/yum(/.*)?, /var/spool/up2date(/.*)?
++.B stapserver_var_run_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B rpm_var_lib_t
-+.EE
++ /var/run/stap-server(/.*)?
++.br
+
-+- Set files with the rpm_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the rpm files under the /var/lib directory.
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/lib/yum(/.*)?, /var/lib/rpm(/.*)?, /var/lib/alternatives(/.*)?
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the stapserver_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B rpm_var_run_t
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the rpm_var_run_t type, if you want to store the rpm files under the /run directory.
-+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/run/PackageKit(/.*)?, /var/run/yum.*
-+
-+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
-+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux rpm policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their rpm processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for rpm:
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the stapserver_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B rpm_t, rpm_script_t
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -44311,122 +90133,157 @@ index 0000000..c1b5773
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), rpm(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/rshd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/rshd_selinux.8
++selinux(8), stapserver(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/stunnel_selinux.8 b/man/man8/stunnel_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..2686e88
+index 0000000..feb8ccd
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/rshd_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,125 @@
-+.TH "rshd_selinux" "8" "rshd" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "rshd SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/stunnel_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,160 @@
++.TH "stunnel_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "stunnel" "SELinux Policy documentation for stunnel"
+.SH "NAME"
-+rshd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the rshd processes
++stunnel_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the stunnel processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the rshd processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the stunnel processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The stunnel processes execute with the stunnel_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the rshd_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep stunnel_t
+
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The stunnel_t SELinux type can be entered via the "stunnel_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the stunnel_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/bin/stunnel, /usr/sbin/stunnel
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the rshd_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux stunnel policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their stunnel processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for stunnel:
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B stunnel_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux rshd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their rshd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for rshd:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux stunnel policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their stunnel processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for stunnel:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B rshd_exec_t
++.B stunnel_etc_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the rshd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the rshd_t domain.
++- Set files with the stunnel_etc_t type, if you want to store stunnel files in the /etc directories.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/sbin/in\.rshd, /usr/kerberos/sbin/kshd, /usr/sbin/in\.rexecd
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B rshd_keytab_t
++.B stunnel_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the rshd_keytab_t type, if you want to treat the files as kerberos keytab files.
++- Set files with the stunnel_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the stunnel_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B stunnel_tmp_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the stunnel_tmp_t type, if you want to store stunnel temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B stunnel_var_run_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the stunnel_var_run_t type, if you want to store the stunnel files under the /run directory.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
+.SH PORT TYPES
-+SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
++SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
+.PP
-+You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
++You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
+
+.B semanage port -l
+
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
-+SELinux rshd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their rshd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following port types are defined for rshd:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
++SELinux stunnel policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their stunnel processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following port types are defined for stunnel:
+
+.EX
+.TP 5
-+.B rsh_port_t
++.B stunnel_port_t
+.TP 10
+.EE
+
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type stunnel_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B stunnel_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B stunnel_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/stunnel(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
-+Default Defined Ports:
-+tcp 514
-+.EE
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux rshd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their rshd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for rshd:
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the stunnel_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B rshd_t
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
++
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the stunnel_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -44442,111 +90299,110 @@ index 0000000..2686e88
+can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), rshd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/rssh_selinux.8 b/man/man8/rssh_selinux.8
++selinux(8), stunnel(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/sulogin_selinux.8 b/man/man8/sulogin_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..9988547
+index 0000000..debe287
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/rssh_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
-+.TH "rssh_selinux" "8" "rssh" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "rssh SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/sulogin_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,110 @@
++.TH "sulogin_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "sulogin" "SELinux Policy documentation for sulogin"
+.SH "NAME"
-+rssh_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the rssh processes
++sulogin_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the sulogin processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the rssh processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the sulogin processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The sulogin processes execute with the sulogin_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the rssh_chroot_helper_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep sulogin_t
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
+
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The sulogin_t SELinux type can be entered via the "sulogin_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the sulogin_t domain are the following:"
++
++/sbin/sulogin, /sbin/sushell, /usr/sbin/sulogin, /usr/sbin/sushell
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the rssh_chroot_helper_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux sulogin policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their sulogin processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for sulogin:
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B sulogin_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux rssh policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their rssh processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for rssh:
-+
-+
-+.EX
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux sulogin policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their sulogin processes in as secure a method as possible.
+.PP
-+.B rssh_chroot_helper_exec_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the rssh_chroot_helper_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the rssh_chroot_helper_t domain.
++The following file types are defined for sulogin:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B rssh_exec_t
++.B sulogin_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the rssh_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the rssh_t domain.
++- Set files with the sulogin_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the sulogin_t domain.
+
+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B rssh_ro_t
-+.EE
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
+
-+- Set files with the rssh_ro_t type, if you want to treat the files as rssh read/only content.
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
++The SELinux process type sulogin_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B rssh_rw_t
-+.EE
++.br
++.B security_t
+
-+- Set files with the rssh_rw_t type, if you want to treat the files as rssh read/write content.
++ /selinux
++.br
+
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the sulogin_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux rssh policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their rssh processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for rssh:
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the sulogin_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B rssh_t, rssh_chroot_helper_t
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -44559,244 +90415,249 @@ index 0000000..9988547
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), rssh(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/rsync_selinux.8 b/man/man8/rsync_selinux.8
-index ad9ccf5..805c4ab 100644
---- a/man/man8/rsync_selinux.8
-+++ b/man/man8/rsync_selinux.8
-@@ -1,52 +1,217 @@
--.TH "rsync_selinux" "8" "17 Jan 2005" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "rsync Selinux Policy documentation"
--.de EX
--.nf
--.ft CW
--..
--.de EE
--.ft R
--.fi
--..
-+.TH "rsync_selinux" "8" "rsync" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "rsync SELinux Policy documentation"
- .SH "NAME"
--rsync_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the rsync daemon
-+rsync_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the rsync processes
- .SH "DESCRIPTION"
-
--Security-Enhanced Linux secures the rsync server via flexible mandatory access
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the rsync processes via flexible mandatory access
- control.
--.SH FILE_CONTEXTS
--SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
--Policy governs the access daemons have to these files.
--If you want to share files using the rsync daemon, you must label the files and directories public_content_t. So if you created a special directory /var/rsync, you
--would need to label the directory with the chcon tool.
--.TP
--chcon -t public_content_t /var/rsync
--.TP
--.TP
--To make this change permanent (survive a relabel), use the semanage command to add the change to file context configuration:
-+
-+.SH BOOLEANS
-+SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. rsync policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run rsync with the tightest access possible.
++selinux(8), sulogin(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/svc_multilog_selinux.8 b/man/man8/svc_multilog_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..723cd0c
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/svc_multilog_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,155 @@
++.TH "svc_multilog_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "svc_multilog" "SELinux Policy documentation for svc_multilog"
++.SH "NAME"
++svc_multilog_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the svc_multilog processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the svc_multilog processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow rsync to run as a client, you must turn on the rsync_client boolean.
++The svc_multilog processes execute with the svc_multilog_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P rsync_client 1
-+.EE
++For example:
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow rsync to export any files/directories read only, you must turn on the rsync_export_all_ro boolean.
++.B ps -eZ | grep svc_multilog_t
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P rsync_export_all_ro 1
-+.EE
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow rsync servers to share nfs files systems, you must turn on the rsync_use_nfs boolean.
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P rsync_use_nfs 1
-+.EE
++The svc_multilog_t SELinux type can be entered via the "svc_multilog_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the svc_multilog_t domain are the following:"
+
++/usr/bin/multilog
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow rsync servers to share cifs files systems, you must turn on the rsync_use_cifs boolean.
-+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P rsync_use_cifs 1
-+.EE
-+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
-+
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the rsync_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
-+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
-+
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux svc_multilog policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their svc_multilog processes in as secure a method as possible.
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the rsync_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++The following process types are defined for svc_multilog:
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B svc_multilog_t
+.EE
-+
-+.SH SHARING FILES
-+If you want to share files with multiple domains (Apache, FTP, rsync, Samba), you can set a file context of public_content_t and public_content_rw_t. These context allow any of the above domains to read the content. If you want a particular domain to write to the public_content_rw_t domain, you must set the appropriate boolean.
- .TP
-+Allow rsync servers to read the /var/rsync directory by adding the public_content_t file type to the directory and by restoring the file type.
-+.PP
-+.B
- semanage fcontext -a -t public_content_t "/var/rsync(/.*)?"
-+.br
-+.B restorecon -F -R -v /var/rsync
-+.pp
- .TP
--This command adds the following entry to /etc/selinux/POLICYTYPE/contexts/files/file_contexts.local:
--.TP
--/var/rsync(/.*)? system_u:object_r:publix_content_t:s0
--.TP
--Run the restorecon command to apply the changes:
--.TP
--restorecon -R -v /var/rsync/
-+Allow rsync servers to read and write /var/tmp/incoming by adding the public_content_rw_t type to the directory and by restoring the file type. This also requires the allow_rsyncd_anon_write boolean to be set.
-+.PP
-+.B
-+semanage fcontext -a -t public_content_rw_t "/var/rsync/incoming(/.*)?"
-+.br
-+.B restorecon -F -R -v /var/rsync/incoming
-+
-+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow rsync to modify public files used for public file transfer services. Files/Directories must be labeled public_content_rw_t., you must turn on the rsync_anon_write boolean.
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P rsync_anon_write 1
- .EE
-
--.SH SHARING FILES
--If you want to share files with multiple domains (Apache, FTP, rsync, Samba), you can set a file context of public_content_t and public_content_rw_t. These context allow any of the above domains to read the content. If you want a particular domain to write to the public_content_rw_t domain, you must set the appropriate boolean. allow_DOMAIN_anon_write. So for rsync you would execute:
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux rsync policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their rsync processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for rsync:
-+
-
- .EX
--setsebool -P allow_rsync_anon_write=1
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux svc_multilog policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their svc_multilog processes in as secure a method as possible.
+.PP
-+.B rsync_data_t
- .EE
-
--.SH BOOLEANS
--.TP
--system-config-selinux is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
-+- Set files with the rsync_data_t type, if you want to treat the files as rsync content.
++The following file types are defined for svc_multilog:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B rsync_etc_t
++.B svc_multilog_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the rsync_etc_t type, if you want to store rsync files in the /etc directories.
++- Set files with the svc_multilog_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the svc_multilog_t domain.
+
+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B rsync_exec_t
-+.EE
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
+
-+- Set files with the rsync_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the rsync_t domain.
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
++The SELinux process type svc_multilog_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B rsync_log_t
-+.EE
++.br
++.B svc_svc_t
+
-+- Set files with the rsync_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as rsync log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++ /service/.*
++.br
++ /var/axfrdns(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/tinydns(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/service/.*
++.br
++ /var/dnscache(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/qmail/supervise(/.*)?
++.br
++ /service
++.br
+
++.br
++.B var_log_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B rsync_tmp_t
-+.EE
++ /var/log/.*
++.br
++ /nsr/logs(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/webmin(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/log/cron[^/]*
++.br
++ /var/log/secure[^/]*
++.br
++ /opt/zimbra/log(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/log/maillog[^/]*
++.br
++ /var/log/spooler[^/]*
++.br
++ /var/log/messages[^/]*
++.br
++ /usr/centreon/log(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/spool/rsyslog(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/axfrdns/log/main(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/spool/bacula/log(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/tinydns/log/main(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/dnscache/log/main(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/stockmaniac/templates_cache(/.*)?
++.br
++ /opt/Symantec/scspagent/IDS/system(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/log
++.br
++ /var/log/dmesg
++.br
++ /var/log/syslog
++.br
++ /var/named/chroot/var/log
++.br
+
-+- Set files with the rsync_tmp_t type, if you want to store rsync temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B rsync_var_run_t
-+.EE
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+- Set files with the rsync_var_run_t type, if you want to store the rsync files under the /run directory.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), svc_multilog(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, svc_run_selinux(8), svc_start_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/svc_run_selinux.8 b/man/man8/svc_run_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..81dbe8e
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/svc_run_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
++.TH "svc_run_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "svc_run" "SELinux Policy documentation for svc_run"
++.SH "NAME"
++svc_run_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the svc_run processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the svc_run processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
++The svc_run processes execute with the svc_run_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.SH PORT TYPES
-+SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
-+.PP
-+You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
++For example:
+
-+.B semanage port -l
++.B ps -eZ | grep svc_run_t
+
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
-+SELinux rsync policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their rsync processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following port types are defined for rsync:
+
-+.EX
-+.TP 5
-+.B rsync_port_t
-+.TP 10
-+.EE
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
++The svc_run_t SELinux type can be entered via the "svc_run_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the svc_run_t domain are the following:"
+
-+Default Defined Ports:
-+tcp 873
-+.EE
-+udp 873
-+.EE
++/var/service/.*/run.*, /var/service/.*/log/run, /var/qmail/supervise/.*/run, /var/qmail/supervise/.*/log/run, /usr/bin/envdir, /usr/bin/fghack, /usr/bin/setlock, /var/axfrdns/run, /var/tinydns/run, /usr/bin/pgrphack, /var/dnscache/run, /usr/bin/envuidgid, /usr/bin/setuidgid, /usr/bin/softlimit, /var/axfrdns/log/run, /var/tinydns/log/run, /var/dnscache/log/run
+.SH PROCESS TYPES
+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux rsync policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their rsync processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for rsync:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux svc_run policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their svc_run processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for svc_run:
+
+.EX
-+.B rsync_t
++.B svc_run_t
+.EE
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux svc_run policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their svc_run processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for svc_run:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B svc_run_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the svc_run_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the svc_run_t domain.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
+can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
@@ -44807,98 +90668,111 @@ index ad9ccf5..805c4ab 100644
+.B semanage module
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
-+.B semanage port
-+can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
-+
-+.B semanage boolean
-+can also be used to manipulate the booleans
-+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
- .SH AUTHOR
--This manual page was written by Dan Walsh <dwalsh at redhat.com>.
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
-
- .SH "SEE ALSO"
--selinux(8), rsync(1), chcon(1), setsebool(8), semanage(8)
-+selinux(8), rsync(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-+, setsebool(8)
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), svc_run(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, svc_multilog_selinux(8), svc_start_selinux(8)
\ No newline at end of file
-diff --git a/man/man8/rtkit_selinux.8 b/man/man8/rtkit_selinux.8
+diff --git a/man/man8/svc_start_selinux.8 b/man/man8/svc_start_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..6388e55
+index 0000000..bada5e7
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/rtkit_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
-+.TH "rtkit_selinux" "8" "rtkit" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "rtkit SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/svc_start_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
++.TH "svc_start_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "svc_start" "SELinux Policy documentation for svc_start"
+.SH "NAME"
-+rtkit_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the rtkit processes
++svc_start_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the svc_start processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the rtkit processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the svc_start processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The svc_start processes execute with the svc_start_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the rtkit_daemon_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep svc_start_t
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
+
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The svc_start_t SELinux type can be entered via the "svc_start_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the svc_start_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/bin/svc, /usr/bin/svok, /usr/bin/svscan, /usr/bin/supervise, /usr/bin/svscanboot
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the rtkit_daemon_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux svc_start policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their svc_start processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for svc_start:
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B svc_start_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux rtkit policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their rtkit processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for rtkit:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux svc_start policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their svc_start processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for svc_start:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B rtkit_daemon_exec_t
++.B svc_start_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the rtkit_daemon_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the rtkit_daemon_t domain.
++- Set files with the svc_start_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the svc_start_t domain.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux rtkit policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their rtkit processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for rtkit:
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+.EX
-+.B rtkit_daemon_t
-+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++The SELinux process type svc_start_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B svc_svc_t
++
++ /service/.*
++.br
++ /var/axfrdns(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/tinydns(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/service/.*
++.br
++ /var/dnscache(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/qmail/supervise(/.*)?
++.br
++ /service
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -44911,119 +90785,140 @@ index 0000000..6388e55
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), rtkit(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/run_selinux.8 b/man/man8/run_selinux.8
++selinux(8), svc_start(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, svc_multilog_selinux(8), svc_run_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/svnserve_selinux.8 b/man/man8/svnserve_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..da9ce6c
+index 0000000..19003a2
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/run_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,123 @@
-+.TH "run_selinux" "8" "run" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "run SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/svnserve_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,138 @@
++.TH "svnserve_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "svnserve" "SELinux Policy documentation for svnserve"
+.SH "NAME"
-+run_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the run processes
++svnserve_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the svnserve processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the run processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the svnserve processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH BOOLEANS
-+SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. run policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run run with the tightest access possible.
++The svnserve processes execute with the svnserve_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
++For example:
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow Apache to run in stickshift mode, not transition to passenger, you must turn on the httpd_run_stickshift boolean.
++.B ps -eZ | grep svnserve_t
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P httpd_run_stickshift 1
-+.EE
+
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The svnserve_t SELinux type can be entered via the "svnserve_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the svnserve_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/bin/svnserve
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow xend to run qemu-dm. Not required if using paravirt and no vfb, you must turn on the xend_run_qemu boolean.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux svnserve policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their svnserve processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for svnserve:
+
+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P xend_run_qemu 1
++.B svnserve_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
-+If you want to allow xend to run blktapctrl/tapdisk. Not required if using dedicated logical volumes for disk images, you must turn on the xend_run_blktap boolean.
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux svnserve policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their svnserve processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for svnserve:
++
+
+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P xend_run_blktap 1
++.PP
++.B svnserve_content_t
+.EE
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow samba to run unconfined scripts, you must turn on the samba_run_unconfined boolean.
++- Set files with the svnserve_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as svnserve content.
++
+
+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P samba_run_unconfined 1
++.PP
++.B svnserve_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++- Set files with the svnserve_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the svnserve_t domain.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the run_init_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.PP
++.B svnserve_initrc_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the run_init_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++- Set files with the svnserve_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the svnserve_initrc_t domain.
++
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.PP
++.B svnserve_unit_file_t
+.EE
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux run policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their run processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for run:
++- Set files with the svnserve_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as svnserve unit content.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B run_init_exec_t
++.B svnserve_var_run_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the run_init_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the run_init_t domain.
++- Set files with the svnserve_var_run_t type, if you want to store the svnserve files under the /run directory.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux run policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their run processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for run:
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+.EX
-+.B run_init_t
-+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++The SELinux process type svnserve_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B svnserve_content_t
++
++ /var/subversion/repo(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/subversion/repo(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B svnserve_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/svnserve.pid
++.br
++ /var/run/svnserve(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -45035,126 +90930,212 @@ index 0000000..da9ce6c
+.B semanage module
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
-+.B semanage boolean
-+can also be used to manipulate the booleans
-+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), run(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-+, setsebool(8)
-\ No newline at end of file
-diff --git a/man/man8/rwho_selinux.8 b/man/man8/rwho_selinux.8
++selinux(8), svnserve(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/swat_selinux.8 b/man/man8/swat_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..8acacbd
+index 0000000..7533603
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/rwho_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,123 @@
-+.TH "rwho_selinux" "8" "rwho" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "rwho SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/swat_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,214 @@
++.TH "swat_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "swat" "SELinux Policy documentation for swat"
+.SH "NAME"
-+rwho_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the rwho processes
++swat_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the swat processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the rwho processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the swat processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The swat processes execute with the swat_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep swat_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The swat_t SELinux type can be entered via the "swat_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the swat_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/sbin/swat
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux rwho policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their rwho processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for rwho:
-+
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux swat policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their swat processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for swat:
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B rwho_exec_t
++.B swat_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
-+- Set files with the rwho_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the rwho_t domain.
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux swat policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their swat processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for swat:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B rwho_initrc_exec_t
++.B swat_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the rwho_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the rwho_initrc_t domain.
++- Set files with the swat_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the swat_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B rwho_log_t
++.B swat_tmp_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the rwho_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as rwho log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++- Set files with the swat_tmp_t type, if you want to store swat temporary files in the /tmp directories.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B rwho_spool_t
++.B swat_var_run_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the rwho_spool_t type, if you want to store the rwho files under the /var/spool directory.
++- Set files with the swat_var_run_t type, if you want to store the swat files under the /run directory.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
+.SH PORT TYPES
-+SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
++SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
+.PP
-+You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
++You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
+
+.B semanage port -l
+
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
-+SELinux rwho policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their rwho processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following port types are defined for rwho:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
++SELinux swat policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their swat processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following port types are defined for swat:
+
+.EX
+.TP 5
-+.B rwho_port_t
++.B swat_port_t
+.TP 10
+.EE
+
+
+Default Defined Ports:
-+udp 513
++tcp 901
+.EE
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type swat_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B faillog_t
++
++ /var/log/btmp.*
++.br
++ /var/run/faillock(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/log/faillog
++.br
++ /var/log/tallylog
++.br
++
++.br
++.B pcscd_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/pcscd(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/pcscd\.events(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/pcscd\.pid
++.br
++ /var/run/pcscd\.pub
++.br
++ /var/run/pcscd\.comm
++.br
++
++.br
++.B samba_etc_t
++
++ /etc/samba(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B samba_log_t
++
++ /var/log/samba(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B samba_secrets_t
++
++ /etc/samba/smbpasswd
++.br
++ /etc/samba/passdb\.tdb
++.br
++ /etc/samba/MACHINE\.SID
++.br
++ /etc/samba/secrets\.tdb
++.br
++
++.br
++.B samba_var_t
++
++ /var/lib/samba(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/cache/samba(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/spool/samba(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B swat_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B swat_var_run_t
++
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux rwho policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their rwho processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for rwho:
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the swat_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B rwho_t
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
++
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the swat_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -45170,304 +91151,528 @@ index 0000000..8acacbd
+can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), rwho(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/samba_selinux.8 b/man/man8/samba_selinux.8
-index ca702c7..2a88102 100644
---- a/man/man8/samba_selinux.8
-+++ b/man/man8/samba_selinux.8
-@@ -1,56 +1,275 @@
--.TH "samba_selinux" "8" "17 Jan 2005" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "Samba Selinux Policy documentation"
-+.TH "samba_selinux" "8" "samba" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "samba SELinux Policy documentation"
- .SH "NAME"
--samba_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for Samba
-+samba_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the samba processes
- .SH "DESCRIPTION"
-
--Security-Enhanced Linux secures the Samba server via flexible mandatory access
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the samba processes via flexible mandatory access
- control.
--.SH FILE_CONTEXTS
--SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
--Policy governs the access daemons have to these files.
--If you want to share files other than home directories, those files must be
--labeled samba_share_t. So if you created a special directory /var/eng, you
--would need to label the directory with the chcon tool.
--.TP
--chcon -t samba_share_t /var/eng
--.TP
--To make this change permanent (survive a relabel), use the semanage command to add the change to file context configuration:
--.TP
--semanage fcontext -a -t samba_share_t "/var/eng(/.*)?"
--.TP
--This command adds the following entry to /etc/selinux/POLICYTYPE/contexts/files/file_contexts.local:
--.TP
--/var/eng(/.*)? system_u:object_r:samba_share_t:s0
--.TP
--Run the restorecon command to apply the changes:
--.TP
--restorecon -R -v /var/eng/
--
--.SH SHARING FILES
--If you want to share files with multiple domains (Apache, FTP, rsync, Samba), you can set a file context of public_content_t and public_content_rw_t. These context allow any of the above domains to read the content. If you want a particular domain to write to the public_content_rw_t domain, you must set the appropriate boolean. allow_DOMAIN_anon_write. So for samba you would execute:
--
--setsebool -P allow_smbd_anon_write=1
-
- .SH BOOLEANS
--.br
--SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. So by
--default SELinux policy turns off SELinux sharing of home directories and
--the use of Samba shares from a remote machine as a home directory.
--.TP
--If you are setting up this machine as a Samba server and wish to share the home directories, you need to set the samba_enable_home_dirs boolean.
-+SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. samba policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run samba with the tightest access possible.
++selinux(8), swat(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/sysadm_selinux.8 b/man/man8/sysadm_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..a815869
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/sysadm_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,532 @@
++.TH "sysadm_selinux" "8" "sysadm" "mgrepl at redhat.com" "sysadm SELinux Policy documentation"
++.SH "NAME"
++sysadm_u \- \fBGeneral system administration role\fP - Security Enhanced Linux Policy
+
++.SH DESCRIPTION
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow samba to act as the domain controller, add users, groups and change passwords, you must turn on the samba_domain_controller boolean.
++\fBsysadm_u\fP is an SELinux User defined in the SELinux
++policy. SELinux users have default roles, \fBsysadm_r\fP. The
++default role has a default type, \fBsysadm_t\fP, associated with it.
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P samba_domain_controller 1
-+.EE
++The SELinux user will usually login to a system with a context that looks like:
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow samba to share any file/directory read only, you must turn on the samba_export_all_ro boolean.
++.B sysadm_u:sysadm_r:sysadm_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P samba_export_all_ro 1
-+.EE
++Linux users are automatically assigned an SELinux users at login.
++Login programs use the SELinux User to assign initial context to the user's shell.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to support SAMBA home directories, you must turn on the use_samba_home_dirs boolean.
++SELinux policy uses the context to control the user's access.
++
++By default all users are assigned to the SELinux user via the \fB__default__\fP flag
++
++On Targeted policy systems the \fB__default__\fP user is assigned to the \fBunconfined_u\fP SELinux user.
++
++You can list all Linux User to SELinux user mapping using:
++
++.B semanage login -l
++
++If you wanted to change the default user mapping to use the sysadm_u user, you would execute:
++
++.B semanage login -m -s sysadm_u __default__
++
++
++If you want to map the one Linux user (joe) to the SELinux user sysadm, you would execute:
++
++.B $ semanage login -a -s sysadm_u joe
++
++
++.SH USER DESCRIPTION
++
++The SELinux user sysadm_u is an admin user. It means that a mapped Linux user to this SELinux user is intended for administrative actions. Usually this is assigned to a root Linux user.
++
++.SH SUDO
++
++The SELinux user sysadm can execute sudo.
++
++You can set up sudo to allow sysadm to transition to an administrative domain:
++
++Add one or more of the following record to sudoers using visudo.
++
++
++USERNAME ALL=(ALL) ROLE=auditadm_r TYPE=auditadm_t COMMAND
++.br
++sudo will run COMMAND as sysadm_u:auditadm_r:auditadm_t:LEVEL
++
++You might also need to add one or more of these new roles to your SELinux user record.
++
++List the SELinux roles your SELinux user can reach by executing:
++
++.B $ semanage user -l |grep selinux_name
++
++Modify the roles list and add sysadm_r to this list.
++
++.B $ semanage user -m -R 'sysadm_r auditadm_r secadm_r staff_r user_r' sysadm_u
++
++For more details you can see semanage man page.
++
++
++USERNAME ALL=(ALL) ROLE=secadm_r TYPE=secadm_t COMMAND
++.br
++sudo will run COMMAND as sysadm_u:secadm_r:secadm_t:LEVEL
++
++You might also need to add one or more of these new roles to your SELinux user record.
++
++List the SELinux roles your SELinux user can reach by executing:
++
++.B $ semanage user -l |grep selinux_name
++
++Modify the roles list and add sysadm_r to this list.
++
++.B $ semanage user -m -R 'sysadm_r auditadm_r secadm_r staff_r user_r' sysadm_u
++
++For more details you can see semanage man page.
++
++
++USERNAME ALL=(ALL) ROLE=staff_r TYPE=staff_t COMMAND
++.br
++sudo will run COMMAND as sysadm_u:staff_r:staff_t:LEVEL
++
++You might also need to add one or more of these new roles to your SELinux user record.
++
++List the SELinux roles your SELinux user can reach by executing:
++
++.B $ semanage user -l |grep selinux_name
++
++Modify the roles list and add sysadm_r to this list.
++
++.B $ semanage user -m -R 'sysadm_r auditadm_r secadm_r staff_r user_r' sysadm_u
++
++For more details you can see semanage man page.
++
++
++USERNAME ALL=(ALL) ROLE=user_r TYPE=user_t COMMAND
++.br
++sudo will run COMMAND as sysadm_u:user_r:user_t:LEVEL
++
++You might also need to add one or more of these new roles to your SELinux user record.
++
++List the SELinux roles your SELinux user can reach by executing:
++
++.B $ semanage user -l |grep selinux_name
++
++Modify the roles list and add sysadm_r to this list.
++
++.B $ semanage user -m -R 'sysadm_r auditadm_r secadm_r staff_r user_r' sysadm_u
++
++For more details you can see semanage man page.
++
++
++The SELinux type sysadm_t is not allowed to execute sudo.
++
++.SH X WINDOWS LOGIN
++
++The SELinux user sysadm_u is able to X Windows login.
++
++.SH NETWORK
++
++.TP
++The SELinux user sysadm_u is able to listen on the following tcp ports.
++
++.B all ports with out defined types
++
++.B ephemeral_port_t: 32768-61000
++
++.TP
++The SELinux user sysadm_u is able to connect to the following tcp ports.
++
++.B all ports
++
++.TP
++The SELinux user sysadm_u is able to listen on the following udp ports.
++
++.B all ports with out defined types
++
++.B ntp_port_t: 123
++
++.B ephemeral_port_t: 32768-61000
++
++.TP
++The SELinux user sysadm_u is able to connect to the following tcp ports.
++
++.B all ports
++
++.SH BOOLEANS
++SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. sysadm policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run sysadm with the tightest access possible.
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P use_samba_home_dirs 1
-+.EE
+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow samba to create new home directories (e.g. via PAM), you must turn on the samba_create_home_dirs boolean.
++If you want to allow ssh logins as sysadm_r:sysadm_t, you must turn on the ssh_sysadm_login boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P samba_create_home_dirs 1
++.B setsebool -P ssh_sysadm_login 1
+.EE
+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow samba to share users home directories, you must turn on the samba_enable_home_dirs boolean.
++If you want to allow the graphical login program to login directly as sysadm_r:sysadm_t, you must turn on the xdm_sysadm_login boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P samba_enable_home_dirs 1
++.B setsebool -P xdm_sysadm_login 1
+.EE
+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow samba to act as a portmapper, you must turn on the samba_portmapper boolean.
++If you want to allow ssh logins as sysadm_r:sysadm_t, you must turn on the ssh_sysadm_login boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P samba_portmapper 1
++.B setsebool -P ssh_sysadm_login 1
+.EE
+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow samba to export ntfs/fusefs volumes, you must turn on the samba_share_fusefs boolean.
++If you want to allow the graphical login program to login directly as sysadm_r:sysadm_t, you must turn on the xdm_sysadm_login boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P samba_share_fusefs 1
++.B setsebool -P xdm_sysadm_login 1
+.EE
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow samba to export NFS volumes, you must turn on the samba_share_nfs boolean.
++.SH HOME_EXEC
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P samba_share_nfs 1
-+.EE
++The SELinux user sysadm_u is able execute home content files.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow samba to run unconfined scripts, you must turn on the samba_run_unconfined boolean.
++.SH TRANSITIONS
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P samba_run_unconfined 1
-+.EE
++Three things can happen when sysadm_t attempts to execute a program.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow sanlock to manage cifs files, you must turn on the sanlock_use_samba boolean.
++\fB1.\fP SELinux Policy can deny sysadm_t from executing the program.
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P sanlock_use_samba 1
-+.EE
++.TP
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow samba to share any file/directory read/write, you must turn on the samba_export_all_rw boolean.
++\fB2.\fP SELinux Policy can allow sysadm_t to execute the program in the current user type.
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P samba_export_all_rw 1
-+.EE
++Execute the following to see the types that the SELinux user sysadm_t can execute without transitioning:
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined virtual guests to manage cifs files, you must turn on the virt_use_samba boolean.
++.B search -A -s sysadm_t -c file -p execute_no_trans
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P virt_use_samba 1
-+.EE
++.TP
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++\fB3.\fP SELinux can allow sysadm_t to execute the program and transition to a new type.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the samba_net_t, sambagui_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++Execute the following to see the types that the SELinux user sysadm_t can execute and transition:
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
++.B $ search -A -s sysadm_t -c process -p transition
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the samba_net_t, sambagui_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
-+.EE
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux samba policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their samba processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for samba:
++The SELinux process type sysadm_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
++.br
++.B auditd_etc_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B samba_etc_t
-+.EE
++ /etc/audit(/.*)?
++.br
+
-+- Set files with the samba_etc_t type, if you want to store samba files in the /etc directories.
++.br
++.B auditd_log_t
+
++ /var/log/audit(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/log/audit\.log
++.br
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B samba_initrc_exec_t
-+.EE
++.br
++.B boolean_type
+
-+- Set files with the samba_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the samba_initrc_t domain.
+
- .br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/etc/rc\.d/init\.d/nmb, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/smb, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/winbind
++.br
++.B etc_runtime_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B samba_log_t
-+.EE
++ /[^/]+
++.br
++ /etc/mtab.*
++.br
++ /etc/blkid(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/nologin.*
++.br
++ /etc/\.fstab\.hal\..+
++.br
++ /halt
++.br
++ /fastboot
++.br
++ /poweroff
++.br
++ /etc/cmtab
++.br
++ /\.autofsck
++.br
++ /forcefsck
++.br
++ /\.suspended
++.br
++ /fsckoptions
++.br
++ /\.autorelabel
++.br
++ /etc/securetty
++.br
++ /etc/killpower
++.br
++ /etc/nohotplug
++.br
++ /etc/ioctl\.save
++.br
++ /etc/fstab\.REVOKE
++.br
++ /etc/network/ifstate
++.br
++ /etc/sysconfig/hwconf
++.br
++ /etc/ptal/ptal-printd-like
++.br
++ /etc/sysconfig/iptables\.save
++.br
++ /etc/xorg\.conf\.d/00-system-setup-keyboard\.conf
++.br
++ /etc/X11/xorg\.conf\.d/00-system-setup-keyboard\.conf
++.br
+
-+- Set files with the samba_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as samba log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++.br
++.B iceauth_home_t
+
++ /root/\.DCOP.*
++.br
++ /root/\.ICEauthority.*
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.DCOP.*
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.ICEauthority.*
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.DCOP.*
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.ICEauthority.*
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.DCOP.*
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.ICEauthority.*
++.br
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B samba_net_exec_t
-+.EE
++.br
++.B krb5_host_rcache_t
+
-+- Set files with the samba_net_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the samba_net_t domain.
++ /var/cache/krb5rcache(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/tmp/nfs_0
++.br
++ /var/tmp/DNS_25
++.br
++ /var/tmp/host_0
++.br
++ /var/tmp/imap_0
++.br
++ /var/tmp/HTTP_23
++.br
++ /var/tmp/HTTP_48
++.br
++ /var/tmp/ldap_55
++.br
++ /var/tmp/ldap_487
++.br
++ /var/tmp/ldapmap1_0
++.br
+
++.br
++.B krb5_keytab_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B samba_net_tmp_t
-+.EE
++ /etc/krb5\.keytab
++.br
++ /etc/krb5kdc/kadm5\.keytab
++.br
++ /var/kerberos/krb5kdc/kadm5\.keytab
++.br
+
-+- Set files with the samba_net_tmp_t type, if you want to store samba net temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++.br
++.B non_security_file_type
+
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B samba_secrets_t
-+.EE
++.br
++.B noxattrfs
+
-+- Set files with the samba_secrets_t type, if you want to treat the files as samba secrets data.
++ all files on file systems which do not support extended attributes
++.br
+
+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/etc/samba/secrets\.tdb, /etc/samba/passdb\.tdb, /etc/samba/MACHINE\.SID, /etc/samba/smbpasswd
++.B screen_home_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B samba_share_t
-+.EE
++ /root/\.screen(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.screen(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.screenrc
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.screen(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.screenrc
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.screen(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.screenrc
++.br
+
-+- Set files with the samba_share_t type, if you want to treat the files as samba share data.
++.br
++.B sysctl_type
+
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B samba_unconfined_script_exec_t
-+.EE
++.br
++.B systemd_passwd_var_run_t
+
-+- Set files with the samba_unconfined_script_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the samba_unconfined_script_t domain.
++ /var/run/systemd/ask-password(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/systemd/ask-password-block(/.*)?
++.br
+
++.br
++.B systemd_unit_file_type
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B samba_unit_file_t
-+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the samba_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as samba unit content.
++.br
++.B usbfs_t
++
+
+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/lib/systemd/system/smb.*, /usr/lib/systemd/system/nmb.*
++.B user_fonts_cache_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B samba_var_t
-+.EE
++ /root/\.fontconfig(/.*)?
++.br
++ /root/\.fonts/auto(/.*)?
++.br
++ /root/\.fonts\.cache-.*
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.fontconfig(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.fonts/auto(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.fonts\.cache-.*
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.fontconfig(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.fonts/auto(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.fonts\.cache-.*
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.fontconfig(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.fonts/auto(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.fonts\.cache-.*
++.br
++
++.br
++.B user_fonts_t
+
-+- Set files with the samba_var_t type, if you want to store the s files under the /var directory.
++ /root/\.fonts(/.*)?
++.br
++ /tmp/\.font-unix(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.fonts(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.fonts(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.fonts(/.*)?
++.br
+
+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/spool/samba(/.*)?, /var/cache/samba(/.*)?, /var/lib/samba(/.*)?
++.B user_home_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B sambagui_exec_t
-+.EE
++ /home/[^/]*/.+
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/.+
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/.+
++.br
+
-+- Set files with the sambagui_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the sambagui_t domain.
++.br
++.B user_home_type
+
++ all user home files
++.br
+
-+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
++.br
++.B user_tmp_type
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux samba policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their samba processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for samba:
++ all user tmp files
++.br
++
++.br
++.B user_tmpfs_type
++
++ all user content in tmpfs file systems
++.br
++
++.br
++.B xauth_home_t
++
++ /root/\.xauth.*
++.br
++ /root/\.Xauth.*
++.br
++ /root/\.serverauth.*
++.br
++ /root/\.Xauthority.*
++.br
++ /var/lib/pqsql/\.xauth.*
++.br
++ /var/lib/pqsql/\.Xauthority.*
++.br
++ /var/lib/nxserver/home/\.xauth.*
++.br
++ /var/lib/nxserver/home/\.Xauthority.*
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.xauth.*
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.Xauth.*
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.serverauth.*
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.Xauthority.*
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.xauth.*
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.Xauth.*
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.serverauth.*
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.Xauthority.*
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.xauth.*
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.Xauth.*
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.serverauth.*
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.Xauthority.*
++.br
++
++.br
++.B xserver_tmpfs_t
+
-+.EX
-+.B samba_net_t, samba_unconfined_script_t, sambagui_t
-+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -45478,418 +91683,286 @@ index ca702c7..2a88102 100644
+.PP
+.B semanage module
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
-
--setsebool -P samba_enable_home_dirs 1
--.TP
--If you want to use a remote Samba server for the home directories on this machine, you must set the use_samba_home_dirs boolean.
--.br
++
+.B semanage boolean
+can also be used to manipulate the booleans
-
--setsebool -P use_samba_home_dirs 1
--.TP
--system-config-selinux is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
-
- .SH AUTHOR
--This manual page was written by Dan Walsh <dwalsh at redhat.com>.
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
-
- .SH "SEE ALSO"
--selinux(8), samba(7), chcon(1), setsebool(8), semanage(8)
-+selinux(8), samba(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
++
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), sysadm(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+, setsebool(8)
\ No newline at end of file
-diff --git a/man/man8/sambagui_selinux.8 b/man/man8/sambagui_selinux.8
+diff --git a/man/man8/syslogd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/syslogd_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..0016c04
+index 0000000..6ebf4fa
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/sambagui_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
-+.TH "sambagui_selinux" "8" "sambagui" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "sambagui SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/syslogd_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,286 @@
++.TH "syslogd_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "syslogd" "SELinux Policy documentation for syslogd"
+.SH "NAME"
-+sambagui_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the sambagui processes
++syslogd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the syslogd processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the sambagui processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
-+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
-+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the sambagui_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
-+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
-+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the sambagui_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
-+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
-+.EE
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the syslogd processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux sambagui policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their sambagui processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for sambagui:
++The syslogd processes execute with the syslogd_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B sambagui_exec_t
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep syslogd_t
+
-+- Set files with the sambagui_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the sambagui_t domain.
+
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
-+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
++The syslogd_t SELinux type can be entered via the "syslogd_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the syslogd_t domain are the following:"
+
++/sbin/syslogd, /sbin/minilogd, /sbin/rsyslogd, /sbin/syslog-ng, /usr/sbin/metalog, /usr/sbin/syslogd, /usr/sbin/minilogd, /usr/sbin/rsyslogd, /usr/sbin/syslog-ng, /usr/lib/systemd/systemd-journald, /usr/lib/systemd/systemd-kmsg-syslogd
+.SH PROCESS TYPES
+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux sambagui policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their sambagui processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for sambagui:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux syslogd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their syslogd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for syslogd:
+
+.EX
-+.B sambagui_t
++.B syslogd_t
+.EE
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
-+.SH "COMMANDS"
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
-+.PP
-+.B semanage permissive
-+can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
-+.PP
-+.B semanage module
-+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
-+
-+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
-+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
-+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
-+
-+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), sambagui(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/sandbox_selinux.8 b/man/man8/sandbox_selinux.8
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..76f0d9f
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/sandbox_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,166 @@
-+.TH "sandbox_selinux" "8" "sandbox" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "sandbox SELinux Policy documentation"
-+.SH "NAME"
-+sandbox_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the sandbox processes
-+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
-+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the sandbox processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
-+
+.SH BOOLEANS
-+SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. sandbox policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run sandbox with the tightest access possible.
++SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. syslogd policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run syslogd with the tightest access possible.
+
+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow unconfined users to transition to the chrome sandbox domains when running chrome-sandbox, you must turn on the unconfined_chrome_sandbox_transition boolean.
++If you want to allow syslogd the ability to read/write terminals, you must turn on the logging_syslogd_use_tty boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P unconfined_chrome_sandbox_transition 1
++.B setsebool -P logging_syslogd_use_tty 1
+.EE
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
-+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the sandbox_min_t, sandbox_net_t, sandbox_web_client_t, sandbox_xserver_t, sandbox_web_t, sandbox_x_client_t, sandbox_x_t, sandbox_net_client_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++If you want to allow syslogd daemon to send mail, you must turn on the logging_syslogd_can_sendmail boolean.
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.B setsebool -P logging_syslogd_can_sendmail 1
+.EE
+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the sandbox_min_t, sandbox_net_t, sandbox_web_client_t, sandbox_xserver_t, sandbox_web_t, sandbox_x_client_t, sandbox_x_t, sandbox_net_client_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++If you want to allow syslogd the ability to read/write terminals, you must turn on the logging_syslogd_use_tty boolean.
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B setsebool -P logging_syslogd_use_tty 1
+.EE
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux sandbox policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their sandbox processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for sandbox:
-+
++If you want to allow syslogd daemon to send mail, you must turn on the logging_syslogd_can_sendmail boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B sandbox_devpts_t
++.B setsebool -P logging_syslogd_can_sendmail 1
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the sandbox_devpts_t type, if you want to treat the files as sandbox devpts data.
-+
-+
-+.EX
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
-+.B sandbox_exec_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the sandbox_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the sandbox_t domain.
-+
-+
-+.EX
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+.B sandbox_file_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the sandbox_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as sandbox content.
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux syslogd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their syslogd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for syslogd:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B sandbox_min_client_tmpfs_t
++.B syslogd_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the sandbox_min_client_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store sandbox min client files on a tmpfs file system.
++- Set files with the syslogd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the syslogd_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B sandbox_net_client_tmpfs_t
++.B syslogd_initrc_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the sandbox_net_client_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store sandbox net client files on a tmpfs file system.
++- Set files with the syslogd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the syslogd_initrc_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B sandbox_staff_file_t
++.B syslogd_keytab_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the sandbox_staff_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as sandbox staff content.
++- Set files with the syslogd_keytab_t type, if you want to treat the files as kerberos keytab files.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B sandbox_web_client_tmpfs_t
++.B syslogd_tmp_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the sandbox_web_client_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store sandbox web client files on a tmpfs file system.
++- Set files with the syslogd_tmp_t type, if you want to store syslogd temporary files in the /tmp directories.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B sandbox_x_client_tmpfs_t
++.B syslogd_var_lib_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the sandbox_x_client_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store sandbox x client files on a tmpfs file system.
++- Set files with the syslogd_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the syslogd files under the /var/lib directory.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B sandbox_xserver_tmpfs_t
++.B syslogd_var_run_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the sandbox_xserver_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store sandbox xserver files on a tmpfs file system.
++- Set files with the syslogd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the syslogd files under the /run directory.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux sandbox policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their sandbox processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for sandbox:
-+
-+.EX
-+.B sandbox_x_client_t, sandbox_net_client_t, sandbox_xserver_t, sandbox_x_t, sandbox_staff_t, sandbox_web_client_t, sandbox_min_t, sandbox_net_t, sandbox_web_t, sandbox_min_client_t, sandbox_t
-+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
-+
-+.SH "COMMANDS"
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
-+.PP
-+.B semanage permissive
-+can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.SH PORT TYPES
++SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
+.PP
-+.B semanage module
-+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
+
-+.B semanage boolean
-+can also be used to manipulate the booleans
++.B semanage port -l
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
-+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
-+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
-+
-+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), sandbox(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-+, setsebool(8)
-\ No newline at end of file
-diff --git a/man/man8/sanlock_selinux.8 b/man/man8/sanlock_selinux.8
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..7b9ea7a
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/sanlock_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,140 @@
-+.TH "sanlock_selinux" "8" "sanlock" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "sanlock SELinux Policy documentation"
-+.SH "NAME"
-+sanlock_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the sanlock processes
-+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
-+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the sanlock processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
-+
-+.SH BOOLEANS
-+SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. sanlock policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run sanlock with the tightest access possible.
-+
-+
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
++SELinux syslogd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their syslogd processes in as secure a method as possible.
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined virtual guests to interact with the sanlock, you must turn on the virt_use_sanlock boolean.
++The following port types are defined for syslogd:
+
+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P virt_use_sanlock 1
++.TP 5
++.B syslogd_port_t
++.TP 10
+.EE
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow sanlock to manage nfs files, you must turn on the sanlock_use_nfs boolean.
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P sanlock_use_nfs 1
++Default Defined Ports:
++tcp 6514
+.EE
-+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow sanlock to manage cifs files, you must turn on the sanlock_use_samba boolean.
-+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P sanlock_use_samba 1
++udp 514,6514
+.EE
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The SELinux process type syslogd_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the sanlock_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++.br
++.B krb5_host_rcache_t
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
++ /var/cache/krb5rcache(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/tmp/nfs_0
++.br
++ /var/tmp/DNS_25
++.br
++ /var/tmp/host_0
++.br
++ /var/tmp/imap_0
++.br
++ /var/tmp/HTTP_23
++.br
++ /var/tmp/HTTP_48
++.br
++ /var/tmp/ldap_55
++.br
++ /var/tmp/ldap_487
++.br
++ /var/tmp/ldapmap1_0
++.br
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the sanlock_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++.br
++.B logfile
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
-+.EE
++ all log files
++.br
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux sanlock policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their sanlock processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for sanlock:
++.br
++.B security_t
+
++ /selinux
++.br
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B sanlock_exec_t
-+.EE
++.br
++.B syslogd_tmp_t
+
-+- Set files with the sanlock_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the sanlock_t domain.
+
++.br
++.B syslogd_var_lib_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B sanlock_initrc_exec_t
-+.EE
++ /var/lib/r?syslog(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/syslog-ng(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/syslog-ng.persist
++.br
++
++.br
++.B syslogd_var_run_t
+
-+- Set files with the sanlock_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the sanlock_initrc_t domain.
++ /var/run/log(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/syslog-ng.ctl
++.br
++ /var/log/syslog-ng(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/syslog-ng(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/systemd/journal(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/metalog\.pid
++.br
++ /var/run/syslogd\.pid
++.br
+
++.br
++.B tmpfs_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B sanlock_log_t
-+.EE
++ /dev/shm
++.br
++ /lib/udev/devices/shm
++.br
++ /usr/lib/udev/devices/shm
++.br
+
-+- Set files with the sanlock_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as sanlock log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the syslogd_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B sanlock_var_run_t
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the sanlock_var_run_t type, if you want to store the sanlock files under the /run directory.
-+
-+
-+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
-+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux sanlock policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their sanlock processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for sanlock:
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the syslogd_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B sanlock_t
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -45901,132 +91974,133 @@ index 0000000..7b9ea7a
+.B semanage module
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
++.B semanage port
++can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
++
+.B semanage boolean
+can also be used to manipulate the booleans
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), sanlock(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
++selinux(8), syslogd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+, setsebool(8)
\ No newline at end of file
-diff --git a/man/man8/saslauthd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/saslauthd_selinux.8
+diff --git a/man/man8/sysstat_selinux.8 b/man/man8/sysstat_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..d96e37e
+index 0000000..a41e354
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/saslauthd_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,130 @@
-+.TH "saslauthd_selinux" "8" "saslauthd" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "saslauthd SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/sysstat_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,124 @@
++.TH "sysstat_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "sysstat" "SELinux Policy documentation for sysstat"
+.SH "NAME"
-+saslauthd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the saslauthd processes
++sysstat_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the sysstat processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the saslauthd processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
-+
-+.SH BOOLEANS
-+SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. saslauthd policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run saslauthd with the tightest access possible.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the sysstat processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
++The sysstat processes execute with the sysstat_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow sasl to read shadow, you must turn on the saslauthd_read_shadow boolean.
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P saslauthd_read_shadow 1
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep sysstat_t
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the saslauthd_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
++The sysstat_t SELinux type can be entered via the "sysstat_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the sysstat_t domain are the following:"
+
++/usr/lib/sa/sa.*, /usr/lib/atsar/atsa.*, /usr/lib/sysstat/sa.*
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the saslauthd_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux sysstat policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their sysstat processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for sysstat:
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B sysstat_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux saslauthd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their saslauthd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for saslauthd:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux sysstat policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their sysstat processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for sysstat:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B saslauthd_exec_t
++.B sysstat_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the saslauthd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the saslauthd_t domain.
++- Set files with the sysstat_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the sysstat_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B saslauthd_initrc_exec_t
++.B sysstat_log_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the saslauthd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the saslauthd_initrc_t domain.
++- Set files with the sysstat_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as sysstat log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
+
+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B saslauthd_keytab_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the saslauthd_keytab_t type, if you want to treat the files as kerberos keytab files.
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
+
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B saslauthd_var_run_t
-+.EE
++The SELinux process type sysstat_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
-+- Set files with the saslauthd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the saslauthd files under the /run directory.
++.br
++.B sysstat_log_t
+
++ /var/log/sa(/.*)?
++.br
++ /opt/sartest(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/log/atsar(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/log/sysstat(/.*)?
+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/run/saslauthd(/.*)?, /var/lib/sasl2(/.*)?
+
-+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux saslauthd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their saslauthd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for saslauthd:
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the sysstat_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B saslauthd_t
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
++
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the sysstat_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -46038,95 +92112,115 @@ index 0000000..d96e37e
+.B semanage module
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
-+.B semanage boolean
-+can also be used to manipulate the booleans
-+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), saslauthd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-+, setsebool(8)
-\ No newline at end of file
-diff --git a/man/man8/sblim_selinux.8 b/man/man8/sblim_selinux.8
++selinux(8), sysstat(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/system_munin_plugin_selinux.8 b/man/man8/system_munin_plugin_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..4e9252e
+index 0000000..1b3a9b7
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/sblim_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
-+.TH "sblim_selinux" "8" "sblim" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "sblim SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/system_munin_plugin_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,115 @@
++.TH "system_munin_plugin_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "system_munin_plugin" "SELinux Policy documentation for system_munin_plugin"
+.SH "NAME"
-+sblim_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the sblim processes
++system_munin_plugin_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the system_munin_plugin processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the sblim processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the system_munin_plugin processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The system_munin_plugin processes execute with the system_munin_plugin_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep system_munin_plugin_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The system_munin_plugin_t SELinux type can be entered via the "system_munin_plugin_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the system_munin_plugin_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/share/munin/plugins/cpu.*, /usr/share/munin/plugins/if_.*, /usr/share/munin/plugins/nfs.*, /usr/share/munin/plugins/iostat.*, /usr/share/munin/plugins/munin_.*, /usr/share/munin/plugins/yum, /usr/share/munin/plugins/acpi, /usr/share/munin/plugins/load, /usr/share/munin/plugins/swap, /usr/share/munin/plugins/forks, /usr/share/munin/plugins/users, /usr/share/munin/plugins/memory, /usr/share/munin/plugins/uptime, /usr/share/munin/plugins/netstat, /usr/share/munin/plugins/threads, /usr/share/munin/plugins/irqstats, /usr/share/munin/plugins/proc_pri, /usr/share/munin/plugins/processes, /usr/share/munin/plugins/interrupts, /usr/share/munin/plugins/open_files
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux sblim policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their sblim processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for sblim:
-+
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux system_munin_plugin policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their system_munin_plugin processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for system_munin_plugin:
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B sblim_gatherd_exec_t
++.B system_munin_plugin_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
-+- Set files with the sblim_gatherd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the sblim_gatherd_t domain.
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux system_munin_plugin policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their system_munin_plugin processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for system_munin_plugin:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B sblim_reposd_exec_t
++.B system_munin_plugin_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the sblim_reposd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the sblim_reposd_t domain.
++- Set files with the system_munin_plugin_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the system_munin_plugin_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B sblim_var_run_t
++.B system_munin_plugin_tmp_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the sblim_var_run_t type, if you want to store the sblim files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the system_munin_plugin_tmp_t type, if you want to store system munin plugin temporary files in the /tmp directories.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux sblim policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their sblim processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for sblim:
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+.EX
-+.B sblim_reposd_t, sblim_gatherd_t
-+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++The SELinux process type system_munin_plugin_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B munin_plugin_state_t
++
++ /var/lib/munin/plugin-state(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B munin_var_lib_t
++
++ /var/lib/munin(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B system_munin_plugin_tmp_t
++
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -46139,158 +92233,102 @@ index 0000000..4e9252e
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), sblim(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/secadm_selinux.8 b/man/man8/secadm_selinux.8
++selinux(8), system_munin_plugin(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, systemd_logger_selinux(8), systemd_logind_selinux(8), systemd_notify_selinux(8), systemd_passwd_agent_selinux(8), systemd_tmpfiles_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/systemd_logger_selinux.8 b/man/man8/systemd_logger_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..6bf3e2b
+index 0000000..b8b6a98
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/secadm_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
-+.TH "secadm_selinux" "8" "secadm" "mgrepl at redhat.com" "secadm SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/systemd_logger_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
++.TH "systemd_logger_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "systemd_logger" "SELinux Policy documentation for systemd_logger"
+.SH "NAME"
-+secadm_r \- \fBSecurity administrator role\fP - Security Enhanced Linux Policy
-+
-+.SH DESCRIPTION
-+
-+SELinux supports Roles Based Access Control, some Linux roles are login roles, while other roles need to be transition to.
-+
-+Note: The examples in the man page will user the staff_u user.
-+
-+Non login roles are usually used for administrative tasks.
-+
-+Roles usually have default types assigned to them.
-+
-+The default type for the secadm_r role is secadm_t.
-+
-+You can use the
-+.B newrole
-+program to transition directly to this role.
-+
-+.B newrole -r secadm_r -t secadm_t
-+
-+.B sudo
-+can also be setup to transition to this role using the visudo command.
-+
-+USERNAME ALL=(ALL) ROLE=secadm_r TYPE=secadm_t COMMAND
-+.br
-+sudo will run COMMAND as staff_u:secadm_r:secadm_t:LEVEL
-+
-+If you want to use a non login role, you need to make sure the SELinux user you are using can reach this role.
-+
-+You can see all of the assigned SELinux roles using the following
-+
-+.B semanage user -l
-+
-+If you wanted to add secadm_r to the staff_u user, you would execute:
-+
-+.B $ semanage user -m -R 'staff_r secadm_r' staff_u
-+
-+
-+
-+SELinux policy also controls which roles can transition to a different role.
-+You can list these rules using the following command.
-+
-+.B sesearch --role_allow
-+
-+SELinux policy allows the sysadm_r, staff_r, auditadm_r roles can transition to the secadm_r role.
-+
-+
-+.SH "COMMANDS"
++systemd_logger_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the systemd_logger processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+.B semanage login
-+can also be used to manipulate the Linux User to SELinux User mappings
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the systemd_logger processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.B semanage user
-+can also be used to manipulate SELinux user definitions.
++The systemd_logger processes execute with the systemd_logger_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.B system-config-selinux
-+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++For example:
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genuserman.py.
++.B ps -eZ | grep systemd_logger_t
+
-+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), semanage(8).
-diff --git a/man/man8/sectoolm_selinux.8 b/man/man8/sectoolm_selinux.8
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..584af3d
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/sectoolm_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
-+.TH "sectoolm_selinux" "8" "sectoolm" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "sectoolm SELinux Policy documentation"
-+.SH "NAME"
-+sectoolm_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the sectoolm processes
-+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the sectoolm processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The systemd_logger_t SELinux type can be entered via the "systemd_logger_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the systemd_logger_t domain are the following:"
+
++/usr/lib/systemd/systemd-logger
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the sectoolm_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
-+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
-+
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the sectoolm_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux systemd_logger policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their systemd_logger processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for systemd_logger:
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B systemd_logger_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux sectoolm policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their sectoolm processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for sectoolm:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux systemd_logger policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their systemd_logger processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for systemd_logger:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B sectoolm_exec_t
++.B systemd_logger_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the sectoolm_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the sectoolm_t domain.
++- Set files with the systemd_logger_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the systemd_logger_t domain.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux sectoolm policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their sectoolm processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for sectoolm:
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the systemd_logger_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B sectoolm_t
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
++
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the systemd_logger_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -46303,126 +92341,250 @@ index 0000000..584af3d
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), sectoolm(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/selinux_selinux.8 b/man/man8/selinux_selinux.8
++selinux(8), systemd_logger(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, systemd_logind_selinux(8), systemd_notify_selinux(8), systemd_passwd_agent_selinux(8), systemd_tmpfiles_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/systemd_logind_selinux.8 b/man/man8/systemd_logind_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..13e68bf
+index 0000000..d2912c3
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/selinux_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,130 @@
-+.TH "selinux_selinux" "8" "selinux" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "selinux SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/systemd_logind_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,249 @@
++.TH "systemd_logind_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "systemd_logind" "SELinux Policy documentation for systemd_logind"
+.SH "NAME"
-+selinux_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the selinux processes
++systemd_logind_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the systemd_logind processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the selinux processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the systemd_logind processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH BOOLEANS
-+SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. selinux policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run selinux with the tightest access possible.
++The systemd_logind processes execute with the systemd_logind_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
++For example:
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow unconfined executables to make their heap memory executable. Doing this is a really bad idea. Probably indicates a badly coded executable, but could indicate an attack. This executable should be reported in bugzilla, you must turn on the selinuxuser_execheap boolean.
++.B ps -eZ | grep systemd_logind_t
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P selinuxuser_execheap 1
-+.EE
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow all unconfined executables to use libraries requiring text relocation that are not labeled textrel_shlib_t, you must turn on the selinuxuser_execmod boolean.
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P selinuxuser_execmod 1
-+.EE
++The systemd_logind_t SELinux type can be entered via the "systemd_logind_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the systemd_logind_t domain are the following:"
+
++/usr/lib/systemd/systemd-logind
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow unconfined executables to make their stack executable. This should never, ever be necessary. Probably indicates a badly coded executable, but could indicate an attack. This executable should be reported in bugzilla, you must turn on the selinuxuser_execstack boolean.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux systemd_logind policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their systemd_logind processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for systemd_logind:
+
+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P selinuxuser_execstack 1
++.B systemd_logind_t
+.EE
-+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux selinux policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their selinux processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for selinux:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux systemd_logind policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their systemd_logind processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for systemd_logind:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B selinux_config_t
++.B systemd_logind_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the selinux_config_t type, if you want to treat the files as selinux configuration data, usually stored under the /etc directory.
++- Set files with the systemd_logind_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the systemd_logind_t domain.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/etc/selinux/([^/]*/)?users(/.*)?, /etc/selinux/([^/]*/)?setrans\.conf, /etc/selinux(/.*)?, /etc/selinux/([^/]*/)?seusers
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B selinux_munin_plugin_exec_t
++.B systemd_logind_inhibit_var_run_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the selinux_munin_plugin_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the selinux_munin_plugin_t domain.
++- Set files with the systemd_logind_inhibit_var_run_t type, if you want to store the systemd logind inhibit files under the /run directory.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B selinux_munin_plugin_tmp_t
++.B systemd_logind_sessions_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the selinux_munin_plugin_tmp_t type, if you want to store selinux munin plugin temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++- Set files with the systemd_logind_sessions_t type, if you want to treat the files as systemd logind sessions data.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B selinux_var_lib_t
++.B systemd_logind_var_run_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the selinux_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the selinux files under the /var/lib directory.
++- Set files with the systemd_logind_var_run_t type, if you want to store the systemd logind files under the /run directory.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type systemd_logind_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B cgroup_t
++
++ /cgroup
++.br
++ /sys/fs/cgroup
++.br
++
++.br
++.B config_home_t
++
++ /root/\.kde(/.*)?
++.br
++ /root/\.xine(/.*)?
++.br
++ /root/\.config(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/user/[^/]*/dconf(/.*)?
++.br
++ /root/\.Xdefaults
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.kde(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.xine(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.config(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.Xdefaults
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.kde(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.xine(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.config(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.Xdefaults
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.kde(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.xine(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.config(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.Xdefaults
++.br
++
++.br
++.B sysfs_t
++
++ /sys(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B systemd_logind_inhibit_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/systemd/inhibit(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B systemd_logind_sessions_t
++
++ /var/run/systemd/sessions(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B systemd_logind_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/systemd/seats(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/systemd/users(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/nologin
++.br
++
++.br
++.B systemd_passwd_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/systemd/ask-password(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/systemd/ask-password-block(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B udev_rules_t
++
++ /etc/udev/rules.d(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B user_tmp_t
++
++ /var/run/user(/.*)?
++.br
++ /tmp/gconfd-.*
++.br
++ /tmp/gconfd-dwalsh
++.br
++ /tmp/gconfd-xguest
++.br
++
++.br
++.B var_auth_t
++
++ /var/ace(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/rsa(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/abl(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/rsa(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/pam_ssh(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/pam_ssh(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/pam_shield(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/google-authenticator(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux selinux policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their selinux processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for selinux:
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the systemd_logind_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B selinux_munin_plugin_t
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
++
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the systemd_logind_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -46434,141 +92596,235 @@ index 0000000..13e68bf
+.B semanage module
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
-+.B semanage boolean
-+can also be used to manipulate the booleans
-+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), selinux(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-+, setsebool(8)
++selinux(8), systemd_logind(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, systemd_logger_selinux(8), systemd_notify_selinux(8), systemd_passwd_agent_selinux(8), systemd_tmpfiles_selinux(8)
\ No newline at end of file
-diff --git a/man/man8/semanage_selinux.8 b/man/man8/semanage_selinux.8
+diff --git a/man/man8/systemd_notify_selinux.8 b/man/man8/systemd_notify_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..bb8dd56
+index 0000000..6a06f93
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/semanage_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,135 @@
-+.TH "semanage_selinux" "8" "semanage" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "semanage SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/systemd_notify_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
++.TH "systemd_notify_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "systemd_notify" "SELinux Policy documentation for systemd_notify"
+.SH "NAME"
-+semanage_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the semanage processes
++systemd_notify_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the systemd_notify processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the semanage processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the systemd_notify processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The systemd_notify processes execute with the systemd_notify_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the semanage_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep systemd_notify_t
+
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The systemd_notify_t SELinux type can be entered via the "systemd_notify_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the systemd_notify_t domain are the following:"
++
++/bin/systemd-notify, /usr/bin/systemd-notify
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the semanage_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux systemd_notify policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their systemd_notify processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for systemd_notify:
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B systemd_notify_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux semanage policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their semanage processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for semanage:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux systemd_notify policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their systemd_notify processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for systemd_notify:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B semanage_exec_t
++.B systemd_notify_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the semanage_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the semanage_t domain.
++- Set files with the systemd_notify_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the systemd_notify_t domain.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/share/system-config-selinux/system-config-selinux-dbus\.py, /usr/sbin/semanage, /usr/sbin/semodule
+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B semanage_read_lock_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the semanage_read_lock_t type, if you want to treat the files as semanage read lock data, stored under the /var/lock directory
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
+
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B semanage_store_t
-+.EE
++The SELinux process type systemd_notify_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
-+- Set files with the semanage_store_t type, if you want to treat the files as semanage store data.
++.br
++.B readahead_var_run_t
+
++ /dev/\.systemd/readahead(/.*)?
+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/etc/share/selinux/mls(/.*)?, /etc/selinux/([^/]*/)?modules/(active|tmp|previous)(/.*)?, /etc/selinux/([^/]*/)?policy(/.*)?, /etc/share/selinux/targeted(/.*)?
++ /var/run/systemd/readahead(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the systemd_notify_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
++
+.PP
-+.B semanage_tmp_t
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the systemd_notify_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the semanage_tmp_t type, if you want to store semanage temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.EX
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), systemd_notify(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, systemd_logger_selinux(8), systemd_logind_selinux(8), systemd_passwd_agent_selinux(8), systemd_tmpfiles_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/systemd_passwd_agent_selinux.8 b/man/man8/systemd_passwd_agent_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..e32dad2
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/systemd_passwd_agent_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
++.TH "systemd_passwd_agent_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "systemd_passwd_agent" "SELinux Policy documentation for systemd_passwd_agent"
++.SH "NAME"
++systemd_passwd_agent_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the systemd_passwd_agent processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the systemd_passwd_agent processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The systemd_passwd_agent processes execute with the systemd_passwd_agent_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep systemd_passwd_agent_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The systemd_passwd_agent_t SELinux type can be entered via the "systemd_passwd_agent_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the systemd_passwd_agent_t domain are the following:"
++
++/bin/systemd-tty-ask-password-agent, /usr/bin/systemd-tty-ask-password-agent, /usr/bin/systemd-gnome-ask-password-agent
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+.B semanage_trans_lock_t
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux systemd_passwd_agent policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their systemd_passwd_agent processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for systemd_passwd_agent:
++
++.EX
++.B systemd_passwd_agent_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
-+- Set files with the semanage_trans_lock_t type, if you want to treat the files as semanage trans lock data, stored under the /var/lock directory
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux systemd_passwd_agent policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their systemd_passwd_agent processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for systemd_passwd_agent:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B semanage_var_lib_t
++.B systemd_passwd_agent_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the semanage_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the semanage files under the /var/lib directory.
++- Set files with the systemd_passwd_agent_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the systemd_passwd_agent_t domain.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type systemd_passwd_agent_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B systemd_passwd_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/systemd/ask-password(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/systemd/ask-password-block(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux semanage policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their semanage processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for semanage:
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the systemd_passwd_agent_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B semanage_t
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
++
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the systemd_passwd_agent_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -46581,164 +92837,188 @@ index 0000000..bb8dd56
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), semanage(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/sendmail_selinux.8 b/man/man8/sendmail_selinux.8
++selinux(8), systemd_passwd_agent(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, systemd_logger_selinux(8), systemd_logind_selinux(8), systemd_notify_selinux(8), systemd_tmpfiles_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/systemd_tmpfiles_selinux.8 b/man/man8/systemd_tmpfiles_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..85c765e
+index 0000000..de442a9
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/sendmail_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,168 @@
-+.TH "sendmail_selinux" "8" "sendmail" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "sendmail SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/systemd_tmpfiles_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,187 @@
++.TH "systemd_tmpfiles_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "systemd_tmpfiles" "SELinux Policy documentation for systemd_tmpfiles"
+.SH "NAME"
-+sendmail_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the sendmail processes
++systemd_tmpfiles_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the systemd_tmpfiles processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the sendmail processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the systemd_tmpfiles processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH BOOLEANS
-+SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. sendmail policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run sendmail with the tightest access possible.
++The systemd_tmpfiles processes execute with the systemd_tmpfiles_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
++For example:
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow http daemon to send mail, you must turn on the httpd_can_sendmail boolean.
++.B ps -eZ | grep systemd_tmpfiles_t
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P httpd_can_sendmail 1
-+.EE
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow syslogd daemon to send mail, you must turn on the logging_syslogd_can_sendmail boolean.
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P logging_syslogd_can_sendmail 1
-+.EE
++The systemd_tmpfiles_t SELinux type can be entered via the "systemd_tmpfiles_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the systemd_tmpfiles_t domain are the following:"
+
++/bin/systemd-tmpfiles, /usr/bin/systemd-tmpfiles, /usr/lib/systemd/systemd-tmpfiles
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow gitisis daemon to send mail, you must turn on the gitosis_can_sendmail boolean.
-+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P gitosis_can_sendmail 1
-+.EE
-+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
-+
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the sendmail_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
-+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
-+
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux systemd_tmpfiles policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their systemd_tmpfiles processes in as secure a method as possible.
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the sendmail_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++The following process types are defined for systemd_tmpfiles:
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B systemd_tmpfiles_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux sendmail policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their sendmail processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for sendmail:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux systemd_tmpfiles policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their systemd_tmpfiles processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for systemd_tmpfiles:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B sendmail_exec_t
++.B systemd_tmpfiles_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the sendmail_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the sendmail_t domain.
++- Set files with the systemd_tmpfiles_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the systemd_tmpfiles_t domain.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/bin/mail(x)?, /usr/sbin/rmail, /usr/sbin/ssmtp, /usr/bin/esmtp, /var/qmail/bin/sendmail, /usr/sbin/sendmail\.postfix, /usr/lib/courier/bin/sendmail, /usr/lib/sendmail, /bin/mail(x)?, /usr/sbin/sendmail(\.sendmail)?
+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B sendmail_initrc_exec_t
-+.EE
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
+
-+- Set files with the sendmail_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the sendmail_initrc_t domain.
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
++The SELinux process type systemd_tmpfiles_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B sendmail_keytab_t
-+.EE
++.br
++.B faillog_t
+
-+- Set files with the sendmail_keytab_t type, if you want to treat the files as kerberos keytab files.
++ /var/log/btmp.*
++.br
++ /var/run/faillock(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/log/faillog
++.br
++ /var/log/tallylog
++.br
+
++.br
++.B lockfile
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B sendmail_log_t
-+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the sendmail_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as sendmail log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++.br
++.B man_t
+
++ /opt/(.*/)?man(/.*)?
++.br
++ /usr/man(/.*)?
++.br
++ /usr/share/man(/.*)?
++.br
++ /usr/X11R6/man(/.*)?
++.br
++ /usr/lib/perl5/man(/.*)?
+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/log/sendmail\.st, /var/log/mail(/.*)?
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B sendmail_tmp_t
-+.EE
++.br
++.B pidfile
+
-+- Set files with the sendmail_tmp_t type, if you want to store sendmail temporary files in the /tmp directories.
+
++.br
++.B sysfs_t
++
++ /sys(/.*)?
++.br
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B sendmail_var_run_t
-+.EE
++.br
++.B tmp_t
+
-+- Set files with the sendmail_var_run_t type, if you want to store the sendmail files under the /run directory.
++ /sandbox(/.*)?
++.br
++ /tmp
++.br
++ /var/tmp
++.br
++ /var/tmp
++.br
++ /usr/tmp
++.br
++ /var/tmp/vi\.recover
++.br
+
+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/run/sendmail\.pid, /var/run/sm-client\.pid
++.B var_auth_t
+
-+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
++ /var/ace(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/rsa(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/abl(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/rsa(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/pam_ssh(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/pam_ssh(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/pam_shield(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/google-authenticator(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B wtmp_t
++
++ /var/log/wtmp.*
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux sendmail policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their sendmail processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for sendmail:
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the systemd_tmpfiles_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B sendmail_t
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
++
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the systemd_tmpfiles_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -46750,174 +93030,151 @@ index 0000000..85c765e
+.B semanage module
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
-+.B semanage boolean
-+can also be used to manipulate the booleans
-+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), sendmail(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-+, setsebool(8)
++selinux(8), systemd_tmpfiles(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, systemd_logger_selinux(8), systemd_logind_selinux(8), systemd_notify_selinux(8), systemd_passwd_agent_selinux(8)
\ No newline at end of file
-diff --git a/man/man8/services_selinux.8 b/man/man8/services_selinux.8
+diff --git a/man/man8/tcpd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/tcpd_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..ac4a98f
+index 0000000..42ef6d7
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/services_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
-+.TH "services_selinux" "8" "services" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "services SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/tcpd_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,152 @@
++.TH "tcpd_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "tcpd" "SELinux Policy documentation for tcpd"
+.SH "NAME"
-+services_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the services processes
++tcpd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the tcpd processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the services processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
-+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
-+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux services policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their services processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for services:
-+
-+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B services_munin_plugin_exec_t
-+.EE
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the tcpd processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+- Set files with the services_munin_plugin_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the services_munin_plugin_t domain.
++The tcpd processes execute with the tcpd_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/share/munin/plugins/nut.*, /usr/share/munin/plugins/snmp_.*, /usr/share/munin/plugins/named, /usr/share/munin/plugins/varnish_.*, /usr/share/munin/plugins/tomcat_.*, /usr/share/munin/plugins/postgres_.*, /usr/share/munin/plugins/asterisk_.*, /usr/share/munin/plugins/lpstat, /usr/share/munin/plugins/mysql_.*, /usr/share/munin/plugins/slapd_.*, /usr/share/munin/plugins/apache_.*, /usr/share/munin/plugins/ping_, /usr/share/munin/plugins/squid_.*, /usr/share/munin/plugins/fail2ban, /usr/share/munin/plugins/openvpn, /usr/share/munin/plugins/samba, /usr/share/munin/plugins/ntp_.*, /usr/share/munin/plugins/http_loadtime
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B services_munin_plugin_tmp_t
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep tcpd_t
+
-+- Set files with the services_munin_plugin_tmp_t type, if you want to store services munin plugin temporary files in the /tmp directories.
+
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
-+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
++The tcpd_t SELinux type can be entered via the "tcpd_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the tcpd_t domain are the following:"
+
++/usr/sbin/tcpd
+.SH PROCESS TYPES
+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux services policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their services processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for services:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux tcpd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their tcpd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for tcpd:
+
+.EX
-+.B services_munin_plugin_t
++.B tcpd_t
+.EE
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
-+.SH "COMMANDS"
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.SH BOOLEANS
++SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. tcpd policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run tcpd with the tightest access possible.
++
++
+.PP
-+.B semanage permissive
-+can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++If you want to allow all daemons to use tcp wrappers, you must turn on the daemons_use_tcp_wrapper boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P daemons_use_tcp_wrapper 1
++.EE
++
+.PP
-+.B semanage module
-+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++If you want to allow users to run TCP servers (bind to ports and accept connection from the same domain and outside users) disabling this forces FTP passive mode and may change other protocols, you must turn on the selinuxuser_tcp_server boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P selinuxuser_tcp_server 1
++.EE
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
-+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++If you want to allow the Telepathy connection managers to connect to any generic TCP port, you must turn on the telepathy_tcp_connect_generic_network_ports boolean.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P telepathy_tcp_connect_generic_network_ports 1
++.EE
+
-+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), services(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/setfiles_selinux.8 b/man/man8/setfiles_selinux.8
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..5229951
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/setfiles_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
-+.TH "setfiles_selinux" "8" "setfiles" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "setfiles SELinux Policy documentation"
-+.SH "NAME"
-+setfiles_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the setfiles processes
-+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++.PP
++If you want to allow all daemons to use tcp wrappers, you must turn on the daemons_use_tcp_wrapper boolean.
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the setfiles processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P daemons_use_tcp_wrapper 1
++.EE
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to run TCP servers (bind to ports and accept connection from the same domain and outside users) disabling this forces FTP passive mode and may change other protocols, you must turn on the selinuxuser_tcp_server boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P selinuxuser_tcp_server 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow the Telepathy connection managers to connect to any generic TCP port, you must turn on the telepathy_tcp_connect_generic_network_ports boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P telepathy_tcp_connect_generic_network_ports 1
++.EE
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux setfiles policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their setfiles processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for setfiles:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux tcpd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their tcpd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for tcpd:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B setfiles_exec_t
++.B tcpd_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the setfiles_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the setfiles_t domain.
++- Set files with the tcpd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the tcpd_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B tcpd_tmp_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the tcpd_tmp_t type, if you want to store tcpd temporary files in the /tmp directories.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/sbin/setfiles.*, /sbin/restorecon, /usr/sbin/setfiles.*, /usr/sbin/restorecon
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux setfiles policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their setfiles processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for setfiles:
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+.EX
-+.B setfiles_mac_t, setfiles_t
-+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++The SELinux process type tcpd_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B tcpd_tmp_t
++
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -46929,181 +93186,155 @@ index 0000000..5229951
+.B semanage module
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
++.B semanage boolean
++can also be used to manipulate the booleans
++
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), setfiles(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/setkey_selinux.8 b/man/man8/setkey_selinux.8
++selinux(8), tcpd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, setsebool(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/tcsd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/tcsd_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..156aefb
+index 0000000..f4bc953
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/setkey_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
-+.TH "setkey_selinux" "8" "setkey" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "setkey SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/tcsd_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,152 @@
++.TH "tcsd_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "tcsd" "SELinux Policy documentation for tcsd"
+.SH "NAME"
-+setkey_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the setkey processes
++tcsd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the tcsd processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the setkey processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
-+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the tcsd processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux setkey policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their setkey processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for setkey:
++The tcsd processes execute with the tcsd_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B setkey_exec_t
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep tcsd_t
+
-+- Set files with the setkey_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the setkey_t domain.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/sbin/setkey, /sbin/setkey
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
-+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
++The tcsd_t SELinux type can be entered via the "tcsd_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the tcsd_t domain are the following:"
+
++/usr/sbin/tcsd
+.SH PROCESS TYPES
+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux setkey policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their setkey processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for setkey:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux tcsd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their tcsd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for tcsd:
+
+.EX
-+.B setkey_t
++.B tcsd_t
+.EE
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
-+.SH "COMMANDS"
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
-+.PP
-+.B semanage permissive
-+can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
-+.PP
-+.B semanage module
-+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
-+
-+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
-+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
-+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
-+
-+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), setkey(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/setrans_selinux.8 b/man/man8/setrans_selinux.8
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..53a7586
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/setrans_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
-+.TH "setrans_selinux" "8" "setrans" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "setrans SELinux Policy documentation"
-+.SH "NAME"
-+setrans_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the setrans processes
-+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
-+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the setrans processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
-+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
-+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux setrans policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their setrans processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for setrans:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux tcsd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their tcsd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for tcsd:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B setrans_exec_t
++.B tcsd_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the setrans_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the setrans_t domain.
++- Set files with the tcsd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the tcsd_t domain.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/sbin/mcstransd, /usr/sbin/mcstransd
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B setrans_initrc_exec_t
++.B tcsd_initrc_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the setrans_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the setrans_initrc_t domain.
++- Set files with the tcsd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the tcsd_initrc_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B setrans_var_run_t
++.B tcsd_var_lib_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the setrans_var_run_t type, if you want to store the setrans files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the tcsd_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the tcsd files under the /var/lib directory.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/run/mcstransd\.pid, /var/run/setrans(/.*)?
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.SH PORT TYPES
++SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
++
++.B semanage port -l
++
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux setrans policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their setrans processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for setrans:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
++SELinux tcsd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their tcsd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following port types are defined for tcsd:
++
++.EX
++.TP 5
++.B tcs_port_t
++.TP 10
++.EE
++
++
++Default Defined Ports:
++tcp 30003
++.EE
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type tcsd_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B tcsd_var_lib_t
++
++ /var/lib/tpm(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the tcsd_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B setrans_t
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
++
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the tcsd_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -47115,120 +93346,196 @@ index 0000000..53a7586
+.B semanage module
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
++.B semanage port
++can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
++
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), setrans(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/setroubleshoot_selinux.8 b/man/man8/setroubleshoot_selinux.8
++selinux(8), tcsd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/telepathy_gabble_selinux.8 b/man/man8/telepathy_gabble_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..8f116c9
+index 0000000..a1ba3c0
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/setroubleshoot_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,119 @@
-+.TH "setroubleshoot_selinux" "8" "setroubleshoot" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "setroubleshoot SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/telepathy_gabble_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,193 @@
++.TH "telepathy_gabble_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "telepathy_gabble" "SELinux Policy documentation for telepathy_gabble"
+.SH "NAME"
-+setroubleshoot_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the setroubleshoot processes
++telepathy_gabble_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the telepathy_gabble processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the setroubleshoot processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the telepathy_gabble processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The telepathy_gabble processes execute with the telepathy_gabble_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the setroubleshootd_t, setroubleshoot_fixit_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep telepathy_gabble_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The telepathy_gabble_t SELinux type can be entered via the "telepathy_gabble_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the telepathy_gabble_t domain are the following:"
+
++/usr/libexec/telepathy-gabble
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the setroubleshootd_t, setroubleshoot_fixit_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux telepathy_gabble policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their telepathy_gabble processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for telepathy_gabble:
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B telepathy_gabble_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux setroubleshoot policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their setroubleshoot processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for setroubleshoot:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux telepathy_gabble policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their telepathy_gabble processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for telepathy_gabble:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B setroubleshoot_fixit_exec_t
++.B telepathy_gabble_cache_home_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the setroubleshoot_fixit_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the setroubleshoot_fixit_t domain.
++- Set files with the telepathy_gabble_cache_home_t type, if you want to store telepathy gabble cache files in the users home directory.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B setroubleshoot_var_lib_t
++.B telepathy_gabble_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the setroubleshoot_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the setroubleshoot files under the /var/lib directory.
++- Set files with the telepathy_gabble_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the telepathy_gabble_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B setroubleshoot_var_log_t
++.B telepathy_gabble_tmp_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the setroubleshoot_var_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as setroubleshoot var log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++- Set files with the telepathy_gabble_tmp_t type, if you want to store telepathy gabble temporary files in the /tmp directories.
+
+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B setroubleshoot_var_run_t
-+.EE
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
+
-+- Set files with the setroubleshoot_var_run_t type, if you want to store the setroubleshoot files under the /run directory.
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
++The SELinux process type telepathy_gabble_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B setroubleshootd_exec_t
-+.EE
++.br
++.B cache_home_t
+
-+- Set files with the setroubleshootd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the setroubleshootd_t domain.
++ /root/\.cache(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.nv(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.cache(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.nv(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.cache(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.nv(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.cache(/.*)?
++.br
+
++.br
++.B config_home_t
+
-+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
++ /root/\.kde(/.*)?
++.br
++ /root/\.xine(/.*)?
++.br
++ /root/\.config(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/user/[^/]*/dconf(/.*)?
++.br
++ /root/\.Xdefaults
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.kde(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.xine(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.config(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.Xdefaults
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.kde(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.xine(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.config(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.Xdefaults
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.kde(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.xine(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.config(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.Xdefaults
++.br
++
++.br
++.B telepathy_gabble_cache_home_t
++
++ /home/[^/]*/\.cache/wocky(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.cache/telepathy/gabble(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.cache/wocky(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.cache/telepathy/gabble(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.cache/wocky(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.cache/telepathy/gabble(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux setroubleshoot policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their setroubleshoot processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for setroubleshoot:
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the telepathy_gabble_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B setroubleshoot_fixit_t, setroubleshootd_t
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
++
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the telepathy_gabble_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -47241,87 +93548,132 @@ index 0000000..8f116c9
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), setroubleshoot(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/setroubleshootd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/setroubleshootd_selinux.8
++selinux(8), telepathy_gabble(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, telepathy_idle_selinux(8), telepathy_logger_selinux(8), telepathy_mission_control_selinux(8), telepathy_msn_selinux(8), telepathy_salut_selinux(8), telepathy_sofiasip_selinux(8), telepathy_stream_engine_selinux(8), telepathy_sunshine_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/telepathy_idle_selinux.8 b/man/man8/telepathy_idle_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..3804fc4
+index 0000000..dd6fb69
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/setroubleshootd_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
-+.TH "setroubleshootd_selinux" "8" "setroubleshootd" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "setroubleshootd SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/telepathy_idle_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
++.TH "telepathy_idle_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "telepathy_idle" "SELinux Policy documentation for telepathy_idle"
+.SH "NAME"
-+setroubleshootd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the setroubleshootd processes
++telepathy_idle_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the telepathy_idle processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the setroubleshootd processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the telepathy_idle processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The telepathy_idle processes execute with the telepathy_idle_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep telepathy_idle_t
+
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The telepathy_idle_t SELinux type can be entered via the "telepathy_idle_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the telepathy_idle_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/libexec/telepathy-idle
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux telepathy_idle policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their telepathy_idle processes in as secure a method as possible.
+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the setroubleshootd_t, setroubleshoot_fixit_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++The following process types are defined for telepathy_idle:
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.B telepathy_idle_t
+.EE
-+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the setroubleshootd_t, setroubleshoot_fixit_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
-+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
-+.EE
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux setroubleshootd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their setroubleshootd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for setroubleshootd:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux telepathy_idle policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their telepathy_idle processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for telepathy_idle:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B setroubleshootd_exec_t
++.B telepathy_idle_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the setroubleshootd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the setroubleshootd_t domain.
++- Set files with the telepathy_idle_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the telepathy_idle_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B telepathy_idle_tmp_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the telepathy_idle_tmp_t type, if you want to store telepathy idle temporary files in the /tmp directories.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type telepathy_idle_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B cache_home_t
++
++ /root/\.cache(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.nv(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.cache(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.nv(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.cache(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.nv(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.cache(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux setroubleshootd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their setroubleshootd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for setroubleshootd:
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the telepathy_idle_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B setroubleshoot_fixit_t, setroubleshootd_t
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
++
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the telepathy_idle_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -47334,87 +93686,206 @@ index 0000000..3804fc4
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), setroubleshootd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/setsebool_selinux.8 b/man/man8/setsebool_selinux.8
++selinux(8), telepathy_idle(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, telepathy_gabble_selinux(8), telepathy_logger_selinux(8), telepathy_mission_control_selinux(8), telepathy_msn_selinux(8), telepathy_salut_selinux(8), telepathy_sofiasip_selinux(8), telepathy_stream_engine_selinux(8), telepathy_sunshine_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/telepathy_logger_selinux.8 b/man/man8/telepathy_logger_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..7e5c3d1
+index 0000000..e218a21
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/setsebool_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
-+.TH "setsebool_selinux" "8" "setsebool" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "setsebool SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/telepathy_logger_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,205 @@
++.TH "telepathy_logger_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "telepathy_logger" "SELinux Policy documentation for telepathy_logger"
+.SH "NAME"
-+setsebool_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the setsebool processes
++telepathy_logger_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the telepathy_logger processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the setsebool processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the telepathy_logger processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The telepathy_logger processes execute with the telepathy_logger_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep telepathy_logger_t
+
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The telepathy_logger_t SELinux type can be entered via the "telepathy_logger_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the telepathy_logger_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/libexec/telepathy-logger
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the setsebool_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux telepathy_logger policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their telepathy_logger processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for telepathy_logger:
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.B telepathy_logger_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the setsebool_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux telepathy_logger policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their telepathy_logger processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for telepathy_logger:
++
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.PP
++.B telepathy_logger_cache_home_t
+.EE
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++- Set files with the telepathy_logger_cache_home_t type, if you want to store telepathy logger cache files in the users home directory.
++
++
++.EX
+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.B telepathy_logger_data_home_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the telepathy_logger_data_home_t type, if you want to store telepathy logger data files in the users home directory.
++
++
++.EX
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux setsebool policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their setsebool processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for setsebool:
++.B telepathy_logger_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the telepathy_logger_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the telepathy_logger_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B setsebool_exec_t
++.B telepathy_logger_tmp_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the setsebool_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the setsebool_t domain.
++- Set files with the telepathy_logger_tmp_t type, if you want to store telepathy logger temporary files in the /tmp directories.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type telepathy_logger_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B cache_home_t
++
++ /root/\.cache(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.nv(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.cache(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.nv(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.cache(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.nv(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.cache(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B config_home_t
++
++ /root/\.kde(/.*)?
++.br
++ /root/\.xine(/.*)?
++.br
++ /root/\.config(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/user/[^/]*/dconf(/.*)?
++.br
++ /root/\.Xdefaults
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.kde(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.xine(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.config(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.Xdefaults
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.kde(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.xine(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.config(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.Xdefaults
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.kde(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.xine(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.config(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.Xdefaults
++.br
++
++.br
++.B telepathy_logger_cache_home_t
++
++ /home/[^/]*/\.cache/telepathy/logger(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.cache/telepathy/logger(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.cache/telepathy/logger(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B telepathy_logger_data_home_t
++
++ /home/[^/]*/\.local/share/TpLogger(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.local/share/TpLogger(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.local/share/TpLogger(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux setsebool policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their setsebool processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for setsebool:
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the telepathy_logger_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B setsebool_t
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
++
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the telepathy_logger_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -47427,137 +93898,224 @@ index 0000000..7e5c3d1
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), setsebool(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/sge_selinux.8 b/man/man8/sge_selinux.8
++selinux(8), telepathy_logger(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, telepathy_gabble_selinux(8), telepathy_idle_selinux(8), telepathy_mission_control_selinux(8), telepathy_msn_selinux(8), telepathy_salut_selinux(8), telepathy_sofiasip_selinux(8), telepathy_stream_engine_selinux(8), telepathy_sunshine_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/telepathy_mission_control_selinux.8 b/man/man8/telepathy_mission_control_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..4259e52
+index 0000000..6367510
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/sge_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,141 @@
-+.TH "sge_selinux" "8" "sge" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "sge SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/telepathy_mission_control_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,223 @@
++.TH "telepathy_mission_control_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "telepathy_mission_control" "SELinux Policy documentation for telepathy_mission_control"
+.SH "NAME"
-+sge_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the sge processes
++telepathy_mission_control_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the telepathy_mission_control processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the sge processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
-+
-+.SH BOOLEANS
-+SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. sge policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run sge with the tightest access possible.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the telepathy_mission_control processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
++The telepathy_mission_control processes execute with the telepathy_mission_control_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow sge to connect to the network using any TCP port, you must turn on the sge_domain_can_network_connect boolean.
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P sge_domain_can_network_connect 1
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep telepathy_mission_control_t
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow sge to access nfs file systems, you must turn on the sge_use_nfs boolean.
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P sge_use_nfs 1
-+.EE
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The telepathy_mission_control_t SELinux type can be entered via the "telepathy_mission_control_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the telepathy_mission_control_t domain are the following:"
+
++/usr/libexec/mission-control-5
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the sge_execd_t, sge_job_ssh_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
-+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
-+
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the sge_execd_t, sge_job_ssh_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux telepathy_mission_control policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their telepathy_mission_control processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for telepathy_mission_control:
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B telepathy_mission_control_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux sge policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their sge processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for sge:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux telepathy_mission_control policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their telepathy_mission_control processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for telepathy_mission_control:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B sge_execd_exec_t
++.B telepathy_mission_control_cache_home_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the sge_execd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the sge_execd_t domain.
++- Set files with the telepathy_mission_control_cache_home_t type, if you want to store telepathy mission control cache files in the users home directory.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B sge_job_exec_t
++.B telepathy_mission_control_data_home_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the sge_job_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the sge_job_t domain.
++- Set files with the telepathy_mission_control_data_home_t type, if you want to store telepathy mission control data files in the users home directory.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B sge_shepherd_exec_t
++.B telepathy_mission_control_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the sge_shepherd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the sge_shepherd_t domain.
++- Set files with the telepathy_mission_control_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the telepathy_mission_control_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B sge_spool_t
++.B telepathy_mission_control_home_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the sge_spool_t type, if you want to store the sge files under the /var/spool directory.
++- Set files with the telepathy_mission_control_home_t type, if you want to store telepathy mission control files in the users home directory.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B sge_tmp_t
++.B telepathy_mission_control_tmp_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the sge_tmp_t type, if you want to store sge temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++- Set files with the telepathy_mission_control_tmp_t type, if you want to store telepathy mission control temporary files in the /tmp directories.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type telepathy_mission_control_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B cache_home_t
++
++ /root/\.cache(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.nv(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.cache(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.nv(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.cache(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.nv(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.cache(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B config_home_t
++
++ /root/\.kde(/.*)?
++.br
++ /root/\.xine(/.*)?
++.br
++ /root/\.config(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/user/[^/]*/dconf(/.*)?
++.br
++ /root/\.Xdefaults
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.kde(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.xine(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.config(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.Xdefaults
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.kde(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.xine(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.config(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.Xdefaults
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.kde(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.xine(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.config(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.Xdefaults
++.br
++
++.br
++.B telepathy_mission_control_cache_home_t
++
++ /home/[^/]*/\.cache/\.mc_connections
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.cache/\.mc_connections
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.cache/\.mc_connections
++.br
++
++.br
++.B telepathy_mission_control_data_home_t
++
++ /home/[^/]*/\.local/share/telepathy/mission-control(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.local/share/telepathy/mission-control(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.local/share/telepathy/mission-control(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B telepathy_mission_control_home_t
++
++ /home/[^/]*/\.mission-control(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.mission-control(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.mission-control(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux sge policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their sge processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for sge:
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the telepathy_mission_control_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B sge_execd_t, sge_job_ssh_t, sge_shepherd_t, sge_job_t
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
++
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the telepathy_mission_control_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -47569,157 +94127,137 @@ index 0000000..4259e52
+.B semanage module
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
-+.B semanage boolean
-+can also be used to manipulate the booleans
-+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), sge(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-+, setsebool(8)
++selinux(8), telepathy_mission_control(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, telepathy_gabble_selinux(8), telepathy_idle_selinux(8), telepathy_logger_selinux(8), telepathy_msn_selinux(8), telepathy_salut_selinux(8), telepathy_sofiasip_selinux(8), telepathy_stream_engine_selinux(8), telepathy_sunshine_selinux(8)
\ No newline at end of file
-diff --git a/man/man8/shorewall_selinux.8 b/man/man8/shorewall_selinux.8
+diff --git a/man/man8/telepathy_msn_selinux.8 b/man/man8/telepathy_msn_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..734941b
+index 0000000..69bc52e
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/shorewall_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,151 @@
-+.TH "shorewall_selinux" "8" "shorewall" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "shorewall SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/telepathy_msn_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,135 @@
++.TH "telepathy_msn_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "telepathy_msn" "SELinux Policy documentation for telepathy_msn"
+.SH "NAME"
-+shorewall_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the shorewall processes
++telepathy_msn_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the telepathy_msn processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the shorewall processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the telepathy_msn processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The telepathy_msn processes execute with the telepathy_msn_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the shorewall_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep telepathy_msn_t
+
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The telepathy_msn_t SELinux type can be entered via the "telepathy_msn_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the telepathy_msn_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/libexec/telepathy-haze, /usr/libexec/telepathy-butterfly
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the shorewall_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux telepathy_msn policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their telepathy_msn processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for telepathy_msn:
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B telepathy_msn_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux shorewall policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their shorewall processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for shorewall:
-+
-+
-+.EX
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux telepathy_msn policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their telepathy_msn processes in as secure a method as possible.
+.PP
-+.B shorewall_etc_t
-+.EE
++The following file types are defined for telepathy_msn:
+
-+- Set files with the shorewall_etc_t type, if you want to store shorewall files in the /etc directories.
-+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/etc/shorewall-lite(/.*)?, /etc/shorewall(/.*)?
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B shorewall_exec_t
++.B telepathy_msn_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the shorewall_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the shorewall_t domain.
++- Set files with the telepathy_msn_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the telepathy_msn_t domain.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/sbin/shorewall6?, /sbin/shorewall-lite, /usr/sbin/shorewall-lite, /usr/sbin/shorewall6?
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B shorewall_initrc_exec_t
++.B telepathy_msn_tmp_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the shorewall_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the shorewall_initrc_t domain.
++- Set files with the telepathy_msn_tmp_t type, if you want to store telepathy msn temporary files in the /tmp directories.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/etc/rc\.d/init\.d/shorewall, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/shorewall-lite
+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B shorewall_lock_t
-+.EE
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
+
-+- Set files with the shorewall_lock_t type, if you want to treat the files as shorewall lock data, stored under the /var/lock directory
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
++The SELinux process type telepathy_msn_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B shorewall_log_t
-+.EE
++.br
++.B cache_home_t
+
-+- Set files with the shorewall_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as shorewall log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++ /root/\.cache(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.nv(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.cache(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.nv(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.cache(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.nv(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.cache(/.*)?
++.br
+
++.br
++.B telepathy_msn_tmp_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B shorewall_tmp_t
-+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the shorewall_tmp_t type, if you want to store shorewall temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the telepathy_msn_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B shorewall_var_lib_t
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the shorewall_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the shorewall files under the /var/lib directory.
-+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/lib/shorewall-lite(/.*)?, /var/lib/shorewall(/.*)?, /var/lib/shorewall6(/.*)?
-+
-+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
-+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux shorewall policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their shorewall processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for shorewall:
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the telepathy_msn_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B shorewall_t
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -47732,73 +94270,132 @@ index 0000000..734941b
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), shorewall(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/showmount_selinux.8 b/man/man8/showmount_selinux.8
++selinux(8), telepathy_msn(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, telepathy_gabble_selinux(8), telepathy_idle_selinux(8), telepathy_logger_selinux(8), telepathy_mission_control_selinux(8), telepathy_salut_selinux(8), telepathy_sofiasip_selinux(8), telepathy_stream_engine_selinux(8), telepathy_sunshine_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/telepathy_salut_selinux.8 b/man/man8/telepathy_salut_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..b7b79e9
+index 0000000..b680807
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/showmount_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
-+.TH "showmount_selinux" "8" "showmount" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "showmount SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/telepathy_salut_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
++.TH "telepathy_salut_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "telepathy_salut" "SELinux Policy documentation for telepathy_salut"
+.SH "NAME"
-+showmount_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the showmount processes
++telepathy_salut_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the telepathy_salut processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the showmount processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the telepathy_salut processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The telepathy_salut processes execute with the telepathy_salut_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep telepathy_salut_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The telepathy_salut_t SELinux type can be entered via the "telepathy_salut_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the telepathy_salut_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/libexec/telepathy-salut
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux telepathy_salut policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their telepathy_salut processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for telepathy_salut:
++
++.EX
++.B telepathy_salut_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux showmount policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their showmount processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for showmount:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux telepathy_salut policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their telepathy_salut processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for telepathy_salut:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B showmount_exec_t
++.B telepathy_salut_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the showmount_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the showmount_t domain.
++- Set files with the telepathy_salut_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the telepathy_salut_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B telepathy_salut_tmp_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the telepathy_salut_tmp_t type, if you want to store telepathy salut temporary files in the /tmp directories.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type telepathy_salut_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B cache_home_t
++
++ /root/\.cache(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.nv(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.cache(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.nv(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.cache(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.nv(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.cache(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux showmount policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their showmount processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for showmount:
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the telepathy_salut_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B showmount_t
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
++
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the telepathy_salut_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -47811,118 +94408,132 @@ index 0000000..b7b79e9
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), showmount(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/shutdown_selinux.8 b/man/man8/shutdown_selinux.8
++selinux(8), telepathy_salut(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, telepathy_gabble_selinux(8), telepathy_idle_selinux(8), telepathy_logger_selinux(8), telepathy_mission_control_selinux(8), telepathy_msn_selinux(8), telepathy_sofiasip_selinux(8), telepathy_stream_engine_selinux(8), telepathy_sunshine_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/telepathy_sofiasip_selinux.8 b/man/man8/telepathy_sofiasip_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..36a3b8d
+index 0000000..7a6973e
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/shutdown_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,122 @@
-+.TH "shutdown_selinux" "8" "shutdown" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "shutdown SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/telepathy_sofiasip_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
++.TH "telepathy_sofiasip_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "telepathy_sofiasip" "SELinux Policy documentation for telepathy_sofiasip"
+.SH "NAME"
-+shutdown_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the shutdown processes
++telepathy_sofiasip_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the telepathy_sofiasip processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the shutdown processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
-+
-+.SH BOOLEANS
-+SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. shutdown policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run shutdown with the tightest access possible.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the telepathy_sofiasip processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
++The telepathy_sofiasip processes execute with the telepathy_sofiasip_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow HTTPD to connect to port 80 for graceful shutdown, you must turn on the httpd_graceful_shutdown boolean.
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P httpd_graceful_shutdown 1
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep telepathy_sofiasip_t
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the shutdown_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
++The telepathy_sofiasip_t SELinux type can be entered via the "telepathy_sofiasip_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the telepathy_sofiasip_t domain are the following:"
+
++/usr/libexec/telepathy-sofiasip
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the shutdown_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux telepathy_sofiasip policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their telepathy_sofiasip processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for telepathy_sofiasip:
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B telepathy_sofiasip_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux shutdown policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their shutdown processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for shutdown:
-+
-+
-+.EX
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux telepathy_sofiasip policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their telepathy_sofiasip processes in as secure a method as possible.
+.PP
-+.B shutdown_etc_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the shutdown_etc_t type, if you want to store shutdown files in the /etc directories.
++The following file types are defined for telepathy_sofiasip:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B shutdown_exec_t
++.B telepathy_sofiasip_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the shutdown_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the shutdown_t domain.
++- Set files with the telepathy_sofiasip_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the telepathy_sofiasip_t domain.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/sbin/shutdown, /usr/sbin/shutdown, /usr/lib/upstart/shutdown, /lib/upstart/shutdown
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B shutdown_var_run_t
++.B telepathy_sofiasip_tmp_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the shutdown_var_run_t type, if you want to store the shutdown files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the telepathy_sofiasip_tmp_t type, if you want to store telepathy sofiasip temporary files in the /tmp directories.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type telepathy_sofiasip_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B cache_home_t
++
++ /root/\.cache(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.nv(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.cache(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.nv(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.cache(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.nv(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.cache(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux shutdown policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their shutdown processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for shutdown:
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the telepathy_sofiasip_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B shutdown_t
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
++
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the telepathy_sofiasip_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -47934,276 +94545,293 @@ index 0000000..36a3b8d
+.B semanage module
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
-+.B semanage boolean
-+can also be used to manipulate the booleans
-+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), shutdown(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-+, setsebool(8)
++selinux(8), telepathy_sofiasip(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, telepathy_gabble_selinux(8), telepathy_idle_selinux(8), telepathy_logger_selinux(8), telepathy_mission_control_selinux(8), telepathy_msn_selinux(8), telepathy_salut_selinux(8), telepathy_stream_engine_selinux(8), telepathy_sunshine_selinux(8)
\ No newline at end of file
-diff --git a/man/man8/slapd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/slapd_selinux.8
+diff --git a/man/man8/telepathy_stream_engine_selinux.8 b/man/man8/telepathy_stream_engine_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..12c5b4c
+index 0000000..dafb6b0
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/slapd_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,191 @@
-+.TH "slapd_selinux" "8" "slapd" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "slapd SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/telepathy_stream_engine_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
++.TH "telepathy_stream_engine_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "telepathy_stream_engine" "SELinux Policy documentation for telepathy_stream_engine"
+.SH "NAME"
-+slapd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the slapd processes
++telepathy_stream_engine_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the telepathy_stream_engine processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the slapd processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the telepathy_stream_engine processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The telepathy_stream_engine processes execute with the telepathy_stream_engine_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep telepathy_stream_engine_t
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the slapd_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
++The telepathy_stream_engine_t SELinux type can be entered via the "telepathy_stream_engine_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the telepathy_stream_engine_t domain are the following:"
+
++/usr/libexec/telepathy-stream-engine
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the slapd_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux telepathy_stream_engine policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their telepathy_stream_engine processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for telepathy_stream_engine:
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B telepathy_stream_engine_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux slapd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their slapd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for slapd:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux telepathy_stream_engine policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their telepathy_stream_engine processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for telepathy_stream_engine:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B slapd_cert_t
++.B telepathy_stream_engine_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the slapd_cert_t type, if you want to treat the files as slapd certificate data.
++- Set files with the telepathy_stream_engine_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the telepathy_stream_engine_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B slapd_db_t
++.B telepathy_stream_engine_tmp_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the slapd_db_t type, if you want to treat the files as slapd database content.
++- Set files with the telepathy_stream_engine_tmp_t type, if you want to store telepathy stream engine temporary files in the /tmp directories.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/etc/openldap/slapd\.d(/.*)?, /var/lib/ldap(/.*)?
+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B slapd_etc_t
-+.EE
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
+
-+- Set files with the slapd_etc_t type, if you want to store slapd files in the /etc directories.
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
++The SELinux process type telepathy_stream_engine_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B slapd_exec_t
-+.EE
++.br
++.B cache_home_t
+
-+- Set files with the slapd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the slapd_t domain.
++ /root/\.cache(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.nv(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.cache(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.nv(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.cache(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.nv(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.cache(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the telepathy_stream_engine_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B slapd_initrc_exec_t
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the slapd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the slapd_initrc_t domain.
-+
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the telepathy_stream_engine_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B slapd_keytab_t
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the slapd_keytab_t type, if you want to treat the files as kerberos keytab files.
-+
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B slapd_lock_t
-+.EE
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+- Set files with the slapd_lock_t type, if you want to treat the files as slapd lock data, stored under the /var/lock directory
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), telepathy_stream_engine(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, telepathy_gabble_selinux(8), telepathy_idle_selinux(8), telepathy_logger_selinux(8), telepathy_mission_control_selinux(8), telepathy_msn_selinux(8), telepathy_salut_selinux(8), telepathy_sofiasip_selinux(8), telepathy_sunshine_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/telepathy_sunshine_selinux.8 b/man/man8/telepathy_sunshine_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..96616f7
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/telepathy_sunshine_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,153 @@
++.TH "telepathy_sunshine_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "telepathy_sunshine" "SELinux Policy documentation for telepathy_sunshine"
++.SH "NAME"
++telepathy_sunshine_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the telepathy_sunshine processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B slapd_log_t
-+.EE
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the telepathy_sunshine processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+- Set files with the slapd_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as slapd log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++The telepathy_sunshine processes execute with the telepathy_sunshine_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B slapd_replog_t
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep telepathy_sunshine_t
+
-+- Set files with the slapd_replog_t type, if you want to treat the files as slapd replog data.
+
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
-+.EX
++The telepathy_sunshine_t SELinux type can be entered via the "telepathy_sunshine_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the telepathy_sunshine_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/libexec/telepathy-sunshine
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux telepathy_sunshine policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their telepathy_sunshine processes in as secure a method as possible.
+.PP
-+.B slapd_tmp_t
++The following process types are defined for telepathy_sunshine:
++
++.EX
++.B telepathy_sunshine_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
-+- Set files with the slapd_tmp_t type, if you want to store slapd temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux telepathy_sunshine policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their telepathy_sunshine processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for telepathy_sunshine:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B slapd_tmpfs_t
++.B telepathy_sunshine_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the slapd_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store slapd files on a tmpfs file system.
++- Set files with the telepathy_sunshine_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the telepathy_sunshine_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B slapd_unit_file_t
++.B telepathy_sunshine_home_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the slapd_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as slapd unit content.
++- Set files with the telepathy_sunshine_home_t type, if you want to store telepathy sunshine files in the users home directory.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B slapd_var_run_t
++.B telepathy_sunshine_tmp_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the slapd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the slapd files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the telepathy_sunshine_tmp_t type, if you want to store telepathy sunshine temporary files in the /tmp directories.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/run/slapd\.args, /var/run/openldap(/.*)?, /var/run/slapd\.pid, /var/run/ldapi, /var/run/slapd.*
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux slapd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their slapd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for slapd:
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+.EX
-+.B slapd_t
-+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++The SELinux process type telepathy_sunshine_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
-+.SH "COMMANDS"
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
-+.PP
-+.B semanage permissive
-+can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
-+.PP
-+.B semanage module
-+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++.br
++.B cache_home_t
+
-+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
-+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++ /root/\.cache(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.nv(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.cache(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.nv(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.cache(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.nv(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.cache(/.*)?
++.br
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.br
++.B telepathy_sunshine_home_t
+
-+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), slapd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/smbcontrol_selinux.8 b/man/man8/smbcontrol_selinux.8
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..7f6ce1e
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/smbcontrol_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
-+.TH "smbcontrol_selinux" "8" "smbcontrol" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "smbcontrol SELinux Policy documentation"
-+.SH "NAME"
-+smbcontrol_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the smbcontrol processes
-+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++ /home/[^/]*/\.telepathy-sunshine(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.telepathy-sunshine(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.telepathy-sunshine(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B telepathy_sunshine_tmp_t
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the smbcontrol processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
+
+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux smbcontrol policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their smbcontrol processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for smbcontrol:
-+
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the telepathy_sunshine_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B smbcontrol_exec_t
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the smbcontrol_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the smbcontrol_t domain.
-+
-+
-+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
-+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux smbcontrol policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their smbcontrol processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for smbcontrol:
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the telepathy_sunshine_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B smbcontrol_t
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -48216,164 +94844,221 @@ index 0000000..7f6ce1e
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), smbcontrol(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/smbd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/smbd_selinux.8
++selinux(8), telepathy_sunshine(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, telepathy_gabble_selinux(8), telepathy_idle_selinux(8), telepathy_logger_selinux(8), telepathy_mission_control_selinux(8), telepathy_msn_selinux(8), telepathy_salut_selinux(8), telepathy_sofiasip_selinux(8), telepathy_stream_engine_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/telnetd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/telnetd_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..3dfbd74
+index 0000000..955a5aa
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/smbd_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,167 @@
-+.TH "smbd_selinux" "8" "smbd" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "smbd SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/telnetd_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,222 @@
++.TH "telnetd_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "telnetd" "SELinux Policy documentation for telnetd"
+.SH "NAME"
-+smbd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the smbd processes
++telnetd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the telnetd processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the smbd processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the telnetd processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The telnetd processes execute with the telnetd_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the smbmount_t, smbd_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep telnetd_t
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the smbmount_t, smbd_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
-+.EE
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
-+.SH SHARING FILES
-+If you want to share files with multiple domains (Apache, FTP, rsync, Samba), you can set a file context of public_content_t and public_content_rw_t. These context allow any of the above domains to read the content. If you want a particular domain to write to the public_content_rw_t domain, you must set the appropriate boolean.
-+.TP
-+Allow smbd servers to read the /var/smbd directory by adding the public_content_t file type to the directory and by restoring the file type.
++The telnetd_t SELinux type can be entered via the "telnetd_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the telnetd_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/sbin/in\.telnetd, /usr/kerberos/sbin/telnetd
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+.B
-+semanage fcontext -a -t public_content_t "/var/smbd(/.*)?"
-+.br
-+.B restorecon -F -R -v /var/smbd
-+.pp
-+.TP
-+Allow smbd servers to read and write /var/tmp/incoming by adding the public_content_rw_t type to the directory and by restoring the file type. This also requires the allow_smbdd_anon_write boolean to be set.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+.B
-+semanage fcontext -a -t public_content_rw_t "/var/smbd/incoming(/.*)?"
-+.br
-+.B restorecon -F -R -v /var/smbd/incoming
-+
-+
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux telnetd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their telnetd processes in as secure a method as possible.
+.PP
-+If you want to allow samba to modify public files used for public file transfer services. Files/Directories must be labeled public_content_rw_t., you must turn on the smbd_anon_write boolean.
++The following process types are defined for telnetd:
+
+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P smbd_anon_write 1
++.B telnetd_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux smbd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their smbd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for smbd:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux telnetd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their telnetd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for telnetd:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B smbd_exec_t
++.B telnetd_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the smbd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the smbd_t domain.
++- Set files with the telnetd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the telnetd_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B smbd_keytab_t
++.B telnetd_keytab_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the smbd_keytab_t type, if you want to treat the files as kerberos keytab files.
++- Set files with the telnetd_keytab_t type, if you want to treat the files as kerberos keytab files.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B smbd_tmp_t
++.B telnetd_tmp_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the smbd_tmp_t type, if you want to store smbd temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++- Set files with the telnetd_tmp_t type, if you want to store telnetd temporary files in the /tmp directories.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B smbd_var_run_t
++.B telnetd_var_run_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the smbd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the smbd files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the telnetd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the telnetd files under the /run directory.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/run/samba/gencache\.tdb, /var/run/samba/share_info\.tdb, /var/run/samba(/.*)?, /var/run/samba/locking\.tdb, /var/run/samba/connections\.tdb, /var/run/samba/smbd\.pid, /var/run/samba/sessionid\.tdb, /var/run/samba/brlock\.tdb
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
+.SH PORT TYPES
-+SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
++SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
+.PP
-+You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
++You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
+
+.B semanage port -l
+
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
-+SELinux smbd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their smbd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following port types are defined for smbd:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
++SELinux telnetd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their telnetd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following port types are defined for telnetd:
+
+.EX
+.TP 5
-+.B smbd_port_t
++.B telnetd_port_t
+.TP 10
+.EE
+
+
+Default Defined Ports:
-+tcp 137-139,445
++tcp 23
+.EE
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type telnetd_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B initrc_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/utmp
++.br
++ /var/run/random-seed
++.br
++ /var/run/runlevel\.dir
++.br
++ /var/run/setmixer_flag
++.br
++
++.br
++.B krb5_host_rcache_t
++
++ /var/cache/krb5rcache(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/tmp/nfs_0
++.br
++ /var/tmp/DNS_25
++.br
++ /var/tmp/host_0
++.br
++ /var/tmp/imap_0
++.br
++ /var/tmp/HTTP_23
++.br
++ /var/tmp/HTTP_48
++.br
++ /var/tmp/ldap_55
++.br
++ /var/tmp/ldap_487
++.br
++ /var/tmp/ldapmap1_0
++.br
++
++.br
++.B security_t
++
++ /selinux
++.br
++
++.br
++.B telnetd_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B telnetd_var_run_t
++
++
++.br
++.B user_tmp_t
++
++ /var/run/user(/.*)?
++.br
++ /tmp/gconfd-.*
++.br
++ /tmp/gconfd-dwalsh
++.br
++ /tmp/gconfd-xguest
++.br
++
++.br
++.B wtmp_t
++
++ /var/log/wtmp.*
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux smbd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their smbd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for smbd:
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the telnetd_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B smbcontrol_t, smbmount_t, smbd_t
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
++
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the telnetd_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -48389,309 +95074,220 @@ index 0000000..3dfbd74
+can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), smbd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/smbmount_selinux.8 b/man/man8/smbmount_selinux.8
++selinux(8), telnetd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/tftpd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/tftpd_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..360ca80
+index 0000000..9909eeb
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/smbmount_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
-+.TH "smbmount_selinux" "8" "smbmount" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "smbmount SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/tftpd_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,227 @@
++.TH "tftpd_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "tftpd" "SELinux Policy documentation for tftpd"
+.SH "NAME"
-+smbmount_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the smbmount processes
++tftpd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the tftpd processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the smbmount processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
-+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
-+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the smbmount_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
-+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
-+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the smbmount_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
-+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
-+.EE
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the tftpd processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux smbmount policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their smbmount processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for smbmount:
++The tftpd processes execute with the tftpd_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B smbmount_exec_t
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep tftpd_t
+
-+- Set files with the smbmount_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the smbmount_t domain.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/bin/smbmnt, /usr/bin/smbmount
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
-+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
++The tftpd_t SELinux type can be entered via the "tftpd_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the tftpd_t domain are the following:"
+
++/usr/sbin/atftpd, /usr/sbin/in\.tftpd
+.SH PROCESS TYPES
+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux smbmount policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their smbmount processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for smbmount:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux tftpd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their tftpd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for tftpd:
+
+.EX
-+.B smbmount_t
++.B tftpd_t
+.EE
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
-+.SH "COMMANDS"
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
-+.PP
-+.B semanage permissive
-+can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
-+.PP
-+.B semanage module
-+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++.SH BOOLEANS
++SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. tftpd policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run tftpd with the tightest access possible.
++
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
-+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++If you want to allow tftp to read and write files in the user home directories, you must turn on the tftp_home_dir boolean.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P tftp_home_dir 1
++.EE
+
-+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), smbmount(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/smokeping_selinux.8 b/man/man8/smokeping_selinux.8
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..9b6c4f2
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/smokeping_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
-+.TH "smokeping_selinux" "8" "smokeping" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "smokeping SELinux Policy documentation"
-+.SH "NAME"
-+smokeping_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the smokeping processes
-+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++.PP
++If you want to allow tftp to read and write files in the user home directories, you must turn on the tftp_home_dir boolean.
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the smokeping processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P tftp_home_dir 1
++.EE
++
++.SH SHARING FILES
++If you want to share files with multiple domains (Apache, FTP, rsync, Samba), you can set a file context of public_content_t and public_content_rw_t. These context allow any of the above domains to read the content. If you want a particular domain to write to the public_content_rw_t domain, you must set the appropriate boolean.
++.TP
++Allow tftpd servers to read the /var/tftpd directory by adding the public_content_t file type to the directory and by restoring the file type.
++.PP
++.B
++semanage fcontext -a -t public_content_t "/var/tftpd(/.*)?"
++.br
++.B restorecon -F -R -v /var/tftpd
++.pp
++.TP
++Allow tftpd servers to read and write /var/tmp/incoming by adding the public_content_rw_t type to the directory and by restoring the file type. This also requires the allow_tftpdd_anon_write boolean to be set.
++.PP
++.B
++semanage fcontext -a -t public_content_rw_t "/var/tftpd/incoming(/.*)?"
++.br
++.B restorecon -F -R -v /var/tftpd/incoming
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the smokeping_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++If you want to allow tftp to modify public files used for public file transfer services., you must turn on the tftp_anon_write boolean.
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.B setsebool -P tftp_anon_write 1
+.EE
+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the smokeping_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++If you want to allow tftp to modify public files used for public file transfer services., you must turn on the tftp_anon_write boolean.
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B setsebool -P tftp_anon_write 1
+.EE
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux smokeping policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their smokeping processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for smokeping:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux tftpd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their tftpd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for tftpd:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B smokeping_exec_t
++.B tftpd_etc_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the smokeping_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the smokeping_t domain.
++- Set files with the tftpd_etc_t type, if you want to store tftpd files in the /etc directories.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B smokeping_initrc_exec_t
++.B tftpd_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the smokeping_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the smokeping_initrc_t domain.
++- Set files with the tftpd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the tftpd_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B smokeping_var_lib_t
++.B tftpd_var_run_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the smokeping_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the smokeping files under the /var/lib directory.
++- Set files with the tftpd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the tftpd files under the /run directory.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B smokeping_var_run_t
++.B tftpdir_rw_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the smokeping_var_run_t type, if you want to store the smokeping files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the tftpdir_rw_t type, if you want to treat the files as tftpdir read/write content.
+
+
++.EX
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
++.B tftpdir_t
++.EE
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux smokeping policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their smokeping processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for smokeping:
++- Set files with the tftpdir_t type, if you want to treat the files as tftpdir data.
+
-+.EX
-+.B smokeping_t
-+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
-+.SH "COMMANDS"
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
-+.PP
-+.B semanage permissive
-+can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
+.PP
-+.B semanage module
-+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
+
++.SH PORT TYPES
++SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
-+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
-+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
-+
-+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), smokeping(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/smoltclient_selinux.8 b/man/man8/smoltclient_selinux.8
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..a665ee3
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/smoltclient_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
-+.TH "smoltclient_selinux" "8" "smoltclient" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "smoltclient SELinux Policy documentation"
-+.SH "NAME"
-+smoltclient_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the smoltclient processes
-+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the smoltclient processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
-+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++.B semanage port -l
+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the smoltclient_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
++SELinux tftpd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their tftpd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following port types are defined for tftpd:
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.TP 5
++.B tftp_port_t
++.TP 10
+.EE
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the smoltclient_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++Default Defined Ports:
++udp 69
+.EE
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux smoltclient policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their smoltclient processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for smoltclient:
++The SELinux process type tftpd_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
++.br
++.B tftpd_var_run_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B smoltclient_exec_t
-+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the smoltclient_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the smoltclient_t domain.
++.br
++.B tftpdir_rw_t
++
++ /var/lib/tftpboot(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the tftpd_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B smoltclient_tmp_t
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the smoltclient_tmp_t type, if you want to store smoltclient temporary files in the /tmp directories.
-+
-+
-+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
-+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux smoltclient policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their smoltclient processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for smoltclient:
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the tftpd_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B smoltclient_t
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -48703,157 +95299,155 @@ index 0000000..a665ee3
+.B semanage module
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
++.B semanage port
++can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
++
++.B semanage boolean
++can also be used to manipulate the booleans
++
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), smoltclient(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/snmpd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/snmpd_selinux.8
++selinux(8), tftpd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, setsebool(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/tgtd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/tgtd_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..f87f0d4
+index 0000000..e0da88e
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/snmpd_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,159 @@
-+.TH "snmpd_selinux" "8" "snmpd" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "snmpd SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/tgtd_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,146 @@
++.TH "tgtd_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "tgtd" "SELinux Policy documentation for tgtd"
+.SH "NAME"
-+snmpd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the snmpd processes
++tgtd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the tgtd processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the snmpd processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the tgtd processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The tgtd processes execute with the tgtd_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the snmpd_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep tgtd_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The tgtd_t SELinux type can be entered via the "tgtd_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the tgtd_t domain are the following:"
+
++/usr/sbin/tgtd
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the snmpd_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux tgtd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their tgtd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for tgtd:
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B tgtd_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux snmpd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their snmpd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for snmpd:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux tgtd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their tgtd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for tgtd:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B snmpd_exec_t
++.B tgtd_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the snmpd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the snmpd_t domain.
++- Set files with the tgtd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the tgtd_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B snmpd_initrc_exec_t
++.B tgtd_initrc_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the snmpd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the snmpd_initrc_t domain.
++- Set files with the tgtd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the tgtd_initrc_t domain.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/etc/rc\.d/init\.d/snmpd, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/snmptrapd
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B snmpd_log_t
++.B tgtd_tmp_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the snmpd_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as snmpd log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++- Set files with the tgtd_tmp_t type, if you want to store tgtd temporary files in the /tmp directories.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B snmpd_var_lib_t
++.B tgtd_tmpfs_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the snmpd_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the snmpd files under the /var/lib directory.
++- Set files with the tgtd_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store tgtd files on a tmpfs file system.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/agentx(/.*)?, /usr/share/snmp/mibs/\.index, /var/net-snmp(/.*)?, /var/lib/net-snmp(/.*)?, /var/lib/snmp(/.*)?
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B snmpd_var_run_t
++.B tgtd_var_lib_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the snmpd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the snmpd files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the tgtd_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the tgtd files under the /var/lib directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B tgtd_var_run_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the tgtd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the tgtd files under the /run directory.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/run/net-snmpd(/.*)?, /var/run/snmpd\.pid, /var/run/snmpd(/.*)?
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PORT TYPES
-+SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
-+.PP
-+You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+.B semanage port -l
++The SELinux process type tgtd_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
-+SELinux snmpd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their snmpd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following port types are defined for snmpd:
++.br
++.B tgtd_tmpfs_t
+
-+.EX
-+.TP 5
-+.B snmp_port_t
-+.TP 10
-+.EE
+
++.br
++.B tgtd_var_lib_t
+
-+Default Defined Ports:
-+tcp 161-162,199,1161
-+.EE
-+udp 161-162
-+.EE
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux snmpd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their snmpd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for snmpd:
++ /var/lib/tgtd(/.*)?
++.br
+
-+.EX
-+.B snmpd_t
-+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++.br
++.B tgtd_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/tgtd.*
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -48865,121 +95459,133 @@ index 0000000..f87f0d4
+.B semanage module
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
-+.B semanage port
-+can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
-+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), snmpd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/snort_selinux.8 b/man/man8/snort_selinux.8
++selinux(8), tgtd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/thin_aeolus_configserver_selinux.8 b/man/man8/thin_aeolus_configserver_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..e679e9c
+index 0000000..66344ef
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/snort_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,117 @@
-+.TH "snort_selinux" "8" "snort" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "snort SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/thin_aeolus_configserver_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,133 @@
++.TH "thin_aeolus_configserver_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "thin_aeolus_configserver" "SELinux Policy documentation for thin_aeolus_configserver"
+.SH "NAME"
-+snort_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the snort processes
++thin_aeolus_configserver_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the thin_aeolus_configserver processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the snort processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the thin_aeolus_configserver processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The thin_aeolus_configserver processes execute with the thin_aeolus_configserver_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux snort policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their snort processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for snort:
++For example:
+
++.B ps -eZ | grep thin_aeolus_configserver_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B snort_etc_t
-+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the snort_etc_t type, if you want to store snort files in the /etc directories.
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
++The thin_aeolus_configserver_t SELinux type can be entered via the "thin_aeolus_configserver_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the thin_aeolus_configserver_t domain are the following:"
+
-+.EX
++/usr/bin/aeolus-configserver-thinwrapper
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+.B snort_exec_t
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux thin_aeolus_configserver policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their thin_aeolus_configserver processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for thin_aeolus_configserver:
++
++.EX
++.B thin_aeolus_configserver_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
-+- Set files with the snort_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the snort_t domain.
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux thin_aeolus_configserver policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their thin_aeolus_configserver processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for thin_aeolus_configserver:
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/sbin/snort-plain, /usr/s?bin/snort
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B snort_initrc_exec_t
++.B thin_aeolus_configserver_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the snort_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the snort_initrc_t domain.
++- Set files with the thin_aeolus_configserver_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the thin_aeolus_configserver_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B snort_log_t
++.B thin_aeolus_configserver_lib_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the snort_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as snort log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++- Set files with the thin_aeolus_configserver_lib_t type, if you want to treat the files as thin aeolus configserver lib data.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B snort_tmp_t
++.B thin_aeolus_configserver_log_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the snort_tmp_t type, if you want to store snort temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++- Set files with the thin_aeolus_configserver_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as thin aeolus configserver log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B snort_var_run_t
++.B thin_aeolus_configserver_var_run_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the snort_var_run_t type, if you want to store the snort files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the thin_aeolus_configserver_var_run_t type, if you want to store the thin aeolus configserver files under the /run directory.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux snort policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their snort processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for snort:
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+.EX
-+.B snort_t
-+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++The SELinux process type thin_aeolus_configserver_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B thin_aeolus_configserver_lib_t
++
++ /var/lib/aeolus-configserver(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B thin_aeolus_configserver_log_t
++
++ /var/log/aeolus-configserver(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B thin_aeolus_configserver_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/aeolus-configserver(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -48992,103 +95598,152 @@ index 0000000..e679e9c
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), snort(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/sosreport_selinux.8 b/man/man8/sosreport_selinux.8
++selinux(8), thin_aeolus_configserver(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, thin_selinux(8), thin_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/thin_selinux.8 b/man/man8/thin_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..083ed50
+index 0000000..dbab03d
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/sosreport_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
-+.TH "sosreport_selinux" "8" "sosreport" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "sosreport SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/thin_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,151 @@
++.TH "thin_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "thin" "SELinux Policy documentation for thin"
+.SH "NAME"
-+sosreport_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the sosreport processes
++thin_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the thin processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the sosreport processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the thin processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The thin processes execute with the thin_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the sosreport_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep thin_t
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
+
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The thin_t SELinux type can be entered via the "thin_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the thin_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/bin/thin
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the sosreport_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux thin policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their thin processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for thin:
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B thin_t, thin_aeolus_configserver_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux sosreport policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their sosreport processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for sosreport:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux thin policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their thin processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for thin:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B sosreport_exec_t
++.B thin_aeolus_configserver_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the sosreport_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the sosreport_t domain.
++- Set files with the thin_aeolus_configserver_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the thin_aeolus_configserver_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B sosreport_tmp_t
++.B thin_aeolus_configserver_lib_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the sosreport_tmp_t type, if you want to store sosreport temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++- Set files with the thin_aeolus_configserver_lib_t type, if you want to treat the files as thin aeolus configserver lib data.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B sosreport_tmpfs_t
++.B thin_aeolus_configserver_log_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the sosreport_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store sosreport files on a tmpfs file system.
++- Set files with the thin_aeolus_configserver_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as thin aeolus configserver log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
+
+
++.EX
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
++.B thin_aeolus_configserver_var_run_t
++.EE
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++- Set files with the thin_aeolus_configserver_var_run_t type, if you want to store the thin aeolus configserver files under the /run directory.
++
++
++.EX
+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.B thin_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the thin_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the thin_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux sosreport policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their sosreport processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for sosreport:
++.B thin_log_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the thin_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as thin log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++
+
+.EX
-+.B sosreport_t
++.PP
++.B thin_var_run_t
+.EE
++
++- Set files with the thin_var_run_t type, if you want to store the thin files under the /run directory.
++
++
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type thin_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B thin_log_t
++
++ /var/log/thin\.log.*
++.br
++
++.br
++.B thin_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/aeolus/thin\.pid
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -49101,156 +95756,238 @@ index 0000000..083ed50
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), sosreport(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/soundd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/soundd_selinux.8
++selinux(8), thin(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, thin_aeolus_configserver_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/thumb_selinux.8 b/man/man8/thumb_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..99e1c36
+index 0000000..0983a25
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/soundd_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,159 @@
-+.TH "soundd_selinux" "8" "soundd" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "soundd SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/thumb_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,236 @@
++.TH "thumb_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "thumb" "SELinux Policy documentation for thumb"
+.SH "NAME"
-+soundd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the soundd processes
++thumb_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the thumb processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the soundd processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the thumb processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The thumb processes execute with the thumb_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep thumb_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The thumb_t SELinux type can be entered via the "thumb_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the thumb_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/bin/[^/]*thumbnailer, /usr/bin/gnome-[^/]*-thumbnailer(.sh)?, /usr/lib/tumbler[^/]*/tumblerd, /usr/bin/raw-thumbnailer, /usr/bin/whaaw-thumbnailer, /usr/bin/ffmpegthumbnailer, /usr/bin/evince-thumbnailer, /usr/bin/gnome-thumbnail-font, /usr/bin/gsf-office-thumbnailer, /usr/bin/totem-video-thumbnailer, /usr/bin/shotwell-video-thumbnailer
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux thumb policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their thumb processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for thumb:
++
++.EX
++.B thumb_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux soundd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their soundd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for soundd:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux thumb policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their thumb processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for thumb:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B soundd_etc_t
++.B thumb_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the soundd_etc_t type, if you want to store soundd files in the /etc directories.
++- Set files with the thumb_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the thumb_t domain.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/etc/yiff(/.*)?, /etc/nas(/.*)?
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B soundd_exec_t
++.B thumb_home_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the soundd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the soundd_t domain.
++- Set files with the thumb_home_t type, if you want to store thumb files in the users home directory.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/bin/gpe-soundserver, /usr/sbin/yiff, /usr/bin/nasd
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B soundd_initrc_exec_t
++.B thumb_tmp_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the soundd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the soundd_initrc_t domain.
++- Set files with the thumb_tmp_t type, if you want to store thumb temporary files in the /tmp directories.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B soundd_state_t
++.B thumb_tmpfs_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the soundd_state_t type, if you want to treat the files as soundd state data.
++- Set files with the thumb_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store thumb files on a tmpfs file system.
+
+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B soundd_tmp_t
-+.EE
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
+
-+- Set files with the soundd_tmp_t type, if you want to store soundd temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
++The SELinux process type thumb_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B soundd_tmpfs_t
-+.EE
++.br
++.B gstreamer_home_t
+
-+- Set files with the soundd_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store soundd files on a tmpfs file system.
++ /var/run/user/[^/]*/\.orc(/.*)?
++.br
++ /root/\.gstreamer-.*
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.orc(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.gstreamer-.*
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.grl-bookmarks
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.grl-bookmarks
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.grl-metadata-store
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.orc(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.gstreamer-.*
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.grl-bookmarks
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.grl-bookmarks
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.grl-metadata-store
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.orc(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.gstreamer-.*
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.grl-bookmarks
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.grl-bookmarks
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.grl-metadata-store
++.br
+
++.br
++.B thumb_home_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B soundd_var_run_t
-+.EE
++ /home/[^/]*/\.thumbnails(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/missfont\.log.*
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.cache/thumbnails(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.thumbnails(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/missfont\.log.*
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.cache/thumbnails(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.thumbnails(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/missfont\.log.*
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.cache/thumbnails(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B thumb_tmp_t
+
-+- Set files with the soundd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the soundd files under the /run directory.
+
+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/run/nasd(/.*)?, /var/run/yiff-[0-9]+\.pid
++.B thumb_tmpfs_t
+
-+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PORT TYPES
-+SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
-+.PP
-+You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
++.br
++.B user_fonts_cache_t
+
-+.B semanage port -l
++ /root/\.fontconfig(/.*)?
++.br
++ /root/\.fonts/auto(/.*)?
++.br
++ /root/\.fonts\.cache-.*
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.fontconfig(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.fonts/auto(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.fonts\.cache-.*
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.fontconfig(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.fonts/auto(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.fonts\.cache-.*
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.fontconfig(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.fonts/auto(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.fonts\.cache-.*
++.br
++
++.br
++.B user_tmp_t
++
++ /var/run/user(/.*)?
++.br
++ /tmp/gconfd-.*
++.br
++ /tmp/gconfd-dwalsh
++.br
++ /tmp/gconfd-xguest
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
-+SELinux soundd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their soundd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following port types are defined for soundd:
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the thumb_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.TP 5
-+.B soundd_port_t
-+.TP 10
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
+
-+
-+Default Defined Ports:
-+tcp 8000,9433,16001
-+.EE
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux soundd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their soundd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for soundd:
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the thumb_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B soundd_t
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -49262,108 +95999,137 @@ index 0000000..99e1c36
+.B semanage module
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
-+.B semanage port
-+can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
-+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), soundd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/spamass_selinux.8 b/man/man8/spamass_selinux.8
++selinux(8), thumb(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/tmpreaper_selinux.8 b/man/man8/tmpreaper_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..824297f
+index 0000000..1f3820f
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/spamass_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
-+.TH "spamass_selinux" "8" "spamass" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "spamass SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/tmpreaper_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,136 @@
++.TH "tmpreaper_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "tmpreaper" "SELinux Policy documentation for tmpreaper"
+.SH "NAME"
-+spamass_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the spamass processes
++tmpreaper_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the tmpreaper processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the spamass processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the tmpreaper processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The tmpreaper processes execute with the tmpreaper_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep tmpreaper_t
+
-+.SH BOOLEANS
-+SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. spamass policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run spamass with the tightest access possible.
+
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
++The tmpreaper_t SELinux type can be entered via the "tmpreaper_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the tmpreaper_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/sbin/tmpwatch, /usr/sbin/tmpreaper
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow user spamassassin clients to use the network, you must turn on the spamassassin_can_network boolean.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux tmpreaper policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their tmpreaper processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for tmpreaper:
+
+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P spamassassin_can_network 1
++.B tmpreaper_t
+.EE
-+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux spamass policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their spamass processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for spamass:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux tmpreaper policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their tmpreaper processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for tmpreaper:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B spamass_milter_data_t
++.B tmpreaper_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the spamass_milter_data_t type, if you want to treat the files as spamass milter content.
++- Set files with the tmpreaper_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the tmpreaper_t domain.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/spool/postfix/spamass(/.*)?, /var/run/spamass(/.*)?, /var/run/spamass-milter(/.*)?, /var/run/spamass-milter\.pid
+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B spamass_milter_exec_t
-+.EE
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
+
-+- Set files with the spamass_milter_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the spamass_milter_t domain.
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
++The SELinux process type tmpreaper_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B spamass_milter_state_t
-+.EE
++.br
++.B amavis_spool_t
+
-+- Set files with the spamass_milter_state_t type, if you want to treat the files as spamass milter state data.
++ /var/spool/amavisd(/.*)?
++.br
+
++.br
++.B kismet_log_t
+
-+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
++ /var/log/kismet(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B print_spool_t
++
++ /var/spool/lpd(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/spool/cups(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/spool/cups-pdf(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B rpm_var_cache_t
++
++ /var/cache/yum(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/spool/up2date(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/cache/PackageKit(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux spamass policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their spamass processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for spamass:
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the tmpreaper_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B spamass_milter_t
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
++
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the tmpreaper_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -49375,117 +96141,167 @@ index 0000000..824297f
+.B semanage module
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
-+.B semanage boolean
-+can also be used to manipulate the booleans
-+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), spamass(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-+, setsebool(8)
-\ No newline at end of file
-diff --git a/man/man8/spamc_selinux.8 b/man/man8/spamc_selinux.8
++selinux(8), tmpreaper(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/tomcat_selinux.8 b/man/man8/tomcat_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..36e84ee
+index 0000000..c89378e
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/spamc_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
-+.TH "spamc_selinux" "8" "spamc" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "spamc SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/tomcat_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,166 @@
++.TH "tomcat_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "tomcat" "SELinux Policy documentation for tomcat"
+.SH "NAME"
-+spamc_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the spamc processes
++tomcat_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the tomcat processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the spamc processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the tomcat processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The tomcat processes execute with the tomcat_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the spamc_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep tomcat_t
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
+
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The tomcat_t SELinux type can be entered via the "tomcat_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the tomcat_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/sbin/tomcat(6)?
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the spamc_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux tomcat policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their tomcat processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for tomcat:
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B tomcat_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux spamc policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their spamc processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for spamc:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux tomcat policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their tomcat processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for tomcat:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B spamc_exec_t
++.B tomcat_cache_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the spamc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the spamc_t domain.
++- Set files with the tomcat_cache_t type, if you want to store the files under the /var/cache directory.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/bin/pyzor, /usr/bin/spamc, /usr/bin/razor.*, /usr/bin/sa-learn, /usr/bin/spamassassin
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B spamc_home_t
++.B tomcat_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the spamc_home_t type, if you want to store spamc files in the users home directory.
++- Set files with the tomcat_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the tomcat_t domain.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/root/\.spamd(/.*)?, /root/\.pyzor(/.*)?, /root/\.razor(/.*)?, /root/\.spamassassin(/.*)?
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B spamc_tmp_t
++.B tomcat_log_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the spamc_tmp_t type, if you want to store spamc temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++- Set files with the tomcat_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as tomcat log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
+
+
++.EX
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
++.B tomcat_tmp_t
++.EE
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++- Set files with the tomcat_tmp_t type, if you want to store tomcat temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++
++
++.EX
+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.B tomcat_unit_file_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the tomcat_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as tomcat unit content.
++
++
++.EX
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux spamc policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their spamc processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for spamc:
++.B tomcat_var_lib_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the tomcat_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the tomcat files under the /var/lib directory.
++
+
+.EX
-+.B spamc_t
++.PP
++.B tomcat_var_run_t
+.EE
++
++- Set files with the tomcat_var_run_t type, if you want to store the tomcat files under the /run directory.
++
++
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type tomcat_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B tomcat_cache_t
++
++ /var/cache/tomcat6?(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B tomcat_log_t
++
++ /var/log/tomcat6?(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B tomcat_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B tomcat_var_lib_t
++
++ /var/lib/tomcat6?(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B tomcat_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/tomcat6?\.pid
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -49498,235 +96314,224 @@ index 0000000..36e84ee
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), spamc(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/spamd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/spamd_selinux.8
++selinux(8), tomcat(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/tor_selinux.8 b/man/man8/tor_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..301c200
+index 0000000..2274d81
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/spamd_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,242 @@
-+.TH "spamd_selinux" "8" "spamd" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "spamd SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/tor_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,231 @@
++.TH "tor_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "tor" "SELinux Policy documentation for tor"
+.SH "NAME"
-+spamd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the spamd processes
++tor_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the tor processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the spamd processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the tor processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH BOOLEANS
-+SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. spamd policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run spamd with the tightest access possible.
++The tor processes execute with the tor_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
++For example:
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow user spamassassin clients to use the network, you must turn on the spamassassin_can_network boolean.
++.B ps -eZ | grep tor_t
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P spamassassin_can_network 1
-+.EE
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow spamd to read/write user home directories, you must turn on the spamd_enable_home_dirs boolean.
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P spamd_enable_home_dirs 1
-+.EE
++The tor_t SELinux type can be entered via the "tor_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the tor_t domain are the following:"
+
++/usr/bin/tor, /usr/sbin/tor
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow http daemon to check spam, you must turn on the httpd_can_check_spam boolean.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux tor policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their tor processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for tor:
+
+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P httpd_can_check_spam 1
++.B tor_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH BOOLEANS
++SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. tor policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run tor with the tightest access possible.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the spamc_t, spamd_update_t, spamd_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++If you want to allow tor daemon to bind tcp sockets to all unreserved ports, you must turn on the tor_bind_all_unreserved_ports boolean.
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.B setsebool -P tor_bind_all_unreserved_ports 1
+.EE
+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the spamc_t, spamd_update_t, spamd_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++If you want to allow tor daemon to bind tcp sockets to all unreserved ports, you must turn on the tor_bind_all_unreserved_ports boolean.
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B setsebool -P tor_bind_all_unreserved_ports 1
+.EE
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux spamd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their spamd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for spamd:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux tor policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their tor processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for tor:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B spamd_compiled_t
++.B tor_etc_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the spamd_compiled_t type, if you want to treat the files as spamd compiled data.
++- Set files with the tor_etc_t type, if you want to store tor files in the /etc directories.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B spamd_etc_t
++.B tor_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the spamd_etc_t type, if you want to store spamd files in the /etc directories.
++- Set files with the tor_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the tor_t domain.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/etc/pyzor(/.*)?, /etc/razor(/.*)?
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B spamd_exec_t
++.B tor_initrc_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the spamd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the spamd_t domain.
++- Set files with the tor_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the tor_initrc_t domain.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/sbin/spamd, /usr/bin/mimedefang-multiplexor, /usr/bin/pyzord, /usr/bin/spamd, /usr/bin/mimedefang
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B spamd_initrc_exec_t
++.B tor_unit_file_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the spamd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the spamd_initrc_t domain.
++- Set files with the tor_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as tor unit content.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/etc/rc\.d/init\.d/spamd, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/mimedefang.*, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/pyzord
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B spamd_log_t
++.B tor_var_lib_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the spamd_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as spamd log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++- Set files with the tor_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the tor files under the /var/lib directory.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/log/razor-agent\.log.*, /var/log/mimedefang, /var/log/pyzord\.log.*, /var/log/spamd\.log.*
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B spamd_spool_t
++.B tor_var_log_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the spamd_spool_t type, if you want to store the spamd files under the /var/spool directory.
++- Set files with the tor_var_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as tor var log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/spool/spamd(/.*)?, /var/spool/spamassassin(/.*)?
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B spamd_tmp_t
++.B tor_var_run_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the spamd_tmp_t type, if you want to store spamd temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++- Set files with the tor_var_run_t type, if you want to store the tor files under the /run directory.
+
+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B spamd_update_exec_t
-+.EE
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
+
-+- Set files with the spamd_update_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the spamd_update_t domain.
++.SH PORT TYPES
++SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
++.PP
++You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
+
++.B semanage port -l
+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B spamd_var_lib_t
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
++SELinux tor policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their tor processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following port types are defined for tor:
++
++.EX
++.TP 5
++.B tor_port_t
++.TP 10
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the spamd_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the spamd files under the /var/lib directory.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/lib/spamassassin(/.*)?, /var/lib/razor(/.*)?, /var/lib/pyzord(/.*)?
++Default Defined Ports:
++tcp 6969,9001,9030,9051
++.EE
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B spamd_var_run_t
++.TP 5
++.B tor_socks_port_t
++.TP 10
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the spamd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the spamd files under the /run directory.
++
++Default Defined Ports:
++tcp 9050
++.EE
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type tor_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/run/spamassassin(/.*)?, /var/spool/MIMEDefang(/.*)?, /var/spool/MD-Quarantine(/.*)?
++.B tor_var_lib_t
+
-+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
++ /var/lib/tor(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/tor-data(/.*)?
++.br
+
-+.SH PORT TYPES
-+SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
-+.PP
-+You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
++.br
++.B tor_var_log_t
+
-+.B semanage port -l
++ /var/log/tor(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B tor_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/tor(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
-+SELinux spamd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their spamd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following port types are defined for spamd:
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the tor_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.TP 5
-+.B spamd_port_t
-+.TP 10
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
+
-+
-+Default Defined Ports:
-+tcp 783
-+.EE
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux spamd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their spamd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for spamd:
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the tor_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B spamc_t, spamd_t, spamd_update_t, spamass_milter_t
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -49745,200 +96550,306 @@ index 0000000..301c200
+can also be used to manipulate the booleans
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), spamd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
++selinux(8), tor(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+, setsebool(8)
\ No newline at end of file
-diff --git a/man/man8/squid_selinux.8 b/man/man8/squid_selinux.8
+diff --git a/man/man8/traceroute_selinux.8 b/man/man8/traceroute_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..39622ca
+index 0000000..00db217
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/squid_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,205 @@
-+.TH "squid_selinux" "8" "squid" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "squid SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/traceroute_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,126 @@
++.TH "traceroute_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "traceroute" "SELinux Policy documentation for traceroute"
+.SH "NAME"
-+squid_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the squid processes
++traceroute_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the traceroute processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the squid processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the traceroute processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH BOOLEANS
-+SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. squid policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run squid with the tightest access possible.
++The traceroute processes execute with the traceroute_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
++For example:
+
++.B ps -eZ | grep traceroute_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The traceroute_t SELinux type can be entered via the "traceroute_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the traceroute_t domain are the following:"
++
++/bin/tracepath.*, /bin/traceroute.*, /usr/bin/tracepath.*, /usr/bin/traceroute.*, /usr/sbin/traceroute.*, /usr/bin/lft, /usr/bin/mtr, /usr/bin/nmap, /usr/sbin/mtr
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow squid to run as a transparent proxy (TPROXY), you must turn on the squid_use_tproxy boolean.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux traceroute policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their traceroute processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for traceroute:
+
+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P squid_use_tproxy 1
++.B traceroute_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
-+If you want to allow squid to connect to all ports, not just HTTP, FTP, and Gopher ports, you must turn on the squid_connect_any boolean.
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux traceroute policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their traceroute processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for traceroute:
++
+
+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P squid_connect_any 1
++.PP
++.B traceroute_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the traceroute_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the traceroute_t domain.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH PORT TYPES
++SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
++.PP
++You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
++
++.B semanage port -l
++
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
++SELinux traceroute policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their traceroute processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following port types are defined for traceroute:
++
++.EX
++.TP 5
++.B traceroute_port_t
++.TP 10
+.EE
+
++
++Default Defined Ports:
++udp 64000-64010
++.EE
+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the squid_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the traceroute_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the squid_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the traceroute_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
+.EE
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux squid policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their squid processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for squid:
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
++.B semanage port
++can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B squid_cache_t
-+.EE
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+- Set files with the squid_cache_t type, if you want to store the files under the /var/cache directory.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/cache/squid(/.*)?, /var/spool/squid(/.*)?, /var/squidGuard(/.*)?
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), traceroute(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/tuned_selinux.8 b/man/man8/tuned_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..31c8195
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/tuned_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,172 @@
++.TH "tuned_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "tuned" "SELinux Policy documentation for tuned"
++.SH "NAME"
++tuned_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the tuned processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+.EX
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the tuned processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The tuned processes execute with the tuned_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep tuned_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The tuned_t SELinux type can be entered via the "tuned_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the tuned_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/sbin/tuned
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux tuned policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their tuned processes in as secure a method as possible.
+.PP
-+.B squid_conf_t
++The following process types are defined for tuned:
++
++.EX
++.B tuned_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
-+- Set files with the squid_conf_t type, if you want to treat the files as squid configuration data, usually stored under the /etc directory.
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux tuned policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their tuned processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for tuned:
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/etc/squid(/.*)?, /usr/share/squid(/.*)?
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B squid_exec_t
++.B tuned_etc_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the squid_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the squid_t domain.
++- Set files with the tuned_etc_t type, if you want to store tuned files in the /etc directories.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B squid_initrc_exec_t
++.B tuned_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the squid_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the squid_initrc_t domain.
++- Set files with the tuned_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the tuned_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B squid_log_t
++.B tuned_initrc_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the squid_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as squid log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++- Set files with the tuned_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the tuned_initrc_t domain.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/log/squid(/.*)?, /var/log/squidGuard(/.*)?
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B squid_tmp_t
++.B tuned_log_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the squid_tmp_t type, if you want to store squid temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++- Set files with the tuned_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as tuned log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B squid_tmpfs_t
++.B tuned_rw_etc_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the squid_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store squid files on a tmpfs file system.
++- Set files with the tuned_rw_etc_t type, if you want to store tuned rw files in the /etc directories.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B squid_var_run_t
++.B tuned_var_run_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the squid_var_run_t type, if you want to store the squid files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the tuned_var_run_t type, if you want to store the tuned files under the /run directory.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PORT TYPES
-+SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
-+.PP
-+You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+.B semanage port -l
++The SELinux process type tuned_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B sysfs_t
++
++ /sys(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B tuned_log_t
++
++ /var/log/tuned(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/log/tuned\.log.*
++.br
++
++.br
++.B tuned_rw_etc_t
++
++ /etc/tuned/active_profile
++.br
++
++.br
++.B tuned_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/tuned(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/tuned\.pid
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
-+SELinux squid policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their squid processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following port types are defined for squid:
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the tuned_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.TP 5
-+.B squid_port_t
-+.TP 10
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
+
-+
-+Default Defined Ports:
-+tcp 3128,3401,4827
-+.EE
-+udp 3401,4827
-+.EE
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux squid policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their squid processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for squid:
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the tuned_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B squid_t
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -49950,106 +96861,155 @@ index 0000000..39622ca
+.B semanage module
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
-+.B semanage port
-+can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
-+
-+.B semanage boolean
-+can also be used to manipulate the booleans
-+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), squid(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-+, setsebool(8)
-\ No newline at end of file
-diff --git a/man/man8/srvsvcd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/srvsvcd_selinux.8
++selinux(8), tuned(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/tvtime_selinux.8 b/man/man8/tvtime_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..c867ab4
+index 0000000..f52edbe
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/srvsvcd_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
-+.TH "srvsvcd_selinux" "8" "srvsvcd" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "srvsvcd SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/tvtime_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,154 @@
++.TH "tvtime_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "tvtime" "SELinux Policy documentation for tvtime"
+.SH "NAME"
-+srvsvcd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the srvsvcd processes
++tvtime_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the tvtime processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the srvsvcd processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the tvtime processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The tvtime processes execute with the tvtime_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep tvtime_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The tvtime_t SELinux type can be entered via the "tvtime_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the tvtime_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/bin/tvtime
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux tvtime policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their tvtime processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for tvtime:
++
++.EX
++.B tvtime_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux srvsvcd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their srvsvcd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for srvsvcd:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux tvtime policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their tvtime processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for tvtime:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B srvsvcd_exec_t
++.B tvtime_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the srvsvcd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the srvsvcd_t domain.
++- Set files with the tvtime_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the tvtime_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B srvsvcd_var_lib_t
++.B tvtime_home_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the srvsvcd_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the srvsvcd files under the /var/lib directory.
++- Set files with the tvtime_home_t type, if you want to store tvtime files in the users home directory.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B srvsvcd_var_run_t
++.B tvtime_tmp_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the srvsvcd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the srvsvcd files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the tvtime_tmp_t type, if you want to store tvtime temporary files in the /tmp directories.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B srvsvcd_var_socket_t
++.B tvtime_tmpfs_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the srvsvcd_var_socket_t type, if you want to treat the files as srvsvcd var socket data.
++- Set files with the tvtime_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store tvtime files on a tmpfs file system.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux srvsvcd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their srvsvcd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for srvsvcd:
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+.EX
-+.B srvsvcd_t
-+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++The SELinux process type tvtime_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B tvtime_home_t
++
++
++.br
++.B tvtime_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B tvtime_tmpfs_t
++
++
++.br
++.B user_fonts_cache_t
++
++ /root/\.fontconfig(/.*)?
++.br
++ /root/\.fonts/auto(/.*)?
++.br
++ /root/\.fonts\.cache-.*
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.fontconfig(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.fonts/auto(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.fonts\.cache-.*
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.fontconfig(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.fonts/auto(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.fonts\.cache-.*
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.fontconfig(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.fonts/auto(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.fonts\.cache-.*
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -50062,257 +97022,328 @@ index 0000000..c867ab4
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), srvsvcd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/ssh_selinux.8 b/man/man8/ssh_selinux.8
++selinux(8), tvtime(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/udev_selinux.8 b/man/man8/udev_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..9fc8832
+index 0000000..8e9a765
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/ssh_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,264 @@
-+.TH "ssh_selinux" "8" "ssh" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "ssh SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/udev_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,328 @@
++.TH "udev_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "udev" "SELinux Policy documentation for udev"
+.SH "NAME"
-+ssh_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the ssh processes
++udev_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the udev processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the ssh processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
-+
-+.SH BOOLEANS
-+SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. ssh policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run ssh with the tightest access possible.
-+
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the udev processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow ssh with chroot env to read and write files in the user home directories, you must turn on the ssh_chroot_rw_homedirs boolean.
++The udev processes execute with the udev_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P ssh_chroot_rw_homedirs 1
-+.EE
++For example:
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow internal-sftp to read and write files in the user ssh home directories, you must turn on the sftpd_write_ssh_home boolean.
++.B ps -eZ | grep udev_t
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P sftpd_write_ssh_home 1
-+.EE
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow ssh logins as sysadm_r:sysadm_t, you must turn on the ssh_sysadm_login boolean.
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P ssh_sysadm_login 1
-+.EE
++The udev_t SELinux type can be entered via the "udev_exec_t,udev_helper_exec_t" file types. The default entrypoint paths for the udev_t domain are the following:"
+
++/sbin/udev, /sbin/udevd, /bin/udevadm, /sbin/udevadm, /sbin/udevsend, /usr/sbin/udev, /lib/udev/udevd, /sbin/udevstart, /usr/sbin/udevd, /sbin/start_udev, /usr/bin/udevadm, /usr/bin/udevinfo, /usr/sbin/udevadm, /lib/udev/udev-acl, /usr/sbin/udevsend, /usr/sbin/udevstart, /usr/lib/udev/udevd, /sbin/wait_for_sysfs, /usr/sbin/start_udev, /usr/lib/udev/udev-acl, /usr/sbin/wait_for_sysfs, /usr/lib/systemd/systemd-udevd, /etc/dev\.d/.+, /etc/udev/scripts/.+, /etc/hotplug\.d/default/udev.*
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow host key based authentication, you must turn on the ssh_keysign boolean.
-+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P ssh_keysign 1
-+.EE
-+
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+If you want to allow fenced domain to execute ssh, you must turn on the fenced_can_ssh boolean.
-+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P fenced_can_ssh 1
-+.EE
-+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
-+
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux udev policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their udev processes in as secure a method as possible.
+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the ssh_keygen_t, sshd_t, ssh_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++The following process types are defined for udev:
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.B udev_t
+.EE
-+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the ssh_keygen_t, sshd_t, ssh_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
-+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
-+.EE
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux ssh policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ssh processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for ssh:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux udev policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their udev processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for udev:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B ssh_agent_exec_t
++.B udev_etc_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the ssh_agent_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ssh_agent_t domain.
++- Set files with the udev_etc_t type, if you want to store udev files in the /etc directories.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B ssh_agent_tmp_t
++.B udev_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the ssh_agent_tmp_t type, if you want to store ssh agent temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++- Set files with the udev_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the udev_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B ssh_exec_t
++.B udev_helper_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the ssh_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ssh_t domain.
++- Set files with the udev_helper_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the udev_helper_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B ssh_home_t
++.B udev_rules_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the ssh_home_t type, if you want to store ssh files in the users home directory.
++- Set files with the udev_rules_t type, if you want to treat the files as udev rules data.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/lib/nocpulse/\.ssh(/.*)?, /var/lib/gitolite/\.ssh(/.*)?, /root/\.shosts, /var/lib/amanda/\.ssh(/.*)?, /var/lib/gitolite3/\.ssh(/.*)?, /root/\.ssh(/.*)?, /var/lib/stickshift/.*/\.ssh(/.*)?
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B ssh_keygen_exec_t
++.B udev_var_run_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the ssh_keygen_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ssh_keygen_t domain.
++- Set files with the udev_var_run_t type, if you want to store the udev files under the /run directory.
+
+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B ssh_keysign_exec_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the ssh_keysign_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ssh_keysign_t domain.
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
+
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B ssh_tmpfs_t
-+.EE
++The SELinux process type udev_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
-+- Set files with the ssh_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store ssh files on a tmpfs file system.
++.br
++.B anon_inodefs_t
+
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B sshd_exec_t
-+.EE
++.br
++.B device_t
+
-+- Set files with the sshd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the sshd_t domain.
++ /dev/.*
++.br
++ /lib/udev/devices(/.*)?
++.br
++ /usr/lib/udev/devices(/.*)?
++.br
++ /dev
++.br
++ /etc/udev/devices
++.br
++ /var/named/chroot/dev
++.br
++ /var/spool/postfix/dev
++.br
+
++.br
++.B dhcp_etc_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B sshd_initrc_exec_t
-+.EE
++ /etc/dhcpc.*
++.br
++ /etc/dhcp3(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/dhcpd(6)?\.conf
++.br
++ /etc/dhcp3?/dhclient.*
++.br
++ /etc/dhclient.*conf
++.br
++ /etc/dhcp/dhcpd(6)?\.conf
++.br
++ /etc/dhclient-script
++.br
+
-+- Set files with the sshd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the sshd_initrc_t domain.
++.br
++.B etc_t
+
++ /etc/.*
++.br
++ /var/db/.*\.db
++.br
++ /usr/etc(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/ftp/etc(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/openshift/.limits.d(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/openshift/.openshift-proxy.d(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/openshift/.stickshift-proxy.d(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/stickshift/.limits.d(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/stickshift/.stickshift-proxy.d(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/named/chroot/etc(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/ipsec\.d/examples(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/spool/postfix/etc(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc
++.br
++ /etc/cups/client\.conf
++.br
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B sshd_key_t
-+.EE
++.br
++.B net_conf_t
+
-+- Set files with the sshd_key_t type, if you want to treat the files as sshd key data.
++ /etc/ntpd?\.conf.*
++.br
++ /etc/hosts[^/]*
++.br
++ /etc/yp\.conf.*
++.br
++ /etc/denyhosts.*
++.br
++ /etc/hosts\.deny.*
++.br
++ /etc/resolv\.conf.*
++.br
++ /etc/ntp/step-tickers.*
++.br
++ /etc/sysconfig/networking(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/sysconfig/network-scripts(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/sysconfig/network-scripts/.*resolv\.conf
++.br
++ /etc/ethers
++.br
+
+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key, /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key.pub, /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key.pub, /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key, /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key.pub, /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key, /etc/ssh/primes
++.B security_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B sshd_keytab_t
-+.EE
++ /selinux
++.br
+
-+- Set files with the sshd_keytab_t type, if you want to treat the files as kerberos keytab files.
++.br
++.B sysfs_t
+
++ /sys(/.*)?
++.br
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B sshd_tmpfs_t
-+.EE
++.br
++.B udev_exec_t
+
-+- Set files with the sshd_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store sshd files on a tmpfs file system.
++ /sbin/udev
++.br
++ /sbin/udevd
++.br
++ /bin/udevadm
++.br
++ /sbin/udevadm
++.br
++ /sbin/udevsend
++.br
++ /usr/sbin/udev
++.br
++ /lib/udev/udevd
++.br
++ /sbin/udevstart
++.br
++ /usr/sbin/udevd
++.br
++ /sbin/start_udev
++.br
++ /usr/bin/udevadm
++.br
++ /usr/bin/udevinfo
++.br
++ /usr/sbin/udevadm
++.br
++ /lib/udev/udev-acl
++.br
++ /usr/sbin/udevsend
++.br
++ /usr/sbin/udevstart
++.br
++ /usr/lib/udev/udevd
++.br
++ /sbin/wait_for_sysfs
++.br
++ /usr/sbin/start_udev
++.br
++ /usr/lib/udev/udev-acl
++.br
++ /usr/sbin/wait_for_sysfs
++.br
++ /usr/lib/systemd/systemd-udevd
++.br
+
++.br
++.B udev_rules_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B sshd_var_run_t
-+.EE
++ /etc/udev/rules.d(/.*)?
++.br
+
-+- Set files with the sshd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the sshd files under the /run directory.
++.br
++.B udev_var_run_t
+
++ /dev/\.udev(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/udev(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/libgpod(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/PackageKit/udev(/.*)?
++.br
++ /dev/\.udevdb
++.br
++ /dev/udev\.tbl
+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/run/sshd\.pid, /var/run/sshd\.init\.pid
+
-+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
++.br
++.B xend_var_log_t
+
-+.SH PORT TYPES
-+SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
-+.PP
-+You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
++ /var/log/xen(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/log/xend\.log.*
++.br
++ /var/log/xend-debug\.log.*
++.br
++ /var/log/xen-hotplug\.log.*
++.br
+
-+.B semanage port -l
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
-+SELinux ssh policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ssh processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following port types are defined for ssh:
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the udev_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.TP 5
-+.B ssh_port_t
-+.TP 10
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
+
-+
-+Default Defined Ports:
-+tcp 22
-+.EE
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux ssh policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ssh processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for ssh:
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the udev_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B sshd_sandbox_t, ssh_keysign_t, ssh_keygen_t, ssh_t, sshd_t
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -50324,206 +97355,291 @@ index 0000000..9fc8832
+.B semanage module
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
-+.B semanage port
-+can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
-+
-+.B semanage boolean
-+can also be used to manipulate the booleans
-+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), ssh(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-+, setsebool(8)
-\ No newline at end of file
-diff --git a/man/man8/sshd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/sshd_selinux.8
++selinux(8), udev(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/ulogd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/ulogd_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..1b057a8
+index 0000000..3953cf8
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/sshd_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,204 @@
-+.TH "sshd_selinux" "8" "sshd" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "sshd SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/ulogd_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,128 @@
++.TH "ulogd_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "ulogd" "SELinux Policy documentation for ulogd"
+.SH "NAME"
-+sshd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the sshd processes
++ulogd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the ulogd processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the sshd processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the ulogd processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH BOOLEANS
-+SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. sshd policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run sshd with the tightest access possible.
++The ulogd processes execute with the ulogd_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep ulogd_t
+
+
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The ulogd_t SELinux type can be entered via the "ulogd_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the ulogd_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/sbin/ulogd
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow ssh with chroot env to read and write files in the user home directories, you must turn on the ssh_chroot_rw_homedirs boolean.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux ulogd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ulogd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for ulogd:
+
+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P ssh_chroot_rw_homedirs 1
++.B ulogd_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
-+If you want to allow internal-sftp to read and write files in the user ssh home directories, you must turn on the sftpd_write_ssh_home boolean.
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux ulogd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ulogd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for ulogd:
++
+
+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P sftpd_write_ssh_home 1
++.PP
++.B ulogd_etc_t
+.EE
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow ssh logins as sysadm_r:sysadm_t, you must turn on the ssh_sysadm_login boolean.
++- Set files with the ulogd_etc_t type, if you want to store ulogd files in the /etc directories.
++
+
+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P ssh_sysadm_login 1
++.PP
++.B ulogd_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow host key based authentication, you must turn on the ssh_keysign boolean.
++- Set files with the ulogd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ulogd_t domain.
++
+
+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P ssh_keysign 1
++.PP
++.B ulogd_initrc_exec_t
+.EE
+
++- Set files with the ulogd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ulogd_initrc_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
+.PP
-+If you want to allow fenced domain to execute ssh, you must turn on the fenced_can_ssh boolean.
++.B ulogd_modules_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the ulogd_modules_t type, if you want to treat the files as ulogd modules.
++
+
+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P fenced_can_ssh 1
++.PP
++.B ulogd_var_log_t
+.EE
+
++- Set files with the ulogd_var_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as ulogd var log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type ulogd_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B ulogd_var_log_t
++
++ /var/log/ulogd(/.*)?
++.br
++
+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the ssh_keygen_t, sshd_t, ssh_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), ulogd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/uml_selinux.8 b/man/man8/uml_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..5629dd2
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/uml_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,157 @@
++.TH "uml_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "uml" "SELinux Policy documentation for uml"
++.SH "NAME"
++uml_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the uml processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the uml processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The uml processes execute with the uml_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep uml_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The uml_t SELinux type can be entered via the "uml_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the uml_t domain are the following:"
++
++
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the ssh_keygen_t, sshd_t, ssh_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux uml policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their uml processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for uml:
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B uml_switch_t, uml_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux sshd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their sshd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for sshd:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux uml policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their uml processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for uml:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B sshd_exec_t
++.B uml_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the sshd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the sshd_t domain.
++- Set files with the uml_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the uml_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B sshd_initrc_exec_t
++.B uml_ro_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the sshd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the sshd_initrc_t domain.
++- Set files with the uml_ro_t type, if you want to treat the files as uml read/only content.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B sshd_key_t
++.B uml_rw_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the sshd_key_t type, if you want to treat the files as sshd key data.
++- Set files with the uml_rw_t type, if you want to treat the files as uml read/write content.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key, /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key.pub, /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key.pub, /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key, /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key.pub, /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key, /etc/ssh/primes
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B sshd_keytab_t
++.B uml_switch_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the sshd_keytab_t type, if you want to treat the files as kerberos keytab files.
++- Set files with the uml_switch_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the uml_switch_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B sshd_tmpfs_t
++.B uml_switch_var_run_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the sshd_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store sshd files on a tmpfs file system.
++- Set files with the uml_switch_var_run_t type, if you want to store the uml switch files under the /run directory.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B sshd_var_run_t
++.B uml_tmp_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the sshd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the sshd files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the uml_tmp_t type, if you want to store uml temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B uml_tmpfs_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the uml_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store uml files on a tmpfs file system.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/run/sshd\.pid, /var/run/sshd\.init\.pid
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PORT TYPES
-+SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
-+.PP
-+You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+.B semanage port -l
++The SELinux process type uml_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
-+SELinux sshd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their sshd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following port types are defined for sshd:
++.br
++.B uml_rw_t
+
-+.EX
-+.TP 5
-+.B ssh_port_t
-+.TP 10
-+.EE
++ /home/[^/]*/\.uml(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.uml(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.uml(/.*)?
++.br
+
++.br
++.B uml_tmp_t
+
-+Default Defined Ports:
-+tcp 22
-+.EE
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux sshd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their sshd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for sshd:
+
-+.EX
-+.B sshd_sandbox_t, ssh_keysign_t, ssh_keygen_t, ssh_t, sshd_t
-+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++.br
++.B uml_tmpfs_t
++
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -50535,148 +97651,107 @@ index 0000000..1b057a8
+.B semanage module
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
-+.B semanage port
-+can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
-+
-+.B semanage boolean
-+can also be used to manipulate the booleans
-+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), sshd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-+, setsebool(8)
++selinux(8), uml(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, uml_switch_selinux(8)
\ No newline at end of file
-diff --git a/man/man8/sssd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/sssd_selinux.8
+diff --git a/man/man8/uml_switch_selinux.8 b/man/man8/uml_switch_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..485226e
+index 0000000..e67ca95
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/sssd_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,139 @@
-+.TH "sssd_selinux" "8" "sssd" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "sssd SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/uml_switch_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,105 @@
++.TH "uml_switch_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "uml_switch" "SELinux Policy documentation for uml_switch"
+.SH "NAME"
-+sssd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the sssd processes
++uml_switch_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the uml_switch processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the sssd processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
-+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
-+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the sssd_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
-+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
-+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the sssd_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
-+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
-+.EE
-+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux sssd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their sssd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for sssd:
-+
-+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B sssd_conf_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the sssd_conf_t type, if you want to treat the files as sssd configuration data, usually stored under the /etc directory.
-+
-+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B sssd_exec_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the sssd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the sssd_t domain.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the uml_switch processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
++The uml_switch processes execute with the uml_switch_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B sssd_initrc_exec_t
-+.EE
++For example:
+
-+- Set files with the sssd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the sssd_initrc_t domain.
++.B ps -eZ | grep uml_switch_t
+
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B sssd_public_t
-+.EE
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
-+- Set files with the sssd_public_t type, if you want to treat the files as sssd public data.
++The uml_switch_t SELinux type can be entered via the "uml_switch_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the uml_switch_t domain are the following:"
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/lib/sss/mc(/.*)?, /var/lib/sss/pubconf(/.*)?
++/usr/bin/uml_switch
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux uml_switch policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their uml_switch processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for uml_switch:
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B sssd_var_lib_t
++.B uml_switch_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
-+- Set files with the sssd_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the sssd files under the /var/lib directory.
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux uml_switch policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their uml_switch processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for uml_switch:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B sssd_var_log_t
++.B uml_switch_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the sssd_var_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as sssd var log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++- Set files with the uml_switch_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the uml_switch_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B sssd_var_run_t
++.B uml_switch_var_run_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the sssd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the sssd files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the uml_switch_var_run_t type, if you want to store the uml switch files under the /run directory.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux sssd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their sssd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for sssd:
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+.EX
-+.B sssd_t
-+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++The SELinux process type uml_switch_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B uml_switch_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/uml-utilities(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -50689,361 +97764,412 @@ index 0000000..485226e
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), sssd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/staff_selinux.8 b/man/man8/staff_selinux.8
++selinux(8), uml_switch(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, uml_selinux(8), uml_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/unconfined_munin_plugin_selinux.8 b/man/man8/unconfined_munin_plugin_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..039dc00
+index 0000000..0eca181
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/staff_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,244 @@
-+.TH "staff_selinux" "8" "staff" "mgrepl at redhat.com" "staff SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/unconfined_munin_plugin_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
++.TH "unconfined_munin_plugin_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "unconfined_munin_plugin" "SELinux Policy documentation for unconfined_munin_plugin"
+.SH "NAME"
-+staff_u \- \fBAdministrator's unprivileged user role\fP - Security Enhanced Linux Policy
-+
-+.SH DESCRIPTION
-+
-+\fBstaff_u\fP is an SELinux User defined in the SELinux
-+policy. SELinux users have default roles, \fBstaff_r\fP. The
-+default role has a default type, \fBstaff_t\fP, associated with it.
-+
-+The SELinux user will usually login to a system with a context that looks like:
++unconfined_munin_plugin_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the unconfined_munin_plugin processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+.B staff_u:staff_r:staff_u:s0-s0:c0.c1023
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the unconfined_munin_plugin processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+Linux users are automatically assigned an SELinux users at login.
-+Login programs use the SELinux User to assign initial context to the user's shell.
++The unconfined_munin_plugin processes execute with the unconfined_munin_plugin_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+SELinux policy uses the context to control the user's access.
++For example:
+
-+By default all users are assigned to the SELinux user via the \fB__default__\fP flag
++.B ps -eZ | grep unconfined_munin_plugin_t
+
-+On Targeted policy systems the \fB__default__\fP user is assigned to the \fBunconfined_u\fP SELinux user.
+
-+You can list all Linux User to SELinux user mapping using:
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
-+.B semanage login -l
++The unconfined_munin_plugin_t SELinux type can be entered via the "unconfined_munin_plugin_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the unconfined_munin_plugin_t domain are the following:"
+
-+If you wanted to change the default user mapping to use the staff_u user, you would execute:
+
-+.B semanage login -m -s staff_u __default__
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux unconfined_munin_plugin policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their unconfined_munin_plugin processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for unconfined_munin_plugin:
+
++.EX
++.B unconfined_munin_plugin_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
-+If you want to map the one Linux user (joe) to the SELinux user staff, you would execute:
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux unconfined_munin_plugin policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their unconfined_munin_plugin processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for unconfined_munin_plugin:
+
-+.B $ semanage login -a -s staff_u joe
+
++.EX
++.PP
++.B unconfined_munin_plugin_exec_t
++.EE
+
-+.SH USER DESCRIPTION
++- Set files with the unconfined_munin_plugin_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the unconfined_munin_plugin_t domain.
+
-+The SELinux user staff_u is defined in policy as a unprivileged user. SELinux prevents unprivileged users from doing administration tasks without transitioning to a different role.
+
-+.SH SUDO
++.EX
++.PP
++.B unconfined_munin_plugin_tmp_t
++.EE
+
-+The SELinux user staff can execute sudo.
++- Set files with the unconfined_munin_plugin_tmp_t type, if you want to store unconfined munin plugin temporary files in the /tmp directories.
+
-+You can set up sudo to allow staff to transition to an administrative domain:
+
-+Add one or more of the following record to sudoers using visudo.
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
+
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+USERNAME ALL=(ALL) ROLE=ftpadmin_r TYPE=ftpadmin_t COMMAND
-+.br
-+sudo will run COMMAND as staff_u:ftpadmin_r:ftpadmin_t:LEVEL
++The SELinux process type unconfined_munin_plugin_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
-+USERNAME ALL=(ALL) ROLE=auditadm_r TYPE=auditadm_t COMMAND
+.br
-+sudo will run COMMAND as staff_u:auditadm_r:auditadm_t:LEVEL
++.B munin_plugin_state_t
+
-+USERNAME ALL=(ALL) ROLE=dbadm_r TYPE=dbadm_t COMMAND
++ /var/lib/munin/plugin-state(/.*)?
+.br
-+sudo will run COMMAND as staff_u:dbadm_r:dbadm_t:LEVEL
+
-+USERNAME ALL=(ALL) ROLE=logadm_r TYPE=logadm_t COMMAND
+.br
-+sudo will run COMMAND as staff_u:logadm_r:logadm_t:LEVEL
++.B unconfined_munin_plugin_tmp_t
+
-+USERNAME ALL=(ALL) ROLE=secadm_r TYPE=secadm_t COMMAND
-+.br
-+sudo will run COMMAND as staff_u:secadm_r:secadm_t:LEVEL
+
-+USERNAME ALL=(ALL) ROLE=sysadm_r TYPE=sysadm_t COMMAND
-+.br
-+sudo will run COMMAND as staff_u:sysadm_r:sysadm_t:LEVEL
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
-+USERNAME ALL=(ALL) ROLE=unconfined_r TYPE=unconfined_t COMMAND
-+.br
-+sudo will run COMMAND as staff_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:LEVEL
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
-+USERNAME ALL=(ALL) ROLE=webadm_r TYPE=webadm_t COMMAND
-+.br
-+sudo will run COMMAND as staff_u:webadm_r:webadm_t:LEVEL
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+You might also need to add one or more of these new roles to your SELinux user record.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
-+List the SELinux roles your SELinux user can reach by executing:
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), unconfined_munin_plugin(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, unconfined_selinux(8), unconfined_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/unconfined_selinux.8 b/man/man8/unconfined_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..da88b6e
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/unconfined_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,165 @@
++.TH "unconfined_selinux" "8" "unconfined" "mgrepl at redhat.com" "unconfined SELinux Policy documentation"
++.SH "NAME"
++unconfined_r \- \fBUnconfiend user role\fP - Security Enhanced Linux Policy
+
-+.B $ semanage user -l |grep selinux_name
++.SH DESCRIPTION
+
-+Modify the roles list and add staff_r to this list.
++SELinux supports Roles Based Access Control (RBAC), some Linux roles are login roles, while other roles need to be transition into.
+
-+.B $ semanage user -m -R 'staff_r ftpadmin_r auditadm_r dbadm_r logadm_r secadm_r sysadm_r unconfined_r webadm_r' staff_u
++.I Note:
++Examples in this man page will use the
++.B staff_u
++SELinux user.
+
-+For more details you can see semanage man page.
++Non login roles are usually used for administrative tasks. For example, tasks that require root privileges. Roles control which types a user can run processes with. Roles often have default types assigned to them.
+
++The default type for the unconfined_r role is unconfined_t.
+
-+.SH X WINDOWS LOGIN
++The
++.B newrole
++program to transition directly to this role.
+
-+The SELinux user staff_u is able to X Windows login.
++.B newrole -r unconfined_r -t unconfined_t
+
-+.SH TERMINAL LOGIN
++.B sudo
++is the preferred method to do transition from one role to another. You setup sudo to transition to unconfined_r by adding a similar line to the /etc/sudoers file.
+
-+The SELinux user staff_u is able to terminal login.
++USERNAME ALL=(ALL) ROLE=unconfined_r TYPE=unconfined_t COMMAND
+
-+.SH NETWORK
++.br
++sudo will run COMMAND as staff_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:LEVEL
+
-+.TP
-+The SELinux user staff_u is able to listen on the following tcp ports.
++When using a a non login role, you need to setup SELinux so that your SELinux user can reach unconfined_r role.
+
-+.B xserver_port_t: 6000-6020
++Execute the following to see all of the assigned SELinux roles:
+
-+.TP
-+The SELinux user staff_u is able to listen on the following udp ports.
++.B semanage user -l
+
-+.B all ports with out defined types
++You need to add unconfined_r to the staff_u user. You could setup the staff_u user to be able to use the unconfined_r role with a command like:
+
-+.TP
-+The SELinux user staff_u is able to connect to the following tcp ports.
++.B $ semanage user -m -R 'staff_r system_r unconfined_r' staff_u
+
-+.B all ports
+
+.SH BOOLEANS
-+SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. staff_t policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run staff_t with the tightest access possible.
++SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. unconfined policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run unconfined with the tightest access possible.
+
+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to connect to the local mysql server, you must turn on the allow_user_mysql_connect boolean.
++If you want to allow database admins to execute DML statement, you must turn on the postgresql_selinux_unconfined_dbadm boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P allow_user_mysql_connect 1
++.B setsebool -P postgresql_selinux_unconfined_dbadm 1
+.EE
+
+.PP
-+If you want to control users use of ping and traceroute, you must turn on the user_ping boolean.
++If you want to allow unconfined users to transition to the chrome sandbox domains when running chrome-sandbox, you must turn on the unconfined_chrome_sandbox_transition boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P user_ping 1
++.B setsebool -P unconfined_chrome_sandbox_transition 1
+.EE
+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow w to display everyone, you must turn on the user_ttyfile_stat boolean.
++If you want to allow a user to login as an unconfined domain, you must turn on the unconfined_login boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P user_ttyfile_stat 1
++.B setsebool -P unconfined_login 1
+.EE
+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow user music sharing, you must turn on the user_share_music boolean.
++If you want to allow samba to run unconfined scripts, you must turn on the samba_run_unconfined boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P user_share_music 1
++.B setsebool -P samba_run_unconfined 1
+.EE
+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow regular users direct dri device access, you must turn on the user_direct_dri boolean.
++If you want to allow video playing tools to run unconfined, you must turn on the unconfined_mplayer boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P user_direct_dri 1
++.B setsebool -P unconfined_mplayer 1
+.EE
+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow user to r/w files on filesystems that do not have extended attributes (FAT, CDROM, FLOPPY), you must turn on the user_rw_noexattrfile boolean.
++If you want to allow unconfined users to transition to the Mozilla plugin domain when running xulrunner plugin-container, you must turn on the unconfined_mozilla_plugin_transition boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P user_rw_noexattrfile 1
++.B setsebool -P unconfined_mozilla_plugin_transition 1
+.EE
+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to run TCP servers (bind to ports and accept connection from the same domain and outside users) disabling this forces FTP passive mode and may change other protocols, you must turn on the user_tcp_server boolean.
++If you want to allow database admins to execute DML statement, you must turn on the postgresql_selinux_unconfined_dbadm boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P user_tcp_server 1
++.B setsebool -P postgresql_selinux_unconfined_dbadm 1
+.EE
+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow regular users direct mouse access, you must turn on the user_direct_mouse boolean.
++If you want to allow unconfined users to transition to the chrome sandbox domains when running chrome-sandbox, you must turn on the unconfined_chrome_sandbox_transition boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P user_direct_mouse 1
++.B setsebool -P unconfined_chrome_sandbox_transition 1
+.EE
+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow user processes to change their priority, you must turn on the user_setrlimit boolean.
++If you want to allow a user to login as an unconfined domain, you must turn on the unconfined_login boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P user_setrlimit 1
++.B setsebool -P unconfined_login 1
+.EE
+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to connect to PostgreSQL, you must turn on the allow_user_postgresql_connect boolean.
++If you want to allow samba to run unconfined scripts, you must turn on the samba_run_unconfined boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P allow_user_postgresql_connect 1
++.B setsebool -P samba_run_unconfined 1
+.EE
+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to read system messages, you must turn on the user_dmesg boolean.
++If you want to allow video playing tools to run unconfined, you must turn on the unconfined_mplayer boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P user_dmesg 1
++.B setsebool -P unconfined_mplayer 1
+.EE
+
-+.SH HOME_EXEC
-+
-+The SELinux user staff_u is able execute home content files.
-+
-+.SH TRANSITIONS
-+
-+Three things can happen when staff_t attempts to execute a program.
-+
-+\fB1.\fP SELinux Policy can deny staff_t from executing the program.
-+
-+.TP
-+
-+\fB2.\fP SELinux Policy can allow staff_t to execute the program in the current user type.
-+
-+Execute the following to see the types that the SELinux user staff_t can execute without transitioning:
-+
-+.B sesearch -A -s staff_t -c file -p execute_no_trans
++.PP
++If you want to allow unconfined users to transition to the Mozilla plugin domain when running xulrunner plugin-container, you must turn on the unconfined_mozilla_plugin_transition boolean.
+
-+.TP
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P unconfined_mozilla_plugin_transition 1
++.EE
+
-+\fB3.\fP SELinux can allow staff_t to execute the program and transition to a new type.
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+Execute the following to see the types that the SELinux user staff_t can execute and transition:
++The SELinux process type unconfined_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
-+.B $ sesearch -A -s staff_t -c process -p transition
++.br
++.B file_type
+
++ all files on the system
++.br
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
-+.B semanage login
-+can also be used to manipulate the Linux User to SELinux User mappings
-+
-+.B semanage user
-+can also be used to manipulate SELinux user definitions.
++.B semanage boolean
++can also be used to manipulate the booleans
+
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genuserman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), semanage(8).
-diff --git a/man/man8/stapserver_selinux.8 b/man/man8/stapserver_selinux.8
++selinux(8), unconfined(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, setsebool(8), unconfined_munin_plugin_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/update_modules_selinux.8 b/man/man8/update_modules_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..385ff9b
+index 0000000..733d361
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/stapserver_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
-+.TH "stapserver_selinux" "8" "stapserver" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "stapserver SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/update_modules_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,122 @@
++.TH "update_modules_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "update_modules" "SELinux Policy documentation for update_modules"
+.SH "NAME"
-+stapserver_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the stapserver processes
++update_modules_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the update_modules processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the stapserver processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the update_modules processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The update_modules processes execute with the update_modules_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the stapserver_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep update_modules_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
++The update_modules_t SELinux type can be entered via the "update_modules_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the update_modules_t domain are the following:"
++
++/sbin/modules-update, /sbin/update-modules, /usr/sbin/modules-update, /usr/sbin/update-modules, /sbin/generate-modprobe\.conf, /usr/sbin/generate-modprobe\.conf
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the stapserver_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux update_modules policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their update_modules processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for update_modules:
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B update_modules_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux stapserver policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their stapserver processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for stapserver:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux update_modules policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their update_modules processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for update_modules:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B stapserver_exec_t
++.B update_modules_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the stapserver_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the stapserver_t domain.
++- Set files with the update_modules_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the update_modules_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B stapserver_log_t
++.B update_modules_tmp_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the stapserver_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as stapserver log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++- Set files with the update_modules_tmp_t type, if you want to store update modules temporary files in the /tmp directories.
+
+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B stapserver_var_lib_t
-+.EE
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
+
-+- Set files with the stapserver_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the stapserver files under the /var/lib directory.
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
++The SELinux process type update_modules_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B stapserver_var_run_t
-+.EE
++.br
++.B modules_conf_t
+
-+- Set files with the stapserver_var_run_t type, if you want to store the stapserver files under the /run directory.
++ /etc/modprobe\.d(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/modules\.conf.*
++.br
++ /etc/modprobe\.conf.*
++.br
++ /lib/modules/modprobe\.conf
++.br
++ /usr/lib/modules/modprobe\.conf
++.br
+
++.br
++.B modules_dep_t
+
-+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
++ /lib/modules/[^/]+/modules\..+
++.br
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux stapserver policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their stapserver processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for stapserver:
++.br
++.B update_modules_tmp_t
+
-+.EX
-+.B stapserver_t
-+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -51056,134 +98182,168 @@ index 0000000..385ff9b
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), stapserver(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/stunnel_selinux.8 b/man/man8/stunnel_selinux.8
++selinux(8), update_modules(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/updfstab_selinux.8 b/man/man8/updfstab_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..70b6674
+index 0000000..9bf36a1
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/stunnel_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,137 @@
-+.TH "stunnel_selinux" "8" "stunnel" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "stunnel SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/updfstab_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,168 @@
++.TH "updfstab_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "updfstab" "SELinux Policy documentation for updfstab"
+.SH "NAME"
-+stunnel_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the stunnel processes
++updfstab_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the updfstab processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the stunnel processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the updfstab processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The updfstab processes execute with the updfstab_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the stunnel_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep updfstab_t
+
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The updfstab_t SELinux type can be entered via the "updfstab_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the updfstab_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/sbin/updfstab, /usr/sbin/fstab-sync
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the stunnel_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux updfstab policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their updfstab processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for updfstab:
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B updfstab_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux stunnel policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their stunnel processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for stunnel:
-+
-+
-+.EX
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux updfstab policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their updfstab processes in as secure a method as possible.
+.PP
-+.B stunnel_etc_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the stunnel_etc_t type, if you want to store stunnel files in the /etc directories.
++The following file types are defined for updfstab:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B stunnel_exec_t
++.B updfstab_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the stunnel_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the stunnel_t domain.
++- Set files with the updfstab_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the updfstab_t domain.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/sbin/stunnel, /usr/bin/stunnel
+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B stunnel_tmp_t
-+.EE
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
+
-+- Set files with the stunnel_tmp_t type, if you want to store stunnel temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
++The SELinux process type updfstab_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B stunnel_var_run_t
-+.EE
++.br
++.B etc_t
+
-+- Set files with the stunnel_var_run_t type, if you want to store the stunnel files under the /run directory.
++ /etc/.*
++.br
++ /var/db/.*\.db
++.br
++ /usr/etc(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/ftp/etc(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/openshift/.limits.d(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/openshift/.openshift-proxy.d(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/openshift/.stickshift-proxy.d(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/stickshift/.limits.d(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/stickshift/.stickshift-proxy.d(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/named/chroot/etc(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/ipsec\.d/examples(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/spool/postfix/etc(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc
++.br
++ /etc/cups/client\.conf
++.br
+
++.br
++.B mnt_t
+
-+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
++ /mnt(/[^/]*)
++.br
++ /mnt(/[^/]*)?
++.br
++ /rhev(/[^/]*)?
++.br
++ /media(/[^/]*)
++.br
++ /media(/[^/]*)?
++.br
++ /media/\.hal-.*
++.br
++ /var/run/media(/[^/]*)?
++.br
++ /net
++.br
++ /afs
++.br
++ /rhev
++.br
++ /misc
++.br
+
-+.SH PORT TYPES
-+SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
-+.PP
-+You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
++.br
++.B security_t
+
-+.B semanage port -l
++ /selinux
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
-+SELinux stunnel policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their stunnel processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following port types are defined for stunnel:
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the updfstab_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.TP 5
-+.B stunnel_port_t
-+.TP 10
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux stunnel policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their stunnel processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for stunnel:
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the updfstab_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B stunnel_t
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -51195,230 +98355,171 @@ index 0000000..70b6674
+.B semanage module
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
-+.B semanage port
-+can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
-+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), stunnel(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/sulogin_selinux.8 b/man/man8/sulogin_selinux.8
++selinux(8), updfstab(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/updpwd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/updpwd_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..833aec1
+index 0000000..158653a
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/sulogin_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
-+.TH "sulogin_selinux" "8" "sulogin" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "sulogin SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/updpwd_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,170 @@
++.TH "updpwd_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "updpwd" "SELinux Policy documentation for updpwd"
+.SH "NAME"
-+sulogin_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the sulogin processes
++updpwd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the updpwd processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the sulogin processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
-+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
-+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the sulogin_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
-+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
-+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the sulogin_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
-+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
-+.EE
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the updpwd processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux sulogin policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their sulogin processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for sulogin:
++The updpwd processes execute with the updpwd_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B sulogin_exec_t
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep updpwd_t
+
-+- Set files with the sulogin_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the sulogin_t domain.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/sbin/sushell, /sbin/sulogin, /usr/sbin/sulogin, /sbin/sushell
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
-+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
++The updpwd_t SELinux type can be entered via the "updpwd_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the updpwd_t domain are the following:"
+
++/sbin/unix_update, /usr/sbin/unix_update
+.SH PROCESS TYPES
+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux sulogin policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their sulogin processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for sulogin:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux updpwd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their updpwd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for updpwd:
+
+.EX
-+.B sulogin_t
++.B updpwd_t
+.EE
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
-+.SH "COMMANDS"
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
-+.PP
-+.B semanage permissive
-+can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
-+.PP
-+.B semanage module
-+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
-+
-+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
-+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
-+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
-+
-+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), sulogin(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/svc_selinux.8 b/man/man8/svc_selinux.8
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..8829e0e
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/svc_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,129 @@
-+.TH "svc_selinux" "8" "svc" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "svc SELinux Policy documentation"
-+.SH "NAME"
-+svc_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the svc processes
-+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
-+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the svc processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
-+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
-+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux svc policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their svc processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for svc:
-+
-+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B svc_conf_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the svc_conf_t type, if you want to treat the files as svc configuration data, usually stored under the /etc directory.
-+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/dnscache/env(/.*)?, /var/tinydns/env(/.*)?, /var/axfrdns/env(/.*)?, /var/service/.*/env(/.*)?
-+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B svc_log_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the svc_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as svc log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
-+
-+
-+.EX
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux updpwd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their updpwd processes in as secure a method as possible.
+.PP
-+.B svc_multilog_exec_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the svc_multilog_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the svc_multilog_t domain.
++The following file types are defined for updpwd:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B svc_run_exec_t
++.B updpwd_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the svc_run_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the svc_run_t domain.
++- Set files with the updpwd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the updpwd_t domain.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/tinydns/run, /var/dnscache/log/run, /var/qmail/supervise/.*/run, /var/axfrdns/log/run, /usr/bin/setuidgid, /usr/bin/fghack, /var/tinydns/log/run, /var/service/.*/log/run, /var/axfrdns/run, /var/qmail/supervise/.*/log/run, /usr/bin/envuidgid, /usr/bin/envdir, /var/dnscache/run, /usr/bin/softlimit, /var/service/.*/run.*, /usr/bin/pgrphack, /usr/bin/setlock
+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B svc_start_exec_t
-+.EE
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
+
-+- Set files with the svc_start_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the svc_start_t domain.
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type updpwd_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/bin/svok, /usr/bin/svscan, /usr/bin/svc, /usr/bin/svscanboot, /usr/bin/supervise
++.B etc_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B svc_svc_t
-+.EE
++ /etc/.*
++.br
++ /var/db/.*\.db
++.br
++ /usr/etc(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/ftp/etc(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/openshift/.limits.d(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/openshift/.openshift-proxy.d(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/openshift/.stickshift-proxy.d(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/stickshift/.limits.d(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/stickshift/.stickshift-proxy.d(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/named/chroot/etc(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/ipsec\.d/examples(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/spool/postfix/etc(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc
++.br
++ /etc/cups/client\.conf
++.br
+
-+- Set files with the svc_svc_t type, if you want to treat the files as svc svc data.
++.br
++.B passwd_file_t
+
++ /etc/group[-\+]?
++.br
++ /etc/passwd[-\+]?
++.br
++ /etc/passwd\.adjunct.*
++.br
++ /etc/ptmptmp
++.br
++ /etc/\.pwd\.lock
++.br
++ /etc/group\.lock
++.br
++ /etc/passwd\.OLD
++.br
++ /etc/passwd\.lock
+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/service, /var/tinydns(/.*)?, /service/.*, /var/service/.*, /var/qmail/supervise(/.*)?, /var/dnscache(/.*)?, /var/axfrdns(/.*)?
+
-+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
++.br
++.B shadow_t
++
++ /etc/shadow.*
++.br
++ /etc/gshadow.*
++.br
++ /var/db/shadow.*
++.br
++ /etc/security/opasswd
++.br
++ /etc/security/opasswd\.old
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux svc policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their svc processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for svc:
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the updpwd_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B svc_multilog_t, svc_start_t, svc_run_t
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
++
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the updpwd_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -51431,117 +98532,94 @@ index 0000000..8829e0e
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), svc(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/svnserve_selinux.8 b/man/man8/svnserve_selinux.8
++selinux(8), updpwd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/usbmodules_selinux.8 b/man/man8/usbmodules_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..deeacd8
+index 0000000..39fd388
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/svnserve_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,117 @@
-+.TH "svnserve_selinux" "8" "svnserve" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "svnserve SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/usbmodules_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
++.TH "usbmodules_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "usbmodules" "SELinux Policy documentation for usbmodules"
+.SH "NAME"
-+svnserve_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the svnserve processes
++usbmodules_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the usbmodules processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the svnserve processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the usbmodules processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The usbmodules processes execute with the usbmodules_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux svnserve policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their svnserve processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for svnserve:
++For example:
+
++.B ps -eZ | grep usbmodules_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B svnserve_content_t
-+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the svnserve_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as svnserve content.
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/lib/subversion/repo(/.*)?, /var/subversion/repo(/.*)?
++The usbmodules_t SELinux type can be entered via the "usbmodules_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the usbmodules_t domain are the following:"
+
-+.EX
++/sbin/usbmodules, /usr/sbin/usbmodules
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+.B svnserve_exec_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the svnserve_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the svnserve_t domain.
-+
-+
-+.EX
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+.B svnserve_initrc_exec_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the svnserve_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the svnserve_initrc_t domain.
-+
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux usbmodules policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their usbmodules processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for usbmodules:
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B svnserve_unit_file_t
++.B usbmodules_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
-+- Set files with the svnserve_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as svnserve unit content.
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux usbmodules policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their usbmodules processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for usbmodules:
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/lib/systemd/system/svnserve\.service, /lib/systemd/system/svnserve\.service
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B svnserve_var_run_t
++.B usbmodules_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the svnserve_var_run_t type, if you want to store the svnserve files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the usbmodules_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the usbmodules_t domain.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/run/svnserve(/.*)?, /var/run/svnserve.pid
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux svnserve policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their svnserve processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for svnserve:
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+.EX
-+.B svnserve_t
-+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++The SELinux process type usbmodules_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B usbfs_t
++
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -51554,126 +98632,126 @@ index 0000000..deeacd8
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), svnserve(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/swat_selinux.8 b/man/man8/swat_selinux.8
++selinux(8), usbmodules(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/usbmuxd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/usbmuxd_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..e66b789
+index 0000000..66ed42f
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/swat_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,129 @@
-+.TH "swat_selinux" "8" "swat" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "swat SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/usbmuxd_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,126 @@
++.TH "usbmuxd_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "usbmuxd" "SELinux Policy documentation for usbmuxd"
+.SH "NAME"
-+swat_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the swat processes
++usbmuxd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the usbmuxd processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the swat processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the usbmuxd processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The usbmuxd processes execute with the usbmuxd_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the swat_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep usbmuxd_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
++The usbmuxd_t SELinux type can be entered via the "usbmuxd_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the usbmuxd_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/sbin/usbmuxd
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the swat_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux usbmuxd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their usbmuxd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for usbmuxd:
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B usbmuxd_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux swat policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their swat processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for swat:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux usbmuxd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their usbmuxd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for usbmuxd:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B swat_exec_t
++.B usbmuxd_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the swat_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the swat_t domain.
++- Set files with the usbmuxd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the usbmuxd_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B swat_tmp_t
++.B usbmuxd_unit_file_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the swat_tmp_t type, if you want to store swat temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++- Set files with the usbmuxd_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as usbmuxd unit content.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B swat_var_run_t
++.B usbmuxd_var_run_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the swat_var_run_t type, if you want to store the swat files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the usbmuxd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the usbmuxd files under the /run directory.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PORT TYPES
-+SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
-+.PP
-+You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+.B semanage port -l
++The SELinux process type usbmuxd_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B usbmuxd_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/usbmuxd.*
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
-+SELinux swat policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their swat processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following port types are defined for swat:
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the usbmuxd_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.TP 5
-+.B swat_port_t
-+.TP 10
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
+
-+
-+Default Defined Ports:
-+tcp 901
-+.EE
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux swat policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their swat processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for swat:
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the usbmuxd_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B swat_t
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -51685,39 +98763,38 @@ index 0000000..e66b789
+.B semanage module
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
-+.B semanage port
-+can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
-+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), swat(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/sysadm_selinux.8 b/man/man8/sysadm_selinux.8
++selinux(8), usbmuxd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/user_selinux.8 b/man/man8/user_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..679f836
+index 0000000..1106e32
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/sysadm_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,230 @@
-+.TH "sysadm_selinux" "8" "sysadm" "mgrepl at redhat.com" "sysadm SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/user_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,763 @@
++.TH "user_selinux" "8" "user" "mgrepl at redhat.com" "user SELinux Policy documentation"
+.SH "NAME"
-+sysadm_u \- \fBGeneral system administration role\fP - Security Enhanced Linux Policy
++user_u \- \fBGeneric unprivileged user\fP - Security Enhanced Linux Policy
+
+.SH DESCRIPTION
+
-+\fBsysadm_u\fP is an SELinux User defined in the SELinux
-+policy. SELinux users have default roles, \fBsysadm_r\fP. The
-+default role has a default type, \fBsysadm_t\fP, associated with it.
++\fBuser_u\fP is an SELinux User defined in the SELinux
++policy. SELinux users have default roles, \fBuser_r\fP. The
++default role has a default type, \fBuser_t\fP, associated with it.
+
+The SELinux user will usually login to a system with a context that looks like:
+
-+.B sysadm_u:sysadm_r:sysadm_u:s0-s0:c0.c1023
++.B user_u:user_r:user_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023
+
-+Linux users are automatically assigned an SELinux users at login.
++Linux users are automatically assigned an SELinux users at login.
+Login programs use the SELinux User to assign initial context to the user's shell.
+
+SELinux policy uses the context to control the user's access.
@@ -51730,852 +98807,716 @@ index 0000000..679f836
+
+.B semanage login -l
+
-+If you wanted to change the default user mapping to use the sysadm_u user, you would execute:
++If you wanted to change the default user mapping to use the user_u user, you would execute:
+
-+.B semanage login -m -s sysadm_u __default__
++.B semanage login -m -s user_u __default__
+
+
-+If you want to map the one Linux user (joe) to the SELinux user sysadm, you would execute:
++If you want to map the one Linux user (joe) to the SELinux user user, you would execute:
+
-+.B $ semanage login -a -s sysadm_u joe
++.B $ semanage login -a -s user_u joe
+
+
+.SH USER DESCRIPTION
+
-+The SELinux user sysadm_u is an admin user. It means that a mapped Linux user to this SELinux user is intended for administrative actions. Usually this is assigned to a root Linux user.
++The SELinux user user_u is defined in policy as a unprivileged user. SELinux prevents unprivileged users from doing administration tasks without transitioning to a different role.
+
+.SH SUDO
+
-+The SELinux user sysadm can execute sudo.
-+
-+You can set up sudo to allow sysadm to transition to an administrative domain:
-+
-+Add one or more of the following record to sudoers using visudo.
-+
-+
-+USERNAME ALL=(ALL) ROLE=auditadm_r TYPE=auditadm_t COMMAND
-+.br
-+sudo will run COMMAND as sysadm_u:auditadm_r:auditadm_t:LEVEL
-+
-+USERNAME ALL=(ALL) ROLE=secadm_r TYPE=secadm_t COMMAND
-+.br
-+sudo will run COMMAND as sysadm_u:secadm_r:secadm_t:LEVEL
-+
-+USERNAME ALL=(ALL) ROLE=staff_r TYPE=staff_t COMMAND
-+.br
-+sudo will run COMMAND as sysadm_u:staff_r:staff_t:LEVEL
-+
-+USERNAME ALL=(ALL) ROLE=user_r TYPE=user_t COMMAND
-+.br
-+sudo will run COMMAND as sysadm_u:user_r:user_t:LEVEL
-+
-+You might also need to add one or more of these new roles to your SELinux user record.
-+
-+List the SELinux roles your SELinux user can reach by executing:
-+
-+.B $ semanage user -l |grep selinux_name
-+
-+Modify the roles list and add sysadm_r to this list.
-+
-+.B $ semanage user -m -R 'sysadm_r auditadm_r secadm_r staff_r user_r' sysadm_u
-+
-+For more details you can see semanage man page.
-+
-+
+.SH X WINDOWS LOGIN
+
-+The SELinux user sysadm_u is able to X Windows login.
-+
-+.SH TERMINAL LOGIN
-+
-+The SELinux user sysadm_u is able to terminal login.
++The SELinux user user_u is able to X Windows login.
+
+.SH NETWORK
+
+.TP
-+The SELinux user sysadm_u is able to listen on the following tcp ports.
++The SELinux user user_u is able to listen on the following tcp ports.
+
-+.B all ports with out defined types
++.B xserver_port_t: 6000-6020
+
+.TP
-+The SELinux user sysadm_u is able to listen on the following udp ports.
++The SELinux user user_u is able to connect to the following tcp ports.
+
-+.B ntp_port_t: 123
++.B all ports
++
++.TP
++The SELinux user user_u is able to listen on the following udp ports.
+
+.B all ports with out defined types
+
++.B ephemeral_port_t: 32768-61000
++
+.TP
-+The SELinux user sysadm_u is able to connect to the following tcp ports.
++The SELinux user user_u is able to connect to the following tcp ports.
+
+.B all ports
+
+.SH BOOLEANS
-+SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. sysadm_t policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run sysadm_t with the tightest access possible.
++SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. user policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run user with the tightest access possible.
+
+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to connect to the local mysql server, you must turn on the allow_user_mysql_connect boolean.
++If you want to allow unconfined executables to make their stack executable. This should never, ever be necessary. Probably indicates a badly coded executable, but could indicate an attack. This executable should be reported in bugzilla, you must turn on the selinuxuser_execstack boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P allow_user_mysql_connect 1
++.B setsebool -P selinuxuser_execstack 1
+.EE
+
+.PP
-+If you want to control users use of ping and traceroute, you must turn on the user_ping boolean.
++If you want to allow user to use ssh chroot environment, you must turn on the selinuxuser_use_ssh_chroot boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P user_ping 1
++.B setsebool -P selinuxuser_use_ssh_chroot 1
+.EE
+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow w to display everyone, you must turn on the user_ttyfile_stat boolean.
++If you want to determine whether calling user domains can execute Polipo daemon in the polipo_session_t domain, you must turn on the polipo_session_users boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P user_ttyfile_stat 1
++.B setsebool -P polipo_session_users 1
+.EE
+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow user music sharing, you must turn on the user_share_music boolean.
++If you want to allow confined users the ability to execute the ping and traceroute commands, you must turn on the selinuxuser_ping boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P user_share_music 1
++.B setsebool -P selinuxuser_ping 1
+.EE
+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow regular users direct dri device access, you must turn on the user_direct_dri boolean.
++If you want to allow user music sharing, you must turn on the selinuxuser_user_share_music boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P user_direct_dri 1
++.B setsebool -P selinuxuser_user_share_music 1
+.EE
+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow user to r/w files on filesystems that do not have extended attributes (FAT, CDROM, FLOPPY), you must turn on the user_rw_noexattrfile boolean.
++If you want to allow unprivledged user to create and transition to svirt domains, you must turn on the unprivuser_use_svirt boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P user_rw_noexattrfile 1
++.B setsebool -P unprivuser_use_svirt 1
+.EE
+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to run TCP servers (bind to ports and accept connection from the same domain and outside users) disabling this forces FTP passive mode and may change other protocols, you must turn on the user_tcp_server boolean.
++If you want to allow regular users direct dri device access, you must turn on the selinuxuser_direct_dri_enabled boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P user_tcp_server 1
++.B setsebool -P selinuxuser_direct_dri_enabled 1
+.EE
+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow regular users direct mouse access, you must turn on the user_direct_mouse boolean.
++If you want to allow users to run TCP servers (bind to ports and accept connection from the same domain and outside users) disabling this forces FTP passive mode and may change other protocols, you must turn on the selinuxuser_tcp_server boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P user_direct_mouse 1
++.B setsebool -P selinuxuser_tcp_server 1
+.EE
+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow user processes to change their priority, you must turn on the user_setrlimit boolean.
++If you want to allow unconfined executables to make their heap memory executable. Doing this is a really bad idea. Probably indicates a badly coded executable, but could indicate an attack. This executable should be reported in bugzilla, you must turn on the selinuxuser_execheap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P user_setrlimit 1
++.B setsebool -P selinuxuser_execheap 1
+.EE
+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to connect to PostgreSQL, you must turn on the allow_user_postgresql_connect boolean.
++If you want to allow users to connect to PostgreSQL, you must turn on the selinuxuser_postgresql_connect_enabled boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P allow_user_postgresql_connect 1
++.B setsebool -P selinuxuser_postgresql_connect_enabled 1
+.EE
+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to read system messages, you must turn on the user_dmesg boolean.
++If you want to allow user to r/w files on filesystems that do not have extended attributes (FAT, CDROM, FLOPPY), you must turn on the selinuxuser_rw_noexattrfile boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P user_dmesg 1
++.B setsebool -P selinuxuser_rw_noexattrfile 1
+.EE
+
-+.SH HOME_EXEC
-+
-+The SELinux user sysadm_u is able execute home content files.
-+
-+.SH TRANSITIONS
-+
-+Three things can happen when sysadm_t attempts to execute a program.
-+
-+\fB1.\fP SELinux Policy can deny sysadm_t from executing the program.
-+
-+.TP
-+
-+\fB2.\fP SELinux Policy can allow sysadm_t to execute the program in the current user type.
-+
-+Execute the following to see the types that the SELinux user sysadm_t can execute without transitioning:
-+
-+.B sesearch -A -s sysadm_t -c file -p execute_no_trans
-+
-+.TP
-+
-+\fB3.\fP SELinux can allow sysadm_t to execute the program and transition to a new type.
-+
-+Execute the following to see the types that the SELinux user sysadm_t can execute and transition:
-+
-+.B $ sesearch -A -s sysadm_t -c process -p transition
-+
-+
-+.SH "COMMANDS"
-+
-+.B semanage login
-+can also be used to manipulate the Linux User to SELinux User mappings
-+
-+.B semanage user
-+can also be used to manipulate SELinux user definitions.
-+
-+.B system-config-selinux
-+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
-+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genuserman.py.
-+
-+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), semanage(8).
-diff --git a/man/man8/syslogd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/syslogd_selinux.8
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..838078a
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/syslogd_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,195 @@
-+.TH "syslogd_selinux" "8" "syslogd" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "syslogd SELinux Policy documentation"
-+.SH "NAME"
-+syslogd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the syslogd processes
-+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
-+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the syslogd processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
-+
-+.SH BOOLEANS
-+SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. syslogd policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run syslogd with the tightest access possible.
-+
-+
+.PP
-+If you want to determine whether Polipo session daemon can send syslog messages, you must turn on the polipo_session_send_syslog_msg boolean.
++If you want to allow httpd to read user content, you must turn on the httpd_read_user_content boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P polipo_session_send_syslog_msg 1
++.B setsebool -P httpd_read_user_content 1
+.EE
+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow syslogd the ability to read/write terminals, you must turn on the logging_syslogd_use_tty boolean.
++If you want to allow unprivileged users to execute DDL statement, you must turn on the postgresql_selinux_users_ddl boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P logging_syslogd_use_tty 1
++.B setsebool -P postgresql_selinux_users_ddl 1
+.EE
+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow syslogd daemon to send mail, you must turn on the logging_syslogd_can_sendmail boolean.
++If you want to allow all unconfined executables to use libraries requiring text relocation that are not labeled textrel_shlib_t, you must turn on the selinuxuser_execmod boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P logging_syslogd_can_sendmail 1
++.B setsebool -P selinuxuser_execmod 1
+.EE
+
+.PP
-+If you want to determine whether Git session daemons can send syslog messages, you must turn on the git_session_send_syslog_msg boolean.
++If you want to allow webadm to manage files in users home directories, you must turn on the webadm_manage_user_files boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P git_session_send_syslog_msg 1
++.B setsebool -P webadm_manage_user_files 1
+.EE
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
-+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the syslogd_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++If you want to allow pppd to be run for a regular user, you must turn on the pppd_for_user boolean.
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.B setsebool -P pppd_for_user 1
+.EE
+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the syslogd_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++If you want to allow users to connect to the local mysql server, you must turn on the selinuxuser_mysql_connect_enabled boolean.
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B setsebool -P selinuxuser_mysql_connect_enabled 1
+.EE
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux syslogd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their syslogd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for syslogd:
-+
++If you want to allow clamscan to read user content, you must turn on the clamscan_read_user_content boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B syslogd_exec_t
++.B setsebool -P clamscan_read_user_content 1
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the syslogd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the syslogd_t domain.
-+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/sbin/rsyslogd, /usr/sbin/syslog-ng, /usr/sbin/metalog, /usr/lib/systemd/systemd-journald, /usr/sbin/syslogd, /usr/sbin/minilogd, /sbin/rsyslogd, /usr/lib/systemd/systemd-kmsg-syslogd, /sbin/syslogd, /sbin/syslog-ng, /sbin/minilogd
++.PP
++If you want to allow dbadm to manage files in users home directories, you must turn on the dbadm_manage_user_files boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B syslogd_initrc_exec_t
++.B setsebool -P dbadm_manage_user_files 1
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the syslogd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the syslogd_initrc_t domain.
-+
++.PP
++If you want to allow exim to create, read, write, and delete unprivileged user files, you must turn on the exim_manage_user_files boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B syslogd_tmp_t
++.B setsebool -P exim_manage_user_files 1
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the syslogd_tmp_t type, if you want to store syslogd temporary files in the /tmp directories.
-+
++.PP
++If you want to determine whether calling user domains can execute Git daemon in the git_session_t domain, you must turn on the git_session_users boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B syslogd_var_lib_t
++.B setsebool -P git_session_users 1
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the syslogd_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the syslogd files under the /var/lib directory.
-+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/lib/syslog-ng.persist, /var/lib/r?syslog(/.*)?, /var/lib/syslog-ng(/.*)?
++.PP
++If you want to allow dbadm to read files in users home directories, you must turn on the dbadm_read_user_files boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B syslogd_var_run_t
++.B setsebool -P dbadm_read_user_files 1
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the syslogd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the syslogd files under the /run directory.
-+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/run/syslogd\.pid, /var/log/syslog-ng(/.*)?, /var/run/syslog-ng(/.*)?, /var/run/metalog\.pid, /var/run/log(/.*)?, /var/run/syslog-ng.ctl
-+
-+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
-+
-+.SH PORT TYPES
-+SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
+.PP
-+You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
++If you want to allow exim to read unprivileged user files, you must turn on the exim_read_user_files boolean.
+
-+.B semanage port -l
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P exim_read_user_files 1
++.EE
+
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
-+SELinux syslogd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their syslogd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following port types are defined for syslogd:
++If you want to allow webadm to read files in users home directories, you must turn on the webadm_read_user_files boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.TP 5
-+.B syslogd_port_t
-+.TP 10
++.B setsebool -P webadm_read_user_files 1
+.EE
+
-+
-+Default Defined Ports:
-+tcp 6514
-+.EE
-+udp 514,6514
-+.EE
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux syslogd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their syslogd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for syslogd:
++If you want to allow unconfined executables to make their stack executable. This should never, ever be necessary. Probably indicates a badly coded executable, but could indicate an attack. This executable should be reported in bugzilla, you must turn on the selinuxuser_execstack boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B syslogd_t
++.B setsebool -P selinuxuser_execstack 1
+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
-+.SH "COMMANDS"
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
-+.PP
-+.B semanage permissive
-+can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
+.PP
-+.B semanage module
-+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
-+
-+.B semanage port
-+can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
++If you want to allow user to use ssh chroot environment, you must turn on the selinuxuser_use_ssh_chroot boolean.
+
-+.B semanage boolean
-+can also be used to manipulate the booleans
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P selinuxuser_use_ssh_chroot 1
++.EE
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
-+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
-+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
-+
-+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), syslogd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-+, setsebool(8)
-\ No newline at end of file
-diff --git a/man/man8/sysstat_selinux.8 b/man/man8/sysstat_selinux.8
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..752b8da
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/sysstat_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
-+.TH "sysstat_selinux" "8" "sysstat" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "sysstat SELinux Policy documentation"
-+.SH "NAME"
-+sysstat_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the sysstat processes
-+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
-+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the sysstat processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++If you want to determine whether calling user domains can execute Polipo daemon in the polipo_session_t domain, you must turn on the polipo_session_users boolean.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P polipo_session_users 1
++.EE
+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the sysstat_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++If you want to allow confined users the ability to execute the ping and traceroute commands, you must turn on the selinuxuser_ping boolean.
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.B setsebool -P selinuxuser_ping 1
+.EE
+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the sysstat_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++If you want to allow user music sharing, you must turn on the selinuxuser_user_share_music boolean.
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B setsebool -P selinuxuser_user_share_music 1
+.EE
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux sysstat policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their sysstat processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for sysstat:
-+
++If you want to allow unprivledged user to create and transition to svirt domains, you must turn on the unprivuser_use_svirt boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B sysstat_exec_t
++.B setsebool -P unprivuser_use_svirt 1
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the sysstat_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the sysstat_t domain.
-+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/lib/sa/sa.*, /usr/lib/sysstat/sa.*, /usr/lib/atsar/atsa.*
++.PP
++If you want to allow regular users direct dri device access, you must turn on the selinuxuser_direct_dri_enabled boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B sysstat_log_t
++.B setsebool -P selinuxuser_direct_dri_enabled 1
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the sysstat_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as sysstat log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
-+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/log/sysstat(/.*)?, /var/log/sa(/.*)?, /var/log/atsar(/.*)?
-+
-+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
-+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux sysstat policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their sysstat processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for sysstat:
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to run TCP servers (bind to ports and accept connection from the same domain and outside users) disabling this forces FTP passive mode and may change other protocols, you must turn on the selinuxuser_tcp_server boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B sysstat_t
++.B setsebool -P selinuxuser_tcp_server 1
+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
-+.SH "COMMANDS"
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
-+.PP
-+.B semanage permissive
-+can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
+.PP
-+.B semanage module
-+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++If you want to allow unconfined executables to make their heap memory executable. Doing this is a really bad idea. Probably indicates a badly coded executable, but could indicate an attack. This executable should be reported in bugzilla, you must turn on the selinuxuser_execheap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P selinuxuser_execheap 1
++.EE
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
-+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++If you want to allow users to connect to PostgreSQL, you must turn on the selinuxuser_postgresql_connect_enabled boolean.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P selinuxuser_postgresql_connect_enabled 1
++.EE
+
-+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), sysstat(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/system_selinux.8 b/man/man8/system_selinux.8
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..6ad303f
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/system_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,350 @@
-+.TH "system_selinux" "8" "system" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "system SELinux Policy documentation"
-+.SH "NAME"
-+system_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the system processes
-+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++.PP
++If you want to allow user to r/w files on filesystems that do not have extended attributes (FAT, CDROM, FLOPPY), you must turn on the selinuxuser_rw_noexattrfile boolean.
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the system processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P selinuxuser_rw_noexattrfile 1
++.EE
+
-+.SH BOOLEANS
-+SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. system policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run system with the tightest access possible.
++.PP
++If you want to allow httpd to read user content, you must turn on the httpd_read_user_content boolean.
+
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P httpd_read_user_content 1
++.EE
+
+.PP
-+If you want to determine whether Git system daemon can access cifs file systems, you must turn on the git_system_use_cifs boolean.
++If you want to allow unprivileged users to execute DDL statement, you must turn on the postgresql_selinux_users_ddl boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P git_system_use_cifs 1
++.B setsebool -P postgresql_selinux_users_ddl 1
+.EE
+
+.PP
-+If you want to determine whether Git system daemon can search home directories, you must turn on the git_system_enable_homedirs boolean.
++If you want to allow all unconfined executables to use libraries requiring text relocation that are not labeled textrel_shlib_t, you must turn on the selinuxuser_execmod boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P git_system_enable_homedirs 1
++.B setsebool -P selinuxuser_execmod 1
+.EE
+
+.PP
-+If you want to determine whether Git system daemon can access nfs file systems, you must turn on the git_system_use_nfs boolean.
++If you want to allow webadm to manage files in users home directories, you must turn on the webadm_manage_user_files boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P git_system_use_nfs 1
++.B setsebool -P webadm_manage_user_files 1
+.EE
+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow clamscan to non security files on a system, you must turn on the clamscan_can_scan_system boolean.
++If you want to allow pppd to be run for a regular user, you must turn on the pppd_for_user boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P clamscan_can_scan_system 1
++.B setsebool -P pppd_for_user 1
+.EE
+
+.PP
-+If you want to enable support for systemd as the init program, you must turn on the init_systemd boolean.
++If you want to allow users to connect to the local mysql server, you must turn on the selinuxuser_mysql_connect_enabled boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P init_systemd 1
++.B setsebool -P selinuxuser_mysql_connect_enabled 1
+.EE
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
-+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the system_cronjob_t, systemd_notify_t, systemd_logind_t, system_dbusd_t, systemd_passwd_agent_t, systemd_logger_t, systemd_tmpfiles_t, system_mail_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++If you want to allow clamscan to read user content, you must turn on the clamscan_read_user_content boolean.
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.B setsebool -P clamscan_read_user_content 1
+.EE
+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the system_cronjob_t, systemd_notify_t, systemd_logind_t, system_dbusd_t, systemd_passwd_agent_t, systemd_logger_t, systemd_tmpfiles_t, system_mail_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++If you want to allow dbadm to manage files in users home directories, you must turn on the dbadm_manage_user_files boolean.
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B setsebool -P dbadm_manage_user_files 1
+.EE
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux system policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their system processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for system:
-+
++If you want to allow exim to create, read, write, and delete unprivileged user files, you must turn on the exim_manage_user_files boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B system_conf_t
++.B setsebool -P exim_manage_user_files 1
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the system_conf_t type, if you want to treat the files as system configuration data, usually stored under the /etc directory.
-+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/etc/sysctl\.conf(\.old)?, /etc/sysconfig/ipvsadm.*, /etc/sysconfig/ebtables.*, /etc/sysconfig/ip6?tables.*, /etc/sysconfig/system-config-firewall.*
++.PP
++If you want to determine whether calling user domains can execute Git daemon in the git_session_t domain, you must turn on the git_session_users boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B system_cron_spool_t
++.B setsebool -P git_session_users 1
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the system_cron_spool_t type, if you want to store the system cron files under the /var/spool directory.
-+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/etc/crontab, /var/spool/anacron(/.*)?, /etc/cron\.d(/.*)?, /var/spool/fcron/systab\.orig, /var/spool/fcron/new\.systab, /var/spool/fcron/systab
++.PP
++If you want to allow dbadm to read files in users home directories, you must turn on the dbadm_read_user_files boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B system_cronjob_lock_t
++.B setsebool -P dbadm_read_user_files 1
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the system_cronjob_lock_t type, if you want to treat the files as system cronjob lock data, stored under the /var/lock directory
-+
++.PP
++If you want to allow exim to read unprivileged user files, you must turn on the exim_read_user_files boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B system_cronjob_tmp_t
++.B setsebool -P exim_read_user_files 1
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the system_cronjob_tmp_t type, if you want to store system cronjob temporary files in the /tmp directories.
-+
++.PP
++If you want to allow webadm to read files in users home directories, you must turn on the webadm_read_user_files boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B system_cronjob_var_lib_t
++.B setsebool -P webadm_read_user_files 1
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the system_cronjob_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the system cronjob files under the /var/lib directory.
++.SH HOME_EXEC
+
++The SELinux user user_u is able execute home content files.
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B system_cronjob_var_run_t
-+.EE
++.SH TRANSITIONS
+
-+- Set files with the system_cronjob_var_run_t type, if you want to store the system cronjob files under the /run directory.
++Three things can happen when user_t attempts to execute a program.
+
++\fB1.\fP SELinux Policy can deny user_t from executing the program.
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B system_dbusd_tmp_t
-+.EE
++.TP
+
-+- Set files with the system_dbusd_tmp_t type, if you want to store system dbusd temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++\fB2.\fP SELinux Policy can allow user_t to execute the program in the current user type.
+
++Execute the following to see the types that the SELinux user user_t can execute without transitioning:
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B system_dbusd_var_lib_t
-+.EE
++.B search -A -s user_t -c file -p execute_no_trans
+
-+- Set files with the system_dbusd_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the system dbusd files under the /var/lib directory.
++.TP
+
++\fB3.\fP SELinux can allow user_t to execute the program and transition to a new type.
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B system_dbusd_var_run_t
-+.EE
++Execute the following to see the types that the SELinux user user_t can execute and transition:
++
++.B $ search -A -s user_t -c process -p transition
+
-+- Set files with the system_dbusd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the system dbusd files under the /run directory.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type user_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/named/chroot/var/run/dbus(/.*)?, /var/run/dbus(/.*)?
++.B anon_inodefs_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B system_mail_tmp_t
-+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the system_mail_tmp_t type, if you want to store system mail temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++.br
++.B auth_cache_t
+
++ /var/cache/coolkey(/.*)?
++.br
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B system_map_t
-+.EE
++.br
++.B bluetooth_helper_tmp_t
+
-+- Set files with the system_map_t type, if you want to treat the files as system map data.
+
+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/boot/System\.map(-.*)?, /boot/efi(/.*)?/System\.map(-.*)?
++.B bluetooth_helper_tmpfs_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B system_munin_plugin_exec_t
-+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the system_munin_plugin_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the system_munin_plugin_t domain.
++.br
++.B cgroup_t
+
++ /cgroup
++.br
++ /sys/fs/cgroup
+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/share/munin/plugins/swap, /usr/share/munin/plugins/interrupts, /usr/share/munin/plugins/cpu.*, /usr/share/munin/plugins/yum, /usr/share/munin/plugins/load, /usr/share/munin/plugins/irqstats, /usr/share/munin/plugins/processes, /usr/share/munin/plugins/iostat.*, /usr/share/munin/plugins/nfs.*, /usr/share/munin/plugins/munin_.*, /usr/share/munin/plugins/memory, /usr/share/munin/plugins/threads, /usr/share/munin/plugins/netstat, /usr/share/munin/plugins/acpi, /usr/share/munin/plugins/forks, /usr/share/munin/plugins/uptime, /usr/share/munin/plugins/users, /usr/share/munin/plugins/proc_pri, /usr/share/munin/plugins/if_.*, /usr/share/munin/plugins/open_files
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B system_munin_plugin_tmp_t
-+.EE
++.br
++.B chrome_sandbox_tmpfs_t
+
-+- Set files with the system_munin_plugin_tmp_t type, if you want to store system munin plugin temporary files in the /tmp directories.
+
++.br
++.B games_data_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B systemd_logger_exec_t
-+.EE
++ /var/games(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/games(/.*)?
++.br
+
-+- Set files with the systemd_logger_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the systemd_logger_t domain.
++.br
++.B gpg_agent_tmp_t
+
++ /home/[^/]*/\.gnupg/log-socket
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.gnupg/log-socket
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.gnupg/log-socket
++.br
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B systemd_logind_exec_t
-+.EE
++.br
++.B httpd_user_content_t
+
-+- Set files with the systemd_logind_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the systemd_logind_t domain.
++ /home/[^/]*/((www)|(web)|(public_html))(/.+)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/((www)|(web)|(public_html))(/.+)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/((www)|(web)|(public_html))(/.+)?
++.br
+
++.br
++.B httpd_user_htaccess_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B systemd_logind_sessions_t
-+.EE
++ /home/[^/]*/((www)|(web)|(public_html))(/.*)?/\.htaccess
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/((www)|(web)|(public_html))(/.*)?/\.htaccess
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/((www)|(web)|(public_html))(/.*)?/\.htaccess
++.br
+
-+- Set files with the systemd_logind_sessions_t type, if you want to treat the files as systemd logind sessions data.
++.br
++.B httpd_user_ra_content_t
+
++ /home/[^/]*/((www)|(web)|(public_html))(/.*)?/logs(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/((www)|(web)|(public_html))(/.*)?/logs(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/((www)|(web)|(public_html))(/.*)?/logs(/.*)?
++.br
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B systemd_logind_var_run_t
-+.EE
++.br
++.B httpd_user_rw_content_t
+
-+- Set files with the systemd_logind_var_run_t type, if you want to store the systemd logind files under the /run directory.
+
+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/run/nologin, /var/run/systemd/users(/.*)?, /var/run/systemd/seats(/.*)?
++.B httpd_user_script_exec_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B systemd_notify_exec_t
-+.EE
++ /home/[^/]*/((www)|(web)|(public_html))/cgi-bin(/.+)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/((www)|(web)|(public_html))/cgi-bin(/.+)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/((www)|(web)|(public_html))/cgi-bin(/.+)?
++.br
+
-+- Set files with the systemd_notify_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the systemd_notify_t domain.
++.br
++.B iceauth_home_t
+
++ /root/\.DCOP.*
++.br
++ /root/\.ICEauthority.*
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.DCOP.*
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.ICEauthority.*
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.DCOP.*
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.ICEauthority.*
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.DCOP.*
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.ICEauthority.*
+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/bin/systemd-notify, /bin/systemd-notify
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B systemd_passwd_agent_exec_t
-+.EE
++.br
++.B mail_spool_t
+
-+- Set files with the systemd_passwd_agent_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the systemd_passwd_agent_t domain.
++ /var/mail(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/spool/imap(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/spool/mail(/.*)?
++.br
+
+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/bin/systemd-tty-ask-password-agent, /usr/bin/systemd-gnome-ask-password-agent, /usr/bin/systemd-tty-ask-password-agent
++.B mqueue_spool_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B systemd_passwd_var_run_t
-+.EE
++ /var/spool/(client)?mqueue(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/spool/mqueue\.in(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B nfsd_rw_t
+
-+- Set files with the systemd_passwd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the systemd passwd files under the /run directory.
+
+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/run/systemd/ask-password(/.*)?, /var/run/systemd/ask-password-block(/.*)?
++.B noxattrfs
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B systemd_systemctl_exec_t
-+.EE
++ all files on file systems which do not support extended attributes
++.br
++
++.br
++.B sandbox_file_t
+
-+- Set files with the systemd_systemctl_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the systemd_systemctl_t domain.
+
+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/bin/systemctl, /bin/systemctl
++.B sandbox_tmpfs_type
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B systemd_tmpfiles_exec_t
-+.EE
++ all sandbox content in tmpfs file systems
++.br
+
-+- Set files with the systemd_tmpfiles_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the systemd_tmpfiles_t domain.
++.br
++.B screen_home_t
+
++ /root/\.screen(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.screen(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.screenrc
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.screen(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.screenrc
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.screen(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.screenrc
+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/bin/systemd-tmpfiles, /bin/systemd-tmpfiles, /usr/lib/systemd/systemd-tmpfiles
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B systemd_unit_file_t
-+.EE
++.br
++.B security_t
+
-+- Set files with the systemd_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as systemd unit content.
++ /selinux
++.br
+
++.br
++.B usbfs_t
+
-+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux system policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their system processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for system:
++.br
++.B user_fonts_cache_t
++
++ /root/\.fontconfig(/.*)?
++.br
++ /root/\.fonts/auto(/.*)?
++.br
++ /root/\.fonts\.cache-.*
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.fontconfig(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.fonts/auto(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.fonts\.cache-.*
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.fontconfig(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.fonts/auto(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.fonts\.cache-.*
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.fontconfig(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.fonts/auto(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.fonts\.cache-.*
++.br
++
++.br
++.B user_fonts_t
++
++ /root/\.fonts(/.*)?
++.br
++ /tmp/\.font-unix(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.fonts(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.fonts(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.fonts(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B user_home_type
++
++ all user home files
++.br
++
++.br
++.B user_tmp_type
++
++ all user tmp files
++.br
++
++.br
++.B user_tmpfs_type
++
++ all user content in tmpfs file systems
++.br
++
++.br
++.B xauth_home_t
++
++ /root/\.xauth.*
++.br
++ /root/\.Xauth.*
++.br
++ /root/\.serverauth.*
++.br
++ /root/\.Xauthority.*
++.br
++ /var/lib/pqsql/\.xauth.*
++.br
++ /var/lib/pqsql/\.Xauthority.*
++.br
++ /var/lib/nxserver/home/\.xauth.*
++.br
++ /var/lib/nxserver/home/\.Xauthority.*
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.xauth.*
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.Xauth.*
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.serverauth.*
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.Xauthority.*
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.xauth.*
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.Xauth.*
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.serverauth.*
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.Xauthority.*
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.xauth.*
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.Xauth.*
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.serverauth.*
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.Xauthority.*
++.br
++
++.br
++.B xdm_tmp_t
++
++ /tmp/\.X11-unix(/.*)?
++.br
++ /tmp/\.ICE-unix(/.*)?
++.br
++ /tmp/\.X0-lock
++.br
++
++.br
++.B xserver_tmpfs_t
+
-+.EX
-+.B system_munin_plugin_t, systemd_logger_t, systemd_logind_t, system_cronjob_t, systemd_notify_t, system_mail_t, systemd_passwd_agent_t, system_dbusd_t, systemd_tmpfiles_t
-+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -52591,224 +99532,312 @@ index 0000000..6ad303f
+can also be used to manipulate the booleans
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), system(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-+, setsebool(8)
++selinux(8), user(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, setsebool(8), useradd_selinux(8), usernetctl_selinux(8)
\ No newline at end of file
-diff --git a/man/man8/systemd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/systemd_selinux.8
+diff --git a/man/man8/useradd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/useradd_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..daf7004
+index 0000000..81ee3be
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/systemd_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,226 @@
-+.TH "systemd_selinux" "8" "systemd" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "systemd SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/useradd_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,311 @@
++.TH "useradd_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "useradd" "SELinux Policy documentation for useradd"
+.SH "NAME"
-+systemd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the systemd processes
++useradd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the useradd processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the systemd processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the useradd processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH BOOLEANS
-+SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. systemd policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run systemd with the tightest access possible.
++The useradd processes execute with the useradd_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
++For example:
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to determine whether Git system daemon can access cifs file systems, you must turn on the git_system_use_cifs boolean.
++.B ps -eZ | grep useradd_t
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P git_system_use_cifs 1
-+.EE
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to determine whether Git system daemon can search home directories, you must turn on the git_system_enable_homedirs boolean.
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P git_system_enable_homedirs 1
-+.EE
++The useradd_t SELinux type can be entered via the "useradd_exec_t,user_home_t" file types. The default entrypoint paths for the useradd_t domain are the following:"
+
++/usr/sbin/useradd, /usr/sbin/userdel, /usr/sbin/usermod, /usr/sbin/newusers, /home/[^/]*/.+, /home/dwalsh/.+, /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/.+
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to determine whether Git system daemon can access nfs file systems, you must turn on the git_system_use_nfs boolean.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux useradd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their useradd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for useradd:
+
+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P git_system_use_nfs 1
++.B useradd_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
-+If you want to allow clamscan to non security files on a system, you must turn on the clamscan_can_scan_system boolean.
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux useradd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their useradd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for useradd:
++
+
+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P clamscan_can_scan_system 1
++.PP
++.B useradd_exec_t
+.EE
+
++- Set files with the useradd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the useradd_t domain.
++
++
+.PP
-+If you want to enable support for systemd as the init program, you must turn on the init_systemd boolean.
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P init_systemd 1
-+.EE
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The SELinux process type useradd_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the system_cronjob_t, systemd_notify_t, systemd_logind_t, system_dbusd_t, systemd_passwd_agent_t, systemd_logger_t, systemd_tmpfiles_t, system_mail_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++.br
++.B default_context_t
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
++ /etc/selinux/([^/]*/)?contexts(/.*)?
++.br
++ /root/\.default_contexts
++.br
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the system_cronjob_t, systemd_notify_t, systemd_logind_t, system_dbusd_t, systemd_passwd_agent_t, systemd_logger_t, systemd_tmpfiles_t, system_mail_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++.br
++.B etc_t
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
-+.EE
++ /etc/.*
++.br
++ /var/db/.*\.db
++.br
++ /usr/etc(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/ftp/etc(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/openshift/.limits.d(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/openshift/.openshift-proxy.d(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/openshift/.stickshift-proxy.d(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/stickshift/.limits.d(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/stickshift/.stickshift-proxy.d(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/named/chroot/etc(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/ipsec\.d/examples(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/spool/postfix/etc(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc
++.br
++ /etc/cups/client\.conf
++.br
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux systemd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their systemd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for systemd:
++.br
++.B faillog_t
+
++ /var/log/btmp.*
++.br
++ /var/run/faillock(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/log/faillog
++.br
++ /var/log/tallylog
++.br
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B systemd_logger_exec_t
-+.EE
++.br
++.B file_context_t
+
-+- Set files with the systemd_logger_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the systemd_logger_t domain.
++ /etc/selinux/([^/]*/)?contexts/files(/.*)?
++.br
+
++.br
++.B httpd_user_content_type
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B systemd_logind_exec_t
-+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the systemd_logind_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the systemd_logind_t domain.
++.br
++.B httpd_user_script_exec_type
+
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B systemd_logind_sessions_t
-+.EE
++.br
++.B initrc_var_run_t
+
-+- Set files with the systemd_logind_sessions_t type, if you want to treat the files as systemd logind sessions data.
++ /var/run/utmp
++.br
++ /var/run/random-seed
++.br
++ /var/run/runlevel\.dir
++.br
++ /var/run/setmixer_flag
++.br
+
++.br
++.B lastlog_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B systemd_logind_var_run_t
-+.EE
++ /var/log/lastlog
++.br
+
-+- Set files with the systemd_logind_var_run_t type, if you want to store the systemd logind files under the /run directory.
++.br
++.B mail_spool_t
+
++ /var/mail(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/spool/imap(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/spool/mail(/.*)?
+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/run/nologin, /var/run/systemd/users(/.*)?, /var/run/systemd/seats(/.*)?
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B systemd_notify_exec_t
-+.EE
++.br
++.B passwd_file_t
+
-+- Set files with the systemd_notify_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the systemd_notify_t domain.
++ /etc/group[-\+]?
++.br
++ /etc/passwd[-\+]?
++.br
++ /etc/passwd\.adjunct.*
++.br
++ /etc/ptmptmp
++.br
++ /etc/\.pwd\.lock
++.br
++ /etc/group\.lock
++.br
++ /etc/passwd\.OLD
++.br
++ /etc/passwd\.lock
++.br
+
+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/bin/systemd-notify, /bin/systemd-notify
++.B pcscd_var_run_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B systemd_passwd_agent_exec_t
-+.EE
++ /var/run/pcscd(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/pcscd\.events(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/pcscd\.pid
++.br
++ /var/run/pcscd\.pub
++.br
++ /var/run/pcscd\.comm
++.br
+
-+- Set files with the systemd_passwd_agent_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the systemd_passwd_agent_t domain.
++.br
++.B security_t
+
++ /selinux
+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/bin/systemd-tty-ask-password-agent, /usr/bin/systemd-gnome-ask-password-agent, /usr/bin/systemd-tty-ask-password-agent
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B systemd_passwd_var_run_t
-+.EE
++.br
++.B selinux_config_t
+
-+- Set files with the systemd_passwd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the systemd passwd files under the /run directory.
++ /etc/selinux(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/selinux/([^/]*/)?seusers
++.br
++ /etc/selinux/([^/]*/)?users(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/selinux/([^/]*/)?setrans\.conf
++.br
+
+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/run/systemd/ask-password(/.*)?, /var/run/systemd/ask-password-block(/.*)?
++.B selinux_login_config_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B systemd_systemctl_exec_t
-+.EE
++ /etc/selinux/([^/]*/)?logins(/.*)?
++.br
+
-+- Set files with the systemd_systemctl_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the systemd_systemctl_t domain.
++.br
++.B semanage_read_lock_t
+
++ /etc/selinux/([^/]*/)?modules/semanage\.read\.LOCK
+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/bin/systemctl, /bin/systemctl
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B systemd_tmpfiles_exec_t
-+.EE
++.br
++.B semanage_store_t
+
-+- Set files with the systemd_tmpfiles_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the systemd_tmpfiles_t domain.
++ /etc/selinux/([^/]*/)?policy(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/selinux/([^/]*/)?modules/(active|tmp|previous)(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/share/selinux/mls(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/share/selinux/targeted(/.*)?
++.br
+
+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/bin/systemd-tmpfiles, /bin/systemd-tmpfiles, /usr/lib/systemd/systemd-tmpfiles
++.B semanage_tmp_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B systemd_unit_file_t
-+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the systemd_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as systemd unit content.
++.br
++.B semanage_trans_lock_t
++
++ /etc/selinux/([^/]*/)?modules/semanage\.trans\.LOCK
++.br
+
++.br
++.B shadow_t
+
-+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
++ /etc/shadow.*
++.br
++ /etc/gshadow.*
++.br
++ /var/db/shadow.*
++.br
++ /etc/security/opasswd
++.br
++ /etc/security/opasswd\.old
++.br
++
++.br
++.B stapserver_var_lib_t
++
++ /var/lib/stap-server(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B user_home_type
++
++ all user home files
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the useradd_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
++
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux systemd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their systemd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for systemd:
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the useradd_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B system_munin_plugin_t, systemd_logger_t, systemd_logind_t, system_cronjob_t, systemd_notify_t, system_mail_t, systemd_passwd_agent_t, system_dbusd_t, systemd_tmpfiles_t
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -52820,112 +99849,103 @@ index 0000000..daf7004
+.B semanage module
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
-+.B semanage boolean
-+can also be used to manipulate the booleans
-+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), systemd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-+, setsebool(8)
++selinux(8), useradd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, user_selinux(8)
\ No newline at end of file
-diff --git a/man/man8/tcpd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/tcpd_selinux.8
+diff --git a/man/man8/usernetctl_selinux.8 b/man/man8/usernetctl_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..0f29f20
+index 0000000..cb4d1bf
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/tcpd_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,110 @@
-+.TH "tcpd_selinux" "8" "tcpd" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "tcpd SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/usernetctl_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
++.TH "usernetctl_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "usernetctl" "SELinux Policy documentation for usernetctl"
+.SH "NAME"
-+tcpd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the tcpd processes
++usernetctl_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the usernetctl processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the tcpd processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the usernetctl processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH BOOLEANS
-+SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. tcpd policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run tcpd with the tightest access possible.
++The usernetctl processes execute with the usernetctl_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
++For example:
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow the Telepathy connection managers to connect to any generic TCP port, you must turn on the telepathy_tcp_connect_generic_network_ports boolean.
++.B ps -eZ | grep usernetctl_t
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P telepathy_tcp_connect_generic_network_ports 1
-+.EE
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow all daemons to use tcp wrappers, you must turn on the daemons_use_tcp_wrapper boolean.
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P daemons_use_tcp_wrapper 1
-+.EE
++The usernetctl_t SELinux type can be entered via the "usernetctl_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the usernetctl_t domain are the following:"
+
++/usr/sbin/usernetctl
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux usernetctl policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their usernetctl processes in as secure a method as possible.
+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to run TCP servers (bind to ports and accept connection from the same domain and outside users) disabling this forces FTP passive mode and may change other protocols, you must turn on the user_tcp_server boolean.
++The following process types are defined for usernetctl:
+
+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P user_tcp_server 1
++.B usernetctl_t
+.EE
-+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux tcpd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their tcpd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for tcpd:
-+
-+
-+.EX
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux usernetctl policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their usernetctl processes in as secure a method as possible.
+.PP
-+.B tcpd_exec_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the tcpd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the tcpd_t domain.
++The following file types are defined for usernetctl:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B tcpd_tmp_t
++.B usernetctl_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the tcpd_tmp_t type, if you want to store tcpd temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++- Set files with the usernetctl_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the usernetctl_t domain.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux tcpd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their tcpd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for tcpd:
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the usernetctl_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B tcpd_t
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
++
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the usernetctl_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -52937,132 +99957,137 @@ index 0000000..0f29f20
+.B semanage module
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
-+.B semanage boolean
-+can also be used to manipulate the booleans
-+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), tcpd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-+, setsebool(8)
++selinux(8), usernetctl(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, user_selinux(8)
\ No newline at end of file
-diff --git a/man/man8/tcsd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/tcsd_selinux.8
+diff --git a/man/man8/utempter_selinux.8 b/man/man8/utempter_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..e16b7a1
+index 0000000..7ae0085
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/tcsd_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,129 @@
-+.TH "tcsd_selinux" "8" "tcsd" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "tcsd SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/utempter_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,134 @@
++.TH "utempter_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "utempter" "SELinux Policy documentation for utempter"
+.SH "NAME"
-+tcsd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the tcsd processes
++utempter_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the utempter processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the tcsd processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the utempter processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The utempter processes execute with the utempter_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the tcsd_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep utempter_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The utempter_t SELinux type can be entered via the "utempter_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the utempter_t domain are the following:"
+
++/usr/sbin/utempter
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the tcsd_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux utempter policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their utempter processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for utempter:
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B utempter_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux tcsd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their tcsd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for tcsd:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux utempter policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their utempter processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for utempter:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B tcsd_exec_t
++.B utempter_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the tcsd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the tcsd_t domain.
++- Set files with the utempter_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the utempter_t domain.
+
+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B tcsd_initrc_exec_t
-+.EE
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
+
-+- Set files with the tcsd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the tcsd_initrc_t domain.
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
++The SELinux process type utempter_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B tcsd_var_lib_t
-+.EE
++.br
++.B initrc_var_run_t
+
-+- Set files with the tcsd_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the tcsd files under the /var/lib directory.
++ /var/run/utmp
++.br
++ /var/run/random-seed
++.br
++ /var/run/runlevel\.dir
++.br
++ /var/run/setmixer_flag
++.br
+
++.br
++.B user_tmp_t
+
-+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
++ /var/run/user(/.*)?
++.br
++ /tmp/gconfd-.*
++.br
++ /tmp/gconfd-dwalsh
++.br
++ /tmp/gconfd-xguest
++.br
+
-+.SH PORT TYPES
-+SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
-+.PP
-+You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
++.br
++.B wtmp_t
+
-+.B semanage port -l
++ /var/log/wtmp.*
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
-+SELinux tcsd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their tcsd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following port types are defined for tcsd:
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the utempter_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.TP 5
-+.B tcs_port_t
-+.TP 10
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
+
-+
-+Default Defined Ports:
-+tcp 30003
-+.EE
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux tcsd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their tcsd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for tcsd:
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the utempter_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B tcsd_t
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -53074,321 +100099,216 @@ index 0000000..e16b7a1
+.B semanage module
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
-+.B semanage port
-+can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
-+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), tcsd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/telepathy_selinux.8 b/man/man8/telepathy_selinux.8
++selinux(8), utempter(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/uucpd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/uucpd_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..aca274f
+index 0000000..1f472de
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/telepathy_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,321 @@
-+.TH "telepathy_selinux" "8" "telepathy" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "telepathy SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/uucpd_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,218 @@
++.TH "uucpd_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "uucpd" "SELinux Policy documentation for uucpd"
+.SH "NAME"
-+telepathy_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the telepathy processes
++uucpd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the uucpd processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the telepathy processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
-+
-+.SH BOOLEANS
-+SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. telepathy policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run telepathy with the tightest access possible.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the uucpd processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
++The uucpd processes execute with the uucpd_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow the Telepathy connection managers to connect to any generic TCP port, you must turn on the telepathy_tcp_connect_generic_network_ports boolean.
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P telepathy_tcp_connect_generic_network_ports 1
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep uucpd_t
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow the Telepathy connection managers to connect to any network port, you must turn on the telepathy_connect_all_ports boolean.
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P telepathy_connect_all_ports 1
-+.EE
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The uucpd_t SELinux type can be entered via the "uucpd_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the uucpd_t domain are the following:"
+
++/usr/sbin/uucico
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the telepathy_mission_control_t, telepathy_logger_t, telepathy_salut_t, telepathy_gabble_t, telepathy_idle_t, telepathy_sunshine_t, telepathy_stream_engine_t, telepathy_sofiasip_t, telepathy_msn_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
-+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
-+
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux uucpd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their uucpd processes in as secure a method as possible.
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the telepathy_mission_control_t, telepathy_logger_t, telepathy_salut_t, telepathy_gabble_t, telepathy_idle_t, telepathy_sunshine_t, telepathy_stream_engine_t, telepathy_sofiasip_t, telepathy_msn_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++The following process types are defined for uucpd:
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B uucpd_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux telepathy policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their telepathy processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for telepathy:
-+
-+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B telepathy_cache_home_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the telepathy_cache_home_t type, if you want to store telepathy cache files in the users home directory.
-+
-+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B telepathy_data_home_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the telepathy_data_home_t type, if you want to store telepathy data files in the users home directory.
-+
-+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B telepathy_gabble_cache_home_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the telepathy_gabble_cache_home_t type, if you want to store telepathy gabble cache files in the users home directory.
-+
-+
-+.EX
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux uucpd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their uucpd processes in as secure a method as possible.
+.PP
-+.B telepathy_gabble_exec_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the telepathy_gabble_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the telepathy_gabble_t domain.
++The following file types are defined for uucpd:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B telepathy_gabble_tmp_t
++.B uucpd_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the telepathy_gabble_tmp_t type, if you want to store telepathy gabble temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++- Set files with the uucpd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the uucpd_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B telepathy_idle_exec_t
++.B uucpd_lock_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the telepathy_idle_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the telepathy_idle_t domain.
++- Set files with the uucpd_lock_t type, if you want to treat the files as uucpd lock data, stored under the /var/lock directory
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B telepathy_idle_tmp_t
++.B uucpd_log_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the telepathy_idle_tmp_t type, if you want to store telepathy idle temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++- Set files with the uucpd_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as uucpd log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B telepathy_logger_cache_home_t
++.B uucpd_ro_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the telepathy_logger_cache_home_t type, if you want to store telepathy logger cache files in the users home directory.
++- Set files with the uucpd_ro_t type, if you want to treat the files as uucpd read/only content.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B telepathy_logger_data_home_t
++.B uucpd_rw_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the telepathy_logger_data_home_t type, if you want to store telepathy logger data files in the users home directory.
++- Set files with the uucpd_rw_t type, if you want to treat the files as uucpd read/write content.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B telepathy_logger_exec_t
++.B uucpd_spool_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the telepathy_logger_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the telepathy_logger_t domain.
++- Set files with the uucpd_spool_t type, if you want to store the uucpd files under the /var/spool directory.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B telepathy_logger_tmp_t
++.B uucpd_tmp_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the telepathy_logger_tmp_t type, if you want to store telepathy logger temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++- Set files with the uucpd_tmp_t type, if you want to store uucpd temporary files in the /tmp directories.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B telepathy_mission_control_cache_home_t
++.B uucpd_var_run_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the telepathy_mission_control_cache_home_t type, if you want to store telepathy mission control cache files in the users home directory.
++- Set files with the uucpd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the uucpd files under the /run directory.
+
+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B telepathy_mission_control_data_home_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the telepathy_mission_control_data_home_t type, if you want to store telepathy mission control data files in the users home directory.
-+
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
+
-+.EX
++.SH PORT TYPES
++SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
+.PP
-+.B telepathy_mission_control_exec_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the telepathy_mission_control_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the telepathy_mission_control_t domain.
++You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
+
++.B semanage port -l
+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B telepathy_mission_control_home_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the telepathy_mission_control_home_t type, if you want to store telepathy mission control files in the users home directory.
-+
-+
-+.EX
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
++SELinux uucpd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their uucpd processes in as secure a method as possible.
+.PP
-+.B telepathy_mission_control_tmp_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the telepathy_mission_control_tmp_t type, if you want to store telepathy mission control temporary files in the /tmp directories.
-+
++The following port types are defined for uucpd:
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B telepathy_msn_exec_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the telepathy_msn_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the telepathy_msn_t domain.
-+
-+.br
+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/libexec/telepathy-butterfly, /usr/libexec/telepathy-haze
-+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B telepathy_msn_tmp_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the telepathy_msn_tmp_t type, if you want to store telepathy msn temporary files in the /tmp directories.
-+
-+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B telepathy_salut_exec_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the telepathy_salut_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the telepathy_salut_t domain.
-+
-+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B telepathy_salut_tmp_t
++.B uucpd_port_t
++.TP 10
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the telepathy_salut_tmp_t type, if you want to store telepathy salut temporary files in the /tmp directories.
-+
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B telepathy_sofiasip_exec_t
++Default Defined Ports:
++tcp 540
+.EE
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+- Set files with the telepathy_sofiasip_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the telepathy_sofiasip_t domain.
++The SELinux process type uucpd_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
++.br
++.B uucpd_lock_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B telepathy_sofiasip_tmp_t
-+.EE
++ /var/lock/uucp(/.*)?
++.br
+
-+- Set files with the telepathy_sofiasip_tmp_t type, if you want to store telepathy sofiasip temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++.br
++.B uucpd_log_t
+
++ /var/log/uucp(/.*)?
++.br
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B telepathy_stream_engine_exec_t
-+.EE
++.br
++.B uucpd_rw_t
+
-+- Set files with the telepathy_stream_engine_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the telepathy_stream_engine_t domain.
+
++.br
++.B uucpd_spool_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B telepathy_stream_engine_tmp_t
-+.EE
++ /var/spool/uucp(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/spool/uucppublic(/.*)?
++.br
+
-+- Set files with the telepathy_stream_engine_tmp_t type, if you want to store telepathy stream engine temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++.br
++.B uucpd_tmp_t
+
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B telepathy_sunshine_exec_t
-+.EE
++.br
++.B uucpd_var_run_t
+
-+- Set files with the telepathy_sunshine_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the telepathy_sunshine_t domain.
+
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B telepathy_sunshine_home_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the telepathy_sunshine_home_t type, if you want to store telepathy sunshine files in the users home directory.
-+
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the uucpd_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B telepathy_sunshine_tmp_t
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the telepathy_sunshine_tmp_t type, if you want to store telepathy sunshine temporary files in the /tmp directories.
-+
-+
-+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
-+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux telepathy policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their telepathy processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for telepathy:
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the uucpd_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B telepathy_gabble_t, telepathy_sofiasip_t, telepathy_idle_t, telepathy_mission_control_t, telepathy_salut_t, telepathy_sunshine_t, telepathy_logger_t, telepathy_stream_engine_t, telepathy_msn_t
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -53400,144 +100320,130 @@ index 0000000..aca274f
+.B semanage module
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
-+.B semanage boolean
-+can also be used to manipulate the booleans
++.B semanage port
++can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), telepathy(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-+, setsebool(8)
-\ No newline at end of file
-diff --git a/man/man8/telnetd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/telnetd_selinux.8
++selinux(8), uucpd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/uuidd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/uuidd_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..053c28a
+index 0000000..219e6f4
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/telnetd_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,141 @@
-+.TH "telnetd_selinux" "8" "telnetd" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "telnetd SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/uuidd_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,126 @@
++.TH "uuidd_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "uuidd" "SELinux Policy documentation for uuidd"
+.SH "NAME"
-+telnetd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the telnetd processes
++uuidd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the uuidd processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the telnetd processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the uuidd processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The uuidd processes execute with the uuidd_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the telnetd_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep uuidd_t
+
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The uuidd_t SELinux type can be entered via the "uuidd_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the uuidd_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/sbin/uuidd
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the telnetd_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux uuidd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their uuidd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for uuidd:
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B uuidd_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux telnetd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their telnetd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for telnetd:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux uuidd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their uuidd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for uuidd:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B telnetd_exec_t
++.B uuidd_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the telnetd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the telnetd_t domain.
++- Set files with the uuidd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the uuidd_t domain.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/kerberos/sbin/telnetd, /usr/sbin/in\.telnetd
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B telnetd_keytab_t
++.B uuidd_initrc_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the telnetd_keytab_t type, if you want to treat the files as kerberos keytab files.
++- Set files with the uuidd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the uuidd_initrc_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B telnetd_tmp_t
++.B uuidd_var_lib_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the telnetd_tmp_t type, if you want to store telnetd temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++- Set files with the uuidd_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the uuidd files under the /var/lib directory.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B telnetd_var_run_t
++.B uuidd_var_run_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the telnetd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the telnetd files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the uuidd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the uuidd files under the /run directory.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PORT TYPES
-+SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
-+.PP
-+You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+.B semanage port -l
++The SELinux process type uuidd_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
-+SELinux telnetd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their telnetd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following port types are defined for telnetd:
++.br
++.B uuidd_var_lib_t
+
-+.EX
-+.TP 5
-+.B telnetd_port_t
-+.TP 10
-+.EE
++ /var/lib/libuuid(/.*)?
++.br
+
++.br
++.B uuidd_var_run_t
+
-+Default Defined Ports:
-+tcp 23
-+.EE
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux telnetd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their telnetd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for telnetd:
++ /var/run/uuidd(/.*)?
++.br
+
-+.EX
-+.B telnetd_t
-+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -53549,180 +100455,117 @@ index 0000000..053c28a
+.B semanage module
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
-+.B semanage port
-+can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
-+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), telnetd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/tftpd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/tftpd_selinux.8
++selinux(8), uuidd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/uux_selinux.8 b/man/man8/uux_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..a3dee82
+index 0000000..5c1314d
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/tftpd_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,179 @@
-+.TH "tftpd_selinux" "8" "tftpd" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "tftpd SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/uux_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,116 @@
++.TH "uux_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "uux" "SELinux Policy documentation for uux"
+.SH "NAME"
-+tftpd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the tftpd processes
++uux_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the uux processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the tftpd processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
-+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
-+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the tftpd_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
-+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
-+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the tftpd_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
-+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
-+.EE
-+
-+.SH SHARING FILES
-+If you want to share files with multiple domains (Apache, FTP, rsync, Samba), you can set a file context of public_content_t and public_content_rw_t. These context allow any of the above domains to read the content. If you want a particular domain to write to the public_content_rw_t domain, you must set the appropriate boolean.
-+.TP
-+Allow tftpd servers to read the /var/tftpd directory by adding the public_content_t file type to the directory and by restoring the file type.
-+.PP
-+.B
-+semanage fcontext -a -t public_content_t "/var/tftpd(/.*)?"
-+.br
-+.B restorecon -F -R -v /var/tftpd
-+.pp
-+.TP
-+Allow tftpd servers to read and write /var/tmp/incoming by adding the public_content_rw_t type to the directory and by restoring the file type. This also requires the allow_tftpdd_anon_write boolean to be set.
-+.PP
-+.B
-+semanage fcontext -a -t public_content_rw_t "/var/tftpd/incoming(/.*)?"
-+.br
-+.B restorecon -F -R -v /var/tftpd/incoming
-+
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the uux processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow tftp to modify public files used for public file transfer services., you must turn on the tftp_anon_write boolean.
-+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P tftp_anon_write 1
-+.EE
-+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux tftpd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their tftpd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for tftpd:
++The uux processes execute with the uux_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B tftpd_etc_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the tftpd_etc_t type, if you want to store tftpd files in the /etc directories.
-+
-+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B tftpd_exec_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the tftpd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the tftpd_t domain.
-+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/sbin/in\.tftpd, /usr/sbin/atftpd
++.B ps -eZ | grep uux_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B tftpd_var_run_t
-+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the tftpd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the tftpd files under the /run directory.
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
++The uux_t SELinux type can be entered via the "uux_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the uux_t domain are the following:"
+
-+.EX
++/usr/bin/uux
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux uux policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their uux processes in as secure a method as possible.
+.PP
-+.B tftpdir_rw_t
++The following process types are defined for uux:
++
++.EX
++.B uux_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
-+- Set files with the tftpdir_rw_t type, if you want to treat the files as tftpdir read/write content.
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux uux policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their uux processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for uux:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B tftpdir_t
++.B uux_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the tftpdir_t type, if you want to treat the files as tftpdir data.
++- Set files with the uux_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the uux_t domain.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/tftpboot/.*, /tftpboot
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PORT TYPES
-+SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
-+.PP
-+You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+.B semanage port -l
++The SELinux process type uux_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B anon_inodefs_t
++
++
++.br
++.B uucpd_spool_t
++
++ /var/spool/uucp(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/spool/uucppublic(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
-+SELinux tftpd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their tftpd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following port types are defined for tftpd:
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the uux_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.TP 5
-+.B tftp_port_t
-+.TP 10
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
+
-+
-+Default Defined Ports:
-+udp 69
-+.EE
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux tftpd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their tftpd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for tftpd:
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the uux_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B tftpd_t
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -53734,202 +100577,202 @@ index 0000000..a3dee82
+.B semanage module
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
-+.B semanage port
-+can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
-+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), tftpd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/tgtd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/tgtd_selinux.8
++selinux(8), uux(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/varnishd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/varnishd_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..6882c89
+index 0000000..a0af064
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/tgtd_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
-+.TH "tgtd_selinux" "8" "tgtd" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "tgtd SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/varnishd_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,208 @@
++.TH "varnishd_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "varnishd" "SELinux Policy documentation for varnishd"
+.SH "NAME"
-+tgtd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the tgtd processes
++varnishd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the varnishd processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the tgtd processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the varnishd processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The varnishd processes execute with the varnishd_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep varnishd_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The varnishd_t SELinux type can be entered via the "varnishd_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the varnishd_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/sbin/varnishd
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux varnishd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their varnishd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for varnishd:
++
++.EX
++.B varnishd_t, varnishlog_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH BOOLEANS
++SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. varnishd policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run varnishd with the tightest access possible.
++
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow varnishd to connect to all ports, not just HTTP, you must turn on the varnishd_connect_any boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P varnishd_connect_any 1
++.EE
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow varnishd to connect to all ports, not just HTTP, you must turn on the varnishd_connect_any boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P varnishd_connect_any 1
++.EE
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux tgtd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their tgtd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for tgtd:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux varnishd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their varnishd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for varnishd:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B tgtd_exec_t
++.B varnishd_etc_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the tgtd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the tgtd_t domain.
++- Set files with the varnishd_etc_t type, if you want to store varnishd files in the /etc directories.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B tgtd_initrc_exec_t
++.B varnishd_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the tgtd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the tgtd_initrc_t domain.
++- Set files with the varnishd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the varnishd_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B tgtd_tmp_t
++.B varnishd_initrc_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the tgtd_tmp_t type, if you want to store tgtd temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++- Set files with the varnishd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the varnishd_initrc_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B tgtd_tmpfs_t
++.B varnishd_tmp_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the tgtd_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store tgtd files on a tmpfs file system.
++- Set files with the varnishd_tmp_t type, if you want to store varnishd temporary files in the /tmp directories.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B tgtd_var_lib_t
++.B varnishd_var_lib_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the tgtd_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the tgtd files under the /var/lib directory.
++- Set files with the varnishd_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the varnishd files under the /var/lib directory.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B tgtd_var_run_t
++.B varnishd_var_run_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the tgtd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the tgtd files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the varnishd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the varnishd files under the /run directory.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.SH PORT TYPES
++SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux tgtd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their tgtd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for tgtd:
++You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
+
-+.EX
-+.B tgtd_t
-+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++.B semanage port -l
+
-+.SH "COMMANDS"
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
+.PP
-+.B semanage permissive
-+can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
++SELinux varnishd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their varnishd processes in as secure a method as possible.
+.PP
-+.B semanage module
-+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++The following port types are defined for varnishd:
+
-+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
-+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++.EX
++.TP 5
++.B varnishd_port_t
++.TP 10
++.EE
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
+
-+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), tgtd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/thin_selinux.8 b/man/man8/thin_selinux.8
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..c7f6423
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/thin_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
-+.TH "thin_selinux" "8" "thin" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "thin SELinux Policy documentation"
-+.SH "NAME"
-+thin_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the thin processes
-+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++Default Defined Ports:
++tcp 6081-6082
++.EE
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
++The SELinux process type varnishd_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
++.br
++.B varnishd_tmp_t
+
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux thin policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their thin processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for thin:
++.br
++.B varnishd_var_lib_t
+
++ /var/lib/varnish(/.*)?
++.br
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B thin_exec_t
-+.EE
++.br
++.B varnishd_var_run_t
+
-+- Set files with the thin_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the thin_t domain.
++ /var/run/varnish\.pid
++.br
+
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B thin_var_run_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the thin_var_run_t type, if you want to store the thin files under the /run directory.
-+
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the varnishd_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
-+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux thin policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their thin processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for thin:
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the varnishd_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B thin_t
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -53941,108 +100784,137 @@ index 0000000..c7f6423
+.B semanage module
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
++.B semanage port
++can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
++
++.B semanage boolean
++can also be used to manipulate the booleans
++
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), thin(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/thumb_selinux.8 b/man/man8/thumb_selinux.8
++selinux(8), varnishd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, setsebool(8), varnishlog_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/varnishlog_selinux.8 b/man/man8/varnishlog_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..99425cf
+index 0000000..bc3b750
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/thumb_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,107 @@
-+.TH "thumb_selinux" "8" "thumb" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "thumb SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/varnishlog_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,128 @@
++.TH "varnishlog_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "varnishlog" "SELinux Policy documentation for varnishlog"
+.SH "NAME"
-+thumb_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the thumb processes
++varnishlog_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the varnishlog processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the thumb processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the varnishlog processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The varnishlog processes execute with the varnishlog_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the thumb_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep varnishlog_t
+
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The varnishlog_t SELinux type can be entered via the "varnishlog_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the varnishlog_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/bin/varnishlog, /usr/bin/varnisncsa
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the thumb_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux varnishlog policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their varnishlog processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for varnishlog:
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B varnishlog_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux thumb policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their thumb processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for thumb:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux varnishlog policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their varnishlog processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for varnishlog:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B thumb_exec_t
++.B varnishlog_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the thumb_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the thumb_t domain.
++- Set files with the varnishlog_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the varnishlog_t domain.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/bin/whaaw-thumbnailer, /usr/lib/tumbler[^/]*/tumblerd, /usr/bin/raw-thumbnailer, /usr/bin/evince-thumbnailer, /usr/bin/[^/]*thumbnailer, /usr/bin/ffmpegthumbnailer, /usr/bin/shotwell-video-thumbnailer, /usr/bin/gsf-office-thumbnailer, /usr/bin/totem-video-thumbnailer, /usr/bin/gnome-thumbnail-font, /usr/bin/gnome-[^/]*-thumbnailer(.sh)?
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B thumb_home_t
++.B varnishlog_initrc_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the thumb_home_t type, if you want to store thumb files in the users home directory.
++- Set files with the varnishlog_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the varnishlog_initrc_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B thumb_tmp_t
++.B varnishlog_log_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the thumb_tmp_t type, if you want to store thumb temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++- Set files with the varnishlog_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as varnishlog log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B varnishlog_var_run_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the varnishlog_var_run_t type, if you want to store the varnishlog files under the /run directory.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux thumb policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their thumb processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for thumb:
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+.EX
-+.B thumb_t
-+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++The SELinux process type varnishlog_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B varnishlog_log_t
++
++ /var/log/varnish(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B varnishlog_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/varnishlog\.pid
++.br
++ /var/run/varnishncsa\.pid
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -54055,91 +100927,120 @@ index 0000000..99425cf
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), thumb(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/tmpreaper_selinux.8 b/man/man8/tmpreaper_selinux.8
++selinux(8), varnishlog(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/vbetool_selinux.8 b/man/man8/vbetool_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..5dbbf85
+index 0000000..507145b
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/tmpreaper_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
-+.TH "tmpreaper_selinux" "8" "tmpreaper" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "tmpreaper SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/vbetool_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,124 @@
++.TH "vbetool_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "vbetool" "SELinux Policy documentation for vbetool"
+.SH "NAME"
-+tmpreaper_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the tmpreaper processes
++vbetool_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the vbetool processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the tmpreaper processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the vbetool processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The vbetool processes execute with the vbetool_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep vbetool_t
+
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The vbetool_t SELinux type can be entered via the "vbetool_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the vbetool_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/sbin/vbetool
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the tmpreaper_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux vbetool policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their vbetool processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for vbetool:
++
++.EX
++.B vbetool_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH BOOLEANS
++SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. vbetool policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run vbetool with the tightest access possible.
++
++
++.PP
++If you want to ignore vbetool mmap_zero errors, you must turn on the vbetool_mmap_zero_ignore boolean.
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.B setsebool -P vbetool_mmap_zero_ignore 1
+.EE
+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the tmpreaper_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++If you want to ignore vbetool mmap_zero errors, you must turn on the vbetool_mmap_zero_ignore boolean.
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B setsebool -P vbetool_mmap_zero_ignore 1
+.EE
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux tmpreaper policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their tmpreaper processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for tmpreaper:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux vbetool policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their vbetool processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for vbetool:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B tmpreaper_exec_t
++.B vbetool_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the tmpreaper_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the tmpreaper_t domain.
++- Set files with the vbetool_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the vbetool_t domain.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/sbin/tmpwatch, /usr/sbin/tmpreaper
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux tmpreaper policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their tmpreaper processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for tmpreaper:
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+.EX
-+.B tmpreaper_t
-+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++The SELinux process type vbetool_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B mtrr_device_t
++
++ /dev/cpu/mtrr
++.br
++
++.br
++.B sysfs_t
++
++ /sys(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -54151,122 +101052,128 @@ index 0000000..5dbbf85
+.B semanage module
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
++.B semanage boolean
++can also be used to manipulate the booleans
++
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), tmpreaper(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/tomcat_selinux.8 b/man/man8/tomcat_selinux.8
++selinux(8), vbetool(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, setsebool(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/vdagent_selinux.8 b/man/man8/vdagent_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..0d35133
+index 0000000..1d1e6e4
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/tomcat_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,121 @@
-+.TH "tomcat_selinux" "8" "tomcat" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "tomcat SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/vdagent_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,122 @@
++.TH "vdagent_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "vdagent" "SELinux Policy documentation for vdagent"
+.SH "NAME"
-+tomcat_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the tomcat processes
++vdagent_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the vdagent processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the tomcat processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the vdagent processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The vdagent processes execute with the vdagent_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux tomcat policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their tomcat processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for tomcat:
++For example:
+
++.B ps -eZ | grep vdagent_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B tomcat_cache_t
-+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the tomcat_cache_t type, if you want to store the files under the /var/cache directory.
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
++The vdagent_t SELinux type can be entered via the "vdagent_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the vdagent_t domain are the following:"
+
-+.EX
++/usr/sbin/spice-vdagentd
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+.B tomcat_exec_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the tomcat_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the tomcat_t domain.
-+
-+
-+.EX
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+.B tomcat_log_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the tomcat_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as tomcat log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
-+
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux vdagent policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their vdagent processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for vdagent:
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B tomcat_tmp_t
++.B vdagent_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
-+- Set files with the tomcat_tmp_t type, if you want to store tomcat temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux vdagent policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their vdagent processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for vdagent:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B tomcat_unit_file_t
++.B vdagent_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the tomcat_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as tomcat unit content.
++- Set files with the vdagent_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the vdagent_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B tomcat_var_lib_t
++.B vdagent_log_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the tomcat_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the tomcat files under the /var/lib directory.
++- Set files with the vdagent_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as vdagent log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B tomcat_var_run_t
++.B vdagent_var_run_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the tomcat_var_run_t type, if you want to store the tomcat files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the vdagent_var_run_t type, if you want to store the vdagent files under the /run directory.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux tomcat policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their tomcat processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for tomcat:
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+.EX
-+.B tomcat_t
-+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++The SELinux process type vdagent_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B vdagent_log_t
++
++ /var/log/spice-vdagentd(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/log/spice-vdagentd\.log.*
++.br
++
++.br
++.B vdagent_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/spice-vdagentd(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/spice-vdagentd\.pid
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -54279,188 +101186,156 @@ index 0000000..0d35133
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), tomcat(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/tor_selinux.8 b/man/man8/tor_selinux.8
++selinux(8), vdagent(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/vhostmd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/vhostmd_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..fee5733
+index 0000000..eafe755
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/tor_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,195 @@
-+.TH "tor_selinux" "8" "tor" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "tor SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/vhostmd_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,156 @@
++.TH "vhostmd_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "vhostmd" "SELinux Policy documentation for vhostmd"
+.SH "NAME"
-+tor_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the tor processes
++vhostmd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the vhostmd processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the tor processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
-+
-+.SH BOOLEANS
-+SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. tor policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run tor with the tightest access possible.
-+
-+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow tor daemon to bind tcp sockets to all unreserved ports, you must turn on the tor_bind_all_unreserved_ports boolean.
-+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P tor_bind_all_unreserved_ports 1
-+.EE
-+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
-+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the tor_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
-+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
-+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the tor_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
-+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
-+.EE
-+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux tor policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their tor processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for tor:
-+
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the vhostmd processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B tor_etc_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the tor_etc_t type, if you want to store tor files in the /etc directories.
++The vhostmd processes execute with the vhostmd_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B tor_exec_t
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep vhostmd_t
+
-+- Set files with the tor_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the tor_t domain.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/sbin/tor, /usr/bin/tor
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
-+.EX
++The vhostmd_t SELinux type can be entered via the "vhostmd_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the vhostmd_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/sbin/vhostmd
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+.B tor_initrc_exec_t
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux vhostmd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their vhostmd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for vhostmd:
++
++.EX
++.B vhostmd_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
-+- Set files with the tor_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the tor_initrc_t domain.
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux vhostmd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their vhostmd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for vhostmd:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B tor_unit_file_t
++.B vhostmd_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the tor_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as tor unit content.
++- Set files with the vhostmd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the vhostmd_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B tor_var_lib_t
++.B vhostmd_initrc_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the tor_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the tor files under the /var/lib directory.
++- Set files with the vhostmd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the vhostmd_initrc_t domain.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/lib/tor(/.*)?, /var/lib/tor-data(/.*)?
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B tor_var_log_t
++.B vhostmd_tmpfs_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the tor_var_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as tor var log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++- Set files with the vhostmd_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store vhostmd files on a tmpfs file system.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B tor_var_run_t
++.B vhostmd_var_run_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the tor_var_run_t type, if you want to store the tor files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the vhostmd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the vhostmd files under the /run directory.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PORT TYPES
-+SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
-+.PP
-+You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+.B semanage port -l
++The SELinux process type vhostmd_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
-+SELinux tor policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their tor processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following port types are defined for tor:
++.br
++.B vhostmd_tmpfs_t
+
-+.EX
-+.TP 5
-+.B tor_port_t
-+.TP 10
-+.EE
+
++.br
++.B vhostmd_var_run_t
+
-+Default Defined Ports:
-+tcp 6969,9001,9030,9051
-+.EE
++ /var/run/vhostmd.pid
++.br
+
-+.EX
-+.TP 5
-+.B tor_socks_port_t
-+.TP 10
-+.EE
++.br
++.B virt_content_t
++
++ /var/lib/vdsm(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/oz/isos(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/libvirt/boot(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/libvirt/isos(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/VirtualMachines/isos(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/VirtualMachines/isos(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/VirtualMachines/isos(/.*)?
++.br
+
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
-+Default Defined Ports:
-+tcp 9050
-+.EE
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux tor policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their tor processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for tor:
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the vhostmd_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B tor_t
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
++
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the vhostmd_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -54472,123 +101347,187 @@ index 0000000..fee5733
+.B semanage module
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
-+.B semanage port
-+can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
-+
-+.B semanage boolean
-+can also be used to manipulate the booleans
-+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), tor(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-+, setsebool(8)
-\ No newline at end of file
-diff --git a/man/man8/traceroute_selinux.8 b/man/man8/traceroute_selinux.8
++selinux(8), vhostmd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/virsh_selinux.8 b/man/man8/virsh_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..480158c
+index 0000000..595b506
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/traceroute_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,117 @@
-+.TH "traceroute_selinux" "8" "traceroute" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "traceroute SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/virsh_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,186 @@
++.TH "virsh_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "virsh" "SELinux Policy documentation for virsh"
+.SH "NAME"
-+traceroute_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the traceroute processes
++virsh_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the virsh processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the traceroute processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the virsh processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The virsh processes execute with the virsh_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the traceroute_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep virsh_t
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
+
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The virsh_t SELinux type can be entered via the "virsh_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the virsh_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/bin/virt-sandbox-service.*, /usr/bin/virsh
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the traceroute_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux virsh policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their virsh processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for virsh:
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B virsh_ssh_t, virsh_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux traceroute policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their traceroute processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for traceroute:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux virsh policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their virsh processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for virsh:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B traceroute_exec_t
++.B virsh_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the traceroute_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the traceroute_t domain.
++- Set files with the virsh_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the virsh_t domain.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/bin/tracepath.*, /usr/sbin/mtr, /usr/bin/traceroute.*, /usr/bin/nmap, /usr/bin/lft, /bin/traceroute.*, /usr/bin/tracepath.*, /usr/sbin/traceroute.*, /usr/bin/mtr
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PORT TYPES
-+SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
-+.PP
-+You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+.B semanage port -l
++The SELinux process type virsh_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B ssh_home_t
++
++ /root/\.ssh(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/openshift/[^/]+/\.ssh(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/amanda/\.ssh(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/stickshift/[^/]+/\.ssh(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/gitolite/\.ssh(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/nocpulse/\.ssh(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/gitolite3/\.ssh(/.*)?
++.br
++ /root/\.shosts
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.ssh(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.shosts
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.ssh(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.shosts
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.ssh(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.shosts
++.br
++
++.br
++.B svirt_lxc_file_t
++
++
++.br
++.B vhostmd_tmpfs_t
++
++
++.br
++.B virt_etc_rw_t
++
++ /etc/xen/.*/.*
++.br
++ /etc/xen/[^/]*
++.br
++ /etc/libvirt/.*/.*
++.br
++ /etc/libvirt/[^/]*
++.br
++
++.br
++.B virt_etc_t
++
++ /etc/xen/[^/]*
++.br
++ /etc/libvirt/[^/]*
++.br
++ /etc/xen
++.br
++ /etc/libvirt
++.br
++
++.br
++.B virt_image_type
++
++ all virtual image files
++.br
++
++.br
++.B virt_lxc_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/libvirt/lxc(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/libvirt-sandbox(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B xenfs_t
++
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
-+SELinux traceroute policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their traceroute processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following port types are defined for traceroute:
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the virsh_ssh_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.TP 5
-+.B traceroute_port_t
-+.TP 10
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
+
-+
-+Default Defined Ports:
-+udp 64000-64010
-+.EE
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux traceroute policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their traceroute processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for traceroute:
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the virsh_ssh_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B traceroute_t
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -54600,139 +101539,119 @@ index 0000000..480158c
+.B semanage module
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
-+.B semanage port
-+can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
-+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), traceroute(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/tuned_selinux.8 b/man/man8/tuned_selinux.8
++selinux(8), virsh(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/virt_bridgehelper_selinux.8 b/man/man8/virt_bridgehelper_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..fa0b060
+index 0000000..4c6e5e6
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/tuned_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,135 @@
-+.TH "tuned_selinux" "8" "tuned" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "tuned SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/virt_bridgehelper_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,119 @@
++.TH "virt_bridgehelper_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "virt_bridgehelper" "SELinux Policy documentation for virt_bridgehelper"
+.SH "NAME"
-+tuned_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the tuned processes
++virt_bridgehelper_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the virt_bridgehelper processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the tuned processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the virt_bridgehelper processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The virt_bridgehelper processes execute with the virt_bridgehelper_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the tuned_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep virt_bridgehelper_t
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the tuned_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
-+.EE
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++The virt_bridgehelper_t SELinux type can be entered via the "virt_bridgehelper_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the virt_bridgehelper_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/libexec/qemu-bridge-helper
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux tuned policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their tuned processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for tuned:
-+
-+
-+.EX
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux virt_bridgehelper policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their virt_bridgehelper processes in as secure a method as possible.
+.PP
-+.B tuned_etc_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the tuned_etc_t type, if you want to store tuned files in the /etc directories.
-+
++The following process types are defined for virt_bridgehelper:
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B tuned_exec_t
++.B virt_bridgehelper_t
+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the tuned_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the tuned_t domain.
-+
-+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B tuned_initrc_exec_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the tuned_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the tuned_initrc_t domain.
-+
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
-+.EX
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
-+.B tuned_log_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the tuned_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as tuned log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
-+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/log/tuned\.log.*, /var/log/tuned(/.*)?
-+
-+.EX
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+.B tuned_rw_etc_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the tuned_rw_etc_t type, if you want to store tuned rw files in the /etc directories.
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux virt_bridgehelper policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their virt_bridgehelper processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for virt_bridgehelper:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B tuned_var_run_t
++.B virt_bridgehelper_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the tuned_var_run_t type, if you want to store the tuned files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the virt_bridgehelper_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the virt_bridgehelper_t domain.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/run/tuned(/.*)?, /var/run/tuned\.pid
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux tuned policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their tuned processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for tuned:
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+.EX
-+.B tuned_t
-+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++The SELinux process type virt_bridgehelper_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B svirt_home_t
++
++ /home/[^/]*/\.libvirt/qemu(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.cache/libvirt/qemu(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.config/libvirt/qemu(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.local/share/gnome-boxes/images(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.libvirt/qemu(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.cache/libvirt/qemu(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.config/libvirt/qemu(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.local/share/gnome-boxes/images(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.libvirt/qemu(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.cache/libvirt/qemu(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.config/libvirt/qemu(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.local/share/gnome-boxes/images(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -54745,97 +101664,120 @@ index 0000000..fa0b060
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), tuned(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/tvtime_selinux.8 b/man/man8/tvtime_selinux.8
++selinux(8), virt_bridgehelper(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, virt_qemu_ga_selinux(8), virt_qmf_selinux(8), virtd_selinux(8), virtd_lxc_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/virt_qemu_ga_selinux.8 b/man/man8/virt_qemu_ga_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..99e344a
+index 0000000..0419773
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/tvtime_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
-+.TH "tvtime_selinux" "8" "tvtime" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "tvtime SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/virt_qemu_ga_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,119 @@
++.TH "virt_qemu_ga_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "virt_qemu_ga" "SELinux Policy documentation for virt_qemu_ga"
+.SH "NAME"
-+tvtime_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the tvtime processes
++virt_qemu_ga_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the virt_qemu_ga processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the tvtime processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the virt_qemu_ga processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The virt_qemu_ga processes execute with the virt_qemu_ga_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep virt_qemu_ga_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The virt_qemu_ga_t SELinux type can be entered via the "virt_qemu_ga_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the virt_qemu_ga_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/bin/qemu-ga
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux tvtime policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their tvtime processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for tvtime:
-+
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux virt_qemu_ga policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their virt_qemu_ga processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for virt_qemu_ga:
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B tvtime_exec_t
++.B virt_qemu_ga_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
-+- Set files with the tvtime_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the tvtime_t domain.
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux virt_qemu_ga policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their virt_qemu_ga processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for virt_qemu_ga:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B tvtime_home_t
++.B virt_qemu_ga_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the tvtime_home_t type, if you want to store tvtime files in the users home directory.
++- Set files with the virt_qemu_ga_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the virt_qemu_ga_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B tvtime_tmp_t
++.B virt_qemu_ga_log_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the tvtime_tmp_t type, if you want to store tvtime temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++- Set files with the virt_qemu_ga_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as virt qemu ga log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B tvtime_tmpfs_t
++.B virt_qemu_ga_var_run_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the tvtime_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store tvtime files on a tmpfs file system.
++- Set files with the virt_qemu_ga_var_run_t type, if you want to store the virt qemu ga files under the /run directory.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux tvtime policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their tvtime processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for tvtime:
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+.EX
-+.B tvtime_t
-+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++The SELinux process type virt_qemu_ga_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B virt_qemu_ga_log_t
++
++ /var/log/qemu-ga\.log
++.br
++
++.br
++.B virt_qemu_ga_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/qemu-ga\.pid
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -54848,131 +101790,88 @@ index 0000000..99e344a
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), tvtime(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/udev_selinux.8 b/man/man8/udev_selinux.8
++selinux(8), virt_qemu_ga(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, virt_bridgehelper_selinux(8), virt_qmf_selinux(8), virtd_selinux(8), virtd_lxc_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/virt_qmf_selinux.8 b/man/man8/virt_qmf_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..5d64458
+index 0000000..03fd507
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/udev_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
-+.TH "udev_selinux" "8" "udev" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "udev SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/virt_qmf_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
++.TH "virt_qmf_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "virt_qmf" "SELinux Policy documentation for virt_qmf"
+.SH "NAME"
-+udev_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the udev processes
++virt_qmf_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the virt_qmf processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the udev processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the virt_qmf processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The virt_qmf processes execute with the virt_qmf_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the udev_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep virt_qmf_t
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the udev_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
-+.EE
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++The virt_qmf_t SELinux type can be entered via the "virt_qmf_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the virt_qmf_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/sbin/libvirt-qmf
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux udev policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their udev processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for udev:
-+
-+
-+.EX
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux virt_qmf policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their virt_qmf processes in as secure a method as possible.
+.PP
-+.B udev_etc_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the udev_etc_t type, if you want to store udev files in the /etc directories.
-+
++The following process types are defined for virt_qmf:
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B udev_exec_t
++.B virt_qmf_t
+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the udev_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the udev_t domain.
-+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/lib/udev/udevd, /usr/bin/udevinfo, /sbin/udevd, /sbin/udev, /usr/sbin/wait_for_sysfs, /sbin/udevsend, /usr/sbin/udevadm, /usr/bin/udevadm, /usr/sbin/start_udev, /usr/sbin/udev, /usr/sbin/udevsend, /sbin/start_udev, /sbin/udevstart, /bin/udevadm, /sbin/wait_for_sysfs, /lib/udev/udev-acl, /sbin/udevadm, /usr/sbin/udevd, /usr/lib/systemd/systemd-udevd, /usr/sbin/udevstart, /usr/lib/udev/udev-acl, /usr/lib/udev/udevd
-+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B udev_helper_exec_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the udev_helper_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the udev_helper_t domain.
-+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/etc/udev/scripts/.+, /etc/hotplug\.d/default/udev.*, /etc/dev\.d/.+
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
-+.EX
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
-+.B udev_rules_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the udev_rules_t type, if you want to treat the files as udev rules data.
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux virt_qmf policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their virt_qmf processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for virt_qmf:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B udev_var_run_t
++.B virt_qmf_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the udev_var_run_t type, if you want to store the udev files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the virt_qmf_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the virt_qmf_t domain.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/run/udev(/.*)?, /dev/\.udevdb, /var/run/PackageKit/udev(/.*)?, /dev/\.udev(/.*)?, /dev/udev\.tbl, /var/run/libgpod(/.*)?
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux udev policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their udev processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for udev:
-+
-+.EX
-+.B udev_t
-+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -54985,105 +101884,154 @@ index 0000000..5d64458
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), udev(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/ulogd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/ulogd_selinux.8
++selinux(8), virt_qmf(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, virt_bridgehelper_selinux(8), virt_qemu_ga_selinux(8), virtd_selinux(8), virtd_lxc_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/virt_selinux.8 b/man/man8/virt_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..996fdd3
+index 0000000..ee560da
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/ulogd_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,105 @@
-+.TH "ulogd_selinux" "8" "ulogd" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "ulogd SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/virt_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1 @@
++.so man8/virtd_selinux.8
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/virtd_lxc_selinux.8 b/man/man8/virtd_lxc_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..68244d4
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/virtd_lxc_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,145 @@
++.TH "virtd_lxc_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "virtd_lxc" "SELinux Policy documentation for virtd_lxc"
+.SH "NAME"
-+ulogd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the ulogd processes
++virtd_lxc_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the virtd_lxc processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the ulogd processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the virtd_lxc processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The virtd_lxc processes execute with the virtd_lxc_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep virtd_lxc_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The virtd_lxc_t SELinux type can be entered via the "virtd_lxc_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the virtd_lxc_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/libexec/libvirt_lxc
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux virtd_lxc policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their virtd_lxc processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for virtd_lxc:
++
++.EX
++.B virtd_lxc_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux ulogd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ulogd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for ulogd:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux virtd_lxc policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their virtd_lxc processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for virtd_lxc:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B ulogd_etc_t
++.B virtd_lxc_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the ulogd_etc_t type, if you want to store ulogd files in the /etc directories.
++- Set files with the virtd_lxc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the virtd_lxc_t domain.
+
+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B ulogd_exec_t
-+.EE
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
+
-+- Set files with the ulogd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ulogd_t domain.
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
++The SELinux process type virtd_lxc_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B ulogd_initrc_exec_t
-+.EE
++.br
++.B cgroup_t
+
-+- Set files with the ulogd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ulogd_initrc_t domain.
++ /cgroup
++.br
++ /sys/fs/cgroup
++.br
+
++.br
++.B security_t
++
++ /selinux
++.br
++
++.br
++.B svirt_lxc_file_t
++
++
++.br
++.B sysfs_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B ulogd_modules_t
-+.EE
++ /sys(/.*)?
++.br
+
-+- Set files with the ulogd_modules_t type, if you want to treat the files as ulogd modules.
++.br
++.B virt_image_t
+
++ /var/lib/libvirt/images(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/imagefactory/images(/.*)?
++.br
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B ulogd_var_log_t
-+.EE
++.br
++.B virt_lxc_var_run_t
+
-+- Set files with the ulogd_var_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as ulogd var log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++ /var/run/libvirt/lxc(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/libvirt-sandbox(/.*)?
++.br
+
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the virtd_lxc_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux ulogd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ulogd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for ulogd:
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the virtd_lxc_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B ulogd_t
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -55096,457 +102044,611 @@ index 0000000..996fdd3
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), ulogd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/uml_selinux.8 b/man/man8/uml_selinux.8
++selinux(8), virtd_lxc(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, virtd_selinux(8), virtd_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/virtd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/virtd_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..f128c0a
+index 0000000..783d0c9
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/uml_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,121 @@
-+.TH "uml_selinux" "8" "uml" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "uml SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/virtd_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,616 @@
++.TH "virtd_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "virtd" "SELinux Policy documentation for virtd"
+.SH "NAME"
-+uml_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the uml processes
++virtd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the virtd processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the uml processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the virtd processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The virtd processes execute with the virtd_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep virtd_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The virtd_t SELinux type can be entered via the "virtd_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the virtd_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/sbin/libvirtd, /usr/bin/imgfac\.py, /usr/bin/imagefactory, /usr/bin/nova-compute, /usr/sbin/condor_vm-gahp, /usr/bin/vios-proxy-host, /usr/bin/vios-proxy-guest
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux uml policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their uml processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for uml:
-+
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux virtd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their virtd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for virtd:
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B uml_exec_t
++.B virtd_lxc_t, virt_qmf_t, virt_qemu_ga_t, virt_bridgehelper_t, virtd_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
-+- Set files with the uml_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the uml_t domain.
++.SH BOOLEANS
++SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. virtd policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run virtd with the tightest access possible.
+
+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B uml_ro_t
-+.EE
++If you want to allow confined virtual guests to manage device configuration, (pci), you must turn on the virt_use_sysfs boolean.
+
-+- Set files with the uml_ro_t type, if you want to treat the files as uml read/only content.
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P virt_use_sysfs 1
++.EE
+
++.PP
++If you want to allow unprivledged user to create and transition to svirt domains, you must turn on the unprivuser_use_svirt boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B uml_rw_t
++.B setsebool -P unprivuser_use_svirt 1
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the uml_rw_t type, if you want to treat the files as uml read/write content.
-+
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined virtual guests to manage nfs files, you must turn on the virt_use_nfs boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B uml_switch_exec_t
++.B setsebool -P virt_use_nfs 1
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the uml_switch_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the uml_switch_t domain.
-+
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined virtual guests to manage cifs files, you must turn on the virt_use_samba boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B uml_switch_var_run_t
++.B setsebool -P virt_use_samba 1
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the uml_switch_var_run_t type, if you want to store the uml switch files under the /run directory.
-+
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined virtual guests to use usb devices, you must turn on the virt_use_usb boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B uml_tmp_t
++.B setsebool -P virt_use_usb 1
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the uml_tmp_t type, if you want to store uml temporary files in the /tmp directories.
-+
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined virtual guests to use serial/parallel communication ports, you must turn on the virt_use_comm boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B uml_tmpfs_t
++.B setsebool -P virt_use_comm 1
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the uml_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store uml files on a tmpfs file system.
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined virtual guests to interact with the xserver, you must turn on the virt_use_xserver boolean.
+
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P virt_use_xserver 1
++.EE
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
++If you want to allow staff user to create and transition to svirt domains, you must turn on the staff_use_svirt boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P staff_use_svirt 1
++.EE
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux uml policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their uml processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for uml:
++If you want to allow confined virtual guests to read fuse files, you must turn on the virt_use_fusefs boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B uml_switch_t, uml_t
++.B setsebool -P virt_use_fusefs 1
+.EE
++
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++If you want to allow confined virtual guests to use executable memory and executable stack, you must turn on the virt_use_execmem boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P virt_use_execmem 1
++.EE
+
-+.SH "COMMANDS"
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
+.PP
-+.B semanage permissive
-+can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++If you want to allow confined virtual guests to interact with the sanlock, you must turn on the virt_use_sanlock boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P virt_use_sanlock 1
++.EE
++
+.PP
-+.B semanage module
-+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++If you want to allow confined virtual guests to manage device configuration, (pci), you must turn on the virt_use_sysfs boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P virt_use_sysfs 1
++.EE
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
-+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++If you want to allow unprivledged user to create and transition to svirt domains, you must turn on the unprivuser_use_svirt boolean.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P unprivuser_use_svirt 1
++.EE
+
-+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), uml(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/unconfined_selinux.8 b/man/man8/unconfined_selinux.8
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..1f8a4a7
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/unconfined_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,141 @@
-+.TH "unconfined_selinux" "8" "unconfined" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "unconfined SELinux Policy documentation"
-+.SH "NAME"
-+unconfined_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the unconfined processes
-+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined virtual guests to manage nfs files, you must turn on the virt_use_nfs boolean.
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the unconfined processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P virt_use_nfs 1
++.EE
+
-+.SH BOOLEANS
-+SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. unconfined policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run unconfined with the tightest access possible.
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined virtual guests to manage cifs files, you must turn on the virt_use_samba boolean.
+
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P virt_use_samba 1
++.EE
+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow database admins to execute DML statement, you must turn on the sepgsql_unconfined_dbadm boolean.
++If you want to allow confined virtual guests to use usb devices, you must turn on the virt_use_usb boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P sepgsql_unconfined_dbadm 1
++.B setsebool -P virt_use_usb 1
+.EE
+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow unconfined users to transition to the Mozilla plugin domain when running xulrunner plugin-container, you must turn on the unconfined_mozilla_plugin_transition boolean.
++If you want to allow confined virtual guests to use serial/parallel communication ports, you must turn on the virt_use_comm boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P unconfined_mozilla_plugin_transition 1
++.B setsebool -P virt_use_comm 1
+.EE
+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow a user to login as an unconfined domain, you must turn on the unconfined_login boolean.
++If you want to allow confined virtual guests to interact with the xserver, you must turn on the virt_use_xserver boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P unconfined_login 1
++.B setsebool -P virt_use_xserver 1
+.EE
+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow unconfined users to transition to the chrome sandbox domains when running chrome-sandbox, you must turn on the unconfined_chrome_sandbox_transition boolean.
++If you want to allow staff user to create and transition to svirt domains, you must turn on the staff_use_svirt boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P unconfined_chrome_sandbox_transition 1
++.B setsebool -P staff_use_svirt 1
+.EE
+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow samba to run unconfined scripts, you must turn on the samba_run_unconfined boolean.
++If you want to allow confined virtual guests to read fuse files, you must turn on the virt_use_fusefs boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P samba_run_unconfined 1
++.B setsebool -P virt_use_fusefs 1
+.EE
+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow video playing tools to run unconfined, you must turn on the unconfined_mplayer boolean.
++If you want to allow confined virtual guests to use executable memory and executable stack, you must turn on the virt_use_execmem boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P unconfined_mplayer 1
++.B setsebool -P virt_use_execmem 1
+.EE
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined virtual guests to interact with the sanlock, you must turn on the virt_use_sanlock boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P virt_use_sanlock 1
++.EE
+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the unconfined_dbusd_t, unconfined_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++If you want to allow confined virtual guests to manage device configuration, (pci), you must turn on the virt_use_sysfs boolean.
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.B setsebool -P virt_use_sysfs 1
+.EE
+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the unconfined_dbusd_t, unconfined_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++If you want to allow unprivledged user to create and transition to svirt domains, you must turn on the unprivuser_use_svirt boolean.
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B setsebool -P unprivuser_use_svirt 1
+.EE
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++If you want to allow confined virtual guests to manage nfs files, you must turn on the virt_use_nfs boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P virt_use_nfs 1
++.EE
++
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux unconfined policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their unconfined processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for unconfined:
++If you want to allow confined virtual guests to manage cifs files, you must turn on the virt_use_samba boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P virt_use_samba 1
++.EE
+
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined virtual guests to use usb devices, you must turn on the virt_use_usb boolean.
+
+.EX
++.B setsebool -P virt_use_usb 1
++.EE
++
+.PP
-+.B unconfined_exec_t
++If you want to allow confined virtual guests to use serial/parallel communication ports, you must turn on the virt_use_comm boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P virt_use_comm 1
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the unconfined_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the unconfined_t domain.
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined virtual guests to interact with the xserver, you must turn on the virt_use_xserver boolean.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/sbin/xrdp, /usr/sbin/xrdp-sesman, /usr/bin/vncserver
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P virt_use_xserver 1
++.EE
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
++If you want to allow staff user to create and transition to svirt domains, you must turn on the staff_use_svirt boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P staff_use_svirt 1
++.EE
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++If you want to allow confined virtual guests to read fuse files, you must turn on the virt_use_fusefs boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P virt_use_fusefs 1
++.EE
++
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux unconfined policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their unconfined processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for unconfined:
++If you want to allow confined virtual guests to use executable memory and executable stack, you must turn on the virt_use_execmem boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B unconfined_cronjob_t, unconfined_dbusd_t, unconfined_t
++.B setsebool -P virt_use_execmem 1
+.EE
++
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++If you want to allow confined virtual guests to interact with the sanlock, you must turn on the virt_use_sanlock boolean.
+
-+.SH "COMMANDS"
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P virt_use_sanlock 1
++.EE
++
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
-+.B semanage permissive
-+can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+.B semanage module
-+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux virtd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their virtd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for virtd:
+
-+.B semanage boolean
-+can also be used to manipulate the booleans
+
++.EX
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
-+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++.B virtd_exec_t
++.EE
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++- Set files with the virtd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the virtd_t domain.
+
-+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), unconfined(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-+, setsebool(8)
-\ No newline at end of file
-diff --git a/man/man8/update_selinux.8 b/man/man8/update_selinux.8
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..709a167
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/update_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
-+.TH "update_selinux" "8" "update" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "update SELinux Policy documentation"
-+.SH "NAME"
-+update_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the update processes
-+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the update processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++.EX
++.PP
++.B virtd_initrc_exec_t
++.EE
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++- Set files with the virtd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the virtd_initrc_t domain.
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++
++.EX
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux update policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their update processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for update:
++.B virtd_keytab_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the virtd_keytab_t type, if you want to treat the files as kerberos keytab files.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B update_modules_exec_t
++.B virtd_lxc_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the update_modules_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the update_modules_t domain.
++- Set files with the virtd_lxc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the virtd_lxc_t domain.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/sbin/modules-update, /sbin/modules-update, /sbin/generate-modprobe\.conf, /sbin/update-modules, /usr/sbin/generate-modprobe\.conf, /usr/sbin/update-modules
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B update_modules_tmp_t
++.B virtd_unit_file_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the update_modules_tmp_t type, if you want to store update modules temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++- Set files with the virtd_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as virtd unit content.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.SH PORT TYPES
++SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
++
++.B semanage port -l
++
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux update policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their update processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for update:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
++SELinux virtd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their virtd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following port types are defined for virtd:
+
+.EX
-+.B update_modules_t
++.TP 5
++.B virt_migration_port_t
++.TP 10
+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
-+.SH "COMMANDS"
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
-+.PP
-+.B semanage permissive
-+can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
-+.PP
-+.B semanage module
-+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
-+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
-+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++Default Defined Ports:
++tcp 49152-49216
++.EE
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.EX
++.TP 5
++.B virt_port_t
++.TP 10
++.EE
+
-+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), update(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/updfstab_selinux.8 b/man/man8/updfstab_selinux.8
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..fea0af1
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/updfstab_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
-+.TH "updfstab_selinux" "8" "updfstab" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "updfstab SELinux Policy documentation"
-+.SH "NAME"
-+updfstab_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the updfstab processes
-+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the updfstab processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Default Defined Ports:
++tcp 16509,16514
++.EE
++udp 16509,16514
++.EE
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The SELinux process type virtd_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the updfstab_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++.br
++.B anon_inodefs_t
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the updfstab_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++.br
++.B cgroup_t
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
-+.EE
++ /cgroup
++.br
++ /sys/fs/cgroup
++.br
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux updfstab policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their updfstab processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for updfstab:
++.br
++.B dnsmasq_var_run_t
+
++ /var/run/libvirt/network(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/dnsmasq\.pid
++.br
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B updfstab_exec_t
-+.EE
++.br
++.B hugetlbfs_t
+
-+- Set files with the updfstab_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the updfstab_t domain.
++ /dev/hugepages
++.br
++ /lib/udev/devices/hugepages
++.br
++ /usr/lib/udev/devices/hugepages
++.br
+
+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/sbin/updfstab, /usr/sbin/fstab-sync
++.B modules_conf_t
+
-+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
++ /etc/modprobe\.d(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/modules\.conf.*
++.br
++ /etc/modprobe\.conf.*
++.br
++ /lib/modules/modprobe\.conf
++.br
++ /usr/lib/modules/modprobe\.conf
++.br
++
++.br
++.B mtrr_device_t
++
++ /dev/cpu/mtrr
++.br
++
++.br
++.B qemu_var_run_t
++
++ /var/lib/libvirt/qemu(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/libvirt/qemu(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B security_t
++
++ /selinux
++.br
++
++.br
++.B sysfs_t
++
++ /sys(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B system_conf_t
++
++ /etc/sysctl\.conf(\.old)?
++.br
++ /etc/sysconfig/ip6?tables.*
++.br
++ /etc/sysconfig/ipvsadm.*
++.br
++ /etc/sysconfig/ebtables.*
++.br
++ /etc/sysconfig/system-config-firewall.*
++.br
++
++.br
++.B systemd_passwd_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/systemd/ask-password(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/systemd/ask-password-block(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B virt_cache_t
++
++ /var/cache/oz(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/cache/libvirt(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B virt_etc_rw_t
++
++ /etc/xen/.*/.*
++.br
++ /etc/xen/[^/]*
++.br
++ /etc/libvirt/.*/.*
++.br
++ /etc/libvirt/[^/]*
++.br
++
++.br
++.B virt_home_t
++
++ /home/[^/]*/\.libvirt(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.virtinst(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.cache/libvirt(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.config/libvirt(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/VirtualMachines(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.cache/gnome-boxes(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.libvirt(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.virtinst(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.cache/libvirt(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.config/libvirt(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/VirtualMachines(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.cache/gnome-boxes(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.libvirt(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.virtinst(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.cache/libvirt(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.config/libvirt(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/VirtualMachines(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.cache/gnome-boxes(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B virt_image_type
++
++ all virtual image files
++.br
++
++.br
++.B virt_lock_t
++
++
++.br
++.B virt_log_t
++
++ /var/log/log(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/log/vdsm(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/log/libvirt(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B virt_lxc_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/libvirt/lxc(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/libvirt-sandbox(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B virt_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B virt_var_lib_t
++
++ /var/lib/oz(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/libvirt(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B virt_var_run_t
++
++ /var/vdsm(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/vdsm(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/libvirt(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux updfstab policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their updfstab processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for updfstab:
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the virtd_t, virtd_lxc_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B updfstab_t
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
++
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the virtd_t, virtd_lxc_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -55558,92 +102660,139 @@ index 0000000..fea0af1
+.B semanage module
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
++.B semanage port
++can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
++
++.B semanage boolean
++can also be used to manipulate the booleans
++
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), updfstab(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/updpwd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/updpwd_selinux.8
++selinux(8), virtd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, setsebool(8), virt_bridgehelper_selinux(8), virt_qemu_ga_selinux(8), virt_qmf_selinux(8), virtd_lxc_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/vlock_selinux.8 b/man/man8/vlock_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..48588e9
+index 0000000..372dfc6
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/updpwd_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
-+.TH "updpwd_selinux" "8" "updpwd" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "updpwd SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/vlock_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,130 @@
++.TH "vlock_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "vlock" "SELinux Policy documentation for vlock"
+.SH "NAME"
-+updpwd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the updpwd processes
++vlock_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the vlock processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the updpwd processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the vlock processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The vlock processes execute with the vlock_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the updpwd_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep vlock_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The vlock_t SELinux type can be entered via the "vlock_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the vlock_t domain are the following:"
+
++/usr/sbin/vlock-main
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the updpwd_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux vlock policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their vlock processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for vlock:
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B vlock_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux updpwd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their updpwd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for updpwd:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux vlock policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their vlock processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for vlock:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B updpwd_exec_t
++.B vlock_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the updpwd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the updpwd_t domain.
++- Set files with the vlock_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the vlock_t domain.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/sbin/unix_update, /usr/sbin/unix_update
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type vlock_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B faillog_t
++
++ /var/log/btmp.*
++.br
++ /var/run/faillock(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/log/faillog
++.br
++ /var/log/tallylog
++.br
++
++.br
++.B pcscd_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/pcscd(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/pcscd\.events(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/pcscd\.pid
++.br
++ /var/run/pcscd\.pub
++.br
++ /var/run/pcscd\.comm
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux updpwd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their updpwd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for updpwd:
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the vlock_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B updpwd_t
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
++
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the vlock_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -55656,77 +102805,138 @@ index 0000000..48588e9
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), updpwd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/usbmodules_selinux.8 b/man/man8/usbmodules_selinux.8
++selinux(8), vlock(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/vmware_host_selinux.8 b/man/man8/vmware_host_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..7a8990c
+index 0000000..2dd2f97
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/usbmodules_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
-+.TH "usbmodules_selinux" "8" "usbmodules" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "usbmodules SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/vmware_host_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,139 @@
++.TH "vmware_host_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "vmware_host" "SELinux Policy documentation for vmware_host"
+.SH "NAME"
-+usbmodules_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the usbmodules processes
++vmware_host_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the vmware_host processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the usbmodules processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the vmware_host processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The vmware_host processes execute with the vmware_host_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep vmware_host_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The vmware_host_t SELinux type can be entered via the "vmware_host_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the vmware_host_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/sbin/vmware-guest.*, /usr/lib/vmware-tools/sbin32/vmware.*, /usr/lib/vmware-tools/sbin64/vmware.*, /usr/bin/vmnet-natd, /usr/bin/vmware-vmx, /usr/bin/vmnet-dhcpd, /usr/bin/vmware-nmbd, /usr/bin/vmware-smbd, /usr/bin/vmnet-bridge, /usr/bin/vmnet-netifup, /usr/bin/vmnet-sniffer, /usr/bin/vmware-network, /usr/bin/vmware-smbpasswd, /usr/bin/vmware-smbpasswd\.bin, /usr/lib/vmware/bin/vmware-vmx
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux vmware_host policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their vmware_host processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for vmware_host:
++
++.EX
++.B vmware_host_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux usbmodules policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their usbmodules processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for usbmodules:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux vmware_host policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their vmware_host processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for vmware_host:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B usbmodules_exec_t
++.B vmware_host_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the usbmodules_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the usbmodules_t domain.
++- Set files with the vmware_host_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the vmware_host_t domain.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/sbin/usbmodules, /sbin/usbmodules
+
++.EX
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
++.B vmware_host_pid_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the vmware_host_pid_t type, if you want to store the vmware host files under the /run directory.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux usbmodules policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their usbmodules processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for usbmodules:
+
+.EX
-+.B usbmodules_t
++.PP
++.B vmware_host_tmp_t
+.EE
++
++- Set files with the vmware_host_tmp_t type, if you want to store vmware host temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++
++
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type vmware_host_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B systemd_passwd_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/systemd/ask-password(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/systemd/ask-password-block(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B vmware_host_pid_t
++
++
++.br
++.B vmware_host_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B vmware_log_t
++
++ /var/log/vmware.*
++.br
++ /var/log/vnetlib.*
++.br
++
++.br
++.B vmware_sys_conf_t
++
++ /etc/vmware.*(/.*)?
++.br
++ /usr/lib/vmware/config
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -55739,392 +102949,496 @@ index 0000000..7a8990c
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), usbmodules(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/usbmuxd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/usbmuxd_selinux.8
++selinux(8), vmware_host(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, vmware_selinux(8), vmware_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/vmware_selinux.8 b/man/man8/vmware_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..2e76cd8
+index 0000000..de1de63
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/usbmuxd_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
-+.TH "usbmuxd_selinux" "8" "usbmuxd" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "usbmuxd SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/vmware_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,241 @@
++.TH "vmware_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "vmware" "SELinux Policy documentation for vmware"
+.SH "NAME"
-+usbmuxd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the usbmuxd processes
++vmware_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the vmware processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the usbmuxd processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the vmware processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The vmware processes execute with the vmware_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the usbmuxd_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep vmware_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
++The vmware_t SELinux type can be entered via the "vmware_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the vmware_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/bin/vmware, /usr/bin/vmware-ping, /usr/bin/vmware-wizard, /usr/sbin/vmware-serverd, /usr/lib/vmware/bin/vmplayer, /usr/lib/vmware/bin/vmware-ui, /usr/lib/vmware/bin/vmware-mks
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the usbmuxd_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux vmware policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their vmware processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for vmware:
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B vmware_t, vmware_host_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux usbmuxd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their usbmuxd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for usbmuxd:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux vmware policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their vmware processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for vmware:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B usbmuxd_exec_t
++.B vmware_conf_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the usbmuxd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the usbmuxd_t domain.
++- Set files with the vmware_conf_t type, if you want to treat the files as vmware configuration data, usually stored under the /etc directory.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B usbmuxd_var_run_t
++.B vmware_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the usbmuxd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the usbmuxd files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the vmware_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the vmware_t domain.
+
+
++.EX
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
++.B vmware_file_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the vmware_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as vmware content.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux usbmuxd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their usbmuxd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for usbmuxd:
+
+.EX
-+.B usbmuxd_t
-+.EE
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++.B vmware_host_exec_t
++.EE
+
-+.SH "COMMANDS"
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
-+.PP
-+.B semanage permissive
-+can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
-+.PP
-+.B semanage module
-+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++- Set files with the vmware_host_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the vmware_host_t domain.
+
-+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
-+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.EX
++.PP
++.B vmware_host_pid_t
++.EE
+
-+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), usbmuxd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/user_selinux.8 b/man/man8/user_selinux.8
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..a2082e9
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/user_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,194 @@
-+.TH "user_selinux" "8" "user" "mgrepl at redhat.com" "user SELinux Policy documentation"
-+.SH "NAME"
-+user_u \- \fBGeneric unprivileged user role\fP - Security Enhanced Linux Policy
++- Set files with the vmware_host_pid_t type, if you want to store the vmware host files under the /run directory.
+
-+.SH DESCRIPTION
+
-+\fBuser_u\fP is an SELinux User defined in the SELinux
-+policy. SELinux users have default roles, \fBuser_r\fP. The
-+default role has a default type, \fBuser_t\fP, associated with it.
++.EX
++.PP
++.B vmware_host_tmp_t
++.EE
+
-+The SELinux user will usually login to a system with a context that looks like:
++- Set files with the vmware_host_tmp_t type, if you want to store vmware host temporary files in the /tmp directories.
+
-+.B user_u:user_r:user_u:s0-s0:c0.c1023
+
-+Linux users are automatically assigned an SELinux users at login.
-+Login programs use the SELinux User to assign initial context to the user's shell.
++.EX
++.PP
++.B vmware_log_t
++.EE
+
-+SELinux policy uses the context to control the user's access.
++- Set files with the vmware_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as vmware log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
+
-+By default all users are assigned to the SELinux user via the \fB__default__\fP flag
+
-+On Targeted policy systems the \fB__default__\fP user is assigned to the \fBunconfined_u\fP SELinux user.
++.EX
++.PP
++.B vmware_pid_t
++.EE
+
-+You can list all Linux User to SELinux user mapping using:
++- Set files with the vmware_pid_t type, if you want to store the vmware files under the /run directory.
+
-+.B semanage login -l
+
-+If you wanted to change the default user mapping to use the user_u user, you would execute:
++.EX
++.PP
++.B vmware_sys_conf_t
++.EE
+
-+.B semanage login -m -s user_u __default__
++- Set files with the vmware_sys_conf_t type, if you want to treat the files as vmware sys configuration data, usually stored under the /etc directory.
+
+
-+If you want to map the one Linux user (joe) to the SELinux user user, you would execute:
++.EX
++.PP
++.B vmware_tmp_t
++.EE
+
-+.B $ semanage login -a -s user_u joe
++- Set files with the vmware_tmp_t type, if you want to store vmware temporary files in the /tmp directories.
+
+
-+.SH USER DESCRIPTION
++.EX
++.PP
++.B vmware_tmpfs_t
++.EE
+
-+The SELinux user user_u is defined in policy as a unprivileged user. SELinux prevents unprivileged users from doing administration tasks without transitioning to a different role.
++- Set files with the vmware_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store vmware files on a tmpfs file system.
+
-+.SH SUDO
+
-+The SELinux type user_t is not allowed to execute sudo.
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH X WINDOWS LOGIN
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+The SELinux user user_u is able to X Windows login.
++The SELinux process type vmware_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
-+.SH TERMINAL LOGIN
++.br
++.B usbfs_t
+
-+The SELinux user user_u is able to terminal login.
+
-+.SH NETWORK
++.br
++.B user_fonts_cache_t
+
-+.TP
-+The SELinux user user_u is able to listen on the following tcp ports.
++ /root/\.fontconfig(/.*)?
++.br
++ /root/\.fonts/auto(/.*)?
++.br
++ /root/\.fonts\.cache-.*
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.fontconfig(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.fonts/auto(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.fonts\.cache-.*
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.fontconfig(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.fonts/auto(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.fonts\.cache-.*
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.fontconfig(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.fonts/auto(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.fonts\.cache-.*
++.br
+
-+.B xserver_port_t: 6000-6020
++.br
++.B vmware_conf_t
+
-+.TP
-+The SELinux user user_u is able to listen on the following udp ports.
++ /home/[^/]*/\.vmware[^/]*/.*\.cfg
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.vmware[^/]*/.*\.cfg
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.vmware[^/]*/.*\.cfg
++.br
+
-+.B all ports with out defined types
++.br
++.B vmware_file_t
+
-+.TP
-+The SELinux user user_u is able to connect to the following tcp ports.
++ /home/[^/]*/vmware(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.vmware(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/vmware(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.vmware(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/vmware(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.vmware(/.*)?
++.br
+
-+.B all ports
++.br
++.B vmware_pid_t
+
-+.SH BOOLEANS
-+SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. user_t policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run user_t with the tightest access possible.
+
++.br
++.B vmware_tmp_t
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to connect to the local mysql server, you must turn on the allow_user_mysql_connect boolean.
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P allow_user_mysql_connect 1
-+.EE
++.br
++.B vmware_tmpfs_t
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to control users use of ping and traceroute, you must turn on the user_ping boolean.
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P user_ping 1
-+.EE
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
+.PP
-+If you want to allow w to display everyone, you must turn on the user_ttyfile_stat boolean.
-+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P user_ttyfile_stat 1
-+.EE
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow user music sharing, you must turn on the user_share_music boolean.
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P user_share_music 1
-+.EE
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow regular users direct dri device access, you must turn on the user_direct_dri boolean.
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), vmware(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, vmware_host_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/vnstat_selinux.8 b/man/man8/vnstat_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..2139a86
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/vnstat_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,121 @@
++.TH "vnstat_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "vnstat" "SELinux Policy documentation for vnstat"
++.SH "NAME"
++vnstat_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the vnstat processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P user_direct_dri 1
-+.EE
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the vnstat processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow user to r/w files on filesystems that do not have extended attributes (FAT, CDROM, FLOPPY), you must turn on the user_rw_noexattrfile boolean.
++The vnstat processes execute with the vnstat_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P user_rw_noexattrfile 1
-+.EE
++For example:
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to run TCP servers (bind to ports and accept connection from the same domain and outside users) disabling this forces FTP passive mode and may change other protocols, you must turn on the user_tcp_server boolean.
++.B ps -eZ | grep vnstat_t
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P user_tcp_server 1
-+.EE
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow regular users direct mouse access, you must turn on the user_direct_mouse boolean.
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P user_direct_mouse 1
-+.EE
++The vnstat_t SELinux type can be entered via the "vnstat_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the vnstat_t domain are the following:"
+
++/usr/bin/vnstat
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux vnstat policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their vnstat processes in as secure a method as possible.
+.PP
-+If you want to allow user processes to change their priority, you must turn on the user_setrlimit boolean.
++The following process types are defined for vnstat:
+
+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P user_setrlimit 1
++.B vnstat_t, vnstatd_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux vnstat policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their vnstat processes in as secure a method as possible.
+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to connect to PostgreSQL, you must turn on the allow_user_postgresql_connect boolean.
++The following file types are defined for vnstat:
++
+
+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P allow_user_postgresql_connect 1
++.PP
++.B vnstat_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to read system messages, you must turn on the user_dmesg boolean.
++- Set files with the vnstat_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the vnstat_t domain.
++
+
+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P user_dmesg 1
++.PP
++.B vnstatd_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+.SH HOME_EXEC
++- Set files with the vnstatd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the vnstatd_t domain.
+
-+The SELinux user user_u is able execute home content files.
+
-+.SH TRANSITIONS
++.EX
++.PP
++.B vnstatd_var_lib_t
++.EE
+
-+Three things can happen when user_t attempts to execute a program.
++- Set files with the vnstatd_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the vnstatd files under the /var/lib directory.
+
-+\fB1.\fP SELinux Policy can deny user_t from executing the program.
+
-+.TP
++.EX
++.PP
++.B vnstatd_var_run_t
++.EE
+
-+\fB2.\fP SELinux Policy can allow user_t to execute the program in the current user type.
++- Set files with the vnstatd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the vnstatd files under the /run directory.
+
-+Execute the following to see the types that the SELinux user user_t can execute without transitioning:
+
-+.B sesearch -A -s user_t -c file -p execute_no_trans
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
+
-+.TP
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+\fB3.\fP SELinux can allow user_t to execute the program and transition to a new type.
++The SELinux process type vnstat_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
-+Execute the following to see the types that the SELinux user user_t can execute and transition:
++.br
++.B vnstatd_var_lib_t
+
-+.B $ sesearch -A -s user_t -c process -p transition
++ /var/lib/vnstat(/.*)?
++.br
+
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
-+.B semanage login
-+can also be used to manipulate the Linux User to SELinux User mappings
-+
-+.B semanage user
-+can also be used to manipulate SELinux user definitions.
-+
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genuserman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), semanage(8).
-diff --git a/man/man8/useradd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/useradd_selinux.8
++selinux(8), vnstat(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, vnstatd_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/vnstatd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/vnstatd_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..6e4f849
+index 0000000..548eb69
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/useradd_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
-+.TH "useradd_selinux" "8" "useradd" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "useradd SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/vnstatd_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,119 @@
++.TH "vnstatd_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "vnstatd" "SELinux Policy documentation for vnstatd"
+.SH "NAME"
-+useradd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the useradd processes
++vnstatd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the vnstatd processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the useradd processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the vnstatd processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The vnstatd processes execute with the vnstatd_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the useradd_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep vnstatd_t
+
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The vnstatd_t SELinux type can be entered via the "vnstatd_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the vnstatd_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/sbin/vnstatd
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the useradd_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux vnstatd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their vnstatd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for vnstatd:
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B vnstat_t, vnstatd_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux useradd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their useradd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for useradd:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux vnstatd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their vnstatd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for vnstatd:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B useradd_exec_t
++.B vnstatd_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the useradd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the useradd_t domain.
++- Set files with the vnstatd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the vnstatd_t domain.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/sbin/useradd, /usr/sbin/usermod, /usr/sbin/userdel, /usr/sbin/newusers
+
++.EX
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
++.B vnstatd_var_lib_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the vnstatd_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the vnstatd files under the /var/lib directory.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux useradd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their useradd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for useradd:
+
+.EX
-+.B useradd_t
++.PP
++.B vnstatd_var_run_t
+.EE
++
++- Set files with the vnstatd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the vnstatd files under the /run directory.
++
++
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type vnstatd_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B vnstatd_var_lib_t
++
++ /var/lib/vnstat(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B vnstatd_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/vnstat\.pid
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -56137,87 +103451,158 @@ index 0000000..6e4f849
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), useradd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/usernetctl_selinux.8 b/man/man8/usernetctl_selinux.8
++selinux(8), vnstatd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, vnstat_selinux(8), vnstat_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/vpnc_selinux.8 b/man/man8/vpnc_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..8d70cce
+index 0000000..d20c0f1
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/usernetctl_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
-+.TH "usernetctl_selinux" "8" "usernetctl" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "usernetctl SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/vpnc_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,156 @@
++.TH "vpnc_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "vpnc" "SELinux Policy documentation for vpnc"
+.SH "NAME"
-+usernetctl_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the usernetctl processes
++vpnc_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the vpnc processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the usernetctl processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the vpnc processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The vpnc processes execute with the vpnc_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the usernetctl_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep vpnc_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
++The vpnc_t SELinux type can be entered via the "vpnc_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the vpnc_t domain are the following:"
++
++/sbin/vpnc, /usr/sbin/vpnc, /usr/bin/openconnect
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the usernetctl_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux vpnc policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their vpnc processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for vpnc:
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B vpnc_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux usernetctl policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their usernetctl processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for usernetctl:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux vpnc policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their vpnc processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for vpnc:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B usernetctl_exec_t
++.B vpnc_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the usernetctl_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the usernetctl_t domain.
++- Set files with the vpnc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the vpnc_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B vpnc_tmp_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the vpnc_tmp_t type, if you want to store vpnc temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B vpnc_var_run_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the vpnc_var_run_t type, if you want to store the vpnc files under the /run directory.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type vpnc_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B net_conf_t
++
++ /etc/ntpd?\.conf.*
++.br
++ /etc/hosts[^/]*
++.br
++ /etc/yp\.conf.*
++.br
++ /etc/denyhosts.*
++.br
++ /etc/hosts\.deny.*
++.br
++ /etc/resolv\.conf.*
++.br
++ /etc/ntp/step-tickers.*
++.br
++ /etc/sysconfig/networking(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/sysconfig/network-scripts(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/sysconfig/network-scripts/.*resolv\.conf
++.br
++ /etc/ethers
++.br
++
++.br
++.B vpnc_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B vpnc_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/vpnc(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux usernetctl policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their usernetctl processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for usernetctl:
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the vpnc_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B usernetctl_t
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
++
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the vpnc_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -56230,87 +103615,138 @@ index 0000000..8d70cce
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), usernetctl(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/utempter_selinux.8 b/man/man8/utempter_selinux.8
++selinux(8), vpnc(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/wdmd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/wdmd_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..1016d5f
+index 0000000..347d6d8
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/utempter_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
-+.TH "utempter_selinux" "8" "utempter" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "utempter SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/wdmd_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,138 @@
++.TH "wdmd_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "wdmd" "SELinux Policy documentation for wdmd"
+.SH "NAME"
-+utempter_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the utempter processes
++wdmd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the wdmd processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the utempter processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the wdmd processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The wdmd processes execute with the wdmd_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep wdmd_t
+
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The wdmd_t SELinux type can be entered via the "wdmd_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the wdmd_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/sbin/wdmd
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the utempter_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux wdmd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their wdmd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for wdmd:
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.B wdmd_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the utempter_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux wdmd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their wdmd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for wdmd:
++
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.PP
++.B wdmd_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++- Set files with the wdmd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the wdmd_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.B wdmd_initrc_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the wdmd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the wdmd_initrc_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux utempter policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their utempter processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for utempter:
++.B wdmd_tmpfs_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the wdmd_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store wdmd files on a tmpfs file system.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B utempter_exec_t
++.B wdmd_var_run_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the utempter_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the utempter_t domain.
++- Set files with the wdmd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the wdmd files under the /run directory.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type wdmd_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B wdmd_tmpfs_t
++
++
++.br
++.B wdmd_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/wdmd(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux utempter policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their utempter processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for utempter:
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the wdmd_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B utempter_t
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
++
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the wdmd_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -56323,170 +103759,251 @@ index 0000000..1016d5f
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), utempter(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/uucpd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/uucpd_selinux.8
++selinux(8), wdmd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/webadm_selinux.8 b/man/man8/webadm_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..7f7f531
+index 0000000..46d2721
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/uucpd_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,173 @@
-+.TH "uucpd_selinux" "8" "uucpd" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "uucpd SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/webadm_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,255 @@
++.TH "webadm_selinux" "8" "webadm" "mgrepl at redhat.com" "webadm SELinux Policy documentation"
+.SH "NAME"
-+uucpd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the uucpd processes
-+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++webadm_r \- \fBWeb administrator role\fP - Security Enhanced Linux Policy
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the uucpd processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++.SH DESCRIPTION
++
++SELinux supports Roles Based Access Control (RBAC), some Linux roles are login roles, while other roles need to be transition into.
++
++.I Note:
++Examples in this man page will use the
++.B staff_u
++SELinux user.
++
++Non login roles are usually used for administrative tasks. For example, tasks that require root privileges. Roles control which types a user can run processes with. Roles often have default types assigned to them.
++
++The default type for the webadm_r role is webadm_t.
++
++The
++.B newrole
++program to transition directly to this role.
++
++.B newrole -r webadm_r -t webadm_t
++
++.B sudo
++is the preferred method to do transition from one role to another. You setup sudo to transition to webadm_r by adding a similar line to the /etc/sudoers file.
++
++USERNAME ALL=(ALL) ROLE=webadm_r TYPE=webadm_t COMMAND
++
++.br
++sudo will run COMMAND as staff_u:webadm_r:webadm_t:LEVEL
++
++When using a a non login role, you need to setup SELinux so that your SELinux user can reach webadm_r role.
++
++Execute the following to see all of the assigned SELinux roles:
++
++.B semanage user -l
++
++You need to add webadm_r to the staff_u user. You could setup the staff_u user to be able to use the webadm_r role with a command like:
++
++.B $ semanage user -m -R 'staff_r system_r webadm_r' staff_u
++
++
++.SH BOOLEANS
++SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. webadm policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run webadm with the tightest access possible.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the uucpd_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++If you want to allow webadm to manage files in users home directories, you must turn on the webadm_manage_user_files boolean.
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.B setsebool -P webadm_manage_user_files 1
+.EE
+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the uucpd_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++If you want to allow webadm to read files in users home directories, you must turn on the webadm_read_user_files boolean.
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B setsebool -P webadm_read_user_files 1
+.EE
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux uucpd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their uucpd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for uucpd:
-+
++If you want to allow webadm to manage files in users home directories, you must turn on the webadm_manage_user_files boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B uucpd_exec_t
++.B setsebool -P webadm_manage_user_files 1
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the uucpd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the uucpd_t domain.
-+
++.PP
++If you want to allow webadm to read files in users home directories, you must turn on the webadm_read_user_files boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B uucpd_lock_t
++.B setsebool -P webadm_read_user_files 1
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the uucpd_lock_t type, if you want to treat the files as uucpd lock data, stored under the /var/lock directory
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
++The SELinux process type webadm_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B uucpd_log_t
-+.EE
++.br
++.B httpd_config_t
+
-+- Set files with the uucpd_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as uucpd log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++ /etc/httpd(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/apache(2)?(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/cherokee(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/lighttpd(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/apache-ssl(2)?(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/openshift/.httpd.d(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/stickshift/.httpd.d(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/vhosts
++.br
+
++.br
++.B httpd_lock_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B uucpd_ro_t
-+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the uucpd_ro_t type, if you want to treat the files as uucpd read/only content.
++.br
++.B httpd_log_t
++
++ /var/www(/.*)?/logs(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/log/cacti(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/log/httpd(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/log/apache(2)?(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/log/cherokee(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/log/lighttpd(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/log/suphp\.log.*
++.br
++ /var/log/apache-ssl(2)?(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/log/cgiwrap\.log.*
++.br
++ /var/www/stickshift/[^/]*/log(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/log/roundcubemail(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/log/dirsrv/admin-serv(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/httpd/logs
++.br
+
++.br
++.B httpd_modules_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B uucpd_rw_t
-+.EE
++ /usr/lib/httpd(/.*)?
++.br
++ /usr/lib/apache(/.*)?
++.br
++ /usr/lib/cherokee(/.*)?
++.br
++ /usr/lib/lighttpd(/.*)?
++.br
++ /usr/lib/apache2/modules(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/httpd/modules
++.br
+
-+- Set files with the uucpd_rw_t type, if you want to treat the files as uucpd read/write content.
++.br
++.B httpd_php_tmp_t
+
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B uucpd_spool_t
-+.EE
++.br
++.B httpd_script_exec_type
+
-+- Set files with the uucpd_spool_t type, if you want to store the uucpd files under the /var/spool directory.
+
+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/spool/uucppublic(/.*)?, /var/spool/uucp(/.*)?
++.B httpd_suexec_tmp_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B uucpd_tmp_t
-+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the uucpd_tmp_t type, if you want to store uucpd temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++.br
++.B httpd_tmp_t
+
++ /var/run/user/apache(/.*)?
++.br
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B uucpd_var_run_t
-+.EE
++.br
++.B httpd_unit_file_t
+
-+- Set files with the uucpd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the uucpd files under the /run directory.
++ /usr/lib/systemd/system/httpd.*
++.br
++ /usr/lib/systemd/system/jetty.*
++.br
+
++.br
++.B httpd_var_run_t
+
-+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
++ /var/run/mod_.*
++.br
++ /var/run/wsgi.*
++.br
++ /var/run/httpd.*
++.br
++ /var/run/apache.*
++.br
++ /var/run/lighttpd(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/php/session(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/dirsrv/admin-serv.*
++.br
++ /opt/dirsrv/var/run/dirsrv/dsgw/cookies(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/gcache_port
++.br
++ /var/run/cherokee\.pid
++.br
+
-+.SH PORT TYPES
-+SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
-+.PP
-+You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
++.br
++.B httpdcontent
+
-+.B semanage port -l
+
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
-+SELinux uucpd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their uucpd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following port types are defined for uucpd:
++.br
++.B public_content_rw_t
+
-+.EX
-+.TP 5
-+.B uucpd_port_t
-+.TP 10
-+.EE
++ /var/spool/abrt-upload(/.*)?
++.br
+
++.br
++.B systemd_passwd_var_run_t
+
-+Default Defined Ports:
-+tcp 540
-+.EE
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux uucpd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their uucpd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for uucpd:
++ /var/run/systemd/ask-password(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/systemd/ask-password-block(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B var_lock_t
++
++ /var/lock(/.*)?
++.br
++ /run/lock(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lock
++.br
++
++.br
++.B webadm_tmp_t
+
-+.EX
-+.B uucpd_t
-+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -56498,101 +104015,204 @@ index 0000000..7f7f531
+.B semanage module
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
-+.B semanage port
-+can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
++.B semanage boolean
++can also be used to manipulate the booleans
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), uucpd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/uuidd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/uuidd_selinux.8
++selinux(8), webadm(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, setsebool(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/webalizer_selinux.8 b/man/man8/webalizer_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..6a802e0
+index 0000000..c971659
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/uuidd_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
-+.TH "uuidd_selinux" "8" "uuidd" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "uuidd SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/webalizer_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,198 @@
++.TH "webalizer_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "webalizer" "SELinux Policy documentation for webalizer"
+.SH "NAME"
-+uuidd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the uuidd processes
++webalizer_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the webalizer processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the uuidd processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the webalizer processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The webalizer processes execute with the webalizer_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep webalizer_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The webalizer_t SELinux type can be entered via the "webalizer_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the webalizer_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/bin/awffull, /usr/bin/webalizer
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux webalizer policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their webalizer processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for webalizer:
++
++.EX
++.B webalizer_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux uuidd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their uuidd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for uuidd:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux webalizer policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their webalizer processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for webalizer:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B uuidd_exec_t
++.B webalizer_etc_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the uuidd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the uuidd_t domain.
++- Set files with the webalizer_etc_t type, if you want to store webalizer files in the /etc directories.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B uuidd_initrc_exec_t
++.B webalizer_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the uuidd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the uuidd_initrc_t domain.
++- Set files with the webalizer_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the webalizer_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B uuidd_var_lib_t
++.B webalizer_tmp_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the uuidd_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the uuidd files under the /var/lib directory.
++- Set files with the webalizer_tmp_t type, if you want to store webalizer temporary files in the /tmp directories.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B uuidd_var_run_t
++.B webalizer_usage_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the uuidd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the uuidd files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the webalizer_usage_t type, if you want to treat the files as webalizer usage data.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B webalizer_var_lib_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the webalizer_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the webalizer files under the /var/lib directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B webalizer_write_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the webalizer_write_t type, if you want to treat the files as webalizer read/write content.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type webalizer_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B anon_inodefs_t
++
++
++.br
++.B httpd_sys_content_t
++
++ /srv/([^/]*/)?www(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/www(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/htdig(/.*)?
++.br
++ /srv/gallery2(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/trac(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/htdig(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/www/icons(/.*)?
++.br
++ /usr/share/htdig(/.*)?
++.br
++ /usr/share/drupal.*
++.br
++ /var/www/svn/conf(/.*)?
++.br
++ /usr/share/icecast(/.*)?
++.br
++ /usr/share/mythweb(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/cacti/rra(/.*)?
++.br
++ /usr/share/ntop/html(/.*)?
++.br
++ /usr/share/mythtv/data(/.*)?
++.br
++ /usr/share/doc/ghc/html(/.*)?
++.br
++ /usr/share/openca/htdocs(/.*)?
++.br
++ /usr/share/selinux-policy[^/]*/html(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B webalizer_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B webalizer_var_lib_t
++
++ /var/lib/webalizer(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux uuidd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their uuidd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for uuidd:
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the webalizer_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B uuidd_t
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
++
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the webalizer_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -56605,87 +104225,100 @@ index 0000000..6a802e0
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), uuidd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/uux_selinux.8 b/man/man8/uux_selinux.8
++selinux(8), webalizer(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/winbind_helper_selinux.8 b/man/man8/winbind_helper_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..94f9b00
+index 0000000..2cf4c75
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/uux_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
-+.TH "uux_selinux" "8" "uux" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "uux SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/winbind_helper_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
++.TH "winbind_helper_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "winbind_helper" "SELinux Policy documentation for winbind_helper"
+.SH "NAME"
-+uux_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the uux processes
++winbind_helper_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the winbind_helper processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the uux processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the winbind_helper processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The winbind_helper processes execute with the winbind_helper_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the uux_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep winbind_helper_t
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
+
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The winbind_helper_t SELinux type can be entered via the "winbind_helper_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the winbind_helper_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/bin/ntlm_auth
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the uux_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux winbind_helper policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their winbind_helper processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for winbind_helper:
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B winbind_helper_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux uux policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their uux processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for uux:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux winbind_helper policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their winbind_helper processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for winbind_helper:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B uux_exec_t
++.B winbind_helper_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the uux_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the uux_t domain.
++- Set files with the winbind_helper_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the winbind_helper_t domain.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux uux policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their uux processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for uux:
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the winbind_helper_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B uux_t
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
++
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the winbind_helper_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -56698,284 +104331,282 @@ index 0000000..94f9b00
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), uux(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/varnishd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/varnishd_selinux.8
++selinux(8), winbind_helper(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, winbind_selinux(8), winbind_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/winbind_selinux.8 b/man/man8/winbind_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..5e7b955
+index 0000000..63e0898
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/varnishd_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,168 @@
-+.TH "varnishd_selinux" "8" "varnishd" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "varnishd SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/winbind_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,284 @@
++.TH "winbind_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "winbind" "SELinux Policy documentation for winbind"
+.SH "NAME"
-+varnishd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the varnishd processes
++winbind_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the winbind processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the varnishd processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the winbind processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The winbind processes execute with the winbind_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep winbind_t
+
-+.SH BOOLEANS
-+SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. varnishd policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run varnishd with the tightest access possible.
+
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
++The winbind_t SELinux type can be entered via the "winbind_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the winbind_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/sbin/winbindd
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow varnishd to connect to all ports, not just HTTP, you must turn on the varnishd_connect_any boolean.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux winbind policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their winbind processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for winbind:
+
+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P varnishd_connect_any 1
++.B winbind_helper_t, winbind_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH BOOLEANS
++SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. winbind policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run winbind with the tightest access possible.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the varnishd_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++If you want to allow Apache to use mod_auth_ntlm_winbind, you must turn on the httpd_mod_auth_ntlm_winbind boolean.
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.B setsebool -P httpd_mod_auth_ntlm_winbind 1
+.EE
+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the varnishd_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++If you want to allow Apache to use mod_auth_ntlm_winbind, you must turn on the httpd_mod_auth_ntlm_winbind boolean.
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B setsebool -P httpd_mod_auth_ntlm_winbind 1
+.EE
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux varnishd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their varnishd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for varnishd:
-+
-+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B varnishd_etc_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the varnishd_etc_t type, if you want to store varnishd files in the /etc directories.
-+
-+
-+.EX
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux winbind policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their winbind processes in as secure a method as possible.
+.PP
-+.B varnishd_exec_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the varnishd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the varnishd_t domain.
++The following file types are defined for winbind:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B varnishd_initrc_exec_t
++.B winbind_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the varnishd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the varnishd_initrc_t domain.
++- Set files with the winbind_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the winbind_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B varnishd_tmp_t
++.B winbind_helper_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the varnishd_tmp_t type, if you want to store varnishd temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++- Set files with the winbind_helper_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the winbind_helper_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B varnishd_var_lib_t
++.B winbind_log_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the varnishd_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the varnishd files under the /var/lib directory.
++- Set files with the winbind_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as winbind log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B varnishd_var_run_t
++.B winbind_var_run_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the varnishd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the varnishd files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the winbind_var_run_t type, if you want to store the winbind files under the /run directory.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PORT TYPES
-+SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
-+.PP
-+You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
-+
-+.B semanage port -l
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
-+SELinux varnishd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their varnishd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following port types are defined for varnishd:
++The SELinux process type winbind_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
-+.EX
-+.TP 5
-+.B varnishd_port_t
-+.TP 10
-+.EE
++.br
++.B auth_cache_t
+
++ /var/cache/coolkey(/.*)?
++.br
+
-+Default Defined Ports:
-+tcp 6081-6082
-+.EE
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux varnishd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their varnishd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for varnishd:
++.br
++.B ctdbd_var_lib_t
+
-+.EX
-+.B varnishd_t, varnishlog_t
-+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++ /etc/ctdb(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/ctdb(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/ctdbd(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/ctdbd(/.*)?
++.br
+
-+.SH "COMMANDS"
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
-+.PP
-+.B semanage permissive
-+can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
-+.PP
-+.B semanage module
-+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++.br
++.B faillog_t
+
-+.B semanage port
-+can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
++ /var/log/btmp.*
++.br
++ /var/run/faillock(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/log/faillog
++.br
++ /var/log/tallylog
++.br
+
-+.B semanage boolean
-+can also be used to manipulate the booleans
++.br
++.B pcscd_var_run_t
+
-+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
-+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++ /var/run/pcscd(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/pcscd\.events(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/pcscd\.pid
++.br
++ /var/run/pcscd\.pub
++.br
++ /var/run/pcscd\.comm
++.br
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.br
++.B samba_log_t
+
-+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), varnishd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-+, setsebool(8)
-\ No newline at end of file
-diff --git a/man/man8/varnishlog_selinux.8 b/man/man8/varnishlog_selinux.8
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..4f51e3f
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/varnishlog_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
-+.TH "varnishlog_selinux" "8" "varnishlog" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "varnishlog SELinux Policy documentation"
-+.SH "NAME"
-+varnishlog_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the varnishlog processes
-+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++ /var/log/samba(/.*)?
++.br
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the varnishlog processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++.br
++.B samba_secrets_t
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++ /etc/samba/smbpasswd
++.br
++ /etc/samba/passdb\.tdb
++.br
++ /etc/samba/MACHINE\.SID
++.br
++ /etc/samba/secrets\.tdb
++.br
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux varnishlog policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their varnishlog processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for varnishlog:
++.br
++.B samba_var_t
+
++ /var/lib/samba(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/cache/samba(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/spool/samba(/.*)?
++.br
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B varnishlog_exec_t
-+.EE
++.br
++.B smbd_tmp_t
+
-+- Set files with the varnishlog_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the varnishlog_t domain.
+
+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/bin/varnisncsa, /usr/bin/varnishlog
++.B smbd_var_run_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B varnishlog_initrc_exec_t
-+.EE
++ /var/run/samba(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/samba/smbd\.pid
++.br
++ /var/run/samba/brlock\.tdb
++.br
++ /var/run/samba/locking\.tdb
++.br
++ /var/run/samba/gencache\.tdb
++.br
++ /var/run/samba/sessionid\.tdb
++.br
++ /var/run/samba/share_info\.tdb
++.br
++ /var/run/samba/connections\.tdb
++.br
+
-+- Set files with the varnishlog_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the varnishlog_initrc_t domain.
++.br
++.B user_home_t
+
++ /home/[^/]*/.+
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/.+
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/.+
+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/etc/rc\.d/init\.d/varnishlog, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/varnishncsa
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B varnishlog_log_t
-+.EE
++.br
++.B user_tmp_t
+
-+- Set files with the varnishlog_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as varnishlog log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++ /var/run/user(/.*)?
++.br
++ /tmp/gconfd-.*
++.br
++ /tmp/gconfd-dwalsh
++.br
++ /tmp/gconfd-xguest
++.br
+
++.br
++.B winbind_log_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B varnishlog_var_run_t
-+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the varnishlog_var_run_t type, if you want to store the varnishlog files under the /run directory.
++.br
++.B winbind_var_run_t
+
++ /var/run/winbindd(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/samba/winbindd(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/samba/winbindd_privileged(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/cache/samba/winbindd_privileged(/.*)?
+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/run/varnishncsa\.pid, /var/run/varnishlog\.pid
+
-+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux varnishlog policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their varnishlog processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for varnishlog:
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the winbind_helper_t, winbind_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B varnishlog_t
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
++
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the winbind_helper_t, winbind_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -56987,85 +104618,126 @@ index 0000000..4f51e3f
+.B semanage module
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
++.B semanage boolean
++can also be used to manipulate the booleans
++
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), varnishlog(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/vbetool_selinux.8 b/man/man8/vbetool_selinux.8
++selinux(8), winbind(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, setsebool(8), winbind_helper_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/wine_selinux.8 b/man/man8/wine_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..502e672
+index 0000000..b6b7f15
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/vbetool_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
-+.TH "vbetool_selinux" "8" "vbetool" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "vbetool SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/wine_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,124 @@
++.TH "wine_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "wine" "SELinux Policy documentation for wine"
+.SH "NAME"
-+vbetool_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the vbetool processes
++wine_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the wine processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the vbetool processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the wine processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The wine processes execute with the wine_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep wine_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The wine_t SELinux type can be entered via the "wine_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the wine_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/bin/wine.*, /opt/teamviewer(/.*)?/bin/wine.*, /opt/google/picasa(/.*)?/bin/wdi, /opt/google/picasa(/.*)?/bin/wine.*, /opt/google/picasa(/.*)?/bin/msiexec, /opt/google/picasa(/.*)?/bin/notepad, /opt/google/picasa(/.*)?/bin/progman, /opt/google/picasa(/.*)?/bin/regedit, /opt/google/picasa(/.*)?/bin/regsvr32, /opt/google/picasa(/.*)?/Picasa3/.*exe, /opt/google/picasa(/.*)?/bin/uninstaller, /opt/cxoffice/bin/wine.*, /opt/picasa/wine/bin/wine.*, /usr/bin/msiexec, /usr/bin/notepad, /usr/bin/regedit, /usr/bin/regsvr32, /usr/bin/uninstaller, /home/[^/]*/cxoffice/bin/wine.+, /home/dwalsh/cxoffice/bin/wine.+, /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/cxoffice/bin/wine.+
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux wine policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their wine processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for wine:
++
++.EX
++.B wine_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH BOOLEANS
-+SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. vbetool policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run vbetool with the tightest access possible.
++SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. wine policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run wine with the tightest access possible.
+
+
+.PP
-+If you want to ignore vbetool mmap_zero errors, you must turn on the vbetool_mmap_zero_ignore boolean.
++If you want to ignore wine mmap_zero errors, you must turn on the wine_mmap_zero_ignore boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P vbetool_mmap_zero_ignore 1
++.B setsebool -P wine_mmap_zero_ignore 1
+.EE
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++.PP
++If you want to ignore wine mmap_zero errors, you must turn on the wine_mmap_zero_ignore boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P wine_mmap_zero_ignore 1
++.EE
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux vbetool policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their vbetool processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for vbetool:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux wine policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their wine processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for wine:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B vbetool_exec_t
++.B wine_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the vbetool_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the vbetool_t domain.
++- Set files with the wine_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the wine_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B wine_tmp_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the wine_tmp_t type, if you want to store wine temporary files in the /tmp directories.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux vbetool policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their vbetool processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for vbetool:
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+.EX
-+.B vbetool_t
-+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++The SELinux process type wine_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B wine_tmp_t
++
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -57081,99 +104753,186 @@ index 0000000..502e672
+can also be used to manipulate the booleans
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), vbetool(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
++selinux(8), wine(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+, setsebool(8)
\ No newline at end of file
-diff --git a/man/man8/vdagent_selinux.8 b/man/man8/vdagent_selinux.8
+diff --git a/man/man8/wireshark_selinux.8 b/man/man8/wireshark_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..f8c8221
+index 0000000..58e07b9
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/vdagent_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
-+.TH "vdagent_selinux" "8" "vdagent" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "vdagent SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/wireshark_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,184 @@
++.TH "wireshark_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "wireshark" "SELinux Policy documentation for wireshark"
+.SH "NAME"
-+vdagent_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the vdagent processes
++wireshark_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the wireshark processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the vdagent processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the wireshark processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The wireshark processes execute with the wireshark_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep wireshark_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The wireshark_t SELinux type can be entered via the "wireshark_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the wireshark_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/bin/wireshark
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux wireshark policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their wireshark processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for wireshark:
++
++.EX
++.B wireshark_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux vdagent policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their vdagent processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for vdagent:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux wireshark policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their wireshark processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for wireshark:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B vdagent_exec_t
++.B wireshark_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the vdagent_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the vdagent_t domain.
++- Set files with the wireshark_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the wireshark_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B vdagent_log_t
++.B wireshark_home_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the vdagent_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as vdagent log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++- Set files with the wireshark_home_t type, if you want to store wireshark files in the users home directory.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/log/spice-vdagentd\.log.*, /var/log/spice-vdagentd(/.*)?
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B vdagent_var_run_t
++.B wireshark_tmp_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the vdagent_var_run_t type, if you want to store the vdagent files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the wireshark_tmp_t type, if you want to store wireshark temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B wireshark_tmpfs_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the wireshark_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store wireshark files on a tmpfs file system.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/run/spice-vdagentd.\pid, /var/run/spice-vdagentd(/.*)?
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type wireshark_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B user_fonts_cache_t
++
++ /root/\.fontconfig(/.*)?
++.br
++ /root/\.fonts/auto(/.*)?
++.br
++ /root/\.fonts\.cache-.*
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.fontconfig(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.fonts/auto(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.fonts\.cache-.*
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.fontconfig(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.fonts/auto(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.fonts\.cache-.*
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.fontconfig(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.fonts/auto(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.fonts\.cache-.*
++.br
++
++.br
++.B user_home_t
++
++ /home/[^/]*/.+
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/.+
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/.+
++.br
++
++.br
++.B wireshark_home_t
++
++ /home/[^/]*/\.wireshark(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.wireshark(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.wireshark(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B wireshark_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B wireshark_tmpfs_t
++
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux vdagent policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their vdagent processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for vdagent:
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the wireshark_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B vdagent_t
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
++
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the wireshark_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -57186,111 +104945,86 @@ index 0000000..f8c8221
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), vdagent(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/vhostmd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/vhostmd_selinux.8
++selinux(8), wireshark(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/wpa_cli_selinux.8 b/man/man8/wpa_cli_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..f840982
+index 0000000..2ea0f25
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/vhostmd_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
-+.TH "vhostmd_selinux" "8" "vhostmd" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "vhostmd SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/wpa_cli_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
++.TH "wpa_cli_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "wpa_cli" "SELinux Policy documentation for wpa_cli"
+.SH "NAME"
-+vhostmd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the vhostmd processes
++wpa_cli_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the wpa_cli processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the vhostmd processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the wpa_cli processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The wpa_cli processes execute with the wpa_cli_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the vhostmd_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep wpa_cli_t
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the vhostmd_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
-+.EE
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++The wpa_cli_t SELinux type can be entered via the "wpa_cli_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the wpa_cli_t domain are the following:"
++
++/sbin/wpa_cli, /usr/sbin/wpa_cli
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux vhostmd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their vhostmd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for vhostmd:
-+
-+
-+.EX
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux wpa_cli policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their wpa_cli processes in as secure a method as possible.
+.PP
-+.B vhostmd_exec_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the vhostmd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the vhostmd_t domain.
-+
++The following process types are defined for wpa_cli:
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B vhostmd_initrc_exec_t
++.B wpa_cli_t
+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the vhostmd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the vhostmd_initrc_t domain.
-+
-+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B vhostmd_tmpfs_t
-+.EE
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
-+- Set files with the vhostmd_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store vhostmd files on a tmpfs file system.
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux wpa_cli policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their wpa_cli processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for wpa_cli:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B vhostmd_var_run_t
++.B wpa_cli_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the vhostmd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the vhostmd files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the wpa_cli_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the wpa_cli_t domain.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux vhostmd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their vhostmd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for vhostmd:
-+
-+.EX
-+.B vhostmd_t
-+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -57303,91 +105037,232 @@ index 0000000..f840982
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), vhostmd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/virsh_selinux.8 b/man/man8/virsh_selinux.8
++selinux(8), wpa_cli(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/xauth_selinux.8 b/man/man8/xauth_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..f603d57
+index 0000000..4e36630
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/virsh_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
-+.TH "virsh_selinux" "8" "virsh" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "virsh SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/xauth_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,232 @@
++.TH "xauth_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "xauth" "SELinux Policy documentation for xauth"
+.SH "NAME"
-+virsh_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the virsh processes
++xauth_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the xauth processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the virsh processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the xauth processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The xauth processes execute with the xauth_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the virsh_ssh_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep xauth_t
+
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The xauth_t SELinux type can be entered via the "xauth_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the xauth_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/bin/xauth, /usr/X11R6/bin/xauth
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the virsh_ssh_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux xauth policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their xauth processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for xauth:
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B xauth_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux virsh policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their virsh processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for virsh:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux xauth policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their xauth processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for xauth:
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B xauth_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the xauth_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the xauth_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B xauth_home_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the xauth_home_t type, if you want to store xauth files in the users home directory.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B virsh_exec_t
++.B xauth_tmp_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the virsh_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the virsh_t domain.
++- Set files with the xauth_tmp_t type, if you want to store xauth temporary files in the /tmp directories.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/bin/virt-sandbox-service.*, /usr/bin/virsh
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type xauth_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B user_home_t
++
++ /home/[^/]*/.+
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/.+
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/.+
++.br
++
++.br
++.B user_tmp_t
++
++ /var/run/user(/.*)?
++.br
++ /tmp/gconfd-.*
++.br
++ /tmp/gconfd-dwalsh
++.br
++ /tmp/gconfd-xguest
++.br
++
++.br
++.B xauth_home_t
++
++ /root/\.xauth.*
++.br
++ /root/\.Xauth.*
++.br
++ /root/\.serverauth.*
++.br
++ /root/\.Xauthority.*
++.br
++ /var/lib/pqsql/\.xauth.*
++.br
++ /var/lib/pqsql/\.Xauthority.*
++.br
++ /var/lib/nxserver/home/\.xauth.*
++.br
++ /var/lib/nxserver/home/\.Xauthority.*
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.xauth.*
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.Xauth.*
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.serverauth.*
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.Xauthority.*
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.xauth.*
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.Xauth.*
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.serverauth.*
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.Xauthority.*
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.xauth.*
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.Xauth.*
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.serverauth.*
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.Xauthority.*
++.br
++
++.br
++.B xauth_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B xdm_tmp_t
++
++ /tmp/\.X11-unix(/.*)?
++.br
++ /tmp/\.ICE-unix(/.*)?
++.br
++ /tmp/\.X0-lock
++.br
++
++.br
++.B xdm_var_run_t
++
++ /etc/kde[34]?/kdm/backgroundrc
++.br
++ /var/run/[gx]dm\.pid
++.br
++ /var/run/[kgm]dm(/.*)?
++.br
++ /usr/lib/qt-.*/etc/settings(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/slim.*
++.br
++ /var/run/lxdm(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/slim(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/xauth(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/xdmctl(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/lightdm(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/systemd/multi-session-x(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/lxdm\.pid
++.br
++ /var/run/lxdm\.auth
++.br
++ /var/run/gdm_socket
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux virsh policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their virsh processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for virsh:
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the xauth_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B virsh_ssh_t, virsh_t
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
++
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the xauth_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -57400,598 +105275,751 @@ index 0000000..f603d57
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), virsh(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/virt_selinux.8 b/man/man8/virt_selinux.8
++selinux(8), xauth(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/xdm_selinux.8 b/man/man8/xdm_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..8dc1d8d
+index 0000000..b6a703d
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/virt_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,373 @@
-+.TH "virt_selinux" "8" "virt" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "virt SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/xdm_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,758 @@
++.TH "xdm_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "xdm" "SELinux Policy documentation for xdm"
+.SH "NAME"
-+virt_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the virt processes
++xdm_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the xdm processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the virt processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the xdm processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH BOOLEANS
-+SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. virt policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run virt with the tightest access possible.
++The xdm processes execute with the xdm_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
++For example:
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined virtual guests to manage nfs files, you must turn on the virt_use_nfs boolean.
++.B ps -eZ | grep xdm_t
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P virt_use_nfs 1
-+.EE
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined virtual guests to use serial/parallel communication ports, you must turn on the virt_use_comm boolean.
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P virt_use_comm 1
-+.EE
++The xdm_t SELinux type can be entered via the "xdm_exec_t,bin_t" file types. The default entrypoint paths for the xdm_t domain are the following:"
+
++/usr/(s)?bin/lightdm*, /usr/(s)?bin/[mxgkw]dm, /usr/(s)?bin/gdm-binary, /usr/(s)?bin/lxdm(-binary)?, /usr/X11R6/bin/[xgkw]dm, /usr/bin/slim, /usr/bin/gpe-dm, /opt/kde3/bin/kdm, /usr/sbin/mdm-binary, /bin/.*, /opt/(.*/)?bin(/.*)?, /usr/(.*/)?Bin(/.*)?, /usr/(.*/)?bin(/.*)?, /usr/(.*/)?sbin(/.*)?, /opt/(.*/)?sbin(/.*)?, /opt/(.*/)?libexec(/.*)?, /sbin/.*, /usr/lib(.*/)?bin(/.*)?, /usr/lib(.*/)?sbin(/.*)?, /etc/gdm/[^/]+, /root/bin(/.*)?, /etc/gdm/[^/]+/.*, /etc/cron.daily(/.*)?, /etc/cron.weekly(/.*)?, /etc/cron.hourly(/.*)?, /etc/cron.monthly(/.*)?, /usr/lib/.*/program(/.*)?, /usr/lib/.*/scripts(/.*)?, /usr/lib/[^/]*/run-mozilla\.sh, /usr/lib/[^/]*/mozilla-xremote-client, /usr/lib/[^/]*thunderbird[^/]*/thunderbird, /usr/lib/[^/]*thunderbird[^/]*/open-browser\.sh, /usr/lib/[^/]*thunderbird[^/]*/thunderbird-bin, /lib/udev/[^/]*, /etc/auto\.[^/]*, /etc/avahi/.*\.action, /usr/lib/qt.*/bin(/.*)?, /usr/lib/yp/.+, /var/ftp/bin(/.*)?, /usr/Brother(/.*)?, /usr/Printer(/.*)?, /usr/lib
exec(/.*)?, /lib/upstart(/.*)?, /etc/kde/env(/.*)?, /etc/profile.d(/.*)?, /var/mailman.*/bin(/.*)?, /etc/lxdm/Pre.*, /etc/hotplug/.*rc, /usr/lib/cups(/.*)?, /etc/hotplug/.*agent, /usr/Brother/(.*/)?inf/setup.*, /usr/Brother/(.*/)?inf/brprintconf.*, /usr/lib/dpkg/.+, /etc/lxdm/Post.*, /usr/lib/udev/[^/]*, /var/qmail/bin(/.*)?, /usr/lib/xfce4(/.*)?, /usr/lib/fence(/.*)?, /etc/X11/xinit(/.*)?, /lib/readahead(/.*)?, /etc/netplug\.d(/.*)?, /usr/lib/gimp/.*/plug-ins(/.*)?, /usr/lib/ipsec/.*, /etc/ppp/ip-up\..*, /usr/bin/pingus.*, /etc/cipe/ip-up.*, /usr/lib/dracut(/.*)?, /etc/pm/power\.d(/.*)?, /etc/pm/sleep\.d(/.*)?, /etc/redhat-lsb(/.*)?, /usr/lib/tuned/.*/.*\.sh, /usr/lib/xen/bin(/.*)?, /usr/lib/upstart(/.*)?, /usr/lib/courier(/.*)?, /etc/xen/scripts(/.*)?, /usr/share/tucan.*/tucan.py, /usr/lib/mailman.*/bin(/.*)?, /usr/lib/mailman.*/mail(/.*)?, /etc/ppp/ipv6-up\..*, /etc/ppp/ip-down\..*, /etc/cipe/ip-down.*, /usr/share/hplip/[^/]*, /usr/lib/news/bin(/.*)?, /usr/lib/pm-utils(/.
*)?, /etc/vmware-tools(/.*)?, /etc/kde/shutdown(/.*)?, /etc/acpi/actions(/.*)?, /etc/pki/tls/misc(/.*)?, /usr/lib/jvm/java(.*/)bin(/.*), /usr/lib/tumbler-[^/]*/tumblerd, /usr/lib/readahead(/.*)?, /opt/google/chrome(/.*)?, /etc/munin/plugins(/.*)?, /usr/lib/bluetooth(/.*)?, /usr/lib/debug/bin(/.*)?, /usr/lib/xulrunner[^/]*/updater, /usr/lib/xulrunner[^/]*/crashreporter, /usr/lib/xulrunner[^/]*/xulrunner[^/]*, /usr/lib/ruby/gems(/.*)?/helper-scripts(/.*)?, /usr/share/debconf/.+, /etc/ppp/ipv6-down\..*, /usr/share/cluster/.*\.sh, /usr/share/sectool/.*\.py, /usr/share/ssl/misc(/.*)?, /usr/share/e16/misc(/.*)?, /usr/lib/ccache/bin(/.*)?, /etc/racoon/scripts(/.*)?, /usr/lib/debug/sbin(/.*)?, /usr/lib/ruby/gems/.*/agents(/.*)?, /usr/share/mc/extfs/.*, /usr/lib/apt/methods.+, /usr/lib/portage/bin(/.*)?, /usr/lib/MailScanner(/.*)?, /etc/mcelog/triggers(/.*)?, /etc/dhcp/dhclient\.d(/.*)?, /emul/ia32-linux/bin(/.*)?, /usr/lib/libreoffice(/.*)?/bin(/.*)?, /emul/ia32-linux/usr(/.*)?/bin(
/.*)?, /emul/ia32-linux/usr(/.*)?/Bin(/.*)?, /emul/ia32-linux/usr(/.*)?/sbin(/.*)?, /usr/lib/thunderbird.*/mozilla-xremote-client, /usr/lib/cyrus-imapd/.*, /usr/share/createrepo(/.*)?, /emul/ia32-linux/sbin(/.*)?, /usr/share/virtualbox/.*\.sh, /usr/share/wicd/daemon(/.*)?, /usr/share/hal/scripts(/.*)?, /lib/security/pam_krb5(/.*)?, /opt/google/talkplugin(/.*)?, /etc/PackageKit/events(/.*)?, /usr/lib/debug/usr/bin(/.*)?, /usr/lib/vmware-tools/(s)?bin64(/.*)?, /usr/lib/vmware-tools/(s)?bin32(/.*)?, /etc/gdm/XKeepsCrashing[^/]*, /usr/lib/oracle/xe/apps(/.*)?, /usr/share/Modules/init(/.*)?, /usr/share/smolt/client(/.*)?, /usr/lib/nagios/plugins(/.*)?, /usr/lib/debug/usr/sbin(/.*)?, /usr/share/apr-0/build/[^/]+\.sh, /usr/lib/emacsen-common/.*, /usr/share/ajaxterm/qweb.py.*, /var/lib/asterisk/agi-bin(/.*)?, /usr/share/shorewall-perl(/.*)?, /usr/share/shorewall-lite(/.*)?, /usr/linuxprinter/filters(/.*)?, /usr/lib/netsaint/plugins(/.*)?, /usr/lib/chromium-browser(/.*)?, /usr/share/
turboprint/lib(/.*)?, /usr/lib/nfs-utils/scripts(/.*)?, /usr/share/shorewall6-lite(/.*)?, /usr/share/shorewall-shell(/.*)?, /usr/share/vhostmd/scripts(/.*)?, /usr/lib/debug/usr/libexec(/.*)?, /etc/ConsoleKit/run-seat\.d(/.*)?, /usr/lib/nspluginwrapper/np.*, /usr/share/sandbox/sandboxX.sh, /usr/lib/ConsoleKit/scripts(/.*)?, /usr/share/ajaxterm/ajaxterm.py.*, /usr/lib/pgsql/test/regress/.*\.sh, /usr/share/denyhosts/scripts(/.*)?, /usr/share/denyhosts/plugins(/.*)?, /emul/ia32-linux/usr/libexec(/.*)?, /usr/lib/mediawiki/math/texvc.*, /usr/share/PackageKit/helpers(/.*)?, /etc/ConsoleKit/run-session\.d(/.*)?, /etc/hotplug\.d/default/default.*, /usr/lib/systemd/system-sleep/(.*)?, /opt/gutenprint/cups/lib/filter(/.*)?, /usr/share/system-config-network(/netconfig)?/[^/]+\.py, /usr/lib/ConsoleKit/run-session\.d(/.*)?, /etc/sysconfig/network-scripts/net.*, /etc/sysconfig/network-scripts/ifup.*, /etc/sysconfig/network-scripts/init.*, /usr/share/kde4/apps/kajongg/kajongg.py, /etc/sysco
nfig/network-scripts/ifdown.*, /opt/OpenPrinting-Gutenprint/cups/lib/filter(/.*)?, /usr/share/gedit-2/plugins/externaltools/tools(/.*)?, /bin, /sbin, /usr/bin, /dev/MAKEDEV, /var/qmail/rc, /var/qmail/bin, /etc/mail/make, /bin/mountpoint, /usr/lib/rpm/rpmq, /usr/lib/rpm/rpmv, /usr/lib/rpm/rpmd, /usr/lib/rpm/rpmk, /lib/udev/scsi_id, /sbin/mkfs\.cramfs, /etc/xen/qemu-ifup, /etc/lxdm/Xsession, /etc/sysconfig/init, /usr/bin/mountpoint, /etc/apcupsd/commok, /usr/lib/sftp-server, /etc/sysconfig/crond, /etc/lxdm/LoginReady, /usr/sbin/mkfs\.cramfs, /usr/lib/udev/scsi_id, /etc/X11/xdm/Xsetup_0, /etc/init\.d/functions, /etc/apcupsd/changeme, /usr/lib/iscan/network, /etc/apcupsd/onbattery, /usr/lib/yaboot/addnote, /etc/sysconfig/libvirtd, /etc/apcupsd/apccontrol, /etc/apcupsd/offbattery, /usr/lib/wicd/monitor\.py, /etc/X11/xdm/TakeConsole, /etc/X11/xdm/GiveConsole, /etc/apcupsd/commfailure, /usr/lib/misc/sftp-server, /etc/sysconfig/netconsole, /lib/udev/devices/MAKEDEV, /var/lib/iscan/i
nterpreter, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/functions, /etc/apcupsd/masterconnect, /etc/apcupsd/mastertimeout, /usr/share/pydict/pydict\.py, /usr/share/clamav/clamd-gen, /sbin/insmod_ksymoops_clean, /etc/mgetty\+sendfax/new_fax, /usr/lib/xfce4/panel/migrate, /usr/lib/xfce4/panel/wrapper, /etc/sysconfig/readonly-root, /usr/lib/vte/gnome-pty-helper, /usr/lib/udev/devices/MAKEDEV, /usr/lib/xfce4/xfconf/xfconfd, /usr/share/cvs/contrib/rcs2log, /usr/share/hwbrowser/hwbrowser, /usr/X11R6/lib/X11/xkb/xkbcomp, /usr/lib/virtualbox/VBoxManage, /usr/share/cluster/SAPInstance, /usr/share/cluster/checkquorum, /usr/share/shorewall/getparams, /usr/share/apr-0/build/libtool, /usr/share/cluster/SAPDatabase, /etc/hotplug/hotplug\.functions, /usr/share/texmf/web2c/mktexdir, /usr/share/texmf/web2c/mktexnam, /usr/share/texmf/web2c/mktexupd, /usr/share/shorewall/configpath, /usr/sbin/insmod_ksymoops_clean, /etc/mcelog/cache-error-trigger, /usr/share/shorewall/compiler\.pl, /usr/share/dayplanner/dayplanner, /u
sr/libexec/openssh/sftp-server, /usr/share/texmf/texconfig/tcfmgr, /usr/share/clamav/freshclam-sleep, /usr/share/cluster/svclib_nfslock, /usr/share/cluster/ocf-shellfuncs, /usr/lib/xfce4/exo-1/exo-helper-1, /usr/share/pwlib/make/ptlib-config, /usr/share/fedora-usermgmt/wrapper, /usr/share/printconf/util/print\.py, /usr/lib/xfce4/xfwm4/helper-dialog, /etc/pki/tls/certs/make-dummy-cert, /usr/share/rhn/rhn_applet/applet\.py, /usr/share/authconfig/authconfig\.py, /usr/share/spamassassin/sa-update\.cron, /usr/share/gnucash/finance-quote-check, /usr/share/cluster/fence_scsi_check\.pl, /usr/share/selinux/devel/policygentool, /usr/share/switchdesk/switchdesk-gui\.py, /usr/share/authconfig/authconfig-tui\.py, /usr/share/authconfig/authconfig-gtk\.py, /usr/share/gnucash/finance-quote-helper, /usr/share/gitolite/hooks/common/update, /usr/lib/xfce4/exo-1/exo-compose-mail-1, /usr/share/system-config-services/gui\.py, /lib/security/pam_krb5/pam_krb5_storetmp, /usr/share/system-config-netb
oot/pxeos\.py, /usr/lib/xfce4/session/balou-export-theme, /usr/share/system-config-selinux/polgen\.py, /usr/share/system-config-nfs/nfs-export\.py, /usr/share/system-config-printer/applet\.py, /usr/share/PackageKit/pk-upgrade-distro\.sh, /usr/lib/xfce4/session/balou-install-theme, /usr/share/system-config-netboot/pxeboot\.py, /usr/lib/xfce4/session/xfsm-shutdown-helper, /usr/share/rhn/rhn_applet/needed-packages\.py, /usr/lib/security/pam_krb5/pam_krb5_storetmp, /usr/share/system-logviewer/system-logviewer\.py, /usr/share/system-config-network/neat-control\.py, /usr/share/system-config-services/serviceconf\.py, /usr/share/hal/device-manager/hal-device-manager, /usr/share/system-config-lvm/system-config-lvm\.py, /usr/share/system-config-nfs/system-config-nfs\.py, /usr/share/system-config-mouse/system-config-mouse, /usr/share/system-config-httpd/system-config-httpd, /usr/share/system-config-users/system-config-users, /usr/share/system-config-date/system-config-date\.py, /usr/sh
are/doc/ghc/html/libraries/gen_contents_index, /usr/share/gitolite/hooks/gitolite-admin/post-update, /usr/share/system-config-samba/system-config-samba\.py, /usr/share/system-config-display/system-config-display, /usr/share/system-config-keyboard/system-config-keyboard, /usr/share/system-config-language/system-config-language, /usr/share/system-config-services/system-config-services, /usr/share/system-config-selinux/system-config-selinux\.py, /usr/share/system-config-netboot/system-config-netboot\.py, /usr/share/system-config-soundcard/system-config-soundcard, /usr/share/system-config-rootpassword/system-config-rootpassword, /usr/share/system-config-securitylevel/system-config-securitylevel\.py
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined virtual guests to interact with the xserver, you must turn on the virt_use_xserver boolean.
-+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P virt_use_xserver 1
-+.EE
-+
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined virtual guests to manage device configuration, (pci), you must turn on the virt_use_sysfs boolean.
-+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P virt_use_sysfs 1
-+.EE
-+
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux xdm policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their xdm processes in as secure a method as possible.
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined virtual guests to interact with the sanlock, you must turn on the virt_use_sanlock boolean.
++The following process types are defined for xdm:
+
+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P virt_use_sanlock 1
++.B xdm_t, xdm_dbusd_t
+.EE
-+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined virtual guests to use executable memory and executable stack, you must turn on the virt_use_execmem boolean.
-+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P virt_use_execmem 1
-+.EE
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined virtual guests to read fuse files, you must turn on the virt_use_fusefs boolean.
++.SH BOOLEANS
++SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. xdm policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run xdm with the tightest access possible.
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P virt_use_fusefs 1
-+.EE
+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined virtual guests to use usb devices, you must turn on the virt_use_usb boolean.
++If you want to allow the graphical login program to execute bootloader, you must turn on the xdm_exec_bootloader boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P virt_use_usb 1
++.B setsebool -P xdm_exec_bootloader 1
+.EE
+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined virtual guests to manage cifs files, you must turn on the virt_use_samba boolean.
++If you want to allow the graphical login program to login directly as sysadm_r:sysadm_t, you must turn on the xdm_sysadm_login boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P virt_use_samba 1
++.B setsebool -P xdm_sysadm_login 1
+.EE
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
-+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the virtd_t, virtd_lxc_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++If you want to allow the graphical login program to execute bootloader, you must turn on the xdm_exec_bootloader boolean.
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.B setsebool -P xdm_exec_bootloader 1
+.EE
+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the virtd_t, virtd_lxc_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++If you want to allow the graphical login program to login directly as sysadm_r:sysadm_t, you must turn on the xdm_sysadm_login boolean.
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B setsebool -P xdm_sysadm_login 1
+.EE
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux virt policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their virt processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for virt:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux xdm policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their xdm processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for xdm:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B virt_bridgehelper_exec_t
++.B xdm_etc_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the virt_bridgehelper_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the virt_bridgehelper_t domain.
++- Set files with the xdm_etc_t type, if you want to store xdm files in the /etc directories.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B virt_cache_t
++.B xdm_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the virt_cache_t type, if you want to store the files under the /var/cache directory.
++- Set files with the xdm_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the xdm_t domain.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/cache/oz(/.*)?, /var/cache/libvirt(/.*)?
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B virt_content_t
++.B xdm_home_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the virt_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as virt content.
++- Set files with the xdm_home_t type, if you want to store xdm files in the users home directory.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/lib/vdsm(/.*)?, /var/lib/oz/isos(/.*)?, /var/lib/libvirt/boot(/.*)?, /var/lib/libvirt/isos(/.*)?
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B virt_etc_rw_t
++.B xdm_lock_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the virt_etc_rw_t type, if you want to treat the files as virt etc read/write content.
++- Set files with the xdm_lock_t type, if you want to treat the files as xdm lock data, stored under the /var/lock directory
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/etc/libvirt/.*/.*, /etc/xen/.*/.*, /etc/xen/[^/]*, /etc/libvirt/[^/]*
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B virt_etc_t
++.B xdm_log_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the virt_etc_t type, if you want to store virt files in the /etc directories.
++- Set files with the xdm_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as xdm log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/etc/libvirt/[^/]*, /etc/libvirt, /etc/xen/[^/]*, /etc/xen
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B virt_home_t
++.B xdm_rw_etc_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the virt_home_t type, if you want to store virt files in the users home directory.
++- Set files with the xdm_rw_etc_t type, if you want to store xdm rw files in the /etc directories.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B virt_image_t
++.B xdm_spool_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the virt_image_t type, if you want to treat the files as virt image data.
++- Set files with the xdm_spool_t type, if you want to store the xdm files under the /var/spool directory.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/lib/imagefactory/images(/.*)?, /var/lib/libvirt/images(/.*)?
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B virt_lock_t
++.B xdm_tmp_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the virt_lock_t type, if you want to treat the files as virt lock data, stored under the /var/lock directory
++- Set files with the xdm_tmp_t type, if you want to store xdm temporary files in the /tmp directories.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B virt_log_t
++.B xdm_tmpfs_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the virt_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as virt log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++- Set files with the xdm_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store xdm files on a tmpfs file system.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/log/log(/.*)?, /var/log/vdsm(/.*)?, /var/log/libvirt(/.*)?
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B virt_lxc_var_run_t
++.B xdm_unconfined_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the virt_lxc_var_run_t type, if you want to store the virt lxc files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the xdm_unconfined_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the xdm_unconfined_t domain.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/run/libvirt-sandbox(/.*)?, /var/run/libvirt/lxc(/.*)?
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B virt_qmf_exec_t
++.B xdm_var_lib_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the virt_qmf_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the virt_qmf_t domain.
++- Set files with the xdm_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the xdm files under the /var/lib directory.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B virt_tmp_t
++.B xdm_var_run_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the virt_tmp_t type, if you want to store virt temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++- Set files with the xdm_var_run_t type, if you want to store the xdm files under the /run directory.
+
+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B virt_var_lib_t
-+.EE
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
+
-+- Set files with the virt_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the virt files under the /var/lib directory.
++.SH PORT TYPES
++SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
++.PP
++You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/lib/oz(/.*)?, /var/lib/libvirt(/.*)?
++.B semanage port -l
+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B virt_var_run_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the virt_var_run_t type, if you want to store the virt files under the /run directory.
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
++SELinux xdm policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their xdm processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following port types are defined for xdm:
+
-+.br
++.EX
+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/run/vdsm(/.*)?, /var/run/libguestfs(/.*)?, /var/vdsm(/.*)?, /var/run/libvirt(/.*)?
++.B xdmcp_port_t
++.TP 10
++.EE
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B virtd_exec_t
++
++Default Defined Ports:
++tcp 177
+.EE
++udp 177
++.EE
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+- Set files with the virtd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the virtd_t domain.
++The SELinux process type xdm_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/sbin/condor_vm-gahp, /usr/bin/imagefactory, /usr/bin/vios-proxy-host, /usr/bin/imgfac\.py, /usr/bin/vios-proxy-guest, /usr/bin/nova-compute, /usr/sbin/libvirtd
++.B anon_inodefs_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B virtd_initrc_exec_t
-+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the virtd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the virtd_initrc_t domain.
++.br
++.B auth_cache_t
+
++ /var/cache/coolkey(/.*)?
++.br
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B virtd_keytab_t
-+.EE
++.br
++.B auth_home_t
+
-+- Set files with the virtd_keytab_t type, if you want to treat the files as kerberos keytab files.
++ /root/\.google_authenticator
++.br
++ /root/\.google_authenticator~
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.google_authenticator
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.google_authenticator~
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.google_authenticator
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.google_authenticator~
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.google_authenticator
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.google_authenticator~
++.br
+
++.br
++.B cgroup_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B virtd_lxc_exec_t
-+.EE
++ /cgroup
++.br
++ /sys/fs/cgroup
++.br
+
-+- Set files with the virtd_lxc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the virtd_lxc_t domain.
++.br
++.B etc_runtime_t
+
++ /[^/]+
++.br
++ /etc/mtab.*
++.br
++ /etc/blkid(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/nologin.*
++.br
++ /etc/\.fstab\.hal\..+
++.br
++ /halt
++.br
++ /fastboot
++.br
++ /poweroff
++.br
++ /etc/cmtab
++.br
++ /\.autofsck
++.br
++ /forcefsck
++.br
++ /\.suspended
++.br
++ /fsckoptions
++.br
++ /\.autorelabel
++.br
++ /etc/securetty
++.br
++ /etc/killpower
++.br
++ /etc/nohotplug
++.br
++ /etc/ioctl\.save
++.br
++ /etc/fstab\.REVOKE
++.br
++ /etc/network/ifstate
++.br
++ /etc/sysconfig/hwconf
++.br
++ /etc/ptal/ptal-printd-like
++.br
++ /etc/sysconfig/iptables\.save
++.br
++ /etc/xorg\.conf\.d/00-system-setup-keyboard\.conf
++.br
++ /etc/X11/xorg\.conf\.d/00-system-setup-keyboard\.conf
++.br
+
-+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
++.br
++.B faillog_t
+
-+.SH PORT TYPES
-+SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
-+.PP
-+You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
++ /var/log/btmp.*
++.br
++ /var/run/faillock(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/log/faillog
++.br
++ /var/log/tallylog
++.br
+
-+.B semanage port -l
++.br
++.B fonts_cache_t
+
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
-+SELinux virt policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their virt processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following port types are defined for virt:
++ /var/cache/fontconfig(/.*)?
++.br
+
-+.EX
-+.TP 5
-+.B virt_migration_port_t
-+.TP 10
-+.EE
++.br
++.B gconf_home_t
+
++ /root/\.local.*
++.br
++ /root/\.gconf(d)?(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.local.*
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.gconf(d)?(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.local.*
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.gconf(d)?(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.local.*
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.gconf(d)?(/.*)?
++.br
+
-+Default Defined Ports:
-+tcp 49152-49216
-+.EE
++.br
++.B gnome_home_type
+
-+.EX
-+.TP 5
-+.B virt_port_t
-+.TP 10
-+.EE
+
++.br
++.B initrc_var_run_t
+
-+Default Defined Ports:
-+tcp 16509,16514
-+.EE
-+udp 16509,16514
-+.EE
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux virt policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their virt processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for virt:
++ /var/run/utmp
++.br
++ /var/run/random-seed
++.br
++ /var/run/runlevel\.dir
++.br
++ /var/run/setmixer_flag
++.br
+
-+.EX
-+.B virtd_lxc_t, virt_qmf_t, virt_bridgehelper_t, virtd_t
-+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++.br
++.B krb5_host_rcache_t
+
-+.SH "COMMANDS"
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
-+.PP
-+.B semanage permissive
-+can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
-+.PP
-+.B semanage module
-+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++ /var/cache/krb5rcache(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/tmp/nfs_0
++.br
++ /var/tmp/DNS_25
++.br
++ /var/tmp/host_0
++.br
++ /var/tmp/imap_0
++.br
++ /var/tmp/HTTP_23
++.br
++ /var/tmp/HTTP_48
++.br
++ /var/tmp/ldap_55
++.br
++ /var/tmp/ldap_487
++.br
++ /var/tmp/ldapmap1_0
++.br
+
-+.B semanage port
-+can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
++.br
++.B lastlog_t
+
-+.B semanage boolean
-+can also be used to manipulate the booleans
++ /var/log/lastlog
++.br
+
-+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
-+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++.br
++.B locale_t
++
++ /etc/locale.conf
++.br
++ /usr/lib/locale(/.*)?
++.br
++ /usr/share/locale(/.*)?
++.br
++ /usr/share/zoneinfo(/.*)?
++.br
++ /usr/share/X11/locale(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/timezone
++.br
++ /etc/localtime
++.br
++ /etc/sysconfig/clock
++.br
++ /etc/avahi/etc/localtime
++.br
++ /var/empty/sshd/etc/localtime
++.br
++ /var/spool/postfix/etc/localtime
++.br
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.br
++.B pam_var_console_t
+
-+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), virt(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-+, setsebool(8)
-\ No newline at end of file
-diff --git a/man/man8/virtd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/virtd_selinux.8
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..196fc17
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/virtd_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,225 @@
-+.TH "virtd_selinux" "8" "virtd" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "virtd SELinux Policy documentation"
-+.SH "NAME"
-+virtd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the virtd processes
-+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++ /var/run/console(/.*)?
++.br
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the virtd processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++.br
++.B pam_var_run_t
+
-+.SH BOOLEANS
-+SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. virtd policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run virtd with the tightest access possible.
++ /var/(db|lib|adm)/sudo(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/sudo(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/sepermit(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/pam_mount(/.*)?
++.br
+
++.br
++.B pcscd_var_run_t
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined virtual guests to manage nfs files, you must turn on the virt_use_nfs boolean.
++ /var/run/pcscd(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/pcscd\.events(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/pcscd\.pid
++.br
++ /var/run/pcscd\.pub
++.br
++ /var/run/pcscd\.comm
++.br
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P virt_use_nfs 1
-+.EE
++.br
++.B security_t
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined virtual guests to use serial/parallel communication ports, you must turn on the virt_use_comm boolean.
++ /selinux
++.br
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P virt_use_comm 1
-+.EE
++.br
++.B sysfs_t
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined virtual guests to interact with the xserver, you must turn on the virt_use_xserver boolean.
++ /sys(/.*)?
++.br
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P virt_use_xserver 1
-+.EE
++.br
++.B systemd_passwd_var_run_t
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined virtual guests to manage device configuration, (pci), you must turn on the virt_use_sysfs boolean.
++ /var/run/systemd/ask-password(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/systemd/ask-password-block(/.*)?
++.br
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P virt_use_sysfs 1
-+.EE
++.br
++.B user_fonts_t
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined virtual guests to interact with the sanlock, you must turn on the virt_use_sanlock boolean.
++ /root/\.fonts(/.*)?
++.br
++ /tmp/\.font-unix(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.fonts(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.fonts(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.fonts(/.*)?
++.br
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P virt_use_sanlock 1
-+.EE
++.br
++.B user_tmp_t
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined virtual guests to use executable memory and executable stack, you must turn on the virt_use_execmem boolean.
++ /var/run/user(/.*)?
++.br
++ /tmp/gconfd-.*
++.br
++ /tmp/gconfd-dwalsh
++.br
++ /tmp/gconfd-xguest
++.br
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P virt_use_execmem 1
-+.EE
++.br
++.B user_tmpfs_type
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined virtual guests to read fuse files, you must turn on the virt_use_fusefs boolean.
++ all user content in tmpfs file systems
++.br
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P virt_use_fusefs 1
-+.EE
++.br
++.B var_auth_t
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined virtual guests to use usb devices, you must turn on the virt_use_usb boolean.
++ /var/ace(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/rsa(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/abl(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/rsa(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/pam_ssh(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/pam_ssh(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/pam_shield(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/google-authenticator(/.*)?
++.br
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P virt_use_usb 1
-+.EE
++.br
++.B wtmp_t
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined virtual guests to manage cifs files, you must turn on the virt_use_samba boolean.
++ /var/log/wtmp.*
++.br
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P virt_use_samba 1
-+.EE
++.br
++.B xauth_home_t
++
++ /root/\.xauth.*
++.br
++ /root/\.Xauth.*
++.br
++ /root/\.serverauth.*
++.br
++ /root/\.Xauthority.*
++.br
++ /var/lib/pqsql/\.xauth.*
++.br
++ /var/lib/pqsql/\.Xauthority.*
++.br
++ /var/lib/nxserver/home/\.xauth.*
++.br
++ /var/lib/nxserver/home/\.Xauthority.*
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.xauth.*
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.Xauth.*
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.serverauth.*
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.Xauthority.*
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.xauth.*
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.Xauth.*
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.serverauth.*
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.Xauthority.*
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.xauth.*
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.Xauth.*
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.serverauth.*
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.Xauthority.*
++.br
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++.br
++.B xdm_home_t
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the virtd_t, virtd_lxc_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++ /root/\.dmrc.*
++.br
++ /root/\.xsession-errors.*
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.dmrc.*
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.cache/gdm(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.xsession-errors.*
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.dmrc.*
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.cache/gdm(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.xsession-errors.*
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.dmrc.*
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.cache/gdm(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.xsession-errors.*
++.br
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
++.br
++.B xdm_lock_t
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the virtd_t, virtd_lxc_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
-+.EE
++.br
++.B xdm_log_t
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux virtd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their virtd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for virtd:
++ /var/log/[mg]dm(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/log/[mkwx]dm\.log.*
++.br
++ /var/log/lxdm\.log.*
++.br
++ /var/log/slim\.log
++.br
+
++.br
++.B xdm_rw_etc_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B virtd_exec_t
-+.EE
++ /etc/X11/wdm(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/opt/VirtualGL(/.*)?
++.br
+
-+- Set files with the virtd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the virtd_t domain.
++.br
++.B xdm_spool_t
+
++ /var/spool/[mg]dm(/.*)?
+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/sbin/condor_vm-gahp, /usr/bin/imagefactory, /usr/bin/vios-proxy-host, /usr/bin/imgfac\.py, /usr/bin/vios-proxy-guest, /usr/bin/nova-compute, /usr/sbin/libvirtd
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B virtd_initrc_exec_t
-+.EE
++.br
++.B xdm_tmp_t
+
-+- Set files with the virtd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the virtd_initrc_t domain.
++ /tmp/\.X11-unix(/.*)?
++.br
++ /tmp/\.ICE-unix(/.*)?
++.br
++ /tmp/\.X0-lock
++.br
+
++.br
++.B xdm_tmpfs_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B virtd_keytab_t
-+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the virtd_keytab_t type, if you want to treat the files as kerberos keytab files.
++.br
++.B xdm_var_lib_t
+
++ /var/lib/[mxkwg]dm(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/cache/[mg]dm(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/lxdm(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/lightdm(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/cache/lightdm(/.*)?
++.br
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B virtd_lxc_exec_t
-+.EE
++.br
++.B xdm_var_run_t
+
-+- Set files with the virtd_lxc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the virtd_lxc_t domain.
++ /etc/kde[34]?/kdm/backgroundrc
++.br
++ /var/run/[gx]dm\.pid
++.br
++ /var/run/[kgm]dm(/.*)?
++.br
++ /usr/lib/qt-.*/etc/settings(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/slim.*
++.br
++ /var/run/lxdm(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/slim(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/xauth(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/xdmctl(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/lightdm(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/systemd/multi-session-x(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/lxdm\.pid
++.br
++ /var/run/lxdm\.auth
++.br
++ /var/run/gdm_socket
++.br
+
++.br
++.B xkb_var_lib_t
+
-+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
++ /var/lib/xkb(/.*)?
++.br
++ /usr/X11R6/lib/X11/xkb/.*
++.br
++ /usr/X11R6/lib/X11/xkb
++.br
+
-+.SH PORT TYPES
-+SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
-+.PP
-+You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
++.br
++.B xserver_log_t
+
-+.B semanage port -l
++ /var/[xgkw]dm(/.*)?
++.br
++ /usr/var/[xgkw]dm(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/log/Xorg.*
++.br
++ /var/log/XFree86.*
++.br
++ /var/log/lightdm(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/log/nvidia-installer\.log.*
++.br
+
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
-+SELinux virtd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their virtd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following port types are defined for virtd:
++.br
++.B xserver_tmpfs_t
+
-+.EX
-+.TP 5
-+.B virt_migration_port_t
-+.TP 10
-+.EE
+
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
-+Default Defined Ports:
-+tcp 49152-49216
-+.EE
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the xdm_dbusd_t, xdm_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.TP 5
-+.B virt_port_t
-+.TP 10
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
+
-+
-+Default Defined Ports:
-+tcp 16509,16514
-+.EE
-+udp 16509,16514
-+.EE
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux virtd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their virtd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for virtd:
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the xdm_dbusd_t, xdm_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B virtd_lxc_t, virt_qmf_t, virt_bridgehelper_t, virtd_t
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -58010,89 +106038,128 @@ index 0000000..196fc17
+can also be used to manipulate the booleans
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), virtd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
++selinux(8), xdm(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+, setsebool(8)
\ No newline at end of file
-diff --git a/man/man8/vlock_selinux.8 b/man/man8/vlock_selinux.8
+diff --git a/man/man8/xenconsoled_selinux.8 b/man/man8/xenconsoled_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..3db3dd5
+index 0000000..9d5fe35
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/vlock_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
-+.TH "vlock_selinux" "8" "vlock" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "vlock SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/xenconsoled_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,126 @@
++.TH "xenconsoled_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "xenconsoled" "SELinux Policy documentation for xenconsoled"
+.SH "NAME"
-+vlock_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the vlock processes
++xenconsoled_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the xenconsoled processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the vlock processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the xenconsoled processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The xenconsoled processes execute with the xenconsoled_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the vlock_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep xenconsoled_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The xenconsoled_t SELinux type can be entered via the "xenconsoled_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the xenconsoled_t domain are the following:"
+
++/usr/sbin/xenconsoled
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the vlock_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux xenconsoled policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their xenconsoled processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for xenconsoled:
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B xenconsoled_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux vlock policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their vlock processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for vlock:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux xenconsoled policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their xenconsoled processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for xenconsoled:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B vlock_exec_t
++.B xenconsoled_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the vlock_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the vlock_t domain.
++- Set files with the xenconsoled_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the xenconsoled_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B xenconsoled_var_run_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the xenconsoled_var_run_t type, if you want to store the xenconsoled files under the /run directory.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux vlock policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their vlock processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for vlock:
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+.EX
-+.B vlock_t
-+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++The SELinux process type xenconsoled_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B sysfs_t
++
++ /sys(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B xenconsoled_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/xenconsoled\.pid
++.br
++
++.br
++.B xend_var_log_t
++
++ /var/log/xen(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/log/xend\.log.*
++.br
++ /var/log/xend-debug\.log.*
++.br
++ /var/log/xen-hotplug\.log.*
++.br
++
++.br
++.B xenfs_t
++
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -58105,367 +106172,323 @@ index 0000000..3db3dd5
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), vlock(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/vmware_selinux.8 b/man/man8/vmware_selinux.8
++selinux(8), xenconsoled(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/xend_selinux.8 b/man/man8/xend_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..ab1f549
+index 0000000..b211bcb
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/vmware_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,169 @@
-+.TH "vmware_selinux" "8" "vmware" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "vmware SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/xend_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,330 @@
++.TH "xend_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "xend" "SELinux Policy documentation for xend"
+.SH "NAME"
-+vmware_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the vmware processes
++xend_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the xend processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the vmware processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the xend processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The xend processes execute with the xend_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux vmware policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their vmware processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for vmware:
++For example:
+
++.B ps -eZ | grep xend_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B vmware_conf_t
-+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the vmware_conf_t type, if you want to treat the files as vmware configuration data, usually stored under the /etc directory.
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
++The xend_t SELinux type can be entered via the "xend_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the xend_t domain are the following:"
+
-+.EX
++/usr/sbin/xend
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+.B vmware_exec_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the vmware_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the vmware_t domain.
-+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/sbin/vmware-serverd, /usr/lib/vmware/bin/vmware-mks, /usr/lib/vmware/bin/vmplayer, /usr/bin/vmware-ping, /usr/lib/vmware/bin/vmware-ui, /usr/bin/vmware-wizard, /usr/bin/vmware
-+
-+.EX
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+.B vmware_file_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the vmware_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as vmware content.
-+
-+
-+.EX
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux xend policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their xend processes in as secure a method as possible.
+.PP
-+.B vmware_host_exec_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the vmware_host_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the vmware_host_t domain.
-+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/bin/vmware-smbpasswd\.bin, /usr/bin/vmware-smbd, /usr/lib/vmware-tools/sbin64/vmware.*, /usr/bin/vmnet-dhcpd, /usr/bin/vmnet-bridge, /usr/bin/vmware-nmbd, /usr/bin/vmnet-netifup, /usr/sbin/vmware-guest.*, /usr/lib/vmware/bin/vmware-vmx, /usr/bin/vmnet-natd, /usr/bin/vmware-vmx, /usr/bin/vmware-network, /usr/bin/vmnet-sniffer, /usr/bin/vmware-smbpasswd, /usr/lib/vmware-tools/sbin32/vmware.*
++The following process types are defined for xend:
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B vmware_host_pid_t
++.B xend_t, xenstored_t, xenconsoled_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
-+- Set files with the vmware_host_pid_t type, if you want to store the vmware host files under the /run directory.
++.SH BOOLEANS
++SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. xend policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run xend with the tightest access possible.
+
+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B vmware_host_tmp_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the vmware_host_tmp_t type, if you want to store vmware host temporary files in the /tmp directories.
-+
++If you want to allow xend to run blktapctrl/tapdisk. Not required if using dedicated logical volumes for disk images, you must turn on the xend_run_blktap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B vmware_log_t
++.B setsebool -P xend_run_blktap 1
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the vmware_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as vmware log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
-+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/log/vmware.*, /var/log/vnetlib.*
++.PP
++If you want to allow xen to manage nfs files, you must turn on the xen_use_nfs boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B vmware_pid_t
++.B setsebool -P xen_use_nfs 1
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the vmware_pid_t type, if you want to store the vmware files under the /run directory.
-+
++.PP
++If you want to allow xend to run qemu-dm. Not required if using paravirt and no vfb, you must turn on the xend_run_qemu boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B vmware_sys_conf_t
++.B setsebool -P xend_run_qemu 1
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the vmware_sys_conf_t type, if you want to treat the files as vmware sys configuration data, usually stored under the /etc directory.
-+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/lib/vmware/config, /etc/vmware.*(/.*)?
++.PP
++If you want to allow xend to run blktapctrl/tapdisk. Not required if using dedicated logical volumes for disk images, you must turn on the xend_run_blktap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B vmware_tmp_t
++.B setsebool -P xend_run_blktap 1
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the vmware_tmp_t type, if you want to store vmware temporary files in the /tmp directories.
-+
++.PP
++If you want to allow xen to manage nfs files, you must turn on the xen_use_nfs boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B vmware_tmpfs_t
++.B setsebool -P xen_use_nfs 1
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the vmware_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store vmware files on a tmpfs file system.
-+
-+
-+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
-+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux vmware policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their vmware processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for vmware:
++If you want to allow xend to run qemu-dm. Not required if using paravirt and no vfb, you must turn on the xend_run_qemu boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B vmware_t, vmware_host_t
++.B setsebool -P xend_run_qemu 1
+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
-+.SH "COMMANDS"
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
-+.B semanage permissive
-+can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+.B semanage module
-+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
-+
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux xend policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their xend processes in as secure a method as possible.
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
-+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
-+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
-+
-+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), vmware(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/vnstat_selinux.8 b/man/man8/vnstat_selinux.8
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..90431d7
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/vnstat_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
-+.TH "vnstat_selinux" "8" "vnstat" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "vnstat SELinux Policy documentation"
-+.SH "NAME"
-+vnstat_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the vnstat processes
-+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
-+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the vnstat processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++The following file types are defined for xend:
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.EX
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux vnstat policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their vnstat processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for vnstat:
++.B xend_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the xend_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the xend_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B vnstat_exec_t
++.B xend_tmp_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the vnstat_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the vnstat_t domain.
++- Set files with the xend_tmp_t type, if you want to store xend temporary files in the /tmp directories.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B vnstatd_exec_t
++.B xend_var_lib_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the vnstatd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the vnstatd_t domain.
++- Set files with the xend_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the xend files under the /var/lib directory.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B vnstatd_var_lib_t
++.B xend_var_log_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the vnstatd_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the vnstatd files under the /var/lib directory.
++- Set files with the xend_var_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as xend var log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B vnstatd_var_run_t
++.B xend_var_run_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the vnstatd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the vnstatd files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the xend_var_run_t type, if you want to store the xend files under the /run directory.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.SH PORT TYPES
++SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
++
++.B semanage port -l
++
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux vnstat policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their vnstat processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for vnstat:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
++SELinux xend policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their xend processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following port types are defined for xend:
+
+.EX
-+.B vnstat_t, vnstatd_t
++.TP 5
++.B xen_port_t
++.TP 10
+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
-+.SH "COMMANDS"
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
-+.PP
-+.B semanage permissive
-+can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
-+.PP
-+.B semanage module
-+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
-+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
-+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++Default Defined Ports:
++tcp 8002
++.EE
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++The SELinux process type xend_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
-+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), vnstat(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/vnstatd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/vnstatd_selinux.8
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..7fdefeb
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/vnstatd_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
-+.TH "vnstatd_selinux" "8" "vnstatd" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "vnstatd SELinux Policy documentation"
-+.SH "NAME"
-+vnstatd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the vnstatd processes
-+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++.br
++.B dhcp_etc_t
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the vnstatd processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++ /etc/dhcpc.*
++.br
++ /etc/dhcp3(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/dhcpd(6)?\.conf
++.br
++ /etc/dhcp3?/dhclient.*
++.br
++ /etc/dhclient.*conf
++.br
++ /etc/dhcp/dhcpd(6)?\.conf
++.br
++ /etc/dhclient-script
++.br
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++.br
++.B etc_runtime_t
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux vnstatd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their vnstatd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for vnstatd:
++ /[^/]+
++.br
++ /etc/mtab.*
++.br
++ /etc/blkid(/.*)?
++.br
++ /etc/nologin.*
++.br
++ /etc/\.fstab\.hal\..+
++.br
++ /halt
++.br
++ /fastboot
++.br
++ /poweroff
++.br
++ /etc/cmtab
++.br
++ /\.autofsck
++.br
++ /forcefsck
++.br
++ /\.suspended
++.br
++ /fsckoptions
++.br
++ /\.autorelabel
++.br
++ /etc/securetty
++.br
++ /etc/killpower
++.br
++ /etc/nohotplug
++.br
++ /etc/ioctl\.save
++.br
++ /etc/fstab\.REVOKE
++.br
++ /etc/network/ifstate
++.br
++ /etc/sysconfig/hwconf
++.br
++ /etc/ptal/ptal-printd-like
++.br
++ /etc/sysconfig/iptables\.save
++.br
++ /etc/xorg\.conf\.d/00-system-setup-keyboard\.conf
++.br
++ /etc/X11/xorg\.conf\.d/00-system-setup-keyboard\.conf
++.br
+
++.br
++.B sysfs_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B vnstatd_exec_t
-+.EE
++ /sys(/.*)?
++.br
+
-+- Set files with the vnstatd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the vnstatd_t domain.
++.br
++.B xen_image_t
+
++ /xen(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xen/images(/.*)?
++.br
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B vnstatd_var_lib_t
-+.EE
++.br
++.B xend_tmp_t
+
-+- Set files with the vnstatd_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the vnstatd files under the /var/lib directory.
+
++.br
++.B xend_var_lib_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B vnstatd_var_run_t
-+.EE
++ /var/lib/xen(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xend(/.*)?
++.br
+
-+- Set files with the vnstatd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the vnstatd files under the /run directory.
++.br
++.B xend_var_log_t
+
++ /var/log/xen(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/log/xend\.log.*
++.br
++ /var/log/xend-debug\.log.*
++.br
++ /var/log/xen-hotplug\.log.*
++.br
+
-+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
++.br
++.B xend_var_run_t
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux vnstatd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their vnstatd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for vnstatd:
++ /var/run/xend(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/xenner(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/xend\.pid
++.br
+
-+.EX
-+.B vnstat_t, vnstatd_t
-+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++.br
++.B xenfs_t
++
++
++.br
++.B xenstored_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/xenstored(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/xenstore\.pid
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -58477,108 +106500,157 @@ index 0000000..7fdefeb
+.B semanage module
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
++.B semanage port
++can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
++
++.B semanage boolean
++can also be used to manipulate the booleans
++
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), vnstatd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/vpnc_selinux.8 b/man/man8/vpnc_selinux.8
++selinux(8), xend(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, setsebool(8), xenconsoled_selinux(8), xenstored_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/xenstored_selinux.8 b/man/man8/xenstored_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..3c115fb
+index 0000000..5ad6f42
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/vpnc_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,107 @@
-+.TH "vpnc_selinux" "8" "vpnc" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "vpnc SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/xenstored_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,148 @@
++.TH "xenstored_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "xenstored" "SELinux Policy documentation for xenstored"
+.SH "NAME"
-+vpnc_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the vpnc processes
++xenstored_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the xenstored processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the vpnc processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the xenstored processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The xenstored processes execute with the xenstored_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the vpnc_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep xenstored_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
++The xenstored_t SELinux type can be entered via the "xenstored_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the xenstored_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/sbin/xenstored
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the vpnc_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux xenstored policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their xenstored processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for xenstored:
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B xenstored_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux vpnc policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their vpnc processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for vpnc:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux xenstored policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their xenstored processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for xenstored:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B vpnc_exec_t
++.B xenstored_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the vpnc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the vpnc_t domain.
++- Set files with the xenstored_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the xenstored_t domain.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/sbin/vpnc, /usr/bin/openconnect, /sbin/vpnc
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B vpnc_tmp_t
++.B xenstored_tmp_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the vpnc_tmp_t type, if you want to store vpnc temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++- Set files with the xenstored_tmp_t type, if you want to store xenstored temporary files in the /tmp directories.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B vpnc_var_run_t
++.B xenstored_var_lib_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the vpnc_var_run_t type, if you want to store the vpnc files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the xenstored_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the xenstored files under the /var/lib directory.
+
+
++.EX
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
++.B xenstored_var_log_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the xenstored_var_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as xenstored var log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux vpnc policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their vpnc processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for vpnc:
+
+.EX
-+.B vpnc_t
++.PP
++.B xenstored_var_run_t
+.EE
++
++- Set files with the xenstored_var_run_t type, if you want to store the xenstored files under the /run directory.
++
++
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type xenstored_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B xenfs_t
++
++
++.br
++.B xenstored_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B xenstored_var_lib_t
++
++ /var/lib/xenstored(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B xenstored_var_log_t
++
++
++.br
++.B xenstored_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/xenstored(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/xenstore\.pid
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -58591,443 +106663,341 @@ index 0000000..3c115fb
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), vpnc(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/wdmd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/wdmd_selinux.8
++selinux(8), xenstored(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/xguest_selinux.8 b/man/man8/xguest_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..3ad930d
+index 0000000..9a09106
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/wdmd_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
-+.TH "wdmd_selinux" "8" "wdmd" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "wdmd SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/xguest_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,345 @@
++.TH "xguest_selinux" "8" "xguest" "mgrepl at redhat.com" "xguest SELinux Policy documentation"
+.SH "NAME"
-+wdmd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the wdmd processes
-+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++xguest_u \- \fBLeast privledge xwindows user role\fP - Security Enhanced Linux Policy
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the wdmd processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++.SH DESCRIPTION
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++\fBxguest_u\fP is an SELinux User defined in the SELinux
++policy. SELinux users have default roles, \fBxguest_r\fP. The
++default role has a default type, \fBxguest_t\fP, associated with it.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the wdmd_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++The SELinux user will usually login to a system with a context that looks like:
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
++.B xguest_u:xguest_r:xguest_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the wdmd_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++Linux users are automatically assigned an SELinux users at login.
++Login programs use the SELinux User to assign initial context to the user's shell.
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
-+.EE
++SELinux policy uses the context to control the user's access.
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux wdmd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their wdmd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for wdmd:
++By default all users are assigned to the SELinux user via the \fB__default__\fP flag
+
++On Targeted policy systems the \fB__default__\fP user is assigned to the \fBunconfined_u\fP SELinux user.
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B wdmd_exec_t
-+.EE
++You can list all Linux User to SELinux user mapping using:
+
-+- Set files with the wdmd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the wdmd_t domain.
++.B semanage login -l
+
++If you wanted to change the default user mapping to use the xguest_u user, you would execute:
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B wdmd_initrc_exec_t
-+.EE
++.B semanage login -m -s xguest_u __default__
+
-+- Set files with the wdmd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the wdmd_initrc_t domain.
+
++If you want to map the one Linux user (joe) to the SELinux user xguest, you would execute:
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B wdmd_var_run_t
-+.EE
++.B $ semanage login -a -s xguest_u joe
+
-+- Set files with the wdmd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the wdmd files under the /run directory.
+
++.SH USER DESCRIPTION
+
-+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
++The SELinux user xguest_u is defined in policy as a unprivileged user. SELinux prevents unprivileged users from doing administration tasks without transitioning to a different role.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux wdmd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their wdmd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for wdmd:
++.SH SUDO
+
-+.EX
-+.B wdmd_t
-+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++.SH X WINDOWS LOGIN
+
-+.SH "COMMANDS"
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
-+.PP
-+.B semanage permissive
-+can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
-+.PP
-+.B semanage module
-+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++The SELinux user xguest_u is able to X Windows login.
+
-+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
-+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++.SH NETWORK
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.TP
++The SELinux user xguest_u is able to connect to the following tcp ports.
+
-+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), wdmd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/webadm_selinux.8 b/man/man8/webadm_selinux.8
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..072a0c0
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/webadm_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
-+.TH "webadm_selinux" "8" "webadm" "mgrepl at redhat.com" "webadm SELinux Policy documentation"
-+.SH "NAME"
-+webadm_r \- \fBWeb administrator role\fP - Security Enhanced Linux Policy
++.B dns_port_t: 53
+
-+.SH DESCRIPTION
++.B all ports with out defined types
+
-+SELinux supports Roles Based Access Control, some Linux roles are login roles, while other roles need to be transition to.
++.B ftp_port_t: 21,990
+
-+Note: The examples in the man page will user the staff_u user.
++.B speech_port_t: 8036
+
-+Non login roles are usually used for administrative tasks.
++.B http_cache_port_t: 8080,8118,10001-10010
+
-+Roles usually have default types assigned to them.
++.B http_port_t: 80,81,443,488,8008,8009,8443
+
-+The default type for the webadm_r role is webadm_t.
++.B ocsp_port_t: 9080
+
-+You can use the
-+.B newrole
-+program to transition directly to this role.
++.B squid_port_t: 3128,3401,4827
+
-+.B newrole -r webadm_r -t webadm_t
++.B ephemeral_port_t: 32768-61000
+
-+.B sudo
-+can also be setup to transition to this role using the visudo command.
++.B kerberos_port_t: 88,750,4444
+
-+USERNAME ALL=(ALL) ROLE=webadm_r TYPE=webadm_t COMMAND
-+.br
-+sudo will run COMMAND as staff_u:webadm_r:webadm_t:LEVEL
++.B pulseaudio_port_t: 4713
+
-+If you want to use a non login role, you need to make sure the SELinux user you are using can reach this role.
++.B flash_port_t: 843,1935
+
-+You can see all of the assigned SELinux roles using the following
++.B soundd_port_t: 8000,9433,16001
+
-+.B semanage user -l
++.B commplex_port_t: 5001
+
-+If you wanted to add webadm_r to the staff_u user, you would execute:
++.B ipp_port_t: 631,8610-8614
+
-+.B $ semanage user -m -R 'staff_r webadm_r' staff_u
++.B transproxy_port_t: 8081
+
++.TP
++The SELinux user xguest_u is able to connect to the following tcp ports.
+
++.B dns_port_t: 53
+
-+SELinux policy also controls which roles can transition to a different role.
-+You can list these rules using the following command.
++.B all ports with out defined types
+
-+.B sesearch --role_allow
++.B ftp_port_t: 21,990
+
-+SELinux policy allows the staff_r role can transition to the webadm_r role.
++.B speech_port_t: 8036
+
++.B http_cache_port_t: 8080,8118,10001-10010
+
-+.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B http_port_t: 80,81,443,488,8008,8009,8443
+
-+.B semanage login
-+can also be used to manipulate the Linux User to SELinux User mappings
++.B ocsp_port_t: 9080
+
-+.B semanage user
-+can also be used to manipulate SELinux user definitions.
++.B squid_port_t: 3128,3401,4827
+
-+.B system-config-selinux
-+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++.B ephemeral_port_t: 32768-61000
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genuserman.py.
++.B kerberos_port_t: 88,750,4444
+
-+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), semanage(8).
-diff --git a/man/man8/webalizer_selinux.8 b/man/man8/webalizer_selinux.8
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..67e4921
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/webalizer_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
-+.TH "webalizer_selinux" "8" "webalizer" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "webalizer SELinux Policy documentation"
-+.SH "NAME"
-+webalizer_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the webalizer processes
-+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++.B pulseaudio_port_t: 4713
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the webalizer processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++.B flash_port_t: 843,1935
++
++.B soundd_port_t: 8000,9433,16001
++
++.B commplex_port_t: 5001
++
++.B ipp_port_t: 631,8610-8614
++
++.B transproxy_port_t: 8081
++
++.SH BOOLEANS
++SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. xguest policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run xguest with the tightest access possible.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the webalizer_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++If you want to allow xguest users to mount removable media, you must turn on the xguest_mount_media boolean.
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.B setsebool -P xguest_mount_media 1
+.EE
+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the webalizer_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++If you want to allow xguest users to configure Network Manager and connect to apache ports, you must turn on the xguest_connect_network boolean.
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B setsebool -P xguest_connect_network 1
+.EE
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux webalizer policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their webalizer processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for webalizer:
-+
++If you want to allow xguest to use blue tooth devices, you must turn on the xguest_use_bluetooth boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B webalizer_etc_t
++.B setsebool -P xguest_use_bluetooth 1
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the webalizer_etc_t type, if you want to store webalizer files in the /etc directories.
-+
++.PP
++If you want to allow xguest users to mount removable media, you must turn on the xguest_mount_media boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B webalizer_exec_t
++.B setsebool -P xguest_mount_media 1
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the webalizer_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the webalizer_t domain.
-+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/bin/webalizer, /usr/bin/awffull
++.PP
++If you want to allow xguest users to configure Network Manager and connect to apache ports, you must turn on the xguest_connect_network boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B webalizer_tmp_t
++.B setsebool -P xguest_connect_network 1
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the webalizer_tmp_t type, if you want to store webalizer temporary files in the /tmp directories.
-+
++.PP
++If you want to allow xguest to use blue tooth devices, you must turn on the xguest_use_bluetooth boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B webalizer_usage_t
++.B setsebool -P xguest_use_bluetooth 1
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the webalizer_usage_t type, if you want to treat the files as webalizer usage data.
++.SH HOME_EXEC
+
++The SELinux user xguest_u is able execute home content files.
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B webalizer_var_lib_t
-+.EE
++.SH TRANSITIONS
+
-+- Set files with the webalizer_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the webalizer files under the /var/lib directory.
++Three things can happen when xguest_t attempts to execute a program.
+
++\fB1.\fP SELinux Policy can deny xguest_t from executing the program.
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B webalizer_write_t
-+.EE
++.TP
+
-+- Set files with the webalizer_write_t type, if you want to treat the files as webalizer read/write content.
++\fB2.\fP SELinux Policy can allow xguest_t to execute the program in the current user type.
+
++Execute the following to see the types that the SELinux user xguest_t can execute without transitioning:
+
-+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
++.B search -A -s xguest_t -c file -p execute_no_trans
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux webalizer policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their webalizer processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for webalizer:
++.TP
+
-+.EX
-+.B webalizer_t
-+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++\fB3.\fP SELinux can allow xguest_t to execute the program and transition to a new type.
+
-+.SH "COMMANDS"
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
-+.PP
-+.B semanage permissive
-+can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
-+.PP
-+.B semanage module
-+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++Execute the following to see the types that the SELinux user xguest_t can execute and transition:
+
-+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
-+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++.B $ search -A -s xguest_t -c process -p transition
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
+
-+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), webalizer(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/winbind_selinux.8 b/man/man8/winbind_selinux.8
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..663ec66
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/winbind_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,130 @@
-+.TH "winbind_selinux" "8" "winbind" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "winbind SELinux Policy documentation"
-+.SH "NAME"
-+winbind_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the winbind processes
-+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the winbind processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++The SELinux process type xguest_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
-+.SH BOOLEANS
-+SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. winbind policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run winbind with the tightest access possible.
++.br
++.B anon_inodefs_t
+
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow Apache to use mod_auth_ntlm_winbind, you must turn on the httpd_mod_auth_ntlm_winbind boolean.
++.br
++.B auth_cache_t
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P httpd_mod_auth_ntlm_winbind 1
-+.EE
++ /var/cache/coolkey(/.*)?
++.br
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++.br
++.B chrome_sandbox_tmpfs_t
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the winbind_helper_t, winbind_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
++.br
++.B httpd_user_content_t
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the winbind_helper_t, winbind_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++ /home/[^/]*/((www)|(web)|(public_html))(/.+)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/((www)|(web)|(public_html))(/.+)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/((www)|(web)|(public_html))(/.+)?
++.br
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
-+.EE
++.br
++.B httpd_user_htaccess_t
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux winbind policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their winbind processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for winbind:
++ /home/[^/]*/((www)|(web)|(public_html))(/.*)?/\.htaccess
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/((www)|(web)|(public_html))(/.*)?/\.htaccess
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/((www)|(web)|(public_html))(/.*)?/\.htaccess
++.br
++
++.br
++.B httpd_user_ra_content_t
+
++ /home/[^/]*/((www)|(web)|(public_html))(/.*)?/logs(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/((www)|(web)|(public_html))(/.*)?/logs(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/((www)|(web)|(public_html))(/.*)?/logs(/.*)?
++.br
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B winbind_exec_t
-+.EE
++.br
++.B httpd_user_rw_content_t
+
-+- Set files with the winbind_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the winbind_t domain.
+
++.br
++.B httpd_user_script_exec_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B winbind_helper_exec_t
-+.EE
++ /home/[^/]*/((www)|(web)|(public_html))/cgi-bin(/.+)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/((www)|(web)|(public_html))/cgi-bin(/.+)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/((www)|(web)|(public_html))/cgi-bin(/.+)?
++.br
+
-+- Set files with the winbind_helper_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the winbind_helper_t domain.
++.br
++.B noxattrfs
+
++ all files on file systems which do not support extended attributes
++.br
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B winbind_log_t
-+.EE
++.br
++.B usbfs_t
+
-+- Set files with the winbind_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as winbind log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
+
++.br
++.B user_fonts_cache_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B winbind_var_run_t
-+.EE
++ /root/\.fontconfig(/.*)?
++.br
++ /root/\.fonts/auto(/.*)?
++.br
++ /root/\.fonts\.cache-.*
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.fontconfig(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.fonts/auto(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.fonts\.cache-.*
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.fontconfig(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.fonts/auto(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.fonts\.cache-.*
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.fontconfig(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.fonts/auto(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.fonts\.cache-.*
++.br
+
-+- Set files with the winbind_var_run_t type, if you want to store the winbind files under the /run directory.
++.br
++.B user_home_type
+
++ all user home files
+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/cache/samba/winbindd_privileged(/.*)?, /var/lib/samba/winbindd_privileged(/.*)?, /var/run/winbindd(/.*)?, /var/run/samba/winbindd(/.*)?
+
-+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
++.br
++.B user_tmp_type
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux winbind policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their winbind processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for winbind:
++ all user tmp files
++.br
+
-+.EX
-+.B winbind_helper_t, winbind_t
-+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++.br
++.B user_tmpfs_type
++
++ all user content in tmpfs file systems
++.br
++
++.br
++.B xdm_tmp_t
++
++ /tmp/\.X11-unix(/.*)?
++.br
++ /tmp/\.ICE-unix(/.*)?
++.br
++ /tmp/\.X0-lock
++.br
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -59043,676 +107013,575 @@ index 0000000..663ec66
+can also be used to manipulate the booleans
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), winbind(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
++selinux(8), xguest(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+, setsebool(8)
\ No newline at end of file
-diff --git a/man/man8/wine_selinux.8 b/man/man8/wine_selinux.8
+diff --git a/man/man8/xserver_selinux.8 b/man/man8/xserver_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..10fe614
+index 0000000..936e2de
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/wine_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
-+.TH "wine_selinux" "8" "wine" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "wine SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/xserver_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,416 @@
++.TH "xserver_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "xserver" "SELinux Policy documentation for xserver"
+.SH "NAME"
-+wine_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the wine processes
++xserver_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the xserver processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the wine processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the xserver processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH BOOLEANS
-+SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. wine policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run wine with the tightest access possible.
++The xserver processes execute with the xserver_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
++For example:
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to ignore wine mmap_zero errors, you must turn on the wine_mmap_zero_ignore boolean.
++.B ps -eZ | grep xserver_t
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P wine_mmap_zero_ignore 1
-+.EE
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++The xserver_t SELinux type can be entered via the "xserver_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the xserver_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/bin/Xair, /usr/bin/Xorg, /usr/bin/Xephyr, /usr/X11R6/bin/X, /usr/X11R6/bin/Xorg, /usr/X11R6/bin/Xipaq, /usr/X11R6/bin/XFree86, /usr/X11R6/bin/Xwrapper, /etc/init\.d/xfree86-common
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux wine policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their wine processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for wine:
-+
-+
-+.EX
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux xserver policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their xserver processes in as secure a method as possible.
+.PP
-+.B wine_exec_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the wine_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the wine_t domain.
-+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/opt/google/picasa(/.*)?/bin/msiexec, /usr/bin/regedit, /opt/google/picasa(/.*)?/bin/wine.*, /opt/google/picasa(/.*)?/bin/notepad, /opt/google/picasa(/.*)?/bin/regedit, /usr/bin/regsvr32, /usr/bin/uninstaller, /opt/google/picasa(/.*)?/bin/uninstaller, /opt/google/picasa(/.*)?/bin/wdi, /opt/google/picasa(/.*)?/bin/regsvr32, /usr/bin/msiexec, /opt/google/picasa(/.*)?/Picasa3/.*exe, /opt/teamviewer(/.*)?/bin/wine.*, /usr/bin/wine.*, /opt/google/picasa(/.*)?/bin/progman, /opt/picasa/wine/bin/wine.*, /usr/bin/notepad, /opt/cxoffice/bin/wine.*
++The following process types are defined for xserver:
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B wine_tmp_t
++.B xserver_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
-+- Set files with the wine_tmp_t type, if you want to store wine temporary files in the /tmp directories.
-+
++.SH BOOLEANS
++SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. xserver policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run xserver with the tightest access possible.
+
-+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux wine policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their wine processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for wine:
++If you want to support X userspace object manager, you must turn on the xserver_object_manager boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B wine_t
++.B setsebool -P xserver_object_manager 1
+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
-+.SH "COMMANDS"
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
+.PP
-+.B semanage permissive
-+can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++If you want to allow confined virtual guests to interact with the xserver, you must turn on the virt_use_xserver boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P virt_use_xserver 1
++.EE
++
+.PP
-+.B semanage module
-+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++If you want to allows clients to write to the X server shared memory segments, you must turn on the xserver_clients_write_xshm boolean.
+
-+.B semanage boolean
-+can also be used to manipulate the booleans
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P xserver_clients_write_xshm 1
++.EE
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
-+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++If you want to allows XServer to execute writable memory, you must turn on the xserver_execmem boolean.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P xserver_execmem 1
++.EE
+
-+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), wine(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-+, setsebool(8)
-\ No newline at end of file
-diff --git a/man/man8/wireshark_selinux.8 b/man/man8/wireshark_selinux.8
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..c7544cc
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/wireshark_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
-+.TH "wireshark_selinux" "8" "wireshark" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "wireshark SELinux Policy documentation"
-+.SH "NAME"
-+wireshark_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the wireshark processes
-+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++.PP
++If you want to support X userspace object manager, you must turn on the xserver_object_manager boolean.
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the wireshark processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P xserver_object_manager 1
++.EE
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++.PP
++If you want to allow confined virtual guests to interact with the xserver, you must turn on the virt_use_xserver boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P virt_use_xserver 1
++.EE
+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the wireshark_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++If you want to allows clients to write to the X server shared memory segments, you must turn on the xserver_clients_write_xshm boolean.
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.B setsebool -P xserver_clients_write_xshm 1
+.EE
+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the wireshark_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++If you want to allows XServer to execute writable memory, you must turn on the xserver_execmem boolean.
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B setsebool -P xserver_execmem 1
+.EE
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux wireshark policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their wireshark processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for wireshark:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux xserver policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their xserver processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for xserver:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B wireshark_exec_t
++.B xserver_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the wireshark_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the wireshark_t domain.
++- Set files with the xserver_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the xserver_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B wireshark_home_t
++.B xserver_log_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the wireshark_home_t type, if you want to store wireshark files in the users home directory.
++- Set files with the xserver_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as xserver log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B wireshark_tmp_t
++.B xserver_tmpfs_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the wireshark_tmp_t type, if you want to store wireshark temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++- Set files with the xserver_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store xserver files on a tmpfs file system.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B wireshark_tmpfs_t
++.B xserver_var_lib_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the wireshark_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store wireshark files on a tmpfs file system.
++- Set files with the xserver_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the xserver files under the /var/lib directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B xserver_var_run_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the xserver_var_run_t type, if you want to store the xserver files under the /run directory.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.SH PORT TYPES
++SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
++
++.B semanage port -l
++
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux wireshark policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their wireshark processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for wireshark:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
++SELinux xserver policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their xserver processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following port types are defined for xserver:
+
+.EX
-+.B wireshark_t
++.TP 5
++.B xserver_port_t
++.TP 10
+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
-+.SH "COMMANDS"
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
-+.PP
-+.B semanage permissive
-+can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
-+.PP
-+.B semanage module
-+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
-+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
-+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
++Default Defined Ports:
++tcp 6000-6020
++.EE
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++The SELinux process type xserver_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
-+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), wireshark(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/wpa_selinux.8 b/man/man8/wpa_selinux.8
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..2d45137
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/wpa_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
-+.TH "wpa_selinux" "8" "wpa" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "wpa SELinux Policy documentation"
-+.SH "NAME"
-+wpa_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the wpa processes
-+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++.br
++.B bluetooth_helper_tmpfs_t
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the wpa processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++.br
++.B chrome_sandbox_tmpfs_t
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux wpa policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their wpa processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for wpa:
+
++.br
++.B consolekit_tmpfs_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B wpa_cli_exec_t
-+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the wpa_cli_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the wpa_cli_t domain.
++.br
++.B games_tmpfs_t
++
+
+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/sbin/wpa_cli, /sbin/wpa_cli
++.B gpg_pinentry_tmpfs_t
+
-+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux wpa policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their wpa processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for wpa:
++.br
++.B mozilla_tmpfs_t
+
-+.EX
-+.B wpa_cli_t
-+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
-+.SH "COMMANDS"
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
-+.PP
-+.B semanage permissive
-+can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
-+.PP
-+.B semanage module
-+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++.br
++.B mplayer_tmpfs_t
+
-+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
-+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.br
++.B mtrr_device_t
+
-+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), wpa(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/xauth_selinux.8 b/man/man8/xauth_selinux.8
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..cd01807
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/xauth_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
-+.TH "xauth_selinux" "8" "xauth" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "xauth SELinux Policy documentation"
-+.SH "NAME"
-+xauth_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the xauth processes
-+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++ /dev/cpu/mtrr
++.br
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the xauth processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++.br
++.B pulseaudio_tmpfs_t
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the xauth_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++.br
++.B rhgb_tmpfs_t
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the xauth_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++.br
++.B sandbox_xserver_tmpfs_t
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
-+.EE
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux xauth policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their xauth processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for xauth:
++.br
++.B security_t
+
++ /selinux
++.br
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B xauth_exec_t
-+.EE
++.br
++.B ssh_tmpfs_t
+
-+- Set files with the xauth_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the xauth_t domain.
+
+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/bin/xauth, /usr/X11R6/bin/xauth
++.B sysfs_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B xauth_home_t
-+.EE
++ /sys(/.*)?
++.br
+
-+- Set files with the xauth_home_t type, if you want to store xauth files in the users home directory.
++.br
++.B tmpfs_t
+
++ /dev/shm
++.br
++ /lib/udev/devices/shm
++.br
++ /usr/lib/udev/devices/shm
+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/lib/nxserver/home/\.xauth.*, /root/\.Xauth.*, /var/lib/nxserver/home/\.Xauthority.*, /root/\.Xauthority.*, /root/\.serverauth.*, /var/lib/pqsql/\.Xauthority.*, /root/\.xauth.*, /var/lib/pqsql/\.xauth.*
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B xauth_tmp_t
-+.EE
++.br
++.B tvtime_tmpfs_t
+
-+- Set files with the xauth_tmp_t type, if you want to store xauth temporary files in the /tmp directories.
+
++.br
++.B user_fonts_cache_t
+
-+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
-+.B restorecon
-+to apply the labels.
++ /root/\.fontconfig(/.*)?
++.br
++ /root/\.fonts/auto(/.*)?
++.br
++ /root/\.fonts\.cache-.*
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.fontconfig(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.fonts/auto(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/[^/]*/\.fonts\.cache-.*
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.fontconfig(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.fonts/auto(/.*)?
++.br
++ /home/dwalsh/\.fonts\.cache-.*
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.fontconfig(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.fonts/auto(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/xguest/home/xguest/\.fonts\.cache-.*
++.br
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux xauth policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their xauth processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for xauth:
++.br
++.B user_tmpfs_t
+
-+.EX
-+.B xauth_t
-+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++ /dev/shm/mono.*
++.br
++ /dev/shm/pulse-shm.*
++.br
+
-+.SH "COMMANDS"
-+.B semanage fcontext
-+can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
-+.PP
-+.B semanage permissive
-+can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
-+.PP
-+.B semanage module
-+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++.br
++.B vmware_tmpfs_t
+
-+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
-+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.br
++.B wireshark_tmpfs_t
+
-+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), xauth(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/xdm_selinux.8 b/man/man8/xdm_selinux.8
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..8fdf373
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/xdm_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,257 @@
-+.TH "xdm_selinux" "8" "xdm" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "xdm SELinux Policy documentation"
-+.SH "NAME"
-+xdm_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the xdm processes
-+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the xdm processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++.br
++.B xdm_log_t
+
-+.SH BOOLEANS
-+SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. xdm policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run xdm with the tightest access possible.
++ /var/log/[mg]dm(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/log/[mkwx]dm\.log.*
++.br
++ /var/log/lxdm\.log.*
++.br
++ /var/log/slim\.log
++.br
+
++.br
++.B xdm_tmp_t
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow the graphical login program to login directly as sysadm_r:sysadm_t, you must turn on the xdm_sysadm_login boolean.
++ /tmp/\.X11-unix(/.*)?
++.br
++ /tmp/\.ICE-unix(/.*)?
++.br
++ /tmp/\.X0-lock
++.br
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P xdm_sysadm_login 1
-+.EE
++.br
++.B xdm_tmpfs_t
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow the graphical login program to execute bootloader, you must turn on the xdm_exec_bootloader boolean.
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P xdm_exec_bootloader 1
-+.EE
++.br
++.B xkb_var_lib_t
++
++ /var/lib/xkb(/.*)?
++.br
++ /usr/X11R6/lib/X11/xkb/.*
++.br
++ /usr/X11R6/lib/X11/xkb
++.br
++
++.br
++.B xserver_log_t
++
++ /var/[xgkw]dm(/.*)?
++.br
++ /usr/var/[xgkw]dm(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/log/Xorg.*
++.br
++ /var/log/XFree86.*
++.br
++ /var/log/lightdm(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/log/nvidia-installer\.log.*
++.br
++
++.br
++.B xserver_tmpfs_t
++
++
++.br
++.B xserver_var_lib_t
++
++ /var/lib/xorg(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B xserver_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/xorg(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/video.rom
++.br
+
+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the xdm_dbusd_t, xdm_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the xserver_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the xdm_dbusd_t, xdm_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the xserver_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
+.EE
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux xdm policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their xdm processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for xdm:
-+
-+
-+.EX
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
+.PP
-+.B xdm_etc_t
-+.EE
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
-+- Set files with the xdm_etc_t type, if you want to store xdm files in the /etc directories.
++.B semanage port
++can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
+
++.B semanage boolean
++can also be used to manipulate the booleans
+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B xdm_exec_t
-+.EE
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+- Set files with the xdm_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the xdm_t domain.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/bin/slim, /usr/(s)?bin/lightdm*, /usr/(s)?bin/[mxgkw]dm, /usr/sbin/mdm-binary, /usr/(s)?bin/lxdm(-binary)?, /usr/X11R6/bin/[xgkw]dm, /usr/(s)?bin/gdm-binary, /usr/bin/gpe-dm, /opt/kde3/bin/kdm
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), xserver(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, setsebool(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/ypbind_selinux.8 b/man/man8/ypbind_selinux.8
+index 5061a5f..017254a 100644
+--- a/man/man8/ypbind_selinux.8
++++ b/man/man8/ypbind_selinux.8
+@@ -1,19 +1,138 @@
+-.TH "ypbind_selinux" "8" "17 Jan 2005" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "ypbind Selinux Policy documentation"
++.TH "ypbind_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "ypbind" "SELinux Policy documentation for ypbind"
+ .SH "NAME"
+-ypbind_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for NIS.
++ypbind_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the ypbind processes
+ .SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
+-Security-Enhanced Linux secures the system via flexible mandatory access
+-control. SELinux can be setup deny NIS from working, since it requires daemons to be allowed greater access to the network.
+-.SH BOOLEANS
+-.TP
+-You must set the allow_ypbind boolean to allow your system to work properly in a NIS environment.
+-.TP
+-setsebool -P allow_ypbind 1
+-.TP
+-system-config-selinux is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+-.SH AUTHOR
+-This manual page was written by Dan Walsh <dwalsh at redhat.com>.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the ypbind processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B xdm_home_t
-+.EE
++The ypbind processes execute with the ypbind_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+- Set files with the xdm_home_t type, if you want to store xdm files in the users home directory.
++For example:
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/root/\.xsession-errors.*, /root/\.dmrc.*
++.B ps -eZ | grep ypbind_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B xdm_lock_t
-+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the xdm_lock_t type, if you want to treat the files as xdm lock data, stored under the /var/lock directory
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
++The ypbind_t SELinux type can be entered via the "ypbind_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the ypbind_t domain are the following:"
+
-+.EX
++/sbin/ypbind, /usr/sbin/ypbind
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+.B xdm_log_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the xdm_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as xdm log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
-+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/log/slim\.log, /var/log/lxdm\.log.*, /var/log/[mg]dm(/.*)?, /var/log/[mkwx]dm\.log.*
-+
-+.EX
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+.B xdm_rw_etc_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the xdm_rw_etc_t type, if you want to store xdm rw files in the /etc directories.
-+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/etc/opt/VirtualGL(/.*)?, /etc/X11/wdm(/.*)?
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux ypbind policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ypbind processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for ypbind:
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B xdm_spool_t
++.B ypbind_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
-+- Set files with the xdm_spool_t type, if you want to store the xdm files under the /var/spool directory.
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux ypbind policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ypbind processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for ypbind:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B xdm_tmp_t
++.B ypbind_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the xdm_tmp_t type, if you want to store xdm temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++- Set files with the ypbind_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ypbind_t domain.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/tmp/\.X0-lock, /tmp/\.X11-unix(/.*)?, /tmp/\.ICE-unix(/.*)?
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B xdm_tmpfs_t
++.B ypbind_initrc_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the xdm_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store xdm files on a tmpfs file system.
++- Set files with the ypbind_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ypbind_initrc_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B xdm_unconfined_exec_t
++.B ypbind_tmp_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the xdm_unconfined_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the xdm_unconfined_t domain.
++- Set files with the ypbind_tmp_t type, if you want to store ypbind temporary files in the /tmp directories.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/etc/[mg]dm/Init(/.*)?, /etc/[mg]dm/PreSession(/.*)?, /etc/[mg]dm/PostLogin(/.*)?, /etc/[mg]dm/PostSession(/.*)?
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B xdm_var_lib_t
++.B ypbind_unit_file_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the xdm_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the xdm files under the /var/lib directory.
++- Set files with the ypbind_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as ypbind unit content.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/lib/lightdm(/.*)?, /var/cache/lightdm(/.*)?, /var/lib/[mxkwg]dm(/.*)?, /var/lib/lxdm(/.*)?, /var/cache/[mg]dm(/.*)?
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B xdm_var_run_t
++.B ypbind_var_run_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the xdm_var_run_t type, if you want to store the xdm files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the ypbind_var_run_t type, if you want to store the ypbind files under the /run directory.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/etc/kde[34]?/kdm/backgroundrc, /var/run/slim.*, /var/run/lxdm(/.*)?, /usr/lib/qt-.*/etc/settings(/.*)?, /var/run/lxdm\.auth, /var/run/systemd/multi-session-x(/.*)?, /var/run/xauth(/.*)?, /var/run/xdmctl(/.*)?, /var/run/[gx]dm\.pid, /var/run/[kgm]dm(/.*)?, /var/run/slim(/.*)?, /var/run/gdm_socket, /var/run/lxdm\.pid, /var/run/lightdm(/.*)?
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PORT TYPES
-+SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
-+.PP
-+You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+.B semanage port -l
++The SELinux process type ypbind_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
-+SELinux xdm policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their xdm processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following port types are defined for xdm:
++.br
++.B var_yp_t
+
-+.EX
-+.TP 5
-+.B xdmcp_port_t
-+.TP 10
-+.EE
++ /var/yp(/.*)?
++.br
+
++.br
++.B ypbind_tmp_t
+
-+Default Defined Ports:
-+tcp 177
-+.EE
-+udp 177
-+.EE
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux xdm policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their xdm processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for xdm:
+
-+.EX
-+.B xdm_t, xdm_dbusd_t
-+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++.br
++.B ypbind_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/ypbind.*
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -59724,90 +107593,126 @@ index 0000000..8fdf373
+.B semanage module
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
-+.B semanage port
-+can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
-+
-+.B semanage boolean
-+can also be used to manipulate the booleans
-+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
-+
-+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), xdm(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-+, setsebool(8)
-\ No newline at end of file
-diff --git a/man/man8/xenconsoled_selinux.8 b/man/man8/xenconsoled_selinux.8
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+ .SH "SEE ALSO"
+-selinux(8), ypbind(8), chcon(1), setsebool(8)
++selinux(8), ypbind(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/yppasswdd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/yppasswdd_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..ace8c33
+index 0000000..dc85345
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/xenconsoled_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
-+.TH "xenconsoled_selinux" "8" "xenconsoled" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "xenconsoled SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/yppasswdd_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,124 @@
++.TH "yppasswdd_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "yppasswdd" "SELinux Policy documentation for yppasswdd"
+.SH "NAME"
-+xenconsoled_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the xenconsoled processes
++yppasswdd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the yppasswdd processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the xenconsoled processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the yppasswdd processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The yppasswdd processes execute with the yppasswdd_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep yppasswdd_t
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The yppasswdd_t SELinux type can be entered via the "yppasswdd_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the yppasswdd_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/sbin/rpc\.yppasswdd, /usr/sbin/rpc\.yppasswdd\.env
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux yppasswdd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their yppasswdd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for yppasswdd:
++
++.EX
++.B yppasswdd_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux xenconsoled policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their xenconsoled processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for xenconsoled:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux yppasswdd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their yppasswdd processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for yppasswdd:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B xenconsoled_exec_t
++.B yppasswdd_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the xenconsoled_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the xenconsoled_t domain.
++- Set files with the yppasswdd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the yppasswdd_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B xenconsoled_var_run_t
++.B yppasswdd_var_run_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the xenconsoled_var_run_t type, if you want to store the xenconsoled files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the yppasswdd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the yppasswdd files under the /run directory.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux xenconsoled policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their xenconsoled processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for xenconsoled:
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+.EX
-+.B xenconsoled_t
-+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++The SELinux process type yppasswdd_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B shadow_t
++
++ /etc/shadow.*
++.br
++ /etc/gshadow.*
++.br
++ /var/db/shadow.*
++.br
++ /etc/security/opasswd
++.br
++ /etc/security/opasswd\.old
++.br
++
++.br
++.B var_yp_t
++
++ /var/yp(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B yppasswdd_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/yppass.*
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -59820,165 +107725,130 @@ index 0000000..ace8c33
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), xenconsoled(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/xend_selinux.8 b/man/man8/xend_selinux.8
++selinux(8), yppasswdd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/ypserv_selinux.8 b/man/man8/ypserv_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..6d13960
+index 0000000..b34ed73
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/xend_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,172 @@
-+.TH "xend_selinux" "8" "xend" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "xend SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/ypserv_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,130 @@
++.TH "ypserv_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "ypserv" "SELinux Policy documentation for ypserv"
+.SH "NAME"
-+xend_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the xend processes
++ypserv_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the ypserv processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the xend processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the ypserv processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH BOOLEANS
-+SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. xend policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run xend with the tightest access possible.
++The ypserv processes execute with the ypserv_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
++For example:
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow xen to manage nfs files, you must turn on the xen_use_nfs boolean.
++.B ps -eZ | grep ypserv_t
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P xen_use_nfs 1
-+.EE
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow xend to run qemu-dm. Not required if using paravirt and no vfb, you must turn on the xend_run_qemu boolean.
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P xend_run_qemu 1
-+.EE
++The ypserv_t SELinux type can be entered via the "ypserv_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the ypserv_t domain are the following:"
+
++/usr/sbin/ypserv
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow xend to run blktapctrl/tapdisk. Not required if using dedicated logical volumes for disk images, you must turn on the xend_run_blktap boolean.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux ypserv policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ypserv processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for ypserv:
+
+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P xend_run_blktap 1
++.B ypserv_t
+.EE
-+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux xend policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their xend processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for xend:
-+
-+
-+.EX
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux ypserv policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ypserv processes in as secure a method as possible.
+.PP
-+.B xend_exec_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the xend_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the xend_t domain.
++The following file types are defined for ypserv:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B xend_tmp_t
++.B ypserv_conf_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the xend_tmp_t type, if you want to store xend temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++- Set files with the ypserv_conf_t type, if you want to treat the files as ypserv configuration data, usually stored under the /etc directory.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B xend_var_lib_t
++.B ypserv_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the xend_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the xend files under the /var/lib directory.
++- Set files with the ypserv_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ypserv_t domain.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/lib/xen(/.*)?, /var/lib/xend(/.*)?
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B xend_var_log_t
++.B ypserv_tmp_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the xend_var_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as xend var log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++- Set files with the ypserv_tmp_t type, if you want to store ypserv temporary files in the /tmp directories.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/log/xen-hotplug\.log.*, /var/log/xen(/.*)?, /var/log/xend-debug\.log.*, /var/log/xend\.log.*
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B xend_var_run_t
++.B ypserv_var_run_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the xend_var_run_t type, if you want to store the xend files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the ypserv_var_run_t type, if you want to store the ypserv files under the /run directory.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/run/xenner(/.*)?, /var/run/xend(/.*)?, /var/run/xend\.pid
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PORT TYPES
-+SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
-+.PP
-+You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+.B semanage port -l
++The SELinux process type ypserv_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
-+SELinux xend policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their xend processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following port types are defined for xend:
++.br
++.B var_yp_t
+
-+.EX
-+.TP 5
-+.B xen_port_t
-+.TP 10
-+.EE
++ /var/yp(/.*)?
++.br
+
++.br
++.B ypserv_tmp_t
+
-+Default Defined Ports:
-+tcp 8002
-+.EE
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux xend policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their xend processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for xend:
+
-+.EX
-+.B xend_t, xenstored_t, xenconsoled_t
-+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++.br
++.B ypserv_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/ypserv.*
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -59990,118 +107860,111 @@ index 0000000..6d13960
+.B semanage module
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
-+.B semanage port
-+can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
-+
-+.B semanage boolean
-+can also be used to manipulate the booleans
-+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), xend(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-+, setsebool(8)
-\ No newline at end of file
-diff --git a/man/man8/xenstored_selinux.8 b/man/man8/xenstored_selinux.8
++selinux(8), ypserv(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/ypxfr_selinux.8 b/man/man8/ypxfr_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..6143bee
+index 0000000..ca3f8ec
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/xenstored_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
-+.TH "xenstored_selinux" "8" "xenstored" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "xenstored SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/ypxfr_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,110 @@
++.TH "ypxfr_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "ypxfr" "SELinux Policy documentation for ypxfr"
+.SH "NAME"
-+xenstored_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the xenstored processes
++ypxfr_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the ypxfr processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the xenstored processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the ypxfr processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The ypxfr processes execute with the ypxfr_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux xenstored policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their xenstored processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for xenstored:
++For example:
+
++.B ps -eZ | grep ypxfr_t
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B xenstored_exec_t
-+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the xenstored_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the xenstored_t domain.
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
++The ypxfr_t SELinux type can be entered via the "ypxfr_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the ypxfr_t domain are the following:"
+
-+.EX
++/usr/lib/yp/ypxfr, /usr/sbin/rpc\.ypxfrd
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+.B xenstored_tmp_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the xenstored_tmp_t type, if you want to store xenstored temporary files in the /tmp directories.
-+
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux ypxfr policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ypxfr processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for ypxfr:
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B xenstored_var_lib_t
++.B ypxfr_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
-+- Set files with the xenstored_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the xenstored files under the /var/lib directory.
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux ypxfr policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ypxfr processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for ypxfr:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B xenstored_var_log_t
++.B ypxfr_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the xenstored_var_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as xenstored var log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++- Set files with the ypxfr_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ypxfr_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B xenstored_var_run_t
++.B ypxfr_var_run_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the xenstored_var_run_t type, if you want to store the xenstored files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the ypxfr_var_run_t type, if you want to store the ypxfr files under the /run directory.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/run/xenstore\.pid, /var/run/xenstored(/.*)?
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux xenstored policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their xenstored processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for xenstored:
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+.EX
-+.B xenstored_t
-+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++The SELinux process type ypxfr_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B var_yp_t
++
++ /var/yp(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B ypxfr_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/ypxfrd.*
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -60114,423 +107977,394 @@ index 0000000..6143bee
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), xenstored(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/xguest_selinux.8 b/man/man8/xguest_selinux.8
++selinux(8), ypxfr(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/zabbix_agent_selinux.8 b/man/man8/zabbix_agent_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..2478817
+index 0000000..e7df99d
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/xguest_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,231 @@
-+.TH "xguest_selinux" "8" "xguest" "mgrepl at redhat.com" "xguest SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/zabbix_agent_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,141 @@
++.TH "zabbix_agent_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "zabbix_agent" "SELinux Policy documentation for zabbix_agent"
+.SH "NAME"
-+xguest_u \- \fBLeast privledge xwindows user role\fP - Security Enhanced Linux Policy
-+
-+.SH DESCRIPTION
-+
-+\fBxguest_u\fP is an SELinux User defined in the SELinux
-+policy. SELinux users have default roles, \fBxguest_r\fP. The
-+default role has a default type, \fBxguest_t\fP, associated with it.
-+
-+The SELinux user will usually login to a system with a context that looks like:
-+
-+.B xguest_u:xguest_r:xguest_u:s0-s0:c0.c1023
-+
-+Linux users are automatically assigned an SELinux users at login.
-+Login programs use the SELinux User to assign initial context to the user's shell.
-+
-+SELinux policy uses the context to control the user's access.
-+
-+By default all users are assigned to the SELinux user via the \fB__default__\fP flag
-+
-+On Targeted policy systems the \fB__default__\fP user is assigned to the \fBunconfined_u\fP SELinux user.
-+
-+You can list all Linux User to SELinux user mapping using:
-+
-+.B semanage login -l
-+
-+If you wanted to change the default user mapping to use the xguest_u user, you would execute:
-+
-+.B semanage login -m -s xguest_u __default__
-+
-+
-+If you want to map the one Linux user (joe) to the SELinux user xguest, you would execute:
-+
-+.B $ semanage login -a -s xguest_u joe
-+
-+
-+.SH USER DESCRIPTION
-+
-+The SELinux user xguest_u is defined in policy as a unprivileged user. SELinux prevents unprivileged users from doing administration tasks without transitioning to a different role.
-+
-+.SH SUDO
-+
-+The SELinux type xguest_t is not allowed to execute sudo.
-+
-+.SH X WINDOWS LOGIN
-+
-+The SELinux user xguest_u is able to X Windows login.
-+
-+.SH TERMINAL LOGIN
-+
-+The SELinux user xguest_u is able to terminal login.
-+
-+.SH NETWORK
-+
-+.TP
-+The SELinux user xguest_u is able to connect to the following tcp ports.
-+
-+.B dns_port_t: 53
-+
-+.B ipp_port_t: 631,8610-8614
-+
-+.B transproxy_port_t: 8081
-+
-+.B ocsp_port_t: 9080
-+
-+.B kerberos_port_t: 88,750,4444
-+
-+.B all ports with out defined types
-+
-+.B ftp_port_t: 21,990
-+
-+.B speech_port_t: 8036
-+
-+.B squid_port_t: 3128,3401,4827
++zabbix_agent_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the zabbix_agent processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+.B http_cache_port_t: 8080,8118,8123,10001-10010
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the zabbix_agent processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.B http_port_t: 80,443,488,8008,8009,8443
++The zabbix_agent processes execute with the zabbix_agent_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.B flash_port_t: 843,1935
++For example:
+
-+.B pulseaudio_port_t: 4713
++.B ps -eZ | grep zabbix_agent_t
+
-+.B soundd_port_t: 8000,9433,16001
+
-+.SH BOOLEANS
-+SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. xguest_t policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run xguest_t with the tightest access possible.
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
++The zabbix_agent_t SELinux type can be entered via the "zabbix_agent_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the zabbix_agent_t domain are the following:"
+
++/usr/(s)?bin/zabbix_agentd
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow xguest users to configure Network Manager and connect to apache ports, you must turn on the xguest_connect_network boolean.
-+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P xguest_connect_network 1
-+.EE
-+
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to connect to the local mysql server, you must turn on the allow_user_mysql_connect boolean.
-+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P allow_user_mysql_connect 1
-+.EE
-+
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux zabbix_agent policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their zabbix_agent processes in as secure a method as possible.
+.PP
-+If you want to control users use of ping and traceroute, you must turn on the user_ping boolean.
++The following process types are defined for zabbix_agent:
+
+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P user_ping 1
++.B zabbix_agent_t
+.EE
-+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow w to display everyone, you must turn on the user_ttyfile_stat boolean.
-+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P user_ttyfile_stat 1
-+.EE
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
-+If you want to allow user music sharing, you must turn on the user_share_music boolean.
-+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P user_share_music 1
-+.EE
-+
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+If you want to allow regular users direct dri device access, you must turn on the user_direct_dri boolean.
-+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P user_direct_dri 1
-+.EE
-+
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux zabbix_agent policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their zabbix_agent processes in as secure a method as possible.
+.PP
-+If you want to allow xguest users to use blue tooth devices, you must turn on the xguest_use_bluetooth boolean.
-+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P xguest_use_bluetooth 1
-+.EE
++The following file types are defined for zabbix_agent:
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow user to r/w files on filesystems that do not have extended attributes (FAT, CDROM, FLOPPY), you must turn on the user_rw_noexattrfile boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P user_rw_noexattrfile 1
-+.EE
-+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to run TCP servers (bind to ports and accept connection from the same domain and outside users) disabling this forces FTP passive mode and may change other protocols, you must turn on the user_tcp_server boolean.
-+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P user_tcp_server 1
++.B zabbix_agent_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow regular users direct mouse access, you must turn on the user_direct_mouse boolean.
++- Set files with the zabbix_agent_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the zabbix_agent_t domain.
++
+
+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P user_direct_mouse 1
++.PP
++.B zabbix_agent_initrc_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow user processes to change their priority, you must turn on the user_setrlimit boolean.
++- Set files with the zabbix_agent_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the zabbix_agent_initrc_t domain.
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P user_setrlimit 1
-+.EE
+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to connect to PostgreSQL, you must turn on the allow_user_postgresql_connect boolean.
-+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P allow_user_postgresql_connect 1
-+.EE
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
+
++.SH PORT TYPES
++SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
+.PP
-+If you want to allow xguest users to mount removable media, you must turn on the xguest_mount_media boolean.
++You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P xguest_mount_media 1
-+.EE
++.B semanage port -l
+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to read system messages, you must turn on the user_dmesg boolean.
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
++SELinux zabbix_agent policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their zabbix_agent processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following port types are defined for zabbix_agent:
+
+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P user_dmesg 1
++.TP 5
++.B zabbix_agent_port_t
++.TP 10
+.EE
+
-+.SH HOME_EXEC
-+
-+The SELinux user xguest_u is able execute home content files.
-+
-+.SH TRANSITIONS
-+
-+Three things can happen when xguest_t attempts to execute a program.
-+
-+\fB1.\fP SELinux Policy can deny xguest_t from executing the program.
+
-+.TP
++Default Defined Ports:
++tcp 10050
++.EE
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+\fB2.\fP SELinux Policy can allow xguest_t to execute the program in the current user type.
++The SELinux process type zabbix_agent_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
-+Execute the following to see the types that the SELinux user xguest_t can execute without transitioning:
++.br
++.B zabbix_log_t
+
-+.B sesearch -A -s xguest_t -c file -p execute_no_trans
++ /var/log/zabbix(/.*)?
++.br
+
-+.TP
++.br
++.B zabbix_tmpfs_t
+
-+\fB3.\fP SELinux can allow xguest_t to execute the program and transition to a new type.
+
-+Execute the following to see the types that the SELinux user xguest_t can execute and transition:
++.br
++.B zabbix_var_run_t
+
-+.B $ sesearch -A -s xguest_t -c process -p transition
++ /var/run/zabbix(/.*)?
++.br
+
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
-+.B semanage login
-+can also be used to manipulate the Linux User to SELinux User mappings
-+
-+.B semanage user
-+can also be used to manipulate SELinux user definitions.
++.B semanage port
++can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
+
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genuserman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), semanage(8).
-diff --git a/man/man8/xserver_selinux.8 b/man/man8/xserver_selinux.8
++selinux(8), zabbix_agent(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, zabbix_selinux(8), zabbix_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/zabbix_selinux.8 b/man/man8/zabbix_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..ac568e6
+index 0000000..ed7cfcc
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/xserver_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,193 @@
-+.TH "xserver_selinux" "8" "xserver" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "xserver SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/zabbix_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,253 @@
++.TH "zabbix_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "zabbix" "SELinux Policy documentation for zabbix"
+.SH "NAME"
-+xserver_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the xserver processes
++zabbix_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the zabbix processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the xserver processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the zabbix processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH BOOLEANS
-+SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. xserver policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run xserver with the tightest access possible.
++The zabbix processes execute with the zabbix_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep zabbix_t
+
+
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The zabbix_t SELinux type can be entered via the "zabbix_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the zabbix_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/(s)?bin/zabbix_server, /usr/sbin/zabbix_server_mysql, /usr/sbin/zabbix_server_pgsql, /usr/sbin/zabbix_server_sqlite3
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to support X userspace object manager, you must turn on the xserver_object_manager boolean.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux zabbix policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their zabbix processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for zabbix:
+
+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P xserver_object_manager 1
++.B zabbix_agent_t, zabbix_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++
++.SH BOOLEANS
++SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. zabbix policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run zabbix with the tightest access possible.
++
+
+.PP
-+If you want to allows XServer to execute writable memory, you must turn on the xserver_execmem boolean.
++If you want to allow zabbix to connect to unreserved ports, you must turn on the zabbix_can_network boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P xserver_execmem 1
++.B setsebool -P zabbix_can_network 1
+.EE
+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined virtual guests to interact with the xserver, you must turn on the virt_use_xserver boolean.
++If you want to allow http daemon to connect to zabbix, you must turn on the httpd_can_connect_zabbix boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P virt_use_xserver 1
++.B setsebool -P httpd_can_connect_zabbix 1
+.EE
+
+.PP
-+If you want to allows clients to write to the X server shared memory segments, you must turn on the xserver_clients_write_xshm boolean.
++If you want to allow zabbix to connect to unreserved ports, you must turn on the zabbix_can_network boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P xserver_clients_write_xshm 1
++.B setsebool -P zabbix_can_network 1
+.EE
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
-+
+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the xserver_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++If you want to allow http daemon to connect to zabbix, you must turn on the httpd_can_connect_zabbix boolean.
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.B setsebool -P httpd_can_connect_zabbix 1
+.EE
+
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the xserver_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux zabbix policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their zabbix processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for zabbix:
++
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.PP
++.B zabbix_agent_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++- Set files with the zabbix_agent_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the zabbix_agent_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.B zabbix_agent_initrc_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the zabbix_agent_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the zabbix_agent_initrc_t domain.
++
++
++.EX
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux xserver policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their xserver processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for xserver:
++.B zabbix_exec_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the zabbix_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the zabbix_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B xserver_exec_t
++.B zabbix_initrc_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the xserver_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the xserver_t domain.
++- Set files with the zabbix_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the zabbix_initrc_t domain.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/bin/Xair, /usr/X11R6/bin/Xwrapper, /usr/X11R6/bin/XFree86, /etc/init\.d/xfree86-common, /usr/X11R6/bin/Xorg, /usr/X11R6/bin/Xipaq, /usr/bin/Xephyr, /usr/bin/Xorg, /usr/X11R6/bin/X
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B xserver_log_t
++.B zabbix_log_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the xserver_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as xserver log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++- Set files with the zabbix_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as zabbix log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/log/lightdm(/.*)?, /usr/var/[xgkw]dm(/.*)?, /var/log/nvidia-installer\.log.*, /var/[xgkw]dm(/.*)?, /var/log/XFree86.*, /var/log/Xorg.*
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B xserver_tmpfs_t
++.B zabbix_tmp_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the xserver_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store xserver files on a tmpfs file system.
++- Set files with the zabbix_tmp_t type, if you want to store zabbix temporary files in the /tmp directories.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B xserver_var_lib_t
++.B zabbix_tmpfs_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the xserver_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the xserver files under the /var/lib directory.
++- Set files with the zabbix_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store zabbix files on a tmpfs file system.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B xserver_var_run_t
++.B zabbix_var_run_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the xserver_var_run_t type, if you want to store the xserver files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the zabbix_var_run_t type, if you want to store the zabbix files under the /run directory.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/run/xorg(/.*)?, /var/run/video.rom
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
+.SH PORT TYPES
-+SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
++SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
+.PP
-+You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
++You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
+
+.B semanage port -l
+
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
-+SELinux xserver policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their xserver processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following port types are defined for xserver:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
++SELinux zabbix policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their zabbix processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following port types are defined for zabbix:
+
+.EX
+.TP 5
-+.B xserver_port_t
++.B zabbix_agent_port_t
+.TP 10
+.EE
+
+
+Default Defined Ports:
-+tcp 6000-6020
++tcp 10050
+.EE
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++
++.EX
++.TP 5
++.B zabbix_port_t
++.TP 10
++.EE
++
++
++Default Defined Ports:
++tcp 10051
++.EE
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type zabbix_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B zabbix_log_t
++
++ /var/log/zabbix(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B zabbix_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B zabbix_tmpfs_t
++
++
++.br
++.B zabbix_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/zabbix(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux xserver policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their xserver processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for xserver:
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the zabbix_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B xserver_t
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
++
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the zabbix_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -60549,121 +108383,146 @@ index 0000000..ac568e6
+can also be used to manipulate the booleans
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), xserver(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-+, setsebool(8)
++selinux(8), zabbix(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, setsebool(8), zabbix_agent_selinux(8)
\ No newline at end of file
-diff --git a/man/man8/ypbind_selinux.8 b/man/man8/ypbind_selinux.8
-index 5061a5f..a89264a 100644
---- a/man/man8/ypbind_selinux.8
-+++ b/man/man8/ypbind_selinux.8
-@@ -1,19 +1,109 @@
--.TH "ypbind_selinux" "8" "17 Jan 2005" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "ypbind Selinux Policy documentation"
-+.TH "ypbind_selinux" "8" "ypbind" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "ypbind SELinux Policy documentation"
- .SH "NAME"
--ypbind_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for NIS.
-+ypbind_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the ypbind processes
- .SH "DESCRIPTION"
-
--Security-Enhanced Linux secures the system via flexible mandatory access
--control. SELinux can be setup deny NIS from working, since it requires daemons to be allowed greater access to the network.
--.SH BOOLEANS
--.TP
--You must set the allow_ypbind boolean to allow your system to work properly in a NIS environment.
--.TP
--setsebool -P allow_ypbind 1
--.TP
--system-config-selinux is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the ypbind processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
+diff --git a/man/man8/zarafa_deliver_selinux.8 b/man/man8/zarafa_deliver_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..a840dc6
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/zarafa_deliver_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,145 @@
++.TH "zarafa_deliver_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "zarafa_deliver" "SELinux Policy documentation for zarafa_deliver"
++.SH "NAME"
++zarafa_deliver_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the zarafa_deliver processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the zarafa_deliver processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++The zarafa_deliver processes execute with the zarafa_deliver_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep zarafa_deliver_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The zarafa_deliver_t SELinux type can be entered via the "zarafa_deliver_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the zarafa_deliver_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/bin/zarafa-dagent
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux ypbind policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ypbind processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for ypbind:
-+
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux zarafa_deliver policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their zarafa_deliver processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for zarafa_deliver:
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B ypbind_exec_t
++.B zarafa_deliver_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
-+- Set files with the ypbind_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ypbind_t domain.
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux zarafa_deliver policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their zarafa_deliver processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for zarafa_deliver:
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/sbin/ypbind, /sbin/ypbind
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B ypbind_initrc_exec_t
++.B zarafa_deliver_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the ypbind_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ypbind_initrc_t domain.
++- Set files with the zarafa_deliver_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the zarafa_deliver_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B ypbind_tmp_t
++.B zarafa_deliver_log_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the ypbind_tmp_t type, if you want to store ypbind temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++- Set files with the zarafa_deliver_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as zarafa deliver log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B ypbind_unit_file_t
++.B zarafa_deliver_tmp_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the ypbind_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as ypbind unit content.
++- Set files with the zarafa_deliver_tmp_t type, if you want to store zarafa deliver temporary files in the /tmp directories.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B ypbind_var_run_t
++.B zarafa_deliver_var_run_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the ypbind_var_run_t type, if you want to store the ypbind files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the zarafa_deliver_var_run_t type, if you want to store the zarafa deliver files under the /run directory.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type zarafa_deliver_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B zarafa_deliver_log_t
++
++ /var/log/zarafa/dagent\.log.*
++.br
++
++.br
++.B zarafa_deliver_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B zarafa_deliver_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/zarafa-dagent\.pid
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux ypbind policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ypbind processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for ypbind:
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the zarafa_deliver_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B ypbind_t
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
++
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the zarafa_deliver_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -60676,87 +108535,134 @@ index 5061a5f..a89264a 100644
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
- .SH AUTHOR
--This manual page was written by Dan Walsh <dwalsh at redhat.com>.
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
-
- .SH "SEE ALSO"
--selinux(8), ypbind(8), chcon(1), setsebool(8)
-+selinux(8), ypbind(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/yppasswdd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/yppasswdd_selinux.8
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
++
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), zarafa_deliver(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, zarafa_gateway_selinux(8), zarafa_ical_selinux(8), zarafa_indexer_selinux(8), zarafa_monitor_selinux(8), zarafa_server_selinux(8), zarafa_spooler_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/zarafa_gateway_selinux.8 b/man/man8/zarafa_gateway_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..2881e38
+index 0000000..e4eeeb5
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/yppasswdd_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
-+.TH "yppasswdd_selinux" "8" "yppasswdd" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "yppasswdd SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/zarafa_gateway_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,133 @@
++.TH "zarafa_gateway_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "zarafa_gateway" "SELinux Policy documentation for zarafa_gateway"
+.SH "NAME"
-+yppasswdd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the yppasswdd processes
++zarafa_gateway_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the zarafa_gateway processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the yppasswdd processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the zarafa_gateway processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The zarafa_gateway processes execute with the zarafa_gateway_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep zarafa_gateway_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The zarafa_gateway_t SELinux type can be entered via the "zarafa_gateway_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the zarafa_gateway_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/bin/zarafa-gateway
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux zarafa_gateway policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their zarafa_gateway processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for zarafa_gateway:
++
++.EX
++.B zarafa_gateway_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux yppasswdd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their yppasswdd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for yppasswdd:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux zarafa_gateway policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their zarafa_gateway processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for zarafa_gateway:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B yppasswdd_exec_t
++.B zarafa_gateway_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the yppasswdd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the yppasswdd_t domain.
++- Set files with the zarafa_gateway_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the zarafa_gateway_t domain.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/sbin/rpc\.yppasswdd\.env, /usr/sbin/rpc\.yppasswdd
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B yppasswdd_var_run_t
++.B zarafa_gateway_log_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the yppasswdd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the yppasswdd files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the zarafa_gateway_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as zarafa gateway log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B zarafa_gateway_var_run_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the zarafa_gateway_var_run_t type, if you want to store the zarafa gateway files under the /run directory.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type zarafa_gateway_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B zarafa_gateway_log_t
++
++ /var/log/zarafa/gateway\.log.*
++.br
++
++.br
++.B zarafa_gateway_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/zarafa-gateway\.pid
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux yppasswdd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their yppasswdd processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for yppasswdd:
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the zarafa_gateway_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B yppasswdd_t
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
++
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the zarafa_gateway_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -60769,97 +108675,134 @@ index 0000000..2881e38
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), yppasswdd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/ypserv_selinux.8 b/man/man8/ypserv_selinux.8
++selinux(8), zarafa_gateway(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, zarafa_deliver_selinux(8), zarafa_ical_selinux(8), zarafa_indexer_selinux(8), zarafa_monitor_selinux(8), zarafa_server_selinux(8), zarafa_spooler_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/zarafa_ical_selinux.8 b/man/man8/zarafa_ical_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..8206c6b
+index 0000000..08fcb78
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/ypserv_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
-+.TH "ypserv_selinux" "8" "ypserv" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "ypserv SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/zarafa_ical_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,133 @@
++.TH "zarafa_ical_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "zarafa_ical" "SELinux Policy documentation for zarafa_ical"
+.SH "NAME"
-+ypserv_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the ypserv processes
++zarafa_ical_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the zarafa_ical processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the ypserv processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the zarafa_ical processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The zarafa_ical processes execute with the zarafa_ical_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep zarafa_ical_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The zarafa_ical_t SELinux type can be entered via the "zarafa_ical_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the zarafa_ical_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/bin/zarafa-ical
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux ypserv policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ypserv processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for ypserv:
-+
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux zarafa_ical policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their zarafa_ical processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for zarafa_ical:
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B ypserv_conf_t
++.B zarafa_ical_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
-+- Set files with the ypserv_conf_t type, if you want to treat the files as ypserv configuration data, usually stored under the /etc directory.
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux zarafa_ical policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their zarafa_ical processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for zarafa_ical:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B ypserv_exec_t
++.B zarafa_ical_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the ypserv_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ypserv_t domain.
++- Set files with the zarafa_ical_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the zarafa_ical_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B ypserv_tmp_t
++.B zarafa_ical_log_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the ypserv_tmp_t type, if you want to store ypserv temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++- Set files with the zarafa_ical_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as zarafa ical log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B ypserv_var_run_t
++.B zarafa_ical_var_run_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the ypserv_var_run_t type, if you want to store the ypserv files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the zarafa_ical_var_run_t type, if you want to store the zarafa ical files under the /run directory.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type zarafa_ical_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B zarafa_ical_log_t
++
++ /var/log/zarafa/ical\.log.*
++.br
++
++.br
++.B zarafa_ical_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/zarafa-ical\.pid
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux ypserv policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ypserv processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for ypserv:
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the zarafa_ical_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B ypserv_t
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
++
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the zarafa_ical_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -60872,85 +108815,156 @@ index 0000000..8206c6b
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), ypserv(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/ypxfr_selinux.8 b/man/man8/ypxfr_selinux.8
++selinux(8), zarafa_ical(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, zarafa_deliver_selinux(8), zarafa_gateway_selinux(8), zarafa_indexer_selinux(8), zarafa_monitor_selinux(8), zarafa_server_selinux(8), zarafa_spooler_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/zarafa_indexer_selinux.8 b/man/man8/zarafa_indexer_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..a5abcec
+index 0000000..72df8d0
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/ypxfr_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
-+.TH "ypxfr_selinux" "8" "ypxfr" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "ypxfr SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/zarafa_indexer_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,155 @@
++.TH "zarafa_indexer_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "zarafa_indexer" "SELinux Policy documentation for zarafa_indexer"
+.SH "NAME"
-+ypxfr_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the ypxfr processes
++zarafa_indexer_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the zarafa_indexer processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the ypxfr processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the zarafa_indexer processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The zarafa_indexer processes execute with the zarafa_indexer_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep zarafa_indexer_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The zarafa_indexer_t SELinux type can be entered via the "zarafa_indexer_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the zarafa_indexer_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/bin/zarafa-indexer
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux zarafa_indexer policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their zarafa_indexer processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for zarafa_indexer:
++
++.EX
++.B zarafa_indexer_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux ypxfr policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ypxfr processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for ypxfr:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux zarafa_indexer policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their zarafa_indexer processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for zarafa_indexer:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B ypxfr_exec_t
++.B zarafa_indexer_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the ypxfr_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ypxfr_t domain.
++- Set files with the zarafa_indexer_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the zarafa_indexer_t domain.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/lib/yp/ypxfr, /usr/sbin/rpc\.ypxfrd
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B ypxfr_var_run_t
++.B zarafa_indexer_log_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the ypxfr_var_run_t type, if you want to store the ypxfr files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the zarafa_indexer_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as zarafa indexer log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B zarafa_indexer_tmp_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the zarafa_indexer_tmp_t type, if you want to store zarafa indexer temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++
++
++.EX
++.PP
++.B zarafa_indexer_var_run_t
++.EE
++
++- Set files with the zarafa_indexer_var_run_t type, if you want to store the zarafa indexer files under the /run directory.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type zarafa_indexer_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B zarafa_indexer_log_t
++
++ /var/log/zarafa/indexer\.log.*
++.br
++
++.br
++.B zarafa_indexer_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B zarafa_indexer_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/zarafa-indexer
++.br
++ /var/run/zarafa-indexer\.pid
++.br
++
++.br
++.B zarafa_var_lib_t
++
++ /var/lib/zarafa(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/zarafa-webaccess(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux ypxfr policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ypxfr processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for ypxfr:
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the zarafa_indexer_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B ypxfr_t
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
++
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the zarafa_indexer_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -60963,203 +108977,134 @@ index 0000000..a5abcec
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), ypxfr(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/zabbix_selinux.8 b/man/man8/zabbix_selinux.8
++selinux(8), zarafa_indexer(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, zarafa_deliver_selinux(8), zarafa_gateway_selinux(8), zarafa_ical_selinux(8), zarafa_monitor_selinux(8), zarafa_server_selinux(8), zarafa_spooler_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/zarafa_monitor_selinux.8 b/man/man8/zarafa_monitor_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..583271e
+index 0000000..c563b1e
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/zabbix_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,210 @@
-+.TH "zabbix_selinux" "8" "zabbix" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "zabbix SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/zarafa_monitor_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,133 @@
++.TH "zarafa_monitor_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "zarafa_monitor" "SELinux Policy documentation for zarafa_monitor"
+.SH "NAME"
-+zabbix_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the zabbix processes
++zarafa_monitor_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the zarafa_monitor processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the zabbix processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
-+
-+.SH BOOLEANS
-+SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. zabbix policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run zabbix with the tightest access possible.
-+
-+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow zabbix to connect to unreserved ports, you must turn on the zabbix_can_network boolean.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the zarafa_monitor processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P zabbix_can_network 1
-+.EE
++The zarafa_monitor processes execute with the zarafa_monitor_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow http daemon to connect to zabbix, you must turn on the httpd_can_connect_zabbix boolean.
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+.B setsebool -P httpd_can_connect_zabbix 1
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep zarafa_monitor_t
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the zabbix_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
++The zarafa_monitor_t SELinux type can be entered via the "zarafa_monitor_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the zarafa_monitor_t domain are the following:"
+
++/usr/bin/zarafa-monitor
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the zabbix_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
-+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
-+.EE
-+
-+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux zarafa_monitor policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their zarafa_monitor processes in as secure a method as possible.
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux zabbix policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their zabbix processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for zabbix:
-+
++The following process types are defined for zarafa_monitor:
+
+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B zabbix_agent_exec_t
++.B zarafa_monitor_t
+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the zabbix_agent_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the zabbix_agent_t domain.
-+
-+
-+.EX
+.PP
-+.B zabbix_agent_initrc_exec_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the zabbix_agent_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the zabbix_agent_initrc_t domain.
-+
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
-+.EX
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
-+.B zabbix_exec_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the zabbix_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the zabbix_t domain.
-+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/sbin/zabbix_server_pgsql, /usr/sbin/zabbix_server_sqlite3, /usr/sbin/zabbix_server_mysql, /usr/(s)?bin/zabbix_server
-+
-+.EX
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+.B zabbix_initrc_exec_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the zabbix_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the zabbix_initrc_t domain.
-+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/etc/rc\.d/init\.d/zabbix-server, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/zabbix
-+
-+.EX
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux zarafa_monitor policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their zarafa_monitor processes in as secure a method as possible.
+.PP
-+.B zabbix_log_t
-+.EE
-+
-+- Set files with the zabbix_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as zabbix log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++The following file types are defined for zarafa_monitor:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B zabbix_tmp_t
++.B zarafa_monitor_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the zabbix_tmp_t type, if you want to store zabbix temporary files in the /tmp directories.
++- Set files with the zarafa_monitor_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the zarafa_monitor_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B zabbix_tmpfs_t
++.B zarafa_monitor_log_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the zabbix_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store zabbix files on a tmpfs file system.
++- Set files with the zarafa_monitor_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as zarafa monitor log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B zabbix_var_run_t
++.B zarafa_monitor_var_run_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the zabbix_var_run_t type, if you want to store the zabbix files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the zarafa_monitor_var_run_t type, if you want to store the zarafa monitor files under the /run directory.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PORT TYPES
-+SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
-+.PP
-+You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+.B semanage port -l
++The SELinux process type zarafa_monitor_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
+
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
-+SELinux zabbix policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their zabbix processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following port types are defined for zabbix:
++.br
++.B zarafa_monitor_log_t
+
-+.EX
-+.TP 5
-+.B zabbix_agent_port_t
-+.TP 10
-+.EE
++ /var/log/zarafa/monitor\.log.*
++.br
++
++.br
++.B zarafa_monitor_var_run_t
+
++ /var/run/zarafa-monitor\.pid
++.br
+
-+Default Defined Ports:
-+tcp 10050
-+.EE
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the zarafa_monitor_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.TP 5
-+.B zabbix_port_t
-+.TP 10
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
+
-+
-+Default Defined Ports:
-+tcp 10051
-+.EE
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux zabbix policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their zabbix processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for zabbix:
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the zarafa_monitor_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B zabbix_agent_t, zabbix_t
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -61171,29 +109116,25 @@ index 0000000..583271e
+.B semanage module
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
-+.B semanage port
-+can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
-+
-+.B semanage boolean
-+can also be used to manipulate the booleans
-+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), zabbix(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-+, setsebool(8)
++selinux(8), zarafa_monitor(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, zarafa_deliver_selinux(8), zarafa_gateway_selinux(8), zarafa_ical_selinux(8), zarafa_indexer_selinux(8), zarafa_server_selinux(8), zarafa_spooler_selinux(8)
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/man/man8/zarafa_selinux.8 b/man/man8/zarafa_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..3937f44
+index 0000000..23c13e3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/man/man8/zarafa_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,333 @@
+@@ -0,0 +1,165 @@
+.TH "zarafa_selinux" "8" "zarafa" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "zarafa SELinux Policy documentation"
+.SH "NAME"
+zarafa_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the zarafa processes
@@ -61208,14 +109149,14 @@ index 0000000..3937f44
+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the zarafa_deliver_t, zarafa_spooler_t, zarafa_gateway_t, zarafa_ical_t, zarafa_server_t, zarafa_monitor_t, zarafa_indexer_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
+
+.PP
+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the zarafa_deliver_t, zarafa_spooler_t, zarafa_gateway_t, zarafa_ical_t, zarafa_server_t, zarafa_monitor_t, zarafa_indexer_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
+.EE
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
@@ -61358,28 +109299,65 @@ index 0000000..3937f44
+.B zarafa_monitor_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the zarafa_monitor_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the zarafa_monitor_t domain.
++- Set files with the zarafa_monitor_exec_t type, if you want to transition an execut
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/zarafa_server_selinux.8 b/man/man8/zarafa_server_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..09bb9df
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/zarafa_server_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,155 @@
++.TH "zarafa_server_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "zarafa_server" "SELinux Policy documentation for zarafa_server"
++.SH "NAME"
++zarafa_server_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the zarafa_server processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the zarafa_server processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.EX
-+.PP
-+.B zarafa_monitor_log_t
-+.EE
++The zarafa_server processes execute with the zarafa_server_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+- Set files with the zarafa_monitor_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as zarafa monitor log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++For example:
+
++.B ps -eZ | grep zarafa_server_t
+
-+.EX
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The zarafa_server_t SELinux type can be entered via the "zarafa_server_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the zarafa_server_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/bin/zarafa-server
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+.B zarafa_monitor_var_run_t
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux zarafa_server policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their zarafa_server processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for zarafa_server:
++
++.EX
++.B zarafa_server_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
-+- Set files with the zarafa_monitor_var_run_t type, if you want to store the zarafa monitor files under the /run directory.
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux zarafa_server policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their zarafa_server processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for zarafa_server:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B zarafa_server_exec_t
++.B zarafa_server_exec_t
+.EE
+
+- Set files with the zarafa_server_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the zarafa_server_t domain.
@@ -61387,7 +109365,7 @@ index 0000000..3937f44
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B zarafa_server_log_t
++.B zarafa_server_log_t
+.EE
+
+- Set files with the zarafa_server_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as zarafa server log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
@@ -61395,7 +109373,7 @@ index 0000000..3937f44
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B zarafa_server_tmp_t
++.B zarafa_server_tmp_t
+.EE
+
+- Set files with the zarafa_server_tmp_t type, if you want to store zarafa server temporary files in the /tmp directories.
@@ -61403,107 +109381,204 @@ index 0000000..3937f44
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B zarafa_server_var_run_t
++.B zarafa_server_var_run_t
+.EE
+
+- Set files with the zarafa_server_var_run_t type, if you want to store the zarafa server files under the /run directory.
+
++
++.PP
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
++command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
++.B restorecon
++to apply the labels.
++
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type zarafa_server_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/run/zarafa, /var/run/zarafa-server\.pid
++.B zarafa_server_log_t
++
++ /var/log/zarafa/server\.log.*
++.br
++
++.br
++.B zarafa_server_tmp_t
++
++
++.br
++.B zarafa_server_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/zarafa
++.br
++ /var/run/zarafa-server\.pid
++.br
++
++.br
++.B zarafa_var_lib_t
++
++ /var/lib/zarafa(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/zarafa-webaccess(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
++.PP
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the zarafa_server_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
++.EE
++
+.PP
-+.B zarafa_share_t
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the zarafa_server_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the zarafa_share_t type, if you want to treat the files as zarafa share data.
++.SH "COMMANDS"
++.B semanage fcontext
++can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
++.PP
++.B semanage permissive
++can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
++.PP
++.B semanage module
++can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
++
++.PP
++.B system-config-selinux
++is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
-+.EX
++.SH "SEE ALSO"
++selinux(8), zarafa_server(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, zarafa_deliver_selinux(8), zarafa_gateway_selinux(8), zarafa_ical_selinux(8), zarafa_indexer_selinux(8), zarafa_monitor_selinux(8), zarafa_spooler_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/man/man8/zarafa_spooler_selinux.8 b/man/man8/zarafa_spooler_selinux.8
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..2c41587
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man8/zarafa_spooler_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,133 @@
++.TH "zarafa_spooler_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "zarafa_spooler" "SELinux Policy documentation for zarafa_spooler"
++.SH "NAME"
++zarafa_spooler_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the zarafa_spooler processes
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the zarafa_spooler processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The zarafa_spooler processes execute with the zarafa_spooler_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep zarafa_spooler_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The zarafa_spooler_t SELinux type can be entered via the "zarafa_spooler_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the zarafa_spooler_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/bin/zarafa-spooler
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+.B zarafa_spooler_exec_t
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux zarafa_spooler policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their zarafa_spooler processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for zarafa_spooler:
++
++.EX
++.B zarafa_spooler_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
-+- Set files with the zarafa_spooler_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the zarafa_spooler_t domain.
++.SH FILE CONTEXTS
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++.PP
++You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux zarafa_spooler policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their zarafa_spooler processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for zarafa_spooler:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B zarafa_spooler_log_t
++.B zarafa_spooler_exec_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the zarafa_spooler_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as zarafa spooler log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
++- Set files with the zarafa_spooler_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the zarafa_spooler_t domain.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B zarafa_spooler_var_run_t
++.B zarafa_spooler_log_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the zarafa_spooler_var_run_t type, if you want to store the zarafa spooler files under the /run directory.
++- Set files with the zarafa_spooler_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as zarafa spooler log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B zarafa_var_lib_t
++.B zarafa_spooler_var_run_t
+.EE
+
-+- Set files with the zarafa_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the zarafa files under the /var/lib directory.
++- Set files with the zarafa_spooler_var_run_t type, if you want to store the zarafa spooler files under the /run directory.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/lib/zarafa-webaccess(/.*)?, /var/lib/zarafa(/.*)?
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PORT TYPES
-+SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
-+.PP
-+You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+.B semanage port -l
++The SELinux process type zarafa_spooler_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B zarafa_spooler_log_t
++
++ /var/log/zarafa/spooler\.log.*
++.br
++
++.br
++.B zarafa_spooler_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/zarafa-spooler\.pid
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
-+SELinux zarafa policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their zarafa processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following port types are defined for zarafa:
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the zarafa_spooler_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.TP 5
-+.B zarafa_port_t
-+.TP 10
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
+
-+
-+Default Defined Ports:
-+tcp 236,237
-+.EE
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux zarafa policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their zarafa processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for zarafa:
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the zarafa_spooler_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B zarafa_gateway_t, zarafa_spooler_t, zarafa_deliver_t, zarafa_monitor_t, zarafa_indexer_t, zarafa_server_t, zarafa_ical_t
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -61515,31 +109590,61 @@ index 0000000..3937f44
+.B semanage module
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
-+.B semanage port
-+can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
-+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), zarafa(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
++selinux(8), zarafa_spooler(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
++, zarafa_deliver_selinux(8), zarafa_gateway_selinux(8), zarafa_ical_selinux(8), zarafa_indexer_selinux(8), zarafa_monitor_selinux(8), zarafa_server_selinux(8)
+\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/man/man8/zebra_selinux.8 b/man/man8/zebra_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..29db127
+index 0000000..0875d31
--- /dev/null
+++ b/man/man8/zebra_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,176 @@
-+.TH "zebra_selinux" "8" "zebra" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "zebra SELinux Policy documentation"
+@@ -0,0 +1,198 @@
++.TH "zebra_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "zebra" "SELinux Policy documentation for zebra"
+.SH "NAME"
+zebra_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the zebra processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the zebra processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the zebra processes via flexible mandatory access control.
++
++The zebra processes execute with the zebra_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
++
++For example:
++
++.B ps -eZ | grep zebra_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
++
++The zebra_t SELinux type can be entered via the "zebra_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the zebra_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/sbin/rip.*, /usr/sbin/ospf.*, /usr/sbin/bgpd, /usr/sbin/zebra
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
++.PP
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux zebra policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their zebra processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for zebra:
++
++.EX
++.B zebra_t
++.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH BOOLEANS
+SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. zebra policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run zebra with the tightest access possible.
@@ -61552,70 +109657,59 @@ index 0000000..29db127
+.B setsebool -P zebra_write_config 1
+.EE
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++.PP
++If you want to allow zebra daemon to write it configuration files, you must turn on the zebra_write_config boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P zebra_write_config 1
++.EE
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
+SELinux zebra policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their zebra processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
++.PP
+The following file types are defined for zebra:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B zebra_conf_t
++.B zebra_conf_t
+.EE
+
+- Set files with the zebra_conf_t type, if you want to treat the files as zebra configuration data, usually stored under the /etc directory.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/etc/zebra(/.*)?, /etc/quagga(/.*)?
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B zebra_exec_t
++.B zebra_exec_t
+.EE
+
+- Set files with the zebra_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the zebra_t domain.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/sbin/zebra, /usr/sbin/rip.*, /usr/sbin/bgpd, /usr/sbin/ospf.*
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B zebra_initrc_exec_t
++.B zebra_initrc_exec_t
+.EE
+
+- Set files with the zebra_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the zebra_initrc_t domain.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/etc/rc\.d/init\.d/ripd, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/ripngd, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/zebra, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/bgpd, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/ospf6d, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/ospfd
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B zebra_log_t
++.B zebra_log_t
+.EE
+
+- Set files with the zebra_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as zebra log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/log/quagga(/.*)?, /var/log/zebra(/.*)?
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B zebra_tmp_t
++.B zebra_tmp_t
+.EE
+
+- Set files with the zebra_tmp_t type, if you want to store zebra temporary files in the /tmp directories.
@@ -61623,39 +109717,35 @@ index 0000000..29db127
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B zebra_var_run_t
++.B zebra_var_run_t
+.EE
+
+- Set files with the zebra_var_run_t type, if you want to store the zebra files under the /run directory.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/run/\.zserv, /var/run/\.zebra, /var/run/quagga(/.*)?
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
+.SH PORT TYPES
-+SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
++SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
+.PP
-+You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
++You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
+
+.B semanage port -l
+
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports.
+SELinux zebra policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their zebra processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
++.PP
+The following port types are defined for zebra:
+
+.EX
+.TP 5
-+.B zebra_port_t
++.B zebra_port_t
+.TP 10
+.EE
+
@@ -61665,23 +109755,29 @@ index 0000000..29db127
+.EE
+udp 2600-2604,2606
+.EE
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
-+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux zebra policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their zebra processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for zebra:
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
+
-+.EX
-+.B zebra_t
-+.EE
-+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++The SELinux process type zebra_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B zebra_log_t
++
++ /var/log/zebra(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/log/quagga(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B zebra_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/quagga(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/run/\.zebra
++.br
++ /var/run/\.zserv
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -61700,45 +109796,60 @@ index 0000000..29db127
+can also be used to manipulate the booleans
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), zebra(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
++selinux(8), zebra(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+, setsebool(8)
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/man/man8/zoneminder_selinux.8 b/man/man8/zoneminder_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..810320c
+index 0000000..ac66364
--- /dev/null
+++ b/man/man8/zoneminder_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,173 @@
-+.TH "zoneminder_selinux" "8" "zoneminder" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "zoneminder SELinux Policy documentation"
+@@ -0,0 +1,217 @@
++.TH "zoneminder_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "zoneminder" "SELinux Policy documentation for zoneminder"
+.SH "NAME"
+zoneminder_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the zoneminder processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the zoneminder processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the zoneminder processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The zoneminder processes execute with the zoneminder_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the zoneminder_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep zoneminder_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
++The zoneminder_t SELinux type can be entered via the "zoneminder_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the zoneminder_t domain are the following:"
++
++/usr/bin/zmpkg.pl, /usr/bin/motion
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the zoneminder_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux zoneminder policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their zoneminder processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for zoneminder:
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B zoneminder_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH SHARING FILES
+If you want to share files with multiple domains (Apache, FTP, rsync, Samba), you can set a file context of public_content_t and public_content_rw_t. These context allow any of the above domains to read the content. If you want a particular domain to write to the public_content_rw_t domain, you must set the appropriate boolean.
@@ -61766,56 +109877,51 @@ index 0000000..810320c
+.B setsebool -P zoneminder_anon_write 1
+.EE
+
++.PP
++If you want to allow ZoneMinder to modify public files used for public file transfer services., you must turn on the zoneminder_anon_write boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P zoneminder_anon_write 1
++.EE
++
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
+SELinux zoneminder policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their zoneminder processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
++.PP
+The following file types are defined for zoneminder:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B zoneminder_exec_t
++.B zoneminder_exec_t
+.EE
+
+- Set files with the zoneminder_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the zoneminder_t domain.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/usr/bin/zmpkg.pl, /usr/bin/motion
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B zoneminder_initrc_exec_t
++.B zoneminder_initrc_exec_t
+.EE
+
+- Set files with the zoneminder_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the zoneminder_initrc_t domain.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/etc/rc\.d/init\.d/motion, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/zoneminder
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B zoneminder_log_t
++.B zoneminder_log_t
+.EE
+
+- Set files with the zoneminder_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as zoneminder log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/var/log/zoneminder(/.*)?, /var/log/motion\.log.*
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B zoneminder_spool_t
++.B zoneminder_spool_t
+.EE
+
+- Set files with the zoneminder_spool_t type, if you want to store the zoneminder files under the /var/spool directory.
@@ -61823,7 +109929,7 @@ index 0000000..810320c
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B zoneminder_tmpfs_t
++.B zoneminder_tmpfs_t
+.EE
+
+- Set files with the zoneminder_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store zoneminder files on a tmpfs file system.
@@ -61831,7 +109937,7 @@ index 0000000..810320c
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B zoneminder_var_lib_t
++.B zoneminder_var_lib_t
+.EE
+
+- Set files with the zoneminder_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the zoneminder files under the /var/lib directory.
@@ -61839,36 +109945,70 @@ index 0000000..810320c
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B zoneminder_var_run_t
++.B zoneminder_var_run_t
+.EE
+
+- Set files with the zoneminder_var_run_t type, if you want to store the zoneminder files under the /run directory.
+
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.SH "MANAGED FILES"
++
++The SELinux process type zoneminder_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.
++
++.br
++.B zoneminder_log_t
++
++ /var/log/motion\.log.*
++.br
++ /var/log/zoneminder(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B zoneminder_spool_t
++
++ /var/spool/zoneminder-upload(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B zoneminder_tmpfs_t
++
++
++.br
++.B zoneminder_var_lib_t
++
++ /var/motion(/.*)?
++.br
++ /var/lib/zoneminder(/.*)?
++.br
++
++.br
++.B zoneminder_var_run_t
++
++ /var/run/motion\.pid
++.br
++
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux zoneminder policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their zoneminder processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for zoneminder:
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the zoneminder_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B zoneminder_t
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
++
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the zoneminder_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -61881,91 +110021,100 @@ index 0000000..810320c
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), zoneminder(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
-diff --git a/man/man8/zos_selinux.8 b/man/man8/zos_selinux.8
++selinux(8), zoneminder(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
+diff --git a/man/man8/zos_remote_selinux.8 b/man/man8/zos_remote_selinux.8
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..ec9a6d7
+index 0000000..29d9940
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/man8/zos_selinux.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
-+.TH "zos_selinux" "8" "zos" "dwalsh at redhat.com" "zos SELinux Policy documentation"
++++ b/man/man8/zos_remote_selinux.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
++.TH "zos_remote_selinux" "8" "12-11-01" "zos_remote" "SELinux Policy documentation for zos_remote"
+.SH "NAME"
-+zos_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the zos processes
++zos_remote_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the zos_remote processes
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
-+Security-Enhanced Linux secures the zos processes via flexible mandatory access
-+control.
++Security-Enhanced Linux secures the zos_remote processes via flexible mandatory access control.
+
-+.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++The zos_remote processes execute with the zos_remote_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the \fBps\fP command with the \fB\-Z\fP qualifier.
+
-+.PP
-+If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the zos_remote_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
++For example:
+
-+.EX
-+setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
-+.EE
++.B ps -eZ | grep zos_remote_t
++
++
++.SH "ENTRYPOINTS"
+
++The zos_remote_t SELinux type can be entered via the "zos_remote_exec_t" file type. The default entrypoint paths for the zos_remote_t domain are the following:"
++
++/sbin/audispd-zos-remote, /usr/sbin/audispd-zos-remote
++.SH PROCESS TYPES
++SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
+.PP
-+If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the zos_remote_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.PP
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
++SELinux zos_remote policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their zos_remote processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following process types are defined for zos_remote:
+
+.EX
-+setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.B zos_remote_t
+.EE
++.PP
++Note:
++.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
++can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
+
+.SH FILE CONTEXTS
-+SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
++SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
+.PP
+You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
-+SELinux zos policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their zos processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following file types are defined for zos:
++Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files.
++SELinux zos_remote policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their zos_remote processes in as secure a method as possible.
++.PP
++The following file types are defined for zos_remote:
+
+
+.EX
+.PP
-+.B zos_remote_exec_t
++.B zos_remote_exec_t
+.EE
+
+- Set files with the zos_remote_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the zos_remote_t domain.
+
-+.br
-+.TP 5
-+Paths:
-+/sbin/audispd-zos-remote, /usr/sbin/audispd-zos-remote
+
+.PP
-+Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
-+.B semanage fcontext
++Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
++.B semanage fcontext
+command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use
+.B restorecon
+to apply the labels.
+
-+.SH PROCESS TYPES
-+SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system
-+.PP
-+You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP
++.SH NSSWITCH DOMAIN
++
+.PP
-+Policy governs the access confined processes have to files.
-+SELinux zos policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their zos processes in as secure a method as possible.
-+.PP
-+The following process types are defined for zos:
++If you want to allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd serve for the zos_remote_t, you must turn on the authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap boolean.
+
+.EX
-+.B zos_remote_t
++.B setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap 1
+.EE
++
+.PP
-+Note:
-+.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE
-+can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated.
++If you want to allow confined applications to run with kerberos for the zos_remote_t, you must turn on the kerberos_enabled boolean.
++
++.EX
++.B setsebool -P kerberos_enabled 1
++.EE
+
+.SH "COMMANDS"
+.B semanage fcontext
@@ -61978,14 +110127,16 @@ index 0000000..ec9a6d7
+can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
+
+.PP
-+.B system-config-selinux
++.B system-config-selinux
+is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
+
-+.SH AUTHOR
-+This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py.
++.SH AUTHOR
++This manual page was auto-generated using
++.B "sepolicy manpage"
++by Dan Walsh.
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
-+selinux(8), zos(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1)
++selinux(8), zos_remote(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8)
diff --git a/policy/constraints b/policy/constraints
index 3a45f23..f4754f0 100644
--- a/policy/constraints
@@ -62010,7 +110161,7 @@ index 3a45f23..f4754f0 100644
# fork
# setexec
diff --git a/policy/flask/access_vectors b/policy/flask/access_vectors
-index 28802c5..c73c1d2 100644
+index 28802c5..d9460ea 100644
--- a/policy/flask/access_vectors
+++ b/policy/flask/access_vectors
@@ -329,6 +329,7 @@ class process
@@ -62032,7 +110183,7 @@ index 28802c5..c73c1d2 100644
}
#
-@@ -443,10 +448,11 @@ class capability
+@@ -443,10 +448,12 @@ class capability
class capability2
{
mac_override # unused by SELinux
@@ -62040,12 +110191,13 @@ index 28802c5..c73c1d2 100644
+ mac_admin
syslog
wake_alarm
++ epolwakeup
block_suspend
-+ secure_firmware
++ compromise_kernel
}
#
-@@ -862,3 +868,20 @@ inherits database
+@@ -862,3 +869,20 @@ inherits database
implement
execute
}
@@ -62096,7 +110248,7 @@ index 66e85ea..d02654d 100644
## user domains.
## </p>
diff --git a/policy/global_tunables b/policy/global_tunables
-index 4705ab6..8ba19a0 100644
+index 4705ab6..11a1ae6 100644
--- a/policy/global_tunables
+++ b/policy/global_tunables
@@ -6,52 +6,59 @@
@@ -62208,10 +110360,11 @@ index 4705ab6..8ba19a0 100644
## and may change other protocols.
## </p>
## </desc>
- gen_tunable(user_tcp_server,false)
+-gen_tunable(user_tcp_server,false)
++gen_tunable(selinuxuser_tcp_server,false)
+
diff --git a/policy/mcs b/policy/mcs
-index f477c7f..4acbe5d 100644
+index f477c7f..ff7369c 100644
--- a/policy/mcs
+++ b/policy/mcs
@@ -1,4 +1,6 @@
@@ -62221,7 +110374,7 @@ index f477c7f..4acbe5d 100644
#
# Define sensitivities
#
-@@ -69,16 +71,32 @@ gen_levels(1,mcs_num_cats)
+@@ -69,28 +71,48 @@ gen_levels(1,mcs_num_cats)
# - /proc/pid operations are not constrained.
mlsconstrain file { read ioctl lock execute execute_no_trans }
@@ -62258,7 +110411,10 @@ index f477c7f..4acbe5d 100644
# New filesystem object labels must be dominated by the relabeling subject
# clearance, also the objects are single-level.
-@@ -87,10 +105,13 @@ mlsconstrain file { create relabelto }
+ mlsconstrain file { create relabelto }
+- (( h1 dom h2 ) and ( l2 eq h2 ));
++ ((( h1 dom h2 ) and ( l2 eq h2 )) or
++ ( t1 != mcsuntrustedproc ));
# new file labels must be dominated by the relabeling subject clearance
mlsconstrain { dir file lnk_file chr_file blk_file sock_file fifo_file } { relabelfrom }
@@ -62274,7 +110430,7 @@ index f477c7f..4acbe5d 100644
mlsconstrain process { transition dyntransition }
(( h1 dom h2 ) or ( t1 == mcssetcats ));
-@@ -101,6 +122,9 @@ mlsconstrain process { ptrace }
+@@ -101,6 +123,9 @@ mlsconstrain process { ptrace }
mlsconstrain process { sigkill sigstop }
(( h1 dom h2 ) or ( t1 == mcskillall ));
@@ -62284,7 +110440,7 @@ index f477c7f..4acbe5d 100644
#
# MCS policy for SELinux-enabled databases
#
-@@ -144,4 +168,21 @@ mlsconstrain db_language { drop getattr setattr relabelfrom execute }
+@@ -144,4 +169,23 @@ mlsconstrain db_language { drop getattr setattr relabelfrom execute }
mlsconstrain db_blob { drop getattr setattr relabelfrom read write import export }
( h1 dom h2 );
@@ -62294,20 +110450,22 @@ index f477c7f..4acbe5d 100644
+# the node recvfrom/sendto ops, the recvfrom permission is a "write" operation
+# because the subject in this particular case is the remote domain which is
+# writing data out the network node which is acting as the object
-+mlsconstrain { node } { recvfrom }
-+ ((( l1 dom l2 ) and ( l1 domby h2 )) or
-+ ( t1 == mcsnetwrite ) or
-+ ( t1 == unlabeled_t ));
-+mlsconstrain { node } { sendto }
-+ ((( l1 dom l2 ) and ( l1 domby h2 )) or
-+ ( t1 == mcsnetwrite ));
++mlsconstrain { node } { recvfrom sendto }
++ (( l1 dom l2 ) or (t1 != mcsuntrustedproc));
++
++mlsconstrain { packet peer } { recv }
++ (( l1 dom l2 ) or
++ ((t1 != mcsuntrustedproc) and (t2 != mcsuntrustedproc)));
+
-+mlsconstrain packet { send recv }
-+ (( h1 dom h2 ) or ( t1 == mcsnetwrite ));
++# the netif ingress/egress ops, the ingress permission is a "write" operation
++# because the subject in this particular case is the remote domain which is
++# writing data out the network interface which is acting as the object
++mlsconstrain { netif } { egress ingress }
++ (( l1 dom l2 ) or (t1 != mcsuntrustedproc));
+
') dnl end enable_mcs
diff --git a/policy/mls b/policy/mls
-index d218387..c406594 100644
+index d218387..c2541c2 100644
--- a/policy/mls
+++ b/policy/mls
@@ -195,7 +195,8 @@ mlsconstrain { socket tcp_socket udp_socket rawip_socket netlink_socket packet_s
@@ -62320,8 +110478,18 @@ index d218387..c406594 100644
# used by netlabel to restrict normal domains to same level connections
mlsconstrain { tcp_socket udp_socket rawip_socket } recvfrom
+@@ -361,9 +362,6 @@ mlsconstrain { peer packet } { recv }
+ (( t1 == mlsnetreadtoclr ) and ( h1 dom l2 )) or
+ ( t1 == mlsnetread ));
+
+-
+-
+-
+ #
+ # MLS policy for the process class
+ #
diff --git a/policy/modules/admin/bootloader.fc b/policy/modules/admin/bootloader.fc
-index 7a6f06f..48fc840 100644
+index 7a6f06f..bf04b0a 100644
--- a/policy/modules/admin/bootloader.fc
+++ b/policy/modules/admin/bootloader.fc
@@ -1,9 +1,16 @@
@@ -62337,13 +110505,13 @@ index 7a6f06f..48fc840 100644
/sbin/ybin.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bootloader_exec_t,s0)
+/sbin/zipl -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bootloader_exec_t,s0)
+
-+/var/run/blkid(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:bootloader_var_run_t,s0)
-
--/usr/sbin/grub -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bootloader_exec_t,s0)
+/usr/sbin/grub.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bootloader_exec_t,s0)
+/usr/sbin/lilo.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bootloader_exec_t,s0)
+/usr/sbin/ybin.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bootloader_exec_t,s0)
+/usr/sbin/zipl -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bootloader_exec_t,s0)
+
+-/usr/sbin/grub -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bootloader_exec_t,s0)
++/var/lib/os-prober(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:bootloader_var_lib_t,s0)
diff --git a/policy/modules/admin/bootloader.if b/policy/modules/admin/bootloader.if
index a778bb1..5e914db 100644
--- a/policy/modules/admin/bootloader.if
@@ -62430,7 +110598,7 @@ index a778bb1..5e914db 100644
+ files_etc_filetrans($1,bootloader_etc_t,file, "yaboot.conf")
+')
diff --git a/policy/modules/admin/bootloader.te b/policy/modules/admin/bootloader.te
-index ab0439a..4104b53 100644
+index ab0439a..57890fe 100644
--- a/policy/modules/admin/bootloader.te
+++ b/policy/modules/admin/bootloader.te
@@ -5,8 +5,8 @@ policy_module(bootloader, 1.13.0)
@@ -62444,7 +110612,7 @@ index ab0439a..4104b53 100644
#
# boot_runtime_t is the type for /boot/kernel.h,
-@@ -19,14 +19,18 @@ files_type(boot_runtime_t)
+@@ -19,14 +19,21 @@ files_type(boot_runtime_t)
type bootloader_t;
type bootloader_exec_t;
application_domain(bootloader_t, bootloader_exec_t)
@@ -62454,6 +110622,9 @@ index ab0439a..4104b53 100644
+
+type bootloader_var_run_t;
+files_pid_file(bootloader_var_run_t)
++
++type bootloader_var_lib_t;
++files_type(bootloader_var_lib_t)
#
# bootloader_etc_t is the configuration file,
@@ -62465,7 +110636,7 @@ index ab0439a..4104b53 100644
#
# The temp file is used for initrd creation;
-@@ -41,7 +45,7 @@ dev_node(bootloader_tmp_t)
+@@ -41,7 +48,7 @@ dev_node(bootloader_tmp_t)
# bootloader local policy
#
@@ -62474,7 +110645,7 @@ index ab0439a..4104b53 100644
allow bootloader_t self:process { signal_perms execmem };
allow bootloader_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms;
-@@ -59,6 +63,10 @@ files_tmp_filetrans(bootloader_t, bootloader_tmp_t, { dir file lnk_file chr_file
+@@ -59,6 +66,15 @@ files_tmp_filetrans(bootloader_t, bootloader_tmp_t, { dir file lnk_file chr_file
# for tune2fs (cjp: ?)
files_root_filetrans(bootloader_t, bootloader_tmp_t, file)
@@ -62482,26 +110653,35 @@ index ab0439a..4104b53 100644
+manage_files_pattern(bootloader_t, bootloader_var_run_t, bootloader_var_run_t)
+files_pid_filetrans(bootloader_t, bootloader_var_run_t, {dir file })
+
++manage_dirs_pattern(bootloader_t, bootloader_var_lib_t, bootloader_var_lib_t)
++manage_files_pattern(bootloader_t, bootloader_var_lib_t, bootloader_var_lib_t)
++manage_lnk_files_pattern(bootloader_t, bootloader_var_lib_t, bootloader_var_lib_t)
++files_var_lib_filetrans(bootloader_t, bootloader_var_lib_t, {dir file })
++
kernel_getattr_core_if(bootloader_t)
kernel_read_network_state(bootloader_t)
kernel_read_system_state(bootloader_t)
-@@ -81,6 +89,7 @@ dev_rw_nvram(bootloader_t)
+@@ -81,6 +97,8 @@ dev_rw_nvram(bootloader_t)
fs_getattr_xattr_fs(bootloader_t)
fs_getattr_tmpfs(bootloader_t)
+fs_list_hugetlbfs(bootloader_t)
++fs_list_tmpfs(bootloader_t)
fs_read_tmpfs_symlinks(bootloader_t)
#Needed for ia64
fs_manage_dos_files(bootloader_t)
-@@ -89,6 +98,7 @@ mls_file_read_all_levels(bootloader_t)
+@@ -89,7 +107,10 @@ mls_file_read_all_levels(bootloader_t)
mls_file_write_all_levels(bootloader_t)
term_getattr_all_ttys(bootloader_t)
+term_getattr_all_ptys(bootloader_t)
term_dontaudit_manage_pty_dirs(bootloader_t)
++term_dontaudit_getattr_generic_ptys(bootloader_t)
++term_use_unallocated_ttys(bootloader_t)
corecmd_exec_all_executables(bootloader_t)
-@@ -98,12 +108,14 @@ domain_use_interactive_fds(bootloader_t)
+
+@@ -98,12 +119,14 @@ domain_use_interactive_fds(bootloader_t)
files_create_boot_dirs(bootloader_t)
files_manage_boot_files(bootloader_t)
files_manage_boot_symlinks(bootloader_t)
@@ -62516,7 +110696,7 @@ index ab0439a..4104b53 100644
# for nscd
files_dontaudit_search_pids(bootloader_t)
# for blkid.tab
-@@ -111,6 +123,7 @@ files_manage_etc_runtime_files(bootloader_t)
+@@ -111,6 +134,7 @@ files_manage_etc_runtime_files(bootloader_t)
files_etc_filetrans_etc_runtime(bootloader_t, file)
files_dontaudit_search_home(bootloader_t)
@@ -62524,7 +110704,7 @@ index ab0439a..4104b53 100644
init_getattr_initctl(bootloader_t)
init_use_script_ptys(bootloader_t)
init_use_script_fds(bootloader_t)
-@@ -118,8 +131,10 @@ init_rw_script_pipes(bootloader_t)
+@@ -118,19 +142,21 @@ init_rw_script_pipes(bootloader_t)
libs_read_lib_files(bootloader_t)
libs_exec_lib_files(bootloader_t)
@@ -62532,13 +110712,16 @@ index ab0439a..4104b53 100644
+
+auth_use_nsswitch(bootloader_t)
--logging_send_syslog_msg(bootloader_t)
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(bootloader_t)
logging_rw_generic_logs(bootloader_t)
- miscfiles_read_localization(bootloader_t)
-@@ -130,7 +145,8 @@ seutil_read_bin_policy(bootloader_t)
+-miscfiles_read_localization(bootloader_t)
+
+ modutils_domtrans_insmod(bootloader_t)
+
+ seutil_read_bin_policy(bootloader_t)
seutil_read_loadpolicy(bootloader_t)
- seutil_dontaudit_search_config(bootloader_t)
+-seutil_dontaudit_search_config(bootloader_t)
-userdom_use_user_terminals(bootloader_t)
+userdom_getattr_user_tmpfs_files(bootloader_t)
@@ -62546,7 +110729,7 @@ index ab0439a..4104b53 100644
userdom_dontaudit_search_user_home_dirs(bootloader_t)
ifdef(`distro_debian',`
-@@ -166,7 +182,8 @@ ifdef(`distro_redhat',`
+@@ -166,7 +192,8 @@ ifdef(`distro_redhat',`
files_manage_isid_type_chr_files(bootloader_t)
# for mke2fs
@@ -62556,7 +110739,7 @@ index ab0439a..4104b53 100644
optional_policy(`
unconfined_domain(bootloader_t)
-@@ -174,6 +191,10 @@ ifdef(`distro_redhat',`
+@@ -174,6 +201,10 @@ ifdef(`distro_redhat',`
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -62567,7 +110750,7 @@ index ab0439a..4104b53 100644
fstools_exec(bootloader_t)
')
-@@ -183,6 +204,10 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -183,6 +214,14 @@ optional_policy(`
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -62575,10 +110758,14 @@ index ab0439a..4104b53 100644
+')
+
+optional_policy(`
++ fsadm_manage_pid(bootloader_t)
++')
++
++optional_policy(`
kudzu_domtrans(bootloader_t)
')
-@@ -195,15 +220,13 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -195,17 +234,19 @@ optional_policy(`
optional_policy(`
modutils_exec_insmod(bootloader_t)
@@ -62588,14 +110775,18 @@ index ab0439a..4104b53 100644
modutils_exec_insmod(bootloader_t)
modutils_exec_depmod(bootloader_t)
modutils_exec_update_mods(bootloader_t)
--')
--
--optional_policy(`
-- nscd_socket_use(bootloader_t)
+ modutils_domtrans_insmod_uncond(bootloader_t)
')
optional_policy(`
+- nscd_socket_use(bootloader_t)
++ rpm_rw_pipes(bootloader_t)
+ ')
+
+ optional_policy(`
+- rpm_rw_pipes(bootloader_t)
++ udev_read_pid_files(bootloader_t)
+ ')
diff --git a/policy/modules/admin/consoletype.fc b/policy/modules/admin/consoletype.fc
index b7f053b..5d4fc31 100644
--- a/policy/modules/admin/consoletype.fc
@@ -62694,10 +110885,21 @@ index d6cc2d9..0685b19 100644
+
+/usr/bin/dmesg -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:dmesg_exec_t,s0)
diff --git a/policy/modules/admin/dmesg.te b/policy/modules/admin/dmesg.te
-index 72bc6d8..1f55eba 100644
+index 72bc6d8..ff164b3 100644
--- a/policy/modules/admin/dmesg.te
+++ b/policy/modules/admin/dmesg.te
-@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ dontaudit dmesg_t self:capability sys_tty_config;
+@@ -9,6 +9,10 @@ type dmesg_t;
+ type dmesg_exec_t;
+ init_system_domain(dmesg_t, dmesg_exec_t)
+
++ifdef(`enable_mls',`
++ init_ranged_daemon_domain(dmesg_t, dmesg_exec_t, mls_systemhigh)
++')
++
+ ########################################
+ #
+ # Local policy
+@@ -19,6 +23,7 @@ dontaudit dmesg_t self:capability sys_tty_config;
allow dmesg_t self:process signal_perms;
@@ -62705,24 +110907,35 @@ index 72bc6d8..1f55eba 100644
kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(dmesg_t)
kernel_read_ring_buffer(dmesg_t)
kernel_clear_ring_buffer(dmesg_t)
-@@ -47,7 +48,11 @@ logging_write_generic_logs(dmesg_t)
- miscfiles_read_localization(dmesg_t)
+@@ -27,6 +32,7 @@ kernel_list_proc(dmesg_t)
+ kernel_read_proc_symlinks(dmesg_t)
+
+ dev_read_sysfs(dmesg_t)
++dev_read_kmsg(dmesg_t)
+
+ fs_search_auto_mountpoints(dmesg_t)
+
+@@ -44,10 +50,13 @@ init_use_script_ptys(dmesg_t)
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(dmesg_t)
+ logging_write_generic_logs(dmesg_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(dmesg_t)
userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fds(dmesg_t)
-userdom_use_user_terminals(dmesg_t)
+userdom_use_inherited_user_terminals(dmesg_t)
+
+optional_policy(`
-+ abrt_manage_pid_files(dmesg_t)
++ abrt_rw_inherited_cache(dmesg_t)
+')
optional_policy(`
seutil_sigchld_newrole(dmesg_t)
diff --git a/policy/modules/admin/netutils.fc b/policy/modules/admin/netutils.fc
-index 407078f..56cc947 100644
+index 407078f..1a09bea 100644
--- a/policy/modules/admin/netutils.fc
+++ b/policy/modules/admin/netutils.fc
-@@ -1,15 +1,20 @@
+@@ -1,15 +1,22 @@
/bin/ping.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:ping_exec_t,s0)
-/bin/tracepath.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:traceroute_exec_t,s0)
+/bin/tracepath.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:traceroute_exec_t,s0)
@@ -62738,6 +110951,8 @@ index 407078f..56cc947 100644
/usr/bin/traceroute.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:traceroute_exec_t,s0)
-/usr/sbin/fping -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:ping_exec_t,s0)
++/usr/lib/heartbeat/send_arp -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:ping_exec_t,s0)
++
+/usr/sbin/arping -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:netutils_exec_t,s0)
+/usr/sbin/fping.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:ping_exec_t,s0)
/usr/sbin/traceroute.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:traceroute_exec_t,s0)
@@ -62746,7 +110961,7 @@ index 407078f..56cc947 100644
/usr/sbin/send_arp -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:ping_exec_t,s0)
/usr/sbin/tcpdump -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:netutils_exec_t,s0)
diff --git a/policy/modules/admin/netutils.if b/policy/modules/admin/netutils.if
-index c6ca761..46e0767 100644
+index c6ca761..0c86bfd 100644
--- a/policy/modules/admin/netutils.if
+++ b/policy/modules/admin/netutils.if
@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ interface(`netutils_run',`
@@ -62765,9 +110980,18 @@ index c6ca761..46e0767 100644
')
########################################
-@@ -190,6 +192,7 @@ interface(`netutils_run_ping_cond',`
+@@ -183,13 +185,14 @@ interface(`netutils_run_ping',`
+ interface(`netutils_run_ping_cond',`
+ gen_require(`
+ type ping_t;
+- bool user_ping;
++ bool selinuxuser_ping;
+ ')
- if ( user_ping ) {
+ role $2 types ping_t;
+
+- if ( user_ping ) {
++ if ( selinuxuser_ping ) {
netutils_domtrans_ping($1)
+ allow $1 ping_t:process { signal sigkill };
}
@@ -62781,19 +111005,48 @@ index c6ca761..46e0767 100644
role $2 types traceroute_t;
')
-@@ -284,6 +288,7 @@ interface(`netutils_run_traceroute_cond',`
+@@ -277,13 +281,14 @@ interface(`netutils_run_traceroute',`
+ interface(`netutils_run_traceroute_cond',`
+ gen_require(`
+ type traceroute_t;
+- bool user_ping;
++ bool selinuxuser_ping;
+ ')
+
+ role $2 types traceroute_t;
- if( user_ping ) {
+- if( user_ping ) {
++ if( selinuxuser_ping ) {
netutils_domtrans_traceroute($1)
+ allow $1 traceroute_t:process { signal sigkill };
}
')
diff --git a/policy/modules/admin/netutils.te b/policy/modules/admin/netutils.te
-index e0791b9..9d5a8c0 100644
+index e0791b9..db9ddf7 100644
--- a/policy/modules/admin/netutils.te
+++ b/policy/modules/admin/netutils.te
-@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ allow netutils_t self:packet_socket create_socket_perms;
+@@ -7,10 +7,10 @@ policy_module(netutils, 1.11.0)
+
+ ## <desc>
+ ## <p>
+-## Control users use of ping and traceroute
++## Allow confined users the ability to execute the ping and traceroute commands.
+ ## </p>
+ ## </desc>
+-gen_tunable(user_ping, false)
++gen_tunable(selinuxuser_ping, false)
+
+ type netutils_t;
+ type netutils_exec_t;
+@@ -35,12 +35,13 @@ init_system_domain(traceroute_t, traceroute_exec_t)
+ # Perform network administration operations and have raw access to the network.
+ allow netutils_t self:capability { net_admin net_raw setuid setgid };
+ dontaudit netutils_t self:capability sys_tty_config;
+-allow netutils_t self:process signal_perms;
++allow netutils_t self:process { setcap signal_perms };
+ allow netutils_t self:netlink_route_socket create_netlink_socket_perms;
+ allow netutils_t self:packet_socket create_socket_perms;
allow netutils_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms;
allow netutils_t self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
allow netutils_t self:socket create_socket_perms;
@@ -62822,8 +111075,11 @@ index e0791b9..9d5a8c0 100644
fs_getattr_xattr_fs(netutils_t)
-@@ -83,7 +88,7 @@ logging_send_syslog_msg(netutils_t)
- miscfiles_read_localization(netutils_t)
+@@ -80,10 +85,9 @@ auth_use_nsswitch(netutils_t)
+
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(netutils_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(netutils_t)
term_dontaudit_use_console(netutils_t)
-userdom_use_user_terminals(netutils_t)
@@ -62831,7 +111087,7 @@ index e0791b9..9d5a8c0 100644
userdom_use_all_users_fds(netutils_t)
optional_policy(`
-@@ -104,13 +109,14 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -104,13 +108,14 @@ optional_policy(`
#
allow ping_t self:capability { setuid net_raw };
@@ -62839,30 +111095,45 @@ index e0791b9..9d5a8c0 100644
+
dontaudit ping_t self:capability sys_tty_config;
allow ping_t self:tcp_socket create_socket_perms;
- allow ping_t self:rawip_socket { create ioctl read write bind getopt setopt };
- allow ping_t self:packet_socket { create ioctl read write bind getopt setopt };
+-allow ping_t self:rawip_socket { create ioctl read write bind getopt setopt };
+-allow ping_t self:packet_socket { create ioctl read write bind getopt setopt };
++allow ping_t self:rawip_socket create_socket_perms;
++allow ping_t self:packet_socket create_socket_perms;
allow ping_t self:netlink_route_socket create_netlink_socket_perms;
-corenet_all_recvfrom_unlabeled(ping_t)
corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(ping_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(ping_t)
corenet_raw_sendrecv_generic_if(ping_t)
-@@ -134,8 +140,6 @@ logging_send_syslog_msg(ping_t)
+@@ -120,6 +125,7 @@ corenet_raw_bind_generic_node(ping_t)
+ corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_ports(ping_t)
- miscfiles_read_localization(ping_t)
+ fs_dontaudit_getattr_xattr_fs(ping_t)
++fs_dontaudit_rw_anon_inodefs_files(ping_t)
--userdom_use_user_terminals(ping_t)
+ domain_use_interactive_fds(ping_t)
+
+@@ -130,11 +136,9 @@ kernel_read_system_state(ping_t)
+
+ auth_use_nsswitch(ping_t)
+
+-logging_send_syslog_msg(ping_t)
-
+-miscfiles_read_localization(ping_t)
++init_rw_inherited_script_tmp_files(ping_t)
+
+-userdom_use_user_terminals(ping_t)
++logging_send_syslog_msg(ping_t)
+
ifdef(`hide_broken_symptoms',`
init_dontaudit_use_fds(ping_t)
-
@@ -145,11 +149,25 @@ ifdef(`hide_broken_symptoms',`
')
')
+term_use_all_inherited_terms(ping_t)
+
-+tunable_policy(`user_ping',`
++tunable_policy(`selinuxuser_ping',`
+ term_use_all_ttys(ping_t)
+ term_use_all_ptys(ping_t)
+',`
@@ -62882,18 +111153,23 @@ index e0791b9..9d5a8c0 100644
pcmcia_use_cardmgr_fds(ping_t)
')
-@@ -157,6 +175,10 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -157,6 +175,15 @@ optional_policy(`
hotplug_use_fds(ping_t)
')
+optional_policy(`
++ openshift_rw_inherited_content(ping_t)
++ openshift_dontaudit_rw_inherited_fifo_files(ping_t)
++')
++
++optional_policy(`
+ zabbix_read_tmp(ping_t)
+')
+
########################################
#
# Traceroute local policy
-@@ -170,7 +192,6 @@ allow traceroute_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms;
+@@ -170,7 +197,6 @@ allow traceroute_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms;
kernel_read_system_state(traceroute_t)
kernel_read_network_state(traceroute_t)
@@ -62901,7 +111177,7 @@ index e0791b9..9d5a8c0 100644
corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(traceroute_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(traceroute_t)
corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if(traceroute_t)
-@@ -194,6 +215,7 @@ fs_dontaudit_getattr_xattr_fs(traceroute_t)
+@@ -194,6 +220,7 @@ fs_dontaudit_getattr_xattr_fs(traceroute_t)
domain_use_interactive_fds(traceroute_t)
files_read_etc_files(traceroute_t)
@@ -62909,12 +111185,14 @@ index e0791b9..9d5a8c0 100644
files_dontaudit_search_var(traceroute_t)
init_use_fds(traceroute_t)
-@@ -204,9 +226,16 @@ logging_send_syslog_msg(traceroute_t)
+@@ -202,11 +229,17 @@ auth_use_nsswitch(traceroute_t)
- miscfiles_read_localization(traceroute_t)
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(traceroute_t)
--userdom_use_user_terminals(traceroute_t)
+-miscfiles_read_localization(traceroute_t)
-
+-userdom_use_user_terminals(traceroute_t)
+
#rules needed for nmap
dev_read_rand(traceroute_t)
dev_read_urand(traceroute_t)
@@ -62922,7 +111200,7 @@ index e0791b9..9d5a8c0 100644
+
+term_use_all_inherited_terms(traceroute_t)
+
-+tunable_policy(`user_ping',`
++tunable_policy(`selinuxuser_ping',`
+ term_use_all_ttys(traceroute_t)
+ term_use_all_ptys(traceroute_t)
+',`
@@ -62939,10 +111217,18 @@ index 688abc2..3d89250 100644
/usr/bin/kdesu -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:su_exec_t,s0)
+/usr/bin/su -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:su_exec_t,s0)
diff --git a/policy/modules/admin/su.if b/policy/modules/admin/su.if
-index 03ec5ca..336ad27 100644
+index 03ec5ca..bfc85a0 100644
--- a/policy/modules/admin/su.if
+++ b/policy/modules/admin/su.if
-@@ -119,11 +119,6 @@ template(`su_restricted_domain_template', `
+@@ -89,7 +89,6 @@ template(`su_restricted_domain_template', `
+
+ logging_send_syslog_msg($1_su_t)
+
+- miscfiles_read_localization($1_su_t)
+
+ ifdef(`distro_redhat',`
+ # RHEL5 and possibly newer releases incl. Fedora
+@@ -119,11 +118,6 @@ template(`su_restricted_domain_template', `
userdom_spec_domtrans_unpriv_users($1_su_t)
')
@@ -62954,7 +111240,7 @@ index 03ec5ca..336ad27 100644
optional_policy(`
cron_read_pipes($1_su_t)
')
-@@ -208,7 +203,7 @@ template(`su_role_template',`
+@@ -208,7 +202,7 @@ template(`su_role_template',`
auth_domtrans_chk_passwd($1_su_t)
auth_dontaudit_read_shadow($1_su_t)
@@ -62963,7 +111249,11 @@ index 03ec5ca..336ad27 100644
auth_rw_faillog($1_su_t)
corecmd_search_bin($1_su_t)
-@@ -232,6 +227,7 @@ template(`su_role_template',`
+@@ -228,10 +222,10 @@ template(`su_role_template',`
+
+ logging_send_syslog_msg($1_su_t)
+
+- miscfiles_read_localization($1_su_t)
userdom_use_user_terminals($1_su_t)
userdom_search_user_home_dirs($1_su_t)
@@ -62971,7 +111261,7 @@ index 03ec5ca..336ad27 100644
ifdef(`distro_redhat',`
# RHEL5 and possibly newer releases incl. Fedora
-@@ -277,12 +273,7 @@ template(`su_role_template',`
+@@ -277,12 +271,7 @@ template(`su_role_template',`
')
')
@@ -62995,7 +111285,7 @@ index 7bddc02..2b59ed0 100644
+
+/var/db/sudo(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:sudo_db_t,s0)
diff --git a/policy/modules/admin/sudo.if b/policy/modules/admin/sudo.if
-index 0960199..6c2e521 100644
+index 0960199..aa51ab2 100644
--- a/policy/modules/admin/sudo.if
+++ b/policy/modules/admin/sudo.if
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ template(`sudo_role_template',`
@@ -63039,7 +111329,7 @@ index 0960199..6c2e521 100644
allow $1_sudo_t $3:key search;
-@@ -75,88 +62,25 @@ template(`sudo_role_template',`
+@@ -75,88 +62,30 @@ template(`sudo_role_template',`
# By default, revert to the calling domain when a shell is executed.
corecmd_shell_domtrans($1_sudo_t, $3)
corecmd_bin_domtrans($1_sudo_t, $3)
@@ -63053,7 +111343,7 @@ index 0960199..6c2e521 100644
allow $3 $1_sudo_t:process signal_perms;
- kernel_read_kernel_sysctls($1_sudo_t)
-- kernel_read_system_state($1_sudo_t)
+ kernel_read_system_state($1_sudo_t)
- kernel_link_key($1_sudo_t)
-
- corecmd_read_bin_symlinks($1_sudo_t)
@@ -63085,7 +111375,8 @@ index 0960199..6c2e521 100644
- term_getattr_pty_fs($1_sudo_t)
- term_relabel_all_ttys($1_sudo_t)
- term_relabel_all_ptys($1_sudo_t)
--
++ seutil_libselinux_linked($1_sudo_t)
+
auth_run_chk_passwd($1_sudo_t, $2)
- # sudo stores a token in the pam_pid directory
- auth_manage_pam_pid($1_sudo_t)
@@ -63094,8 +111385,8 @@ index 0960199..6c2e521 100644
- init_rw_utmp($1_sudo_t)
-
- logging_send_audit_msgs($1_sudo_t)
-- logging_send_syslog_msg($1_sudo_t)
--
+ logging_send_syslog_msg($1_sudo_t)
+
- miscfiles_read_localization($1_sudo_t)
-
- seutil_search_default_contexts($1_sudo_t)
@@ -63131,12 +111422,12 @@ index 0960199..6c2e521 100644
optional_policy(`
- fprintd_dbus_chat($1_sudo_t)
-+ kerberos_manage_host_rcache($1_sudo_t)
-+ kerberos_read_config($1_sudo_t)
++ kerberos_manage_host_rcache($1_sudo_t)
++ kerberos_read_config($1_sudo_t)
')
')
-@@ -178,3 +102,22 @@ interface(`sudo_sigchld',`
+@@ -178,3 +107,22 @@ interface(`sudo_sigchld',`
allow $1 sudodomain:process sigchld;
')
@@ -63160,10 +111451,10 @@ index 0960199..6c2e521 100644
+ can_exec($1, sudo_exec_t)
+')
diff --git a/policy/modules/admin/sudo.te b/policy/modules/admin/sudo.te
-index d9fce57..0424852 100644
+index d9fce57..8ae7673 100644
--- a/policy/modules/admin/sudo.te
+++ b/policy/modules/admin/sudo.te
-@@ -7,3 +7,104 @@ attribute sudodomain;
+@@ -7,3 +7,100 @@ attribute sudodomain;
type sudo_exec_t;
application_executable_file(sudo_exec_t)
@@ -63197,7 +111488,6 @@ index d9fce57..0424852 100644
+allow sudodomain self:key manage_key_perms;
+
+kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(sudodomain)
-+kernel_read_system_state(sudodomain)
+kernel_link_key(sudodomain)
+
+corecmd_read_bin_symlinks(sudodomain)
@@ -63241,13 +111531,9 @@ index d9fce57..0424852 100644
+init_rw_utmp(sudodomain)
+
+logging_send_audit_msgs(sudodomain)
-+logging_send_syslog_msg(sudodomain)
+logging_set_audit_parameters(sudodomain)
+
-+miscfiles_read_localization(sudodomain)
-+
+seutil_read_default_contexts(sudodomain)
-+seutil_libselinux_linked(sudodomain)
+
+userdom_spec_domtrans_all_users(sudodomain)
+userdom_manage_user_home_content_files(sudodomain)
@@ -63256,6 +111542,7 @@ index d9fce57..0424852 100644
+userdom_manage_user_tmp_symlinks(sudodomain)
+userdom_use_user_terminals(sudodomain)
+userdom_signal_all_users(sudodomain)
++userdom_exec_user_home_content_files(sudodomain)
+# for some PAM modules and for cwd
+userdom_search_user_home_content(sudodomain)
+userdom_search_admin_dir(sudodomain)
@@ -63281,7 +111568,7 @@ index f82f0ce..204bdc8 100644
/usr/sbin/pwunconv -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:admin_passwd_exec_t,s0)
/usr/sbin/useradd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:useradd_exec_t,s0)
diff --git a/policy/modules/admin/usermanage.if b/policy/modules/admin/usermanage.if
-index 98b8b2d..da75471 100644
+index 98b8b2d..41f4994 100644
--- a/policy/modules/admin/usermanage.if
+++ b/policy/modules/admin/usermanage.if
@@ -17,10 +17,6 @@ interface(`usermanage_domtrans_chfn',`
@@ -63375,7 +111662,7 @@ index 98b8b2d..da75471 100644
')
########################################
-@@ -156,11 +176,36 @@ interface(`usermanage_kill_passwd',`
+@@ -156,11 +176,35 @@ interface(`usermanage_kill_passwd',`
#
interface(`usermanage_run_passwd',`
gen_require(`
@@ -63391,7 +111678,6 @@ index 98b8b2d..da75471 100644
- roleattribute $2 passwd_roles;
+ role $2 types passwd_t;
+ auth_run_chk_passwd(passwd_t, $2)
-+
+')
+
+########################################
@@ -63414,7 +111700,7 @@ index 98b8b2d..da75471 100644
')
########################################
-@@ -203,11 +248,20 @@ interface(`usermanage_domtrans_admin_passwd',`
+@@ -203,11 +247,20 @@ interface(`usermanage_domtrans_admin_passwd',`
#
interface(`usermanage_run_admin_passwd',`
gen_require(`
@@ -63437,7 +111723,7 @@ index 98b8b2d..da75471 100644
')
########################################
-@@ -245,10 +299,6 @@ interface(`usermanage_domtrans_useradd',`
+@@ -245,10 +298,6 @@ interface(`usermanage_domtrans_useradd',`
corecmd_search_bin($1)
domtrans_pattern($1, useradd_exec_t, useradd_t)
@@ -63448,27 +111734,25 @@ index 98b8b2d..da75471 100644
')
########################################
-@@ -270,11 +320,39 @@ interface(`usermanage_domtrans_useradd',`
+@@ -270,11 +319,38 @@ interface(`usermanage_domtrans_useradd',`
#
interface(`usermanage_run_useradd',`
gen_require(`
- attribute_role useradd_roles;
+ #attribute_role useradd_roles;
-+ type sysadm_passwd_t;
++ type useradd_t;
')
-- usermanage_domtrans_useradd($1)
-- roleattribute $2 useradd_roles;
+ #usermanage_domtrans_useradd($1)
+ #roleattribute $2 useradd_roles;
+
-+ usermanage_domtrans_admin_passwd($1)
-+ role $2 types sysadm_passwd_t;
-+
-+ optional_policy(`
-+ nscd_run(sysadm_passwd_t, $2)
-+ ')
+ usermanage_domtrans_useradd($1)
+- roleattribute $2 useradd_roles;
++ role $2 types useradd_t;
+
++ optional_policy(`
++ nscd_run(useradd_t, $2)
++ ')
+')
+
+########################################
@@ -63492,7 +111776,7 @@ index 98b8b2d..da75471 100644
########################################
diff --git a/policy/modules/admin/usermanage.te b/policy/modules/admin/usermanage.te
-index 673180c..6274145 100644
+index 673180c..17d6f72 100644
--- a/policy/modules/admin/usermanage.te
+++ b/policy/modules/admin/usermanage.te
@@ -5,18 +5,18 @@ policy_module(usermanage, 1.18.0)
@@ -63557,9 +111841,11 @@ index 673180c..6274145 100644
type sysadm_passwd_tmp_t;
files_tmp_file(sysadm_passwd_tmp_t)
-@@ -62,7 +66,8 @@ type useradd_t;
+@@ -61,8 +65,10 @@ files_tmp_file(sysadm_passwd_tmp_t)
+ type useradd_t;
type useradd_exec_t;
domain_obj_id_change_exemption(useradd_t)
++domain_system_change_exemption(useradd_t)
init_system_domain(useradd_t, useradd_exec_t)
-role useradd_roles types useradd_t;
+#role useradd_roles types useradd_t;
@@ -63567,7 +111853,7 @@ index 673180c..6274145 100644
########################################
#
-@@ -86,6 +91,7 @@ allow chfn_t self:unix_stream_socket connectto;
+@@ -86,6 +92,7 @@ allow chfn_t self:unix_stream_socket connectto;
kernel_read_system_state(chfn_t)
kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(chfn_t)
@@ -63575,7 +111861,7 @@ index 673180c..6274145 100644
selinux_get_fs_mount(chfn_t)
selinux_validate_context(chfn_t)
-@@ -94,25 +100,29 @@ selinux_compute_create_context(chfn_t)
+@@ -94,25 +101,29 @@ selinux_compute_create_context(chfn_t)
selinux_compute_relabel_context(chfn_t)
selinux_compute_user_contexts(chfn_t)
@@ -63611,21 +111897,21 @@ index 673180c..6274145 100644
files_read_etc_runtime_files(chfn_t)
files_dontaudit_search_var(chfn_t)
files_dontaudit_search_home(chfn_t)
-@@ -120,6 +130,7 @@ files_dontaudit_search_home(chfn_t)
+@@ -120,19 +131,29 @@ files_dontaudit_search_home(chfn_t)
# /usr/bin/passwd asks for w access to utmp, but it will operate
# correctly without it. Do not audit write denials to utmp.
init_dontaudit_rw_utmp(chfn_t)
+init_dontaudit_getattr_initctl(chfn_t)
- miscfiles_read_localization(chfn_t)
+-miscfiles_read_localization(chfn_t)
-@@ -128,11 +139,24 @@ logging_send_syslog_msg(chfn_t)
- # uses unix_chkpwd for checking passwords
- seutil_dontaudit_search_config(chfn_t)
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(chfn_t)
+-# uses unix_chkpwd for checking passwords
+-seutil_dontaudit_search_config(chfn_t)
+userdom_manage_user_tmp_files(chfn_t)
+userdom_tmp_filetrans_user_tmp(chfn_t, { file })
-+
+
userdom_use_unpriv_users_fds(chfn_t)
# user generally runs this from their home directory, so do not audit a search
# on user home dir
@@ -63644,7 +111930,7 @@ index 673180c..6274145 100644
########################################
#
# Crack local policy
-@@ -209,8 +233,8 @@ selinux_compute_create_context(groupadd_t)
+@@ -209,8 +230,8 @@ selinux_compute_create_context(groupadd_t)
selinux_compute_relabel_context(groupadd_t)
selinux_compute_user_contexts(groupadd_t)
@@ -63655,7 +111941,7 @@ index 673180c..6274145 100644
init_use_fds(groupadd_t)
init_read_utmp(groupadd_t)
-@@ -218,8 +242,8 @@ init_dontaudit_write_utmp(groupadd_t)
+@@ -218,8 +239,8 @@ init_dontaudit_write_utmp(groupadd_t)
domain_use_interactive_fds(groupadd_t)
@@ -63665,9 +111951,11 @@ index 673180c..6274145 100644
files_read_etc_runtime_files(groupadd_t)
files_read_usr_symlinks(groupadd_t)
-@@ -231,12 +255,14 @@ logging_send_syslog_msg(groupadd_t)
+@@ -229,14 +250,15 @@ corecmd_exec_bin(groupadd_t)
+ logging_send_audit_msgs(groupadd_t)
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(groupadd_t)
- miscfiles_read_localization(groupadd_t)
+-miscfiles_read_localization(groupadd_t)
-auth_run_chk_passwd(groupadd_t, groupadd_roles)
+#auth_run_chk_passwd(groupadd_t, groupadd_roles)
@@ -63682,7 +111970,7 @@ index 673180c..6274145 100644
auth_relabel_shadow(groupadd_t)
auth_etc_filetrans_shadow(groupadd_t)
-@@ -253,7 +279,8 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -253,7 +275,8 @@ optional_policy(`
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -63692,7 +111980,7 @@ index 673180c..6274145 100644
')
optional_policy(`
-@@ -285,6 +312,7 @@ allow passwd_t self:shm create_shm_perms;
+@@ -285,6 +308,7 @@ allow passwd_t self:shm create_shm_perms;
allow passwd_t self:sem create_sem_perms;
allow passwd_t self:msgq create_msgq_perms;
allow passwd_t self:msg { send receive };
@@ -63700,7 +111988,7 @@ index 673180c..6274145 100644
allow passwd_t crack_db_t:dir list_dir_perms;
read_files_pattern(passwd_t, crack_db_t, crack_db_t)
-@@ -293,6 +321,7 @@ kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(passwd_t)
+@@ -293,6 +317,7 @@ kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(passwd_t)
# for SSP
dev_read_urand(passwd_t)
@@ -63708,7 +111996,7 @@ index 673180c..6274145 100644
fs_getattr_xattr_fs(passwd_t)
fs_search_auto_mountpoints(passwd_t)
-@@ -307,26 +336,37 @@ selinux_compute_create_context(passwd_t)
+@@ -307,26 +332,38 @@ selinux_compute_create_context(passwd_t)
selinux_compute_relabel_context(passwd_t)
selinux_compute_user_contexts(passwd_t)
@@ -63742,6 +112030,7 @@ index 673180c..6274145 100644
files_read_etc_runtime_files(passwd_t)
-files_manage_etc_files(passwd_t)
++files_read_usr_files(passwd_t)
files_search_var(passwd_t)
files_dontaudit_search_pids(passwd_t)
files_relabel_etc_files(passwd_t)
@@ -63751,7 +112040,12 @@ index 673180c..6274145 100644
# /usr/bin/passwd asks for w access to utmp, but it will operate
# correctly without it. Do not audit write denials to utmp.
init_dontaudit_rw_utmp(passwd_t)
-@@ -340,7 +380,7 @@ miscfiles_read_localization(passwd_t)
+@@ -335,12 +372,11 @@ init_use_fds(passwd_t)
+ logging_send_audit_msgs(passwd_t)
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(passwd_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(passwd_t)
+
seutil_read_config(passwd_t)
seutil_read_file_contexts(passwd_t)
@@ -63760,7 +112054,7 @@ index 673180c..6274145 100644
userdom_use_unpriv_users_fds(passwd_t)
# make sure that getcon succeeds
userdom_getattr_all_users(passwd_t)
-@@ -349,9 +389,11 @@ userdom_read_user_tmp_files(passwd_t)
+@@ -349,9 +385,11 @@ userdom_read_user_tmp_files(passwd_t)
# user generally runs this from their home directory, so do not audit a search
# on user home dir
userdom_dontaudit_search_user_home_content(passwd_t)
@@ -63773,7 +112067,7 @@ index 673180c..6274145 100644
')
########################################
-@@ -398,9 +440,10 @@ dev_read_urand(sysadm_passwd_t)
+@@ -398,9 +436,10 @@ dev_read_urand(sysadm_passwd_t)
fs_getattr_xattr_fs(sysadm_passwd_t)
fs_search_auto_mountpoints(sysadm_passwd_t)
@@ -63786,7 +112080,7 @@ index 673180c..6274145 100644
auth_manage_shadow(sysadm_passwd_t)
auth_relabel_shadow(sysadm_passwd_t)
auth_etc_filetrans_shadow(sysadm_passwd_t)
-@@ -413,7 +456,6 @@ files_read_usr_files(sysadm_passwd_t)
+@@ -413,7 +452,6 @@ files_read_usr_files(sysadm_passwd_t)
domain_use_interactive_fds(sysadm_passwd_t)
@@ -63794,7 +112088,19 @@ index 673180c..6274145 100644
files_relabel_etc_files(sysadm_passwd_t)
files_read_etc_runtime_files(sysadm_passwd_t)
# for nscd lookups
-@@ -435,7 +477,8 @@ userdom_use_unpriv_users_fds(sysadm_passwd_t)
+@@ -423,19 +461,17 @@ files_dontaudit_search_pids(sysadm_passwd_t)
+ # correctly without it. Do not audit write denials to utmp.
+ init_dontaudit_rw_utmp(sysadm_passwd_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(sysadm_passwd_t)
+
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(sysadm_passwd_t)
+
+-seutil_dontaudit_search_config(sysadm_passwd_t)
+-
+ userdom_use_unpriv_users_fds(sysadm_passwd_t)
+ # user generally runs this from their home directory, so do not audit a search
+ # on user home dir
userdom_dontaudit_search_user_home_content(sysadm_passwd_t)
optional_policy(`
@@ -63804,7 +112110,7 @@ index 673180c..6274145 100644
')
########################################
-@@ -443,7 +486,8 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -443,7 +479,8 @@ optional_policy(`
# Useradd local policy
#
@@ -63814,7 +112120,7 @@ index 673180c..6274145 100644
dontaudit useradd_t self:capability sys_tty_config;
allow useradd_t self:process ~{ ptrace setcurrent setexec setfscreate setrlimit execmem execstack execheap };
allow useradd_t self:process setfscreate;
-@@ -465,10 +509,13 @@ corecmd_exec_shell(useradd_t)
+@@ -465,36 +502,35 @@ corecmd_exec_shell(useradd_t)
# Execute /usr/bin/{passwd,chfn,chsh} and /usr/sbin/{useradd,vipw}.
corecmd_exec_bin(useradd_t)
@@ -63829,7 +112135,9 @@ index 673180c..6274145 100644
files_search_var_lib(useradd_t)
files_relabel_etc_files(useradd_t)
files_read_etc_runtime_files(useradd_t)
-@@ -477,24 +524,19 @@ fs_search_auto_mountpoints(useradd_t)
++files_manage_etc_files(useradd_t)
+
+ fs_search_auto_mountpoints(useradd_t)
fs_getattr_xattr_fs(useradd_t)
mls_file_upgrade(useradd_t)
@@ -63860,16 +112168,18 @@ index 673180c..6274145 100644
auth_manage_shadow(useradd_t)
auth_relabel_shadow(useradd_t)
auth_etc_filetrans_shadow(useradd_t)
-@@ -507,31 +549,35 @@ logging_send_syslog_msg(useradd_t)
-
- miscfiles_read_localization(useradd_t)
+@@ -505,33 +541,36 @@ init_rw_utmp(useradd_t)
+ logging_send_audit_msgs(useradd_t)
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(useradd_t)
+-miscfiles_read_localization(useradd_t)
++
+seutil_semanage_policy(useradd_t)
+seutil_manage_file_contexts(useradd_t)
+seutil_manage_config(useradd_t)
+seutil_manage_login_config(useradd_t)
+seutil_manage_default_contexts(useradd_t)
-+
+
seutil_read_config(useradd_t)
seutil_read_file_contexts(useradd_t)
seutil_read_default_contexts(useradd_t)
@@ -63888,10 +112198,10 @@ index 673180c..6274145 100644
userdom_use_unpriv_users_fds(useradd_t)
# Add/remove user home directories
-userdom_manage_user_home_dirs(useradd_t)
--userdom_home_filetrans_user_home_dir(useradd_t)
+ userdom_home_filetrans_user_home_dir(useradd_t)
-userdom_manage_user_home_content_dirs(useradd_t)
-userdom_manage_user_home_content_files(useradd_t)
- userdom_home_filetrans_user_home_dir(useradd_t)
+-userdom_home_filetrans_user_home_dir(useradd_t)
-userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans_user_home_content(useradd_t, notdevfile_class_set)
+userdom_manage_home_role(system_r, useradd_t)
+userdom_delete_all_user_home_content(useradd_t)
@@ -63909,7 +112219,7 @@ index 673180c..6274145 100644
optional_policy(`
apache_manage_all_user_content(useradd_t)
')
-@@ -542,7 +588,8 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -542,7 +581,8 @@ optional_policy(`
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -63919,7 +112229,7 @@ index 673180c..6274145 100644
')
optional_policy(`
-@@ -550,6 +597,11 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -550,6 +590,11 @@ optional_policy(`
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -63931,7 +112241,7 @@ index 673180c..6274145 100644
tunable_policy(`samba_domain_controller',`
samba_append_log(useradd_t)
')
-@@ -559,3 +611,7 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -559,3 +604,7 @@ optional_policy(`
rpm_use_fds(useradd_t)
rpm_rw_pipes(useradd_t)
')
@@ -63940,7 +112250,7 @@ index 673180c..6274145 100644
+ stapserver_manage_lib(useradd_t)
+')
diff --git a/policy/modules/apps/seunshare.if b/policy/modules/apps/seunshare.if
-index 1dc7a85..a01511f 100644
+index 1dc7a85..dcc6337 100644
--- a/policy/modules/apps/seunshare.if
+++ b/policy/modules/apps/seunshare.if
@@ -43,18 +43,18 @@ interface(`seunshare_run',`
@@ -63969,7 +112279,7 @@ index 1dc7a85..a01511f 100644
## <param name="role">
## <summary>
## Role allowed access.
-@@ -66,15 +66,30 @@ interface(`seunshare_run',`
+@@ -66,15 +66,43 @@ interface(`seunshare_run',`
## </summary>
## </param>
#
@@ -63987,12 +112297,25 @@ index 1dc7a85..a01511f 100644
+ role $2 types $1_seunshare_t;
- seunshare_domtrans($1)
++ kernel_read_system_state($1_seunshare_t)
++
+ auth_use_nsswitch($1_seunshare_t)
-+
++
++ logging_send_syslog_msg($1_seunshare_t)
++
+ mls_process_set_level($1_seunshare_t)
+
+ domtrans_pattern($3, seunshare_exec_t, $1_seunshare_t)
-+ sandbox_transition($1_seunshare_t, $2)
++
++ # part of sandboxX.pp
++ optional_policy(`
++ sandbox_x_transition($1_seunshare_t, $2)
++ ')
++
++ # part of sandbox.pp
++ optional_policy(`
++ sandbox_transition($1_seunshare_t, $2)
++ ')
+
+ ps_process_pattern($3, $1_seunshare_t)
+ allow $3 $1_seunshare_t:process signal_perms;
@@ -64007,10 +112330,10 @@ index 1dc7a85..a01511f 100644
+ corecmd_shell_domtrans($1_seunshare_t, $1_t)
')
diff --git a/policy/modules/apps/seunshare.te b/policy/modules/apps/seunshare.te
-index 7590165..59539e8 100644
+index 7590165..19aaaed 100644
--- a/policy/modules/apps/seunshare.te
+++ b/policy/modules/apps/seunshare.te
-@@ -5,40 +5,63 @@ policy_module(seunshare, 1.1.0)
+@@ -5,40 +5,57 @@ policy_module(seunshare, 1.1.0)
# Declarations
#
@@ -64034,19 +112357,16 @@ index 7590165..59539e8 100644
-allow seunshare_t self:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
-allow seunshare_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
-+kernel_read_system_state(seunshare_domain)
-
--corecmd_exec_shell(seunshare_t)
--corecmd_exec_bin(seunshare_t)
+corecmd_exec_shell(seunshare_domain)
+corecmd_exec_bin(seunshare_domain)
--files_read_etc_files(seunshare_t)
--files_mounton_all_poly_members(seunshare_t)
+-corecmd_exec_shell(seunshare_t)
+-corecmd_exec_bin(seunshare_t)
+dev_read_urand(seunshare_domain)
+dev_dontaudit_rw_dri(seunshare_domain)
--auth_use_nsswitch(seunshare_t)
+-files_read_etc_files(seunshare_t)
+-files_mounton_all_poly_members(seunshare_t)
+files_search_all(seunshare_domain)
+files_read_etc_files(seunshare_domain)
+files_mounton_all_poly_members(seunshare_domain)
@@ -64054,17 +112374,17 @@ index 7590165..59539e8 100644
+files_manage_generic_tmp_dirs(seunshare_domain)
+files_relabelfrom_tmp_dirs(seunshare_domain)
+-auth_use_nsswitch(seunshare_t)
+-
-logging_send_syslog_msg(seunshare_t)
+-
+-miscfiles_read_localization(seunshare_t)
+-
+-userdom_use_user_terminals(seunshare_t)
+fs_manage_cgroup_dirs(seunshare_domain)
+fs_manage_cgroup_files(seunshare_domain)
+fs_unmount_all_fs(seunshare_domain)
--miscfiles_read_localization(seunshare_t)
-+logging_send_syslog_msg(seunshare_domain)
-
--userdom_use_user_terminals(seunshare_t)
-+miscfiles_read_localization(seunshare_domain)
-
+userdom_dontaudit_rw_user_tmp_pipes(seunshare_domain)
+userdom_use_inherited_user_terminals(seunshare_domain)
+userdom_list_user_home_content(seunshare_domain)
@@ -64092,7 +112412,7 @@ index 7590165..59539e8 100644
+ fs_mounton_fusefs(seunshare_domain)
+')
diff --git a/policy/modules/kernel/corecommands.fc b/policy/modules/kernel/corecommands.fc
-index db981df..414f3e4 100644
+index db981df..e2c87b3 100644
--- a/policy/modules/kernel/corecommands.fc
+++ b/policy/modules/kernel/corecommands.fc
@@ -1,9 +1,10 @@
@@ -64143,7 +112463,7 @@ index db981df..414f3e4 100644
/etc/sysconfig/crond -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0)
/etc/sysconfig/init -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0)
/etc/sysconfig/libvirtd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0)
-@@ -130,8 +138,8 @@ ifdef(`distro_debian',`
+@@ -130,10 +138,11 @@ ifdef(`distro_debian',`
/lib/readahead(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0)
/lib/security/pam_krb5/pam_krb5_storetmp -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0)
@@ -64152,8 +112472,11 @@ index db981df..414f3e4 100644
+/lib/udev/devices/MAKEDEV -l gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0)
/lib/udev/scsi_id -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0)
/lib/upstart(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0)
++/lib/security/pam_krb5(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0)
-@@ -147,7 +155,7 @@ ifdef(`distro_gentoo',`
+ ifdef(`distro_gentoo',`
+ /lib/dhcpcd/dhcpcd-run-hooks -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0)
+@@ -147,7 +156,7 @@ ifdef(`distro_gentoo',`
#
# /sbin
#
@@ -64162,7 +112485,7 @@ index db981df..414f3e4 100644
/sbin/.* gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0)
/sbin/insmod_ksymoops_clean -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0)
/sbin/mkfs\.cramfs -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0)
-@@ -163,6 +171,7 @@ ifdef(`distro_gentoo',`
+@@ -163,6 +172,7 @@ ifdef(`distro_gentoo',`
/opt/(.*/)?sbin(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0)
/opt/google/talkplugin(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0)
@@ -64170,7 +112493,7 @@ index db981df..414f3e4 100644
/opt/gutenprint/cups/lib/filter(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0)
-@@ -174,53 +183,77 @@ ifdef(`distro_gentoo',`
+@@ -174,53 +184,80 @@ ifdef(`distro_gentoo',`
/opt/vmware/workstation/lib/lib/wrapper-gtk24\.sh -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0)
')
@@ -64209,6 +112532,7 @@ index db981df..414f3e4 100644
+/usr/lib(.*/)?bin(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0)
/usr/lib/ccache/bin(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0)
/usr/lib/fence(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0)
++/usr/lib/libreoffice(/.*)?/bin(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0)
/usr/lib/pgsql/test/regress/.*\.sh -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0)
/usr/lib/qt.*/bin(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0)
/usr/lib/wicd/monitor\.py -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t, s0)
@@ -64241,13 +112565,17 @@ index db981df..414f3e4 100644
-/usr/lib/nagios/plugins(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0)
-/usr/lib/netsaint/plugins(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0)
-/usr/lib/news/bin(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0)
+-/usr/lib/nspluginwrapper/np.* gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0)
+-/usr/lib/portage/bin(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0)
+-/usr/lib/pm-utils(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0)
+/usr/lib/nagios/plugins(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0)
+/usr/lib/netsaint/plugins(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0)
+/usr/lib/news/bin(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0)
- /usr/lib/nspluginwrapper/np.* gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0)
- /usr/lib/portage/bin(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0)
- /usr/lib/pm-utils(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0)
-+/usr/lib/readahead(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0)
++/usr/lib/nspluginwrapper/np.* gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0)
++/usr/lib/ocf(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0)
++/usr/lib/portage/bin(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0)
++/usr/lib/pm-utils(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0)
++/usr/lib/readahead(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0)
/usr/lib/rpm/rpmd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0)
/usr/lib/rpm/rpmk -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0)
/usr/lib/rpm/rpmq -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0)
@@ -64256,6 +112584,7 @@ index db981df..414f3e4 100644
+/usr/lib/security/pam_krb5/pam_krb5_storetmp -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0)
/usr/lib/sftp-server -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0)
-/usr/lib/vte/gnome-pty-helper -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0)
++/usr/lib/systemd/system-sleep/(.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0)
+/usr/lib/vte/gnome-pty-helper -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0)
+/usr/lib/yaboot/addnote -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0)
+/usr/lib/udev/[^/]* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0)
@@ -64265,7 +112594,7 @@ index db981df..414f3e4 100644
/usr/lib/xfce4/exo-1/exo-compose-mail-1 -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0)
/usr/lib/xfce4/exo-1/exo-helper-1 -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0)
/usr/lib/xfce4/panel/migrate -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0)
-@@ -235,10 +268,15 @@ ifdef(`distro_gentoo',`
+@@ -235,10 +272,15 @@ ifdef(`distro_gentoo',`
/usr/lib/debug/sbin(/.*)? -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0)
/usr/lib/debug/usr/bin(/.*)? -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0)
/usr/lib/debug/usr/sbin(/.*)? -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0)
@@ -64281,7 +112610,7 @@ index db981df..414f3e4 100644
/usr/lib/[^/]*/run-mozilla\.sh -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0)
/usr/lib/[^/]*/mozilla-xremote-client -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0)
/usr/lib/thunderbird.*/mozilla-xremote-client -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0)
-@@ -251,11 +289,17 @@ ifdef(`distro_gentoo',`
+@@ -251,11 +293,17 @@ ifdef(`distro_gentoo',`
/usr/libexec/openssh/sftp-server -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0)
@@ -64303,22 +112632,30 @@ index db981df..414f3e4 100644
/usr/sbin/scponlyc -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:shell_exec_t,s0)
/usr/sbin/sesh -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:shell_exec_t,s0)
/usr/sbin/smrsh -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:shell_exec_t,s0)
-@@ -271,6 +315,10 @@ ifdef(`distro_gentoo',`
+@@ -271,10 +319,15 @@ ifdef(`distro_gentoo',`
/usr/share/cluster/.*\.sh gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0)
/usr/share/cluster/ocf-shellfuncs -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0)
/usr/share/cluster/svclib_nfslock -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0)
+/usr/share/cluster/SAPDatabase -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0)
+/usr/share/cluster/SAPInstance -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0)
+/usr/share/cluster/fence_scsi_check\.pl -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0)
-+/usr/share/cluster/checkquorum -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0)
++/usr/share/cluster/checkquorum.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0)
/usr/share/e16/misc(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0)
/usr/share/gedit-2/plugins/externaltools/tools(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0)
/usr/share/gitolite/hooks/common/update -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0)
-@@ -290,15 +338,19 @@ ifdef(`distro_gentoo',`
+ /usr/share/gitolite/hooks/gitolite-admin/post-update -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0)
++/usr/share/gitolite3/commands(/.*)? -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0)
+ /usr/share/gnucash/finance-quote-check -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0)
+ /usr/share/gnucash/finance-quote-helper -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0)
+ /usr/share/hal/device-manager/hal-device-manager -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0)
+@@ -289,16 +342,21 @@ ifdef(`distro_gentoo',`
+ /usr/share/selinux/devel/policygentool -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0)
/usr/share/smolt/client(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0)
/usr/share/shorewall/compiler\.pl -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0)
- /usr/share/shorewall/configpath -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0)
+-/usr/share/shorewall/configpath -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0)
++/usr/share/shorewall6?/configpath -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0)
+/usr/share/shorewall/getparams -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0)
++/usr/share/shorewall6?/wait4ifup -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0)
/usr/share/shorewall-perl(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0)
/usr/share/shorewall-shell(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0)
/usr/share/shorewall-lite(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0)
@@ -64335,7 +112672,7 @@ index db981df..414f3e4 100644
ifdef(`distro_debian',`
/usr/lib/ConsoleKit/.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0)
-@@ -314,8 +366,12 @@ ifdef(`distro_redhat', `
+@@ -314,8 +372,12 @@ ifdef(`distro_redhat', `
/etc/gdm/[^/]+ -d gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0)
/etc/gdm/[^/]+/.* gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0)
@@ -64348,7 +112685,7 @@ index db981df..414f3e4 100644
/usr/lib/vmware-tools/(s)?bin32(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0)
/usr/lib/vmware-tools/(s)?bin64(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0)
/usr/share/authconfig/authconfig-gtk\.py -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0)
-@@ -325,9 +381,11 @@ ifdef(`distro_redhat', `
+@@ -325,9 +387,11 @@ ifdef(`distro_redhat', `
/usr/share/clamav/clamd-gen -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0)
/usr/share/clamav/freshclam-sleep -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0)
/usr/share/createrepo(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0)
@@ -64360,7 +112697,7 @@ index db981df..414f3e4 100644
/usr/share/pwlib/make/ptlib-config -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0)
/usr/share/pydict/pydict\.py -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0)
/usr/share/rhn/rhn_applet/applet\.py -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0)
-@@ -376,11 +434,14 @@ ifdef(`distro_suse', `
+@@ -376,11 +440,15 @@ ifdef(`distro_suse', `
#
# /var
#
@@ -64372,11 +112709,12 @@ index db981df..414f3e4 100644
/var/lib/asterisk/agi-bin(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0)
+/var/lib/iscan/interpreter gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0)
+/usr/lib/ruby/gems(/.*)?/helper-scripts(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0)
++/usr/share/gems(/.*)?/helper-scripts(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0)
+
/usr/lib/yp/.+ -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0)
/var/qmail/bin -d gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0)
-@@ -390,3 +451,12 @@ ifdef(`distro_suse', `
+@@ -390,3 +458,12 @@ ifdef(`distro_suse', `
ifdef(`distro_suse',`
/var/lib/samba/bin/.+ gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0)
')
@@ -64390,7 +112728,7 @@ index db981df..414f3e4 100644
+/usr/lib/ruby/gems/.*/agents(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0)
+/usr/lib/virtualbox/VBoxManage -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0)
diff --git a/policy/modules/kernel/corecommands.if b/policy/modules/kernel/corecommands.if
-index 9e9263a..c4dc1b6 100644
+index 9e9263a..87d577e 100644
--- a/policy/modules/kernel/corecommands.if
+++ b/policy/modules/kernel/corecommands.if
@@ -122,6 +122,7 @@ interface(`corecmd_search_bin',`
@@ -64471,10 +112809,10 @@ index 9e9263a..c4dc1b6 100644
read_lnk_files_pattern($1, bin_t, bin_t)
list_dirs_pattern($1, bin_t, bin_t)
can_exec($1, bin_t)
-+ #ifdef(`enable_mls',`',`
-+ # files_exec_usr_files($1)
-+ # libs_exec_lib_files($1)
-+ #')
++
++ ifdef(`enable_mls',`',`
++ files_exec_all_base_ro_files($1)
++ ')
')
########################################
@@ -64519,7 +112857,18 @@ index 9e9263a..c4dc1b6 100644
## Get the attributes of all executable files.
## </summary>
## <param name="domain">
-@@ -1049,6 +1096,7 @@ interface(`corecmd_manage_all_executables',`
+@@ -1012,6 +1059,10 @@ interface(`corecmd_exec_all_executables',`
+ can_exec($1, exec_type)
+ list_dirs_pattern($1, bin_t, bin_t)
+ read_lnk_files_pattern($1, bin_t, exec_type)
++
++ ifdef(`enable_mls',`',`
++ files_exec_all_base_ro_files($1)
++ ')
+ ')
+
+ ########################################
+@@ -1049,6 +1100,7 @@ interface(`corecmd_manage_all_executables',`
type bin_t;
')
@@ -64527,19 +112876,65 @@ index 9e9263a..c4dc1b6 100644
manage_files_pattern($1, bin_t, exec_type)
manage_lnk_files_pattern($1, bin_t, bin_t)
')
+@@ -1091,3 +1143,36 @@ interface(`corecmd_mmap_all_executables',`
+
+ mmap_files_pattern($1, bin_t, exec_type)
+ ')
++
++########################################
++## <summary>
++## Create objects in the /bin directory
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++## <param name="file_type">
++## <summary>
++## The type of the object to be created
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++## <param name="object_class">
++## <summary>
++## The object class.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++## <param name="name" optional="true">
++## <summary>
++## The name of the object being created.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`corecmd_bin_filetrans',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type bin_t;
++ ')
++
++ filetrans_pattern($1, bin_t, $2, $3, $4)
++')
diff --git a/policy/modules/kernel/corecommands.te b/policy/modules/kernel/corecommands.te
-index 1dd0427..a4ba874 100644
+index 1dd0427..6d6f456 100644
--- a/policy/modules/kernel/corecommands.te
+++ b/policy/modules/kernel/corecommands.te
-@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ attribute exec_type;
+@@ -13,7 +13,8 @@ attribute exec_type;
#
# bin_t is the type of files in the system bin/sbin directories.
#
-type bin_t alias { ls_exec_t sbin_t };
+type bin_t alias { ls_exec_t sbin_t unconfined_execmem_exec_t execmem_exec_t java_exec_t mono_exec_t };
++files_ro_base_file(bin_t)
corecmd_executable_file(bin_t)
dev_associate(bin_t) #For /dev/MAKEDEV
+@@ -21,6 +22,7 @@ dev_associate(bin_t) #For /dev/MAKEDEV
+ # shell_exec_t is the type of user shells such as /bin/bash.
+ #
+ type shell_exec_t;
++files_ro_base_file(shell_exec_t)
+ corecmd_executable_file(shell_exec_t)
+
+ type chroot_exec_t;
diff --git a/policy/modules/kernel/corenetwork.fc b/policy/modules/kernel/corenetwork.fc
index f9b25c1..9af1f7a 100644
--- a/policy/modules/kernel/corenetwork.fc
@@ -64552,7 +112947,7 @@ index f9b25c1..9af1f7a 100644
+/usr/lib/udev/devices/ppp -c gen_context(system_u:object_r:ppp_device_t,s0)
+/usr/lib/udev/devices/net/.* -c gen_context(system_u:object_r:tun_tap_device_t,s0)
diff --git a/policy/modules/kernel/corenetwork.if.in b/policy/modules/kernel/corenetwork.if.in
-index 07126bd..a69c99d 100644
+index 07126bd..7ac4630 100644
--- a/policy/modules/kernel/corenetwork.if.in
+++ b/policy/modules/kernel/corenetwork.if.in
@@ -55,6 +55,7 @@ interface(`corenet_reserved_port',`
@@ -64685,10 +113080,10 @@ index 07126bd..a69c99d 100644
+#
+interface(`corenet_dccp_sendrecv_generic_port',`
+ gen_require(`
-+ type port_t, unreserved_port_t;
++ type port_t, unreserved_port_t, ephemeral_port_t;
+ ')
+
-+ allow $1 { port_t unreserved_port_t }:dccp_socket { send_msg recv_msg };
++ allow $1 { port_t unreserved_port_t ephemeral_port_t }:dccp_socket { send_msg recv_msg };
+')
+
+########################################
@@ -64701,11 +113096,11 @@ index 07126bd..a69c99d 100644
interface(`corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_port',`
gen_require(`
- type port_t;
-+ type port_t, unreserved_port_t;
++ type port_t, unreserved_port_t, ephemeral_port_t;
')
- allow $1 port_t:tcp_socket { send_msg recv_msg };
-+ allow $1 { port_t unreserved_port_t }:tcp_socket { send_msg recv_msg };
++ allow $1 { port_t unreserved_port_t ephemeral_port_t }:tcp_socket { send_msg recv_msg };
+')
+
+########################################
@@ -64722,10 +113117,10 @@ index 07126bd..a69c99d 100644
+#
+interface(`corenet_dontaudit_dccp_sendrecv_generic_port',`
+ gen_require(`
-+ type port_t, unreserved_port_t;
++ type port_t, unreserved_port_t, ephemeral_port_t;
+ ')
+
-+ dontaudit $1 { port_t unreserved_port_t }:dccp_socket { send_msg recv_msg };
++ dontaudit $1 { port_t unreserved_port_t ephemeral_port_t }:dccp_socket { send_msg recv_msg };
')
########################################
@@ -64734,11 +113129,11 @@ index 07126bd..a69c99d 100644
interface(`corenet_dontaudit_tcp_sendrecv_generic_port',`
gen_require(`
- type port_t;
-+ type port_t, unreserved_port_t;
++ type port_t, unreserved_port_t, ephemeral_port_t;
')
- dontaudit $1 port_t:tcp_socket { send_msg recv_msg };
-+ dontaudit $1 { port_t unreserved_port_t }:tcp_socket { send_msg recv_msg };
++ dontaudit $1 { port_t unreserved_port_t ephemeral_port_t }:tcp_socket { send_msg recv_msg };
')
########################################
@@ -64747,11 +113142,11 @@ index 07126bd..a69c99d 100644
interface(`corenet_udp_send_generic_port',`
gen_require(`
- type port_t;
-+ type port_t, unreserved_port_t;
++ type port_t, unreserved_port_t, ephemeral_port_t;
')
- allow $1 port_t:udp_socket send_msg;
-+ allow $1 { port_t unreserved_port_t }:udp_socket send_msg;
++ allow $1 { port_t unreserved_port_t ephemeral_port_t }:udp_socket send_msg;
')
########################################
@@ -64760,11 +113155,11 @@ index 07126bd..a69c99d 100644
interface(`corenet_udp_receive_generic_port',`
gen_require(`
- type port_t;
-+ type port_t, unreserved_port_t;
++ type port_t, unreserved_port_t, ephemeral_port_t;
')
- allow $1 port_t:udp_socket recv_msg;
-+ allow $1 { port_t unreserved_port_t }:udp_socket recv_msg;
++ allow $1 { port_t unreserved_port_t ephemeral_port_t }:udp_socket recv_msg;
')
########################################
@@ -64782,11 +113177,11 @@ index 07126bd..a69c99d 100644
+#
+interface(`corenet_dccp_bind_generic_port',`
+ gen_require(`
-+ type port_t, unreserved_port_t;
++ type port_t, unreserved_port_t, ephemeral_port_t;
+ attribute defined_port_type;
+ ')
+
-+ allow $1 { port_t unreserved_port_t }:dccp_socket name_bind;
++ allow $1 { port_t unreserved_port_t ephemeral_port_t }:dccp_socket name_bind;
+ dontaudit $1 defined_port_type:dccp_socket name_bind;
+')
+
@@ -64800,12 +113195,12 @@ index 07126bd..a69c99d 100644
interface(`corenet_tcp_bind_generic_port',`
gen_require(`
- type port_t;
-+ type port_t, unreserved_port_t;
++ type port_t, unreserved_port_t, ephemeral_port_t;
attribute defined_port_type;
')
- allow $1 port_t:tcp_socket name_bind;
-+ allow $1 { port_t unreserved_port_t }:tcp_socket name_bind;
++ allow $1 { port_t unreserved_port_t ephemeral_port_t }:tcp_socket name_bind;
dontaudit $1 defined_port_type:tcp_socket name_bind;
')
@@ -64822,10 +113217,10 @@ index 07126bd..a69c99d 100644
+#
+interface(`corenet_dontaudit_dccp_bind_generic_port',`
+ gen_require(`
-+ type port_t, unreserved_port_t;
++ type port_t, unreserved_port_t, ephemeral_port_t;
+ ')
+
-+ dontaudit $1 { port_t unreserved_port_t }:dccp_socket name_bind;
++ dontaudit $1 { port_t unreserved_port_t ephemeral_port_t }:dccp_socket name_bind;
+')
+
+########################################
@@ -64838,11 +113233,11 @@ index 07126bd..a69c99d 100644
interface(`corenet_dontaudit_tcp_bind_generic_port',`
gen_require(`
- type port_t;
-+ type port_t, unreserved_port_t;
++ type port_t, unreserved_port_t, ephemeral_port_t;
')
- dontaudit $1 port_t:tcp_socket name_bind;
-+ dontaudit $1 { port_t unreserved_port_t }:tcp_socket name_bind;
++ dontaudit $1 { port_t unreserved_port_t ephemeral_port_t }:tcp_socket name_bind;
')
########################################
@@ -64851,12 +113246,12 @@ index 07126bd..a69c99d 100644
interface(`corenet_udp_bind_generic_port',`
gen_require(`
- type port_t;
-+ type port_t, unreserved_port_t;
++ type port_t, unreserved_port_t, ephemeral_port_t;
attribute defined_port_type;
')
- allow $1 port_t:udp_socket name_bind;
-+ allow $1 { port_t unreserved_port_t }:udp_socket name_bind;
++ allow $1 { port_t unreserved_port_t ephemeral_port_t }:udp_socket name_bind;
dontaudit $1 defined_port_type:udp_socket name_bind;
')
@@ -64872,10 +113267,10 @@ index 07126bd..a69c99d 100644
+#
+interface(`corenet_dccp_connect_generic_port',`
+ gen_require(`
-+ type port_t, unreserved_port_t;
++ type port_t, unreserved_port_t,ephemeral_port_t;
+ ')
+
-+ allow $1 { port_t unreserved_port_t }:dccp_socket name_connect;
++ allow $1 { port_t unreserved_port_t ephemeral_port_t }:dccp_socket name_connect;
+')
+
+########################################
@@ -64888,11 +113283,11 @@ index 07126bd..a69c99d 100644
interface(`corenet_tcp_connect_generic_port',`
gen_require(`
- type port_t;
-+ type port_t, unreserved_port_t;
++ type port_t, unreserved_port_t, ephemeral_port_t;
')
- allow $1 port_t:tcp_socket name_connect;
-+ allow $1 { port_t unreserved_port_t }:tcp_socket name_connect;
++ allow $1 { port_t unreserved_port_t ephemeral_port_t }:tcp_socket name_connect;
+')
+
+########################################
@@ -65117,16 +113512,11 @@ index 07126bd..a69c99d 100644
## Send and receive TCP network traffic on all reserved ports.
## </summary>
## <param name="domain">
-@@ -1747,17 +2081,215 @@ interface(`corenet_udp_send_all_reserved_ports',`
- ## </summary>
- ## </param>
- #
--interface(`corenet_udp_receive_all_reserved_ports',`
-+interface(`corenet_udp_receive_all_reserved_ports',`
-+ gen_require(`
-+ attribute reserved_port_type;
-+ ')
-+
+@@ -1752,12 +2086,210 @@ interface(`corenet_udp_receive_all_reserved_ports',`
+ attribute reserved_port_type;
+ ')
+
+- allow $1 reserved_port_type:udp_socket recv_msg;
+ allow $1 reserved_port_type:udp_socket recv_msg;
+')
+
@@ -65321,12 +113711,10 @@ index 07126bd..a69c99d 100644
+## </param>
+#
+interface(`corenet_tcp_bind_all_ephemeral_ports',`
- gen_require(`
-- attribute reserved_port_type;
++ gen_require(`
+ attribute ephemeral_port_type;
- ')
-
-- allow $1 reserved_port_type:udp_socket recv_msg;
++ ')
++
+ allow $1 ephemeral_port_type:tcp_socket name_bind;
')
@@ -65792,12 +114180,17 @@ index 07126bd..a69c99d 100644
')
########################################
-@@ -2571,7 +3239,31 @@ interface(`corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel',`
+@@ -2567,11 +3235,34 @@ interface(`corenet_all_recvfrom_unlabeled',`
+ #
+ interface(`corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel',`
+ gen_require(`
+- type netlabel_peer_t;
++ attribute netlabel_peer_type;
')
- allow $1 netlabel_peer_t:peer recv;
+- allow $1 netlabel_peer_t:peer recv;
- allow $1 netlabel_peer_t:{ tcp_socket udp_socket rawip_socket } recvfrom;
-+ allow $1 netlabel_peer_t:{ tcp_socket udp_socket rawip_socket dccp_socket } recvfrom;
++ typeattribute $1 netlabel_peer_type;
+')
+
+########################################
@@ -65825,7 +114218,7 @@ index 07126bd..a69c99d 100644
')
########################################
-@@ -2585,6 +3277,7 @@ interface(`corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel',`
+@@ -2585,6 +3276,7 @@ interface(`corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel',`
## </param>
#
interface(`corenet_dontaudit_all_recvfrom_unlabeled',`
@@ -65833,7 +114226,7 @@ index 07126bd..a69c99d 100644
kernel_dontaudit_tcp_recvfrom_unlabeled($1)
kernel_dontaudit_udp_recvfrom_unlabeled($1)
kernel_dontaudit_raw_recvfrom_unlabeled($1)
-@@ -2613,7 +3306,35 @@ interface(`corenet_dontaudit_all_recvfrom_netlabel',`
+@@ -2613,7 +3305,35 @@ interface(`corenet_dontaudit_all_recvfrom_netlabel',`
')
dontaudit $1 netlabel_peer_t:peer recv;
@@ -65870,7 +114263,7 @@ index 07126bd..a69c99d 100644
')
########################################
-@@ -2727,6 +3448,7 @@ interface(`corenet_raw_recvfrom_labeled',`
+@@ -2727,6 +3447,7 @@ interface(`corenet_raw_recvfrom_labeled',`
## </param>
#
interface(`corenet_all_recvfrom_labeled',`
@@ -65878,7 +114271,7 @@ index 07126bd..a69c99d 100644
corenet_tcp_recvfrom_labeled($1, $2)
corenet_udp_recvfrom_labeled($1, $2)
corenet_raw_recvfrom_labeled($1, $2)
-@@ -3134,3 +3856,53 @@ interface(`corenet_unconfined',`
+@@ -3134,3 +3855,53 @@ interface(`corenet_unconfined',`
typeattribute $1 corenet_unconfined_type;
')
@@ -65933,7 +114326,7 @@ index 07126bd..a69c99d 100644
+ dev_filetrans($1, ppp_device_t, chr_file, "ppp")
+')
diff --git a/policy/modules/kernel/corenetwork.if.m4 b/policy/modules/kernel/corenetwork.if.m4
-index 8e0f9cd..da3b374 100644
+index 8e0f9cd..b9f45b9 100644
--- a/policy/modules/kernel/corenetwork.if.m4
+++ b/policy/modules/kernel/corenetwork.if.m4
@@ -631,6 +631,26 @@ interface(`corenet_udp_bind_$1_port',`
@@ -65963,11 +114356,43 @@ index 8e0f9cd..da3b374 100644
## Make a TCP connection to the $1 port.
## </summary>
## <param name="domain">
+@@ -646,6 +666,23 @@ interface(`corenet_tcp_connect_$1_port',`
+
+ allow dollarsone $1_$2:tcp_socket name_connect;
+ ')
++########################################
++## <summary>
++## Do not audit attempts to make a TCP connection to $1 port.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`corenet_dontaudit_tcp_connect_$1_port',`
++ gen_require(`
++ $3 $1_$2;
++ ')
++
++ dontaudit dollarsone $1_$2:tcp_socket name_connect;
++')
+ '') dnl end create_port_interfaces
+
+ define(`create_packet_interfaces',``
diff --git a/policy/modules/kernel/corenetwork.te.in b/policy/modules/kernel/corenetwork.te.in
-index fe2ee5e..7f3dc50 100644
+index fe2ee5e..5a58a39 100644
--- a/policy/modules/kernel/corenetwork.te.in
+++ b/policy/modules/kernel/corenetwork.te.in
-@@ -14,12 +14,14 @@ attribute node_type;
+@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ policy_module(corenetwork, 1.18.0)
+ # Declarations
+ #
+
++attribute netlabel_peer_type;
+ attribute client_packet_type;
+ # This is an optimization for { port_type -port_t }
+ attribute defined_port_type;
+@@ -14,12 +15,14 @@ attribute node_type;
attribute packet_type;
attribute port_type;
attribute reserved_port_type;
@@ -65982,7 +114407,7 @@ index fe2ee5e..7f3dc50 100644
type ppp_device_t;
dev_node(ppp_device_t)
-@@ -29,6 +31,7 @@ dev_node(ppp_device_t)
+@@ -29,6 +32,7 @@ dev_node(ppp_device_t)
#
type tun_tap_device_t;
dev_node(tun_tap_device_t)
@@ -65990,7 +114415,7 @@ index fe2ee5e..7f3dc50 100644
########################################
#
-@@ -38,6 +41,18 @@ dev_node(tun_tap_device_t)
+@@ -38,6 +42,18 @@ dev_node(tun_tap_device_t)
#
# client_packet_t is the default type of IPv4 and IPv6 client packets.
#
@@ -66009,7 +114434,15 @@ index fe2ee5e..7f3dc50 100644
type client_packet_t, packet_type, client_packet_type;
#
-@@ -59,6 +74,12 @@ sid port gen_context(system_u:object_r:port_t,s0)
+@@ -46,6 +62,7 @@ type client_packet_t, packet_type, client_packet_type;
+ #
+ type netlabel_peer_t;
+ sid netmsg gen_context(system_u:object_r:netlabel_peer_t,mls_systemhigh)
++mcs_untrusted_proc(netlabel_peer_t)
+
+ #
+ # port_t is the default type of INET port numbers.
+@@ -59,6 +76,12 @@ sid port gen_context(system_u:object_r:port_t,s0)
type unreserved_port_t, port_type, unreserved_port_type;
#
@@ -66022,7 +114455,7 @@ index fe2ee5e..7f3dc50 100644
# reserved_port_t is the type of INET port numbers below 1024.
#
type reserved_port_t, port_type, reserved_port_type;
-@@ -74,30 +95,39 @@ type hi_reserved_port_t, port_type, reserved_port_type, rpc_port_type;
+@@ -74,30 +97,39 @@ type hi_reserved_port_t, port_type, reserved_port_type, rpc_port_type;
type server_packet_t, packet_type, server_packet_type;
network_port(afs_bos, udp,7007,s0)
@@ -66063,7 +114496,7 @@ index fe2ee5e..7f3dc50 100644
network_port(cvs, tcp,2401,s0, udp,2401,s0)
network_port(cyphesis, tcp,6767,s0, tcp,6769,s0, tcp,6780-6799,s0, udp,32771,s0)
network_port(daap, tcp,3689,s0, udp,3689,s0)
-@@ -108,14 +138,23 @@ network_port(dhcpc, udp,68,s0, tcp,68,s0, udp,546,s0, tcp, 546,s0)
+@@ -108,14 +140,23 @@ network_port(dhcpc, udp,68,s0, tcp,68,s0, udp,546,s0, tcp, 546,s0)
network_port(dhcpd, udp,67,s0, udp,547,s0, tcp, 547,s0, udp,548,s0, tcp, 548,s0, tcp,647,s0, udp,647,s0, tcp,847,s0, udp,847,s0, tcp,7911,s0)
network_port(dict, tcp,2628,s0)
network_port(distccd, tcp,3632,s0)
@@ -66087,15 +114520,16 @@ index fe2ee5e..7f3dc50 100644
network_port(glance_registry, tcp,9191,s0, udp,9191,s0)
network_port(gopher, tcp,70,s0, udp,70,s0)
network_port(gpsd, tcp,2947,s0)
-@@ -123,13 +162,15 @@ network_port(hadoop_datanode, tcp,50010,s0)
+@@ -123,104 +164,139 @@ network_port(hadoop_datanode, tcp,50010,s0)
network_port(hadoop_namenode, tcp,8020,s0)
network_port(hddtemp, tcp,7634,s0)
network_port(howl, tcp,5335,s0, udp,5353,s0)
-network_port(hplip, tcp,1782,s0, tcp,2207,s0, tcp,2208,s0, tcp, 8290,s0, tcp,50000,s0, tcp,50002,s0, tcp,8292,s0, tcp,9100,s0, tcp,9101,s0, tcp,9102,s0, tcp,9220,s0, tcp,9221,s0, tcp,9222,s0, tcp,9280,s0, tcp,9281,s0, tcp,9282,s0, tcp,9290,s0, tcp,9291,s0, tcp,9292,s0)
-+network_port(hplip, tcp,1782,s0, tcp,2207,s0, tcp,2208,s0, tcp, 8290,s0, tcp,50000,s0, tcp,50002,s0, tcp,8292,s0, tcp,9100,s0, tcp,9101,s0, tcp,9102,s0, tcp,9220,s0, tcp,9221,s0, tcp,9222,s0, tcp,9280,s0, tcp,9281,s0, tcp,9282,s0, tcp,9290,s0, tcp,9291,s0)
- network_port(http, tcp,80,s0, tcp,443,s0, tcp,488,s0, tcp,8008,s0, tcp,8009,s0, tcp,8443,s0) #8443 is mod_nss default port
+-network_port(http, tcp,80,s0, tcp,443,s0, tcp,488,s0, tcp,8008,s0, tcp,8009,s0, tcp,8443,s0) #8443 is mod_nss default port
-network_port(http_cache, tcp,3128,s0, udp,3130,s0, tcp,8080,s0, tcp,8118,s0, tcp,10001-10010,s0) # 8118 is for privoxy
-+network_port(http_cache, udp,3130,s0, tcp,8080,s0, tcp,8118,s0, tcp,10001-10010,s0) # 8118 is for privoxy
++network_port(hplip, tcp,1782,s0, tcp,2207,s0, tcp,2208,s0, tcp, 8290,s0, tcp,50000,s0, tcp,50002,s0, tcp,8292,s0, tcp,9100,s0, tcp,9101,s0, tcp,9102,s0, tcp,9220,s0, tcp,9221,s0, tcp,9222,s0, tcp,9280,s0, tcp,9281,s0, tcp,9282,s0, tcp,9290,s0, tcp,9291,s0)
++network_port(http, tcp,80,s0, tcp,81,s0, tcp,443,s0, tcp,488,s0, tcp,8008,s0, tcp,8009,s0, tcp,8443,s0,tcp,9000, s0) #8443 is mod_nss default port
++network_port(http_cache, udp,3130,s0, tcp,8080,s0, tcp,8118,s0, tcp,8123,s0, tcp,10001-10010,s0) # 8118 is for privoxy
network_port(i18n_input, tcp,9010,s0)
network_port(imaze, tcp,5323,s0, udp,5323,s0)
-network_port(inetd_child, tcp,1,s0, udp,1,s0, tcp,7,s0, udp,7,s0, tcp,9,s0, udp,9,s0, tcp,13,s0, udp,13,s0, tcp,19,s0, udp,19,s0, tcp,37,s0, udp,37,s0, tcp,512,s0, tcp,543,s0, tcp,544,s0, tcp,891,s0, udp,891,s0, tcp,892,s0, udp,892,s0, tcp,2105,s0, tcp,5666,s0)
@@ -66106,7 +114540,10 @@ index fe2ee5e..7f3dc50 100644
network_port(ipmi, udp,623,s0, udp,664,s0)
network_port(ipp, tcp,631,s0, udp,631,s0, tcp,8610-8614,s0, udp,8610-8614,s0)
network_port(ipsecnat, tcp,4500,s0, udp,4500,s0)
-@@ -139,87 +180,118 @@ network_port(iscsi, tcp,3260,s0)
+-network_port(ircd, tcp,6667,s0)
++network_port(ircd, tcp,6667,s0, tcp,6697,s0)
+ network_port(isakmp, udp,500,s0)
+ network_port(iscsi, tcp,3260,s0)
network_port(isns, tcp,3205,s0, udp,3205,s0)
network_port(jabber_client, tcp,5222,s0, tcp,5223,s0)
network_port(jabber_interserver, tcp,5269,s0)
@@ -66126,7 +114563,8 @@ index fe2ee5e..7f3dc50 100644
+network_port(rtsclient, tcp,2501,s0)
network_port(kprop, tcp,754,s0)
network_port(ktalkd, udp,517,s0, udp,518,s0)
- network_port(ldap, tcp,389,s0, udp,389,s0, tcp,636,s0, udp,636,s0, tcp,3268,s0)
+-network_port(ldap, tcp,389,s0, udp,389,s0, tcp,636,s0, udp,636,s0, tcp,3268,s0)
++network_port(ldap, tcp,389,s0, udp,389,s0, tcp,636,s0, udp,636,s0, tcp,3268,s0, tcp, 7389,s0)
network_port(lirc, tcp,8765,s0)
+network_port(luci, tcp,8084,s0)
network_port(lmtp, tcp,24,s0, udp,24,s0)
@@ -66205,6 +114643,7 @@ index fe2ee5e..7f3dc50 100644
network_port(rsync, tcp,873,s0, udp,873,s0)
network_port(rwho, udp,513,s0)
network_port(sap, tcp,9875,s0, udp,9875,s0)
++network_port(saphostctrl, tcp,1128,s0, tcp,1129,s0)
+network_port(sametime, tcp,1533,s0, udp,1533,s0)
network_port(sieve, tcp,4190,s0)
network_port(sip, tcp,5060,s0, udp,5060,s0, tcp,5061,s0, udp,5061,s0)
@@ -66237,9 +114676,11 @@ index fe2ee5e..7f3dc50 100644
+network_port(tor, tcp, 6969, s0, tcp,9001,s0, tcp,9030,s0, tcp,9051,s0)
+network_port(tor_socks, tcp,9050,s0)
network_port(traceroute, udp,64000-64010,s0)
++network_port(tram, tcp, 4567, s0)
network_port(transproxy, tcp,8081,s0)
network_port(ups, tcp,3493,s0)
-@@ -228,9 +300,12 @@ network_port(uucpd, tcp,540,s0)
+ network_port(utcpserver) # no defined portcon
+@@ -228,9 +304,12 @@ network_port(uucpd, tcp,540,s0)
network_port(varnishd, tcp,6081-6082,s0)
network_port(virt, tcp,16509,s0, udp,16509,s0, tcp,16514,s0, udp,16514,s0)
network_port(virt_migration, tcp,49152-49216,s0)
@@ -66253,7 +114694,7 @@ index fe2ee5e..7f3dc50 100644
network_port(xdmcp, udp,177,s0, tcp,177,s0)
network_port(xen, tcp,8002,s0)
network_port(xfs, tcp,7100,s0)
-@@ -242,17 +317,22 @@ network_port(zookeeper_client, tcp,2181,s0)
+@@ -242,17 +321,22 @@ network_port(zookeeper_client, tcp,2181,s0)
network_port(zookeeper_election, tcp,3888,s0)
network_port(zookeeper_leader, tcp,2888,s0)
network_port(zebra, tcp,2600-2604,s0, tcp,2606,s0, udp,2600-2604,s0, udp,2606,s0)
@@ -66278,7 +114719,7 @@ index fe2ee5e..7f3dc50 100644
########################################
#
-@@ -297,9 +377,19 @@ typealias netif_t alias { lo_netif_t netif_lo_t };
+@@ -297,9 +381,24 @@ typealias netif_t alias { lo_netif_t netif_lo_t };
allow corenet_unconfined_type node_type:node *;
allow corenet_unconfined_type netif_type:netif *;
allow corenet_unconfined_type packet_type:packet *;
@@ -66300,6 +114741,11 @@ index fe2ee5e..7f3dc50 100644
+kernel_udp_recvfrom_unlabeled(corenet_unlabeled_type)
+kernel_raw_recvfrom_unlabeled(corenet_unlabeled_type)
+kernel_recvfrom_unlabeled_peer(corenet_unlabeled_type)
++
++allow netlabel_peer_type netlabel_peer_t:peer recv;
++allow netlabel_peer_type netlabel_peer_t:{ tcp_socket udp_socket rawip_socket dccp_socket } recvfrom;
++allow netlabel_peer_t netif_t:netif ingress;
++allow netlabel_peer_t node_t:node recvfrom;
diff --git a/policy/modules/kernel/corenetwork.te.m4 b/policy/modules/kernel/corenetwork.te.m4
index 3f6e168..51ad69a 100644
--- a/policy/modules/kernel/corenetwork.te.m4
@@ -66325,7 +114771,7 @@ index 3f6e168..51ad69a 100644
')
diff --git a/policy/modules/kernel/devices.fc b/policy/modules/kernel/devices.fc
-index 02b7ac1..82666ab 100644
+index 02b7ac1..b30f7b8 100644
--- a/policy/modules/kernel/devices.fc
+++ b/policy/modules/kernel/devices.fc
@@ -15,14 +15,17 @@
@@ -66347,7 +114793,7 @@ index 02b7ac1..82666ab 100644
/dev/efirtc -c gen_context(system_u:object_r:clock_device_t,s0)
/dev/elographics/e2201 -c gen_context(system_u:object_r:mouse_device_t,s0)
/dev/em8300.* -c gen_context(system_u:object_r:v4l_device_t,s0)
-@@ -57,8 +60,10 @@
+@@ -57,8 +60,11 @@
/dev/lirc[0-9]+ -c gen_context(system_u:object_r:lirc_device_t,s0)
/dev/lircm -c gen_context(system_u:object_r:mouse_device_t,s0)
/dev/logibm -c gen_context(system_u:object_r:mouse_device_t,s0)
@@ -66355,13 +114801,16 @@ index 02b7ac1..82666ab 100644
/dev/lp.* -c gen_context(system_u:object_r:printer_device_t,s0)
/dev/mcelog -c gen_context(system_u:object_r:kmsg_device_t,mls_systemhigh)
+/dev/media.* -c gen_context(system_u:object_r:v4l_device_t,s0)
++/dev/mei -c gen_context(system_u:object_r:mei_device_t,s0)
/dev/mem -c gen_context(system_u:object_r:memory_device_t,mls_systemhigh)
/dev/mergemem -c gen_context(system_u:object_r:memory_device_t,mls_systemhigh)
/dev/mga_vid.* -c gen_context(system_u:object_r:xserver_misc_device_t,s0)
-@@ -126,12 +131,14 @@ ifdef(`distro_suse', `
+@@ -125,13 +131,15 @@ ifdef(`distro_suse', `
+ /dev/vrtpanel -c gen_context(system_u:object_r:mouse_device_t,s0)
/dev/vttuner -c gen_context(system_u:object_r:v4l_device_t,s0)
/dev/vtx.* -c gen_context(system_u:object_r:v4l_device_t,s0)
- /dev/watchdog -c gen_context(system_u:object_r:watchdog_device_t,s0)
+-/dev/watchdog -c gen_context(system_u:object_r:watchdog_device_t,s0)
++/dev/watchdog.* -c gen_context(system_u:object_r:watchdog_device_t,s0)
+/dev/cdc-wdm[0-1] -c gen_context(system_u:object_r:modem_device_t,s0)
/dev/winradio. -c gen_context(system_u:object_r:v4l_device_t,s0)
/dev/z90crypt -c gen_context(system_u:object_r:crypt_device_t,s0)
@@ -66373,7 +114822,7 @@ index 02b7ac1..82666ab 100644
/dev/card.* -c gen_context(system_u:object_r:xserver_misc_device_t,s0)
/dev/cmx.* -c gen_context(system_u:object_r:smartcard_device_t,s0)
-@@ -195,12 +202,22 @@ ifdef(`distro_debian',`
+@@ -195,12 +203,22 @@ ifdef(`distro_debian',`
/lib/udev/devices/null -c gen_context(system_u:object_r:null_device_t,s0)
/lib/udev/devices/zero -c gen_context(system_u:object_r:zero_device_t,s0)
@@ -66399,7 +114848,7 @@ index 02b7ac1..82666ab 100644
+/usr/lib/udev/devices/null -c gen_context(system_u:object_r:null_device_t,s0)
+/usr/lib/udev/devices/zero -c gen_context(system_u:object_r:zero_device_t,s0)
diff --git a/policy/modules/kernel/devices.if b/policy/modules/kernel/devices.if
-index d820975..21a21e4 100644
+index d820975..a8b5aa9 100644
--- a/policy/modules/kernel/devices.if
+++ b/policy/modules/kernel/devices.if
@@ -143,13 +143,32 @@ interface(`dev_relabel_all_dev_nodes',`
@@ -66635,7 +115084,34 @@ index d820975..21a21e4 100644
')
########################################
-@@ -1034,6 +1143,7 @@ interface(`dev_dontaudit_getattr_all_blk_files',`
+@@ -1003,6 +1112,26 @@ interface(`dev_getattr_all_blk_files',`
+
+ ########################################
+ ## <summary>
++## Read on all block file device nodes.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++## <rolecap/>
++#
++interface(`dev_read_all_blk_files',`
++ gen_require(`
++ attribute device_node;
++ type device_t;
++ ')
++
++ read_blk_files_pattern($1, device_t, device_node)
++')
++
++########################################
++## <summary>
+ ## Dontaudit getattr on all block file device nodes.
+ ## </summary>
+ ## <param name="domain">
+@@ -1034,6 +1163,7 @@ interface(`dev_dontaudit_getattr_all_blk_files',`
interface(`dev_getattr_all_chr_files',`
gen_require(`
attribute device_node;
@@ -66643,7 +115119,7 @@ index d820975..21a21e4 100644
')
getattr_chr_files_pattern($1, device_t, device_node)
-@@ -1206,6 +1316,42 @@ interface(`dev_create_all_chr_files',`
+@@ -1206,6 +1336,42 @@ interface(`dev_create_all_chr_files',`
########################################
## <summary>
@@ -66686,7 +115162,7 @@ index d820975..21a21e4 100644
## Delete all block device files.
## </summary>
## <param name="domain">
-@@ -1663,6 +1809,26 @@ interface(`dev_filetrans_cardmgr',`
+@@ -1663,6 +1829,26 @@ interface(`dev_filetrans_cardmgr',`
########################################
## <summary>
@@ -66713,7 +115189,7 @@ index d820975..21a21e4 100644
## Get the attributes of the CPU
## microcode and id interfaces.
## </summary>
-@@ -1772,6 +1938,24 @@ interface(`dev_rw_crypto',`
+@@ -1772,6 +1958,24 @@ interface(`dev_rw_crypto',`
rw_chr_files_pattern($1, device_t, crypt_device_t)
')
@@ -66738,48 +115214,259 @@ index d820975..21a21e4 100644
#######################################
## <summary>
## Set the attributes of the dlm control devices.
-@@ -2383,7 +2567,97 @@ interface(`dev_filetrans_lirc',`
+@@ -2383,7 +2587,7 @@ interface(`dev_filetrans_lirc',`
########################################
## <summary>
-## Get the attributes of the lvm comtrol device.
+## Get the attributes of the loop comtrol device.
-+## </summary>
-+## <param name="domain">
-+## <summary>
-+## Domain allowed access.
-+## </summary>
-+## </param>
-+#
+ ## </summary>
+ ## <param name="domain">
+ ## <summary>
+@@ -2391,17 +2595,17 @@ interface(`dev_filetrans_lirc',`
+ ## </summary>
+ ## </param>
+ #
+-interface(`dev_getattr_lvm_control',`
+interface(`dev_getattr_loop_control',`
-+ gen_require(`
+ gen_require(`
+- type device_t, lvm_control_t;
++ type device_t, loop_control_device_t;
+ ')
+
+- getattr_chr_files_pattern($1, device_t, lvm_control_t)
++ getattr_chr_files_pattern($1, device_t, loop_control_device_t)
+ ')
+
+ ########################################
+ ## <summary>
+-## Read the lvm comtrol device.
++## Read the loop comtrol device.
+ ## </summary>
+ ## <param name="domain">
+ ## <summary>
+@@ -2409,17 +2613,17 @@ interface(`dev_getattr_lvm_control',`
+ ## </summary>
+ ## </param>
+ #
+-interface(`dev_read_lvm_control',`
++interface(`dev_read_loop_control',`
+ gen_require(`
+- type device_t, lvm_control_t;
+ type device_t, loop_control_device_t;
+ ')
+
+- read_chr_files_pattern($1, device_t, lvm_control_t)
++ read_chr_files_pattern($1, device_t, loop_control_device_t)
+ ')
+
+ ########################################
+ ## <summary>
+-## Read and write the lvm control device.
++## Read and write the loop control device.
+ ## </summary>
+ ## <param name="domain">
+ ## <summary>
+@@ -2427,17 +2631,17 @@ interface(`dev_read_lvm_control',`
+ ## </summary>
+ ## </param>
+ #
+-interface(`dev_rw_lvm_control',`
++interface(`dev_rw_loop_control',`
+ gen_require(`
+- type device_t, lvm_control_t;
++ type device_t, loop_control_device_t;
+ ')
+
+- rw_chr_files_pattern($1, device_t, lvm_control_t)
++ rw_chr_files_pattern($1, device_t, loop_control_device_t)
+ ')
+
+ ########################################
+ ## <summary>
+-## Do not audit attempts to read and write lvm control device.
++## Do not audit attempts to read and write loop control device.
+ ## </summary>
+ ## <param name="domain">
+ ## <summary>
+@@ -2445,17 +2649,17 @@ interface(`dev_rw_lvm_control',`
+ ## </summary>
+ ## </param>
+ #
+-interface(`dev_dontaudit_rw_lvm_control',`
++interface(`dev_dontaudit_rw_loop_control',`
+ gen_require(`
+- type lvm_control_t;
++ type loop_control_device_t;
+ ')
+
+- dontaudit $1 lvm_control_t:chr_file rw_file_perms;
++ dontaudit $1 loop_control_device_t:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+ ')
+
+ ########################################
+ ## <summary>
+-## Delete the lvm control device.
++## Delete the loop control device.
+ ## </summary>
+ ## <param name="domain">
+ ## <summary>
+@@ -2463,35 +2667,35 @@ interface(`dev_dontaudit_rw_lvm_control',`
+ ## </summary>
+ ## </param>
+ #
+-interface(`dev_delete_lvm_control_dev',`
++interface(`dev_delete_loop_control_dev',`
+ gen_require(`
+- type device_t, lvm_control_t;
++ type device_t, loop_control_device_t;
+ ')
+
+- delete_chr_files_pattern($1, device_t, lvm_control_t)
++ delete_chr_files_pattern($1, device_t, loop_control_device_t)
+ ')
+
+ ########################################
+ ## <summary>
+-## dontaudit getattr raw memory devices (e.g. /dev/mem).
++## Get the attributes of the loop comtrol device.
+ ## </summary>
+ ## <param name="domain">
+ ## <summary>
+-## Domain to not audit.
++## Domain allowed access.
+ ## </summary>
+ ## </param>
+ #
+-interface(`dev_dontaudit_getattr_memory_dev',`
++interface(`dev_getattr_lvm_control',`
+ gen_require(`
+- type memory_device_t;
++ type device_t, lvm_control_t;
+ ')
+
+- dontaudit $1 memory_device_t:chr_file getattr;
++ getattr_chr_files_pattern($1, device_t, lvm_control_t)
+ ')
+
+ ########################################
+ ## <summary>
+-## Read raw memory devices (e.g. /dev/mem).
++## Read the lvm comtrol device.
+ ## </summary>
+ ## <param name="domain">
+ ## <summary>
+@@ -2499,62 +2703,53 @@ interface(`dev_dontaudit_getattr_memory_dev',`
+ ## </summary>
+ ## </param>
+ #
+-interface(`dev_read_raw_memory',`
++interface(`dev_read_lvm_control',`
+ gen_require(`
+- type device_t, memory_device_t;
+- attribute memory_raw_read;
++ type device_t, lvm_control_t;
+ ')
+
+- read_chr_files_pattern($1, device_t, memory_device_t)
+-
+- allow $1 self:capability sys_rawio;
+- typeattribute $1 memory_raw_read;
++ read_chr_files_pattern($1, device_t, lvm_control_t)
+ ')
+
+ ########################################
+ ## <summary>
+-## Do not audit attempts to read raw memory devices
+-## (e.g. /dev/mem).
++## Read and write the lvm control device.
+ ## </summary>
+ ## <param name="domain">
+ ## <summary>
+-## Domain to not audit.
++## Domain allowed access.
+ ## </summary>
+ ## </param>
+ #
+-interface(`dev_dontaudit_read_raw_memory',`
++interface(`dev_rw_lvm_control',`
+ gen_require(`
+- type memory_device_t;
++ type device_t, lvm_control_t;
+ ')
+
+- dontaudit $1 memory_device_t:chr_file read_chr_file_perms;
++ rw_chr_files_pattern($1, device_t, lvm_control_t)
+ ')
+
+ ########################################
+ ## <summary>
+-## Write raw memory devices (e.g. /dev/mem).
++## Do not audit attempts to read and write lvm control device.
+ ## </summary>
+ ## <param name="domain">
+ ## <summary>
+-## Domain allowed access.
++## Domain to not audit.
+ ## </summary>
+ ## </param>
+ #
+-interface(`dev_write_raw_memory',`
++interface(`dev_dontaudit_rw_lvm_control',`
+ gen_require(`
+- type device_t, memory_device_t;
+- attribute memory_raw_write;
++ type lvm_control_t;
+ ')
+
+- write_chr_files_pattern($1, device_t, memory_device_t)
+-
+- allow $1 self:capability sys_rawio;
+- typeattribute $1 memory_raw_write;
++ dontaudit $1 lvm_control_t:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+ ')
+
+ ########################################
+ ## <summary>
+-## Read and execute raw memory devices (e.g. /dev/mem).
++## Delete the lvm control device.
+ ## </summary>
+ ## <param name="domain">
+ ## <summary>
+@@ -2562,7 +2757,106 @@ interface(`dev_write_raw_memory',`
+ ## </summary>
+ ## </param>
+ #
+-interface(`dev_rx_raw_memory',`
++interface(`dev_delete_lvm_control_dev',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type device_t, lvm_control_t;
+ ')
+
-+ getattr_chr_files_pattern($1, device_t, loop_control_device_t)
++ delete_chr_files_pattern($1, device_t, lvm_control_t)
+')
+
+########################################
+## <summary>
-+## Read the loop comtrol device.
++## dontaudit getattr raw memory devices (e.g. /dev/mem).
+## </summary>
+## <param name="domain">
+## <summary>
-+## Domain allowed access.
++## Domain to not audit.
+## </summary>
+## </param>
+#
-+interface(`dev_read_loop_control',`
++interface(`dev_dontaudit_getattr_memory_dev',`
+ gen_require(`
-+ type device_t, loop_control_device_t;
++ type memory_device_t;
+ ')
+
-+ read_chr_files_pattern($1, device_t, loop_control_device_t)
++ dontaudit $1 memory_device_t:chr_file getattr;
+')
+
+########################################
+## <summary>
-+## Read and write the loop control device.
++## Read raw memory devices (e.g. /dev/mem).
+## </summary>
+## <param name="domain">
+## <summary>
@@ -66787,17 +115474,22 @@ index d820975..21a21e4 100644
+## </summary>
+## </param>
+#
-+interface(`dev_rw_loop_control',`
++interface(`dev_read_raw_memory',`
+ gen_require(`
-+ type device_t, loop_control_device_t;
++ type device_t, memory_device_t;
++ attribute memory_raw_read;
+ ')
+
-+ rw_chr_files_pattern($1, device_t, loop_control_device_t)
++ read_chr_files_pattern($1, device_t, memory_device_t)
++
++ allow $1 self:capability sys_rawio;
++ typeattribute $1 memory_raw_read;
+')
+
+########################################
+## <summary>
-+## Do not audit attempts to read and write loop control device.
++## Do not audit attempts to read raw memory devices
++## (e.g. /dev/mem).
+## </summary>
+## <param name="domain">
+## <summary>
@@ -66805,17 +115497,17 @@ index d820975..21a21e4 100644
+## </summary>
+## </param>
+#
-+interface(`dev_dontaudit_rw_loop_control',`
++interface(`dev_dontaudit_read_raw_memory',`
+ gen_require(`
-+ type loop_control_device_t;
++ type memory_device_t;
+ ')
+
-+ dontaudit $1 loop_control_device_t:chr_file rw_file_perms;
++ dontaudit $1 memory_device_t:chr_file read_chr_file_perms;
+')
+
+########################################
+## <summary>
-+## Delete the loop control device.
++## Write raw memory devices (e.g. /dev/mem).
+## </summary>
+## <param name="domain">
+## <summary>
@@ -66823,21 +115515,33 @@ index d820975..21a21e4 100644
+## </summary>
+## </param>
+#
-+interface(`dev_delete_loop_control_dev',`
++interface(`dev_write_raw_memory',`
+ gen_require(`
-+ type device_t, loop_control_device_t;
++ type device_t, memory_device_t;
++ attribute memory_raw_write;
+ ')
+
-+ delete_chr_files_pattern($1, device_t, loop_control_device_t)
++ write_chr_files_pattern($1, device_t, memory_device_t)
++
++ allow $1 self:capability sys_rawio;
++ typeattribute $1 memory_raw_write;
+')
+
+########################################
+## <summary>
-+## Get the attributes of the loop comtrol device.
- ## </summary>
- ## <param name="domain">
- ## <summary>
-@@ -2706,7 +2980,7 @@ interface(`dev_write_misc',`
++## Read and execute raw memory devices (e.g. /dev/mem).
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`dev_rx_raw_memory',`
+ gen_require(`
+ type device_t, memory_device_t;
+ ')
+@@ -2706,7 +3000,7 @@ interface(`dev_write_misc',`
## </summary>
## <param name="domain">
## <summary>
@@ -66846,7 +115550,7 @@ index d820975..21a21e4 100644
## </summary>
## </param>
#
-@@ -2956,8 +3230,8 @@ interface(`dev_dontaudit_write_mtrr',`
+@@ -2956,8 +3250,8 @@ interface(`dev_dontaudit_write_mtrr',`
type mtrr_device_t;
')
@@ -66857,33 +115561,55 @@ index d820975..21a21e4 100644
')
########################################
-@@ -3235,7 +3509,7 @@ interface(`dev_rw_printer',`
+@@ -3125,6 +3419,42 @@ interface(`dev_create_null_dev',`
########################################
## <summary>
--## Read printk devices (e.g., /dev/kmsg /dev/mcelog)
-+## Relabel the printer device node.
- ## </summary>
- ## <param name="domain">
- ## <summary>
-@@ -3243,12 +3517,31 @@ interface(`dev_rw_printer',`
- ## </summary>
- ## </param>
- #
--interface(`dev_read_printk',`
-+interface(`dev_relabel_printer',`
- gen_require(`
-- type device_t, printk_device_t;
-+ type printer_device_t;
- ')
-
-- read_chr_files_pattern($1, device_t, printk_device_t)
-+ allow $1 printer_device_t:chr_file relabel_chr_file_perms;
++## Get the status of a null device service.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`dev_service_status_null_dev',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type null_device_t;
++ ')
++
++ allow $1 null_device_t:service status;
+')
+
+########################################
+## <summary>
-+## Read and write the printer device.
++## Configure null_device as a unit files.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed to transition.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`dev_config_null_dev_service',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type null_device_t;
++ ')
++
++ allow $1 null_device_t:service manage_service_perms;
++')
++
++########################################
++## <summary>
+ ## Do not audit attempts to get the attributes
+ ## of the BIOS non-volatile RAM device.
+ ## </summary>
+@@ -3235,7 +3565,25 @@ interface(`dev_rw_printer',`
+
+ ########################################
+ ## <summary>
+-## Read printk devices (e.g., /dev/kmsg /dev/mcelog)
++## Relabel the printer device node.
+## </summary>
+## <param name="domain">
+## <summary>
@@ -66891,17 +115617,38 @@ index d820975..21a21e4 100644
+## </summary>
+## </param>
+#
-+interface(`dev_manage_printer',`
++interface(`dev_relabel_printer',`
+ gen_require(`
-+ type device_t, printer_device_t;
++ type printer_device_t;
+ ')
+
++ allow $1 printer_device_t:chr_file relabel_chr_file_perms;
++')
++
++########################################
++## <summary>
++## Read and write the printer device.
+ ## </summary>
+ ## <param name="domain">
+ ## <summary>
+@@ -3243,12 +3591,13 @@ interface(`dev_rw_printer',`
+ ## </summary>
+ ## </param>
+ #
+-interface(`dev_read_printk',`
++interface(`dev_manage_printer',`
+ gen_require(`
+- type device_t, printk_device_t;
++ type device_t, printer_device_t;
+ ')
+
+- read_chr_files_pattern($1, device_t, printk_device_t)
+ manage_chr_files_pattern($1, device_t, printer_device_t)
+ dev_filetrans_printer_named_dev($1)
')
########################################
-@@ -3836,6 +4129,42 @@ interface(`dev_getattr_sysfs_dirs',`
+@@ -3836,6 +4185,42 @@ interface(`dev_getattr_sysfs_dirs',`
########################################
## <summary>
@@ -66944,7 +115691,7 @@ index d820975..21a21e4 100644
## Search the sysfs directories.
## </summary>
## <param name="domain">
-@@ -3885,6 +4214,7 @@ interface(`dev_list_sysfs',`
+@@ -3885,6 +4270,7 @@ interface(`dev_list_sysfs',`
type sysfs_t;
')
@@ -66952,7 +115699,7 @@ index d820975..21a21e4 100644
list_dirs_pattern($1, sysfs_t, sysfs_t)
')
-@@ -3927,23 +4257,49 @@ interface(`dev_dontaudit_write_sysfs_dirs',`
+@@ -3927,23 +4313,49 @@ interface(`dev_dontaudit_write_sysfs_dirs',`
########################################
## <summary>
@@ -67006,7 +115753,7 @@ index d820975..21a21e4 100644
########################################
## <summary>
## Read hardware state information.
-@@ -3997,6 +4353,62 @@ interface(`dev_rw_sysfs',`
+@@ -3997,6 +4409,62 @@ interface(`dev_rw_sysfs',`
########################################
## <summary>
@@ -67069,7 +115816,7 @@ index d820975..21a21e4 100644
## Read and write the TPM device.
## </summary>
## <param name="domain">
-@@ -4094,6 +4506,25 @@ interface(`dev_write_urand',`
+@@ -4094,6 +4562,25 @@ interface(`dev_write_urand',`
########################################
## <summary>
@@ -67095,7 +115842,7 @@ index d820975..21a21e4 100644
## Getattr generic the USB devices.
## </summary>
## <param name="domain">
-@@ -4128,6 +4559,24 @@ interface(`dev_setattr_generic_usb_dev',`
+@@ -4128,6 +4615,24 @@ interface(`dev_setattr_generic_usb_dev',`
setattr_chr_files_pattern($1, device_t, usb_device_t)
')
@@ -67120,7 +115867,7 @@ index d820975..21a21e4 100644
########################################
## <summary>
## Read generic the USB devices.
-@@ -4520,6 +4969,24 @@ interface(`dev_rw_vhost',`
+@@ -4520,6 +5025,24 @@ interface(`dev_rw_vhost',`
########################################
## <summary>
@@ -67145,7 +115892,7 @@ index d820975..21a21e4 100644
## Read and write VMWare devices.
## </summary>
## <param name="domain">
-@@ -4725,6 +5192,26 @@ interface(`dev_rw_xserver_misc',`
+@@ -4725,6 +5248,26 @@ interface(`dev_rw_xserver_misc',`
########################################
## <summary>
@@ -67172,7 +115919,7 @@ index d820975..21a21e4 100644
## Read and write to the zero device (/dev/zero).
## </summary>
## <param name="domain">
-@@ -4814,3 +5301,863 @@ interface(`dev_unconfined',`
+@@ -4814,3 +5357,917 @@ interface(`dev_unconfined',`
typeattribute $1 devices_unconfined_type;
')
@@ -67198,6 +115945,60 @@ index d820975..21a21e4 100644
+
+########################################
+## <summary>
++## Get the attributes of the mei devices.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`dev_getattr_mei',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type device_t, mei_device_t;
++ ')
++
++ getattr_chr_files_pattern($1, device_t, mei_device_t)
++')
++
++########################################
++## <summary>
++## Read the mei devices.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`dev_read_mei',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type device_t, mei_device_t;
++ ')
++
++ read_chr_files_pattern($1, device_t, mei_device_t)
++')
++
++########################################
++## <summary>
++## Read and write to mei devices.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`dev_rw_mei',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type device_t, mei_device_t;
++ ')
++
++ rw_chr_files_pattern($1, device_t, mei_device_t)
++')
++
++########################################
++## <summary>
+## Create all named devices with the correct label
+## </summary>
+## <param name="domain">
@@ -68037,10 +116838,16 @@ index d820975..21a21e4 100644
+ filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, xserver_misc_device_t, chr_file, "card9")
+')
diff --git a/policy/modules/kernel/devices.te b/policy/modules/kernel/devices.te
-index 06eda45..7fa1559 100644
+index 06eda45..ed26516 100644
--- a/policy/modules/kernel/devices.te
+++ b/policy/modules/kernel/devices.te
-@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ files_mountpoint(device_t)
+@@ -15,11 +15,12 @@ attribute devices_unconfined_type;
+ #
+ type device_t;
+ fs_associate_tmpfs(device_t)
+-files_type(device_t)
++files_base_file(device_t)
+ files_mountpoint(device_t)
files_associate_tmp(device_t)
fs_type(device_t)
fs_use_trans devtmpfs gen_context(system_u:object_r:device_t,s0);
@@ -68066,7 +116873,7 @@ index 06eda45..7fa1559 100644
#
# Type for /dev/lirc
-@@ -118,6 +123,12 @@ dev_node(lirc_device_t)
+@@ -118,9 +123,18 @@ dev_node(lirc_device_t)
#
# Type for /dev/mapper/control
#
@@ -68079,7 +116886,13 @@ index 06eda45..7fa1559 100644
type lvm_control_t;
dev_node(lvm_control_t)
-@@ -218,6 +229,10 @@ files_mountpoint(sysfs_t)
++type mei_device_t;
++dev_node(mei_device_t)
++
+ #
+ # memory_device_t is the type of /dev/kmem,
+ # /dev/mem and /dev/port.
+@@ -218,6 +232,10 @@ files_mountpoint(sysfs_t)
fs_type(sysfs_t)
genfscon sysfs / gen_context(system_u:object_r:sysfs_t,s0)
@@ -68090,7 +116903,7 @@ index 06eda45..7fa1559 100644
#
# Type for /dev/tpm
#
-@@ -265,6 +280,7 @@ dev_node(v4l_device_t)
+@@ -265,6 +283,7 @@ dev_node(v4l_device_t)
#
type vhost_device_t;
dev_node(vhost_device_t)
@@ -68098,7 +116911,7 @@ index 06eda45..7fa1559 100644
# Type for vmware devices.
type vmware_device_t;
-@@ -310,5 +326,5 @@ files_associate_tmp(device_node)
+@@ -310,5 +329,5 @@ files_associate_tmp(device_node)
#
allow devices_unconfined_type self:capability sys_rawio;
@@ -68246,10 +117059,10 @@ index 6a1e4d1..eee8419 100644
+ dontaudit $1 domain:socket_class_set { read write };
')
diff --git a/policy/modules/kernel/domain.te b/policy/modules/kernel/domain.te
-index cf04cb5..e43701b 100644
+index cf04cb5..09a61e6 100644
--- a/policy/modules/kernel/domain.te
+++ b/policy/modules/kernel/domain.te
-@@ -4,6 +4,21 @@ policy_module(domain, 1.11.0)
+@@ -4,6 +4,29 @@ policy_module(domain, 1.11.0)
#
# Declarations
#
@@ -68263,6 +117076,14 @@ index cf04cb5..e43701b 100644
+
+## <desc>
+## <p>
++## Allow all domains to execute in fips_mode
++## </p>
++## </desc>
++#
++gen_tunable(fips_mode, true)
++
++## <desc>
++## <p>
+## Allow all domains to have the kernel load modules
+## </p>
+## </desc>
@@ -68271,7 +117092,7 @@ index cf04cb5..e43701b 100644
## <desc>
## <p>
-@@ -86,23 +101,39 @@ neverallow ~{ domain unlabeled_t } *:process *;
+@@ -86,23 +109,43 @@ neverallow ~{ domain unlabeled_t } *:process *;
allow domain self:dir list_dir_perms;
allow domain self:lnk_file { read_lnk_file_perms lock ioctl };
allow domain self:file rw_file_perms;
@@ -68279,6 +117100,7 @@ index cf04cb5..e43701b 100644
+
kernel_read_proc_symlinks(domain)
+kernel_read_crypto_sysctls(domain)
++kernel_read_vm_overcommit_sysctls(domain)
+
# Every domain gets the key ring, so we should default
# to no one allowed to look at it; afs kernel support creates
@@ -68302,6 +117124,9 @@ index cf04cb5..e43701b 100644
+# allow all domains to search through default_t directory, since users sometimes
+# place labels within these directories. (samba_share_t) for example.
+files_search_default(domain)
++files_read_inherited_tmp_files(domain)
++files_append_inherited_tmp_files(domain)
++files_read_all_base_ro_files(domain)
+
+# All executables should be able to search the directory they are in
+corecmd_search_bin(domain)
@@ -68312,7 +117137,7 @@ index cf04cb5..e43701b 100644
ifdef(`hide_broken_symptoms',`
# This check is in the general socket
-@@ -121,8 +152,13 @@ tunable_policy(`global_ssp',`
+@@ -121,8 +164,18 @@ tunable_policy(`global_ssp',`
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -68323,10 +117148,15 @@ index cf04cb5..e43701b 100644
libs_use_ld_so(domain)
libs_use_shared_libs(domain)
+ libs_read_lib_files(domain)
++')
++
++optional_policy(`
++ miscfiles_read_localization(domain)
++ miscfiles_read_man_pages(domain)
')
optional_policy(`
-@@ -133,6 +169,8 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -133,6 +186,8 @@ optional_policy(`
optional_policy(`
xserver_dontaudit_use_xdm_fds(domain)
xserver_dontaudit_rw_xdm_pipes(domain)
@@ -68335,7 +117165,12 @@ index cf04cb5..e43701b 100644
')
########################################
-@@ -151,8 +189,13 @@ allow unconfined_domain_type domain:{ socket_class_set socket key_socket } *;
+@@ -147,12 +202,18 @@ optional_policy(`
+ # Use/sendto/connectto sockets created by any domain.
+ allow unconfined_domain_type domain:{ socket_class_set socket key_socket } *;
+
++allow unconfined_domain_type domain:system all_system_perms;
+ # Use descriptors and pipes created by any domain.
allow unconfined_domain_type domain:fd use;
allow unconfined_domain_type domain:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
@@ -68350,7 +117185,7 @@ index cf04cb5..e43701b 100644
# Create/access any System V IPC objects.
allow unconfined_domain_type domain:{ sem msgq shm } *;
-@@ -166,5 +209,259 @@ allow unconfined_domain_type domain:lnk_file { read_lnk_file_perms ioctl lock };
+@@ -166,5 +227,278 @@ allow unconfined_domain_type domain:lnk_file { read_lnk_file_perms ioctl lock };
# act on all domains keys
allow unconfined_domain_type domain:key *;
@@ -68363,6 +117198,8 @@ index cf04cb5..e43701b 100644
+
+files_filetrans_named_content(unconfined_domain_type)
+files_filetrans_system_conf_named_files(unconfined_domain_type)
++files_config_all_files(unconfined_domain_type)
++dev_config_null_dev_service(unconfined_domain_type)
+
+storage_filetrans_all_named_dev(unconfined_domain_type)
+
@@ -68410,15 +117247,23 @@ index cf04cb5..e43701b 100644
+')
+
+optional_policy(`
++ devicekit_filetrans_named_content(unconfined_domain_type)
++')
++
++optional_policy(`
++ dnsmasq_filetrans_named_content(unconfined_domain_type)
++')
++
++optional_policy(`
+ gnome_filetrans_admin_home_content(unconfined_domain_type)
+')
+
+optional_policy(`
-+ devicekit_filetrans_named_content(unconfined_domain_type)
++ gpg_filetrans_home_content(unconfined_domain_type)
+')
+
+optional_policy(`
-+ dnsmasq_filetrans_named_content(unconfined_domain_type)
++ irc_filetrans_home_content(unconfined_domain_type)
+')
+
+optional_policy(`
@@ -68454,6 +117299,10 @@ index cf04cb5..e43701b 100644
+')
+
+optional_policy(`
++ prelink_filetrans_named_content(unconfined_domain_type)
++')
++
++optional_policy(`
+ pulseaudio_filetrans_home_content(unconfined_domain_type)
+ pulseaudio_filetrans_admin_home_content(unconfined_domain_type)
+')
@@ -68463,6 +117312,10 @@ index cf04cb5..e43701b 100644
+')
+
+optional_policy(`
++ rpcbind_filetrans_named_content(unconfined_domain_type)
++')
++
++optional_policy(`
+ sysnet_filetrans_named_content(unconfined_domain_type)
+')
+
@@ -68587,31 +117440,32 @@ index cf04cb5..e43701b 100644
+ ')
+')
+
-+# send init a sigchld and signull
++# these seem questionable:
++
+optional_policy(`
-+ init_sigchld(domain)
-+ init_signull(domain)
++ puppet_rw_tmp(domain)
+')
+
-+# these seem questionable:
-+
+optional_policy(`
+ rpm_use_fds(domain)
+ rpm_read_pipes(domain)
+')
+
-+optional_policy(`
-+ selinux_dontaudit_getattr_fs(domain)
-+ selinux_dontaudit_read_fs(domain)
++dontaudit domain domain:process { noatsecure siginh rlimitinh } ;
++
++
++tunable_policy(`fips_mode',`
++ allow domain self:fifo_file manage_fifo_file_perms;
++ kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(domain)
+')
+
+optional_policy(`
-+ seutil_dontaudit_read_config(domain)
++ tunable_policy(`fips_mode',`
++ prelink_exec(domain)
++ ')
+')
-+
-+dontaudit domain domain:process { noatsecure siginh rlimitinh } ;
diff --git a/policy/modules/kernel/files.fc b/policy/modules/kernel/files.fc
-index 8796ca3..38dcaf6 100644
+index 8796ca3..cb02728 100644
--- a/policy/modules/kernel/files.fc
+++ b/policy/modules/kernel/files.fc
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ ifdef(`distro_redhat',`
@@ -68622,10 +117476,36 @@ index 8796ca3..38dcaf6 100644
')
ifdef(`distro_suse',`
-@@ -53,12 +54,16 @@ ifdef(`distro_suse',`
+@@ -27,7 +28,7 @@ ifdef(`distro_suse',`
+ #
+ # /boot
+ #
+-/boot -d gen_context(system_u:object_r:boot_t,s0)
++/boot gen_context(system_u:object_r:boot_t,s0)
+ /boot/.* gen_context(system_u:object_r:boot_t,s0)
+ /boot/\.journal <<none>>
+ /boot/efi(/.*)?/System\.map(-.*)? -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:system_map_t,s0)
+@@ -38,13 +39,13 @@ ifdef(`distro_suse',`
+ #
+ # /emul
+ #
+-/emul -d gen_context(system_u:object_r:usr_t,s0)
++/emul gen_context(system_u:object_r:usr_t,s0)
+ /emul/.* gen_context(system_u:object_r:usr_t,s0)
+
+ #
+ # /etc
+ #
+-/etc -d gen_context(system_u:object_r:etc_t,s0)
++/etc gen_context(system_u:object_r:etc_t,s0)
+ /etc/.* gen_context(system_u:object_r:etc_t,s0)
+ /etc/\.fstab\.hal\..+ -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:etc_runtime_t,s0)
+ /etc/blkid(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:etc_runtime_t,s0)
+@@ -52,13 +53,16 @@ ifdef(`distro_suse',`
+ /etc/fstab\.REVOKE -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:etc_runtime_t,s0)
/etc/ioctl\.save -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:etc_runtime_t,s0)
/etc/killpower -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:etc_runtime_t,s0)
- /etc/localtime -l gen_context(system_u:object_r:etc_t,s0)
+-/etc/localtime -l gen_context(system_u:object_r:etc_t,s0)
-/etc/mtab -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:etc_runtime_t,s0)
-/etc/mtab~[0-9]* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:etc_runtime_t,s0)
-/etc/mtab\.tmp -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:etc_runtime_t,s0)
@@ -68643,7 +117523,7 @@ index 8796ca3..38dcaf6 100644
/etc/cups/client\.conf -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:etc_t,s0)
-@@ -70,7 +75,10 @@ ifdef(`distro_suse',`
+@@ -70,7 +74,10 @@ ifdef(`distro_suse',`
/etc/sysconfig/hwconf -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:etc_runtime_t,s0)
/etc/sysconfig/iptables\.save -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:etc_runtime_t,s0)
@@ -68655,7 +117535,18 @@ index 8796ca3..38dcaf6 100644
ifdef(`distro_gentoo', `
/etc/profile\.env -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:etc_runtime_t,s0)
-@@ -104,7 +112,7 @@ HOME_ROOT/lost\+found/.* <<none>>
+@@ -78,10 +85,6 @@ ifdef(`distro_gentoo', `
+ /etc/env\.d/.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:etc_runtime_t,s0)
+ ')
+
+-ifdef(`distro_redhat',`
+-/etc/rhgb(/.*)? -d gen_context(system_u:object_r:mnt_t,s0)
+-')
+-
+ ifdef(`distro_suse',`
+ /etc/defkeymap\.map -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:etc_runtime_t,s0)
+ /etc/init\.d/\.depend.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:etc_runtime_t,s0)
+@@ -104,7 +107,7 @@ HOME_ROOT/lost\+found/.* <<none>>
/initrd -d gen_context(system_u:object_r:root_t,s0)
#
@@ -68664,7 +117555,7 @@ index 8796ca3..38dcaf6 100644
#
/lib/modules(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:modules_object_t,s0)
-@@ -129,6 +137,8 @@ ifdef(`distro_debian',`
+@@ -129,6 +132,8 @@ ifdef(`distro_debian',`
/media(/[^/]*)? -d gen_context(system_u:object_r:mnt_t,s0)
/media/[^/]*/.* <<none>>
/media/\.hal-.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:mnt_t,s0)
@@ -68673,8 +117564,12 @@ index 8796ca3..38dcaf6 100644
#
# /misc
-@@ -153,7 +163,7 @@ ifdef(`distro_debian',`
- /opt -d gen_context(system_u:object_r:usr_t,s0)
+@@ -150,10 +155,10 @@ ifdef(`distro_debian',`
+ #
+ # /opt
+ #
+-/opt -d gen_context(system_u:object_r:usr_t,s0)
++/opt gen_context(system_u:object_r:usr_t,s0)
/opt/.* gen_context(system_u:object_r:usr_t,s0)
-/opt/(.*/)?var/lib(64)?(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:var_lib_t,s0)
@@ -68682,7 +117577,7 @@ index 8796ca3..38dcaf6 100644
#
# /proc
-@@ -161,6 +171,12 @@ ifdef(`distro_debian',`
+@@ -161,6 +166,12 @@ ifdef(`distro_debian',`
/proc -d <<none>>
/proc/.* <<none>>
@@ -68695,15 +117590,44 @@ index 8796ca3..38dcaf6 100644
#
# /run
#
-@@ -197,6 +213,7 @@ ifdef(`distro_debian',`
- /usr -d gen_context(system_u:object_r:usr_t,s0)
+@@ -169,6 +180,7 @@ ifdef(`distro_debian',`
+ /run/.*\.*pid <<none>>
+ /run/lock(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:var_lock_t,s0)
+
++/sandbox(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:tmp_t,s0)
+ #
+ # /selinux
+ #
+@@ -178,13 +190,14 @@ ifdef(`distro_debian',`
+ #
+ # /srv
+ #
+-/srv -d gen_context(system_u:object_r:var_t,s0)
++/srv gen_context(system_u:object_r:var_t,s0)
+ /srv/.* gen_context(system_u:object_r:var_t,s0)
+
+ #
+ # /tmp
+ #
+-/tmp -d gen_context(system_u:object_r:tmp_t,s0-mls_systemhigh)
++/tmp gen_context(system_u:object_r:tmp_t,s0-mls_systemhigh)
++/tmp-inst gen_context(system_u:object_r:tmp_t,s0-mls_systemhigh)
+ /tmp/.* <<none>>
+ /tmp/\.journal <<none>>
+
+@@ -194,9 +207,10 @@ ifdef(`distro_debian',`
+ #
+ # /usr
+ #
+-/usr -d gen_context(system_u:object_r:usr_t,s0)
++/usr gen_context(system_u:object_r:usr_t,s0)
/usr/.* gen_context(system_u:object_r:usr_t,s0)
/usr/\.journal <<none>>
+/export(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:usr_t,s0)
/usr/doc(/.*)?/lib(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:usr_t,s0)
-@@ -204,15 +221,9 @@ ifdef(`distro_debian',`
+@@ -204,15 +218,9 @@ ifdef(`distro_debian',`
/usr/inclu.e(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:usr_t,s0)
@@ -68720,7 +117644,7 @@ index 8796ca3..38dcaf6 100644
/usr/share/doc(/.*)?/README.* gen_context(system_u:object_r:usr_t,s0)
-@@ -220,8 +231,6 @@ ifdef(`distro_debian',`
+@@ -220,8 +228,6 @@ ifdef(`distro_debian',`
/usr/tmp/.* <<none>>
ifndef(`distro_redhat',`
@@ -68729,7 +117653,16 @@ index 8796ca3..38dcaf6 100644
/usr/src(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:src_t,s0)
/usr/src/kernels/.+/lib(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:usr_t,s0)
')
-@@ -237,11 +246,14 @@ ifndef(`distro_redhat',`
+@@ -229,7 +235,7 @@ ifndef(`distro_redhat',`
+ #
+ # /var
+ #
+-/var -d gen_context(system_u:object_r:var_t,s0)
++/var gen_context(system_u:object_r:var_t,s0)
+ /var/.* gen_context(system_u:object_r:var_t,s0)
+ /var/\.journal <<none>>
+
+@@ -237,11 +243,21 @@ ifndef(`distro_redhat',`
/var/ftp/etc(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:etc_t,s0)
@@ -68739,19 +117672,34 @@ index 8796ca3..38dcaf6 100644
/var/lib/nfs/rpc_pipefs(/.*)? <<none>>
++/var/lib/stickshift/.stickshift-proxy.d(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:etc_t,s0)
++/var/lib/stickshift/.limits.d(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:etc_t,s0)
++
++/var/lib/openshift/.openshift-proxy.d(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:etc_t,s0)
++/var/lib/openshift/.stickshift-proxy.d(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:etc_t,s0)
++/var/lib/openshift/.limits.d(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:etc_t,s0)
++
/var/lock(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:var_lock_t,s0)
+/var/lock -l gen_context(system_u:object_r:var_lock_t,s0)
/var/lost\+found -d gen_context(system_u:object_r:lost_found_t,mls_systemhigh)
/var/lost\+found/.* <<none>>
-@@ -264,3 +276,5 @@ ifndef(`distro_redhat',`
+@@ -256,6 +272,7 @@ ifndef(`distro_redhat',`
+
+ /var/tmp -d gen_context(system_u:object_r:tmp_t,s0-mls_systemhigh)
+ /var/tmp -l gen_context(system_u:object_r:tmp_t,s0)
++/var/tmp-inst -d gen_context(system_u:object_r:tmp_t,s0-mls_systemhigh)
+ /var/tmp/.* <<none>>
+ /var/tmp/lost\+found -d gen_context(system_u:object_r:lost_found_t,mls_systemhigh)
+ /var/tmp/lost\+found/.* <<none>>
+@@ -264,3 +281,5 @@ ifndef(`distro_redhat',`
ifdef(`distro_debian',`
/var/run/motd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:initrc_var_run_t,s0)
')
+/nsr(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:var_t,s0)
+/nsr/logs(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:var_log_t,s0)
diff --git a/policy/modules/kernel/files.if b/policy/modules/kernel/files.if
-index e1e814d..89379cc 100644
+index e1e814d..37f3b90 100644
--- a/policy/modules/kernel/files.if
+++ b/policy/modules/kernel/files.if
@@ -55,6 +55,7 @@
@@ -68762,7 +117710,80 @@ index e1e814d..89379cc 100644
## <li>files_tmp_file()</li>
## <li>files_tmpfs_file()</li>
## <li>logging_log_file()</li>
-@@ -683,12 +684,82 @@ interface(`files_read_non_security_files',`
+@@ -521,7 +522,7 @@ interface(`files_mounton_non_security',`
+ attribute non_security_file_type;
+ ')
+
+- allow $1 non_security_file_type:dir mounton;
++ allow $1 non_security_file_type:dir { write setattr mounton };
+ allow $1 non_security_file_type:file mounton;
+ ')
+
+@@ -620,6 +621,63 @@ interface(`files_dontaudit_getattr_non_security_files',`
+
+ ########################################
+ ## <summary>
++## Do not audit attempts to search
++## non security dirs.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain to not audit.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`files_dontaudit_search_non_security_dirs',`
++ gen_require(`
++ attribute non_security_file_type;
++ ')
++
++ dontaudit $1 non_security_file_type:dir search_dir_perms;
++')
++
++########################################
++## <summary>
++## Do not audit attempts to set the attributes
++## of non security files.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain to not audit.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`files_dontaudit_setattr_non_security_files',`
++ gen_require(`
++ attribute non_security_file_type;
++ ')
++
++ dontaudit $1 non_security_file_type:file setattr;
++')
++
++########################################
++## <summary>
++## Do not audit attempts to set the attributes
++## of non security directories.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain to not audit.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`files_dontaudit_setattr_non_security_dirs',`
++ gen_require(`
++ attribute non_security_file_type;
++ ')
++
++ dontaudit $1 non_security_file_type:dir setattr;
++')
++
++########################################
++## <summary>
+ ## Read all files.
+ ## </summary>
+ ## <param name="domain">
+@@ -683,12 +741,82 @@ interface(`files_read_non_security_files',`
attribute non_security_file_type;
')
@@ -68845,7 +117866,33 @@ index e1e814d..89379cc 100644
## Read all directories on the filesystem, except
## the listed exceptions.
## </summary>
-@@ -1073,10 +1144,8 @@ interface(`files_relabel_all_files',`
+@@ -953,6 +1081,25 @@ interface(`files_dontaudit_getattr_non_security_pipes',`
+
+ ########################################
+ ## <summary>
++## Do not audit attempts to read/write
++## of non security named pipes.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain to not audit.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`files_dontaudit_rw_inherited_pipes',`
++ gen_require(`
++ attribute non_security_file_type;
++ ')
++
++ dontaudit $1 non_security_file_type:fifo_file rw_inherited_fifo_file_perms;
++')
++
++########################################
++## <summary>
+ ## Get the attributes of all named sockets.
+ ## </summary>
+ ## <param name="domain">
+@@ -1073,10 +1220,8 @@ interface(`files_relabel_all_files',`
relabel_lnk_files_pattern($1, { file_type $2 }, { file_type $2 })
relabel_fifo_files_pattern($1, { file_type $2 }, { file_type $2 })
relabel_sock_files_pattern($1, { file_type $2 }, { file_type $2 })
@@ -68858,7 +117905,7 @@ index e1e814d..89379cc 100644
# satisfy the assertions:
seutil_relabelto_bin_policy($1)
-@@ -1655,6 +1724,24 @@ interface(`files_dontaudit_list_all_mountpoints',`
+@@ -1655,6 +1800,24 @@ interface(`files_dontaudit_list_all_mountpoints',`
########################################
## <summary>
@@ -68883,7 +117930,7 @@ index e1e814d..89379cc 100644
## Do not audit attempts to write to mount points.
## </summary>
## <param name="domain">
-@@ -1673,6 +1760,24 @@ interface(`files_dontaudit_write_all_mountpoints',`
+@@ -1673,6 +1836,24 @@ interface(`files_dontaudit_write_all_mountpoints',`
########################################
## <summary>
@@ -68908,7 +117955,7 @@ index e1e814d..89379cc 100644
## List the contents of the root directory.
## </summary>
## <param name="domain">
-@@ -1856,6 +1961,42 @@ interface(`files_delete_root_dir_entry',`
+@@ -1856,6 +2037,42 @@ interface(`files_delete_root_dir_entry',`
########################################
## <summary>
@@ -68951,7 +117998,7 @@ index e1e814d..89379cc 100644
## Unmount a rootfs filesystem.
## </summary>
## <param name="domain">
-@@ -1874,6 +2015,24 @@ interface(`files_unmount_rootfs',`
+@@ -1874,6 +2091,24 @@ interface(`files_unmount_rootfs',`
########################################
## <summary>
@@ -68976,7 +118023,7 @@ index e1e814d..89379cc 100644
## Get attributes of the /boot directory.
## </summary>
## <param name="domain">
-@@ -2573,6 +2732,24 @@ interface(`files_rw_etc_dirs',`
+@@ -2573,6 +2808,24 @@ interface(`files_rw_etc_dirs',`
allow $1 etc_t:dir rw_dir_perms;
')
@@ -69001,7 +118048,15 @@ index e1e814d..89379cc 100644
##########################################
## <summary>
## Manage generic directories in /etc
-@@ -2652,7 +2829,7 @@ interface(`files_read_etc_files',`
+@@ -2644,6 +2897,7 @@ interface(`files_read_etc_files',`
+ allow $1 etc_t:dir list_dir_perms;
+ read_files_pattern($1, etc_t, etc_t)
+ read_lnk_files_pattern($1, etc_t, etc_t)
++ files_read_etc_runtime_files($1)
+ ')
+
+ ########################################
+@@ -2652,7 +2906,7 @@ interface(`files_read_etc_files',`
## </summary>
## <param name="domain">
## <summary>
@@ -69010,7 +118065,7 @@ index e1e814d..89379cc 100644
## </summary>
## </param>
#
-@@ -2708,6 +2885,25 @@ interface(`files_manage_etc_files',`
+@@ -2708,6 +2962,25 @@ interface(`files_manage_etc_files',`
########################################
## <summary>
@@ -69036,7 +118091,7 @@ index e1e814d..89379cc 100644
## Delete system configuration files in /etc.
## </summary>
## <param name="domain">
-@@ -2726,6 +2922,24 @@ interface(`files_delete_etc_files',`
+@@ -2726,6 +2999,24 @@ interface(`files_delete_etc_files',`
########################################
## <summary>
@@ -69061,7 +118116,7 @@ index e1e814d..89379cc 100644
## Execute generic files in /etc.
## </summary>
## <param name="domain">
-@@ -2891,24 +3105,6 @@ interface(`files_delete_boot_flag',`
+@@ -2891,24 +3182,6 @@ interface(`files_delete_boot_flag',`
########################################
## <summary>
@@ -69086,11 +118141,34 @@ index e1e814d..89379cc 100644
## Read files in /etc that are dynamically
## created on boot, such as mtab.
## </summary>
-@@ -2949,6 +3145,42 @@ interface(`files_read_etc_runtime_files',`
+@@ -2949,9 +3222,7 @@ interface(`files_read_etc_runtime_files',`
########################################
## <summary>
+-## Do not audit attempts to read files
+-## in /etc that are dynamically
+-## created on boot, such as mtab.
+## Do not audit attempts to set the attributes of the etc_runtime files
+ ## </summary>
+ ## <param name="domain">
+ ## <summary>
+@@ -2959,12 +3230,50 @@ interface(`files_read_etc_runtime_files',`
+ ## </summary>
+ ## </param>
+ #
+-interface(`files_dontaudit_read_etc_runtime_files',`
++interface(`files_dontaudit_setattr_etc_runtime_files',`
+ gen_require(`
+ type etc_runtime_t;
+ ')
+
+- dontaudit $1 etc_runtime_t:file { getattr read };
++ dontaudit $1 etc_runtime_t:file setattr;
++')
++
++########################################
++## <summary>
++## Do not audit attempts to write etc_runtime files
+## </summary>
+## <param name="domain">
+## <summary>
@@ -69098,17 +118176,19 @@ index e1e814d..89379cc 100644
+## </summary>
+## </param>
+#
-+interface(`files_dontaudit_setattr_etc_runtime_files',`
++interface(`files_dontaudit_write_etc_runtime_files',`
+ gen_require(`
+ type etc_runtime_t;
+ ')
+
-+ dontaudit $1 etc_runtime_t:file setattr;
++ dontaudit $1 etc_runtime_t:file write;
+')
+
+########################################
+## <summary>
-+## Do not audit attempts to write etc_runtime files
++## Do not audit attempts to read files
++## in /etc that are dynamically
++## created on boot, such as mtab.
+## </summary>
+## <param name="domain">
+## <summary>
@@ -69116,20 +118196,16 @@ index e1e814d..89379cc 100644
+## </summary>
+## </param>
+#
-+interface(`files_dontaudit_write_etc_runtime_files',`
++interface(`files_dontaudit_read_etc_runtime_files',`
+ gen_require(`
+ type etc_runtime_t;
+ ')
+
-+ dontaudit $1 etc_runtime_t:file write;
-+')
-+
-+########################################
-+## <summary>
- ## Do not audit attempts to read files
- ## in /etc that are dynamically
- ## created on boot, such as mtab.
-@@ -2986,6 +3218,7 @@ interface(`files_rw_etc_runtime_files',`
++ dontaudit $1 etc_runtime_t:file { getattr read };
+ ')
+
+ ########################################
+@@ -2986,6 +3295,7 @@ interface(`files_rw_etc_runtime_files',`
allow $1 etc_t:dir list_dir_perms;
rw_files_pattern($1, etc_t, etc_runtime_t)
@@ -69137,7 +118213,7 @@ index e1e814d..89379cc 100644
')
########################################
-@@ -3007,6 +3240,7 @@ interface(`files_manage_etc_runtime_files',`
+@@ -3007,6 +3317,7 @@ interface(`files_manage_etc_runtime_files',`
')
manage_files_pattern($1, { etc_t etc_runtime_t }, etc_runtime_t)
@@ -69145,7 +118221,33 @@ index e1e814d..89379cc 100644
')
########################################
-@@ -3382,6 +3616,25 @@ interface(`files_rw_isid_type_blk_files',`
+@@ -3135,6 +3446,25 @@ interface(`files_delete_isid_type_dirs',`
+
+ ########################################
+ ## <summary>
++## Relabelfrom all file opbjects on new filesystems
++## that have not yet been labeled.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`files_relabelfrom_isid_type',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type file_t;
++ ')
++
++ dontaudit $1 file_t:dir_file_class_set relabelfrom;
++')
++
++########################################
++## <summary>
+ ## Create, read, write, and delete directories
+ ## on new filesystems that have not yet been labeled.
+ ## </summary>
+@@ -3382,6 +3712,25 @@ interface(`files_rw_isid_type_blk_files',`
########################################
## <summary>
@@ -69171,7 +118273,7 @@ index e1e814d..89379cc 100644
## Create, read, write, and delete block device nodes
## on new filesystems that have not yet been labeled.
## </summary>
-@@ -3723,20 +3976,38 @@ interface(`files_list_mnt',`
+@@ -3723,20 +4072,38 @@ interface(`files_list_mnt',`
######################################
## <summary>
@@ -69215,15 +118317,12 @@ index e1e814d..89379cc 100644
')
########################################
-@@ -4126,10 +4397,131 @@ interface(`files_read_world_readable_sockets',`
+@@ -4126,6 +4493,133 @@ interface(`files_read_world_readable_sockets',`
allow $1 readable_t:sock_file read_sock_file_perms;
')
--########################################
+#######################################
- ## <summary>
--## Allow the specified type to associate
--## to a filesystem with the type of the
++## <summary>
+## Read manageable system configuration files in /etc
+## </summary>
+## <param name="domain">
@@ -69278,12 +118377,18 @@ index e1e814d..89379cc 100644
+
+ filetrans_pattern($1, etc_t, system_conf_t, file, "sysctl.conf")
+ filetrans_pattern($1, etc_t, system_conf_t, file, "sysctl.conf.old")
++ filetrans_pattern($1, etc_t, system_conf_t, file, "ebtables")
+ filetrans_pattern($1, etc_t, system_conf_t, file, "ebtables.old")
+ filetrans_pattern($1, etc_t, system_conf_t, file, "ebtables-config")
+ filetrans_pattern($1, etc_t, system_conf_t, file, "ebtables-config.old")
++ filetrans_pattern($1, etc_t, system_conf_t, file, "iptables")
+ filetrans_pattern($1, etc_t, system_conf_t, file, "iptables.old")
+ filetrans_pattern($1, etc_t, system_conf_t, file, "iptables-config")
+ filetrans_pattern($1, etc_t, system_conf_t, file, "iptables-config.old")
++ filetrans_pattern($1, etc_t, system_conf_t, file, "ip6tables")
++ filetrans_pattern($1, etc_t, system_conf_t, file, "ip6tables.old")
++ filetrans_pattern($1, etc_t, system_conf_t, file, "ip6tables-config")
++ filetrans_pattern($1, etc_t, system_conf_t, file, "ip6tables-config.old")
+ filetrans_pattern($1, etc_t, system_conf_t, file, "system-config-firewall")
+ filetrans_pattern($1, etc_t, system_conf_t, file, "system-config-firewall.old")
+')
@@ -69343,14 +118448,10 @@ index e1e814d..89379cc 100644
+ filetrans_pattern($1, etc_t, system_conf_t, file)
+')
+
-+########################################
-+## <summary>
-+## Allow the specified type to associate
-+## to a filesystem with the type of the
- ## temporary directory (/tmp).
- ## </summary>
- ## <param name="file_type">
-@@ -4148,6 +4540,26 @@ interface(`files_associate_tmp',`
+ ########################################
+ ## <summary>
+ ## Allow the specified type to associate
+@@ -4148,6 +4642,26 @@ interface(`files_associate_tmp',`
########################################
## <summary>
@@ -69377,7 +118478,7 @@ index e1e814d..89379cc 100644
## Get the attributes of the tmp directory (/tmp).
## </summary>
## <param name="domain">
-@@ -4161,6 +4573,7 @@ interface(`files_getattr_tmp_dirs',`
+@@ -4161,6 +4675,7 @@ interface(`files_getattr_tmp_dirs',`
type tmp_t;
')
@@ -69385,7 +118486,7 @@ index e1e814d..89379cc 100644
allow $1 tmp_t:dir getattr;
')
-@@ -4171,7 +4584,7 @@ interface(`files_getattr_tmp_dirs',`
+@@ -4171,7 +4686,7 @@ interface(`files_getattr_tmp_dirs',`
## </summary>
## <param name="domain">
## <summary>
@@ -69394,7 +118495,7 @@ index e1e814d..89379cc 100644
## </summary>
## </param>
#
-@@ -4198,6 +4611,7 @@ interface(`files_search_tmp',`
+@@ -4198,6 +4713,7 @@ interface(`files_search_tmp',`
type tmp_t;
')
@@ -69402,7 +118503,7 @@ index e1e814d..89379cc 100644
allow $1 tmp_t:dir search_dir_perms;
')
-@@ -4234,6 +4648,7 @@ interface(`files_list_tmp',`
+@@ -4234,6 +4750,7 @@ interface(`files_list_tmp',`
type tmp_t;
')
@@ -69410,7 +118511,7 @@ index e1e814d..89379cc 100644
allow $1 tmp_t:dir list_dir_perms;
')
-@@ -4243,7 +4658,7 @@ interface(`files_list_tmp',`
+@@ -4243,7 +4760,7 @@ interface(`files_list_tmp',`
## </summary>
## <param name="domain">
## <summary>
@@ -69419,7 +118520,7 @@ index e1e814d..89379cc 100644
## </summary>
## </param>
#
-@@ -4255,6 +4670,25 @@ interface(`files_dontaudit_list_tmp',`
+@@ -4255,6 +4772,25 @@ interface(`files_dontaudit_list_tmp',`
dontaudit $1 tmp_t:dir list_dir_perms;
')
@@ -69445,7 +118546,7 @@ index e1e814d..89379cc 100644
########################################
## <summary>
## Remove entries from the tmp directory.
-@@ -4270,6 +4704,7 @@ interface(`files_delete_tmp_dir_entry',`
+@@ -4270,6 +4806,7 @@ interface(`files_delete_tmp_dir_entry',`
type tmp_t;
')
@@ -69453,7 +118554,7 @@ index e1e814d..89379cc 100644
allow $1 tmp_t:dir del_entry_dir_perms;
')
-@@ -4311,6 +4746,32 @@ interface(`files_manage_generic_tmp_dirs',`
+@@ -4311,6 +4848,32 @@ interface(`files_manage_generic_tmp_dirs',`
########################################
## <summary>
@@ -69486,7 +118587,7 @@ index e1e814d..89379cc 100644
## Manage temporary files and directories in /tmp.
## </summary>
## <param name="domain">
-@@ -4365,6 +4826,42 @@ interface(`files_rw_generic_tmp_sockets',`
+@@ -4365,6 +4928,42 @@ interface(`files_rw_generic_tmp_sockets',`
########################################
## <summary>
@@ -69529,7 +118630,50 @@ index e1e814d..89379cc 100644
## Set the attributes of all tmp directories.
## </summary>
## <param name="domain">
-@@ -4428,7 +4925,7 @@ interface(`files_relabel_all_tmp_dirs',`
+@@ -4383,6 +4982,42 @@ interface(`files_setattr_all_tmp_dirs',`
+
+ ########################################
+ ## <summary>
++## Allow caller to read inherited tmp files.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`files_read_inherited_tmp_files',`
++ gen_require(`
++ attribute tmpfile;
++ ')
++
++ allow $1 tmpfile:file { append read_inherited_file_perms };
++')
++
++########################################
++## <summary>
++## Allow caller to append inherited tmp files.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`files_append_inherited_tmp_files',`
++ gen_require(`
++ attribute tmpfile;
++ ')
++
++ allow $1 tmpfile:file append_inherited_file_perms;
++')
++
++########################################
++## <summary>
+ ## List all tmp directories.
+ ## </summary>
+ ## <param name="domain">
+@@ -4428,7 +5063,7 @@ interface(`files_relabel_all_tmp_dirs',`
## </summary>
## <param name="domain">
## <summary>
@@ -69538,7 +118682,7 @@ index e1e814d..89379cc 100644
## </summary>
## </param>
#
-@@ -4488,7 +4985,7 @@ interface(`files_relabel_all_tmp_files',`
+@@ -4488,7 +5123,7 @@ interface(`files_relabel_all_tmp_files',`
## </summary>
## <param name="domain">
## <summary>
@@ -69547,7 +118691,7 @@ index e1e814d..89379cc 100644
## </summary>
## </param>
#
-@@ -4573,6 +5070,16 @@ interface(`files_purge_tmp',`
+@@ -4573,6 +5208,16 @@ interface(`files_purge_tmp',`
delete_lnk_files_pattern($1, tmpfile, tmpfile)
delete_fifo_files_pattern($1, tmpfile, tmpfile)
delete_sock_files_pattern($1, tmpfile, tmpfile)
@@ -69564,14 +118708,17 @@ index e1e814d..89379cc 100644
')
########################################
-@@ -5150,6 +5657,24 @@ interface(`files_list_var',`
+@@ -5150,12 +5795,30 @@ interface(`files_list_var',`
########################################
## <summary>
+-## Create, read, write, and delete directories
+-## in the /var directory.
+## Do not audit listing of the var directory (/var).
-+## </summary>
-+## <param name="domain">
-+## <summary>
+ ## </summary>
+ ## <param name="domain">
+ ## <summary>
+-## Domain allowed access.
+## Domain to not audit.
+## </summary>
+## </param>
@@ -69586,10 +118733,16 @@ index e1e814d..89379cc 100644
+
+########################################
+## <summary>
- ## Create, read, write, and delete directories
- ## in the /var directory.
- ## </summary>
-@@ -5505,6 +6030,25 @@ interface(`files_read_var_lib_symlinks',`
++## Create, read, write, and delete directories
++## in the /var directory.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
+ ## </summary>
+ ## </param>
+ #
+@@ -5505,6 +6168,25 @@ interface(`files_read_var_lib_symlinks',`
read_lnk_files_pattern($1, { var_t var_lib_t }, var_lib_t)
')
@@ -69615,7 +118768,7 @@ index e1e814d..89379cc 100644
# cjp: the next two interfaces really need to be fixed
# in some way. They really neeed their own types.
-@@ -5550,7 +6094,7 @@ interface(`files_manage_mounttab',`
+@@ -5550,7 +6232,7 @@ interface(`files_manage_mounttab',`
########################################
## <summary>
@@ -69624,7 +118777,7 @@ index e1e814d..89379cc 100644
## </summary>
## <param name="domain">
## <summary>
-@@ -5558,12 +6102,13 @@ interface(`files_manage_mounttab',`
+@@ -5558,12 +6240,13 @@ interface(`files_manage_mounttab',`
## </summary>
## </param>
#
@@ -69640,7 +118793,7 @@ index e1e814d..89379cc 100644
')
########################################
-@@ -5581,6 +6126,7 @@ interface(`files_search_locks',`
+@@ -5581,6 +6264,7 @@ interface(`files_search_locks',`
type var_t, var_lock_t;
')
@@ -69648,16 +118801,35 @@ index e1e814d..89379cc 100644
allow $1 var_lock_t:lnk_file read_lnk_file_perms;
search_dirs_pattern($1, var_t, var_lock_t)
')
-@@ -5607,7 +6153,7 @@ interface(`files_dontaudit_search_locks',`
+@@ -5607,7 +6291,26 @@ interface(`files_dontaudit_search_locks',`
########################################
## <summary>
-## List generic lock directories.
++## Do not audit attempts to read/write inherited
++## locks (/var/lock).
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain to not audit.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`files_dontaudit_rw_inherited_locks',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type var_lock_t;
++ ')
++
++ dontaudit $1 var_lock_t:file rw_inherited_file_perms;
++')
++
++########################################
++## <summary>
+## Set the attributes of the /var/lock directory.
## </summary>
## <param name="domain">
## <summary>
-@@ -5615,13 +6161,12 @@ interface(`files_dontaudit_search_locks',`
+@@ -5615,13 +6318,12 @@ interface(`files_dontaudit_search_locks',`
## </summary>
## </param>
#
@@ -69674,7 +118846,7 @@ index e1e814d..89379cc 100644
')
########################################
-@@ -5640,7 +6185,7 @@ interface(`files_rw_lock_dirs',`
+@@ -5640,7 +6342,7 @@ interface(`files_rw_lock_dirs',`
type var_t, var_lock_t;
')
@@ -69683,7 +118855,7 @@ index e1e814d..89379cc 100644
rw_dirs_pattern($1, var_t, var_lock_t)
')
-@@ -5673,7 +6218,6 @@ interface(`files_create_lock_dirs',`
+@@ -5673,7 +6375,6 @@ interface(`files_create_lock_dirs',`
## Domain allowed access.
## </summary>
## </param>
@@ -69691,7 +118863,7 @@ index e1e814d..89379cc 100644
#
interface(`files_relabel_all_lock_dirs',`
gen_require(`
-@@ -5701,8 +6245,7 @@ interface(`files_getattr_generic_locks',`
+@@ -5701,8 +6402,7 @@ interface(`files_getattr_generic_locks',`
type var_t, var_lock_t;
')
@@ -69701,7 +118873,7 @@ index e1e814d..89379cc 100644
allow $1 var_lock_t:dir list_dir_perms;
getattr_files_pattern($1, var_lock_t, var_lock_t)
')
-@@ -5718,13 +6261,12 @@ interface(`files_getattr_generic_locks',`
+@@ -5718,13 +6418,12 @@ interface(`files_getattr_generic_locks',`
## </param>
#
interface(`files_delete_generic_locks',`
@@ -69719,7 +118891,7 @@ index e1e814d..89379cc 100644
')
########################################
-@@ -5743,8 +6285,7 @@ interface(`files_manage_generic_locks',`
+@@ -5743,8 +6442,7 @@ interface(`files_manage_generic_locks',`
type var_t, var_lock_t;
')
@@ -69729,7 +118901,7 @@ index e1e814d..89379cc 100644
manage_files_pattern($1, var_lock_t, var_lock_t)
')
-@@ -5786,8 +6327,7 @@ interface(`files_read_all_locks',`
+@@ -5786,8 +6484,7 @@ interface(`files_read_all_locks',`
type var_t, var_lock_t;
')
@@ -69739,7 +118911,7 @@ index e1e814d..89379cc 100644
allow $1 lockfile:dir list_dir_perms;
read_files_pattern($1, lockfile, lockfile)
read_lnk_files_pattern($1, lockfile, lockfile)
-@@ -5809,8 +6349,7 @@ interface(`files_manage_all_locks',`
+@@ -5809,8 +6506,7 @@ interface(`files_manage_all_locks',`
type var_t, var_lock_t;
')
@@ -69749,7 +118921,7 @@ index e1e814d..89379cc 100644
manage_dirs_pattern($1, lockfile, lockfile)
manage_files_pattern($1, lockfile, lockfile)
manage_lnk_files_pattern($1, lockfile, lockfile)
-@@ -5847,8 +6386,7 @@ interface(`files_lock_filetrans',`
+@@ -5847,8 +6543,7 @@ interface(`files_lock_filetrans',`
type var_t, var_lock_t;
')
@@ -69759,7 +118931,7 @@ index e1e814d..89379cc 100644
filetrans_pattern($1, var_lock_t, $2, $3, $4)
')
-@@ -5911,6 +6449,43 @@ interface(`files_search_pids',`
+@@ -5911,6 +6606,43 @@ interface(`files_search_pids',`
search_dirs_pattern($1, var_t, var_run_t)
')
@@ -69803,7 +118975,7 @@ index e1e814d..89379cc 100644
########################################
## <summary>
## Do not audit attempts to search
-@@ -5933,6 +6508,25 @@ interface(`files_dontaudit_search_pids',`
+@@ -5933,6 +6665,25 @@ interface(`files_dontaudit_search_pids',`
########################################
## <summary>
@@ -69829,7 +119001,7 @@ index e1e814d..89379cc 100644
## List the contents of the runtime process
## ID directories (/var/run).
## </summary>
-@@ -6048,7 +6642,6 @@ interface(`files_pid_filetrans',`
+@@ -6048,7 +6799,6 @@ interface(`files_pid_filetrans',`
')
allow $1 var_t:dir search_dir_perms;
@@ -69837,7 +119009,7 @@ index e1e814d..89379cc 100644
filetrans_pattern($1, var_run_t, $2, $3, $4)
')
-@@ -6157,30 +6750,25 @@ interface(`files_dontaudit_ioctl_all_pids',`
+@@ -6157,30 +6907,25 @@ interface(`files_dontaudit_ioctl_all_pids',`
########################################
## <summary>
@@ -69872,7 +119044,7 @@ index e1e814d..89379cc 100644
## </summary>
## <param name="domain">
## <summary>
-@@ -6188,43 +6776,213 @@ interface(`files_read_all_pids',`
+@@ -6188,43 +6933,35 @@ interface(`files_read_all_pids',`
## </summary>
## </param>
#
@@ -69920,43 +119092,326 @@ index e1e814d..89379cc 100644
## <summary>
-## Delete all process ID directories.
+## Create all pid named pipes
-+## </summary>
-+## <param name="domain">
-+## <summary>
+ ## </summary>
+ ## <param name="domain">
+ ## <summary>
+@@ -6232,21 +6969,17 @@ interface(`files_delete_all_pids',`
+ ## </summary>
+ ## </param>
+ #
+-interface(`files_delete_all_pid_dirs',`
++interface(`files_create_all_pid_pipes',`
+ gen_require(`
+ attribute pidfile;
+- type var_t, var_run_t;
+ ')
+
+- allow $1 var_t:dir search_dir_perms;
+- allow $1 var_run_t:lnk_file read_lnk_file_perms;
+- delete_dirs_pattern($1, pidfile, pidfile)
++ allow $1 pidfile:fifo_file create_fifo_file_perms;
+ ')
+
+ ########################################
+ ## <summary>
+-## Search the contents of generic spool
+-## directories (/var/spool).
++## Delete all pid named pipes
+ ## </summary>
+ ## <param name="domain">
+ ## <summary>
+@@ -6254,56 +6987,59 @@ interface(`files_delete_all_pid_dirs',`
+ ## </summary>
+ ## </param>
+ #
+-interface(`files_search_spool',`
++interface(`files_delete_all_pid_pipes',`
+ gen_require(`
+- type var_t, var_spool_t;
++ attribute pidfile;
+ ')
+
+- search_dirs_pattern($1, var_t, var_spool_t)
++ allow $1 pidfile:fifo_file delete_fifo_file_perms;
+ ')
+
+ ########################################
+ ## <summary>
+-## Do not audit attempts to search generic
+-## spool directories.
++## manage all pidfile directories
++## in the /var/run directory.
+ ## </summary>
+ ## <param name="domain">
+ ## <summary>
+-## Domain to not audit.
+## Domain allowed access.
-+## </summary>
-+## </param>
+ ## </summary>
+ ## </param>
+ #
+-interface(`files_dontaudit_search_spool',`
++interface(`files_manage_all_pid_dirs',`
+ gen_require(`
+- type var_spool_t;
++ attribute pidfile;
+ ')
+
+- dontaudit $1 var_spool_t:dir search_dir_perms;
++ manage_dirs_pattern($1,pidfile,pidfile)
+ ')
+
++
+ ########################################
+ ## <summary>
+-## List the contents of generic spool
+-## (/var/spool) directories.
++## Read all process ID files.
+ ## </summary>
+ ## <param name="domain">
+ ## <summary>
+ ## Domain allowed access.
+ ## </summary>
+ ## </param>
++## <rolecap/>
+ #
+-interface(`files_list_spool',`
++interface(`files_read_all_pids',`
+ gen_require(`
+- type var_t, var_spool_t;
++ attribute pidfile;
++ type var_t;
+ ')
+
+- list_dirs_pattern($1, var_t, var_spool_t)
++ list_dirs_pattern($1, var_t, pidfile)
++ read_files_pattern($1, pidfile, pidfile)
++ read_lnk_files_pattern($1, pidfile, pidfile)
+ ')
+
+ ########################################
+ ## <summary>
+-## Create, read, write, and delete generic
+-## spool directories (/var/spool).
++## Relable all pid files
+ ## </summary>
+ ## <param name="domain">
+ ## <summary>
+@@ -6311,18 +7047,17 @@ interface(`files_list_spool',`
+ ## </summary>
+ ## </param>
+ #
+-interface(`files_manage_generic_spool_dirs',`
++interface(`files_relabel_all_pid_files',`
+ gen_require(`
+- type var_t, var_spool_t;
++ attribute pidfile;
+ ')
+
+- allow $1 var_t:dir search_dir_perms;
+- manage_dirs_pattern($1, var_spool_t, var_spool_t)
++ relabel_files_pattern($1, pidfile, pidfile)
+ ')
+
+ ########################################
+ ## <summary>
+-## Read generic spool files.
++## Execute generic programs in /var/run in the caller domain.
+ ## </summary>
+ ## <param name="domain">
+ ## <summary>
+@@ -6330,19 +7065,18 @@ interface(`files_manage_generic_spool_dirs',`
+ ## </summary>
+ ## </param>
+ #
+-interface(`files_read_generic_spool',`
++interface(`files_exec_generic_pid_files',`
+ gen_require(`
+- type var_t, var_spool_t;
++ type var_run_t;
+ ')
+
+- list_dirs_pattern($1, var_t, var_spool_t)
+- read_files_pattern($1, var_spool_t, var_spool_t)
++ exec_files_pattern($1, var_run_t, var_run_t)
+ ')
+
+ ########################################
+ ## <summary>
+-## Create, read, write, and delete generic
+-## spool files.
++## manage all pidfiles
++## in the /var/run directory.
+ ## </summary>
+ ## <param name="domain">
+ ## <summary>
+@@ -6350,55 +7084,62 @@ interface(`files_read_generic_spool',`
+ ## </summary>
+ ## </param>
+ #
+-interface(`files_manage_generic_spool',`
++interface(`files_manage_all_pids',`
+ gen_require(`
+- type var_t, var_spool_t;
++ attribute pidfile;
+ ')
+
+- allow $1 var_t:dir search_dir_perms;
+- manage_files_pattern($1, var_spool_t, var_spool_t)
++ manage_files_pattern($1,pidfile,pidfile)
+ ')
+
+ ########################################
+ ## <summary>
+-## Create objects in the spool directory
+-## with a private type with a type transition.
++## Mount filesystems on all polyinstantiation
++## member directories.
+ ## </summary>
+ ## <param name="domain">
+ ## <summary>
+ ## Domain allowed access.
+ ## </summary>
+ ## </param>
+-## <param name="file">
+-## <summary>
+-## Type to which the created node will be transitioned.
+-## </summary>
+-## </param>
+-## <param name="class">
+-## <summary>
+-## Object class(es) (single or set including {}) for which this
+-## the transition will occur.
+-## </summary>
+-## </param>
+-## <param name="name" optional="true">
+#
-+interface(`files_create_all_pid_pipes',`
++interface(`files_mounton_all_poly_members',`
+ gen_require(`
-+ attribute pidfile;
++ attribute polymember;
+ ')
+
-+ allow $1 pidfile:fifo_file create_fifo_file_perms;
++ allow $1 polymember:dir mounton;
+')
+
+########################################
+## <summary>
-+## Delete all pid named pipes
++## Delete all process IDs.
+## </summary>
+## <param name="domain">
-+## <summary>
+ ## <summary>
+-## The name of the object being created.
+## Domain allowed access.
+ ## </summary>
+ ## </param>
++## <rolecap/>
+ #
+-interface(`files_spool_filetrans',`
++interface(`files_delete_all_pids',`
+ gen_require(`
+- type var_t, var_spool_t;
++ attribute pidfile;
++ type var_t, var_run_t;
+ ')
+
+ allow $1 var_t:dir search_dir_perms;
+- filetrans_pattern($1, var_spool_t, $2, $3, $4)
++ allow $1 var_run_t:lnk_file read_lnk_file_perms;
++ allow $1 var_run_t:dir rmdir;
++ allow $1 var_run_t:lnk_file delete_lnk_file_perms;
++ delete_files_pattern($1, pidfile, pidfile)
++ delete_fifo_files_pattern($1, pidfile, pidfile)
++ delete_sock_files_pattern($1, pidfile, { pidfile var_run_t })
+ ')
+
+ ########################################
+ ## <summary>
+-## Allow access to manage all polyinstantiated
+-## directories on the system.
++## Delete all process ID directories.
+ ## </summary>
+ ## <param name="domain">
+ ## <summary>
+@@ -6406,25 +7147,283 @@ interface(`files_spool_filetrans',`
+ ## </summary>
+ ## </param>
+ #
+-interface(`files_polyinstantiate_all',`
++interface(`files_delete_all_pid_dirs',`
+ gen_require(`
+- attribute polydir, polymember, polyparent;
+- type poly_t;
++ attribute pidfile;
++ type var_t, var_run_t;
+ ')
+
+- # Need to give access to /selinux/member
+- selinux_compute_member($1)
+-
+- # Need sys_admin capability for mounting
+- allow $1 self:capability { chown fsetid sys_admin fowner };
+-
+- # Need to give access to the directories to be polyinstantiated
+- allow $1 polydir:dir { create open getattr search write add_name setattr mounton rmdir };
+-
+- # Need to give access to the polyinstantiated subdirectories
+- allow $1 polymember:dir search_dir_perms;
++ allow $1 var_t:dir search_dir_perms;
++ allow $1 var_run_t:lnk_file read_lnk_file_perms;
++ delete_dirs_pattern($1, pidfile, pidfile)
++')
+
+- # Need to give access to parent directories where original
++########################################
++## <summary>
++## Make the specified type a file
++## used for spool files.
++## </summary>
++## <desc>
++## <p>
++## Make the specified type usable for spool files.
++## This will also make the type usable for files, making
++## calls to files_type() redundant. Failure to use this interface
++## for a spool file may result in problems with
++## purging spool files.
++## </p>
++## <p>
++## Related interfaces:
++## </p>
++## <ul>
++## <li>files_spool_filetrans()</li>
++## </ul>
++## <p>
++## Example usage with a domain that can create and
++## write its spool file in the system spool file
++## directories (/var/spool):
++## </p>
++## <p>
++## type myspoolfile_t;
++## files_spool_file(myfile_spool_t)
++## allow mydomain_t myfile_spool_t:file { create_file_perms write_file_perms };
++## files_spool_filetrans(mydomain_t, myfile_spool_t, file)
++## </p>
++## </desc>
++## <param name="file_type">
++## <summary>
++## Type of the file to be used as a
++## spool file.
+## </summary>
+## </param>
++## <infoflow type="none"/>
+#
-+interface(`files_delete_all_pid_pipes',`
++interface(`files_spool_file',`
+ gen_require(`
-+ attribute pidfile;
++ attribute spoolfile;
+ ')
+
-+ allow $1 pidfile:fifo_file delete_fifo_file_perms;
++ files_type($1)
++ typeattribute $1 spoolfile;
+')
+
+########################################
+## <summary>
-+## manage all pidfile directories
-+## in the /var/run directory.
++## Create all spool sockets
+## </summary>
+## <param name="domain">
+## <summary>
@@ -69964,40 +119419,36 @@ index e1e814d..89379cc 100644
+## </summary>
+## </param>
+#
-+interface(`files_manage_all_pid_dirs',`
++interface(`files_create_all_spool_sockets',`
+ gen_require(`
-+ attribute pidfile;
++ attribute spoolfile;
+ ')
+
-+ manage_dirs_pattern($1,pidfile,pidfile)
++ allow $1 spoolfile:sock_file create_sock_file_perms;
+')
+
-+
+########################################
+## <summary>
-+## Read all process ID files.
++## Delete all spool sockets
+## </summary>
+## <param name="domain">
+## <summary>
+## Domain allowed access.
+## </summary>
+## </param>
-+## <rolecap/>
+#
-+interface(`files_read_all_pids',`
++interface(`files_delete_all_spool_sockets',`
+ gen_require(`
-+ attribute pidfile;
-+ type var_t;
++ attribute spoolfile;
+ ')
+
-+ list_dirs_pattern($1, var_t, pidfile)
-+ read_files_pattern($1, pidfile, pidfile)
-+ read_lnk_files_pattern($1, pidfile, pidfile)
++ allow $1 spoolfile:sock_file delete_sock_file_perms;
+')
+
+########################################
+## <summary>
-+## Relable all pid files
++## Search the contents of generic spool
++## directories (/var/spool).
+## </summary>
+## <param name="domain">
+## <summary>
@@ -70005,36 +119456,37 @@ index e1e814d..89379cc 100644
+## </summary>
+## </param>
+#
-+interface(`files_relabel_all_pid_files',`
++interface(`files_search_spool',`
+ gen_require(`
-+ attribute pidfile;
++ type var_t, var_spool_t;
+ ')
+
-+ relabel_files_pattern($1, pidfile, pidfile)
++ search_dirs_pattern($1, var_t, var_spool_t)
+')
+
+########################################
+## <summary>
-+## Execute generic programs in /var/run in the caller domain.
++## Do not audit attempts to search generic
++## spool directories.
+## </summary>
+## <param name="domain">
+## <summary>
-+## Domain allowed access.
++## Domain to not audit.
+## </summary>
+## </param>
+#
-+interface(`files_exec_generic_pid_files',`
++interface(`files_dontaudit_search_spool',`
+ gen_require(`
-+ type var_run_t;
++ type var_spool_t;
+ ')
+
-+ exec_files_pattern($1, var_run_t, var_run_t)
++ dontaudit $1 var_spool_t:dir search_dir_perms;
+')
+
+########################################
+## <summary>
-+## manage all pidfiles
-+## in the /var/run directory.
++## List the contents of generic spool
++## (/var/spool) directories.
+## </summary>
+## <param name="domain">
+## <summary>
@@ -70042,18 +119494,18 @@ index e1e814d..89379cc 100644
+## </summary>
+## </param>
+#
-+interface(`files_manage_all_pids',`
++interface(`files_list_spool',`
+ gen_require(`
-+ attribute pidfile;
++ type var_t, var_spool_t;
+ ')
+
-+ manage_files_pattern($1,pidfile,pidfile)
++ list_dirs_pattern($1, var_t, var_spool_t)
+')
+
+########################################
+## <summary>
-+## Mount filesystems on all polyinstantiation
-+## member directories.
++## Create, read, write, and delete generic
++## spool directories (/var/spool).
+## </summary>
+## <param name="domain">
+## <summary>
@@ -70061,117 +119513,94 @@ index e1e814d..89379cc 100644
+## </summary>
+## </param>
+#
-+interface(`files_mounton_all_poly_members',`
++interface(`files_manage_generic_spool_dirs',`
+ gen_require(`
-+ attribute polymember;
++ type var_t, var_spool_t;
+ ')
+
-+ allow $1 polymember:dir mounton;
++ allow $1 var_t:dir search_dir_perms;
++ manage_dirs_pattern($1, var_spool_t, var_spool_t)
+')
+
+########################################
+## <summary>
-+## Delete all process IDs.
++## Read generic spool files.
+## </summary>
+## <param name="domain">
+## <summary>
+## Domain allowed access.
+## </summary>
+## </param>
-+## <rolecap/>
+#
-+interface(`files_delete_all_pids',`
++interface(`files_read_generic_spool',`
+ gen_require(`
-+ attribute pidfile;
-+ type var_t, var_run_t;
++ type var_t, var_spool_t;
+ ')
+
-+ allow $1 var_t:dir search_dir_perms;
-+ allow $1 var_run_t:lnk_file read_lnk_file_perms;
-+ allow $1 var_run_t:dir rmdir;
-+ allow $1 var_run_t:lnk_file delete_lnk_file_perms;
-+ delete_files_pattern($1, pidfile, pidfile)
-+ delete_fifo_files_pattern($1, pidfile, pidfile)
-+ delete_sock_files_pattern($1, pidfile, { pidfile var_run_t })
++ list_dirs_pattern($1, var_t, var_spool_t)
++ read_files_pattern($1, var_spool_t, var_spool_t)
+')
+
+########################################
+## <summary>
-+## Delete all process ID directories.
- ## </summary>
- ## <param name="domain">
- ## <summary>
-@@ -6245,6 +7003,90 @@ interface(`files_delete_all_pid_dirs',`
-
- ########################################
- ## <summary>
-+## Make the specified type a file
-+## used for spool files.
++## Create, read, write, and delete generic
++## spool files.
+## </summary>
-+## <desc>
-+## <p>
-+## Make the specified type usable for spool files.
-+## This will also make the type usable for files, making
-+## calls to files_type() redundant. Failure to use this interface
-+## for a spool file may result in problems with
-+## purging spool files.
-+## </p>
-+## <p>
-+## Related interfaces:
-+## </p>
-+## <ul>
-+## <li>files_spool_filetrans()</li>
-+## </ul>
-+## <p>
-+## Example usage with a domain that can create and
-+## write its spool file in the system spool file
-+## directories (/var/spool):
-+## </p>
-+## <p>
-+## type myspoolfile_t;
-+## files_spool_file(myfile_spool_t)
-+## allow mydomain_t myfile_spool_t:file { create_file_perms write_file_perms };
-+## files_spool_filetrans(mydomain_t, myfile_spool_t, file)
-+## </p>
-+## </desc>
-+## <param name="file_type">
++## <param name="domain">
+## <summary>
-+## Type of the file to be used as a
-+## spool file.
++## Domain allowed access.
+## </summary>
+## </param>
-+## <infoflow type="none"/>
+#
-+interface(`files_spool_file',`
++interface(`files_manage_generic_spool',`
+ gen_require(`
-+ attribute spoolfile;
++ type var_t, var_spool_t;
+ ')
+
-+ files_type($1)
-+ typeattribute $1 spoolfile;
++ allow $1 var_t:dir search_dir_perms;
++ manage_files_pattern($1, var_spool_t, var_spool_t)
+')
+
+########################################
+## <summary>
-+## Create all spool sockets
++## Create objects in the spool directory
++## with a private type with a type transition.
+## </summary>
+## <param name="domain">
+## <summary>
+## Domain allowed access.
+## </summary>
+## </param>
++## <param name="file">
++## <summary>
++## Type to which the created node will be transitioned.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++## <param name="class">
++## <summary>
++## Object class(es) (single or set including {}) for which this
++## the transition will occur.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++## <param name="name" optional="true">
++## <summary>
++## The name of the object being created.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
+#
-+interface(`files_create_all_spool_sockets',`
++interface(`files_spool_filetrans',`
+ gen_require(`
-+ attribute spoolfile;
++ type var_t, var_spool_t;
+ ')
+
-+ allow $1 spoolfile:sock_file create_sock_file_perms;
++ allow $1 var_t:dir search_dir_perms;
++ filetrans_pattern($1, var_spool_t, $2, $3, $4)
+')
+
+########################################
+## <summary>
-+## Delete all spool sockets
++## Allow access to manage all polyinstantiated
++## directories on the system.
+## </summary>
+## <param name="domain">
+## <summary>
@@ -70179,20 +119608,29 @@ index e1e814d..89379cc 100644
+## </summary>
+## </param>
+#
-+interface(`files_delete_all_spool_sockets',`
++interface(`files_polyinstantiate_all',`
+ gen_require(`
-+ attribute spoolfile;
++ attribute polydir, polymember, polyparent;
++ type poly_t;
+ ')
+
-+ allow $1 spoolfile:sock_file delete_sock_file_perms;
-+')
++ # Need to give access to /selinux/member
++ selinux_compute_member($1)
+
-+########################################
-+## <summary>
- ## Search the contents of generic spool
- ## directories (/var/spool).
- ## </summary>
-@@ -6467,3 +7309,343 @@ interface(`files_unconfined',`
++ # Need sys_admin capability for mounting
++ allow $1 self:capability { chown fsetid sys_admin fowner };
++
++ # Need to give access to the directories to be polyinstantiated
++ allow $1 polydir:dir { create open getattr search write add_name setattr mounton rmdir };
++
++ # Need to give access to the polyinstantiated subdirectories
++ allow $1 polymember:dir search_dir_perms;
++
++ # Need to give access to parent directories where original
+ # is remounted for polyinstantiation aware programs (like gdm)
+ allow $1 polyparent:dir { getattr mounton };
+
+@@ -6467,3 +7466,457 @@ interface(`files_unconfined',`
typeattribute $1 files_unconfined_type;
')
@@ -70497,6 +119935,7 @@ index e1e814d..89379cc 100644
+ attribute non_security_file_type;
+ ')
+
++ allow $1 non_security_file_type:dir del_entry_dir_perms;
+ allow $1 non_security_file_type:file_class_set delete_file_perms;
+')
+
@@ -70518,6 +119957,8 @@ index e1e814d..89379cc 100644
+ ')
+
+ files_pid_filetrans($1, mnt_t, dir, "media")
++ files_root_filetrans($1, etc_runtime_t, file, ".readahead")
++ files_root_filetrans($1, etc_runtime_t, file, ".autorelabel")
+ files_root_filetrans($1, mnt_t, dir, "afs")
+ files_root_filetrans($1, mnt_t, dir, "misc")
+ files_root_filetrans($1, mnt_t, dir, "net")
@@ -70536,11 +119977,129 @@ index e1e814d..89379cc 100644
+ files_etc_filetrans_etc_runtime($1, file, "hwconf")
+ files_etc_filetrans_etc_runtime($1, file, "iptables.save")
+')
++
++########################################
++## <summary>
++## Make the specified type a
++## base file.
++## </summary>
++## <desc>
++## <p>
++## Identify file type as base file type. Tools will use this attribute,
++## to help users diagnose problems.
++## </p>
++## </desc>
++## <param name="file_type">
++## <summary>
++## Type to be used as a base files.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++## <infoflow type="none"/>
++#
++interface(`files_base_file',`
++ gen_require(`
++ attribute base_file_type;
++ ')
++ files_type($1)
++ typeattribute $1 base_file_type;
++')
++
++########################################
++## <summary>
++## Make the specified type a
++## base read only file.
++## </summary>
++## <desc>
++## <p>
++## Make the specified type readable for all domains.
++## </p>
++## </desc>
++## <param name="file_type">
++## <summary>
++## Type to be used as a base read only files.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++## <infoflow type="none"/>
++#
++interface(`files_ro_base_file',`
++ gen_require(`
++ attribute base_ro_file_type;
++ ')
++ files_base_file($1)
++ typeattribute $1 base_ro_file_type;
++')
++
++########################################
++## <summary>
++## Read all ro base files.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++## <rolecap/>
++#
++interface(`files_read_all_base_ro_files',`
++ gen_require(`
++ attribute base_ro_file_type;
++ ')
++
++ list_dirs_pattern($1, base_ro_file_type, base_ro_file_type)
++ read_files_pattern($1, base_ro_file_type, base_ro_file_type)
++ read_lnk_files_pattern($1, base_ro_file_type, base_ro_file_type)
++')
++
++########################################
++## <summary>
++## Execute all base ro files.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++## <rolecap/>
++#
++interface(`files_exec_all_base_ro_files',`
++ gen_require(`
++ attribute base_ro_file_type;
++ ')
++
++ can_exec($1, base_ro_file_type)
++')
++
++########################################
++## <summary>
++## Allow the specified domain to modify the systemd configuration of
++## any file.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`files_config_all_files',`
++ gen_require(`
++ attribute file_type;
++ ')
++
++ allow $1 file_type:service all_service_perms;
++')
++
diff --git a/policy/modules/kernel/files.te b/policy/modules/kernel/files.te
-index 52ef84e..14fabe2 100644
+index 52ef84e..45cb0bc 100644
--- a/policy/modules/kernel/files.te
+++ b/policy/modules/kernel/files.te
-@@ -10,7 +10,9 @@ attribute files_unconfined_type;
+@@ -5,12 +5,16 @@ policy_module(files, 1.17.0)
+ # Declarations
+ #
+
++attribute base_file_type;
++attribute base_ro_file_type;
+ attribute file_type;
+ attribute files_unconfined_type;
attribute lockfile;
attribute mountpoint;
attribute pidfile;
@@ -70550,7 +120109,27 @@ index 52ef84e..14fabe2 100644
# For labeling types that are to be polyinstantiated
attribute polydir;
-@@ -64,12 +66,21 @@ files_type(etc_t)
+@@ -48,28 +52,40 @@ attribute usercanread;
+ #
+ type boot_t;
+ files_mountpoint(boot_t)
++files_ro_base_file(boot_t)
+
+ # default_t is the default type for files that do not
+ # match any specification in the file_contexts configuration
+ # other than the generic /.* specification.
+ type default_t;
+ files_mountpoint(default_t)
++files_base_file(default_t)
+
+ #
+ # etc_t is the type of the system etc directories.
+ #
+ type etc_t, configfile;
+-files_type(etc_t)
++files_ro_base_file(etc_t)
++
+ # compatibility aliases for removed types:
typealias etc_t alias automount_etc_t;
typealias etc_t alias snmpd_etc_t;
@@ -70573,7 +120152,53 @@ index 52ef84e..14fabe2 100644
files_type(etc_runtime_t)
#Temporarily in policy until FC5 dissappears
typealias etc_runtime_t alias firstboot_rw_t;
-@@ -139,6 +150,7 @@ files_mountpoint(src_t)
+@@ -81,6 +97,7 @@ typealias etc_runtime_t alias firstboot_rw_t;
+ #
+ type file_t;
+ files_mountpoint(file_t)
++files_base_file(file_t)
+ kernel_rootfs_mountpoint(file_t)
+ sid file gen_context(system_u:object_r:file_t,s0)
+
+@@ -89,6 +106,7 @@ sid file gen_context(system_u:object_r:file_t,s0)
+ # are created
+ #
+ type home_root_t;
++files_base_file(home_root_t)
+ files_mountpoint(home_root_t)
+ files_poly_parent(home_root_t)
+
+@@ -96,12 +114,13 @@ files_poly_parent(home_root_t)
+ # lost_found_t is the type for the lost+found directories.
+ #
+ type lost_found_t;
+-files_type(lost_found_t)
++files_base_file(lost_found_t)
+
+ #
+ # mnt_t is the type for mount points such as /mnt/cdrom
+ #
+ type mnt_t;
++files_base_file(mnt_t)
+ files_mountpoint(mnt_t)
+
+ #
+@@ -123,6 +142,7 @@ files_type(readable_t)
+ # root_t is the type for rootfs and the root directory.
+ #
+ type root_t;
++files_base_file(root_t)
+ files_mountpoint(root_t)
+ files_poly_parent(root_t)
+ kernel_rootfs_mountpoint(root_t)
+@@ -133,52 +153,63 @@ genfscon rootfs / gen_context(system_u:object_r:root_t,s0)
+ #
+ type src_t;
+ files_mountpoint(src_t)
++files_ro_base_file(src_t)
+
+ #
+ # system_map_t is for the system.map files in /boot
#
type system_map_t;
files_type(system_map_t)
@@ -70581,7 +120206,11 @@ index 52ef84e..14fabe2 100644
genfscon proc /kallsyms gen_context(system_u:object_r:system_map_t,s0)
#
-@@ -149,6 +161,7 @@ files_tmp_file(tmp_t)
+ # tmp_t is the type of the temporary directories
+ #
+ type tmp_t;
++files_base_file(tmp_t)
+ files_tmp_file(tmp_t)
files_mountpoint(tmp_t)
files_poly(tmp_t)
files_poly_parent(tmp_t)
@@ -70589,9 +120218,23 @@ index 52ef84e..14fabe2 100644
#
# usr_t is the type for /usr.
-@@ -167,12 +180,14 @@ files_mountpoint(var_t)
+ #
+ type usr_t;
++files_ro_base_file(usr_t)
+ files_mountpoint(usr_t)
+
+ #
+ # var_t is the type of /var
+ #
+ type var_t;
++files_base_file(var_t)
+ files_mountpoint(var_t)
+
+ #
+ # var_lib_t is the type of /var/lib
#
type var_lib_t;
++files_base_file(var_lib_t)
files_mountpoint(var_lib_t)
+files_poly(var_lib_t)
@@ -70599,20 +120242,35 @@ index 52ef84e..14fabe2 100644
# var_lock_t is tye type of /var/lock
#
type var_lock_t;
++files_base_file(var_lock_t)
files_lock_file(var_lock_t)
+files_mountpoint(var_lock_t)
#
# var_run_t is the type of /var/run, usually
-@@ -187,6 +202,7 @@ files_mountpoint(var_run_t)
+ # used for pid and other runtime files.
+ #
+ type var_run_t;
++files_base_file(var_run_t)
+ files_pid_file(var_run_t)
+ files_mountpoint(var_run_t)
+
+@@ -186,7 +217,9 @@ files_mountpoint(var_run_t)
+ # var_spool_t is the type of /var/spool
#
type var_spool_t;
++files_base_file(var_spool_t)
files_tmp_file(var_spool_t)
+files_spool_file(var_spool_t)
########################################
#
-@@ -229,6 +245,6 @@ allow files_unconfined_type file_type:{ dir lnk_file sock_file fifo_file blk_fil
+@@ -225,10 +258,11 @@ fs_associate_tmpfs(tmpfsfile)
+ # Create/access any file in a labeled filesystem;
+ allow files_unconfined_type file_type:{ file chr_file } ~execmod;
+ allow files_unconfined_type file_type:{ dir lnk_file sock_file fifo_file blk_file } *;
++allow files_unconfined_type file_type:service *;
+
# Mount/unmount any filesystem with the context= option.
allow files_unconfined_type file_type:filesystem *;
@@ -70642,7 +120300,7 @@ index cda5588..91d1e25 100644
+/usr/lib/udev/devices/shm -d gen_context(system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t,s0)
+/usr/lib/udev/devices/shm/.* <<none>>
diff --git a/policy/modules/kernel/filesystem.if b/policy/modules/kernel/filesystem.if
-index 7c6b791..b40a5a5 100644
+index 7c6b791..aa86bf7 100644
--- a/policy/modules/kernel/filesystem.if
+++ b/policy/modules/kernel/filesystem.if
@@ -631,6 +631,27 @@ interface(`fs_getattr_cgroup',`
@@ -70968,7 +120626,7 @@ index 7c6b791..b40a5a5 100644
+#
+interface(`fs_search_ecryptfs',`
+ gen_require(`
-+ type fusefs_t;
++ type ecryptfs_t;
+ ')
+
+ allow $1 ecryptfs_t:dir search_dir_perms;
@@ -71086,7 +120744,7 @@ index 7c6b791..b40a5a5 100644
+#
+interface(`fs_manage_ecryptfs_symlinks',`
+ gen_require(`
-+ type fusefs_t;
++ type ecryptfs_t;
+ ')
+
+ manage_lnk_files_pattern($1, ecryptfs_t, ecryptfs_t)
@@ -71274,92 +120932,164 @@ index 7c6b791..b40a5a5 100644
allow $1 nfs_t:dir list_dir_perms;
read_files_pattern($1, nfs_t, nfs_t)
')
-@@ -2523,6 +2986,7 @@ interface(`fs_write_nfs_files',`
- type nfs_t;
- ')
-
-+ fs_search_auto_mountpoints($1)
- allow $1 nfs_t:dir list_dir_perms;
- write_files_pattern($1, nfs_t, nfs_t)
- ')
-@@ -2549,6 +3013,25 @@ interface(`fs_exec_nfs_files',`
+@@ -2510,81 +2973,137 @@ interface(`fs_dontaudit_read_nfs_files',`
########################################
## <summary>
-+## Make general progams in nfs an entrypoint for
-+## the specified domain.
+-## Read files on a NFS filesystem.
++## Read files on a NFS filesystem.
+## </summary>
+## <param name="domain">
+## <summary>
-+## The domain for which nfs_t is an entrypoint.
++## Domain allowed access.
+## </summary>
+## </param>
+#
-+interface(`fs_nfs_entry_type',`
++interface(`fs_write_nfs_files',`
+ gen_require(`
+ type nfs_t;
+ ')
+
-+ domain_entry_file($1, nfs_t)
++ fs_search_auto_mountpoints($1)
++ allow $1 nfs_t:dir list_dir_perms;
++ write_files_pattern($1, nfs_t, nfs_t)
+')
+
+########################################
+## <summary>
- ## Append files
- ## on a NFS filesystem.
- ## </summary>
-@@ -2569,7 +3052,7 @@ interface(`fs_append_nfs_files',`
-
- ########################################
- ## <summary>
--## dontaudit Append files
-+## Do not audit attempts to append files
- ## on a NFS filesystem.
- ## </summary>
- ## <param name="domain">
-@@ -2589,6 +3072,42 @@ interface(`fs_dontaudit_append_nfs_files',`
-
- ########################################
- ## <summary>
-+## Read inherited files on a NFS filesystem.
++## Execute files on a NFS filesystem.
+## </summary>
+## <param name="domain">
+## <summary>
+## Domain allowed access.
+## </summary>
+## </param>
++## <rolecap/>
+#
-+interface(`fs_read_inherited_nfs_files',`
++interface(`fs_exec_nfs_files',`
+ gen_require(`
+ type nfs_t;
+ ')
+
-+ allow $1 nfs_t:file read_inherited_file_perms;
++ allow $1 nfs_t:dir list_dir_perms;
++ exec_files_pattern($1, nfs_t, nfs_t)
+')
+
+########################################
+## <summary>
-+## Read/write inherited files on a NFS filesystem.
++## Make general progams in nfs an entrypoint for
++## the specified domain.
+## </summary>
+## <param name="domain">
+## <summary>
-+## Domain allowed access.
++## The domain for which nfs_t is an entrypoint.
+## </summary>
+## </param>
+#
-+interface(`fs_rw_inherited_nfs_files',`
++interface(`fs_nfs_entry_type',`
+ gen_require(`
+ type nfs_t;
+ ')
+
-+ allow $1 nfs_t:file rw_inherited_file_perms;
++ domain_entry_file($1, nfs_t)
+')
+
+########################################
+## <summary>
- ## Do not audit attempts to read or
- ## write files on a NFS filesystem.
++## Append files
++## on a NFS filesystem.
+ ## </summary>
+ ## <param name="domain">
+ ## <summary>
+ ## Domain allowed access.
+ ## </summary>
+ ## </param>
++## <rolecap/>
+ #
+-interface(`fs_write_nfs_files',`
++interface(`fs_append_nfs_files',`
+ gen_require(`
+ type nfs_t;
+ ')
+
+- allow $1 nfs_t:dir list_dir_perms;
+- write_files_pattern($1, nfs_t, nfs_t)
++ append_files_pattern($1, nfs_t, nfs_t)
+ ')
+
+ ########################################
+ ## <summary>
+-## Execute files on a NFS filesystem.
++## Do not audit attempts to append files
++## on a NFS filesystem.
## </summary>
+ ## <param name="domain">
+ ## <summary>
+-## Domain allowed access.
++## Domain to not audit.
+ ## </summary>
+ ## </param>
+ ## <rolecap/>
+ #
+-interface(`fs_exec_nfs_files',`
++interface(`fs_dontaudit_append_nfs_files',`
+ gen_require(`
+ type nfs_t;
+ ')
+
+- allow $1 nfs_t:dir list_dir_perms;
+- exec_files_pattern($1, nfs_t, nfs_t)
++ dontaudit $1 nfs_t:file append_file_perms;
+ ')
+
+ ########################################
+ ## <summary>
+-## Append files
+-## on a NFS filesystem.
++## Read inherited files on a NFS filesystem.
+ ## </summary>
+ ## <param name="domain">
+ ## <summary>
+ ## Domain allowed access.
+ ## </summary>
+ ## </param>
+-## <rolecap/>
+ #
+-interface(`fs_append_nfs_files',`
++interface(`fs_read_inherited_nfs_files',`
+ gen_require(`
+ type nfs_t;
+ ')
+
+- append_files_pattern($1, nfs_t, nfs_t)
++ allow $1 nfs_t:file read_inherited_file_perms;
+ ')
+
+ ########################################
+ ## <summary>
+-## dontaudit Append files
+-## on a NFS filesystem.
++## Read/write inherited files on a NFS filesystem.
+ ## </summary>
+ ## <param name="domain">
+ ## <summary>
+-## Domain to not audit.
++## Domain allowed access.
+ ## </summary>
+ ## </param>
+-## <rolecap/>
+ #
+-interface(`fs_dontaudit_append_nfs_files',`
++interface(`fs_rw_inherited_nfs_files',`
+ gen_require(`
+ type nfs_t;
+ ')
+
+- dontaudit $1 nfs_t:file append_file_perms;
++ allow $1 nfs_t:file rw_inherited_file_perms;
+ ')
+
+ ########################################
@@ -2603,7 +3122,7 @@ interface(`fs_dontaudit_rw_nfs_files',`
type nfs_t;
')
@@ -71522,7 +121252,7 @@ index 7c6b791..b40a5a5 100644
## Get the attributes of a tmpfs
## filesystem.
## </summary>
-@@ -3963,6 +4539,42 @@ interface(`fs_dontaudit_list_tmpfs',`
+@@ -3963,6 +4539,60 @@ interface(`fs_dontaudit_list_tmpfs',`
########################################
## <summary>
@@ -71544,6 +121274,24 @@ index 7c6b791..b40a5a5 100644
+
+########################################
+## <summary>
++## Relabel fifo_file on tmpfs filesystems.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`fs_relabel_tmpfs_fifo_files',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type tmpfs_t;
++ ')
++
++ relabel_fifo_files_pattern($1, tmpfs_t, tmpfs_t)
++')
++
++########################################
++## <summary>
+## Relabel files on tmpfs filesystems.
+## </summary>
+## <param name="domain">
@@ -71565,7 +121313,7 @@ index 7c6b791..b40a5a5 100644
## Create, read, write, and delete
## tmpfs directories
## </summary>
-@@ -4069,7 +4681,7 @@ interface(`fs_dontaudit_rw_tmpfs_files',`
+@@ -4069,7 +4699,7 @@ interface(`fs_dontaudit_rw_tmpfs_files',`
type tmpfs_t;
')
@@ -71574,7 +121322,7 @@ index 7c6b791..b40a5a5 100644
')
########################################
-@@ -4129,6 +4741,24 @@ interface(`fs_rw_tmpfs_files',`
+@@ -4129,6 +4759,24 @@ interface(`fs_rw_tmpfs_files',`
########################################
## <summary>
@@ -71599,7 +121347,7 @@ index 7c6b791..b40a5a5 100644
## Read tmpfs link files.
## </summary>
## <param name="domain">
-@@ -4166,7 +4796,7 @@ interface(`fs_rw_tmpfs_chr_files',`
+@@ -4166,7 +4814,7 @@ interface(`fs_rw_tmpfs_chr_files',`
########################################
## <summary>
@@ -71608,10 +121356,28 @@ index 7c6b791..b40a5a5 100644
## </summary>
## <param name="domain">
## <summary>
-@@ -4185,6 +4815,42 @@ interface(`fs_dontaudit_use_tmpfs_chr_dev',`
+@@ -4185,6 +4833,60 @@ interface(`fs_dontaudit_use_tmpfs_chr_dev',`
########################################
## <summary>
++## Do not audit attempts to create character nodes on tmpfs filesystems.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain to not audit.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`fs_dontaudit_create_tmpfs_chr_dev',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type tmpfs_t;
++ ')
++
++ dontaudit $1 tmpfs_t:chr_file create;
++')
++
++########################################
++## <summary>
+## Do not audit attempts to dontaudit read block nodes on tmpfs filesystems.
+## </summary>
+## <param name="domain">
@@ -71651,7 +121417,7 @@ index 7c6b791..b40a5a5 100644
## Relabel character nodes on tmpfs filesystems.
## </summary>
## <param name="domain">
-@@ -4242,6 +4908,43 @@ interface(`fs_relabel_tmpfs_blk_file',`
+@@ -4242,6 +4944,43 @@ interface(`fs_relabel_tmpfs_blk_file',`
########################################
## <summary>
@@ -71695,7 +121461,7 @@ index 7c6b791..b40a5a5 100644
## Read and write, create and delete generic
## files on tmpfs filesystems.
## </summary>
-@@ -4261,6 +4964,25 @@ interface(`fs_manage_tmpfs_files',`
+@@ -4261,6 +5000,25 @@ interface(`fs_manage_tmpfs_files',`
########################################
## <summary>
@@ -71721,7 +121487,7 @@ index 7c6b791..b40a5a5 100644
## Read and write, create and delete symbolic
## links on tmpfs filesystems.
## </summary>
-@@ -4467,6 +5189,8 @@ interface(`fs_mount_all_fs',`
+@@ -4467,6 +5225,8 @@ interface(`fs_mount_all_fs',`
')
allow $1 filesystem_type:filesystem mount;
@@ -71730,7 +121496,7 @@ index 7c6b791..b40a5a5 100644
')
########################################
-@@ -4513,7 +5237,7 @@ interface(`fs_unmount_all_fs',`
+@@ -4513,7 +5273,7 @@ interface(`fs_unmount_all_fs',`
## <desc>
## <p>
## Allow the specified domain to
@@ -71739,7 +121505,7 @@ index 7c6b791..b40a5a5 100644
## Example attributes:
## </p>
## <ul>
-@@ -4876,3 +5600,43 @@ interface(`fs_unconfined',`
+@@ -4876,3 +5636,43 @@ interface(`fs_unconfined',`
typeattribute $1 filesystem_unconfined_type;
')
@@ -71784,7 +121550,7 @@ index 7c6b791..b40a5a5 100644
+ fs_tmpfs_filetrans($1, cgroup_t, lnk_file, "cpuacct")
+')
diff --git a/policy/modules/kernel/filesystem.te b/policy/modules/kernel/filesystem.te
-index 376bae8..7c84405 100644
+index 376bae8..36a5041 100644
--- a/policy/modules/kernel/filesystem.te
+++ b/policy/modules/kernel/filesystem.te
@@ -33,6 +33,8 @@ fs_use_xattr jffs2 gen_context(system_u:object_r:fs_t,s0);
@@ -71813,7 +121579,19 @@ index 376bae8..7c84405 100644
fs_type(cgroup_t)
files_type(cgroup_t)
files_mountpoint(cgroup_t)
-@@ -96,6 +99,7 @@ type hugetlbfs_t;
+@@ -88,6 +91,11 @@ fs_noxattr_type(ecryptfs_t)
+ files_mountpoint(ecryptfs_t)
+ genfscon ecryptfs / gen_context(system_u:object_r:ecryptfs_t,s0)
+
++type efivarfs_t;
++fs_noxattr_type(efivarfs_t)
++files_mountpoint(efivarfs_t)
++genfscon efivarfs / gen_context(system_u:object_r:efivarfs_t,s0)
++
+ type futexfs_t;
+ fs_type(futexfs_t)
+ genfscon futexfs / gen_context(system_u:object_r:futexfs_t,s0)
+@@ -96,6 +104,7 @@ type hugetlbfs_t;
fs_type(hugetlbfs_t)
files_mountpoint(hugetlbfs_t)
fs_use_trans hugetlbfs gen_context(system_u:object_r:hugetlbfs_t,s0);
@@ -71821,7 +121599,7 @@ index 376bae8..7c84405 100644
type ibmasmfs_t;
fs_type(ibmasmfs_t)
-@@ -144,11 +148,6 @@ fs_type(spufs_t)
+@@ -144,11 +153,6 @@ fs_type(spufs_t)
genfscon spufs / gen_context(system_u:object_r:spufs_t,s0)
files_mountpoint(spufs_t)
@@ -71833,7 +121611,7 @@ index 376bae8..7c84405 100644
type sysv_t;
fs_noxattr_type(sysv_t)
files_mountpoint(sysv_t)
-@@ -175,6 +174,7 @@ fs_type(tmpfs_t)
+@@ -175,6 +179,7 @@ fs_type(tmpfs_t)
files_type(tmpfs_t)
files_mountpoint(tmpfs_t)
files_poly_parent(tmpfs_t)
@@ -71841,7 +121619,7 @@ index 376bae8..7c84405 100644
# Use a transition SID based on the allocating task SID and the
# filesystem SID to label inodes in the following filesystem types,
-@@ -254,6 +254,8 @@ genfscon udf / gen_context(system_u:object_r:iso9660_t,s0)
+@@ -254,6 +259,8 @@ genfscon udf / gen_context(system_u:object_r:iso9660_t,s0)
type removable_t;
allow removable_t noxattrfs:filesystem associate;
fs_noxattr_type(removable_t)
@@ -71850,7 +121628,7 @@ index 376bae8..7c84405 100644
files_mountpoint(removable_t)
#
-@@ -273,6 +275,7 @@ genfscon ncpfs / gen_context(system_u:object_r:nfs_t,s0)
+@@ -273,6 +280,7 @@ genfscon ncpfs / gen_context(system_u:object_r:nfs_t,s0)
genfscon reiserfs / gen_context(system_u:object_r:nfs_t,s0)
genfscon panfs / gen_context(system_u:object_r:nfs_t,s0)
genfscon gadgetfs / gen_context(system_u:object_r:nfs_t,s0)
@@ -71867,7 +121645,7 @@ index 7be4ddf..f7021a0 100644
+
+/sys/class/net/ib.* gen_context(system_u:object_r:sysctl_net_t,s0)
diff --git a/policy/modules/kernel/kernel.if b/policy/modules/kernel/kernel.if
-index 4bf45cb..e9855e0 100644
+index 4bf45cb..9f81200 100644
--- a/policy/modules/kernel/kernel.if
+++ b/policy/modules/kernel/kernel.if
@@ -267,7 +267,7 @@ interface(`kernel_rw_unix_dgram_sockets',`
@@ -71904,7 +121682,23 @@ index 4bf45cb..e9855e0 100644
## Get the attributes of the proc filesystem.
## </summary>
## <param name="domain">
-@@ -1458,6 +1476,24 @@ interface(`kernel_dontaudit_list_all_proc',`
+@@ -972,13 +990,10 @@ interface(`kernel_read_proc_symlinks',`
+ #
+ interface(`kernel_read_system_state',`
+ gen_require(`
+- type proc_t;
++ attribute kernel_system_state_reader;
+ ')
+
+- read_files_pattern($1, proc_t, proc_t)
+- read_lnk_files_pattern($1, proc_t, proc_t)
+-
+- list_dirs_pattern($1, proc_t, proc_t)
++ typeattribute $1 kernel_system_state_reader;
+ ')
+
+ ########################################
+@@ -1458,6 +1473,24 @@ interface(`kernel_dontaudit_list_all_proc',`
########################################
## <summary>
@@ -71929,7 +121723,7 @@ index 4bf45cb..e9855e0 100644
## Do not audit attempts by caller to search
## the base directory of sysctls.
## </summary>
-@@ -2066,7 +2102,7 @@ interface(`kernel_dontaudit_list_all_sysctls',`
+@@ -2066,7 +2099,7 @@ interface(`kernel_dontaudit_list_all_sysctls',`
')
dontaudit $1 sysctl_type:dir list_dir_perms;
@@ -71938,7 +121732,33 @@ index 4bf45cb..e9855e0 100644
')
########################################
-@@ -2287,7 +2323,7 @@ interface(`kernel_read_unlabeled_state',`
+@@ -2263,6 +2296,25 @@ interface(`kernel_list_unlabeled',`
+
+ ########################################
+ ## <summary>
++## Delete unlabeled files
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`kernel_delete_unlabeled',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type unlabeled_t;
++ ')
++
++ allow $1 unlabeled_t:dir delete_dir_perms;
++ allow $1 unlabeled_t:dir_file_class_set delete_file_perms;
++')
++
++########################################
++## <summary>
+ ## Read the process state (/proc/pid) of all unlabeled_t.
+ ## </summary>
+ ## <param name="domain">
+@@ -2287,7 +2339,7 @@ interface(`kernel_read_unlabeled_state',`
## </summary>
## <param name="domain">
## <summary>
@@ -71947,7 +121767,7 @@ index 4bf45cb..e9855e0 100644
## </summary>
## </param>
#
-@@ -2469,6 +2505,24 @@ interface(`kernel_rw_unlabeled_blk_files',`
+@@ -2469,6 +2521,24 @@ interface(`kernel_rw_unlabeled_blk_files',`
########################################
## <summary>
@@ -71972,7 +121792,32 @@ index 4bf45cb..e9855e0 100644
## Do not audit attempts by caller to get attributes for
## unlabeled character devices.
## </summary>
-@@ -2613,7 +2667,7 @@ interface(`kernel_sendrecv_unlabeled_association',`
+@@ -2506,6 +2576,24 @@ interface(`kernel_relabelfrom_unlabeled_dirs',`
+
+ ########################################
+ ## <summary>
++## Allow caller to relabel unlabeled filesystems.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`kernel_relabelfrom_unlabeled_fs',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type unlabeled_t;
++ ')
++
++ allow $1 unlabeled_t:filesystem relabelfrom;
++')
++
++########################################
++## <summary>
+ ## Allow caller to relabel unlabeled files.
+ ## </summary>
+ ## <param name="domain">
+@@ -2613,7 +2701,7 @@ interface(`kernel_sendrecv_unlabeled_association',`
allow $1 unlabeled_t:association { sendto recvfrom };
# temporary hack until labeling on packets is supported
@@ -71981,7 +121826,7 @@ index 4bf45cb..e9855e0 100644
')
########################################
-@@ -2651,6 +2705,24 @@ interface(`kernel_dontaudit_sendrecv_unlabeled_association',`
+@@ -2651,6 +2739,24 @@ interface(`kernel_dontaudit_sendrecv_unlabeled_association',`
########################################
## <summary>
@@ -72006,7 +121851,7 @@ index 4bf45cb..e9855e0 100644
## Receive TCP packets from an unlabeled connection.
## </summary>
## <desc>
-@@ -2678,6 +2750,25 @@ interface(`kernel_tcp_recvfrom_unlabeled',`
+@@ -2678,6 +2784,25 @@ interface(`kernel_tcp_recvfrom_unlabeled',`
########################################
## <summary>
@@ -72032,7 +121877,7 @@ index 4bf45cb..e9855e0 100644
## Do not audit attempts to receive TCP packets from an unlabeled
## connection.
## </summary>
-@@ -2787,6 +2878,33 @@ interface(`kernel_raw_recvfrom_unlabeled',`
+@@ -2787,6 +2912,33 @@ interface(`kernel_raw_recvfrom_unlabeled',`
allow $1 unlabeled_t:rawip_socket recvfrom;
')
@@ -72066,7 +121911,7 @@ index 4bf45cb..e9855e0 100644
########################################
## <summary>
-@@ -2942,6 +3060,24 @@ interface(`kernel_relabelfrom_unlabeled_database',`
+@@ -2942,6 +3094,24 @@ interface(`kernel_relabelfrom_unlabeled_database',`
########################################
## <summary>
@@ -72091,7 +121936,7 @@ index 4bf45cb..e9855e0 100644
## Unconfined access to kernel module resources.
## </summary>
## <param name="domain">
-@@ -2956,5 +3092,98 @@ interface(`kernel_unconfined',`
+@@ -2956,5 +3126,318 @@ interface(`kernel_unconfined',`
')
typeattribute $1 kern_unconfined;
@@ -72156,6 +122001,25 @@ index 4bf45cb..e9855e0 100644
+ allow $1 kernel_t:unix_stream_socket { write getattr };
+')
+
++#######################################
++## <summary>
++## Allow the specified domain to read/write on
++## the kernel with a unix socket.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`kernel_rw_stream_socket_perms',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type kernel_t;
++ ')
++
++ allow $1 kernel_t:unix_stream_socket rw_socket_perms;
++')
++
+########################################
+## <summary>
+## Make the specified type usable for regular entries in proc
@@ -72190,12 +122054,231 @@ index 4bf45cb..e9855e0 100644
+ ')
+
+ dontaudit $1 sysctl_type:file getattr;
++')
++
++########################################
++## <summary>
++## Read the process state (/proc/pid) of the kernel.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`kernel_read_state',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type kernel_t;
++ ')
++
++ allow $1 kernel_t:dir search_dir_perms;
++ allow $1 kernel_t:file read_file_perms;
++ allow $1 kernel_t:lnk_file read_lnk_file_perms;
++')
++
++########################################
++## <summary>
++## Dontaudit attempts to read the process state (/proc/pid) of the kernel.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`kernel_dontaudit_read_state',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type kernel_t;
++ ')
++
++ dontaudit $1 kernel_t:dir search_dir_perms;
++ dontaudit $1 kernel_t:file read_file_perms;
++ dontaudit $1 kernel_t:lnk_file read_lnk_file_perms;
++')
++
++########################################
++## <summary>
++## Allow searching of numa state directory.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++##
++#
++interface(`kernel_search_numa_state',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type proc_t, proc_numa_t;
++ ')
++
++ search_dirs_pattern($1, proc_t, proc_numa_t)
++')
++
++########################################
++## <summary>
++## Do not audit attempts to search the numa
++## state directory.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain to not audit.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++##
++#
++interface(`kernel_dontaudit_search_numa_state',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type proc_numa_t;
++ ')
++
++ dontaudit $1 proc_numa_t:dir search;
++')
++
++########################################
++## <summary>
++## Allow caller to read the numa state information.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++##
++#
++interface(`kernel_read_numa_state',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type proc_t, proc_numa_t;
++ ')
++
++ read_files_pattern($1, { proc_t proc_numa_t }, proc_numa_t)
++ read_lnk_files_pattern($1, { proc_t proc_numa_t }, proc_numa_t)
++
++ list_dirs_pattern($1, proc_t, proc_numa_t)
++')
++
++########################################
++## <summary>
++## Allow caller to read the numa state symbolic links.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++##
++#
++interface(`kernel_read_numa_state_symlinks',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type proc_t, proc_numa_t;
++ ')
++
++ read_lnk_files_pattern($1, { proc_t proc_numa_t }, proc_numa_t)
++
++ list_dirs_pattern($1, proc_t, proc_numa_t)
++')
++
++########################################
++## <summary>
++## Allow caller to write numa state information.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++##
++#
++interface(`kernel_write_numa_state',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type proc_t, proc_numa_t;
++ ')
++
++ write_files_pattern($1, { proc_t proc_numa_t }, proc_numa_t)
++')
++
++########################################
++## <summary>
++## Allow caller to search virtual memory overcommit sysctls.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`kernel_search_vm_overcommit_sysctl',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type sysctl_vm_overcommit_t;
++ ')
++
++ kernel_search_vm_sysctl($1)
++ search_dirs_pattern($1, sysctl_vm_overcommit_t, sysctl_vm_overcommit_t)
++')
++
++########################################
++## <summary>
++## Allow caller to read virtual memory overcommit sysctls.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++## <rolecap/>
++#
++interface(`kernel_read_vm_overcommit_sysctls',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type sysctl_vm_overcommit_t;
++ ')
++
++ kernel_search_vm_sysctl($1)
++ read_files_pattern($1, sysctl_vm_overcommit_t, sysctl_vm_overcommit_t)
++')
++
++########################################
++## <summary>
++## Read and write virtual memory overcommit sysctls.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++## <rolecap/>
++#
++interface(`kernel_rw_vm_overcommit_sysctls',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type sysctl_vm_overcommit_t;
++ ')
++
++ kernel_search_vm_sysctl($1)
++ rw_files_pattern($1, sysctl_vm_overcommit_t, sysctl_vm_overcommit_t)
++ list_dirs_pattern($1, sysctl_vm_overcommit_t, sysctl_vm_overcommit_t)
')
diff --git a/policy/modules/kernel/kernel.te b/policy/modules/kernel/kernel.te
-index ab9b6cd..0665979 100644
+index ab9b6cd..ccffb0f 100644
--- a/policy/modules/kernel/kernel.te
+++ b/policy/modules/kernel/kernel.te
-@@ -58,6 +58,8 @@ sid kernel gen_context(system_u:system_r:kernel_t,mls_systemhigh)
+@@ -25,6 +25,9 @@ attribute kern_unconfined;
+ # regular entries in proc
+ attribute proc_type;
+
++# attribute for domains which read proc_t
++attribute kernel_system_state_reader;
++
+ # sysctls
+ attribute sysctl_type;
+
+@@ -48,6 +51,7 @@ ifdef(`enable_mls',`
+ type kernel_t, can_load_kernmodule;
+ domain_base_type(kernel_t)
+ mls_rangetrans_source(kernel_t)
++mls_trusted_object(kernel_t)
+ role system_r types kernel_t;
+ sid kernel gen_context(system_u:system_r:kernel_t,mls_systemhigh)
+
+@@ -58,6 +62,8 @@ sid kernel gen_context(system_u:system_r:kernel_t,mls_systemhigh)
type debugfs_t;
files_mountpoint(debugfs_t)
fs_type(debugfs_t)
@@ -72204,7 +122287,29 @@ index ab9b6cd..0665979 100644
allow debugfs_t self:filesystem associate;
genfscon debugfs / gen_context(system_u:object_r:debugfs_t,s0)
-@@ -165,6 +167,7 @@ genfscon proc /sys/dev gen_context(system_u:object_r:sysctl_dev_t,s0)
+@@ -95,6 +101,10 @@ genfscon proc /kcore gen_context(system_u:object_r:proc_kcore_t,mls_systemhigh)
+ type proc_mdstat_t, proc_type;
+ genfscon proc /mdstat gen_context(system_u:object_r:proc_mdstat_t,s0)
+
++type proc_numa_t, proc_type;
++genfscon proc /numatools gen_context(system_u:object_r:proc_numa_t,s0)
++mls_trusted_object(proc_numa_t)
++
+ type proc_net_t, proc_type;
+ genfscon proc /net gen_context(system_u:object_r:proc_net_t,s0)
+
+@@ -153,6 +163,10 @@ genfscon proc /sys/net/unix gen_context(system_u:object_r:sysctl_net_unix_t,s0)
+ type sysctl_vm_t, sysctl_type;
+ genfscon proc /sys/vm gen_context(system_u:object_r:sysctl_vm_t,s0)
+
++# /proc/sys/vm/overcommit_memory
++type sysctl_vm_overcommit_t, sysctl_type;
++genfscon proc /sys/vm/overcommit_memory gen_context(system_u:object_r:sysctl_vm_overcommit_t,s0)
++
+ # /proc/sys/dev directory and files
+ type sysctl_dev_t, sysctl_type;
+ genfscon proc /sys/dev gen_context(system_u:object_r:sysctl_dev_t,s0)
+@@ -165,6 +179,7 @@ genfscon proc /sys/dev gen_context(system_u:object_r:sysctl_dev_t,s0)
type unlabeled_t;
fs_associate(unlabeled_t)
sid unlabeled gen_context(system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t,mls_systemhigh)
@@ -72212,7 +122317,7 @@ index ab9b6cd..0665979 100644
# These initial sids are no longer used, and can be removed:
sid any_socket gen_context(system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t,mls_systemhigh)
-@@ -233,7 +236,6 @@ allow unlabeled_t unlabeled_t:packet { forward_in forward_out };
+@@ -233,7 +248,6 @@ allow unlabeled_t unlabeled_t:packet { forward_in forward_out };
corenet_in_generic_if(unlabeled_t)
corenet_in_generic_node(unlabeled_t)
@@ -72220,7 +122325,7 @@ index ab9b6cd..0665979 100644
corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(kernel_t)
# Kernel-generated traffic e.g., ICMP replies:
corenet_raw_sendrecv_all_if(kernel_t)
-@@ -244,17 +246,21 @@ corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_if(kernel_t)
+@@ -244,17 +258,21 @@ corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_if(kernel_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_nodes(kernel_t)
corenet_raw_send_generic_node(kernel_t)
corenet_send_all_packets(kernel_t)
@@ -72246,7 +122351,7 @@ index ab9b6cd..0665979 100644
# Mount root file system. Used when loading a policy
# from initrd, then mounting the root filesystem
-@@ -263,7 +269,8 @@ fs_unmount_all_fs(kernel_t)
+@@ -263,7 +281,8 @@ fs_unmount_all_fs(kernel_t)
selinux_load_policy(kernel_t)
@@ -72256,7 +122361,7 @@ index ab9b6cd..0665979 100644
corecmd_exec_shell(kernel_t)
corecmd_list_bin(kernel_t)
-@@ -277,25 +284,47 @@ files_list_root(kernel_t)
+@@ -277,25 +296,48 @@ files_list_root(kernel_t)
files_list_etc(kernel_t)
files_list_home(kernel_t)
files_read_usr_files(kernel_t)
@@ -72275,6 +122380,7 @@ index ab9b6cd..0665979 100644
mls_file_read_all_levels(kernel_t)
+mls_socket_write_all_levels(kernel_t)
+mls_fd_share_all_levels(kernel_t)
++mls_fd_use_all_levels(kernel_t)
ifdef(`distro_redhat',`
# Bugzilla 222337
@@ -72304,7 +122410,7 @@ index ab9b6cd..0665979 100644
')
optional_policy(`
-@@ -305,6 +334,19 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -305,6 +347,19 @@ optional_policy(`
optional_policy(`
logging_send_syslog_msg(kernel_t)
@@ -72324,7 +122430,7 @@ index ab9b6cd..0665979 100644
')
optional_policy(`
-@@ -334,7 +376,6 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -334,7 +389,6 @@ optional_policy(`
rpc_manage_nfs_ro_content(kernel_t)
rpc_manage_nfs_rw_content(kernel_t)
@@ -72332,7 +122438,7 @@ index ab9b6cd..0665979 100644
rpc_udp_rw_nfs_sockets(kernel_t)
tunable_policy(`nfs_export_all_ro',`
-@@ -343,9 +384,7 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -343,9 +397,7 @@ optional_policy(`
fs_read_noxattr_fs_files(kernel_t)
fs_read_noxattr_fs_symlinks(kernel_t)
@@ -72343,7 +122449,7 @@ index ab9b6cd..0665979 100644
')
tunable_policy(`nfs_export_all_rw',`
-@@ -354,7 +393,7 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -354,7 +406,7 @@ optional_policy(`
fs_read_noxattr_fs_files(kernel_t)
fs_read_noxattr_fs_symlinks(kernel_t)
@@ -72352,7 +122458,7 @@ index ab9b6cd..0665979 100644
')
')
-@@ -367,6 +406,15 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -367,6 +419,15 @@ optional_policy(`
unconfined_domain_noaudit(kernel_t)
')
@@ -72368,7 +122474,7 @@ index ab9b6cd..0665979 100644
########################################
#
# Unlabeled process local policy
-@@ -409,4 +457,17 @@ allow kern_unconfined unlabeled_t:dir_file_class_set *;
+@@ -409,4 +470,26 @@ allow kern_unconfined unlabeled_t:dir_file_class_set *;
allow kern_unconfined unlabeled_t:filesystem *;
allow kern_unconfined unlabeled_t:association *;
allow kern_unconfined unlabeled_t:packet *;
@@ -72381,12 +122487,21 @@ index ab9b6cd..0665979 100644
+
+if( ! secure_mode_insmod ) {
+ allow can_load_kernmodule self:capability sys_module;
++ allow can_load_kernmodule self:capability2 compromise_kernel;
+ # load_module() calls stop_machine() which
+ # calls sched_setscheduler()
+ allow can_load_kernmodule self:capability sys_nice;
+ kernel_setsched(can_load_kernmodule)
+}
+
++#######################################
++#
++# Kernel system state reader policy
++#
++
++read_files_pattern(kernel_system_state_reader, proc_t, proc_t)
++read_lnk_files_pattern(kernel_system_state_reader, proc_t, proc_t)
++list_dirs_pattern(kernel_system_state_reader, proc_t, proc_t)
diff --git a/policy/modules/kernel/mcs.if b/policy/modules/kernel/mcs.if
index f52faaf..6bb6529 100644
--- a/policy/modules/kernel/mcs.if
@@ -72459,7 +122574,7 @@ index 7be4ddf..4d4c577 100644
-# This module currently does not have any file contexts.
+/selinux -l gen_context(system_u:object_r:security_t,s0)
diff --git a/policy/modules/kernel/selinux.if b/policy/modules/kernel/selinux.if
-index 81440c5..0383653 100644
+index 81440c5..a02d444 100644
--- a/policy/modules/kernel/selinux.if
+++ b/policy/modules/kernel/selinux.if
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ interface(`selinux_labeled_boolean',`
@@ -72471,16 +122586,17 @@ index 81440c5..0383653 100644
')
########################################
-@@ -58,6 +58,8 @@ interface(`selinux_get_fs_mount',`
+@@ -58,6 +58,9 @@ interface(`selinux_get_fs_mount',`
type security_t;
')
++ allow $1 security_t:lnk_file read_lnk_file_perms;
+ dev_getattr_sysfs_fs($1)
+ dev_search_sysfs($1)
# starting in libselinux 2.0.5, init_selinuxmnt() will
# attempt to short circuit by checking if SELINUXMNT
# (/selinux) is already a selinuxfs
-@@ -87,6 +89,7 @@ interface(`selinux_dontaudit_get_fs_mount',`
+@@ -87,6 +90,7 @@ interface(`selinux_dontaudit_get_fs_mount',`
# starting in libselinux 2.0.5, init_selinuxmnt() will
# attempt to short circuit by checking if SELINUXMNT
# (/selinux) is already a selinuxfs
@@ -72488,43 +122604,55 @@ index 81440c5..0383653 100644
dontaudit $1 security_t:filesystem getattr;
# read /proc/filesystems to see if selinuxfs is supported
-@@ -109,6 +112,8 @@ interface(`selinux_mount_fs',`
+@@ -109,6 +113,9 @@ interface(`selinux_mount_fs',`
type security_t;
')
+ dev_getattr_sysfs_fs($1)
+ dev_search_sysfs($1)
++ allow $1 security_t:lnk_file read_lnk_file_perms;
allow $1 security_t:filesystem mount;
')
-@@ -128,6 +133,8 @@ interface(`selinux_remount_fs',`
+@@ -128,6 +135,9 @@ interface(`selinux_remount_fs',`
type security_t;
')
+ dev_getattr_sysfs_fs($1)
+ dev_search_sysfs($1)
++ allow $1 security_t:lnk_file read_lnk_file_perms;
allow $1 security_t:filesystem remount;
')
-@@ -146,6 +153,8 @@ interface(`selinux_unmount_fs',`
+@@ -146,6 +156,9 @@ interface(`selinux_unmount_fs',`
type security_t;
')
+ dev_getattr_sysfs_fs($1)
+ dev_search_sysfs($1)
++ allow $1 security_t:lnk_file read_lnk_file_perms;
allow $1 security_t:filesystem unmount;
')
-@@ -220,6 +229,8 @@ interface(`selinux_search_fs',`
+@@ -164,6 +177,7 @@ interface(`selinux_getattr_fs',`
+ type security_t;
+ ')
+
++ allow $1 security_t:lnk_file read_lnk_file_perms;
+ allow $1 security_t:filesystem getattr;
+ ')
+
+@@ -220,6 +234,9 @@ interface(`selinux_search_fs',`
type security_t;
')
+ dev_getattr_sysfs_fs($1)
+ dev_search_sysfs($1)
++ allow $1 security_t:lnk_file read_lnk_file_perms;
allow $1 security_t:dir search_dir_perms;
')
-@@ -243,6 +254,27 @@ interface(`selinux_dontaudit_search_fs',`
+@@ -243,6 +260,28 @@ interface(`selinux_dontaudit_search_fs',`
########################################
## <summary>
@@ -72543,6 +122671,7 @@ index 81440c5..0383653 100644
+
+ dev_getattr_sysfs_fs($1)
+ dev_search_sysfs($1)
++ allow $1 security_t:lnk_file read_lnk_file_perms;
+ allow $1 security_t:dir mounton;
+')
+
@@ -72552,7 +122681,7 @@ index 81440c5..0383653 100644
## Do not audit attempts to read
## generic selinuxfs entries
## </summary>
-@@ -257,6 +289,7 @@ interface(`selinux_dontaudit_read_fs',`
+@@ -257,6 +296,7 @@ interface(`selinux_dontaudit_read_fs',`
type security_t;
')
@@ -72560,15 +122689,16 @@ index 81440c5..0383653 100644
dontaudit $1 security_t:dir search_dir_perms;
dontaudit $1 security_t:file read_file_perms;
')
-@@ -278,6 +311,7 @@ interface(`selinux_get_enforce_mode',`
+@@ -278,6 +318,8 @@ interface(`selinux_get_enforce_mode',`
type security_t;
')
+ selinux_get_fs_mount($1)
++ allow $1 security_t:lnk_file read_lnk_file_perms;
allow $1 security_t:dir list_dir_perms;
allow $1 security_t:file read_file_perms;
')
-@@ -308,21 +342,9 @@ interface(`selinux_set_enforce_mode',`
+@@ -308,21 +350,9 @@ interface(`selinux_set_enforce_mode',`
gen_require(`
type security_t;
attribute can_setenforce;
@@ -72590,7 +122720,7 @@ index 81440c5..0383653 100644
')
########################################
-@@ -339,21 +361,13 @@ interface(`selinux_load_policy',`
+@@ -339,21 +369,14 @@ interface(`selinux_load_policy',`
gen_require(`
type security_t;
attribute can_load_policy;
@@ -72599,6 +122729,7 @@ index 81440c5..0383653 100644
+ dev_getattr_sysfs_fs($1)
+ dev_search_sysfs($1)
++ allow $1 security_t:lnk_file read_lnk_file_perms;
allow $1 security_t:dir list_dir_perms;
allow $1 security_t:file rw_file_perms;
typeattribute $1 can_load_policy;
@@ -72614,16 +122745,17 @@ index 81440c5..0383653 100644
')
########################################
-@@ -371,6 +385,8 @@ interface(`selinux_read_policy',`
+@@ -371,6 +394,9 @@ interface(`selinux_read_policy',`
type security_t;
')
+ dev_getattr_sysfs_fs($1)
+ dev_search_sysfs($1)
++ allow $1 security_t:lnk_file read_lnk_file_perms;
allow $1 security_t:dir list_dir_perms;
allow $1 security_t:file read_file_perms;
allow $1 security_t:security read_policy;
-@@ -433,17 +449,15 @@ interface(`selinux_set_boolean',`
+@@ -433,17 +459,16 @@ interface(`selinux_set_boolean',`
interface(`selinux_set_generic_booleans',`
gen_require(`
type security_t;
@@ -72633,6 +122765,7 @@ index 81440c5..0383653 100644
+ typeattribute $1 can_setbool;
+ dev_getattr_sysfs_fs($1)
+ dev_search_sysfs($1)
++ allow $1 security_t:lnk_file read_lnk_file_perms;
allow $1 security_t:dir list_dir_perms;
allow $1 security_t:file rw_file_perms;
@@ -72645,7 +122778,7 @@ index 81440c5..0383653 100644
')
########################################
-@@ -472,23 +486,15 @@ interface(`selinux_set_all_booleans',`
+@@ -472,23 +497,16 @@ interface(`selinux_set_all_booleans',`
gen_require(`
type security_t, secure_mode_policyload_t;
attribute boolean_type;
@@ -72656,6 +122789,7 @@ index 81440c5..0383653 100644
+ typeattribute $1 can_setbool;
+ dev_getattr_sysfs_fs($1)
+ dev_search_sysfs($1)
++ allow $1 security_t:lnk_file read_lnk_file_perms;
allow $1 security_t:dir list_dir_perms;
- allow $1 { boolean_type -secure_mode_policyload_t }:file rw_file_perms;
- allow $1 secure_mode_policyload_t:file read_file_perms;
@@ -72675,70 +122809,77 @@ index 81440c5..0383653 100644
')
########################################
-@@ -519,6 +525,8 @@ interface(`selinux_set_parameters',`
+@@ -519,6 +537,9 @@ interface(`selinux_set_parameters',`
attribute can_setsecparam;
')
+ dev_getattr_sysfs_fs($1)
+ dev_search_sysfs($1)
++ allow $1 security_t:lnk_file read_lnk_file_perms;
allow $1 security_t:dir list_dir_perms;
allow $1 security_t:file rw_file_perms;
allow $1 security_t:security setsecparam;
-@@ -542,6 +550,8 @@ interface(`selinux_validate_context',`
+@@ -542,6 +563,9 @@ interface(`selinux_validate_context',`
type security_t;
')
+ dev_getattr_sysfs_fs($1)
+ dev_search_sysfs($1)
++ allow $1 security_t:lnk_file read_lnk_file_perms;
allow $1 security_t:dir list_dir_perms;
allow $1 security_t:file rw_file_perms;
allow $1 security_t:security check_context;
-@@ -584,6 +594,8 @@ interface(`selinux_compute_access_vector',`
+@@ -584,6 +608,9 @@ interface(`selinux_compute_access_vector',`
type security_t;
')
+ dev_getattr_sysfs_fs($1)
+ dev_search_sysfs($1)
++ allow $1 security_t:lnk_file read_lnk_file_perms;
allow $1 security_t:dir list_dir_perms;
allow $1 security_t:file rw_file_perms;
allow $1 security_t:security compute_av;
-@@ -605,6 +617,8 @@ interface(`selinux_compute_create_context',`
+@@ -605,6 +632,9 @@ interface(`selinux_compute_create_context',`
type security_t;
')
+ dev_getattr_sysfs_fs($1)
+ dev_search_sysfs($1)
++ allow $1 security_t:lnk_file read_lnk_file_perms;
allow $1 security_t:dir list_dir_perms;
allow $1 security_t:file rw_file_perms;
allow $1 security_t:security compute_create;
-@@ -626,6 +640,8 @@ interface(`selinux_compute_member',`
+@@ -626,6 +656,9 @@ interface(`selinux_compute_member',`
type security_t;
')
+ dev_getattr_sysfs_fs($1)
+ dev_search_sysfs($1)
++ allow $1 security_t:lnk_file read_lnk_file_perms;
allow $1 security_t:dir list_dir_perms;
allow $1 security_t:file rw_file_perms;
allow $1 security_t:security compute_member;
-@@ -655,6 +671,8 @@ interface(`selinux_compute_relabel_context',`
+@@ -655,6 +688,9 @@ interface(`selinux_compute_relabel_context',`
type security_t;
')
+ dev_getattr_sysfs_fs($1)
+ dev_search_sysfs($1)
++ allow $1 security_t:lnk_file read_lnk_file_perms;
allow $1 security_t:dir list_dir_perms;
allow $1 security_t:file rw_file_perms;
allow $1 security_t:security compute_relabel;
-@@ -675,6 +693,8 @@ interface(`selinux_compute_user_contexts',`
+@@ -675,6 +711,9 @@ interface(`selinux_compute_user_contexts',`
type security_t;
')
+ dev_getattr_sysfs_fs($1)
+ dev_search_sysfs($1)
++ allow $1 security_t:lnk_file read_lnk_file_perms;
allow $1 security_t:dir list_dir_perms;
allow $1 security_t:file rw_file_perms;
allow $1 security_t:security compute_user;
-@@ -696,4 +716,29 @@ interface(`selinux_unconfined',`
+@@ -696,4 +735,29 @@ interface(`selinux_unconfined',`
')
typeattribute $1 selinux_unconfined_type;
@@ -72832,7 +122973,7 @@ index 522ab32..443f4a0 100644
')
}
diff --git a/policy/modules/kernel/storage.fc b/policy/modules/kernel/storage.fc
-index 54f1827..9784cf6 100644
+index 54f1827..a2d5eaa 100644
--- a/policy/modules/kernel/storage.fc
+++ b/policy/modules/kernel/storage.fc
@@ -28,7 +28,8 @@
@@ -72845,6 +122986,15 @@ index 54f1827..9784cf6 100644
/dev/mmcblk.* -b gen_context(system_u:object_r:removable_device_t,s0)
/dev/mspblk.* -b gen_context(system_u:object_r:removable_device_t,s0)
/dev/mtd.* -b gen_context(system_u:object_r:fixed_disk_device_t,mls_systemhigh)
+@@ -51,7 +52,7 @@ ifdef(`distro_redhat', `
+ /dev/sjcd -b gen_context(system_u:object_r:removable_device_t,s0)
+ /dev/sonycd -b gen_context(system_u:object_r:removable_device_t,s0)
+ /dev/tape.* -c gen_context(system_u:object_r:tape_device_t,s0)
+-/dev/tw[a-z][^/]+ -c gen_context(system_u:object_r:fixed_disk_device_t,mls_systemhigh)
++/dev/tw[a-z][^/]* -c gen_context(system_u:object_r:fixed_disk_device_t,mls_systemhigh)
+ /dev/ub[a-z][^/]+ -b gen_context(system_u:object_r:removable_device_t,mls_systemhigh)
+ /dev/ubd[^/]* -b gen_context(system_u:object_r:fixed_disk_device_t,mls_systemhigh)
+ /dev/vd[^/]* -b gen_context(system_u:object_r:fixed_disk_device_t,mls_systemhigh)
@@ -81,3 +82,6 @@ ifdef(`distro_redhat', `
/lib/udev/devices/loop.* -b gen_context(system_u:object_r:fixed_disk_device_t,mls_systemhigh)
@@ -72853,10 +123003,37 @@ index 54f1827..9784cf6 100644
+/usr/lib/udev/devices/loop.* -b gen_context(system_u:object_r:fixed_disk_device_t,mls_systemhigh)
+/usr/lib/udev/devices/fuse -c gen_context(system_u:object_r:fuse_device_t,s0)
diff --git a/policy/modules/kernel/storage.if b/policy/modules/kernel/storage.if
-index 1700ef2..9282b84 100644
+index 1700ef2..6fb69e7 100644
--- a/policy/modules/kernel/storage.if
+++ b/policy/modules/kernel/storage.if
-@@ -101,6 +101,8 @@ interface(`storage_raw_read_fixed_disk',`
+@@ -22,6 +22,26 @@ interface(`storage_getattr_fixed_disk_dev',`
+
+ ########################################
+ ## <summary>
++## Allow the caller to read/write inherited fixed disk
++## device nodes.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## The domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`storage_rw_inherited_fixed_disk_dev',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type fixed_disk_device_t;
++ ')
++
++ allow $1 fixed_disk_device_t:chr_file { read write };
++ allow $1 fixed_disk_device_t:blk_file { read write };
++')
++
++########################################
++## <summary>
+ ## Do not audit attempts made by the caller to get
+ ## the attributes of fixed disk device nodes.
+ ## </summary>
+@@ -101,6 +121,8 @@ interface(`storage_raw_read_fixed_disk',`
dev_list_all_dev_nodes($1)
allow $1 fixed_disk_device_t:blk_file read_blk_file_perms;
allow $1 fixed_disk_device_t:chr_file read_chr_file_perms;
@@ -72865,7 +123042,7 @@ index 1700ef2..9282b84 100644
typeattribute $1 fixed_disk_raw_read;
')
-@@ -205,6 +207,7 @@ interface(`storage_create_fixed_disk_dev',`
+@@ -205,6 +227,7 @@ interface(`storage_create_fixed_disk_dev',`
allow $1 self:capability mknod;
allow $1 fixed_disk_device_t:blk_file create_blk_file_perms;
@@ -72873,7 +123050,7 @@ index 1700ef2..9282b84 100644
dev_add_entry_generic_dirs($1)
')
-@@ -269,6 +272,48 @@ interface(`storage_dev_filetrans_fixed_disk',`
+@@ -269,6 +292,48 @@ interface(`storage_dev_filetrans_fixed_disk',`
dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file)
')
@@ -72922,7 +123099,32 @@ index 1700ef2..9282b84 100644
########################################
## <summary>
## Create block devices in on a tmpfs filesystem with the
-@@ -808,3 +853,369 @@ interface(`storage_unconfined',`
+@@ -711,6 +776,24 @@ interface(`storage_dontaudit_raw_write_removable_device',`
+ dontaudit $1 removable_device_t:blk_file write_blk_file_perms;
+ ')
+
++#######################################
++## <summary>
++## Alow read and write inherited removable devices.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain to not audit.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`storage_rw_inherited_removable_device',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type removable_device_t;
++ ')
++
++ dontaudit $1 removable_device_t:blk_file { read write };
++')
++
+ ########################################
+ ## <summary>
+ ## Allow the caller to directly read
+@@ -808,3 +891,369 @@ interface(`storage_unconfined',`
typeattribute $1 storage_unconfined_type;
')
@@ -73319,7 +123521,7 @@ index 7d45d15..22c9cfe 100644
+
+/usr/lib/udev/devices/pts -d gen_context(system_u:object_r:devpts_t,s0-mls_systemhigh)
diff --git a/policy/modules/kernel/terminal.if b/policy/modules/kernel/terminal.if
-index 01dd2f1..dfeffc7 100644
+index 01dd2f1..3541088 100644
--- a/policy/modules/kernel/terminal.if
+++ b/policy/modules/kernel/terminal.if
@@ -124,7 +124,7 @@ interface(`term_user_tty',`
@@ -73431,6 +123633,15 @@ index 01dd2f1..dfeffc7 100644
## Do not audit attempts to read the
## /dev/pts directory.
## </summary>
+@@ -601,7 +660,7 @@ interface(`term_use_generic_ptys',`
+
+ ########################################
+ ## <summary>
+-## Dot not audit attempts to read and
++## Do not audit attempts to read and
+ ## write the generic pty type. This is
+ ## generally only used in the targeted policy.
+ ## </summary>
@@ -616,6 +675,7 @@ interface(`term_dontaudit_use_generic_ptys',`
type devpts_t;
')
@@ -73493,7 +123704,7 @@ index 01dd2f1..dfeffc7 100644
## </summary>
## </param>
#
-@@ -1240,7 +1320,28 @@ interface(`term_dontaudit_use_unallocated_ttys',`
+@@ -1240,7 +1320,47 @@ interface(`term_dontaudit_use_unallocated_ttys',`
type tty_device_t;
')
@@ -73520,10 +123731,29 @@ index 01dd2f1..dfeffc7 100644
+
+ dev_list_all_dev_nodes($1)
+ allow $1 usbtty_device_t:chr_file rw_chr_file_perms;
++')
++
++#######################################
++## <summary>
++## Setattr on USB tty character
++## device nodes.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`term_setattr_usb_ttys',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type usbtty_device_t;
++ ')
++
++ allow $1 usbtty_device_t:chr_file setattr;
')
########################################
-@@ -1256,11 +1357,13 @@ interface(`term_dontaudit_use_unallocated_ttys',`
+@@ -1256,11 +1376,13 @@ interface(`term_dontaudit_use_unallocated_ttys',`
#
interface(`term_getattr_all_ttys',`
gen_require(`
@@ -73537,7 +123767,7 @@ index 01dd2f1..dfeffc7 100644
')
########################################
-@@ -1277,10 +1380,12 @@ interface(`term_getattr_all_ttys',`
+@@ -1277,10 +1399,12 @@ interface(`term_getattr_all_ttys',`
interface(`term_dontaudit_getattr_all_ttys',`
gen_require(`
attribute ttynode;
@@ -73550,7 +123780,7 @@ index 01dd2f1..dfeffc7 100644
')
########################################
-@@ -1358,7 +1463,27 @@ interface(`term_use_all_ttys',`
+@@ -1358,7 +1482,27 @@ interface(`term_use_all_ttys',`
')
dev_list_all_dev_nodes($1)
@@ -73579,7 +123809,7 @@ index 01dd2f1..dfeffc7 100644
')
########################################
-@@ -1377,7 +1502,7 @@ interface(`term_dontaudit_use_all_ttys',`
+@@ -1377,7 +1521,7 @@ interface(`term_dontaudit_use_all_ttys',`
attribute ttynode;
')
@@ -73588,7 +123818,7 @@ index 01dd2f1..dfeffc7 100644
')
########################################
-@@ -1485,7 +1610,7 @@ interface(`term_use_all_user_ttys',`
+@@ -1485,7 +1629,7 @@ interface(`term_use_all_user_ttys',`
## </summary>
## <param name="domain">
## <summary>
@@ -73597,7 +123827,7 @@ index 01dd2f1..dfeffc7 100644
## </summary>
## </param>
#
-@@ -1493,3 +1618,426 @@ interface(`term_dontaudit_use_all_user_ttys',`
+@@ -1493,3 +1637,436 @@ interface(`term_dontaudit_use_all_user_ttys',`
refpolicywarn(`$0() is deprecated, use term_dontaudit_use_all_ttys() instead.')
term_dontaudit_use_all_ttys($1)
')
@@ -73972,6 +124202,16 @@ index 01dd2f1..dfeffc7 100644
+ dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "slamr7")
+ dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "slamr8")
+ dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "slamr9")
++ dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "ttyACM0")
++ dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "ttyACM1")
++ dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "ttyACM2")
++ dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "ttyACM3")
++ dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "ttyACM4")
++ dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "ttyACM5")
++ dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "ttyACM6")
++ dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "ttyACM7")
++ dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "ttyACM8")
++ dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "ttyACM9")
+ dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "ttyS0")
+ dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "ttyS1")
+ dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "ttyS2")
@@ -74025,7 +124265,7 @@ index 01dd2f1..dfeffc7 100644
+ dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "xvc9")
+')
diff --git a/policy/modules/kernel/terminal.te b/policy/modules/kernel/terminal.te
-index 9d64659..31b2165 100644
+index 9d64659..f85e86f 100644
--- a/policy/modules/kernel/terminal.te
+++ b/policy/modules/kernel/terminal.te
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ files_mountpoint(devpts_t)
@@ -74036,10 +124276,14 @@ index 9d64659..31b2165 100644
#
# devtty_t is the type of /dev/tty.
-@@ -56,3 +57,9 @@ dev_node(tty_device_t)
+@@ -54,5 +55,11 @@ dev_node(tty_device_t)
#
- type usbtty_device_t, serial_device;
- dev_node(usbtty_device_t)
+ # usbtty_device_t is the type of /dev/usr/tty*
+ #
+-type usbtty_device_t, serial_device;
+-dev_node(usbtty_device_t)
++type usbtty_device_t;
++term_tty(usbtty_device_t)
+
+#
+# virtio_device_t is the type of /dev/vport[0-9]p[0-9]
@@ -74062,11 +124306,11 @@ index 0000000..0ce0470
+## <summary> Policy for allowing confined domains to use unlabeled_t packets</summary>
diff --git a/policy/modules/kernel/unlabelednet.te b/policy/modules/kernel/unlabelednet.te
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..e1ebd1a
+index 0000000..64b5db7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/policy/modules/kernel/unlabelednet.te
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
-+policy_module(unlabelednet, 1.0)
++policy_module(unlabelednet, 1.0.0)
+
+corenet_enable_unlabeled_packets()
diff --git a/policy/modules/roles/auditadm.te b/policy/modules/roles/auditadm.te
@@ -74141,10 +124385,10 @@ index 234a940..d340f20 100644
########################################
## <summary>
diff --git a/policy/modules/roles/staff.te b/policy/modules/roles/staff.te
-index e5aee97..681001d 100644
+index e5aee97..2699a70 100644
--- a/policy/modules/roles/staff.te
+++ b/policy/modules/roles/staff.te
-@@ -8,12 +8,64 @@ policy_module(staff, 2.3.0)
+@@ -8,12 +8,67 @@ policy_module(staff, 2.3.0)
role staff_r;
userdom_unpriv_user_template(staff)
@@ -74167,10 +124411,13 @@ index e5aee97..681001d 100644
+kernel_getattr_message_if(staff_t)
+kernel_read_software_raid_state(staff_t)
+kernel_read_fs_sysctls(staff_t)
++kernel_read_numa_state(staff_t)
++kernel_write_numa_state(staff_t)
+
+fs_read_hugetlbfs_files(staff_t)
+
+dev_read_cpuid(staff_t)
++dev_read_kmsg(staff_t)
+
+domain_read_all_domains_state(staff_t)
+domain_getattr_all_domains(staff_t)
@@ -74209,7 +124456,7 @@ index e5aee97..681001d 100644
optional_policy(`
apache_role(staff_r, staff_t)
')
-@@ -23,11 +75,98 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -23,11 +78,106 @@ optional_policy(`
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -74217,6 +124464,10 @@ index e5aee97..681001d 100644
+')
+
+optional_policy(`
++ kdumpgui_dbus_chat(staff_t)
++')
++
++optional_policy(`
+ bluetooth_role(staff_r, staff_t)
+')
+
@@ -74238,6 +124489,10 @@ index e5aee97..681001d 100644
+')
+
+optional_policy(`
++ dmesg_exec(staff_t)
++')
++
++optional_policy(`
+ gnomeclock_dbus_chat(staff_t)
+')
+
@@ -74309,7 +124564,7 @@ index e5aee97..681001d 100644
')
optional_policy(`
-@@ -35,15 +174,27 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -35,15 +185,31 @@ optional_policy(`
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -74335,11 +124590,15 @@ index e5aee97..681001d 100644
optional_policy(`
- sudo_role_template(staff, staff_r, staff_t)
++ sandbox_x_transition(staff_t, staff_r)
++')
++
++optional_policy(`
+ screen_role_template(staff, staff_r, staff_t)
')
optional_policy(`
-@@ -52,10 +203,59 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -52,10 +218,59 @@ optional_policy(`
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -74399,7 +124658,7 @@ index e5aee97..681001d 100644
xserver_role(staff_r, staff_t)
')
-@@ -65,10 +265,6 @@ ifndef(`distro_redhat',`
+@@ -65,10 +280,6 @@ ifndef(`distro_redhat',`
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -74410,7 +124669,7 @@ index e5aee97..681001d 100644
cdrecord_role(staff_r, staff_t)
')
-@@ -93,18 +289,10 @@ ifndef(`distro_redhat',`
+@@ -93,18 +304,10 @@ ifndef(`distro_redhat',`
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -74429,7 +124688,7 @@ index e5aee97..681001d 100644
java_role(staff_r, staff_t)
')
-@@ -125,10 +313,6 @@ ifndef(`distro_redhat',`
+@@ -125,10 +328,6 @@ ifndef(`distro_redhat',`
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -74440,7 +124699,7 @@ index e5aee97..681001d 100644
pyzor_role(staff_r, staff_t)
')
-@@ -141,10 +325,6 @@ ifndef(`distro_redhat',`
+@@ -141,10 +340,6 @@ ifndef(`distro_redhat',`
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -74451,7 +124710,7 @@ index e5aee97..681001d 100644
spamassassin_role(staff_r, staff_t)
')
-@@ -176,3 +356,15 @@ ifndef(`distro_redhat',`
+@@ -176,3 +371,20 @@ ifndef(`distro_redhat',`
wireshark_role(staff_r, staff_t)
')
')
@@ -74460,12 +124719,17 @@ index e5aee97..681001d 100644
+ userdom_execmod_user_home_files(staff_t)
+')
+
-+virt_transition_svirt(staff_t, staff_r)
-+virt_filetrans_home_content(staff_t)
-+tunable_policy(`staff_use_svirt',`
-+ allow staff_t self:fifo_file relabelfrom;
-+ dev_rw_kvm(staff_t)
-+ virt_manage_images(staff_t)
++optional_policy(`
++ virt_transition_svirt(staff_t, staff_r)
++ virt_filetrans_home_content(staff_t)
++')
++
++optional_policy(`
++ tunable_policy(`staff_use_svirt',`
++ allow staff_t self:fifo_file relabelfrom;
++ dev_rw_kvm(staff_t)
++ virt_manage_images(staff_t)
++ ')
+')
diff --git a/policy/modules/roles/sysadm.if b/policy/modules/roles/sysadm.if
index ff92430..36740ea 100644
@@ -75056,10 +125320,10 @@ index 0000000..bd83148
+## <summary>No Interfaces</summary>
diff --git a/policy/modules/roles/sysadm_secadm.te b/policy/modules/roles/sysadm_secadm.te
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..e45e8b0
+index 0000000..63bc797
--- /dev/null
+++ b/policy/modules/roles/sysadm_secadm.te
-@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+policy_module(sysadm_secadm, 1.0.0)
+
+########################################
@@ -75079,6 +125343,8 @@ index 0000000..e45e8b0
+# Local policy
+#
+
++mls_file_write_all_levels(sysadm_t)
++
+logging_manage_audit_log(sysadm_t)
+logging_manage_audit_config(sysadm_t)
+logging_run_auditctl(sysadm_t, sysadm_r)
@@ -75700,10 +125966,10 @@ index 0000000..bac0dc0
+
diff --git a/policy/modules/roles/unconfineduser.te b/policy/modules/roles/unconfineduser.te
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..35fc04a
+index 0000000..d609f53
--- /dev/null
+++ b/policy/modules/roles/unconfineduser.te
-@@ -0,0 +1,376 @@
+@@ -0,0 +1,387 @@
+policy_module(unconfineduser, 1.0.0)
+
+########################################
@@ -75747,7 +126013,7 @@ index 0000000..35fc04a
+userdom_manage_home_role(unconfined_r, unconfined_t)
+userdom_manage_tmp_role(unconfined_r, unconfined_t)
+userdom_manage_tmpfs_role(unconfined_r, unconfined_t)
-+userdom_unpriv_type(unconfined_r, unconfined_t)
++userdom_unpriv_type(unconfined_t)
+
+type unconfined_exec_t;
+init_system_domain(unconfined_t, unconfined_exec_t)
@@ -75801,7 +126067,6 @@ index 0000000..35fc04a
+unconfined_domain_noaudit(unconfined_t)
+
+usermanage_run_passwd(unconfined_t, unconfined_r)
-+usermanage_run_chfn(unconfined_t, unconfined_r)
+
+tunable_policy(`deny_execmem',`',`
+ allow unconfined_t self:process execmem;
@@ -75881,6 +126146,10 @@ index 0000000..35fc04a
+ ')
+
+ optional_policy(`
++ sandbox_x_transition(unconfined_t, unconfined_r)
++ ')
++
++ optional_policy(`
+ shutdown_run(unconfined_t, unconfined_r)
+ ')
+
@@ -75992,6 +126261,10 @@ index 0000000..35fc04a
+')
+
+optional_policy(`
++ fsadm_manage_pid(unconfined_t)
++')
++
++optional_policy(`
+ ftp_run_ftpdctl(unconfined_t, unconfined_r)
+')
+
@@ -76058,6 +126331,10 @@ index 0000000..35fc04a
+')
+
+optional_policy(`
++ openshift_run(unconfined_usertype, unconfined_r)
++')
++
++optional_policy(`
+ usermanage_run_useradd(unconfined_t, unconfined_r)
+')
+
@@ -76091,7 +126368,7 @@ index 3835596..fbca2be 100644
########################################
## <summary>
diff --git a/policy/modules/roles/unprivuser.te b/policy/modules/roles/unprivuser.te
-index 9f6d4c3..7852ae3 100644
+index 9f6d4c3..23a78b4 100644
--- a/policy/modules/roles/unprivuser.te
+++ b/policy/modules/roles/unprivuser.te
@@ -1,5 +1,12 @@
@@ -76107,10 +126384,13 @@ index 9f6d4c3..7852ae3 100644
# this module should be named user, but that is
# a compile error since user is a keyword.
-@@ -12,12 +19,90 @@ role user_r;
+@@ -12,12 +19,97 @@ role user_r;
userdom_unpriv_user_template(user)
++kernel_read_numa_state(user_t)
++kernel_write_numa_state(user_t)
++
+fs_exec_noxattr(user_t)
+fs_read_hugetlbfs_files(user_t)
+
@@ -76191,6 +126471,10 @@ index 9f6d4c3..7852ae3 100644
+')
+
+optional_policy(`
++ sandbox_x_transition(user_t, user_r)
++')
++
++optional_policy(`
+ ssh_role_template(user, user_r, user_t)
+')
+
@@ -76199,7 +126483,7 @@ index 9f6d4c3..7852ae3 100644
')
optional_policy(`
-@@ -25,6 +110,18 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -25,6 +117,18 @@ optional_policy(`
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -76218,7 +126502,7 @@ index 9f6d4c3..7852ae3 100644
vlock_run(user_t, user_r)
')
-@@ -66,10 +163,6 @@ ifndef(`distro_redhat',`
+@@ -66,10 +170,6 @@ ifndef(`distro_redhat',`
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -76229,7 +126513,7 @@ index 9f6d4c3..7852ae3 100644
gpg_role(user_r, user_t)
')
-@@ -102,10 +195,6 @@ ifndef(`distro_redhat',`
+@@ -102,10 +202,6 @@ ifndef(`distro_redhat',`
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -76240,7 +126524,7 @@ index 9f6d4c3..7852ae3 100644
postgresql_role(user_r, user_t)
')
-@@ -128,7 +217,6 @@ ifndef(`distro_redhat',`
+@@ -128,7 +224,6 @@ ifndef(`distro_redhat',`
optional_policy(`
ssh_role_template(user, user_r, user_t)
')
@@ -76248,22 +126532,35 @@ index 9f6d4c3..7852ae3 100644
optional_policy(`
su_role_template(user, user_r, user_t)
')
-@@ -161,3 +249,10 @@ ifndef(`distro_redhat',`
+@@ -161,3 +256,15 @@ ifndef(`distro_redhat',`
wireshark_role(user_r, user_t)
')
')
+
+
-+virt_transition_svirt(user_t, user_r)
-+virt_filetrans_home_content(user_t)
-+tunable_policy(`unprivuser_use_svirt',`
-+ virt_manage_images(user_t)
++optional_policy(`
++ virt_transition_svirt(user_t, user_r)
++ virt_filetrans_home_content(user_t)
++')
++
++optional_policy(`
++ tunable_policy(`unprivuser_use_svirt',`
++ virt_manage_images(user_t)
++ ')
+')
diff --git a/policy/modules/services/postgresql.fc b/policy/modules/services/postgresql.fc
-index a26f84f..4e52843 100644
+index a26f84f..d3cc612 100644
--- a/policy/modules/services/postgresql.fc
+++ b/policy/modules/services/postgresql.fc
-@@ -28,9 +28,9 @@ ifdef(`distro_redhat', `
+@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
+ #
+ /usr/bin/initdb(\.sepgsql)? -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:postgresql_exec_t,s0)
+ /usr/bin/(se)?postgres -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:postgresql_exec_t,s0)
++/usr/bin/pg_ctl -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:postgresql_exec_t,s0)
+
+ /usr/lib/pgsql/test/regress(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:postgresql_db_t,s0)
+ /usr/lib/pgsql/test/regress/pg_regress -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:postgresql_exec_t,s0)
+@@ -28,9 +29,9 @@ ifdef(`distro_redhat', `
#
/var/lib/postgres(ql)?(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:postgresql_db_t,s0)
@@ -76275,7 +126572,7 @@ index a26f84f..4e52843 100644
/var/lib/sepgsql(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:postgresql_db_t,s0)
/var/lib/sepgsql/pgstartup\.log -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:postgresql_log_t,s0)
-@@ -45,4 +45,4 @@ ifdef(`distro_redhat', `
+@@ -45,4 +46,4 @@ ifdef(`distro_redhat', `
/var/run/postgresql(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:postgresql_var_run_t,s0)
@@ -76458,10 +126755,10 @@ index ecef19f..fcbc25a 100644
postgresql_tcp_connect($1)
diff --git a/policy/modules/services/postgresql.te b/policy/modules/services/postgresql.te
-index 4318f73..90f98a2 100644
+index 4318f73..e4d0b31 100644
--- a/policy/modules/services/postgresql.te
+++ b/policy/modules/services/postgresql.te
-@@ -19,9 +19,9 @@ gen_require(`
+@@ -19,25 +19,32 @@ gen_require(`
#
## <desc>
@@ -76469,21 +126766,51 @@ index 4318f73..90f98a2 100644
-## Allow unprived users to execute DDL statement
-## </p>
+## <p>
++## Allow postgresql to use ssh and rsync for point-in-time recovery
++## </p>
++## </desc>
++gen_tunable(postgresql_can_rsync, false)
++
++## <desc>
++## <p>
+## Allow unprivileged users to execute DDL statement
+## </p>
## </desc>
- gen_tunable(sepgsql_enable_users_ddl, true)
+-gen_tunable(sepgsql_enable_users_ddl, true)
++gen_tunable(postgresql_selinux_users_ddl, true)
-@@ -233,7 +233,7 @@ allow postgresql_t self:shm create_shm_perms;
+ ## <desc>
+ ## <p>
+ ## Allow transmit client label to foreign database
+ ## </p>
+ ## </desc>
+-gen_tunable(sepgsql_transmit_client_label, false)
++gen_tunable(postgresql_selinux_transmit_client_label, false)
+
+ ## <desc>
+ ## <p>
+ ## Allow database admins to execute DML statement
+ ## </p>
+ ## </desc>
+-gen_tunable(sepgsql_unconfined_dbadm, true)
++gen_tunable(postgresql_selinux_unconfined_dbadm, true)
+
+ type postgresql_t;
+ type postgresql_exec_t;
+@@ -233,9 +240,10 @@ allow postgresql_t self:shm create_shm_perms;
allow postgresql_t self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
allow postgresql_t self:udp_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
allow postgresql_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms;
-allow postgresql_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
+allow postgresql_t self:unix_stream_socket { connectto create_stream_socket_perms };
allow postgresql_t self:netlink_selinux_socket create_socket_perms;
- tunable_policy(`sepgsql_transmit_client_label',`
+-tunable_policy(`sepgsql_transmit_client_label',`
++
++tunable_policy(`postgresql_selinux_transmit_client_label',`
allow postgresql_t self:process { setsockcreate };
-@@ -275,7 +275,7 @@ allow postgresql_t postgresql_etc_t:dir list_dir_perms;
+ ')
+
+@@ -275,7 +283,7 @@ allow postgresql_t postgresql_etc_t:dir list_dir_perms;
read_files_pattern(postgresql_t, postgresql_etc_t, postgresql_etc_t)
read_lnk_files_pattern(postgresql_t, postgresql_etc_t, postgresql_etc_t)
@@ -76492,7 +126819,7 @@ index 4318f73..90f98a2 100644
can_exec(postgresql_t, postgresql_exec_t )
allow postgresql_t postgresql_lock_t:file manage_file_perms;
-@@ -303,7 +303,6 @@ kernel_list_proc(postgresql_t)
+@@ -303,7 +311,6 @@ kernel_list_proc(postgresql_t)
kernel_read_all_sysctls(postgresql_t)
kernel_read_proc_symlinks(postgresql_t)
@@ -76500,7 +126827,7 @@ index 4318f73..90f98a2 100644
corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(postgresql_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(postgresql_t)
corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if(postgresql_t)
-@@ -341,8 +340,7 @@ domain_dontaudit_list_all_domains_state(postgresql_t)
+@@ -341,8 +348,7 @@ domain_dontaudit_list_all_domains_state(postgresql_t)
domain_use_interactive_fds(postgresql_t)
files_dontaudit_search_home(postgresql_t)
@@ -76510,7 +126837,15 @@ index 4318f73..90f98a2 100644
files_read_etc_runtime_files(postgresql_t)
files_read_usr_files(postgresql_t)
-@@ -366,7 +364,7 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -353,7 +359,6 @@ init_read_utmp(postgresql_t)
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(postgresql_t)
+ logging_send_audit_msgs(postgresql_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(postgresql_t)
+
+ seutil_libselinux_linked(postgresql_t)
+ seutil_read_default_contexts(postgresql_t)
+@@ -366,7 +371,7 @@ optional_policy(`
mta_getattr_spool(postgresql_t)
')
@@ -76519,11 +126854,47 @@ index 4318f73..90f98a2 100644
allow postgresql_t self:process execmem;
')
+@@ -487,7 +492,7 @@ allow sepgsql_client_type sepgsql_temp_object_t:{db_schema db_table db_column db
+ # Note that permission of creation/deletion are eventually controlled by
+ # create or drop permission of individual objects within shared schemas.
+ # So, it just allows to create/drop user specific types.
+-tunable_policy(`sepgsql_enable_users_ddl',`
++tunable_policy(`postgresql_selinux_users_ddl',`
+ allow sepgsql_client_type sepgsql_schema_t:db_schema { add_name remove_name };
+ ')
+
+@@ -535,7 +540,7 @@ allow sepgsql_admin_type sepgsql_module_type:db_database install_module;
+
+ kernel_relabelfrom_unlabeled_database(sepgsql_admin_type)
+
+-tunable_policy(`sepgsql_unconfined_dbadm',`
++tunable_policy(`postgresql_selinux_unconfined_dbadm',`
+ allow sepgsql_admin_type sepgsql_database_type:db_database *;
+
+ allow sepgsql_admin_type sepgsql_schema_type:db_schema *;
+@@ -588,3 +593,17 @@ allow sepgsql_unconfined_type sepgsql_blob_type:db_blob *;
+ allow sepgsql_unconfined_type sepgsql_module_type:db_database install_module;
+
+ kernel_relabelfrom_unlabeled_database(sepgsql_unconfined_type)
++
++optional_policy(`
++ tunable_policy(`postgresql_can_rsync',`
++ rsync_exec(postgresql_t)
++ ')
++')
++
++optional_policy(`
++ tunable_policy(`postgresql_can_rsync',`
++ ssh_exec(postgresql_t)
++ ssh_read_user_home_files(postgresql_t)
++ corenet_tcp_connect_ssh_port(postgresql_t)
++ ')
++')
diff --git a/policy/modules/services/ssh.fc b/policy/modules/services/ssh.fc
-index 078bcd7..8ed5b99 100644
+index 078bcd7..022c7db 100644
--- a/policy/modules/services/ssh.fc
+++ b/policy/modules/services/ssh.fc
-@@ -1,9 +1,20 @@
+@@ -1,9 +1,23 @@
HOME_DIR/\.ssh(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:ssh_home_t,s0)
+HOME_DIR/\.shosts gen_context(system_u:object_r:ssh_home_t,s0)
+
@@ -76531,6 +126902,9 @@ index 078bcd7..8ed5b99 100644
+/var/lib/gitolite/\.ssh(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:ssh_home_t,s0)
+/var/lib/gitolite3/\.ssh(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:ssh_home_t,s0)
+/var/lib/nocpulse/\.ssh(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:ssh_home_t,s0)
++/var/lib/stickshift/[^/]+/\.ssh(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:ssh_home_t,s0)
++/var/lib/openshift/[^/]+/\.ssh(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:ssh_home_t,s0)
++/var/lib/pgsql/\.ssh(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:ssh_home_t,s0)
+
+/etc/rc\.d/init\.d/sshd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:sshd_initrc_exec_t,s0)
@@ -76544,8 +126918,11 @@ index 078bcd7..8ed5b99 100644
/usr/bin/ssh -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:ssh_exec_t,s0)
/usr/bin/ssh-agent -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:ssh_agent_exec_t,s0)
-@@ -14,3 +25,7 @@ HOME_DIR/\.ssh(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:ssh_home_t,s0)
+@@ -12,5 +26,10 @@ HOME_DIR/\.ssh(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:ssh_home_t,s0)
+ /usr/libexec/openssh/ssh-keysign -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:ssh_keysign_exec_t,s0)
+
/usr/sbin/sshd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:sshd_exec_t,s0)
++/usr/sbin/gsisshd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:sshd_exec_t,s0)
/var/run/sshd\.init\.pid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:sshd_var_run_t,s0)
+/var/run/sshd\.pid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:sshd_var_run_t,s0)
@@ -76553,7 +126930,7 @@ index 078bcd7..8ed5b99 100644
+/root/\.ssh(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:ssh_home_t,s0)
+/root/\.shosts gen_context(system_u:object_r:ssh_home_t,s0)
diff --git a/policy/modules/services/ssh.if b/policy/modules/services/ssh.if
-index fe0c682..61070e4 100644
+index fe0c682..6395fe1 100644
--- a/policy/modules/services/ssh.if
+++ b/policy/modules/services/ssh.if
@@ -32,10 +32,11 @@
@@ -76628,7 +127005,15 @@ index fe0c682..61070e4 100644
dev_read_urand($1_ssh_t)
-@@ -148,6 +150,29 @@ template(`ssh_basic_client_template',`
+@@ -139,7 +141,6 @@ template(`ssh_basic_client_template',`
+ logging_send_syslog_msg($1_ssh_t)
+ logging_read_generic_logs($1_ssh_t)
+
+- miscfiles_read_localization($1_ssh_t)
+
+ seutil_read_config($1_ssh_t)
+
+@@ -148,6 +149,29 @@ template(`ssh_basic_client_template',`
')
')
@@ -76658,7 +127043,7 @@ index fe0c682..61070e4 100644
#######################################
## <summary>
## The template to define a ssh server.
-@@ -168,7 +193,7 @@ template(`ssh_basic_client_template',`
+@@ -168,7 +192,7 @@ template(`ssh_basic_client_template',`
## </summary>
## </param>
#
@@ -76667,7 +127052,7 @@ index fe0c682..61070e4 100644
type $1_t, ssh_server;
auth_login_pgm_domain($1_t)
-@@ -181,16 +206,18 @@ template(`ssh_server_template', `
+@@ -181,16 +205,18 @@ template(`ssh_server_template', `
type $1_var_run_t;
files_pid_file($1_var_run_t)
@@ -76689,7 +127074,7 @@ index fe0c682..61070e4 100644
term_create_pty($1_t, $1_devpts_t)
manage_files_pattern($1_t, $1_tmpfs_t, $1_tmpfs_t)
-@@ -206,6 +233,7 @@ template(`ssh_server_template', `
+@@ -206,6 +232,7 @@ template(`ssh_server_template', `
kernel_read_kernel_sysctls($1_t)
kernel_read_network_state($1_t)
@@ -76697,7 +127082,7 @@ index fe0c682..61070e4 100644
corenet_all_recvfrom_unlabeled($1_t)
corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel($1_t)
-@@ -220,10 +248,13 @@ template(`ssh_server_template', `
+@@ -220,10 +247,13 @@ template(`ssh_server_template', `
corenet_tcp_bind_generic_node($1_t)
corenet_udp_bind_generic_node($1_t)
corenet_tcp_bind_ssh_port($1_t)
@@ -76713,7 +127098,7 @@ index fe0c682..61070e4 100644
auth_rw_login_records($1_t)
auth_rw_faillog($1_t)
-@@ -234,6 +265,7 @@ template(`ssh_server_template', `
+@@ -234,6 +264,7 @@ template(`ssh_server_template', `
corecmd_getattr_bin_files($1_t)
domain_interactive_fd($1_t)
@@ -76721,9 +127106,11 @@ index fe0c682..61070e4 100644
files_read_etc_files($1_t)
files_read_etc_runtime_files($1_t)
-@@ -243,33 +275,33 @@ template(`ssh_server_template', `
+@@ -241,35 +272,34 @@ template(`ssh_server_template', `
- miscfiles_read_localization($1_t)
+ logging_search_logs($1_t)
+
+- miscfiles_read_localization($1_t)
- userdom_create_all_users_keys($1_t)
userdom_dontaudit_relabelfrom_user_ptys($1_t)
@@ -76766,7 +127153,7 @@ index fe0c682..61070e4 100644
')
########################################
-@@ -292,14 +324,15 @@ template(`ssh_server_template', `
+@@ -292,14 +322,15 @@ template(`ssh_server_template', `
## User domain for the role
## </summary>
## </param>
@@ -76783,7 +127170,7 @@ index fe0c682..61070e4 100644
')
##############################
-@@ -328,17 +361,20 @@ template(`ssh_role_template',`
+@@ -328,103 +359,56 @@ template(`ssh_role_template',`
# allow ps to show ssh
ps_process_pattern($3, ssh_t)
@@ -76805,8 +127192,20 @@ index fe0c682..61070e4 100644
##############################
#
-@@ -358,9 +394,10 @@ template(`ssh_role_template',`
+ # SSH agent local policy
+ #
+
+- allow $1_ssh_agent_t self:process setrlimit;
+- allow $1_ssh_agent_t self:capability setgid;
+-
+ allow $1_ssh_agent_t { $1_ssh_agent_t $3 }:process signull;
+
+ allow $1_ssh_agent_t self:unix_stream_socket { create_stream_socket_perms connectto };
+- manage_dirs_pattern($1_ssh_agent_t, ssh_agent_tmp_t, ssh_agent_tmp_t)
+- manage_sock_files_pattern($1_ssh_agent_t, ssh_agent_tmp_t, ssh_agent_tmp_t)
+- files_tmp_filetrans($1_ssh_agent_t, ssh_agent_tmp_t, { dir sock_file })
+-
# for ssh-add
stream_connect_pattern($3, ssh_agent_tmp_t, ssh_agent_tmp_t, $1_ssh_agent_t)
+ stream_connect_pattern($3, cache_home_t, cache_home_t, $1_ssh_agent_t)
@@ -76817,32 +127216,50 @@ index fe0c682..61070e4 100644
# allow ps to show ssh
ps_process_pattern($3, $1_ssh_agent_t)
-@@ -382,7 +419,6 @@ template(`ssh_role_template',`
- files_read_etc_files($1_ssh_agent_t)
- files_read_etc_runtime_files($1_ssh_agent_t)
-- files_search_home($1_ssh_agent_t)
+ domtrans_pattern($3, ssh_agent_exec_t, $1_ssh_agent_t)
- libs_read_lib_files($1_ssh_agent_t)
+- kernel_read_kernel_sysctls($1_ssh_agent_t)
+-
+- dev_read_urand($1_ssh_agent_t)
+- dev_read_rand($1_ssh_agent_t)
+-
+- fs_search_auto_mountpoints($1_ssh_agent_t)
++ kernel_read_system_state($1_ssh_agent_t)
-@@ -394,28 +430,15 @@ template(`ssh_role_template',`
- seutil_dontaudit_read_config($1_ssh_agent_t)
+ # transition back to normal privs upon exec
+ corecmd_shell_domtrans($1_ssh_agent_t, $3)
+ corecmd_bin_domtrans($1_ssh_agent_t, $3)
- # Write to the user domain tty.
-- userdom_use_user_terminals($1_ssh_agent_t)
-+ userdom_use_inherited_user_terminals($1_ssh_agent_t)
+- domain_use_interactive_fds($1_ssh_agent_t)
+-
+- files_read_etc_files($1_ssh_agent_t)
+- files_read_etc_runtime_files($1_ssh_agent_t)
+- files_search_home($1_ssh_agent_t)
+-
+- libs_read_lib_files($1_ssh_agent_t)
++ auth_use_nsswitch($1_ssh_agent_t)
- # for the transition back to normal privs upon exec
- userdom_search_user_home_content($1_ssh_agent_t)
+ logging_send_syslog_msg($1_ssh_agent_t)
+
+- miscfiles_read_localization($1_ssh_agent_t)
+- miscfiles_read_generic_certs($1_ssh_agent_t)
+-
+- seutil_dontaudit_read_config($1_ssh_agent_t)
+-
+- # Write to the user domain tty.
+- userdom_use_user_terminals($1_ssh_agent_t)
+-
+- # for the transition back to normal privs upon exec
+- userdom_search_user_home_content($1_ssh_agent_t)
userdom_user_home_domtrans($1_ssh_agent_t, $3)
- allow $3 $1_ssh_agent_t:fd use;
- allow $3 $1_ssh_agent_t:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
- allow $3 $1_ssh_agent_t:process sigchld;
-
+-
- tunable_policy(`use_nfs_home_dirs',`
- fs_manage_nfs_files($1_ssh_agent_t)
-+ ssh_exec_keygen($3)
-
+-
- # transition back to normal privs upon exec
- fs_nfs_domtrans($1_ssh_agent_t, $3)
- ')
@@ -76853,17 +127270,27 @@ index fe0c682..61070e4 100644
- # transition back to normal privs upon exec
- fs_cifs_domtrans($1_ssh_agent_t, $3)
- ')
+-
+- optional_policy(`
+- nis_use_ypbind($1_ssh_agent_t)
+- ')
+ userdom_home_manager($1_ssh_agent_t)
- optional_policy(`
- nis_use_ypbind($1_ssh_agent_t)
-@@ -496,8 +519,27 @@ interface(`ssh_read_pipes',`
+- optional_policy(`
+- xserver_use_xdm_fds($1_ssh_agent_t)
+- xserver_rw_xdm_pipes($1_ssh_agent_t)
+- ')
++ ssh_exec_keygen($3)
+ ')
+
+ ########################################
+@@ -496,8 +480,27 @@ interface(`ssh_read_pipes',`
type sshd_t;
')
- allow $1 sshd_t:fifo_file { getattr read };
+ allow $1 sshd_t:fifo_file read_fifo_file_perms;
-+')
+ ')
+
+######################################
+## <summary>
@@ -76881,12 +127308,12 @@ index fe0c682..61070e4 100644
+ ')
+
+ allow $1 sshd_t:unix_dgram_socket rw_stream_socket_perms;
- ')
++')
+
########################################
## <summary>
## Read and write a ssh server unnamed pipe.
-@@ -513,7 +555,7 @@ interface(`ssh_rw_pipes',`
+@@ -513,7 +516,7 @@ interface(`ssh_rw_pipes',`
type sshd_t;
')
@@ -76895,7 +127322,7 @@ index fe0c682..61070e4 100644
')
########################################
-@@ -605,6 +647,24 @@ interface(`ssh_domtrans',`
+@@ -605,6 +608,24 @@ interface(`ssh_domtrans',`
########################################
## <summary>
@@ -76920,7 +127347,7 @@ index fe0c682..61070e4 100644
## Execute the ssh client in the caller domain.
## </summary>
## <param name="domain">
-@@ -637,7 +697,7 @@ interface(`ssh_setattr_key_files',`
+@@ -637,7 +658,7 @@ interface(`ssh_setattr_key_files',`
type sshd_key_t;
')
@@ -76929,7 +127356,7 @@ index fe0c682..61070e4 100644
files_search_pids($1)
')
-@@ -662,6 +722,42 @@ interface(`ssh_agent_exec',`
+@@ -662,6 +683,42 @@ interface(`ssh_agent_exec',`
########################################
## <summary>
@@ -76972,7 +127399,7 @@ index fe0c682..61070e4 100644
## Read ssh home directory content
## </summary>
## <param name="domain">
-@@ -701,6 +797,50 @@ interface(`ssh_domtrans_keygen',`
+@@ -701,6 +758,50 @@ interface(`ssh_domtrans_keygen',`
########################################
## <summary>
@@ -77023,7 +127450,7 @@ index fe0c682..61070e4 100644
## Read ssh server keys
## </summary>
## <param name="domain">
-@@ -714,7 +854,7 @@ interface(`ssh_dontaudit_read_server_keys',`
+@@ -714,7 +815,7 @@ interface(`ssh_dontaudit_read_server_keys',`
type sshd_key_t;
')
@@ -77032,7 +127459,7 @@ index fe0c682..61070e4 100644
')
######################################
-@@ -754,3 +894,64 @@ interface(`ssh_delete_tmp',`
+@@ -754,3 +855,101 @@ interface(`ssh_delete_tmp',`
files_search_tmp($1)
delete_files_pattern($1, sshd_tmp_t, sshd_tmp_t)
')
@@ -77097,8 +127524,45 @@ index fe0c682..61070e4 100644
+ userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans($1, ssh_home_t, dir, ".ssh")
+ userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans($1, ssh_home_t, dir, ".shosts")
+')
++
++########################################
++## <summary>
++## Do not audit attempts to read and
++## write the sshd pty type.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain to not audit.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`ssh_dontaudit_use_ptys',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type sshd_devpts_t;
++ ')
++
++ dontaudit $1 sshd_devpts_t:chr_file { getattr read write ioctl };
++')
++
++########################################
++## <summary>
++## Read and write inherited sshd pty type.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain to not audit.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`ssh_use_ptys',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type sshd_devpts_t;
++ ')
++
++ allow $1 sshd_devpts_t:chr_file { getattr open read write ioctl };
++')
diff --git a/policy/modules/services/ssh.te b/policy/modules/services/ssh.te
-index b17e27a..5c691d1 100644
+index b17e27a..3354b8f 100644
--- a/policy/modules/services/ssh.te
+++ b/policy/modules/services/ssh.te
@@ -6,44 +6,51 @@ policy_module(ssh, 2.3.0)
@@ -77205,7 +127669,7 @@ index b17e27a..5c691d1 100644
manage_files_pattern(ssh_t, ssh_tmpfs_t, ssh_tmpfs_t)
manage_lnk_files_pattern(ssh_t, ssh_tmpfs_t, ssh_tmpfs_t)
manage_fifo_files_pattern(ssh_t, ssh_tmpfs_t, ssh_tmpfs_t)
-@@ -108,32 +117,41 @@ fs_tmpfs_filetrans(ssh_t, ssh_tmpfs_t, { dir file lnk_file sock_file fifo_file }
+@@ -108,32 +117,42 @@ fs_tmpfs_filetrans(ssh_t, ssh_tmpfs_t, { dir file lnk_file sock_file fifo_file }
manage_dirs_pattern(ssh_t, ssh_home_t, ssh_home_t)
manage_sock_files_pattern(ssh_t, ssh_home_t, ssh_home_t)
userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans(ssh_t, ssh_home_t, { dir sock_file })
@@ -77242,6 +127706,7 @@ index b17e27a..5c691d1 100644
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_node(ssh_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_ports(ssh_t)
corenet_tcp_connect_ssh_port(ssh_t)
++corenet_tcp_connect_all_unreserved_ports(ssh_t)
corenet_sendrecv_ssh_client_packets(ssh_t)
+corenet_tcp_bind_generic_node(ssh_t)
+#corenet_tcp_bind_all_unreserved_ports(ssh_t)
@@ -77251,10 +127716,11 @@ index b17e27a..5c691d1 100644
dev_read_urand(ssh_t)
fs_getattr_all_fs(ssh_t)
-@@ -157,37 +175,42 @@ logging_read_generic_logs(ssh_t)
+@@ -156,38 +175,42 @@ logging_read_generic_logs(ssh_t)
+
auth_use_nsswitch(ssh_t)
- miscfiles_read_localization(ssh_t)
+-miscfiles_read_localization(ssh_t)
+miscfiles_read_generic_certs(ssh_t)
seutil_read_config(ssh_t)
@@ -77274,16 +127740,6 @@ index b17e27a..5c691d1 100644
- allow ssh_keysign_t ssh_t:fd use;
- allow ssh_keysign_t ssh_t:process sigchld;
- allow ssh_keysign_t ssh_t:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
--')
--
--tunable_policy(`use_nfs_home_dirs',`
-- fs_manage_nfs_dirs(ssh_t)
-- fs_manage_nfs_files(ssh_t)
--')
--
--tunable_policy(`use_samba_home_dirs',`
-- fs_manage_cifs_dirs(ssh_t)
-- fs_manage_cifs_files(ssh_t)
+userdom_write_user_tmp_files(ssh_t)
+userdom_read_user_home_content_symlinks(ssh_t)
+userdom_rw_inherited_user_home_content_files(ssh_t)
@@ -77294,19 +127750,29 @@ index b17e27a..5c691d1 100644
+ domtrans_pattern(ssh_t, ssh_keysign_exec_t, ssh_keysign_t)
')
- # for port forwarding
- tunable_policy(`user_tcp_server',`
- corenet_tcp_bind_ssh_port(ssh_t)
- corenet_tcp_bind_generic_node(ssh_t)
+-tunable_policy(`use_nfs_home_dirs',`
+- fs_manage_nfs_dirs(ssh_t)
+- fs_manage_nfs_files(ssh_t)
++# for port forwarding
++tunable_policy(`selinuxuser_tcp_server',`
++ corenet_tcp_bind_ssh_port(ssh_t)
++ corenet_tcp_bind_generic_node(ssh_t)
+ corenet_tcp_bind_all_unreserved_ports(ssh_t)
-+')
-+
+ ')
+
+-tunable_policy(`use_samba_home_dirs',`
+- fs_manage_cifs_dirs(ssh_t)
+- fs_manage_cifs_files(ssh_t)
+ifdef(`enable_mcs',`
+ optional_policy(`
+ condor_startd_ranged_domtrans_to(sshd_t, sshd_exec_t, mcs_systemlow - mcs_systemhigh)
+ ')
-+')
-+
+ ')
+
+-# for port forwarding
+-tunable_policy(`user_tcp_server',`
+- corenet_tcp_bind_ssh_port(ssh_t)
+- corenet_tcp_bind_generic_node(ssh_t)
+optional_policy(`
+ gnome_stream_connect_gkeyringd(ssh_t)
')
@@ -77345,7 +127811,7 @@ index b17e27a..5c691d1 100644
#################################
#
# sshd local policy
-@@ -227,33 +246,48 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -227,33 +246,50 @@ optional_policy(`
# so a tunnel can point to another ssh tunnel
allow sshd_t self:netlink_route_socket r_netlink_socket_perms;
allow sshd_t self:key { search link write };
@@ -77359,6 +127825,8 @@ index b17e27a..5c691d1 100644
kernel_search_key(sshd_t)
kernel_link_key(sshd_t)
++files_search_all(sshd_t)
++
term_use_all_ptys(sshd_t)
term_setattr_all_ptys(sshd_t)
+term_setattr_all_ttys(sshd_t)
@@ -77403,7 +127871,7 @@ index b17e27a..5c691d1 100644
')
optional_policy(`
-@@ -261,11 +295,24 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -261,11 +297,24 @@ optional_policy(`
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -77429,7 +127897,18 @@ index b17e27a..5c691d1 100644
')
optional_policy(`
-@@ -283,6 +330,15 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -273,6 +322,10 @@ optional_policy(`
+ ')
+
+ optional_policy(`
++ munin_read_var_lib_files(sshd_t)
++')
++
++optional_policy(`
+ rpm_use_script_fds(sshd_t)
+ ')
+
+@@ -283,6 +336,28 @@ optional_policy(`
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -77442,10 +127921,23 @@ index b17e27a..5c691d1 100644
+')
+
+optional_policy(`
++ openshift_dyntransition(sshd_t)
++ openshift_transition(sshd_t)
++ openshift_manage_tmp_files(sshd_t)
++ openshift_manage_tmp_sockets(sshd_t)
++ openshift_mounton_tmp(sshd_t)
++ openshift_search_lib(sshd_t)
++')
++
++optional_policy(`
++ postgresql_search_db(sshd_t)
++')
++
++optional_policy(`
unconfined_shell_domtrans(sshd_t)
')
-@@ -290,6 +346,29 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -290,6 +365,29 @@ optional_policy(`
xserver_domtrans_xauth(sshd_t)
')
@@ -77475,7 +127967,7 @@ index b17e27a..5c691d1 100644
########################################
#
# ssh_keygen local policy
-@@ -298,19 +377,26 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -298,19 +396,26 @@ optional_policy(`
# ssh_keygen_t is the type of the ssh-keygen program when run at install time
# and by sysadm_t
@@ -77503,7 +127995,7 @@ index b17e27a..5c691d1 100644
dev_read_urand(ssh_keygen_t)
term_dontaudit_use_console(ssh_keygen_t)
-@@ -327,9 +413,11 @@ auth_use_nsswitch(ssh_keygen_t)
+@@ -327,9 +432,11 @@ auth_use_nsswitch(ssh_keygen_t)
logging_send_syslog_msg(ssh_keygen_t)
userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fds(ssh_keygen_t)
@@ -77517,7 +128009,7 @@ index b17e27a..5c691d1 100644
')
optional_policy(`
-@@ -339,3 +427,83 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -339,3 +446,121 @@ optional_policy(`
optional_policy(`
udev_read_db(ssh_keygen_t)
')
@@ -77601,6 +128093,44 @@ index b17e27a..5c691d1 100644
+optional_policy(`
+ ssh_rw_dgram_sockets(chroot_user_t)
+')
++
++######################################
++#
++# ssh_agent_type common policy local policy
++#
++allow ssh_agent_type self:process setrlimit;
++allow ssh_agent_type self:capability setgid;
++
++manage_dirs_pattern(ssh_agent_type, ssh_agent_tmp_t, ssh_agent_tmp_t)
++manage_sock_files_pattern(ssh_agent_type, ssh_agent_tmp_t, ssh_agent_tmp_t)
++files_tmp_filetrans(ssh_agent_type, ssh_agent_tmp_t, { dir sock_file })
++
++kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(ssh_agent_type)
++
++dev_read_urand(ssh_agent_type)
++dev_read_rand(ssh_agent_type)
++
++fs_search_auto_mountpoints(ssh_agent_type)
++
++domain_use_interactive_fds(ssh_agent_type)
++
++files_read_etc_files(ssh_agent_type)
++files_read_etc_runtime_files(ssh_agent_type)
++
++libs_read_lib_files(ssh_agent_type)
++
++miscfiles_read_generic_certs(ssh_agent_type)
++
++# Write to the user domain tty.
++userdom_use_inherited_user_terminals(ssh_agent_type)
++
++# for the transition back to normal privs upon exec
++userdom_search_user_home_content(ssh_agent_type)
++
++optional_policy(`
++ xserver_use_xdm_fds(ssh_agent_type)
++ xserver_rw_xdm_pipes(ssh_agent_type)
++')
diff --git a/policy/modules/services/xserver.fc b/policy/modules/services/xserver.fc
index fc86b7c..ba6be42 100644
--- a/policy/modules/services/xserver.fc
@@ -77747,7 +128277,7 @@ index fc86b7c..ba6be42 100644
+/var/lib/pqsql/\.Xauthority.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:xauth_home_t,s0)
+
diff --git a/policy/modules/services/xserver.if b/policy/modules/services/xserver.if
-index 130ced9..1b31c76 100644
+index 130ced9..a75282a 100644
--- a/policy/modules/services/xserver.if
+++ b/policy/modules/services/xserver.if
@@ -19,9 +19,10 @@
@@ -77850,7 +128380,7 @@ index 130ced9..1b31c76 100644
allow $2 xserver_tmpfs_t:file rw_file_perms;
')
+
-+ tunable_policy(`user_direct_dri',`
++ tunable_policy(`selinuxuser_direct_dri_enabled',`
+ dev_rw_dri($2)
+ ')
+
@@ -78046,7 +128576,7 @@ index 130ced9..1b31c76 100644
allow $2 xserver_tmpfs_t:file rw_file_perms;
')
+
-+ tunable_policy(`user_direct_dri',`
++ tunable_policy(`selinuxuser_direct_dri_enabled',`
+ dev_rw_dri($2)
+ ')
')
@@ -78327,16 +128857,35 @@ index 130ced9..1b31c76 100644
## Make an X session script an entrypoint for the specified domain.
## </summary>
## <param name="domain">
-@@ -897,7 +1105,7 @@ interface(`xserver_getattr_log',`
+@@ -897,7 +1105,26 @@ interface(`xserver_getattr_log',`
')
logging_search_logs($1)
- allow $1 xserver_log_t:file getattr;
+ allow $1 xserver_log_t:file getattr_file_perms;
++')
++
++#######################################
++## <summary>
++## Allow domain to read X server logs.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`xserver_read_log',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type xserver_log_t;
++ ')
++
++ logging_search_logs($1)
++ allow $1 xserver_log_t:file read_file_perms;
')
########################################
-@@ -916,7 +1124,7 @@ interface(`xserver_dontaudit_write_log',`
+@@ -916,7 +1143,7 @@ interface(`xserver_dontaudit_write_log',`
type xserver_log_t;
')
@@ -78345,7 +128894,7 @@ index 130ced9..1b31c76 100644
')
########################################
-@@ -963,6 +1171,45 @@ interface(`xserver_read_xkb_libs',`
+@@ -963,6 +1190,45 @@ interface(`xserver_read_xkb_libs',`
########################################
## <summary>
@@ -78391,7 +128940,7 @@ index 130ced9..1b31c76 100644
## Read xdm temporary files.
## </summary>
## <param name="domain">
-@@ -976,7 +1223,7 @@ interface(`xserver_read_xdm_tmp_files',`
+@@ -976,7 +1242,7 @@ interface(`xserver_read_xdm_tmp_files',`
type xdm_tmp_t;
')
@@ -78400,7 +128949,7 @@ index 130ced9..1b31c76 100644
read_files_pattern($1, xdm_tmp_t, xdm_tmp_t)
')
-@@ -1038,6 +1285,42 @@ interface(`xserver_manage_xdm_tmp_files',`
+@@ -1038,6 +1304,42 @@ interface(`xserver_manage_xdm_tmp_files',`
########################################
## <summary>
@@ -78443,7 +128992,7 @@ index 130ced9..1b31c76 100644
## Do not audit attempts to get the attributes of
## xdm temporary named sockets.
## </summary>
-@@ -1052,7 +1335,7 @@ interface(`xserver_dontaudit_getattr_xdm_tmp_sockets',`
+@@ -1052,7 +1354,7 @@ interface(`xserver_dontaudit_getattr_xdm_tmp_sockets',`
type xdm_tmp_t;
')
@@ -78452,7 +129001,7 @@ index 130ced9..1b31c76 100644
')
########################################
-@@ -1070,8 +1353,10 @@ interface(`xserver_domtrans',`
+@@ -1070,8 +1372,10 @@ interface(`xserver_domtrans',`
type xserver_t, xserver_exec_t;
')
@@ -78464,7 +129013,7 @@ index 130ced9..1b31c76 100644
')
########################################
-@@ -1185,6 +1470,26 @@ interface(`xserver_stream_connect',`
+@@ -1185,6 +1489,26 @@ interface(`xserver_stream_connect',`
files_search_tmp($1)
stream_connect_pattern($1, xserver_tmp_t, xserver_tmp_t, xserver_t)
@@ -78491,7 +129040,7 @@ index 130ced9..1b31c76 100644
')
########################################
-@@ -1210,7 +1515,7 @@ interface(`xserver_read_tmp_files',`
+@@ -1210,7 +1534,7 @@ interface(`xserver_read_tmp_files',`
## <summary>
## Interface to provide X object permissions on a given X server to
## an X client domain. Gives the domain permission to read the
@@ -78500,7 +129049,7 @@ index 130ced9..1b31c76 100644
## </summary>
## <param name="domain">
## <summary>
-@@ -1220,13 +1525,23 @@ interface(`xserver_read_tmp_files',`
+@@ -1220,13 +1544,23 @@ interface(`xserver_read_tmp_files',`
#
interface(`xserver_manage_core_devices',`
gen_require(`
@@ -78525,7 +129074,7 @@ index 130ced9..1b31c76 100644
')
########################################
-@@ -1243,10 +1558,534 @@ interface(`xserver_manage_core_devices',`
+@@ -1243,10 +1577,541 @@ interface(`xserver_manage_core_devices',`
#
interface(`xserver_unconfined',`
gen_require(`
@@ -79029,7 +129578,9 @@ index 130ced9..1b31c76 100644
+ userdom_admin_home_dir_filetrans($1, user_fonts_config_t, dir, ".fonts.d")
+ userdom_admin_home_dir_filetrans($1, user_fonts_t, dir, ".fonts")
+ userdom_admin_home_dir_filetrans($1, user_fonts_cache_t, dir, ".fontconfig")
-+ gnome_cache_filetrans($1, xdm_home_t, dir, "xdm")
++ optional_policy(`
++ gnome_cache_filetrans($1, xdm_home_t, dir, "xdm")
++ ')
+')
+
+########################################
@@ -79053,6 +129604,11 @@ index 130ced9..1b31c76 100644
+## The class of the object to be created.
+## </summary>
+## </param>
++## <param name="name" optional="true">
++## <summary>
++## The name of the object being created.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
+#
+interface(`xserver_xdm_tmp_filetrans',`
+ gen_require(`
@@ -79063,7 +129619,7 @@ index 130ced9..1b31c76 100644
+ files_search_tmp($1)
+')
diff --git a/policy/modules/services/xserver.te b/policy/modules/services/xserver.te
-index d40f750..3711d39 100644
+index d40f750..6a1f890 100644
--- a/policy/modules/services/xserver.te
+++ b/policy/modules/services/xserver.te
@@ -26,27 +26,50 @@ gen_require(`
@@ -79078,15 +129634,15 @@ index d40f750..3711d39 100644
+## Allows clients to write to the X server shared
+## memory segments.
+## </p>
- ## </desc>
--gen_tunable(allow_write_xshm, false)
++## </desc>
+gen_tunable(xserver_clients_write_xshm, false)
+
+## <desc>
+## <p>
+## Allows XServer to execute writable memory
+## </p>
-+## </desc>
+ ## </desc>
+-gen_tunable(allow_write_xshm, false)
+gen_tunable(xserver_execmem, false)
## <desc>
@@ -79119,7 +129675,7 @@ index d40f750..3711d39 100644
+## Allow regular users direct dri device access
+## </p>
+## </desc>
-+gen_tunable(user_direct_dri, false)
++gen_tunable(selinuxuser_direct_dri_enabled, false)
+
+attribute xdmhomewriter;
+attribute x_userdomain;
@@ -79298,7 +129854,7 @@ index d40f750..3711d39 100644
')
########################################
-@@ -247,45 +311,78 @@ tunable_policy(`use_samba_home_dirs',`
+@@ -247,45 +311,81 @@ tunable_policy(`use_samba_home_dirs',`
# Xauth local policy
#
@@ -79332,6 +129888,9 @@ index d40f750..3711d39 100644
+kernel_read_system_state(xauth_t)
kernel_request_load_module(xauth_t)
++dev_read_rand(xauth_t)
++dev_read_urand(xauth_t)
++
domain_use_interactive_fds(xauth_t)
+domain_dontaudit_leaks(xauth_t)
@@ -79387,7 +129946,7 @@ index d40f750..3711d39 100644
')
optional_policy(`
-@@ -299,64 +396,104 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -299,64 +399,108 @@ optional_policy(`
# XDM Local policy
#
@@ -79396,6 +129955,9 @@ index d40f750..3711d39 100644
+allow xdm_t self:capability { setgid setuid sys_resource kill sys_tty_config mknod chown dac_override dac_read_search fowner fsetid ipc_owner sys_nice sys_rawio net_bind_service sys_ptrace };
+allow xdm_t self:capability2 { block_suspend };
+dontaudit xdm_t self:capability sys_admin;
++tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',`
++ allow xdm_t self:process ptrace;
++')
+
+allow xdm_t self:process { setexec setpgid getattr getcap setcap getsched getsession setsched setrlimit signal_perms setkeycreate };
allow xdm_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms;
@@ -79418,6 +129980,7 @@ index d40f750..3711d39 100644
+manage_dirs_pattern(xdm_t, xkb_var_lib_t, xkb_var_lib_t)
+manage_files_pattern(xdm_t, xkb_var_lib_t, xkb_var_lib_t)
+
++manage_dirs_pattern(xdm_t, xdm_home_t, xdm_home_t)
+manage_files_pattern(xdm_t, xdm_home_t, xdm_home_t)
+userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans(xdm_t, xdm_home_t, file)
+userdom_admin_home_dir_filetrans(xdm_t, xdm_home_t, file)
@@ -79502,7 +130065,7 @@ index d40f750..3711d39 100644
# connect to xdm xserver over stream socket
stream_connect_pattern(xdm_t, xserver_tmp_t, xserver_tmp_t, xserver_t)
-@@ -365,20 +502,27 @@ stream_connect_pattern(xdm_t, xserver_tmp_t, xserver_tmp_t, xserver_t)
+@@ -365,20 +509,27 @@ stream_connect_pattern(xdm_t, xserver_tmp_t, xserver_tmp_t, xserver_t)
delete_files_pattern(xdm_t, xserver_tmp_t, xserver_tmp_t)
delete_sock_files_pattern(xdm_t, xserver_tmp_t, xserver_tmp_t)
@@ -79532,7 +130095,7 @@ index d40f750..3711d39 100644
corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(xdm_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(xdm_t)
corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if(xdm_t)
-@@ -388,38 +532,48 @@ corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_ports(xdm_t)
+@@ -388,38 +539,48 @@ corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_ports(xdm_t)
corenet_udp_sendrecv_all_ports(xdm_t)
corenet_tcp_bind_generic_node(xdm_t)
corenet_udp_bind_generic_node(xdm_t)
@@ -79585,7 +130148,7 @@ index d40f750..3711d39 100644
files_read_etc_files(xdm_t)
files_read_var_files(xdm_t)
-@@ -430,9 +584,25 @@ files_list_mnt(xdm_t)
+@@ -430,9 +591,26 @@ files_list_mnt(xdm_t)
files_read_usr_files(xdm_t)
# Poweroff wants to create the /poweroff file when run from xdm
files_create_boot_flag(xdm_t)
@@ -79599,6 +130162,7 @@ index d40f750..3711d39 100644
fs_getattr_all_fs(xdm_t)
fs_search_auto_mountpoints(xdm_t)
++fs_search_all(xdm_t)
+fs_rw_anon_inodefs_files(xdm_t)
+fs_mount_tmpfs(xdm_t)
+fs_list_inotifyfs(xdm_t)
@@ -79611,7 +130175,7 @@ index d40f750..3711d39 100644
storage_dontaudit_read_fixed_disk(xdm_t)
storage_dontaudit_write_fixed_disk(xdm_t)
-@@ -441,28 +611,38 @@ storage_dontaudit_raw_read_removable_device(xdm_t)
+@@ -441,28 +619,42 @@ storage_dontaudit_raw_read_removable_device(xdm_t)
storage_dontaudit_raw_write_removable_device(xdm_t)
storage_dontaudit_setattr_removable_dev(xdm_t)
storage_dontaudit_rw_scsi_generic(xdm_t)
@@ -79637,23 +130201,27 @@ index d40f750..3711d39 100644
init_telinit(xdm_t)
+init_dbus_chat(xdm_t)
+init_pid_filetrans(xdm_t, xdm_var_run_t, dir, "multi-session-x")
++init_status(xdm_t)
++
++systemd_write_inhibit_pipes(xdm_t)
libs_exec_lib_files(xdm_t)
logging_read_generic_logs(xdm_t)
+-miscfiles_read_localization(xdm_t)
+miscfiles_search_man_pages(xdm_t)
- miscfiles_read_localization(xdm_t)
miscfiles_read_fonts(xdm_t)
--
--sysnet_read_config(xdm_t)
+miscfiles_manage_fonts_cache(xdm_t)
+miscfiles_manage_localization(xdm_t)
+miscfiles_read_hwdata(xdm_t)
+-sysnet_read_config(xdm_t)
++systemd_write_inhibit_pipes(xdm_t)
+
userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fds(xdm_t)
userdom_create_all_users_keys(xdm_t)
-@@ -471,24 +651,43 @@ userdom_read_user_home_content_files(xdm_t)
+@@ -471,24 +663,43 @@ userdom_read_user_home_content_files(xdm_t)
# Search /proc for any user domain processes.
userdom_read_all_users_state(xdm_t)
userdom_signal_all_users(xdm_t)
@@ -79703,11 +130271,12 @@ index d40f750..3711d39 100644
tunable_policy(`xdm_sysadm_login',`
userdom_xsession_spec_domtrans_all_users(xdm_t)
# FIXME:
-@@ -502,11 +701,21 @@ tunable_policy(`xdm_sysadm_login',`
+@@ -502,11 +713,26 @@ tunable_policy(`xdm_sysadm_login',`
')
optional_policy(`
+ accountsd_read_lib_files(xdm_t)
++ accountsd_dbus_chat(xdm_t)
+')
+
+optional_policy(`
@@ -79715,6 +130284,10 @@ index d40f750..3711d39 100644
+')
+
+optional_policy(`
++ boinc_dontaudit_getattr_lib(xdm_t)
++')
++
++optional_policy(`
alsa_domtrans(xdm_t)
+ alsa_read_rw_config(xdm_t)
')
@@ -79725,17 +130298,21 @@ index d40f750..3711d39 100644
')
optional_policy(`
-@@ -514,12 +723,64 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -514,12 +740,71 @@ optional_policy(`
')
optional_policy(`
+ # Use dbus to start other processes as xdm_t
+ dbus_role_template(xdm, system_r, xdm_t)
-+
++ dbus_system_bus_client(xdm_dbusd_t)
++ dbus_system_bus_client(xdm_t)
++
++ application_dontaudit_exec(xdm_dbusd_t)
+ #fixes for xfce4-notifyd
+ allow xdm_dbusd_t self:unix_stream_socket connectto;
+ allow xdm_dbusd_t xserver_t:unix_stream_socket connectto;
+
++
+ dontaudit xdm_dbusd_t xdm_var_lib_t:dir search_dir_perms;
+ xserver_xdm_append_log(xdm_dbusd_t)
+ xserver_read_xdm_pid(xdm_dbusd_t)
@@ -79744,8 +130321,6 @@ index d40f750..3711d39 100644
+
+ corecmd_bin_entry_type(xdm_t)
+
-+ dbus_system_bus_client(xdm_t)
-+
+ optional_policy(`
+ bluetooth_dbus_chat(xdm_t)
+ ')
@@ -79764,6 +130339,10 @@ index d40f750..3711d39 100644
+ ')
+
+ optional_policy(`
++ gnomeclock_dbus_chat(xdm_t)
++ ')
++
++ optional_policy(`
+ networkmanager_dbus_chat(xdm_t)
+ ')
+')
@@ -79775,6 +130354,7 @@ index d40f750..3711d39 100644
')
optional_policy(`
++ gnome_stream_connect_gkeyringd(xdm_t)
+ gnome_exec_keyringd(xdm_t)
+ gnome_manage_config(xdm_t)
+ gnome_manage_gconf_home_files(xdm_t)
@@ -79790,7 +130370,7 @@ index d40f750..3711d39 100644
hostname_exec(xdm_t)
')
-@@ -537,28 +798,69 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -537,28 +822,74 @@ optional_policy(`
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -79816,6 +130396,7 @@ index d40f750..3711d39 100644
+ pulseaudio_exec(xdm_t)
+ pulseaudio_dbus_chat(xdm_t)
+ pulseaudio_stream_connect(xdm_t)
++ pulseaudio_read_state(xserver_t)
+')
+
+optional_policy(`
@@ -79858,18 +130439,22 @@ index d40f750..3711d39 100644
- allow xdm_t self:process { execheap execmem };
- ')
+optional_policy(`
-+ udev_read_db(xdm_t)
++ telepathy_exec(xdm_t)
+')
- ifdef(`distro_rhel4',`
- allow xdm_t self:process { execheap execmem };
- ')
+optional_policy(`
++ udev_read_db(xdm_t)
++')
++
++optional_policy(`
+ unconfined_signal(xdm_t)
')
optional_policy(`
-@@ -570,6 +872,14 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -570,6 +901,14 @@ optional_policy(`
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -79884,7 +130469,7 @@ index d40f750..3711d39 100644
xfs_stream_connect(xdm_t)
')
-@@ -594,7 +904,8 @@ allow xserver_t input_xevent_t:x_event send;
+@@ -594,8 +933,11 @@ allow xserver_t input_xevent_t:x_event send;
# execheap needed until the X module loader is fixed.
# NVIDIA Needs execstack
@@ -79892,9 +130477,12 @@ index d40f750..3711d39 100644
+allow xserver_t self:capability { sys_ptrace dac_override fowner fsetid setgid setuid ipc_owner sys_rawio sys_admin sys_nice sys_tty_config mknod net_bind_service };
+
dontaudit xserver_t self:capability chown;
++allow xserver_t self:capability2 compromise_kernel;
++
allow xserver_t self:process ~{ ptrace setcurrent setexec setfscreate setrlimit execmem execstack execheap };
allow xserver_t self:fd use;
-@@ -608,8 +919,15 @@ allow xserver_t self:unix_dgram_socket { create_socket_perms sendto };
+ allow xserver_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms;
+@@ -608,8 +950,15 @@ allow xserver_t self:unix_dgram_socket { create_socket_perms sendto };
allow xserver_t self:unix_stream_socket { create_stream_socket_perms connectto };
allow xserver_t self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
allow xserver_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms;
@@ -79910,7 +130498,7 @@ index d40f750..3711d39 100644
manage_dirs_pattern(xserver_t, xserver_tmp_t, xserver_tmp_t)
manage_files_pattern(xserver_t, xserver_tmp_t, xserver_tmp_t)
manage_sock_files_pattern(xserver_t, xserver_tmp_t, xserver_tmp_t)
-@@ -628,12 +946,19 @@ manage_files_pattern(xserver_t, xkb_var_lib_t, xkb_var_lib_t)
+@@ -628,12 +977,19 @@ manage_files_pattern(xserver_t, xkb_var_lib_t, xkb_var_lib_t)
manage_lnk_files_pattern(xserver_t, xkb_var_lib_t, xkb_var_lib_t)
files_search_var_lib(xserver_t)
@@ -79932,7 +130520,7 @@ index d40f750..3711d39 100644
kernel_read_system_state(xserver_t)
kernel_read_device_sysctls(xserver_t)
-@@ -641,12 +966,12 @@ kernel_read_modprobe_sysctls(xserver_t)
+@@ -641,12 +997,12 @@ kernel_read_modprobe_sysctls(xserver_t)
# Xorg wants to check if kernel is tainted
kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(xserver_t)
kernel_write_proc_files(xserver_t)
@@ -79946,7 +130534,7 @@ index d40f750..3711d39 100644
corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(xserver_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(xserver_t)
corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if(xserver_t)
-@@ -667,23 +992,28 @@ dev_rw_apm_bios(xserver_t)
+@@ -667,23 +1023,28 @@ dev_rw_apm_bios(xserver_t)
dev_rw_agp(xserver_t)
dev_rw_framebuffer(xserver_t)
dev_manage_dri_dev(xserver_t)
@@ -79978,7 +130566,7 @@ index d40f750..3711d39 100644
# brought on by rhgb
files_search_mnt(xserver_t)
-@@ -694,8 +1024,13 @@ fs_getattr_xattr_fs(xserver_t)
+@@ -694,8 +1055,13 @@ fs_getattr_xattr_fs(xserver_t)
fs_search_nfs(xserver_t)
fs_search_auto_mountpoints(xserver_t)
fs_search_ramfs(xserver_t)
@@ -79992,7 +130580,7 @@ index d40f750..3711d39 100644
selinux_validate_context(xserver_t)
selinux_compute_access_vector(xserver_t)
-@@ -708,8 +1043,6 @@ init_getpgid(xserver_t)
+@@ -708,20 +1074,18 @@ init_getpgid(xserver_t)
term_setattr_unallocated_ttys(xserver_t)
term_use_unallocated_ttys(xserver_t)
@@ -80001,9 +130589,9 @@ index d40f750..3711d39 100644
locallogin_use_fds(xserver_t)
logging_send_syslog_msg(xserver_t)
-@@ -717,11 +1050,12 @@ logging_send_audit_msgs(xserver_t)
+ logging_send_audit_msgs(xserver_t)
- miscfiles_read_localization(xserver_t)
+-miscfiles_read_localization(xserver_t)
miscfiles_read_fonts(xserver_t)
-
-modutils_domtrans_insmod(xserver_t)
@@ -80016,7 +130604,7 @@ index d40f750..3711d39 100644
userdom_search_user_home_dirs(xserver_t)
userdom_use_user_ttys(xserver_t)
-@@ -775,16 +1109,40 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -775,16 +1139,40 @@ optional_policy(`
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -80058,7 +130646,7 @@ index d40f750..3711d39 100644
unconfined_domtrans(xserver_t)
')
-@@ -793,6 +1151,10 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -793,6 +1181,10 @@ optional_policy(`
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -80069,7 +130657,7 @@ index d40f750..3711d39 100644
xfs_stream_connect(xserver_t)
')
-@@ -808,10 +1170,10 @@ allow xserver_t xdm_t:shm rw_shm_perms;
+@@ -808,10 +1200,10 @@ allow xserver_t xdm_t:shm rw_shm_perms;
# NB we do NOT allow xserver_t xdm_var_lib_t:dir, only access to an open
# handle of a file inside the dir!!!
@@ -80083,7 +130671,7 @@ index d40f750..3711d39 100644
# Label pid and temporary files with derived types.
manage_files_pattern(xserver_t, xdm_tmp_t, xdm_tmp_t)
-@@ -819,7 +1181,7 @@ manage_lnk_files_pattern(xserver_t, xdm_tmp_t, xdm_tmp_t)
+@@ -819,7 +1211,7 @@ manage_lnk_files_pattern(xserver_t, xdm_tmp_t, xdm_tmp_t)
manage_sock_files_pattern(xserver_t, xdm_tmp_t, xdm_tmp_t)
# Run xkbcomp.
@@ -80092,7 +130680,7 @@ index d40f750..3711d39 100644
can_exec(xserver_t, xkb_var_lib_t)
# VNC v4 module in X server
-@@ -832,26 +1194,21 @@ init_use_fds(xserver_t)
+@@ -832,26 +1224,21 @@ init_use_fds(xserver_t)
# to read ROLE_home_t - examine this in more detail
# (xauth?)
userdom_read_user_home_content_files(xserver_t)
@@ -80127,7 +130715,7 @@ index d40f750..3711d39 100644
')
optional_policy(`
-@@ -859,6 +1216,10 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -859,6 +1246,10 @@ optional_policy(`
rhgb_rw_tmpfs_files(xserver_t)
')
@@ -80138,7 +130726,7 @@ index d40f750..3711d39 100644
########################################
#
# Rules common to all X window domains
-@@ -902,7 +1263,7 @@ allow x_domain xproperty_t:x_property { getattr create read write append destroy
+@@ -902,7 +1293,7 @@ allow x_domain xproperty_t:x_property { getattr create read write append destroy
allow x_domain root_xdrawable_t:x_drawable { getattr setattr list_child add_child remove_child send receive hide show };
# operations allowed on my windows
allow x_domain self:x_drawable { create destroy getattr setattr read write show hide list_child add_child remove_child manage send receive };
@@ -80147,7 +130735,7 @@ index d40f750..3711d39 100644
# operations allowed on all windows
allow x_domain x_domain:x_drawable { getattr get_property set_property remove_child };
-@@ -956,11 +1317,31 @@ allow x_domain self:x_resource { read write };
+@@ -956,11 +1347,31 @@ allow x_domain self:x_resource { read write };
# can mess with the screensaver
allow x_domain xserver_t:x_screen { getattr saver_getattr };
@@ -80179,7 +130767,7 @@ index d40f750..3711d39 100644
tunable_policy(`! xserver_object_manager',`
# should be xserver_unconfined(x_domain),
# but typeattribute doesnt work in conditionals
-@@ -982,18 +1363,44 @@ tunable_policy(`! xserver_object_manager',`
+@@ -982,18 +1393,44 @@ tunable_policy(`! xserver_object_manager',`
allow x_domain xevent_type:{ x_event x_synthetic_event } *;
')
@@ -80240,7 +130828,7 @@ index d40f750..3711d39 100644
+ unconfined_domain(xdm_unconfined_t)
+')
diff --git a/policy/modules/system/application.if b/policy/modules/system/application.if
-index 1b6619e..219acba 100644
+index 1b6619e..be02b96 100644
--- a/policy/modules/system/application.if
+++ b/policy/modules/system/application.if
@@ -43,6 +43,27 @@ interface(`application_executable_file',`
@@ -80271,7 +130859,7 @@ index 1b6619e..219acba 100644
########################################
## <summary>
## Execute application executables in the caller domain.
-@@ -76,7 +97,6 @@ interface(`application_exec_all',`
+@@ -76,13 +97,30 @@ interface(`application_exec_all',`
corecmd_dontaudit_exec_all_executables($1)
corecmd_exec_bin($1)
corecmd_exec_shell($1)
@@ -80279,7 +130867,31 @@ index 1b6619e..219acba 100644
application_exec($1)
')
-@@ -189,6 +209,24 @@ interface(`application_dontaudit_signal',`
+
+ ########################################
+ ## <summary>
++## Dontaudit execute all executable files.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain to not audit.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`application_dontaudit_exec',`
++ gen_require(`
++ attribute application_exec_type;
++ ')
++
++ dontaudit $1 application_exec_type:file execute;
++')
++
++########################################
++## <summary>
+ ## Create a domain for applications.
+ ## </summary>
+ ## <desc>
+@@ -189,6 +227,24 @@ interface(`application_dontaudit_signal',`
########################################
## <summary>
@@ -80304,7 +130916,7 @@ index 1b6619e..219acba 100644
## Do not audit attempts to send kill signals
## to all application domains.
## </summary>
-@@ -205,3 +243,21 @@ interface(`application_dontaudit_sigkill',`
+@@ -205,3 +261,21 @@ interface(`application_dontaudit_sigkill',`
dontaudit $1 application_domain_type:process sigkill;
')
@@ -80327,10 +130939,10 @@ index 1b6619e..219acba 100644
+ allow $1 application_domain_type:socket_class_set getattr;
+')
diff --git a/policy/modules/system/application.te b/policy/modules/system/application.te
-index c6fdab7..32f45fa 100644
+index c6fdab7..c59902a 100644
--- a/policy/modules/system/application.te
+++ b/policy/modules/system/application.te
-@@ -6,6 +6,28 @@ attribute application_domain_type;
+@@ -6,6 +6,30 @@ attribute application_domain_type;
# Executables to be run by user
attribute application_exec_type;
@@ -80339,9 +130951,11 @@ index c6fdab7..32f45fa 100644
+userdom_inherit_append_user_home_content_files(application_domain_type)
+userdom_inherit_append_admin_home_files(application_domain_type)
+userdom_inherit_append_user_tmp_files(application_domain_type)
++userdom_rw_inherited_user_tmp_files(application_domain_type)
++userdom_rw_inherited_user_pipes(application_domain_type)
+logging_inherit_append_all_logs(application_domain_type)
+
-+files_dontaudit_search_all_dirs(application_domain_type)
++files_dontaudit_search_non_security_dirs(application_domain_type)
+
+optional_policy(`
+ afs_rw_udp_sockets(application_domain_type)
@@ -80360,10 +130974,10 @@ index c6fdab7..32f45fa 100644
cron_sigchld(application_domain_type)
')
diff --git a/policy/modules/system/authlogin.fc b/policy/modules/system/authlogin.fc
-index 28ad538..47fdb65 100644
+index 28ad538..ffa1f8f 100644
--- a/policy/modules/system/authlogin.fc
+++ b/policy/modules/system/authlogin.fc
-@@ -1,3 +1,7 @@
+@@ -1,14 +1,25 @@
+HOME_DIR/\.google_authenticator gen_context(system_u:object_r:auth_home_t,s0)
+HOME_DIR/\.google_authenticator~ gen_context(system_u:object_r:auth_home_t,s0)
+/root/\.google_authenticator gen_context(system_u:object_r:auth_home_t,s0)
@@ -80371,22 +130985,29 @@ index 28ad538..47fdb65 100644
/bin/login -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:login_exec_t,s0)
-@@ -5,7 +9,14 @@
- /etc/group\.lock -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:shadow_t,s0)
+-/etc/\.pwd\.lock -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:shadow_t,s0)
+-/etc/group\.lock -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:shadow_t,s0)
++/etc/group\.lock -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:passwd_file_t,s0)
/etc/gshadow.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:shadow_t,s0)
- /etc/passwd\.lock -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:shadow_t,s0)
-+/etc/passwd\.adjunct.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:shadow_t,s0)
+-/etc/passwd\.lock -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:shadow_t,s0)
/etc/shadow.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:shadow_t,s0)
+/etc/security/opasswd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:shadow_t,s0)
+/etc/security/opasswd\.old -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:shadow_t,s0)
++/etc/passwd\.lock -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:passwd_file_t,s0)
++/etc/passwd\.adjunct.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:passwd_file_t,s0)
++/etc/\.pwd\.lock -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:passwd_file_t,s0)
+/etc/passwd[-\+]? -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:passwd_file_t,s0)
+/etc/passwd\.OLD -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:passwd_file_t,s0)
+/etc/ptmptmp -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:passwd_file_t,s0)
+/etc/group[-\+]? -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:passwd_file_t,s0)
/sbin/pam_console_apply -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:pam_console_exec_t,s0)
- /sbin/pam_timestamp_check -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:pam_exec_t,s0)
-@@ -16,13 +27,22 @@ ifdef(`distro_suse', `
+-/sbin/pam_timestamp_check -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:pam_exec_t,s0)
++/sbin/pam_timestamp_check -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:pam_timestamp_exec_t,s0)
+ /sbin/unix_chkpwd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:chkpwd_exec_t,s0)
+ /sbin/unix_update -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:updpwd_exec_t,s0)
+ /sbin/unix_verify -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:chkpwd_exec_t,s0)
+@@ -16,13 +27,24 @@ ifdef(`distro_suse', `
/sbin/unix2_chkpwd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:chkpwd_exec_t,s0)
')
@@ -80397,7 +131018,7 @@ index 28ad538..47fdb65 100644
-/usr/sbin/utempter -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:utempter_exec_t,s0)
-/usr/sbin/validate -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:chkpwd_exec_t,s0)
+/usr/sbin/pam_console_apply -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:pam_console_exec_t,s0)
-+/usr/sbin/pam_timestamp_check -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:pam_exec_t,s0)
++/usr/sbin/pam_timestamp_check -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:pam_timestamp_exec_t,s0)
+/usr/sbin/unix_chkpwd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:chkpwd_exec_t,s0)
+/usr/sbin/unix_update -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:updpwd_exec_t,s0)
+/usr/sbin/unix_verify -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:chkpwd_exec_t,s0)
@@ -80408,10 +131029,12 @@ index 28ad538..47fdb65 100644
+/usr/sbin/validate -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:chkpwd_exec_t,s0)
+
+/var/ace(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:var_auth_t,s0)
++
++/var/opt/quest/vas/vasd(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:var_auth_t,s0)
/var/cache/coolkey(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:auth_cache_t,s0)
-@@ -30,6 +50,8 @@ ifdef(`distro_gentoo', `
+@@ -30,20 +52,24 @@ ifdef(`distro_gentoo', `
/var/lib/abl(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:var_auth_t,s0)
/var/lib/pam_ssh(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:var_auth_t,s0)
@@ -80420,8 +131043,13 @@ index 28ad538..47fdb65 100644
/var/log/btmp.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:faillog_t,s0)
/var/log/dmesg -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:var_log_t,s0)
-@@ -39,11 +61,13 @@ ifdef(`distro_gentoo', `
- /var/log/tallylog -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:faillog_t,s0)
+-/var/log/faillog -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:faillog_t,s0)
+-/var/log/lastlog -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:lastlog_t,s0)
++/var/log/faillog.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:faillog_t,s0)
++/var/log/lastlog.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:lastlog_t,s0)
+ /var/log/syslog -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:var_log_t,s0)
+-/var/log/tallylog -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:faillog_t,s0)
++/var/log/tallylog.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:faillog_t,s0)
/var/log/wtmp.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:wtmp_t,s0)
+/var/lib/rsa(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:var_auth_t,s0)
@@ -80436,7 +131064,7 @@ index 28ad538..47fdb65 100644
-/var/run/user(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:var_auth_t,s0)
/var/(db|lib|adm)/sudo(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:pam_var_run_t,s0)
diff --git a/policy/modules/system/authlogin.if b/policy/modules/system/authlogin.if
-index f416ce9..2fa575e 100644
+index f416ce9..b4efacf 100644
--- a/policy/modules/system/authlogin.if
+++ b/policy/modules/system/authlogin.if
@@ -23,11 +23,17 @@ interface(`auth_role',`
@@ -80487,139 +131115,71 @@ index f416ce9..2fa575e 100644
')
########################################
-@@ -95,9 +114,13 @@ interface(`auth_use_pam',`
+@@ -95,48 +114,21 @@ interface(`auth_use_pam',`
interface(`auth_login_pgm_domain',`
gen_require(`
type var_auth_t, auth_cache_t;
+ attribute polydomain;
++ attribute login_pgm;
+ type auth_home_t;
')
domain_type($1)
+ typeattribute $1 polydomain;
++ typeattribute $1 login_pgm;
+
domain_subj_id_change_exemption($1)
domain_role_change_exemption($1)
domain_obj_id_change_exemption($1)
-@@ -105,14 +128,17 @@ interface(`auth_login_pgm_domain',`
-
- # Needed for pam_selinux_permit to cleanup properly
- domain_read_all_domains_state($1)
-+ corecmd_getattr_all_executables($1)
- domain_kill_all_domains($1)
-
- # pam_keyring
- allow $1 self:capability ipc_lock;
- allow $1 self:process setkeycreate;
- allow $1 self:key manage_key_perms;
-+ userdom_manage_all_users_keys($1)
-
- files_list_var_lib($1)
-+ manage_dirs_pattern($1, var_auth_t, var_auth_t)
- manage_files_pattern($1, var_auth_t, var_auth_t)
-
- manage_dirs_pattern($1, auth_cache_t, auth_cache_t)
-@@ -120,16 +146,31 @@ interface(`auth_login_pgm_domain',`
- manage_sock_files_pattern($1, auth_cache_t, auth_cache_t)
- files_var_filetrans($1, auth_cache_t, dir)
-
-+ manage_dirs_pattern($1, auth_home_t, auth_home_t)
-+ manage_files_pattern($1, auth_home_t, auth_home_t)
-+ auth_filetrans_admin_home_content($1)
-+ auth_filetrans_home_content($1)
-+
- # needed for afs - https://bugzilla.redhat.com/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=253321
- kernel_rw_afs_state($1)
-+ kernel_search_network_sysctl($1)
-+
-+ tunable_policy(`authlogin_radius',`
-+ corenet_udp_bind_all_unreserved_ports($1)
-+ ')
-+ corenet_tcp_connect_pki_ca_port($1)
-
- # for fingerprint readers
- dev_rw_input_dev($1)
- dev_rw_generic_usb_dev($1)
+ role system_r types $1;
+- # Needed for pam_selinux_permit to cleanup properly
+- domain_read_all_domains_state($1)
+- domain_kill_all_domains($1)
+-
+- # pam_keyring
+- allow $1 self:capability ipc_lock;
+- allow $1 self:process setkeycreate;
+- allow $1 self:key manage_key_perms;
+-
+- files_list_var_lib($1)
+- manage_files_pattern($1, var_auth_t, var_auth_t)
+-
+- manage_dirs_pattern($1, auth_cache_t, auth_cache_t)
+- manage_files_pattern($1, auth_cache_t, auth_cache_t)
+- manage_sock_files_pattern($1, auth_cache_t, auth_cache_t)
+- files_var_filetrans($1, auth_cache_t, dir)
+-
+- # needed for afs - https://bugzilla.redhat.com/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=253321
+- kernel_rw_afs_state($1)
+-
+- # for fingerprint readers
+- dev_rw_input_dev($1)
+- dev_rw_generic_usb_dev($1)
+-
- files_read_etc_files($1)
-+ files_read_config_files($1)
-
- fs_list_auto_mountpoints($1)
-+ fs_manage_cgroup_dirs($1)
-+ fs_manage_cgroup_files($1)
-+ fs_read_ecryptfs_symlinks($1)
-+ fs_read_ecryptfs_files($1)
-
+-
+- fs_list_auto_mountpoints($1)
+-
selinux_get_fs_mount($1)
- selinux_validate_context($1)
-@@ -145,6 +186,8 @@ interface(`auth_login_pgm_domain',`
- mls_process_set_level($1)
+- selinux_validate_context($1)
+- selinux_compute_access_vector($1)
+- selinux_compute_create_context($1)
+- selinux_compute_relabel_context($1)
+- selinux_compute_user_contexts($1)
+
+ mls_file_read_all_levels($1)
+ mls_file_write_all_levels($1)
+@@ -146,18 +138,43 @@ interface(`auth_login_pgm_domain',`
mls_fd_share_all_levels($1)
-+ auth_manage_faillog($1)
-+ auth_manage_pam_pid($1)
auth_use_pam($1)
-
- init_rw_utmp($1)
-@@ -153,11 +196,94 @@ interface(`auth_login_pgm_domain',`
- logging_set_tty_audit($1)
-
- seutil_read_config($1)
-+ seutil_read_login_config($1)
- seutil_read_default_contexts($1)
-
-- tunable_policy(`allow_polyinstantiation',`
-- files_polyinstantiate_all($1)
-+ systemd_login_read_pid_files($1)
-+
-+ userdom_set_rlimitnh($1)
-+ userdom_read_user_home_content_symlinks($1)
-+ userdom_delete_user_tmp_files($1)
-+ userdom_search_admin_dir($1)
-+ userdom_stream_connect($1)
-+ userdom_manage_user_tmp_files($1)
-+
-+ optional_policy(`
-+ afs_rw_udp_sockets($1)
-+ ')
-+
-+ optional_policy(`
-+ kerberos_read_config($1)
-+ ')
-+
-+ optional_policy(`
-+ oddjob_dbus_chat($1)
-+ oddjob_domtrans_mkhomedir($1)
-+ ')
-+
-+ optional_policy(`
-+ openct_stream_connect($1)
-+ openct_signull($1)
-+ openct_read_pid_files($1)
-+ ')
-+
-+ optional_policy(`
-+ corecmd_exec_bin($1)
-+ storage_getattr_fixed_disk_dev($1)
-+ mount_domtrans($1)
-+ mount_domtrans_ecryptmount($1)
-+ ')
-+
-+ optional_policy(`
-+ fprintd_dbus_chat($1)
-+ ')
-+
-+ optional_policy(`
-+ # allow execute tmux
-+ screen_exec($1)
-+ ')
-+
-+ optional_policy(`
-+ ssh_agent_exec($1)
-+ ssh_read_user_home_files($1)
-+ ')
+')
-+
+
+- init_rw_utmp($1)
+-
+- logging_set_loginuid($1)
+- logging_set_tty_audit($1)
+########################################
+## <summary>
+## Read authlogin state files.
@@ -80633,12 +131193,16 @@ index f416ce9..2fa575e 100644
+interface(`authlogin_read_state',`
+ gen_require(`
+ attribute polydomain;
- ')
-+
++ ')
+
+- seutil_read_config($1)
+- seutil_read_default_contexts($1)
+ kernel_search_proc($1)
+ ps_process_pattern($1, polydomain)
+')
-+
+
+- tunable_policy(`allow_polyinstantiation',`
+- files_polyinstantiate_all($1)
+########################################
+## <summary>
+## Read and write a authlogin unnamed pipe.
@@ -80652,13 +131216,13 @@ index f416ce9..2fa575e 100644
+interface(`authlogin_rw_pipes',`
+ gen_require(`
+ attribute polydomain;
-+ ')
+ ')
+
+ allow $1 polydomain:fifo_file rw_inherited_fifo_file_perms;
')
########################################
-@@ -231,6 +357,25 @@ interface(`auth_domtrans_login_program',`
+@@ -231,6 +248,25 @@ interface(`auth_domtrans_login_program',`
########################################
## <summary>
@@ -80684,7 +131248,7 @@ index f416ce9..2fa575e 100644
## Execute a login_program in the target domain,
## with a range transition.
## </summary>
-@@ -395,13 +540,15 @@ interface(`auth_domtrans_chk_passwd',`
+@@ -395,13 +431,15 @@ interface(`auth_domtrans_chk_passwd',`
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -80701,7 +131265,7 @@ index f416ce9..2fa575e 100644
')
########################################
-@@ -448,6 +595,25 @@ interface(`auth_run_chk_passwd',`
+@@ -448,6 +486,25 @@ interface(`auth_run_chk_passwd',`
auth_domtrans_chk_passwd($1)
role $2 types chkpwd_t;
@@ -80727,7 +131291,7 @@ index f416ce9..2fa575e 100644
')
########################################
-@@ -467,7 +633,6 @@ interface(`auth_domtrans_upd_passwd',`
+@@ -467,7 +524,6 @@ interface(`auth_domtrans_upd_passwd',`
domtrans_pattern($1, updpwd_exec_t, updpwd_t)
auth_dontaudit_read_shadow($1)
@@ -80735,18 +131299,17 @@ index f416ce9..2fa575e 100644
')
########################################
-@@ -664,6 +829,10 @@ interface(`auth_manage_shadow',`
+@@ -664,6 +720,9 @@ interface(`auth_manage_shadow',`
allow $1 shadow_t:file manage_file_perms;
typeattribute $1 can_read_shadow_passwords, can_write_shadow_passwords;
+ files_var_filetrans($1, shadow_t, file, "shadow")
+ files_var_filetrans($1, shadow_t, file, "shadow-")
-+ files_etc_filetrans($1, shadow_t, file, ".pwd.lock")
+ files_etc_filetrans($1, shadow_t, file, "gshadow")
')
#######################################
-@@ -763,7 +932,50 @@ interface(`auth_rw_faillog',`
+@@ -763,7 +822,50 @@ interface(`auth_rw_faillog',`
')
logging_search_logs($1)
@@ -80798,7 +131361,104 @@ index f416ce9..2fa575e 100644
')
#######################################
-@@ -959,9 +1171,30 @@ interface(`auth_manage_var_auth',`
+@@ -826,7 +928,7 @@ interface(`auth_rw_lastlog',`
+
+ ########################################
+ ## <summary>
+-## Execute pam programs in the pam domain.
++## Execute pam timestamp programs in the pam timestamp domain.
+ ## </summary>
+ ## <param name="domain">
+ ## <summary>
+@@ -834,12 +936,27 @@ interface(`auth_rw_lastlog',`
+ ## </summary>
+ ## </param>
+ #
+-interface(`auth_domtrans_pam',`
++interface(`auth_domtrans_pam_timestamp',`
+ gen_require(`
+- type pam_t, pam_exec_t;
++ type pam_timestamp_t, pam_timestamp_exec_t;
+ ')
+
+- domtrans_pattern($1, pam_exec_t, pam_t)
++ domtrans_pattern($1, pam_timestamp_exec_t, pam_timestamp_t)
++')
++
++########################################
++## <summary>
++## Execute pam timestamp programs in the pam timestamp domain.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed to transition.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`auth_domtrans_pam',`
++ auth_domtrans_pam_timestamp($1)
++ refpolicywarn(`$0() has been deprecated, please use auth_domtrans_pam_timestamp() instead.')
+ ')
+
+ ########################################
+@@ -854,15 +971,15 @@ interface(`auth_domtrans_pam',`
+ #
+ interface(`auth_signal_pam',`
+ gen_require(`
+- type pam_t;
++ type pam_timestamp_t;
+ ')
+
+- allow $1 pam_t:process signal;
++ allow $1 pam_timestamp_t:process signal;
+ ')
+
+ ########################################
+ ## <summary>
+-## Execute pam programs in the PAM domain.
++## Execute pam_timestamp programs in the PAM timestamp domain.
+ ## </summary>
+ ## <param name="domain">
+ ## <summary>
+@@ -875,13 +992,33 @@ interface(`auth_signal_pam',`
+ ## </summary>
+ ## </param>
+ #
+-interface(`auth_run_pam',`
++interface(`auth_run_pam_timestamp',`
+ gen_require(`
+- type pam_t;
++ type pam_timestamp_t;
+ ')
+
+- auth_domtrans_pam($1)
+- role $2 types pam_t;
++ auth_domtrans_pam_timestamp($1)
++ role $2 types pam_timestamp_t;
++')
++
++########################################
++## <summary>
++## Execute pam_timestamp programs in the PAM timestamp domain.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed to transition.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++## <param name="role">
++## <summary>
++## The role to allow the PAM domain.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`auth_run_pam',`
++ auth_run_pam_timestamp($1, $2)
++ refpolicywarn(`$0() has been deprecated, please use auth_run_pam_timestamp.')
+ ')
+
+ ########################################
+@@ -959,9 +1096,30 @@ interface(`auth_manage_var_auth',`
')
files_search_var($1)
@@ -80832,7 +131492,7 @@ index f416ce9..2fa575e 100644
')
########################################
-@@ -1040,6 +1273,10 @@ interface(`auth_manage_pam_pid',`
+@@ -1040,6 +1198,10 @@ interface(`auth_manage_pam_pid',`
files_search_pids($1)
allow $1 pam_var_run_t:dir manage_dir_perms;
allow $1 pam_var_run_t:file manage_file_perms;
@@ -80843,7 +131503,7 @@ index f416ce9..2fa575e 100644
')
########################################
-@@ -1157,6 +1394,7 @@ interface(`auth_manage_pam_console_data',`
+@@ -1157,6 +1319,7 @@ interface(`auth_manage_pam_console_data',`
files_search_pids($1)
manage_files_pattern($1, pam_var_console_t, pam_var_console_t)
manage_lnk_files_pattern($1, pam_var_console_t, pam_var_console_t)
@@ -80851,7 +131511,7 @@ index f416ce9..2fa575e 100644
')
#######################################
-@@ -1526,6 +1764,25 @@ interface(`auth_setattr_login_records',`
+@@ -1526,6 +1689,25 @@ interface(`auth_setattr_login_records',`
########################################
## <summary>
@@ -80877,7 +131537,7 @@ index f416ce9..2fa575e 100644
## Read login records files (/var/log/wtmp).
## </summary>
## <param name="domain">
-@@ -1676,24 +1933,7 @@ interface(`auth_manage_login_records',`
+@@ -1676,24 +1858,7 @@ interface(`auth_manage_login_records',`
logging_rw_generic_log_dirs($1)
allow $1 wtmp_t:file manage_file_perms;
@@ -80903,7 +131563,7 @@ index f416ce9..2fa575e 100644
')
########################################
-@@ -1717,9 +1957,9 @@ interface(`auth_relabel_login_records',`
+@@ -1717,11 +1882,13 @@ interface(`auth_relabel_login_records',`
## <infoflow type="both" weight="10"/>
#
interface(`auth_use_nsswitch',`
@@ -80915,8 +131575,12 @@ index f416ce9..2fa575e 100644
+ ')
typeattribute $1 nsswitch_domain;
++
++ corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel($1)
')
-@@ -1755,3 +1995,194 @@ interface(`auth_unconfined',`
+
+ ########################################
+@@ -1755,3 +1922,199 @@ interface(`auth_unconfined',`
typeattribute $1 can_write_shadow_passwords;
typeattribute $1 can_relabelto_shadow_passwords;
')
@@ -80940,6 +131604,7 @@ index f416ce9..2fa575e 100644
+ type wtmp_t;
+ type pam_var_console_t;
+ type pam_var_run_t;
++ type auth_cache_t;
+ ')
+
+ files_etc_filetrans($1, passwd_file_t, file, "group")
@@ -80950,12 +131615,12 @@ index f416ce9..2fa575e 100644
+ #files_etc_filetrans($1, passwd_file_t, file, "passwd+")
+ files_etc_filetrans($1, passwd_file_t, file, "passwd.OLD")
+ files_etc_filetrans($1, passwd_file_t, file, "ptmptmp")
-+ files_etc_filetrans($1, shadow_t, file, "group.lock")
-+ files_etc_filetrans($1, shadow_t, file, "passwd.lock")
-+ files_etc_filetrans($1, shadow_t, file, "passwd.adjunct")
++ files_etc_filetrans($1, passwd_file_t, file, "passwd.lock")
++ files_etc_filetrans($1, passwd_file_t, file, "group.lock")
++ files_etc_filetrans($1, passwd_file_t, file, "passwd.adjunct")
++ files_etc_filetrans($1, passwd_file_t, file, ".pwd.lock")
+ files_etc_filetrans($1, shadow_t, file, "shadow")
+ files_etc_filetrans($1, shadow_t, file, "shadow-")
-+ files_etc_filetrans($1, shadow_t, file, ".pwd.lock")
+ files_etc_filetrans($1, shadow_t, file, "gshadow")
+ logging_log_named_filetrans($1, lastlog_t, file, "lastlog")
+ logging_log_named_filetrans($1, faillog_t, file, "tallylog")
@@ -80969,6 +131634,7 @@ index f416ce9..2fa575e 100644
+ files_pid_filetrans($1, pam_var_run_t, dir, "sepermit")
+ files_pid_filetrans($1, pam_var_run_t, dir, "sudo")
+ logging_log_named_filetrans($1, wtmp_t, file, "wtmp")
++ files_var_filetrans($1, auth_cache_t, dir, "coolkey")
+')
+
+########################################
@@ -81069,6 +131735,9 @@ index f416ce9..2fa575e 100644
+ files_etc_filetrans($1, passwd_file_t, file, "ptmptmp")
+ files_etc_filetrans($1, passwd_file_t, file, "group")
+ files_etc_filetrans($1, passwd_file_t, file, "group-")
++ files_etc_filetrans($1, passwd_file_t, file, ".pwd.lock")
++ files_etc_filetrans($1, passwd_file_t, file, "passwd.lock")
++ files_etc_filetrans($1, passwd_file_t, file, "group.lock")
+')
+
+########################################
@@ -81112,10 +131781,10 @@ index f416ce9..2fa575e 100644
+ userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans($1, auth_home_t, file, ".google_authenticator~")
+')
diff --git a/policy/modules/system/authlogin.te b/policy/modules/system/authlogin.te
-index f145ccb..c0ed878 100644
+index f145ccb..499ee40 100644
--- a/policy/modules/system/authlogin.te
+++ b/policy/modules/system/authlogin.te
-@@ -5,6 +5,12 @@ policy_module(authlogin, 2.4.0)
+@@ -5,6 +5,19 @@ policy_module(authlogin, 2.4.0)
# Declarations
#
@@ -81125,15 +131794,23 @@ index f145ccb..c0ed878 100644
+## </p>
+## </desc>
+gen_tunable(authlogin_radius, false)
++
++## <desc>
++## <p>
++## Allow users to login using a yubikey server
++## </p>
++## </desc>
++gen_tunable(authlogin_yubikey, false)
## <desc>
## <p>
-@@ -16,20 +22,25 @@ gen_tunable(authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap, false)
+@@ -16,20 +29,26 @@ gen_tunable(authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap, false)
attribute can_read_shadow_passwords;
attribute can_write_shadow_passwords;
attribute can_relabelto_shadow_passwords;
+attribute polydomain;
attribute nsswitch_domain;
++attribute login_pgm;
type auth_cache_t;
logging_log_file(auth_cache_t)
@@ -81155,7 +131832,30 @@ index f145ccb..c0ed878 100644
type lastlog_t;
logging_log_file(lastlog_t)
-@@ -64,6 +75,9 @@ neverallow ~can_read_shadow_passwords shadow_t:file read;
+@@ -42,15 +61,15 @@ type pam_console_exec_t;
+ init_system_domain(pam_console_t, pam_console_exec_t)
+ role system_r types pam_console_t;
+
+-type pam_t;
+-domain_type(pam_t)
+-role system_r types pam_t;
++type pam_timestamp_t alias pam_t;
++domain_type(pam_timestamp_t)
++role system_r types pam_timestamp_t;
+
+-type pam_exec_t;
+-domain_entry_file(pam_t, pam_exec_t)
++type pam_timestamp_exec_t alias pam_exec_t;
++domain_entry_file(pam_timestamp_t, pam_timestamp_exec_t)
+
+-type pam_tmp_t;
+-files_tmp_file(pam_tmp_t)
++type pam_timestamp_tmp_t;
++files_tmp_file(pam_timestamp_tmp_t)
+
+ type pam_var_console_t;
+ files_pid_file(pam_var_console_t)
+@@ -64,6 +83,9 @@ neverallow ~can_read_shadow_passwords shadow_t:file read;
neverallow ~can_write_shadow_passwords shadow_t:file { create write };
neverallow ~can_relabelto_shadow_passwords shadow_t:file relabelto;
@@ -81165,7 +131865,7 @@ index f145ccb..c0ed878 100644
type updpwd_t;
type updpwd_exec_t;
domain_type(updpwd_t)
-@@ -109,6 +123,8 @@ dev_read_urand(chkpwd_t)
+@@ -109,6 +131,8 @@ dev_read_urand(chkpwd_t)
files_read_etc_files(chkpwd_t)
# for nscd
files_dontaudit_search_var(chkpwd_t)
@@ -81174,7 +131874,12 @@ index f145ccb..c0ed878 100644
fs_dontaudit_getattr_xattr_fs(chkpwd_t)
-@@ -127,7 +143,7 @@ miscfiles_read_localization(chkpwd_t)
+@@ -122,12 +146,11 @@ auth_use_nsswitch(chkpwd_t)
+ logging_send_audit_msgs(chkpwd_t)
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(chkpwd_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(chkpwd_t)
+
seutil_read_config(chkpwd_t)
seutil_dontaudit_use_newrole_fds(chkpwd_t)
@@ -81183,7 +131888,97 @@ index f145ccb..c0ed878 100644
ifdef(`distro_ubuntu',`
optional_policy(`
-@@ -341,6 +357,7 @@ kernel_read_system_state(updpwd_t)
+@@ -153,53 +176,52 @@ optional_policy(`
+ # PAM local policy
+ #
+
+-allow pam_t self:process ~{ ptrace setcurrent setexec setfscreate setrlimit execmem execstack execheap };
+-dontaudit pam_t self:capability sys_tty_config;
++allow pam_timestamp_t self:process ~{ ptrace setcurrent setexec setfscreate setrlimit execmem execstack execheap };
++dontaudit pam_timestamp_t self:capability sys_tty_config;
+
+-allow pam_t self:fd use;
+-allow pam_t self:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
+-allow pam_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms;
+-allow pam_t self:unix_stream_socket rw_stream_socket_perms;
+-allow pam_t self:unix_dgram_socket sendto;
+-allow pam_t self:unix_stream_socket connectto;
+-allow pam_t self:shm create_shm_perms;
+-allow pam_t self:sem create_sem_perms;
+-allow pam_t self:msgq create_msgq_perms;
+-allow pam_t self:msg { send receive };
++allow pam_timestamp_t self:fd use;
++allow pam_timestamp_t self:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
++allow pam_timestamp_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms;
++allow pam_timestamp_t self:unix_stream_socket rw_stream_socket_perms;
++allow pam_timestamp_t self:unix_dgram_socket sendto;
++allow pam_timestamp_t self:unix_stream_socket connectto;
++allow pam_timestamp_t self:shm create_shm_perms;
++allow pam_timestamp_t self:sem create_sem_perms;
++allow pam_timestamp_t self:msgq create_msgq_perms;
++allow pam_timestamp_t self:msg { send receive };
+
+-delete_files_pattern(pam_t, pam_var_run_t, pam_var_run_t)
+-read_files_pattern(pam_t, pam_var_run_t, pam_var_run_t)
+-files_list_pids(pam_t)
++delete_files_pattern(pam_timestamp_t, pam_var_run_t, pam_var_run_t)
++read_files_pattern(pam_timestamp_t, pam_var_run_t, pam_var_run_t)
++files_list_pids(pam_timestamp_t)
+
+-allow pam_t pam_tmp_t:dir manage_dir_perms;
+-allow pam_t pam_tmp_t:file manage_file_perms;
+-files_tmp_filetrans(pam_t, pam_tmp_t, { file dir })
++allow pam_timestamp_t pam_timestamp_tmp_t:dir manage_dir_perms;
++allow pam_timestamp_t pam_timestamp_tmp_t:file manage_file_perms;
++files_tmp_filetrans(pam_timestamp_t, pam_timestamp_tmp_t, { file dir })
+
+-auth_use_nsswitch(pam_t)
++auth_use_nsswitch(pam_timestamp_t)
+
+-kernel_read_system_state(pam_t)
++kernel_read_system_state(pam_timestamp_t)
+
+-files_read_etc_files(pam_t)
++files_read_etc_files(pam_timestamp_t)
+
+-fs_search_auto_mountpoints(pam_t)
++fs_search_auto_mountpoints(pam_timestamp_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(pam_t)
+
+-term_use_all_ttys(pam_t)
+-term_use_all_ptys(pam_t)
++term_use_all_ttys(pam_timestamp_t)
++term_use_all_ptys(pam_timestamp_t)
+
+-init_dontaudit_rw_utmp(pam_t)
++init_dontaudit_rw_utmp(pam_timestamp_t)
+
+-logging_send_syslog_msg(pam_t)
++logging_send_syslog_msg(pam_timestamp_t)
+
+ ifdef(`distro_ubuntu',`
+ optional_policy(`
+- unconfined_domain(pam_t)
++ unconfined_domain(pam_timestamp_t)
+ ')
+ ')
+
+ optional_policy(`
+- locallogin_use_fds(pam_t)
++ locallogin_use_fds(pam_timestamp_t)
+ ')
+
+ ########################################
+@@ -289,7 +311,6 @@ init_use_script_ptys(pam_console_t)
+
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(pam_console_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(pam_console_t)
+ miscfiles_read_generic_certs(pam_console_t)
+
+ seutil_read_file_contexts(pam_console_t)
+@@ -341,6 +362,7 @@ kernel_read_system_state(updpwd_t)
dev_read_urand(updpwd_t)
files_manage_etc_files(updpwd_t)
@@ -81191,16 +131986,18 @@ index f145ccb..c0ed878 100644
term_dontaudit_use_console(updpwd_t)
term_dontaudit_use_unallocated_ttys(updpwd_t)
-@@ -352,7 +369,7 @@ logging_send_syslog_msg(updpwd_t)
+@@ -350,9 +372,8 @@ auth_use_nsswitch(updpwd_t)
+
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(updpwd_t)
- miscfiles_read_localization(updpwd_t)
+-miscfiles_read_localization(updpwd_t)
-userdom_use_user_terminals(updpwd_t)
+userdom_use_inherited_user_terminals(updpwd_t)
ifdef(`distro_ubuntu',`
optional_policy(`
-@@ -380,13 +397,15 @@ term_dontaudit_use_all_ttys(utempter_t)
+@@ -380,13 +401,15 @@ term_dontaudit_use_all_ttys(utempter_t)
term_dontaudit_use_all_ptys(utempter_t)
term_dontaudit_use_ptmx(utempter_t)
@@ -81217,7 +132014,7 @@ index f145ccb..c0ed878 100644
# Allow utemper to write to /tmp/.xses-*
userdom_write_user_tmp_files(utempter_t)
-@@ -397,12 +416,81 @@ ifdef(`distro_ubuntu',`
+@@ -397,19 +420,27 @@ ifdef(`distro_ubuntu',`
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -81236,93 +132033,190 @@ index f145ccb..c0ed878 100644
+ tunable_policy(`polyinstantiation_enabled',`
+ namespace_init_domtrans(polydomain)
+ ')
+ ')
+
+-#######################################
++######################################
+ #
+ # nsswitch_domain local policy
+ #
+
++auth_read_passwd(nsswitch_domain)
++
+ files_list_var_lib(nsswitch_domain)
+
+ # read /etc/nsswitch.conf
+@@ -426,6 +457,12 @@ tunable_policy(`authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap',`
+
+ optional_policy(`
+ tunable_policy(`authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap',`
++ dirsrv_stream_connect(nsswitch_domain)
++ ')
+')
+
-+######################################
++optional_policy(`
++ tunable_policy(`authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap',`
+ ldap_stream_connect(nsswitch_domain)
+ ')
+ ')
+@@ -438,6 +475,7 @@ optional_policy(`
+ likewise_stream_connect_lsassd(nsswitch_domain)
+ ')
+
++# can not wrap nis_use_ypbind or kerberos_use, but they both have booleans you can turn off.
+ optional_policy(`
+ kerberos_use(nsswitch_domain)
+ ')
+@@ -447,7 +485,7 @@ optional_policy(`
+ ')
+
+ optional_policy(`
+- nscd_socket_use(nsswitch_domain)
++ nscd_use(nsswitch_domain)
+ ')
+
+ optional_policy(`
+@@ -456,6 +494,7 @@ optional_policy(`
+
+ optional_policy(`
+ sssd_stream_connect(nsswitch_domain)
++ sssd_read_public_files(nsswitch_domain)
+ ')
+
+ optional_policy(`
+@@ -463,3 +502,132 @@ optional_policy(`
+ samba_read_var_files(nsswitch_domain)
+ samba_dontaudit_write_var_files(nsswitch_domain)
+ ')
++
++#######################################
+#
-+# nsswitch_domain local policy
++# Login Program local policy
+#
+
-+auth_read_passwd(nsswitch_domain)
++domain_read_all_domains_state(login_pgm)
++corecmd_getattr_all_executables(login_pgm)
++domain_kill_all_domains(login_pgm)
++
++# pam_keyring
++allow login_pgm self:capability ipc_lock;
++allow login_pgm self:process setkeycreate;
++allow login_pgm self:key manage_key_perms;
++userdom_manage_all_users_keys(login_pgm)
++
++files_list_var_lib(login_pgm)
++manage_dirs_pattern(login_pgm, var_auth_t, var_auth_t)
++manage_files_pattern(login_pgm, var_auth_t, var_auth_t)
++manage_sock_files_pattern(login_pgm, var_auth_t, var_auth_t)
+
-+# read /etc/nsswitch.conf
-+files_read_etc_files(nsswitch_domain)
++manage_dirs_pattern(login_pgm, auth_cache_t, auth_cache_t)
++manage_files_pattern(login_pgm, auth_cache_t, auth_cache_t)
++manage_sock_files_pattern(login_pgm, auth_cache_t, auth_cache_t)
++files_var_filetrans(login_pgm, auth_cache_t, dir)
+
-+sysnet_dns_name_resolve(nsswitch_domain)
++manage_dirs_pattern(login_pgm, auth_home_t, auth_home_t)
++manage_files_pattern(login_pgm, auth_home_t, auth_home_t)
++auth_filetrans_admin_home_content(login_pgm)
++auth_filetrans_home_content(login_pgm)
+
-+tunable_policy(`authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap',`
-+ files_list_var_lib(nsswitch_domain)
++# needed for afs - https://bugzilla.redhat.com/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=253321
++kernel_search_network_sysctl(login_pgm)
++kernel_rw_afs_state(login_pgm)
+
-+ miscfiles_read_generic_certs(nsswitch_domain)
-+ sysnet_use_ldap(nsswitch_domain)
++tunable_policy(`authlogin_radius',`
++ corenet_udp_bind_all_unreserved_ports(login_pgm)
+')
+
-+optional_policy(`
-+ tunable_policy(`authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap',`
-+ dirsrv_stream_connect(nsswitch_domain)
-+ ')
++tunable_policy(`authlogin_yubikey',`
++ corenet_tcp_connect_http_port(login_pgm)
+')
+
++corenet_tcp_connect_pki_ca_port(login_pgm)
++
++# for fingerprint readers
++dev_rw_input_dev(login_pgm)
++dev_rw_generic_usb_dev(login_pgm)
++
++files_read_config_files(login_pgm)
++
++fs_list_auto_mountpoints(login_pgm)
++fs_manage_cgroup_dirs(login_pgm)
++fs_manage_cgroup_files(login_pgm)
++fs_read_ecryptfs_symlinks(login_pgm)
++fs_read_ecryptfs_files(login_pgm)
++
++selinux_validate_context(login_pgm)
++selinux_compute_access_vector(login_pgm)
++selinux_compute_create_context(login_pgm)
++selinux_compute_relabel_context(login_pgm)
++selinux_compute_user_contexts(login_pgm)
++
++auth_manage_faillog(login_pgm)
++auth_manage_pam_pid(login_pgm)
++
++init_rw_utmp(login_pgm)
++
++logging_set_loginuid(login_pgm)
++logging_set_tty_audit(login_pgm)
++
++miscfiles_dontaudit_write_generic_cert_files(login_pgm)
++
++seutil_read_config(login_pgm)
++seutil_read_login_config(login_pgm)
++seutil_read_default_contexts(login_pgm)
++systemd_login_read_pid_files(login_pgm)
++
++userdom_set_rlimitnh(login_pgm)
++userdom_read_user_home_content_symlinks(login_pgm)
++userdom_delete_user_tmp_files(login_pgm)
++userdom_search_admin_dir(login_pgm)
++userdom_stream_connect(login_pgm)
++userdom_manage_user_tmp_dirs(login_pgm)
++userdom_manage_user_tmp_files(login_pgm)
++
+optional_policy(`
-+ tunable_policy(`authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap',`
-+ ldap_stream_connect(nsswitch_domain)
-+ ')
++ afs_rw_udp_sockets(login_pgm)
+')
+
+optional_policy(`
-+ likewise_stream_connect_lsassd(nsswitch_domain)
++ kerberos_read_config(login_pgm)
+')
+
-+# can not wrap nis_use_ypbind or kerberos_use, but they both have booleans you can turn off.
+optional_policy(`
-+ kerberos_use(nsswitch_domain)
++ oddjob_dbus_chat(login_pgm)
++ oddjob_domtrans_mkhomedir(login_pgm)
+')
+
+optional_policy(`
-+ nis_use_ypbind(nsswitch_domain)
++ openct_stream_connect(login_pgm)
++ openct_signull(login_pgm)
++ openct_read_pid_files(login_pgm)
+')
+
+optional_policy(`
-+ nscd_use(nsswitch_domain)
++ corecmd_exec_bin(login_pgm)
++ storage_getattr_fixed_disk_dev(login_pgm)
++ mount_domtrans(login_pgm)
++ mount_domtrans_ecryptmount(login_pgm)
+')
+
+optional_policy(`
-+ nslcd_stream_connect(nsswitch_domain)
++ fprintd_dbus_chat(login_pgm)
+')
+
+optional_policy(`
-+ sssd_stream_connect(nsswitch_domain)
-+ sssd_read_public_files(nsswitch_domain)
++ realmd_dbus_chat(login_pgm)
+')
+
+optional_policy(`
-+ samba_stream_connect_winbind(nsswitch_domain)
-+ samba_read_var_files(nsswitch_domain)
-+ samba_dontaudit_write_var_files(nsswitch_domain)
- ')
-
- #######################################
-@@ -426,6 +514,12 @@ tunable_policy(`authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap',`
-
- optional_policy(`
- tunable_policy(`authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap',`
-+ dirsrv_stream_connect(nsswitch_domain)
-+ ')
++ # allow execute tmux
++ screen_exec(login_pgm)
+')
+
+optional_policy(`
-+ tunable_policy(`authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap',`
- ldap_stream_connect(nsswitch_domain)
- ')
- ')
-@@ -456,6 +550,7 @@ optional_policy(`
-
- optional_policy(`
- sssd_stream_connect(nsswitch_domain)
-+ sssd_read_public_files(nsswitch_domain)
- ')
-
- optional_policy(`
++ ssh_agent_exec(login_pgm)
++ ssh_read_user_home_files(login_pgm)
++')
diff --git a/policy/modules/system/clock.fc b/policy/modules/system/clock.fc
index c5e05ca..c9ddbee 100644
--- a/policy/modules/system/clock.fc
@@ -81364,10 +132258,10 @@ index e2f6d93..c78ccc6 100644
## </summary>
## <param name="domain">
diff --git a/policy/modules/system/clock.te b/policy/modules/system/clock.te
-index b9ed25b..39e1dc1 100644
+index b9ed25b..91e25b5 100644
--- a/policy/modules/system/clock.te
+++ b/policy/modules/system/clock.te
-@@ -46,11 +46,13 @@ fs_search_auto_mountpoints(hwclock_t)
+@@ -46,18 +46,19 @@ fs_search_auto_mountpoints(hwclock_t)
term_dontaudit_use_console(hwclock_t)
term_use_unallocated_ttys(hwclock_t)
@@ -81383,7 +132277,14 @@ index b9ed25b..39e1dc1 100644
init_use_fds(hwclock_t)
init_use_script_ptys(hwclock_t)
-@@ -65,10 +67,6 @@ optional_policy(`
+ logging_send_audit_msgs(hwclock_t)
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(hwclock_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(hwclock_t)
+
+ optional_policy(`
+ apm_append_log(hwclock_t)
+@@ -65,10 +66,6 @@ optional_policy(`
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -81395,7 +132296,7 @@ index b9ed25b..39e1dc1 100644
')
diff --git a/policy/modules/system/fstools.fc b/policy/modules/system/fstools.fc
-index a97a096..e1b5cd8 100644
+index a97a096..f65892c 100644
--- a/policy/modules/system/fstools.fc
+++ b/policy/modules/system/fstools.fc
@@ -1,4 +1,3 @@
@@ -81411,7 +132312,7 @@ index a97a096..e1b5cd8 100644
/sbin/parted -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:fsadm_exec_t,s0)
/sbin/partprobe -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:fsadm_exec_t,s0)
/sbin/partx -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:fsadm_exec_t,s0)
-@@ -41,7 +39,44 @@
+@@ -41,7 +39,46 @@
/usr/bin/scsi_unique_id -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:fsadm_exec_t,s0)
/usr/bin/syslinux -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:fsadm_exec_t,s0)
@@ -81456,11 +132357,58 @@ index a97a096..e1b5cd8 100644
+/usr/sbin/tune2fs -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:fsadm_exec_t,s0)
/var/log/fsck(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:fsadm_log_t,s0)
++
++/var/run/blkid(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:fsadm_var_run_t,s0)
+diff --git a/policy/modules/system/fstools.if b/policy/modules/system/fstools.if
+index 016a770..927f4b8 100644
+--- a/policy/modules/system/fstools.if
++++ b/policy/modules/system/fstools.if
+@@ -154,3 +154,23 @@ interface(`fstools_getattr_swap_files',`
+
+ allow $1 swapfile_t:file getattr;
+ ')
++
++########################################
++## <summary>
++## Create, read, write, and delete the FSADM pid files.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`fsadm_manage_pid',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type fsadm_var_run_t;
++ ')
++
++ files_search_pids($1)
++ manage_files_pattern($1, fsadm_var_run_t, fsadm_var_run_t)
++ files_pid_filetrans($1, fsadm_var_run_t, dir, "blkid")
++')
diff --git a/policy/modules/system/fstools.te b/policy/modules/system/fstools.te
-index 6c4b6ee..3daf357 100644
+index 6c4b6ee..86a90a2 100644
--- a/policy/modules/system/fstools.te
+++ b/policy/modules/system/fstools.te
-@@ -44,6 +44,8 @@ can_exec(fsadm_t, fsadm_exec_t)
+@@ -13,6 +13,9 @@ role system_r types fsadm_t;
+ type fsadm_log_t;
+ logging_log_file(fsadm_log_t)
+
++type fsadm_var_run_t;
++files_pid_file(fsadm_var_run_t)
++
+ type fsadm_tmp_t;
+ files_tmp_file(fsadm_tmp_t)
+
+@@ -41,9 +44,15 @@ allow fsadm_t self:msg { send receive };
+
+ can_exec(fsadm_t, fsadm_exec_t)
+
++manage_dirs_pattern(fsadm_t, fsadm_var_run_t, fsadm_var_run_t)
++manage_files_pattern(fsadm_t, fsadm_var_run_t, fsadm_var_run_t)
++files_pid_filetrans(fsadm_t, fsadm_var_run_t, {dir file })
++
allow fsadm_t fsadm_tmp_t:dir manage_dir_perms;
allow fsadm_t fsadm_tmp_t:file manage_file_perms;
files_tmp_filetrans(fsadm_t, fsadm_tmp_t, { file dir })
@@ -81469,7 +132417,7 @@ index 6c4b6ee..3daf357 100644
# log files
allow fsadm_t fsadm_log_t:dir setattr;
-@@ -101,6 +103,8 @@ files_read_usr_files(fsadm_t)
+@@ -101,6 +110,8 @@ files_read_usr_files(fsadm_t)
files_read_etc_files(fsadm_t)
files_manage_lost_found(fsadm_t)
files_manage_isid_type_dirs(fsadm_t)
@@ -81478,7 +132426,7 @@ index 6c4b6ee..3daf357 100644
# Write to /etc/mtab.
files_manage_etc_runtime_files(fsadm_t)
files_etc_filetrans_etc_runtime(fsadm_t, file)
-@@ -120,11 +124,16 @@ fs_list_auto_mountpoints(fsadm_t)
+@@ -120,11 +131,16 @@ fs_list_auto_mountpoints(fsadm_t)
fs_search_tmpfs(fsadm_t)
fs_getattr_tmpfs_dirs(fsadm_t)
fs_read_tmpfs_symlinks(fsadm_t)
@@ -81495,7 +132443,7 @@ index 6c4b6ee..3daf357 100644
mls_file_read_all_levels(fsadm_t)
mls_file_write_all_levels(fsadm_t)
-@@ -133,21 +142,25 @@ storage_raw_write_fixed_disk(fsadm_t)
+@@ -133,21 +149,24 @@ storage_raw_write_fixed_disk(fsadm_t)
storage_raw_read_removable_device(fsadm_t)
storage_raw_write_removable_device(fsadm_t)
storage_read_scsi_generic(fsadm_t)
@@ -81513,7 +132461,7 @@ index 6c4b6ee..3daf357 100644
logging_send_syslog_msg(fsadm_t)
+logging_stream_connect_syslog(fsadm_t)
- miscfiles_read_localization(fsadm_t)
+-miscfiles_read_localization(fsadm_t)
seutil_read_config(fsadm_t)
@@ -81522,7 +132470,7 @@ index 6c4b6ee..3daf357 100644
ifdef(`distro_redhat',`
optional_policy(`
-@@ -166,6 +179,11 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -166,6 +185,11 @@ optional_policy(`
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -81534,7 +132482,18 @@ index 6c4b6ee..3daf357 100644
hal_dontaudit_write_log(fsadm_t)
')
-@@ -192,6 +210,10 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -179,6 +203,10 @@ optional_policy(`
+ ')
+
+ optional_policy(`
++ mount_read_pid_files(fsadm_t)
++')
++
++optional_policy(`
+ nis_use_ypbind(fsadm_t)
+ ')
+
+@@ -192,6 +220,10 @@ optional_policy(`
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -81546,26 +132505,89 @@ index 6c4b6ee..3daf357 100644
xen_rw_image_files(fsadm_t)
')
diff --git a/policy/modules/system/getty.fc b/policy/modules/system/getty.fc
-index e1a1848..909af45 100644
+index e1a1848..c0d34e7 100644
--- a/policy/modules/system/getty.fc
+++ b/policy/modules/system/getty.fc
-@@ -3,6 +3,8 @@
+@@ -3,6 +3,10 @@
/sbin/.*getty -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:getty_exec_t,s0)
++/usr/lib/systemd/system/[^/]*getty.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:getty_unit_file_t,s0)
++
+/usr/sbin/.*getty -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:getty_exec_t,s0)
+
/var/log/mgetty\.log.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:getty_log_t,s0)
/var/log/vgetty\.log\..* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:getty_log_t,s0)
+diff --git a/policy/modules/system/getty.if b/policy/modules/system/getty.if
+index e4376aa..2c98c56 100644
+--- a/policy/modules/system/getty.if
++++ b/policy/modules/system/getty.if
+@@ -96,3 +96,45 @@ interface(`getty_rw_config',`
+ files_search_etc($1)
+ allow $1 getty_etc_t:file rw_file_perms;
+ ')
++
++########################################
++## <summary>
++## Execute getty server in the getty domain.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed to transition.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`getty_systemctl',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type getty_unit_file_t;
++ type getty_t;
++ ')
++
++ systemd_exec_systemctl($1)
++ allow $1 getty_unit_file_t:file read_file_perms;
++ allow $1 getty_unit_file_t:service manage_service_perms;
++
++ ps_process_pattern($1, getty_t)
++')
++
++########################################
++## <summary>
++## Start getty unit files domain.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed to transition.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`getty_start_services',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type getty_unit_file_t;
++ ')
++
++ systemd_exec_systemctl($1)
++ allow $1 getty_unit_file_t:service start;
++')
diff --git a/policy/modules/system/getty.te b/policy/modules/system/getty.te
-index fd100fc..8409f5c 100644
+index fd100fc..3e61328 100644
--- a/policy/modules/system/getty.te
+++ b/policy/modules/system/getty.te
-@@ -83,8 +83,10 @@ term_use_unallocated_ttys(getty_t)
+@@ -27,6 +27,9 @@ files_tmp_file(getty_tmp_t)
+ type getty_var_run_t;
+ files_pid_file(getty_var_run_t)
+
++type getty_unit_file_t;
++systemd_unit_file(getty_unit_file_t)
++
+ ########################################
+ #
+ # Getty local policy
+@@ -83,8 +86,11 @@ term_use_unallocated_ttys(getty_t)
term_setattr_all_ttys(getty_t)
term_setattr_unallocated_ttys(getty_t)
term_setattr_console(getty_t)
++term_setattr_usb_ttys(getty_t)
+term_use_console(getty_t)
auth_rw_login_records(getty_t)
@@ -81573,7 +132595,15 @@ index fd100fc..8409f5c 100644
init_rw_utmp(getty_t)
init_use_script_ptys(getty_t)
-@@ -113,7 +115,7 @@ ifdef(`distro_ubuntu',`
+@@ -94,7 +100,6 @@ locallogin_domtrans(getty_t)
+
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(getty_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(getty_t)
+
+ ifdef(`distro_gentoo',`
+ # Gentoo default /etc/issue makes agetty
+@@ -113,7 +118,7 @@ ifdef(`distro_ubuntu',`
')
')
@@ -81582,7 +132612,7 @@ index fd100fc..8409f5c 100644
# Support logging in from /dev/console
term_use_console(getty_t)
',`
-@@ -125,10 +127,6 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -125,10 +130,6 @@ optional_policy(`
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -81603,10 +132633,10 @@ index 9dfecf7..6d00f5c 100644
+
+/usr/bin/hostname -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:hostname_exec_t,s0)
diff --git a/policy/modules/system/hostname.te b/policy/modules/system/hostname.te
-index f6cbda9..9a75c1e 100644
+index f6cbda9..8c37105 100644
--- a/policy/modules/system/hostname.te
+++ b/policy/modules/system/hostname.te
-@@ -23,29 +23,34 @@ dontaudit hostname_t self:capability sys_tty_config;
+@@ -23,39 +23,47 @@ dontaudit hostname_t self:capability sys_tty_config;
kernel_list_proc(hostname_t)
kernel_read_proc_symlinks(hostname_t)
@@ -81643,7 +132673,10 @@ index f6cbda9..9a75c1e 100644
logging_send_syslog_msg(hostname_t)
-@@ -56,6 +61,10 @@ sysnet_read_config(hostname_t)
+-miscfiles_read_localization(hostname_t)
+
+ sysnet_dontaudit_rw_dhcpc_unix_stream_sockets(hostname_t)
+ sysnet_read_config(hostname_t)
sysnet_dns_name_resolve(hostname_t)
optional_policy(`
@@ -81681,7 +132714,7 @@ index 40eb10c..2a0a32c 100644
corecmd_search_bin($1)
diff --git a/policy/modules/system/hotplug.te b/policy/modules/system/hotplug.te
-index b2e41cc..f2d880c 100644
+index b2e41cc..6a37dca 100644
--- a/policy/modules/system/hotplug.te
+++ b/policy/modules/system/hotplug.te
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ files_pid_file(hotplug_var_run_t)
@@ -81710,7 +132743,17 @@ index b2e41cc..f2d880c 100644
logging_send_syslog_msg(hotplug_t)
logging_search_logs(hotplug_t)
-@@ -164,14 +165,6 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -103,9 +104,6 @@ logging_search_logs(hotplug_t)
+ libs_read_lib_files(hotplug_t)
+
+ miscfiles_read_hwdata(hotplug_t)
+-miscfiles_read_localization(hotplug_t)
+-
+-seutil_dontaudit_search_config(hotplug_t)
+
+ sysnet_read_config(hotplug_t)
+
+@@ -164,14 +162,6 @@ optional_policy(`
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -81787,71 +132830,23 @@ index d2e40b8..3ba2e4c 100644
')
+/var/run/systemd(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:init_var_run_t,s0)
diff --git a/policy/modules/system/init.if b/policy/modules/system/init.if
-index d26fe81..3f3a57f 100644
+index d26fe81..95c1bd8 100644
--- a/policy/modules/system/init.if
+++ b/policy/modules/system/init.if
-@@ -79,6 +79,44 @@ interface(`init_script_domain',`
- domtrans_pattern(init_run_all_scripts_domain, $2, $1)
- ')
-
-+
-+#######################################
-+## <summary>
-+## Create a domain which can be started by init.
-+## </summary>
-+## <param name="domain">
-+## <summary>
-+## Type to be used as a domain.
-+## </summary>
-+## </param>
-+## <param name="entry_point">
-+## <summary>
-+## Type of the program to be used as an entry point to this domain.
-+## </summary>
-+## </param>
-+#
-+interface(`init_systemd_domain',`
-+ gen_require(`
-+ type init_t;
-+ role system_r;
-+ ')
-+
-+ domain_type($1)
-+ domain_entry_file($1,$2)
-+
-+ role system_r types $1;
-+
-+ tunable_policy(`init_systemd',`
-+ domtrans_pattern(init_t,$2,$1)
-+ allow init_t $1:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
-+ allow init_t $1:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms;
-+ allow $1 init_t:unix_stream_socket ioctl;
-+ allow $1 init_t:unix_dgram_socket sendto;
-+ # need write to /var/run/systemd/notify
-+ init_write_pid_socket($1)
-+ ')
-+')
-+
- ########################################
- ## <summary>
- ## Create a domain which can be started by init.
-@@ -105,7 +143,11 @@ interface(`init_domain',`
-
+@@ -106,6 +106,8 @@ interface(`init_domain',`
role system_r types $1;
-- domtrans_pattern(init_t, $2, $1)
-+ tunable_policy(`init_systemd',`', `
-+ domtrans_pattern(init_t, $2, $1)
-+ allow init_t $1:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
-+ allow $1 init_t:unix_dgram_socket sendto;
-+ ')
+ domtrans_pattern(init_t, $2, $1)
++ allow init_t $1:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
++ allow $1 init_t:unix_dgram_socket sendto;
ifdef(`hide_broken_symptoms',`
# RHEL4 systems seem to have a stray
-@@ -193,8 +235,11 @@ interface(`init_daemon_domain',`
+@@ -192,50 +194,43 @@ interface(`init_ranged_domain',`
+ interface(`init_daemon_domain',`
gen_require(`
attribute direct_run_init, direct_init, direct_init_entry;
- type initrc_t;
+- type initrc_t;
+ type init_t;
role system_r;
attribute daemon;
@@ -81860,7 +132855,8 @@ index d26fe81..3f3a57f 100644
')
typeattribute $1 daemon;
-@@ -202,40 +247,40 @@ interface(`init_daemon_domain',`
++ typeattribute $2 direct_init_entry;
+
domain_type($1)
domain_entry_file($1, $2)
@@ -81876,19 +132872,19 @@ index d26fe81..3f3a57f 100644
- # init script ptys are the stdin/out/err
- # when using run_init
- init_use_script_ptys($1)
-+ domtrans_pattern(initrc_t,$2,$1)
-+ domtrans_pattern(initrc_domain, $2,$1)
++ type_transition initrc_domain $2:process $1;
ifdef(`direct_sysadm_daemon',`
- domtrans_pattern(direct_run_init, $2, $1)
+- domtrans_pattern(direct_run_init, $2, $1)
- allow direct_run_init $1:process { noatsecure siginh rlimitinh };
-
+-
++ type_transition direct_run_init $2:process $1;
typeattribute $1 direct_init;
- typeattribute $2 direct_init_entry;
-
+- typeattribute $2 direct_init_entry;
+-
- userdom_dontaudit_use_user_terminals($1)
-+# userdom_dontaudit_use_user_terminals($1)
')
++')
- ifdef(`hide_broken_symptoms',`
- # RHEL4 systems seem to have a stray
@@ -81896,14 +132892,6 @@ index d26fe81..3f3a57f 100644
- ifdef(`distro_rhel4',`
- kernel_dontaudit_use_fds($1)
- ')
-+ tunable_policy(`init_upstart || init_systemd',`
-+ # Handle upstart direct transition to a executable
-+ domtrans_pattern(init_t,$2,$1)
- ')
-+')
-
-- optional_policy(`
-- nscd_socket_use($1)
- ')
+#######################################
+## <summary>
@@ -81919,12 +132907,15 @@ index d26fe81..3f3a57f 100644
+ gen_require(`
+ attribute initrc_domain;
+ ')
-+
+
+- optional_policy(`
+- nscd_socket_use($1)
+- ')
+ typeattribute $1 initrc_domain;
')
########################################
-@@ -283,17 +328,20 @@ interface(`init_daemon_domain',`
+@@ -283,17 +278,20 @@ interface(`init_daemon_domain',`
interface(`init_ranged_daemon_domain',`
gen_require(`
type initrc_t;
@@ -81946,40 +132937,38 @@ index d26fe81..3f3a57f 100644
')
')
-@@ -336,22 +384,25 @@ interface(`init_ranged_daemon_domain',`
+@@ -336,23 +334,19 @@ interface(`init_ranged_daemon_domain',`
#
interface(`init_system_domain',`
gen_require(`
+- type initrc_t;
+ type init_t;
- type initrc_t;
role system_r;
+ attribute initrc_transition_domain;
-+ attribute systemprocess;
++ attribute systemprocess, systemprocess_entry;
+ attribute initrc_domain;
')
+ typeattribute $1 systemprocess;
application_domain($1, $2)
-
+-
role system_r types $1;
++ typeattribute $2 systemprocess_entry;
- domtrans_pattern(initrc_t, $2, $1)
-+ domtrans_pattern(initrc_t,$2,$1)
-+ domtrans_pattern(initrc_domain, $2,$1)
-
+-
- ifdef(`hide_broken_symptoms',`
- # RHEL4 systems seem to have a stray
- # fds open from the initrd
- ifdef(`distro_rhel4',`
- kernel_dontaudit_use_fds($1)
- ')
-+ tunable_policy(`init_systemd',`
-+ # Handle upstart/systemd direct transition to a executable
-+ domtrans_pattern(init_t,$2,$1)
- ')
+- ')
++ type_transition initrc_domain $2:process $1;
')
-@@ -401,20 +452,41 @@ interface(`init_system_domain',`
+ ########################################
+@@ -401,20 +395,41 @@ interface(`init_system_domain',`
interface(`init_ranged_system_domain',`
gen_require(`
type initrc_t;
@@ -82021,7 +133010,7 @@ index d26fe81..3f3a57f 100644
########################################
## <summary>
## Execute init (/sbin/init) with a domain transition.
-@@ -442,7 +514,6 @@ interface(`init_domtrans',`
+@@ -442,7 +457,6 @@ interface(`init_domtrans',`
## Domain allowed access.
## </summary>
## </param>
@@ -82029,12 +133018,12 @@ index d26fe81..3f3a57f 100644
#
interface(`init_exec',`
gen_require(`
-@@ -451,6 +522,48 @@ interface(`init_exec',`
+@@ -451,6 +465,48 @@ interface(`init_exec',`
corecmd_search_bin($1)
can_exec($1, init_exec_t)
+
-+ tunable_policy(`init_systemd',`
++ optional_policy(`
+ systemd_exec_systemctl($1)
+ ')
+')
@@ -82078,7 +133067,7 @@ index d26fe81..3f3a57f 100644
')
########################################
-@@ -539,6 +652,24 @@ interface(`init_sigchld',`
+@@ -539,6 +595,24 @@ interface(`init_sigchld',`
########################################
## <summary>
@@ -82103,7 +133092,7 @@ index d26fe81..3f3a57f 100644
## Connect to init with a unix socket.
## </summary>
## <param name="domain">
-@@ -549,10 +680,66 @@ interface(`init_sigchld',`
+@@ -549,10 +623,66 @@ interface(`init_sigchld',`
#
interface(`init_stream_connect',`
gen_require(`
@@ -82172,8 +133161,11 @@ index d26fe81..3f3a57f 100644
')
########################################
-@@ -718,19 +905,25 @@ interface(`init_telinit',`
+@@ -716,22 +846,23 @@ interface(`init_write_initctl',`
+ interface(`init_telinit',`
+ gen_require(`
type initctl_t;
++ type init_t;
')
+ corecmd_exec_bin($1)
@@ -82184,22 +133176,25 @@ index d26fe81..3f3a57f 100644
init_exec($1)
- tunable_policy(`init_upstart',`
-+ tunable_policy(`init_upstart || init_systemd',`
- gen_require(`
- type init_t;
- ')
-
-+ ps_process_pattern($1, init_t)
-+ allow $1 init_t:process signal;
- # upstart uses a datagram socket instead of initctl pipe
- allow $1 self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms;
- allow $1 init_t:unix_dgram_socket sendto;
-+ #576913
-+ allow $1 init_t:unix_stream_socket connectto;
- ')
+- gen_require(`
+- type init_t;
+- ')
+-
+- # upstart uses a datagram socket instead of initctl pipe
+- allow $1 self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms;
+- allow $1 init_t:unix_dgram_socket sendto;
+- ')
++ ps_process_pattern($1, init_t)
++ allow $1 init_t:process signal;
++ # upstart uses a datagram socket instead of initctl pipe
++ allow $1 self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms;
++ allow $1 init_t:unix_dgram_socket sendto;
++ #576913
++ allow $1 init_t:unix_stream_socket connectto;
')
-@@ -760,7 +953,7 @@ interface(`init_rw_initctl',`
+ ########################################
+@@ -760,7 +891,7 @@ interface(`init_rw_initctl',`
## </summary>
## <param name="domain">
## <summary>
@@ -82208,7 +133203,7 @@ index d26fe81..3f3a57f 100644
## </summary>
## </param>
#
-@@ -803,11 +996,12 @@ interface(`init_script_file_entry_type',`
+@@ -803,11 +934,12 @@ interface(`init_script_file_entry_type',`
#
interface(`init_spec_domtrans_script',`
gen_require(`
@@ -82223,7 +133218,7 @@ index d26fe81..3f3a57f 100644
ifdef(`distro_gentoo',`
gen_require(`
-@@ -818,11 +1012,11 @@ interface(`init_spec_domtrans_script',`
+@@ -818,11 +950,11 @@ interface(`init_spec_domtrans_script',`
')
ifdef(`enable_mcs',`
@@ -82237,7 +133232,7 @@ index d26fe81..3f3a57f 100644
')
')
-@@ -838,19 +1032,41 @@ interface(`init_spec_domtrans_script',`
+@@ -838,19 +970,41 @@ interface(`init_spec_domtrans_script',`
#
interface(`init_domtrans_script',`
gen_require(`
@@ -82283,7 +133278,7 @@ index d26fe81..3f3a57f 100644
')
########################################
-@@ -906,9 +1122,14 @@ interface(`init_script_file_domtrans',`
+@@ -906,9 +1060,14 @@ interface(`init_script_file_domtrans',`
interface(`init_labeled_script_domtrans',`
gen_require(`
type initrc_t;
@@ -82298,7 +133293,7 @@ index d26fe81..3f3a57f 100644
files_search_etc($1)
')
-@@ -999,7 +1220,9 @@ interface(`init_ptrace',`
+@@ -999,7 +1158,9 @@ interface(`init_ptrace',`
type init_t;
')
@@ -82309,7 +133304,33 @@ index d26fe81..3f3a57f 100644
')
########################################
-@@ -1117,6 +1340,24 @@ interface(`init_read_all_script_files',`
+@@ -1098,6 +1259,25 @@ interface(`init_getattr_all_script_files',`
+
+ ########################################
+ ## <summary>
++## Allow the specified domain to modify the systemd configuration of
++## all init scripts.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`init_config_all_script_files',`
++ gen_require(`
++ attribute init_script_file_type;
++ ')
++
++ allow $1 init_script_file_type:service all_service_perms;
++')
++
++########################################
++## <summary>
+ ## Read all init script files.
+ ## </summary>
+ ## <param name="domain">
+@@ -1117,6 +1297,24 @@ interface(`init_read_all_script_files',`
#######################################
## <summary>
@@ -82334,7 +133355,7 @@ index d26fe81..3f3a57f 100644
## Dontaudit read all init script files.
## </summary>
## <param name="domain">
-@@ -1168,12 +1409,7 @@ interface(`init_read_script_state',`
+@@ -1168,12 +1366,7 @@ interface(`init_read_script_state',`
')
kernel_search_proc($1)
@@ -82348,7 +133369,7 @@ index d26fe81..3f3a57f 100644
')
########################################
-@@ -1413,6 +1649,27 @@ interface(`init_dbus_send_script',`
+@@ -1413,6 +1606,27 @@ interface(`init_dbus_send_script',`
########################################
## <summary>
## Send and receive messages from
@@ -82376,7 +133397,7 @@ index d26fe81..3f3a57f 100644
## init scripts over dbus.
## </summary>
## <param name="domain">
-@@ -1499,6 +1756,25 @@ interface(`init_getattr_script_status_files',`
+@@ -1499,6 +1713,25 @@ interface(`init_getattr_script_status_files',`
########################################
## <summary>
@@ -82402,7 +133423,7 @@ index d26fe81..3f3a57f 100644
## Do not audit attempts to read init script
## status files.
## </summary>
-@@ -1557,6 +1833,24 @@ interface(`init_rw_script_tmp_files',`
+@@ -1557,6 +1790,24 @@ interface(`init_rw_script_tmp_files',`
########################################
## <summary>
@@ -82427,7 +133448,7 @@ index d26fe81..3f3a57f 100644
## Create files in a init script
## temporary data directory.
## </summary>
-@@ -1629,6 +1923,43 @@ interface(`init_read_utmp',`
+@@ -1629,6 +1880,43 @@ interface(`init_read_utmp',`
########################################
## <summary>
@@ -82471,7 +133492,7 @@ index d26fe81..3f3a57f 100644
## Do not audit attempts to write utmp.
## </summary>
## <param name="domain">
-@@ -1717,7 +2048,7 @@ interface(`init_dontaudit_rw_utmp',`
+@@ -1717,7 +2005,7 @@ interface(`init_dontaudit_rw_utmp',`
type initrc_var_run_t;
')
@@ -82480,10 +133501,11 @@ index d26fe81..3f3a57f 100644
')
########################################
-@@ -1758,6 +2089,128 @@ interface(`init_pid_filetrans_utmp',`
+@@ -1758,7 +2046,134 @@ interface(`init_pid_filetrans_utmp',`
files_pid_filetrans($1, initrc_var_run_t, file, "utmp")
')
+-########################################
+######################################
+## <summary>
+## Allow search directory in the /run/systemd directory.
@@ -82560,6 +133582,11 @@ index d26fe81..3f3a57f 100644
+## The class of the object to be created.
+## </summary>
+## </param>
++## <param name="name" optional="true">
++## <summary>
++## The name of the object being created.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
+#
+interface(`init_pid_filetrans',`
+ gen_require(`
@@ -82591,9 +133618,9 @@ index d26fe81..3f3a57f 100644
+## The class of the object to be created.
+## </summary>
+## </param>
-+## <param name="object_name">
++## <param name="name" optional="true">
+## <summary>
-+## The name of the object to be created.
++## The name of the object being created.
+## </summary>
+## </param>
+#
@@ -82606,10 +133633,11 @@ index d26fe81..3f3a57f 100644
+ filetrans_pattern($1, init_var_run_t, $2, $3, $4)
+')
+
- ########################################
++########################################
## <summary>
## Allow the specified domain to connect to daemon with a tcp socket
-@@ -1792,3 +2245,284 @@ interface(`init_udp_recvfrom_all_daemons',`
+ ## </summary>
+@@ -1792,3 +2207,283 @@ interface(`init_udp_recvfrom_all_daemons',`
')
corenet_udp_recvfrom_labeled($1, daemon)
')
@@ -82657,10 +133685,7 @@ index d26fe81..3f3a57f 100644
+ type initrc_t;
+ ')
+
-+ dontaudit $1 initrc_t:tcp_socket { read write };
-+ dontaudit $1 initrc_t:udp_socket { read write };
-+ dontaudit $1 initrc_t:unix_dgram_socket { read write };
-+ dontaudit $1 initrc_t:unix_stream_socket { read write };
++ dontaudit $1 initrc_t:socket_class_set { read write };
+ dontaudit $1 initrc_t:shm rw_shm_perms;
+ init_dontaudit_use_script_ptys($1)
+ init_dontaudit_use_script_fds($1)
@@ -82857,6 +133882,7 @@ index d26fe81..3f3a57f 100644
+ ')
+
+ allow $1 init_t:system reboot;
++ systemd_config_power_services($1)
+')
+
+########################################
@@ -82875,6 +133901,7 @@ index d26fe81..3f3a57f 100644
+ ')
+
+ allow $1 init_t:system halt;
++ systemd_config_power_services($1)
+')
+
+########################################
@@ -82895,25 +133922,18 @@ index d26fe81..3f3a57f 100644
+ allow $1 init_t:system undefined;
+')
diff --git a/policy/modules/system/init.te b/policy/modules/system/init.te
-index 4a88fa1..9895bfe 100644
+index 4a88fa1..c57afad 100644
--- a/policy/modules/system/init.te
+++ b/policy/modules/system/init.te
-@@ -16,6 +16,34 @@ gen_require(`
- ## </desc>
- gen_tunable(init_upstart, false)
+@@ -11,10 +11,24 @@ gen_require(`
-+## <desc>
-+## <p>
-+## Enable support for systemd as the init program.
-+## </p>
-+## </desc>
-+gen_tunable(init_systemd, false)
-+
-+## <desc>
-+## <p>
+ ## <desc>
+ ## <p>
+-## Enable support for upstart as the init program.
+## Allow all daemons to use tcp wrappers.
-+## </p>
-+## </desc>
+ ## </p>
+ ## </desc>
+-gen_tunable(init_upstart, false)
+gen_tunable(daemons_use_tcp_wrapper, false)
+
+## <desc>
@@ -82929,11 +133949,10 @@ index 4a88fa1..9895bfe 100644
+## </p>
+## </desc>
+gen_tunable(daemons_dump_core, false)
-+
+
# used for direct running of init scripts
# by admin domains
- attribute direct_run_init;
-@@ -25,14 +53,21 @@ attribute direct_init_entry;
+@@ -25,19 +39,28 @@ attribute direct_init_entry;
attribute init_script_domain_type;
attribute init_script_file_type;
attribute init_run_all_scripts_domain;
@@ -82944,6 +133963,7 @@ index 4a88fa1..9895bfe 100644
# Mark process types as daemons
attribute daemon;
+attribute systemprocess;
++attribute systemprocess_entry;
+
+# Mark process types as initrc domain
+attribute initrc_domain;
@@ -82956,17 +133976,38 @@ index 4a88fa1..9895bfe 100644
type init_exec_t;
domain_type(init_t)
domain_entry_file(init_t, init_exec_t)
-@@ -45,6 +80,9 @@ role system_r types init_t;
- type init_var_run_t;
+ kernel_domtrans_to(init_t, init_exec_t)
+ role system_r types init_t;
++init_initrc_domain(init_t)
+
+ #
+ # init_var_run_t is the type for /var/run/shutdown.pid.
+@@ -46,6 +69,15 @@ type init_var_run_t;
files_pid_file(init_var_run_t)
+ #
++# init_var_lib_t is the type for /var/lib/random-seed
++#
++type init_var_lib_t;
++files_pid_file(init_var_lib_t)
++
+type machineid_t;
+files_config_file(machineid_t)
+
- #
++#
# initctl_t is the type of the named pipe created
# by init during initialization. This pipe is used
-@@ -63,6 +101,8 @@ role system_r types initrc_t;
+ # to communicate with init.
+@@ -54,7 +86,7 @@ type initctl_t;
+ files_type(initctl_t)
+ mls_trusted_object(initctl_t)
+
+-type initrc_t, init_script_domain_type, init_run_all_scripts_domain;
++type initrc_t, initrc_domain, init_script_domain_type, init_run_all_scripts_domain;
+ type initrc_exec_t, init_script_file_type;
+ domain_type(initrc_t)
+ domain_entry_file(initrc_t, initrc_exec_t)
+@@ -63,6 +95,8 @@ role system_r types initrc_t;
# of the below init_upstart tunable
# but this has a typeattribute in it
corecmd_shell_entry_type(initrc_t)
@@ -82975,17 +134016,17 @@ index 4a88fa1..9895bfe 100644
type initrc_devpts_t;
term_pty(initrc_devpts_t)
-@@ -95,7 +135,8 @@ ifdef(`enable_mls',`
+@@ -95,7 +129,8 @@ ifdef(`enable_mls',`
#
# Use capabilities. old rule:
-allow init_t self:capability ~sys_module;
-+allow init_t self:capability ~{ sys_ptrace audit_control audit_write sys_module };
++allow init_t self:capability ~{ audit_control audit_write sys_module };
+allow init_t self:capability2 ~{ mac_admin mac_override };
# is ~sys_module really needed? observed:
# sys_boot
# sys_tty_config
-@@ -107,12 +148,26 @@ allow init_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms;
+@@ -107,12 +142,32 @@ allow init_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms;
# Re-exec itself
can_exec(init_t, init_exec_t)
@@ -83003,6 +134044,12 @@ index 4a88fa1..9895bfe 100644
+allow initrc_t init_t:unix_stream_socket { connectto rw_stream_socket_perms sendto };
+allow initrc_t init_t:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms;
+
++manage_dirs_pattern(init_t, init_var_lib_t, init_var_lib_t)
++manage_files_pattern(init_t, init_var_lib_t, init_var_lib_t)
++manage_lnk_files_pattern(init_t, init_var_lib_t, init_var_lib_t)
++manage_sock_files_pattern(init_t, init_var_lib_t, init_var_lib_t)
++files_var_lib_filetrans(init_t, init_var_lib_t, { dir file })
++
+manage_dirs_pattern(init_t, init_var_run_t, init_var_run_t)
+manage_files_pattern(init_t, init_var_run_t, init_var_run_t)
+manage_lnk_files_pattern(init_t, init_var_run_t, init_var_run_t)
@@ -83074,6 +134121,7 @@ index 4a88fa1..9895bfe 100644
+mls_socket_read_all_levels(init_t)
+mls_socket_write_all_levels(init_t)
+
++mls_rangetrans_source(init_t)
+mls_rangetrans_source(initrc_t)
selinux_set_all_booleans(init_t)
@@ -83099,18 +134147,18 @@ index 4a88fa1..9895bfe 100644
seutil_read_config(init_t)
+seutil_read_module_store(init_t)
-
- miscfiles_read_localization(init_t)
++
+miscfiles_manage_localization(init_t)
+miscfiles_filetrans_named_content(init_t)
+
+userdom_use_user_ttys(init_t)
-+
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(init_t)
+allow init_t self:process setsched;
ifdef(`distro_gentoo',`
allow init_t self:process { getcap setcap };
-@@ -183,12 +269,19 @@ ifdef(`distro_gentoo',`
+@@ -183,29 +269,177 @@ ifdef(`distro_gentoo',`
')
ifdef(`distro_redhat',`
@@ -83127,18 +134175,22 @@ index 4a88fa1..9895bfe 100644
')
-tunable_policy(`init_upstart',`
-+tunable_policy(`init_upstart || init_systemd',`
- corecmd_shell_domtrans(init_t, initrc_t)
- ',`
- # Run the shell in the sysadm role for single-user mode.
-@@ -196,16 +289,151 @@ tunable_policy(`init_upstart',`
- sysadm_shell_domtrans(init_t)
- ')
-
+- corecmd_shell_domtrans(init_t, initrc_t)
+-',`
+- # Run the shell in the sysadm role for single-user mode.
+- # causes problems with upstart
+- sysadm_shell_domtrans(init_t)
++corecmd_shell_domtrans(init_t, initrc_t)
++
+storage_raw_rw_fixed_disk(init_t)
+
+optional_policy(`
++ gnome_filetrans_home_content(init_t)
++')
++
++optional_policy(`
+ modutils_domtrans_insmod(init_t)
++ modutils_list_module_config(init_t)
+')
+
+optional_policy(`
@@ -83147,148 +134199,160 @@ index 4a88fa1..9895bfe 100644
+ mta_read_aliases(init_t)
+')
+
-+tunable_policy(`init_systemd',`
-+ allow init_t self:system all_system_perms;
-+ allow init_t self:unix_dgram_socket { create_socket_perms sendto };
-+ allow init_t self:process { setsockcreate setfscreate setrlimit };
-+ allow init_t self:process { getcap setcap };
-+ allow init_t self:unix_stream_socket { create_stream_socket_perms connectto };
-+ allow init_t self:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket create_socket_perms;
-+ allow init_t self:netlink_selinux_socket create_socket_perms;
-+ # Until systemd is fixed
-+ allow daemon init_t:socket_class_set { getopt read getattr ioctl setopt write };
-+ allow init_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms;
-+ allow init_t self:netlink_route_socket create_netlink_socket_perms;
-+
-+ allow init_t initrc_t:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms;
-+
-+ kernel_list_unlabeled(init_t)
-+ kernel_read_network_state(init_t)
-+ kernel_rw_kernel_sysctl(init_t)
-+ kernel_rw_net_sysctls(init_t)
-+ kernel_read_all_sysctls(init_t)
-+ kernel_read_software_raid_state(init_t)
-+ kernel_unmount_debugfs(init_t)
-+ kernel_setsched(init_t)
-+
-+ dev_write_kmsg(init_t)
-+ dev_write_urand(init_t)
-+ dev_rw_lvm_control(init_t)
-+ dev_rw_autofs(init_t)
-+ dev_manage_generic_symlinks(init_t)
-+ dev_manage_generic_dirs(init_t)
-+ dev_manage_generic_files(init_t)
-+ dev_read_generic_chr_files(init_t)
-+ dev_relabel_generic_dev_dirs(init_t)
-+ dev_relabel_all_dev_nodes(init_t)
-+ dev_relabel_all_dev_files(init_t)
-+ dev_manage_sysfs_dirs(init_t)
-+ dev_relabel_sysfs_dirs(init_t)
-+
-+ files_search_all(init_t)
-+ files_mounton_all_mountpoints(init_t)
-+ files_unmount_all_file_type_fs(init_t)
-+ files_manage_all_pid_dirs(init_t)
-+ files_manage_generic_tmp_dirs(init_t)
-+ files_relabel_all_pid_dirs(init_t)
-+ files_relabel_all_pid_files(init_t)
-+ files_create_all_pid_sockets(init_t)
-+ files_delete_all_pids(init_t)
-+ files_exec_generic_pid_files(init_t)
-+ files_create_all_pid_pipes(init_t)
-+ files_create_all_spool_sockets(init_t)
-+ files_delete_all_spool_sockets(init_t)
-+ files_manage_urandom_seed(init_t)
-+ files_list_locks(init_t)
-+ files_list_spool(init_t)
-+ files_list_var(init_t)
-+ files_create_lock_dirs(init_t)
-+ files_relabel_all_lock_dirs(init_t)
-+
-+ fs_getattr_all_fs(init_t)
-+ fs_manage_cgroup_dirs(init_t)
-+ fs_manage_cgroup_files(init_t)
-+ fs_manage_hugetlbfs_dirs(init_t)
-+ fs_manage_tmpfs_dirs(init_t)
-+ fs_relabel_tmpfs_dirs(init_t)
-+ fs_relabel_tmpfs_files(init_t)
-+ fs_mount_all_fs(init_t)
-+ fs_unmount_all_fs(init_t)
-+ fs_remount_all_fs(init_t)
-+ fs_list_auto_mountpoints(init_t)
-+ fs_relabel_tmpfs_sock_file(init_t)
-+ fs_rw_tmpfs_files(init_t)
-+ fs_relabel_cgroup_dirs(init_t)
-+ fs_search_cgroup_dirs(daemon)
-+
-+
-+ selinux_compute_access_vector(init_t)
-+ selinux_compute_create_context(init_t)
-+ selinux_validate_context(init_t)
-+ selinux_unmount_fs(init_t)
-+
-+ storage_getattr_removable_dev(init_t)
-+
-+ term_relabel_ptys_dirs(init_t)
-+
-+ auth_relabel_login_records(init_t)
-+ auth_relabel_pam_console_data_dirs(init_t)
-+
-+ clock_read_adjtime(init_t)
-+
-+ init_read_script_state(init_t)
-+
-+ seutil_read_file_contexts(init_t)
-+
-+ systemd_exec_systemctl(init_t)
-+ systemd_manage_unit_dirs(init_t)
-+ systemd_manage_all_unit_files(init_t)
-+ systemd_logger_stream_connect(init_t)
-+ systemd_config_all_services(init_t)
-+
-+ systemd_config_all_services(initrc_t)
-+
-+ create_sock_files_pattern(init_t, init_sock_file_type, init_sock_file_type)
-+
-+')
++allow init_t self:system all_system_perms;
++allow init_t self:unix_dgram_socket { create_socket_perms sendto };
++allow init_t self:process { setsockcreate setfscreate setrlimit };
++allow init_t self:process { getcap setcap };
++allow init_t self:unix_stream_socket { create_stream_socket_perms connectto };
++allow init_t self:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket create_socket_perms;
++allow init_t self:netlink_selinux_socket create_socket_perms;
++# Until systemd is fixed
++allow daemon init_t:socket_class_set { getopt read getattr ioctl setopt write };
++allow init_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms;
++allow init_t self:netlink_route_socket create_netlink_socket_perms;
++
++allow init_t initrc_t:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms;
++
++kernel_list_unlabeled(init_t)
++kernel_read_network_state(init_t)
++kernel_rw_kernel_sysctl(init_t)
++kernel_rw_net_sysctls(init_t)
++kernel_read_all_sysctls(init_t)
++kernel_read_software_raid_state(init_t)
++kernel_unmount_debugfs(init_t)
++kernel_setsched(init_t)
++
++dev_write_kmsg(init_t)
++dev_write_urand(init_t)
++dev_rw_lvm_control(init_t)
++dev_rw_autofs(init_t)
++dev_manage_generic_symlinks(init_t)
++dev_manage_generic_dirs(init_t)
++dev_manage_generic_files(init_t)
++dev_read_generic_chr_files(init_t)
++dev_relabel_generic_dev_dirs(init_t)
++dev_relabel_all_dev_nodes(init_t)
++dev_relabel_all_dev_files(init_t)
++dev_manage_sysfs_dirs(init_t)
++dev_relabel_sysfs_dirs(init_t)
++
++files_search_all(init_t)
++files_mounton_all_mountpoints(init_t)
++files_unmount_all_file_type_fs(init_t)
++files_manage_all_pid_dirs(init_t)
++files_manage_etc_dirs(init_t)
++files_manage_generic_tmp_dirs(init_t)
++files_relabel_all_pid_dirs(init_t)
++files_relabel_all_pid_files(init_t)
++files_create_all_pid_sockets(init_t)
++files_delete_all_pids(init_t)
++files_exec_generic_pid_files(init_t)
++files_create_all_pid_pipes(init_t)
++files_create_all_spool_sockets(init_t)
++files_delete_all_spool_sockets(init_t)
++files_manage_urandom_seed(init_t)
++files_list_locks(init_t)
++files_list_spool(init_t)
++files_list_var(init_t)
++files_list_boot(init_t)
++files_list_home(init_t)
++files_create_lock_dirs(init_t)
++files_relabel_all_lock_dirs(init_t)
++files_read_kernel_modules(init_t)
++fs_getattr_all_fs(init_t)
++fs_manage_cgroup_dirs(init_t)
++fs_manage_cgroup_files(init_t)
++fs_manage_hugetlbfs_dirs(init_t)
++fs_manage_tmpfs_dirs(init_t)
++fs_relabel_tmpfs_dirs(init_t)
++fs_relabel_tmpfs_files(init_t)
++fs_relabel_tmpfs_fifo_files(init_t)
++fs_mount_all_fs(init_t)
++fs_unmount_all_fs(init_t)
++fs_remount_all_fs(init_t)
++fs_list_auto_mountpoints(init_t)
++fs_register_binary_executable_type(init_t)
++fs_relabel_tmpfs_sock_file(init_t)
++fs_rw_tmpfs_files(init_t)
++fs_relabel_cgroup_dirs(init_t)
++fs_search_cgroup_dirs(init_t)
++selinux_compute_access_vector(init_t)
++selinux_compute_create_context(init_t)
++selinux_validate_context(init_t)
++selinux_unmount_fs(init_t)
++
++storage_getattr_removable_dev(init_t)
++
++term_relabel_ptys_dirs(init_t)
++
++auth_relabel_login_records(init_t)
++auth_relabel_pam_console_data_dirs(init_t)
++
++clock_read_adjtime(init_t)
++
++init_read_script_state(init_t)
++
++modutils_read_module_config(init_t)
++
++seutil_read_file_contexts(init_t)
++
++systemd_exec_systemctl(init_t)
++systemd_manage_unit_dirs(init_t)
++systemd_manage_random_seed(init_t)
++systemd_manage_all_unit_files(init_t)
++systemd_logger_stream_connect(init_t)
++systemd_config_all_services(init_t)
++systemd_relabelto_fifo_file_passwd_run(init_t)
++systemd_relabel_unit_dirs(init_t)
++systemd_relabel_unit_files(init_t)
++systemd_config_all_services(initrc_t)
++systemd_read_unit_files(initrc_t)
++
++create_sock_files_pattern(init_t, init_sock_file_type, init_sock_file_type)
+
+auth_use_nsswitch(init_t)
+auth_rw_login_records(init_t)
+
- optional_policy(`
-- auth_rw_login_records(init_t)
++optional_policy(`
+ lvm_rw_pipes(init_t)
++ lvm_read_config(init_t)
')
optional_policy(`
+- auth_rw_login_records(init_t)
+ consolekit_manage_log(init_t)
-+')
-+
-+optional_policy(`
+ ')
+
+ optional_policy(`
+ dbus_connect_system_bus(init_t)
dbus_system_bus_client(init_t)
+ dbus_delete_pid_files(init_t)
-+')
-+
-+optional_policy(`
+ ')
+
+ optional_policy(`
+- nscd_socket_use(init_t)
+ # /var/run/dovecot/login/ssl-parameters.dat is a hard link to
+ # /var/lib/dovecot/ssl-parameters.dat and init tries to clean up
+ # the directory. But we do not want to allow this.
+ # The master process of dovecot will manage this file.
+ dovecot_dontaudit_unlink_lib_files(initrc_t)
- ')
-
- optional_policy(`
-- nscd_socket_use(init_t)
++')
++
++optional_policy(`
+ plymouthd_stream_connect(init_t)
+ plymouthd_exec_plymouth(init_t)
')
optional_policy(`
-@@ -213,6 +441,22 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -213,6 +447,27 @@ optional_policy(`
')
optional_policy(`
++ rpcbind_filetrans_named_content(init_t)
++ rpcbind_relabel_sock_file(init_t)
++')
++
++optional_policy(`
+ systemd_filetrans_named_content(init_t)
+')
+
@@ -83308,7 +134372,7 @@ index 4a88fa1..9895bfe 100644
unconfined_domain(init_t)
')
-@@ -222,8 +466,9 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -222,8 +477,9 @@ optional_policy(`
#
allow initrc_t self:process { getpgid setsched setpgid setrlimit getsched };
@@ -83320,12 +134384,13 @@ index 4a88fa1..9895bfe 100644
allow initrc_t self:passwd rootok;
allow initrc_t self:key manage_key_perms;
-@@ -251,12 +496,15 @@ manage_fifo_files_pattern(initrc_t, initrc_state_t, initrc_state_t)
+@@ -251,12 +507,16 @@ manage_fifo_files_pattern(initrc_t, initrc_state_t, initrc_state_t)
allow initrc_t initrc_var_run_t:file manage_file_perms;
files_pid_filetrans(initrc_t, initrc_var_run_t, file)
+files_manage_generic_pids_symlinks(initrc_t)
+files_create_var_run_dirs(initrc_t)
++files_relabelfrom_isid_type(initrc_t)
can_exec(initrc_t, initrc_tmp_t)
manage_files_pattern(initrc_t, initrc_tmp_t, initrc_tmp_t)
@@ -83336,7 +134401,7 @@ index 4a88fa1..9895bfe 100644
manage_dirs_pattern(initrc_t, initrc_var_log_t, initrc_var_log_t)
manage_files_pattern(initrc_t, initrc_var_log_t, initrc_var_log_t)
-@@ -272,23 +520,36 @@ kernel_change_ring_buffer_level(initrc_t)
+@@ -272,23 +532,36 @@ kernel_change_ring_buffer_level(initrc_t)
kernel_clear_ring_buffer(initrc_t)
kernel_get_sysvipc_info(initrc_t)
kernel_read_all_sysctls(initrc_t)
@@ -83379,7 +134444,7 @@ index 4a88fa1..9895bfe 100644
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_ports(initrc_t)
corenet_udp_sendrecv_all_ports(initrc_t)
corenet_tcp_connect_all_ports(initrc_t)
-@@ -296,6 +557,7 @@ corenet_sendrecv_all_client_packets(initrc_t)
+@@ -296,9 +569,11 @@ corenet_sendrecv_all_client_packets(initrc_t)
dev_read_rand(initrc_t)
dev_read_urand(initrc_t)
@@ -83387,7 +134452,11 @@ index 4a88fa1..9895bfe 100644
dev_write_kmsg(initrc_t)
dev_write_rand(initrc_t)
dev_write_urand(initrc_t)
-@@ -306,8 +568,10 @@ dev_write_framebuffer(initrc_t)
++dev_write_watchdog(initrc_t)
+ dev_rw_sysfs(initrc_t)
+ dev_list_usbfs(initrc_t)
+ dev_read_framebuffer(initrc_t)
+@@ -306,8 +581,10 @@ dev_write_framebuffer(initrc_t)
dev_read_realtime_clock(initrc_t)
dev_read_sound_mixer(initrc_t)
dev_write_sound_mixer(initrc_t)
@@ -83398,7 +134467,7 @@ index 4a88fa1..9895bfe 100644
dev_delete_lvm_control_dev(initrc_t)
dev_manage_generic_symlinks(initrc_t)
dev_manage_generic_files(initrc_t)
-@@ -315,17 +579,16 @@ dev_manage_generic_files(initrc_t)
+@@ -315,17 +592,16 @@ dev_manage_generic_files(initrc_t)
dev_delete_generic_symlinks(initrc_t)
dev_getattr_all_blk_files(initrc_t)
dev_getattr_all_chr_files(initrc_t)
@@ -83418,7 +134487,7 @@ index 4a88fa1..9895bfe 100644
domain_getsession_all_domains(initrc_t)
domain_use_interactive_fds(initrc_t)
# for lsof which is used by alsa shutdown:
-@@ -333,6 +596,7 @@ domain_dontaudit_getattr_all_udp_sockets(initrc_t)
+@@ -333,6 +609,7 @@ domain_dontaudit_getattr_all_udp_sockets(initrc_t)
domain_dontaudit_getattr_all_tcp_sockets(initrc_t)
domain_dontaudit_getattr_all_dgram_sockets(initrc_t)
domain_dontaudit_getattr_all_pipes(initrc_t)
@@ -83426,7 +134495,7 @@ index 4a88fa1..9895bfe 100644
files_getattr_all_dirs(initrc_t)
files_getattr_all_files(initrc_t)
-@@ -340,8 +604,10 @@ files_getattr_all_symlinks(initrc_t)
+@@ -340,8 +617,10 @@ files_getattr_all_symlinks(initrc_t)
files_getattr_all_pipes(initrc_t)
files_getattr_all_sockets(initrc_t)
files_purge_tmp(initrc_t)
@@ -83438,7 +134507,7 @@ index 4a88fa1..9895bfe 100644
files_delete_all_pids(initrc_t)
files_delete_all_pid_dirs(initrc_t)
files_read_etc_files(initrc_t)
-@@ -357,8 +623,12 @@ files_list_isid_type_dirs(initrc_t)
+@@ -357,8 +636,12 @@ files_list_isid_type_dirs(initrc_t)
files_mounton_isid_type_dirs(initrc_t)
files_list_default(initrc_t)
files_mounton_default(initrc_t)
@@ -83452,12 +134521,13 @@ index 4a88fa1..9895bfe 100644
fs_list_inotifyfs(initrc_t)
fs_register_binary_executable_type(initrc_t)
# rhgb-console writes to ramfs
-@@ -368,9 +638,12 @@ fs_mount_all_fs(initrc_t)
+@@ -368,9 +651,13 @@ fs_mount_all_fs(initrc_t)
fs_unmount_all_fs(initrc_t)
fs_remount_all_fs(initrc_t)
fs_getattr_all_fs(initrc_t)
+fs_search_all(initrc_t)
+fs_getattr_nfsd_files(initrc_t)
++fs_dontaudit_create_tmpfs_chr_dev(initrc_t)
# initrc_t needs to do a pidof which requires ptrace
-mcs_ptrace_all(initrc_t)
@@ -83466,7 +134536,7 @@ index 4a88fa1..9895bfe 100644
mcs_killall(initrc_t)
mcs_process_set_categories(initrc_t)
-@@ -380,6 +653,7 @@ mls_process_read_up(initrc_t)
+@@ -380,6 +667,7 @@ mls_process_read_up(initrc_t)
mls_process_write_down(initrc_t)
mls_rangetrans_source(initrc_t)
mls_fd_share_all_levels(initrc_t)
@@ -83474,7 +134544,7 @@ index 4a88fa1..9895bfe 100644
selinux_get_enforce_mode(initrc_t)
-@@ -391,6 +665,7 @@ term_use_all_terms(initrc_t)
+@@ -391,6 +679,7 @@ term_use_all_terms(initrc_t)
term_reset_tty_labels(initrc_t)
auth_rw_login_records(initrc_t)
@@ -83482,9 +134552,11 @@ index 4a88fa1..9895bfe 100644
auth_setattr_login_records(initrc_t)
auth_rw_lastlog(initrc_t)
auth_read_pam_pid(initrc_t)
-@@ -411,18 +686,17 @@ logging_read_audit_config(initrc_t)
+@@ -409,20 +698,18 @@ logging_read_all_logs(initrc_t)
+ logging_append_all_logs(initrc_t)
+ logging_read_audit_config(initrc_t)
- miscfiles_read_localization(initrc_t)
+-miscfiles_read_localization(initrc_t)
# slapd needs to read cert files from its initscript
-miscfiles_read_generic_certs(initrc_t)
+miscfiles_manage_generic_cert_files(initrc_t)
@@ -83504,7 +134576,7 @@ index 4a88fa1..9895bfe 100644
ifdef(`distro_debian',`
dev_setattr_generic_dirs(initrc_t)
-@@ -476,6 +750,10 @@ ifdef(`distro_gentoo',`
+@@ -476,6 +763,10 @@ ifdef(`distro_gentoo',`
sysnet_setattr_config(initrc_t)
optional_policy(`
@@ -83515,7 +134587,7 @@ index 4a88fa1..9895bfe 100644
alsa_read_lib(initrc_t)
')
-@@ -496,7 +774,7 @@ ifdef(`distro_redhat',`
+@@ -496,7 +787,7 @@ ifdef(`distro_redhat',`
# Red Hat systems seem to have a stray
# fd open from the initrd
@@ -83524,7 +134596,7 @@ index 4a88fa1..9895bfe 100644
files_dontaudit_read_root_files(initrc_t)
# These seem to be from the initrd
-@@ -511,6 +789,7 @@ ifdef(`distro_redhat',`
+@@ -511,6 +802,7 @@ ifdef(`distro_redhat',`
files_create_boot_dirs(initrc_t)
files_create_boot_flag(initrc_t)
files_rw_boot_symlinks(initrc_t)
@@ -83532,7 +134604,7 @@ index 4a88fa1..9895bfe 100644
# wants to read /.fonts directory
files_read_default_files(initrc_t)
files_mountpoint(initrc_tmp_t)
-@@ -531,6 +810,7 @@ ifdef(`distro_redhat',`
+@@ -531,6 +823,7 @@ ifdef(`distro_redhat',`
miscfiles_rw_localization(initrc_t)
miscfiles_setattr_localization(initrc_t)
miscfiles_relabel_localization(initrc_t)
@@ -83540,7 +134612,7 @@ index 4a88fa1..9895bfe 100644
miscfiles_read_fonts(initrc_t)
miscfiles_read_hwdata(initrc_t)
-@@ -540,8 +820,35 @@ ifdef(`distro_redhat',`
+@@ -540,8 +833,40 @@ ifdef(`distro_redhat',`
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -83555,7 +134627,12 @@ index 4a88fa1..9895bfe 100644
+ ')
+
+ optional_policy(`
++ cyrus_write_data(initrc_t)
++ ')
++
++ optional_policy(`
+ devicekit_append_inherited_log_files(initrc_t)
++ devicekit_dbus_chat_power(initrc_t)
+ ')
+
+ optional_policy(`
@@ -83576,7 +134653,7 @@ index 4a88fa1..9895bfe 100644
')
optional_policy(`
-@@ -549,14 +856,27 @@ ifdef(`distro_redhat',`
+@@ -549,14 +874,31 @@ ifdef(`distro_redhat',`
rpc_write_exports(initrc_t)
rpc_manage_nfs_state_data(initrc_t)
')
@@ -83595,6 +134672,10 @@ index 4a88fa1..9895bfe 100644
+ ')
+
+ optional_policy(`
++ tgtd_stream_connect(initrc_t)
++ ')
++
++ optional_policy(`
+ wdmd_manage_pid_files(initrc_t)
')
@@ -83604,7 +134685,7 @@ index 4a88fa1..9895bfe 100644
')
')
-@@ -567,6 +887,39 @@ ifdef(`distro_suse',`
+@@ -567,6 +909,39 @@ ifdef(`distro_suse',`
')
')
@@ -83644,7 +134725,7 @@ index 4a88fa1..9895bfe 100644
optional_policy(`
amavis_search_lib(initrc_t)
amavis_setattr_pid_files(initrc_t)
-@@ -579,6 +932,8 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -579,6 +954,8 @@ optional_policy(`
optional_policy(`
apache_read_config(initrc_t)
apache_list_modules(initrc_t)
@@ -83653,7 +134734,7 @@ index 4a88fa1..9895bfe 100644
')
optional_policy(`
-@@ -600,6 +955,7 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -600,6 +977,7 @@ optional_policy(`
optional_policy(`
cgroup_stream_connect_cgred(initrc_t)
@@ -83661,7 +134742,7 @@ index 4a88fa1..9895bfe 100644
')
optional_policy(`
-@@ -612,6 +968,17 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -612,6 +990,17 @@ optional_policy(`
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -83679,7 +134760,7 @@ index 4a88fa1..9895bfe 100644
dev_getattr_printer_dev(initrc_t)
cups_read_log(initrc_t)
-@@ -628,9 +995,13 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -628,9 +1017,13 @@ optional_policy(`
dbus_connect_system_bus(initrc_t)
dbus_system_bus_client(initrc_t)
dbus_read_config(initrc_t)
@@ -83693,7 +134774,7 @@ index 4a88fa1..9895bfe 100644
')
optional_policy(`
-@@ -655,6 +1026,10 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -655,6 +1048,10 @@ optional_policy(`
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -83704,7 +134785,7 @@ index 4a88fa1..9895bfe 100644
gpm_setattr_gpmctl(initrc_t)
')
-@@ -672,6 +1047,15 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -672,6 +1069,15 @@ optional_policy(`
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -83720,7 +134801,7 @@ index 4a88fa1..9895bfe 100644
inn_exec_config(initrc_t)
')
-@@ -712,6 +1096,7 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -712,6 +1118,7 @@ optional_policy(`
lpd_list_spool(initrc_t)
lpd_read_config(initrc_t)
@@ -83728,7 +134809,7 @@ index 4a88fa1..9895bfe 100644
')
optional_policy(`
-@@ -729,7 +1114,13 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -729,7 +1136,14 @@ optional_policy(`
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -83737,12 +134818,13 @@ index 4a88fa1..9895bfe 100644
+')
+
+optional_policy(`
++ mta_manage_aliases(initrc_t)
mta_read_config(initrc_t)
+ mta_write_config(initrc_t)
mta_dontaudit_read_spool_symlinks(initrc_t)
')
-@@ -752,6 +1143,10 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -752,6 +1166,10 @@ optional_policy(`
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -83753,7 +134835,7 @@ index 4a88fa1..9895bfe 100644
postgresql_manage_db(initrc_t)
postgresql_read_config(initrc_t)
')
-@@ -761,10 +1156,20 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -761,10 +1179,20 @@ optional_policy(`
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -83774,7 +134856,7 @@ index 4a88fa1..9895bfe 100644
quota_manage_flags(initrc_t)
')
-@@ -773,6 +1178,10 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -773,6 +1201,10 @@ optional_policy(`
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -83785,7 +134867,7 @@ index 4a88fa1..9895bfe 100644
fs_write_ramfs_sockets(initrc_t)
fs_search_ramfs(initrc_t)
-@@ -794,8 +1203,6 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -794,8 +1226,6 @@ optional_policy(`
# bash tries ioctl for some reason
files_dontaudit_ioctl_all_pids(initrc_t)
@@ -83794,7 +134876,7 @@ index 4a88fa1..9895bfe 100644
')
optional_policy(`
-@@ -804,6 +1211,10 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -804,6 +1234,10 @@ optional_policy(`
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -83805,7 +134887,7 @@ index 4a88fa1..9895bfe 100644
# shorewall-init script run /var/lib/shorewall/firewall
shorewall_lib_domtrans(initrc_t)
')
-@@ -813,10 +1224,12 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -813,10 +1247,12 @@ optional_policy(`
squid_manage_logs(initrc_t)
')
@@ -83818,7 +134900,7 @@ index 4a88fa1..9895bfe 100644
optional_policy(`
ssh_dontaudit_read_server_keys(initrc_t)
-@@ -828,8 +1241,6 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -828,8 +1264,6 @@ optional_policy(`
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -83827,7 +134909,7 @@ index 4a88fa1..9895bfe 100644
udev_manage_pid_files(initrc_t)
udev_manage_pid_dirs(initrc_t)
udev_manage_rules_files(initrc_t)
-@@ -840,12 +1251,30 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -840,12 +1274,30 @@ optional_policy(`
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -83860,7 +134942,7 @@ index 4a88fa1..9895bfe 100644
ifdef(`distro_redhat',`
# system-config-services causes avc messages that should be dontaudited
-@@ -855,6 +1284,18 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -855,6 +1307,18 @@ optional_policy(`
optional_policy(`
mono_domtrans(initrc_t)
')
@@ -83879,7 +134961,7 @@ index 4a88fa1..9895bfe 100644
')
optional_policy(`
-@@ -870,6 +1311,10 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -870,6 +1334,10 @@ optional_policy(`
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -83890,7 +134972,7 @@ index 4a88fa1..9895bfe 100644
# Set device ownerships/modes.
xserver_setattr_console_pipes(initrc_t)
-@@ -880,3 +1325,164 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -880,3 +1348,185 @@ optional_policy(`
optional_policy(`
zebra_read_config(initrc_t)
')
@@ -83932,6 +135014,7 @@ index 4a88fa1..9895bfe 100644
+')
+
+init_rw_stream_sockets(daemon)
++init_dontaudit_script_leaks(daemon)
+
+allow init_t var_run_t:dir relabelto;
+
@@ -83941,16 +135024,14 @@ index 4a88fa1..9895bfe 100644
+allow daemon initrc_transition_domain:fifo_file rw_inherited_fifo_file_perms;
+allow daemon initrc_transition_domain:fd use;
+
-+tunable_policy(`init_systemd',`
-+ allow init_t daemon:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
-+ allow init_t daemon:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms;
-+ allow init_t daemon:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
-+ allow init_t daemon:udp_socket create_socket_perms;
-+ allow daemon init_t:unix_dgram_socket sendto;
-+ # need write to /var/run/systemd/notify
-+ init_write_pid_socket(daemon)
-+ allow daemon init_t:unix_stream_socket { append write read getattr ioctl };
-+')
++allow init_t daemon:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
++allow init_t daemon:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms;
++allow init_t daemon:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
++allow init_t daemon:udp_socket create_socket_perms;
++allow daemon init_t:unix_dgram_socket sendto;
++# need write to /var/run/systemd/notify
++init_write_pid_socket(daemon)
++allow daemon init_t:unix_stream_socket { append write read getattr ioctl };
+
+# daemons started from init will
+# inherit fds from init for the console
@@ -83988,23 +135069,26 @@ index 4a88fa1..9895bfe 100644
+
+dontaudit systemprocess init_t:unix_stream_socket getattr;
+
++allow init_t daemon:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
++allow init_t daemon:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms;
++allow daemon init_t:unix_stream_socket ioctl;
++allow daemon init_t:unix_dgram_socket sendto;
++# need write to /var/run/systemd/notify
++init_write_pid_socket(daemon)
++init_rw_inherited_script_tmp_files(daemon)
+
-+tunable_policy(`init_systemd',`
-+ # Handle upstart/systemd direct transition to a executable
-+ allow init_t systemprocess:process { dyntransition siginh };
-+ allow init_t systemprocess:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
-+ allow init_t systemprocess:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms;
-+ allow systemprocess init_t:unix_dgram_socket sendto;
-+ allow systemprocess init_t:unix_stream_socket { append write read getattr ioctl };
-+')
++# Handle upstart/systemd direct transition to a executable
++allow init_t systemprocess:process { dyntransition siginh };
++allow init_t systemprocess:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
++allow init_t systemprocess:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms;
++allow systemprocess init_t:unix_dgram_socket sendto;
++allow systemprocess init_t:unix_stream_socket { append write read getattr ioctl };
+
-+ifdef(`hide_broken_symptoms',`
-+ # RHEL4 systems seem to have a stray
-+ # fds open from the initrd
-+ ifdef(`distro_rhel4',`
-+ kernel_dontaudit_use_fds(systemprocess)
-+ ')
-+')
++files_dontaudit_rw_inherited_locks(systemprocess)
++
++init_rw_inherited_script_tmp_files(systemprocess)
++
++logging_dontaudit_rw_inherited_generic_logs(systemprocess)
+
+userdom_dontaudit_search_user_home_dirs(systemprocess)
+userdom_dontaudit_rw_stream(systemprocess)
@@ -84055,6 +135139,25 @@ index 4a88fa1..9895bfe 100644
+#ifdef(`enable_mls',`
+# mls_rangetrans_target(systemprocess)
+#')
++
++allow initrc_domain daemon:process transition;
++allow daemon initrc_domain:fd use;
++allow daemon initrc_domain:fifo_file rw_inherited_fifo_file_perms;
++allow daemon initrc_domain:process sigchld;
++allow initrc_domain direct_init_entry:file { getattr open read execute };
++
++allow systemprocess initrc_domain:fd use;
++allow systemprocess initrc_domain:fifo_file rw_inherited_fifo_file_perms;
++allow systemprocess initrc_domain:process sigchld;
++allow initrc_domain systemprocess_entry:file { getattr open read execute };
++allow initrc_domain systemprocess:process transition;
++
++ifdef(`direct_sysadm_daemon',`
++ allow daemon direct_run_init:fd use;
++ allow daemon direct_run_init:fifo_file rw_inherited_fifo_file_perms;
++ allow daemon direct_run_init:process sigchld;
++ allow direct_run_init direct_init_entry:file { getattr open read execute };
++')
diff --git a/policy/modules/system/ipsec.fc b/policy/modules/system/ipsec.fc
index ec85acb..662e79b 100644
--- a/policy/modules/system/ipsec.fc
@@ -84108,7 +135211,7 @@ index 0d4c8d3..9d66bf7 100644
########################################
diff --git a/policy/modules/system/ipsec.te b/policy/modules/system/ipsec.te
-index a30840c..1035cf4 100644
+index a30840c..77206a0 100644
--- a/policy/modules/system/ipsec.te
+++ b/policy/modules/system/ipsec.te
@@ -73,13 +73,15 @@ role system_r types setkey_t;
@@ -84128,7 +135231,15 @@ index a30840c..1035cf4 100644
allow ipsec_t ipsec_initrc_exec_t:file read_file_perms;
-@@ -127,20 +129,21 @@ corecmd_exec_shell(ipsec_t)
+@@ -113,6 +115,7 @@ allow ipsec_mgmt_t ipsec_t:unix_stream_socket { read write };
+ allow ipsec_mgmt_t ipsec_t:process { rlimitinh sigchld };
+
+ kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(ipsec_t)
++kernel_read_net_sysctls(ipsec_t)
+ kernel_list_proc(ipsec_t)
+ kernel_read_proc_symlinks(ipsec_t)
+ # allow pluto to access /proc/net/ipsec_eroute;
+@@ -127,20 +130,21 @@ corecmd_exec_shell(ipsec_t)
corecmd_exec_bin(ipsec_t)
# Pluto needs network access
@@ -84157,7 +135268,7 @@ index a30840c..1035cf4 100644
dev_read_sysfs(ipsec_t)
dev_read_rand(ipsec_t)
-@@ -156,6 +159,8 @@ files_dontaudit_search_home(ipsec_t)
+@@ -156,6 +160,8 @@ files_dontaudit_search_home(ipsec_t)
fs_getattr_all_fs(ipsec_t)
fs_search_auto_mountpoints(ipsec_t)
@@ -84166,14 +135277,14 @@ index a30840c..1035cf4 100644
term_use_console(ipsec_t)
term_dontaudit_use_all_ttys(ipsec_t)
-@@ -164,11 +169,14 @@ auth_use_nsswitch(ipsec_t)
+@@ -164,11 +170,13 @@ auth_use_nsswitch(ipsec_t)
init_use_fds(ipsec_t)
init_use_script_ptys(ipsec_t)
+logging_read_all_logs(ipsec_mgmt_t)
logging_send_syslog_msg(ipsec_t)
- miscfiles_read_localization(ipsec_t)
+-miscfiles_read_localization(ipsec_t)
sysnet_domtrans_ifconfig(ipsec_t)
+sysnet_manage_config(ipsec_t)
@@ -84232,7 +135343,15 @@ index a30840c..1035cf4 100644
init_read_utmp(ipsec_mgmt_t)
init_use_script_ptys(ipsec_mgmt_t)
-@@ -297,7 +318,12 @@ sysnet_manage_config(ipsec_mgmt_t)
+@@ -289,15 +310,16 @@ init_labeled_script_domtrans(ipsec_mgmt_t, ipsec_initrc_exec_t)
+
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(ipsec_mgmt_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(ipsec_mgmt_t)
+-
+-seutil_dontaudit_search_config(ipsec_mgmt_t)
+-
+ sysnet_manage_config(ipsec_mgmt_t)
sysnet_domtrans_ifconfig(ipsec_mgmt_t)
sysnet_etc_filetrans_config(ipsec_mgmt_t)
@@ -84246,7 +135365,7 @@ index a30840c..1035cf4 100644
optional_policy(`
consoletype_exec(ipsec_mgmt_t)
-@@ -369,13 +395,12 @@ kernel_request_load_module(racoon_t)
+@@ -369,13 +391,12 @@ kernel_request_load_module(racoon_t)
corecmd_exec_shell(racoon_t)
corecmd_exec_bin(racoon_t)
@@ -84266,7 +135385,11 @@ index a30840c..1035cf4 100644
corenet_udp_bind_isakmp_port(racoon_t)
corenet_udp_bind_ipsecnat_port(racoon_t)
-@@ -404,6 +429,8 @@ miscfiles_read_localization(racoon_t)
+@@ -400,10 +421,11 @@ locallogin_use_fds(racoon_t)
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(racoon_t)
+ logging_send_audit_msgs(racoon_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(racoon_t)
sysnet_exec_ifconfig(racoon_t)
@@ -84275,7 +135398,11 @@ index a30840c..1035cf4 100644
auth_can_read_shadow_passwords(racoon_t)
tunable_policy(`racoon_read_shadow',`
auth_tunable_read_shadow(racoon_t)
-@@ -441,5 +468,6 @@ miscfiles_read_localization(setkey_t)
+@@ -437,9 +459,9 @@ corenet_setcontext_all_spds(setkey_t)
+
+ locallogin_use_fds(setkey_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(setkey_t)
seutil_read_config(setkey_t)
@@ -84387,7 +135514,7 @@ index c42fbc3..7071460 100644
## <summary>
## Set the attributes of iptables config files.
diff --git a/policy/modules/system/iptables.te b/policy/modules/system/iptables.te
-index 0646ee7..36e02fa 100644
+index 0646ee7..da1337a 100644
--- a/policy/modules/system/iptables.te
+++ b/policy/modules/system/iptables.te
@@ -5,26 +5,27 @@ policy_module(iptables, 1.13.0)
@@ -84443,17 +135570,18 @@ index 0646ee7..36e02fa 100644
kernel_request_load_module(iptables_t)
kernel_read_system_state(iptables_t)
kernel_read_network_state(iptables_t)
-@@ -64,6 +66,9 @@ corenet_relabelto_all_packets(iptables_t)
+@@ -64,6 +66,10 @@ corenet_relabelto_all_packets(iptables_t)
corenet_dontaudit_rw_tun_tap_dev(iptables_t)
dev_read_sysfs(iptables_t)
++dev_read_urand(iptables_t)
+ifdef(`hide_broken_symptoms',`
+ dev_dontaudit_write_mtrr(iptables_t)
+')
fs_getattr_xattr_fs(iptables_t)
fs_search_auto_mountpoints(iptables_t)
-@@ -72,11 +77,13 @@ fs_list_inotifyfs(iptables_t)
+@@ -72,11 +78,13 @@ fs_list_inotifyfs(iptables_t)
mls_file_read_all_levels(iptables_t)
term_dontaudit_use_console(iptables_t)
@@ -84468,7 +135596,7 @@ index 0646ee7..36e02fa 100644
auth_use_nsswitch(iptables_t)
-@@ -85,15 +92,17 @@ init_use_script_ptys(iptables_t)
+@@ -85,15 +93,16 @@ init_use_script_ptys(iptables_t)
# to allow rules to be saved on reboot:
init_rw_script_tmp_files(iptables_t)
init_rw_script_stream_sockets(iptables_t)
@@ -84476,7 +135604,7 @@ index 0646ee7..36e02fa 100644
logging_send_syslog_msg(iptables_t)
- miscfiles_read_localization(iptables_t)
+-miscfiles_read_localization(iptables_t)
-sysnet_run_ifconfig(iptables_t, iptables_roles)
+#sysnet_run_ifconfig(iptables_t, iptables_roles)
@@ -84524,10 +135652,15 @@ index 0646ee7..36e02fa 100644
')
diff --git a/policy/modules/system/libraries.fc b/policy/modules/system/libraries.fc
-index ef8bbaf..102c3d8 100644
+index ef8bbaf..a21d5fe 100644
--- a/policy/modules/system/libraries.fc
+++ b/policy/modules/system/libraries.fc
-@@ -28,14 +28,17 @@ ifdef(`distro_redhat',`
+@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
++
+ #
+ # /emul
+ #
+@@ -28,14 +29,17 @@ ifdef(`distro_redhat',`
# /etc
#
/etc/ld\.so\.cache -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:ld_so_cache_t,s0)
@@ -84546,7 +135679,7 @@ index ef8bbaf..102c3d8 100644
/lib/.* gen_context(system_u:object_r:lib_t,s0)
/lib/ld-[^/]*\.so(\.[^/]*)* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:ld_so_t,s0)
-@@ -52,9 +55,8 @@ ifdef(`distro_gentoo',`
+@@ -52,9 +56,8 @@ ifdef(`distro_gentoo',`
#
# /opt
#
@@ -84557,7 +135690,7 @@ index ef8bbaf..102c3d8 100644
/opt/(.*/)?java/.+\.jar -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:lib_t,s0)
/opt/(.*/)?jre.*/.+\.so(\.[^/]*)* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0)
/opt/(.*/)?jre/.+\.jar -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:lib_t,s0)
-@@ -103,6 +105,12 @@ ifdef(`distro_redhat',`
+@@ -103,6 +106,12 @@ ifdef(`distro_redhat',`
#
# /usr
#
@@ -84570,7 +135703,7 @@ index ef8bbaf..102c3d8 100644
/usr/(.*/)?/HelixPlayer/.+\.so(\.[^/]*)* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0)
/usr/(.*/)?/RealPlayer/.+\.so(\.[^/]*)* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0)
-@@ -111,12 +119,12 @@ ifdef(`distro_redhat',`
+@@ -111,12 +120,12 @@ ifdef(`distro_redhat',`
/usr/(.*/)?java/.+\.jsa -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:lib_t,s0)
/usr/(.*/)?lib(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:lib_t,s0)
@@ -84585,16 +135718,21 @@ index ef8bbaf..102c3d8 100644
/usr/lib/altivec/libavcodec\.so(\.[^/]*)* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0)
/usr/lib/cedega/.+\.so(\.[^/]*)* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0)
/usr/lib/vlc/video_chroma/libi420_rgb_mmx_plugin\.so -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0)
-@@ -140,6 +148,7 @@ ifdef(`distro_redhat',`
+@@ -140,6 +149,8 @@ ifdef(`distro_redhat',`
/usr/lib/ati-fglrx/.+\.so(\..*)? -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0)
/usr/lib/fglrx/.*\.so(\.[^/]*)* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0)
/usr/lib/libjs\.so.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0)
++/usr/lib/libjavascriptcoregtk[^/]*\.so.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0)
+/usr/lib/libzvbi\.so(\.[^/]*)* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0)
/usr/lib/sse2/libx264\.so(\.[^/]*)* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0)
/usr/lib(/.*)?/libnvidia.+\.so(\.[^/]*)* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0)
/usr/lib(/.*)?/nvidia_drv.*\.so(\.[^/]*)* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0)
-@@ -150,9 +159,8 @@ ifdef(`distro_redhat',`
- /usr/lib/nvidia/libGL(core)?\.so(\.[^/]*)* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0)
+@@ -147,12 +158,11 @@ ifdef(`distro_redhat',`
+ /usr/lib/nvidia-graphics(-[^/]*/)?libGL(core)?\.so(\.[^/]*)* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0)
+ /usr/lib/nvidia-graphics(-[^/]*/)?libnvidia.*\.so(\.[^/]*)* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0)
+ /usr/lib/nvidia-graphics(-[^/]*/)?libXvMCNVIDIA\.so.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0)
+-/usr/lib/nvidia/libGL(core)?\.so(\.[^/]*)* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0)
++/usr/lib/nvidia.*\.so(\.[^/]*)* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0)
/usr/lib/xorg/modules/glesx\.so(\.[^/]*)* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0)
-/usr/(local/)?.*\.so(\.[^/]*)* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:lib_t,s0)
@@ -84605,7 +135743,7 @@ index ef8bbaf..102c3d8 100644
/usr/NX/lib/libXcomp\.so.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0)
/usr/NX/lib/libjpeg\.so.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0)
-@@ -181,6 +189,7 @@ ifdef(`distro_redhat',`
+@@ -181,11 +191,13 @@ ifdef(`distro_redhat',`
# Fedora Core packages: gstreamer-plugins, compat-libstdc++, Glide3, libdv
# HelixPlayer, SDL, xorg-x11, xorg-x11-libs, Hermes, valgrind, openoffice.org-libs, httpd - php
HOME_DIR/.*/plugins/nppdf\.so.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0)
@@ -84613,7 +135751,13 @@ index ef8bbaf..102c3d8 100644
/usr/lib/allegro/(.*/)?alleg-vga\.so -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0)
/usr/lib/firefox-[^/]*/extensions(/.*)?/libqfaservices.so -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0)
/usr/lib/firefox-[^/]*/plugins/nppdf.so -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0)
-@@ -240,14 +249,10 @@ HOME_DIR/.*/plugins/nppdf\.so.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_
+ /usr/lib/firefox/plugins/libractrl\.so -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0)
+ /usr/lib/libFLAC\.so.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0)
++/usr/lib/dri/fglrx_dri.so.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0)
+ /usr/lib/libfglrx_gamma\.so.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0)
+ /usr/lib/mozilla/plugins/nppdf\.so -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0)
+ /usr/lib/mozilla/plugins/libvlcplugin\.so -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0)
+@@ -240,14 +252,10 @@ HOME_DIR/.*/plugins/nppdf\.so.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_
# Livna.org packages: xmms-mp3, ffmpeg, xvidcore, xine-lib, gsm, lame
/usr/lib.*/libmpg123\.so(\.[^/]*)* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0)
@@ -84629,7 +135773,7 @@ index ef8bbaf..102c3d8 100644
# Jai, Sun Microsystems (Jpackage SPRM)
/usr/lib/libmlib_jai\.so -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0)
-@@ -269,20 +274,19 @@ HOME_DIR/.mozilla/plugins/nprhapengine\.so.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:te
+@@ -269,20 +277,19 @@ HOME_DIR/.mozilla/plugins/nprhapengine\.so.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:te
# Java, Sun Microsystems (JPackage SRPM)
/usr/(.*/)?jre.*/.*\.so(\.[^/]*)* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0)
@@ -84660,7 +135804,7 @@ index ef8bbaf..102c3d8 100644
/usr/(.*/)?intellinux/SPPlugins/ADMPlugin\.apl -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0)
-@@ -299,17 +303,150 @@ HOME_DIR/.mozilla/plugins/nprhapengine\.so.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:te
+@@ -299,17 +306,151 @@ HOME_DIR/.mozilla/plugins/nprhapengine\.so.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:te
#
/var/cache/ldconfig(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:ldconfig_cache_t,s0)
@@ -84755,6 +135899,10 @@ index ef8bbaf..102c3d8 100644
+
+/usr/lib/.*/libflashplayer\.so.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0)
+
++/usr/lib/xorg/modules/dri/.+\.so -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0)
++/usr/X11R6/lib/modules/dri/.+\.so -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0)
++/usr/lib/dri/.+\.so -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0)
++
+ifdef(`fixed',`
+/usr/lib/libavfilter\.so(\..*)? -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0)
+/usr/lib/libavdevice\.so.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0)
@@ -84773,9 +135921,6 @@ index ef8bbaf..102c3d8 100644
+/usr/lib/xulrunner-[^/]*/libxul\.so -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0)
+# Flash plugin, Macromedia
+/usr/lib/php/modules/.+\.so -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0)
-+/usr/lib/xorg/modules/dri/.+\.so -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0)
-+/usr/X11R6/lib/modules/dri/.+\.so -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0)
-+/usr/lib/dri/.+\.so -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0)
+/usr/lib/httpd/modules/libphp5\.so -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0)
+')
+/opt/VBoxGuestAdditions.*/lib/VBox.*\.so -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0)
@@ -84818,10 +135963,36 @@ index ef8bbaf..102c3d8 100644
+
+/usr/sbin/ldconfig -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:ldconfig_exec_t,s0)
diff --git a/policy/modules/system/libraries.if b/policy/modules/system/libraries.if
-index 808ba93..f94b80a 100644
+index 808ba93..7b506f2 100644
--- a/policy/modules/system/libraries.if
+++ b/policy/modules/system/libraries.if
-@@ -147,6 +147,7 @@ interface(`libs_manage_ld_so',`
+@@ -66,6 +66,25 @@ interface(`libs_exec_ldconfig',`
+
+ ########################################
+ ## <summary>
++## Make ldconfig_exec_t entrypoint for
++## the specified domain.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## The domain for which bin_t is an entrypoint.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`libs_ldconfig_exec_entry_type',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type ldconfig_exec_t;
++ ')
++
++ domain_entry_file($1, ldconfig_exec_t)
++')
++
++########################################
++## <summary>
+ ## Use the dynamic link/loader for automatic loading
+ ## of shared libraries.
+ ## </summary>
+@@ -147,6 +166,7 @@ interface(`libs_manage_ld_so',`
type lib_t, ld_so_t;
')
@@ -84829,7 +136000,7 @@ index 808ba93..f94b80a 100644
manage_files_pattern($1, lib_t, ld_so_t)
')
-@@ -205,8 +206,26 @@ interface(`libs_search_lib',`
+@@ -205,8 +225,26 @@ interface(`libs_search_lib',`
type lib_t;
')
@@ -84856,7 +136027,7 @@ index 808ba93..f94b80a 100644
########################################
## <summary>
-@@ -248,29 +267,12 @@ interface(`libs_manage_lib_dirs',`
+@@ -248,29 +286,12 @@ interface(`libs_manage_lib_dirs',`
type lib_t;
')
@@ -84887,7 +136058,7 @@ index 808ba93..f94b80a 100644
## Read files in the library directories, such
## as static libraries.
## </summary>
-@@ -345,6 +347,7 @@ interface(`libs_manage_lib_files',`
+@@ -345,6 +366,7 @@ interface(`libs_manage_lib_files',`
type lib_t;
')
@@ -84895,7 +136066,7 @@ index 808ba93..f94b80a 100644
manage_files_pattern($1, lib_t, lib_t)
')
-@@ -421,7 +424,8 @@ interface(`libs_manage_shared_libs',`
+@@ -421,7 +443,8 @@ interface(`libs_manage_shared_libs',`
type lib_t, textrel_shlib_t;
')
@@ -84905,7 +136076,7 @@ index 808ba93..f94b80a 100644
')
########################################
-@@ -440,9 +444,9 @@ interface(`libs_use_shared_libs',`
+@@ -440,9 +463,9 @@ interface(`libs_use_shared_libs',`
')
files_search_usr($1)
@@ -84918,7 +136089,7 @@ index 808ba93..f94b80a 100644
allow $1 textrel_shlib_t:file execmod;
')
-@@ -483,7 +487,7 @@ interface(`libs_relabel_shared_libs',`
+@@ -483,7 +506,7 @@ interface(`libs_relabel_shared_libs',`
type lib_t, textrel_shlib_t;
')
@@ -84927,7 +136098,7 @@ index 808ba93..f94b80a 100644
')
########################################
-@@ -534,3 +538,26 @@ interface(`lib_filetrans_shared_lib',`
+@@ -534,3 +557,26 @@ interface(`lib_filetrans_shared_lib',`
interface(`files_lib_filetrans_shared_lib',`
refpolicywarn(`$0($*) has been deprecated.')
')
@@ -84955,9 +136126,26 @@ index 808ba93..f94b80a 100644
+ files_etc_filetrans($1, ld_so_cache_t, file, "ld.so.preload~")
+')
diff --git a/policy/modules/system/libraries.te b/policy/modules/system/libraries.te
-index ad01883..1166ff5 100644
+index ad01883..a003fa8 100644
--- a/policy/modules/system/libraries.te
+++ b/policy/modules/system/libraries.te
+@@ -32,14 +32,14 @@ files_tmp_file(ldconfig_tmp_t)
+ # lib_t is the type of files in the system lib directories.
+ #
+ type lib_t alias shlib_t;
+-files_type(lib_t)
++files_ro_base_file(lib_t)
+
+ #
+ # textrel_shlib_t is the type of shared objects in the system lib
+ # directories, which require text relocation.
+ #
+ type textrel_shlib_t alias texrel_shlib_t;
+-files_type(textrel_shlib_t)
++files_ro_base_file(textrel_shlib_t)
+
+ ifdef(`distro_gentoo',`
+ # openrc unfortunately mounts a tmpfs
@@ -59,9 +59,11 @@ optional_policy(`
allow ldconfig_t self:capability { dac_override sys_chroot };
@@ -84986,7 +136174,11 @@ index ad01883..1166ff5 100644
files_search_var_lib(ldconfig_t)
files_read_etc_files(ldconfig_t)
files_read_usr_files(ldconfig_t)
-@@ -94,7 +100,8 @@ miscfiles_read_localization(ldconfig_t)
+@@ -90,11 +96,11 @@ files_delete_etc_files(ldconfig_t)
+ init_use_script_ptys(ldconfig_t)
+ init_read_script_tmp_files(ldconfig_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(ldconfig_t)
logging_send_syslog_msg(ldconfig_t)
@@ -84996,7 +136188,7 @@ index ad01883..1166ff5 100644
userdom_use_all_users_fds(ldconfig_t)
ifdef(`distro_ubuntu',`
-@@ -103,6 +110,12 @@ ifdef(`distro_ubuntu',`
+@@ -103,6 +109,12 @@ ifdef(`distro_ubuntu',`
')
')
@@ -85009,7 +136201,7 @@ index ad01883..1166ff5 100644
ifdef(`hide_broken_symptoms',`
ifdef(`distro_gentoo',`
# leaked fds from portage
-@@ -114,6 +127,9 @@ ifdef(`hide_broken_symptoms',`
+@@ -114,6 +126,9 @@ ifdef(`hide_broken_symptoms',`
')
')
@@ -85019,7 +136211,7 @@ index ad01883..1166ff5 100644
optional_policy(`
unconfined_dontaudit_rw_tcp_sockets(ldconfig_t)
')
-@@ -131,6 +147,14 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -131,6 +146,14 @@ optional_policy(`
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -85034,7 +136226,7 @@ index ad01883..1166ff5 100644
puppet_rw_tmp(ldconfig_t)
')
-@@ -141,6 +165,3 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -141,6 +164,3 @@ optional_policy(`
rpm_manage_script_tmp_files(ldconfig_t)
')
@@ -85119,7 +136311,7 @@ index 0e3c2a9..40adf5a 100644
+')
+
diff --git a/policy/modules/system/locallogin.te b/policy/modules/system/locallogin.te
-index 9fd5be7..226328b 100644
+index 9fd5be7..7e2a02e 100644
--- a/policy/modules/system/locallogin.te
+++ b/policy/modules/system/locallogin.te
@@ -13,9 +13,8 @@ auth_login_entry_type(local_login_t)
@@ -85134,7 +136326,20 @@ index 9fd5be7..226328b 100644
type sulogin_t;
type sulogin_exec_t;
-@@ -32,9 +31,8 @@ role system_r types sulogin_t;
+@@ -27,14 +26,21 @@ init_domain(sulogin_t, sulogin_exec_t)
+ init_system_domain(sulogin_t, sulogin_exec_t)
+ role system_r types sulogin_t;
+
++ifdef(`enable_mcs',`
++ init_ranged_daemon_domain(sulogin_t, sulogin_exec_t, s0 - mcs_systemhigh)
++')
++
++ifdef(`enable_mls',`
++ init_ranged_daemon_domain(sulogin_t, sulogin_exec_t, mls_systemhigh)
++')
++
+ ########################################
+ #
# Local login local policy
#
@@ -85146,7 +136351,7 @@ index 9fd5be7..226328b 100644
allow local_login_t self:fd use;
allow local_login_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms;
allow local_login_t self:sock_file read_sock_file_perms;
-@@ -51,9 +49,7 @@ allow local_login_t self:key { search write link };
+@@ -51,9 +57,7 @@ allow local_login_t self:key { search write link };
allow local_login_t local_login_lock_t:file manage_file_perms;
files_lock_filetrans(local_login_t, local_login_lock_t, file)
@@ -85157,7 +136362,7 @@ index 9fd5be7..226328b 100644
kernel_read_system_state(local_login_t)
kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(local_login_t)
-@@ -73,6 +69,8 @@ dev_getattr_power_mgmt_dev(local_login_t)
+@@ -73,6 +77,8 @@ dev_getattr_power_mgmt_dev(local_login_t)
dev_setattr_power_mgmt_dev(local_login_t)
dev_getattr_sound_dev(local_login_t)
dev_setattr_sound_dev(local_login_t)
@@ -85166,7 +136371,7 @@ index 9fd5be7..226328b 100644
dev_dontaudit_getattr_apm_bios_dev(local_login_t)
dev_dontaudit_setattr_apm_bios_dev(local_login_t)
dev_dontaudit_read_framebuffer(local_login_t)
-@@ -117,14 +115,18 @@ term_relabel_unallocated_ttys(local_login_t)
+@@ -117,16 +123,19 @@ term_relabel_unallocated_ttys(local_login_t)
term_relabel_all_ttys(local_login_t)
term_setattr_all_ttys(local_login_t)
term_setattr_unallocated_ttys(local_login_t)
@@ -85184,9 +136389,11 @@ index 9fd5be7..226328b 100644
init_dontaudit_use_fds(local_login_t)
+init_stream_connect(local_login_t)
- miscfiles_read_localization(local_login_t)
+-miscfiles_read_localization(local_login_t)
-@@ -141,19 +143,19 @@ ifdef(`distro_ubuntu',`
+ userdom_spec_domtrans_all_users(local_login_t)
+ userdom_signal_all_users(local_login_t)
+@@ -141,19 +150,19 @@ ifdef(`distro_ubuntu',`
')
')
@@ -85214,7 +136421,7 @@ index 9fd5be7..226328b 100644
')
optional_policy(`
-@@ -177,14 +179,6 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -177,14 +186,6 @@ optional_policy(`
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -85229,7 +136436,7 @@ index 9fd5be7..226328b 100644
unconfined_shell_domtrans(local_login_t)
')
-@@ -215,6 +209,7 @@ allow sulogin_t self:sem create_sem_perms;
+@@ -215,6 +216,7 @@ allow sulogin_t self:sem create_sem_perms;
allow sulogin_t self:msgq create_msgq_perms;
allow sulogin_t self:msg { send receive };
@@ -85237,7 +136444,7 @@ index 9fd5be7..226328b 100644
kernel_read_system_state(sulogin_t)
fs_search_auto_mountpoints(sulogin_t)
-@@ -223,13 +218,17 @@ fs_rw_tmpfs_chr_files(sulogin_t)
+@@ -223,13 +225,16 @@ fs_rw_tmpfs_chr_files(sulogin_t)
files_read_etc_files(sulogin_t)
# because file systems are not mounted:
files_dontaudit_search_isid_type_dirs(sulogin_t)
@@ -85250,12 +136457,11 @@ index 9fd5be7..226328b 100644
logging_send_syslog_msg(sulogin_t)
-+miscfiles_read_localization(sulogin_t)
+
seutil_read_config(sulogin_t)
seutil_read_default_contexts(sulogin_t)
-@@ -238,14 +237,24 @@ userdom_use_unpriv_users_fds(sulogin_t)
+@@ -238,14 +243,24 @@ userdom_use_unpriv_users_fds(sulogin_t)
userdom_search_user_home_dirs(sulogin_t)
userdom_use_user_ptys(sulogin_t)
@@ -85282,7 +136488,7 @@ index 9fd5be7..226328b 100644
init_getpgid(sulogin_t)
', `
allow sulogin_t self:process setexec;
-@@ -256,11 +265,3 @@ ifdef(`sulogin_no_pam', `
+@@ -256,11 +271,3 @@ ifdef(`sulogin_no_pam', `
selinux_compute_relabel_context(sulogin_t)
selinux_compute_user_contexts(sulogin_t)
')
@@ -85295,10 +136501,15 @@ index 9fd5be7..226328b 100644
- nscd_socket_use(sulogin_t)
-')
diff --git a/policy/modules/system/logging.fc b/policy/modules/system/logging.fc
-index 02f4c97..be8c9a1 100644
+index 02f4c97..70248c6 100644
--- a/policy/modules/system/logging.fc
+++ b/policy/modules/system/logging.fc
-@@ -6,6 +6,8 @@
+@@ -2,10 +2,13 @@
+
+ /etc/rsyslog.conf gen_context(system_u:object_r:syslog_conf_t,s0)
+ /etc/syslog.conf gen_context(system_u:object_r:syslog_conf_t,s0)
++/etc/rsyslog.d(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:syslog_conf_t,s0)
+ /etc/audit(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:auditd_etc_t,mls_systemhigh)
/etc/rc\.d/init\.d/auditd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:auditd_initrc_exec_t,s0)
/etc/rc\.d/init\.d/rsyslog -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:syslogd_initrc_exec_t,s0)
@@ -85307,7 +136518,7 @@ index 02f4c97..be8c9a1 100644
/sbin/audispd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:audisp_exec_t,s0)
/sbin/audisp-remote -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:audisp_remote_exec_t,s0)
/sbin/auditctl -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:auditctl_exec_t,s0)
-@@ -17,12 +19,25 @@
+@@ -17,12 +20,25 @@
/sbin/syslogd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:syslogd_exec_t,s0)
/sbin/syslog-ng -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:syslogd_exec_t,s0)
@@ -85334,7 +136545,7 @@ index 02f4c97..be8c9a1 100644
/var/lib/syslog-ng(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:syslogd_var_lib_t,s0)
/var/lib/r?syslog(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:syslogd_var_lib_t,s0)
-@@ -34,11 +49,11 @@ ifdef(`distro_suse', `
+@@ -34,11 +50,10 @@ ifdef(`distro_suse', `
/var/axfrdns/log/main(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:var_log_t,s0)
/var/dnscache/log/main(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:var_log_t,s0)
@@ -85344,7 +136555,6 @@ index 02f4c97..be8c9a1 100644
/var/log -d gen_context(system_u:object_r:var_log_t,s0-mls_systemhigh)
/var/log/.* gen_context(system_u:object_r:var_log_t,s0)
-/var/log/boot\.log -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:var_log_t,mls_systemhigh)
-+/var/log/boot\.log -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:var_log_t,mls_systemhigh)
/var/log/messages[^/]* gen_context(system_u:object_r:var_log_t,mls_systemhigh)
/var/log/secure[^/]* gen_context(system_u:object_r:var_log_t,mls_systemhigh)
/var/log/cron[^/]* gen_context(system_u:object_r:var_log_t,mls_systemhigh)
@@ -85365,7 +136575,7 @@ index 02f4c97..be8c9a1 100644
')
/var/run/audit_events -s gen_context(system_u:object_r:auditd_var_run_t,mls_systemhigh)
-@@ -66,6 +84,7 @@ ifdef(`distro_redhat',`
+@@ -66,11 +84,16 @@ ifdef(`distro_redhat',`
/var/run/syslogd\.pid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:syslogd_var_run_t,mls_systemhigh)
/var/run/syslog-ng.ctl -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:syslogd_var_run_t,s0)
/var/run/syslog-ng(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:syslogd_var_run_t,s0)
@@ -85373,8 +136583,8 @@ index 02f4c97..be8c9a1 100644
/var/spool/audit(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:audit_spool_t,mls_systemhigh)
/var/spool/bacula/log(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:var_log_t,s0)
-@@ -73,4 +92,9 @@ ifdef(`distro_redhat',`
- /var/spool/plymouth/boot\.log gen_context(system_u:object_r:var_log_t,mls_systemhigh)
+ /var/spool/postfix/pid -d gen_context(system_u:object_r:var_run_t,s0)
+-/var/spool/plymouth/boot\.log gen_context(system_u:object_r:var_log_t,mls_systemhigh)
/var/spool/rsyslog(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:var_log_t,s0)
+/var/stockmaniac/templates_cache(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:var_log_t,s0)
@@ -85384,7 +136594,7 @@ index 02f4c97..be8c9a1 100644
+/var/webmin(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:var_log_t,s0)
+
diff --git a/policy/modules/system/logging.if b/policy/modules/system/logging.if
-index 321bb13..e7fd936 100644
+index 321bb13..3638d50 100644
--- a/policy/modules/system/logging.if
+++ b/policy/modules/system/logging.if
@@ -233,7 +233,7 @@ interface(`logging_run_auditd',`
@@ -85405,7 +136615,7 @@ index 321bb13..e7fd936 100644
## </summary>
## <param name="domain">
## <summary>
-@@ -496,6 +496,63 @@ interface(`logging_log_filetrans',`
+@@ -496,6 +496,68 @@ interface(`logging_log_filetrans',`
filetrans_pattern($1, var_log_t, $2, $3, $4)
')
@@ -85455,6 +136665,11 @@ index 321bb13..e7fd936 100644
+## The object class of the object being created.
+## </summary>
+## </param>
++## <param name="name" optional="true">
++## <summary>
++## The name of the object being created.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
+## <infoflow type="write" weight="10"/>
+#
+interface(`logging_log_named_filetrans',`
@@ -85469,13 +136684,15 @@ index 321bb13..e7fd936 100644
########################################
## <summary>
## Send system log messages.
-@@ -546,6 +603,84 @@ interface(`logging_send_syslog_msg',`
- # will write to the console.
- term_write_console($1)
- term_dontaudit_read_console($1)
-+ ifdef(`hide_broken_symptoms',`
-+ kernel_dgram_send($1)
+@@ -530,22 +592,85 @@ interface(`logging_log_filetrans',`
+ #
+ interface(`logging_send_syslog_msg',`
+ gen_require(`
+- type syslogd_t, devlog_t;
++ attribute syslog_client_type;
+ ')
++
++ typeattribute $1 syslog_client_type;
+')
+
+########################################
@@ -85529,11 +136746,18 @@ index 321bb13..e7fd936 100644
+interface(`logging_relabel_syslog_pid_socket',`
+ gen_require(`
+ type devlog_t;
-+ ')
-+
+ ')
+
+- allow $1 devlog_t:lnk_file read_lnk_file_perms;
+- allow $1 devlog_t:sock_file write_sock_file_perms;
+ allow $1 syslogd_var_run_t:sock_file relabel_sock_file_perms;
+')
-+
+
+- # the type of socket depends on the syslog daemon
+- allow $1 syslogd_t:unix_dgram_socket sendto;
+- allow $1 syslogd_t:unix_stream_socket connectto;
+- allow $1 self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms;
+- allow $1 self:unix_stream_socket create_socket_perms;
+########################################
+## <summary>
+## Connect to the syslog control unix stream socket.
@@ -85548,13 +136772,17 @@ index 321bb13..e7fd936 100644
+ gen_require(`
+ type syslogd_t, syslogd_var_run_t;
+ ')
-+
+
+- # If syslog is down, the glibc syslog() function
+- # will write to the console.
+- term_write_console($1)
+- term_dontaudit_read_console($1)
+ files_search_pids($1)
+ stream_connect_pattern($1, syslogd_var_run_t, syslogd_var_run_t, syslogd_t)
')
########################################
-@@ -739,7 +874,25 @@ interface(`logging_append_all_logs',`
+@@ -739,7 +864,25 @@ interface(`logging_append_all_logs',`
')
files_search_var($1)
@@ -85581,7 +136809,7 @@ index 321bb13..e7fd936 100644
')
########################################
-@@ -822,7 +975,7 @@ interface(`logging_manage_all_logs',`
+@@ -822,7 +965,7 @@ interface(`logging_manage_all_logs',`
files_search_var($1)
manage_files_pattern($1, logfile, logfile)
@@ -85590,7 +136818,7 @@ index 321bb13..e7fd936 100644
')
########################################
-@@ -848,6 +1001,44 @@ interface(`logging_read_generic_logs',`
+@@ -848,6 +991,44 @@ interface(`logging_read_generic_logs',`
########################################
## <summary>
@@ -85635,7 +136863,32 @@ index 321bb13..e7fd936 100644
## Write generic log files.
## </summary>
## <param name="domain">
-@@ -947,11 +1138,16 @@ interface(`logging_admin_audit',`
+@@ -868,6 +1049,24 @@ interface(`logging_write_generic_logs',`
+
+ ########################################
+ ## <summary>
++## Dontaudit read/Write inherited generic log files.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain to not audit.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`logging_dontaudit_rw_inherited_generic_logs',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type var_log_t;
++ ')
++
++ dontaudit $1 var_log_t:file rw_inherited_file_perms;
++')
++
++########################################
++## <summary>
+ ## Dontaudit Write generic log files.
+ ## </summary>
+ ## <param name="domain">
+@@ -947,11 +1146,16 @@ interface(`logging_admin_audit',`
type auditd_t, auditd_etc_t, auditd_log_t;
type auditd_var_run_t;
type auditd_initrc_exec_t;
@@ -85653,7 +136906,7 @@ index 321bb13..e7fd936 100644
manage_dirs_pattern($1, auditd_etc_t, auditd_etc_t)
manage_files_pattern($1, auditd_etc_t, auditd_etc_t)
-@@ -967,6 +1163,33 @@ interface(`logging_admin_audit',`
+@@ -967,6 +1171,33 @@ interface(`logging_admin_audit',`
domain_system_change_exemption($1)
role_transition $2 auditd_initrc_exec_t system_r;
allow $2 system_r;
@@ -85687,7 +136940,7 @@ index 321bb13..e7fd936 100644
')
########################################
-@@ -995,10 +1218,15 @@ interface(`logging_admin_syslog',`
+@@ -995,10 +1226,15 @@ interface(`logging_admin_syslog',`
type syslogd_initrc_exec_t;
')
@@ -85705,7 +136958,7 @@ index 321bb13..e7fd936 100644
manage_dirs_pattern($1, klogd_var_run_t, klogd_var_run_t)
manage_files_pattern($1, klogd_var_run_t, klogd_var_run_t)
-@@ -1020,6 +1248,8 @@ interface(`logging_admin_syslog',`
+@@ -1020,6 +1256,8 @@ interface(`logging_admin_syslog',`
manage_files_pattern($1, syslogd_var_run_t, syslogd_var_run_t)
logging_manage_all_logs($1)
@@ -85714,7 +136967,7 @@ index 321bb13..e7fd936 100644
init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, syslogd_initrc_exec_t)
domain_system_change_exemption($1)
-@@ -1048,3 +1278,29 @@ interface(`logging_admin',`
+@@ -1048,3 +1286,29 @@ interface(`logging_admin',`
logging_admin_audit($1, $2)
logging_admin_syslog($1, $2)
')
@@ -85745,13 +136998,15 @@ index 321bb13..e7fd936 100644
+ init_named_pid_filetrans($1, syslogd_var_run_t, dir, "journal")
+')
diff --git a/policy/modules/system/logging.te b/policy/modules/system/logging.te
-index 0034021..ca33705 100644
+index 0034021..c62bd95 100644
--- a/policy/modules/system/logging.te
+++ b/policy/modules/system/logging.te
-@@ -5,6 +5,20 @@ policy_module(logging, 1.19.0)
+@@ -4,6 +4,21 @@ policy_module(logging, 1.19.0)
+ #
# Declarations
#
-
++attribute syslog_client_type;
++
+## <desc>
+## <p>
+## Allow syslogd daemon to send mail
@@ -85765,11 +137020,10 @@ index 0034021..ca33705 100644
+## </p>
+## </desc>
+gen_tunable(logging_syslogd_use_tty, false)
-+
+
attribute logfile;
- type auditctl_t;
-@@ -20,6 +34,7 @@ files_security_file(auditd_log_t)
+@@ -20,6 +35,7 @@ files_security_file(auditd_log_t)
files_security_mountpoint(auditd_log_t)
type audit_spool_t;
@@ -85777,7 +137031,7 @@ index 0034021..ca33705 100644
files_security_file(audit_spool_t)
files_security_mountpoint(audit_spool_t)
-@@ -33,6 +48,9 @@ init_script_file(auditd_initrc_exec_t)
+@@ -33,6 +49,9 @@ init_script_file(auditd_initrc_exec_t)
type auditd_var_run_t;
files_pid_file(auditd_var_run_t)
@@ -85787,7 +137041,7 @@ index 0034021..ca33705 100644
type audisp_t;
type audisp_exec_t;
init_system_domain(audisp_t, audisp_exec_t)
-@@ -64,6 +82,7 @@ files_config_file(syslog_conf_t)
+@@ -64,6 +83,7 @@ files_config_file(syslog_conf_t)
type syslogd_t;
type syslogd_exec_t;
init_daemon_domain(syslogd_t, syslogd_exec_t)
@@ -85795,7 +137049,15 @@ index 0034021..ca33705 100644
type syslogd_initrc_exec_t;
init_script_file(syslogd_initrc_exec_t)
-@@ -94,6 +113,8 @@ ifdef(`enable_mls',`
+@@ -76,6 +96,7 @@ files_type(syslogd_var_lib_t)
+
+ type syslogd_var_run_t;
+ files_pid_file(syslogd_var_run_t)
++mls_trusted_object(syslogd_var_run_t)
+
+ type var_log_t;
+ logging_log_file(var_log_t)
+@@ -94,6 +115,8 @@ ifdef(`enable_mls',`
allow auditctl_t self:capability { fsetid dac_read_search dac_override };
allow auditctl_t self:netlink_audit_socket nlmsg_readpriv;
@@ -85804,7 +137066,7 @@ index 0034021..ca33705 100644
read_files_pattern(auditctl_t, auditd_etc_t, auditd_etc_t)
allow auditctl_t auditd_etc_t:dir list_dir_perms;
-@@ -111,7 +132,7 @@ domain_use_interactive_fds(auditctl_t)
+@@ -111,7 +134,7 @@ domain_use_interactive_fds(auditctl_t)
mls_file_read_all_levels(auditctl_t)
@@ -85813,7 +137075,7 @@ index 0034021..ca33705 100644
init_dontaudit_use_fds(auditctl_t)
-@@ -148,6 +169,7 @@ kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(auditd_t)
+@@ -148,6 +171,7 @@ kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(auditd_t)
# Needs to be able to run dispatcher. see /etc/audit/auditd.conf
# Probably want a transition, and a new auditd_helper app
kernel_read_system_state(auditd_t)
@@ -85821,28 +137083,30 @@ index 0034021..ca33705 100644
dev_read_sysfs(auditd_t)
-@@ -157,7 +179,6 @@ fs_rw_anon_inodefs_files(auditd_t)
-
- selinux_search_fs(auditctl_t)
+@@ -155,9 +179,6 @@ fs_getattr_all_fs(auditd_t)
+ fs_search_auto_mountpoints(auditd_t)
+ fs_rw_anon_inodefs_files(auditd_t)
+-selinux_search_fs(auditctl_t)
+-
-corenet_all_recvfrom_unlabeled(auditd_t)
corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(auditd_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(auditd_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_node(auditd_t)
-@@ -183,16 +204,19 @@ logging_send_syslog_msg(auditd_t)
+@@ -183,16 +204,16 @@ logging_send_syslog_msg(auditd_t)
logging_domtrans_dispatcher(auditd_t)
logging_signal_dispatcher(auditd_t)
+-miscfiles_read_localization(auditd_t)
+auth_use_nsswitch(auditd_t)
+
- miscfiles_read_localization(auditd_t)
mls_file_read_all_levels(auditd_t)
mls_file_write_all_levels(auditd_t) # Need to be able to write to /var/run/ directory
+-
+-seutil_dontaudit_read_config(auditd_t)
+mls_socket_write_all_levels(auditd_t)
- seutil_dontaudit_read_config(auditd_t)
-
sysnet_dns_name_resolve(auditd_t)
-userdom_use_user_terminals(auditd_t)
@@ -85850,7 +137114,7 @@ index 0034021..ca33705 100644
userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fds(auditd_t)
userdom_dontaudit_search_user_home_dirs(auditd_t)
-@@ -237,10 +261,17 @@ corecmd_exec_shell(audisp_t)
+@@ -237,19 +258,29 @@ corecmd_exec_shell(audisp_t)
domain_use_interactive_fds(audisp_t)
@@ -85868,7 +137132,9 @@ index 0034021..ca33705 100644
logging_send_syslog_msg(audisp_t)
-@@ -250,6 +281,10 @@ sysnet_dns_name_resolve(audisp_t)
+-miscfiles_read_localization(audisp_t)
+
+ sysnet_dns_name_resolve(audisp_t)
optional_policy(`
dbus_system_bus_client(audisp_t)
@@ -85879,7 +137145,7 @@ index 0034021..ca33705 100644
')
########################################
-@@ -268,7 +303,6 @@ files_spool_filetrans(audisp_remote_t, audit_spool_t, { dir file })
+@@ -268,7 +299,6 @@ files_spool_filetrans(audisp_remote_t, audit_spool_t, { dir file })
corecmd_exec_bin(audisp_remote_t)
@@ -85887,7 +137153,7 @@ index 0034021..ca33705 100644
corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(audisp_remote_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(audisp_remote_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_node(audisp_remote_t)
-@@ -280,11 +314,20 @@ corenet_sendrecv_audit_client_packets(audisp_remote_t)
+@@ -280,10 +310,18 @@ corenet_sendrecv_audit_client_packets(audisp_remote_t)
files_read_etc_files(audisp_remote_t)
@@ -85896,26 +137162,33 @@ index 0034021..ca33705 100644
logging_send_syslog_msg(audisp_remote_t)
logging_send_audit_msgs(audisp_remote_t)
+-miscfiles_read_localization(audisp_remote_t)
+auth_use_nsswitch(audisp_remote_t)
+auth_append_login_records(audisp_remote_t)
+
- miscfiles_read_localization(audisp_remote_t)
-
++
+init_telinit(audisp_remote_t)
+init_read_utmp(audisp_remote_t)
+init_dontaudit_write_utmp(audisp_remote_t)
-+
+
sysnet_dns_name_resolve(audisp_remote_t)
- ########################################
-@@ -354,12 +397,12 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -326,7 +364,6 @@ files_read_etc_files(klogd_t)
+
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(klogd_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(klogd_t)
+
+ mls_file_read_all_levels(klogd_t)
+
+@@ -354,12 +391,12 @@ optional_policy(`
# chown fsetid for syslog-ng
# sys_admin for the integrated klog of syslog-ng and metalog
# cjp: why net_admin!
-allow syslogd_t self:capability { dac_override sys_resource sys_tty_config net_admin sys_admin chown fsetid };
+allow syslogd_t self:capability { sys_ptrace dac_override sys_resource sys_tty_config ipc_lock net_admin sys_admin sys_nice chown fsetid setuid setgid };
dontaudit syslogd_t self:capability sys_tty_config;
-+allow syslogd_t self:capability2 syslog;
++allow syslogd_t self:capability2 { syslog block_suspend };
# setpgid for metalog
# setrlimit for syslog-ng
-# getsched for syslog-ng
@@ -85924,7 +137197,15 @@ index 0034021..ca33705 100644
# receive messages to be logged
allow syslogd_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms;
allow syslogd_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
-@@ -377,6 +420,7 @@ files_pid_filetrans(syslogd_t, devlog_t, sock_file)
+@@ -369,6 +406,7 @@ allow syslogd_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms;
+ allow syslogd_t self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
+
+ allow syslogd_t syslog_conf_t:file read_file_perms;
++allow syslogd_t syslog_conf_t:dir list_dir_perms;
+
+ # Create and bind to /dev/log or /var/run/log.
+ allow syslogd_t devlog_t:sock_file manage_sock_file_perms;
+@@ -377,6 +415,7 @@ files_pid_filetrans(syslogd_t, devlog_t, sock_file)
# create/append log files.
manage_files_pattern(syslogd_t, var_log_t, var_log_t)
rw_fifo_files_pattern(syslogd_t, var_log_t, var_log_t)
@@ -85932,7 +137213,7 @@ index 0034021..ca33705 100644
# Allow access for syslog-ng
allow syslogd_t var_log_t:dir { create setattr };
-@@ -386,13 +430,21 @@ manage_dirs_pattern(syslogd_t, syslogd_tmp_t, syslogd_tmp_t)
+@@ -386,22 +425,35 @@ manage_dirs_pattern(syslogd_t, syslogd_tmp_t, syslogd_tmp_t)
manage_files_pattern(syslogd_t, syslogd_tmp_t, syslogd_tmp_t)
files_tmp_filetrans(syslogd_t, syslogd_tmp_t, { dir file })
@@ -85949,24 +137230,27 @@ index 0034021..ca33705 100644
manage_files_pattern(syslogd_t, syslogd_var_run_t, syslogd_var_run_t)
files_pid_filetrans(syslogd_t, syslogd_var_run_t, file)
-+kernel_stream_read(syslogd_t)
-+kernel_stream_write(syslogd_t)
++kernel_rw_stream_socket_perms(syslogd_t)
kernel_read_system_state(syslogd_t)
++kernel_read_network_state(syslogd_t)
kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(syslogd_t)
kernel_read_proc_symlinks(syslogd_t)
-@@ -401,7 +453,10 @@ kernel_read_messages(syslogd_t)
+ # Allow access to /proc/kmsg for syslog-ng
+ kernel_read_messages(syslogd_t)
++kernel_request_load_module(syslogd_t)
kernel_clear_ring_buffer(syslogd_t)
kernel_change_ring_buffer_level(syslogd_t)
-
--corenet_all_recvfrom_unlabeled(syslogd_t)
++kernel_read_ring_buffer(syslogd_t)
++
+ifdef(`hide_broken_symptoms',`
+ kernel_rw_unix_dgram_sockets(syslogd_t)
+')
-+
+
+-corenet_all_recvfrom_unlabeled(syslogd_t)
corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(syslogd_t)
corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if(syslogd_t)
corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_node(syslogd_t)
-@@ -427,10 +482,27 @@ corenet_sendrecv_syslogd_server_packets(syslogd_t)
+@@ -427,10 +479,28 @@ corenet_sendrecv_syslogd_server_packets(syslogd_t)
corenet_sendrecv_postgresql_client_packets(syslogd_t)
corenet_sendrecv_mysqld_client_packets(syslogd_t)
@@ -85986,6 +137270,7 @@ index 0034021..ca33705 100644
+dev_read_urand(syslogd_t)
+# relating to systemd-kmsg-syslogd
+dev_write_kmsg(syslogd_t)
++dev_read_kmsg(syslogd_t)
+domain_read_all_domains_state(syslogd_t)
domain_use_interactive_fds(syslogd_t)
@@ -85994,7 +137279,16 @@ index 0034021..ca33705 100644
files_read_etc_files(syslogd_t)
files_read_usr_files(syslogd_t)
-@@ -448,7 +520,9 @@ mls_file_write_all_levels(syslogd_t) # Need to be able to write to /var/run/ and
+@@ -441,14 +511,18 @@ files_dontaudit_search_isid_type_dirs(syslogd_t)
+ files_read_kernel_symbol_table(syslogd_t)
+
+ fs_getattr_all_fs(syslogd_t)
++fs_rw_tmpfs_files(syslogd_t)
+ fs_search_auto_mountpoints(syslogd_t)
++fs_search_cgroup_dirs(syslogd_t)
+
+ mls_file_write_all_levels(syslogd_t) # Need to be able to write to /var/run/ and /var/log directories
+
term_write_console(syslogd_t)
# Allow syslog to a terminal
term_write_unallocated_ttys(syslogd_t)
@@ -86004,18 +137298,30 @@ index 0034021..ca33705 100644
# for sending messages to logged in users
init_read_utmp(syslogd_t)
init_dontaudit_write_utmp(syslogd_t)
-@@ -460,6 +534,7 @@ init_use_fds(syslogd_t)
+@@ -460,11 +534,11 @@ init_use_fds(syslogd_t)
# cjp: this doesnt make sense
logging_send_syslog_msg(syslogd_t)
+logging_manage_all_logs(syslogd_t)
- miscfiles_read_localization(syslogd_t)
+-miscfiles_read_localization(syslogd_t)
+
+ userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fds(syslogd_t)
+-userdom_dontaudit_search_user_home_dirs(syslogd_t)
++userdom_search_user_home_dirs(syslogd_t)
-@@ -493,15 +568,29 @@ optional_policy(`
+ ifdef(`distro_gentoo',`
+ # default gentoo syslog-ng config appends kernel
+@@ -493,15 +567,36 @@ optional_policy(`
')
optional_policy(`
++ kerberos_keytab_template(syslogd, syslogd_t)
++ kerberos_manage_host_rcache(syslogd_t)
++ kerberos_read_config(syslogd_t)
++')
++
++optional_policy(`
+ mysql_read_config(syslogd_t)
mysql_stream_connect(syslogd_t)
')
@@ -86035,6 +137341,7 @@ index 0034021..ca33705 100644
optional_policy(`
seutil_sigchld_newrole(syslogd_t)
+ snmp_read_snmp_var_lib_files(syslogd_t)
++ snmp_dontaudit_write_snmp_var_lib_files(syslogd_t)
+')
+
+optional_policy(`
@@ -86042,11 +137349,43 @@ index 0034021..ca33705 100644
')
optional_policy(`
+@@ -512,3 +607,24 @@ optional_policy(`
+ # log to the xconsole
+ xserver_rw_console(syslogd_t)
+ ')
++
++#####################################################
++#
++# syslog client rules
++#
++allow syslog_client_type devlog_t:lnk_file read_lnk_file_perms;
++allow syslog_client_type devlog_t:sock_file write_sock_file_perms;
++
++# the type of socket depends on the syslog daemon
++allow syslog_client_type syslogd_t:unix_dgram_socket sendto;
++allow syslog_client_type syslogd_t:unix_stream_socket connectto;
++allow syslog_client_type self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms;
++allow syslog_client_type self:unix_stream_socket create_socket_perms;
++
++# If syslog is down, the glibc syslog() function
++# will write to the console.
++term_write_console(syslog_client_type)
++term_dontaudit_read_console(syslog_client_type)
++ifdef(`hide_broken_symptoms',`
++ kernel_dgram_send(syslog_client_type)
++')
diff --git a/policy/modules/system/lvm.fc b/policy/modules/system/lvm.fc
-index 879bb1e..101d1c0 100644
+index 879bb1e..c11d48b 100644
--- a/policy/modules/system/lvm.fc
+++ b/policy/modules/system/lvm.fc
-@@ -28,23 +28,27 @@ ifdef(`distro_gentoo',`
+@@ -23,28 +23,34 @@ ifdef(`distro_gentoo',`
+ /etc/lvmtab(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:lvm_metadata_t,s0)
+ /etc/lvmtab\.d(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:lvm_metadata_t,s0)
+
++/etc/multipath(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:lvm_metadata_t,s0)
++
+ #
+ # /lib
#
/lib/lvm-10/.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:lvm_exec_t,s0)
/lib/lvm-200/.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:lvm_exec_t,s0)
@@ -86075,7 +137414,7 @@ index 879bb1e..101d1c0 100644
/sbin/lvmiopversion -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:lvm_exec_t,s0)
/sbin/lvmsadc -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:lvm_exec_t,s0)
/sbin/lvmsar -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:lvm_exec_t,s0)
-@@ -88,8 +92,67 @@ ifdef(`distro_gentoo',`
+@@ -88,8 +94,69 @@ ifdef(`distro_gentoo',`
#
# /usr
#
@@ -86083,6 +137422,7 @@ index 879bb1e..101d1c0 100644
-/usr/sbin/lvm -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:lvm_exec_t,s0)
+/usr/sbin/clvmd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:clvmd_exec_t,s0)
+/usr/sbin/cryptsetup -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:lvm_exec_t,s0)
++/usr/sbin/dmeventd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:lvm_exec_t,s0)
+/usr/sbin/dmraid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:lvm_exec_t,s0)
+/usr/sbin/dmsetup -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:lvm_exec_t,s0)
+/usr/sbin/dmsetup\.static -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:lvm_exec_t,s0)
@@ -86140,12 +137480,13 @@ index 879bb1e..101d1c0 100644
+
+/usr/lib/lvm-10/.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:lvm_exec_t,s0)
+/usr/lib/lvm-200/.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:lvm_exec_t,s0)
-+/usr/lib/udev/udisks-lvm-pv-export -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:lvm_exec_t,s0)
+/usr/lib/systemd/systemd-cryptsetup -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:lvm_exec_t,s0)
++/usr/lib/systemd/system-generators/lvm2.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:lvm_exec_t,s0)
++/usr/lib/udev/udisks-lvm-pv-export -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:lvm_exec_t,s0)
#
# /var
-@@ -97,5 +160,7 @@ ifdef(`distro_gentoo',`
+@@ -97,5 +164,7 @@ ifdef(`distro_gentoo',`
/var/cache/multipathd(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:lvm_metadata_t,s0)
/var/lib/multipath(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:lvm_var_lib_t,s0)
/var/lock/lvm(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:lvm_lock_t,s0)
@@ -86253,7 +137594,7 @@ index 58bc27f..51e9872 100644
+ allow $1 lvm_var_run_t:fifo_file rw_inherited_fifo_file_perms;
+')
diff --git a/policy/modules/system/lvm.te b/policy/modules/system/lvm.te
-index f8eeecd..7b9437a 100644
+index f8eeecd..0d42470 100644
--- a/policy/modules/system/lvm.te
+++ b/policy/modules/system/lvm.te
@@ -12,6 +12,9 @@ init_daemon_domain(clvmd_t, clvmd_exec_t)
@@ -86301,7 +137642,17 @@ index f8eeecd..7b9437a 100644
corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(clvmd_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(clvmd_t)
corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if(clvmd_t)
-@@ -141,6 +146,11 @@ ifdef(`distro_redhat',`
+@@ -120,9 +125,7 @@ init_dontaudit_getattr_initctl(clvmd_t)
+
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(clvmd_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(clvmd_t)
+
+-seutil_dontaudit_search_config(clvmd_t)
+ seutil_sigchld_newrole(clvmd_t)
+ seutil_read_config(clvmd_t)
+ seutil_read_file_contexts(clvmd_t)
+@@ -141,6 +144,11 @@ ifdef(`distro_redhat',`
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -86313,7 +137664,7 @@ index f8eeecd..7b9437a 100644
ccs_stream_connect(clvmd_t)
')
-@@ -170,6 +180,7 @@ dontaudit lvm_t self:capability sys_tty_config;
+@@ -170,6 +178,7 @@ dontaudit lvm_t self:capability sys_tty_config;
allow lvm_t self:process { sigchld sigkill sigstop signull signal setfscreate };
# LVM will complain a lot if it cannot set its priority.
allow lvm_t self:process setsched;
@@ -86321,7 +137672,7 @@ index f8eeecd..7b9437a 100644
allow lvm_t self:file rw_file_perms;
allow lvm_t self:fifo_file manage_fifo_file_perms;
allow lvm_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms;
-@@ -191,8 +202,9 @@ read_lnk_files_pattern(lvm_t, lvm_exec_t, lvm_exec_t)
+@@ -191,8 +200,9 @@ read_lnk_files_pattern(lvm_t, lvm_exec_t, lvm_exec_t)
can_exec(lvm_t, lvm_exec_t)
# Creating lock files
@@ -86332,7 +137683,7 @@ index f8eeecd..7b9437a 100644
manage_dirs_pattern(lvm_t, lvm_var_lib_t, lvm_var_lib_t)
manage_files_pattern(lvm_t, lvm_var_lib_t, lvm_var_lib_t)
-@@ -200,8 +212,9 @@ files_var_lib_filetrans(lvm_t, lvm_var_lib_t, { dir file })
+@@ -200,8 +210,9 @@ files_var_lib_filetrans(lvm_t, lvm_var_lib_t, { dir file })
manage_dirs_pattern(lvm_t, lvm_var_run_t, lvm_var_run_t)
manage_files_pattern(lvm_t, lvm_var_run_t, lvm_var_run_t)
@@ -86343,7 +137694,7 @@ index f8eeecd..7b9437a 100644
read_files_pattern(lvm_t, lvm_etc_t, lvm_etc_t)
read_lnk_files_pattern(lvm_t, lvm_etc_t, lvm_etc_t)
-@@ -213,11 +226,13 @@ files_search_mnt(lvm_t)
+@@ -213,11 +224,13 @@ files_search_mnt(lvm_t)
kernel_get_sysvipc_info(lvm_t)
kernel_read_system_state(lvm_t)
@@ -86357,7 +137708,7 @@ index f8eeecd..7b9437a 100644
kernel_search_debugfs(lvm_t)
corecmd_exec_bin(lvm_t)
-@@ -228,11 +243,13 @@ dev_delete_generic_dirs(lvm_t)
+@@ -228,11 +241,13 @@ dev_delete_generic_dirs(lvm_t)
dev_read_rand(lvm_t)
dev_read_urand(lvm_t)
dev_rw_lvm_control(lvm_t)
@@ -86372,7 +137723,7 @@ index f8eeecd..7b9437a 100644
# cjp: this has no effect since LVM does not
# have lnk_file relabelto for anything else.
# perhaps this should be blk_files?
-@@ -244,6 +261,7 @@ dev_dontaudit_getattr_generic_chr_files(lvm_t)
+@@ -244,6 +259,7 @@ dev_dontaudit_getattr_generic_chr_files(lvm_t)
dev_dontaudit_getattr_generic_blk_files(lvm_t)
dev_dontaudit_getattr_generic_pipes(lvm_t)
dev_create_generic_dirs(lvm_t)
@@ -86380,11 +137731,11 @@ index f8eeecd..7b9437a 100644
domain_use_interactive_fds(lvm_t)
domain_read_all_domains_state(lvm_t)
-@@ -253,17 +271,21 @@ files_read_etc_files(lvm_t)
+@@ -253,17 +269,21 @@ files_read_etc_files(lvm_t)
files_read_etc_runtime_files(lvm_t)
# for when /usr is not mounted:
files_dontaudit_search_isid_type_dirs(lvm_t)
-+files_dontaudit_getattr_tmpfs_files(lvm_t)
++fs_rw_inherited_tmpfs_files(lvm_t)
-fs_getattr_xattr_fs(lvm_t)
+fs_getattr_all_fs(lvm_t)
@@ -86403,7 +137754,7 @@ index f8eeecd..7b9437a 100644
selinux_get_fs_mount(lvm_t)
selinux_validate_context(lvm_t)
-@@ -283,7 +305,7 @@ storage_dev_filetrans_fixed_disk(lvm_t)
+@@ -283,7 +303,7 @@ storage_dev_filetrans_fixed_disk(lvm_t)
# Access raw devices and old /dev/lvm (c 109,0). Is this needed?
storage_manage_fixed_disk(lvm_t)
@@ -86412,7 +137763,7 @@ index f8eeecd..7b9437a 100644
init_use_fds(lvm_t)
init_dontaudit_getattr_initctl(lvm_t)
-@@ -291,6 +313,9 @@ init_use_script_ptys(lvm_t)
+@@ -291,15 +311,20 @@ init_use_script_ptys(lvm_t)
init_read_script_state(lvm_t)
logging_send_syslog_msg(lvm_t)
@@ -86420,9 +137771,10 @@ index f8eeecd..7b9437a 100644
+
+authlogin_rw_pipes(lvm_t)
- miscfiles_read_localization(lvm_t)
+-miscfiles_read_localization(lvm_t)
-@@ -299,7 +324,10 @@ seutil_read_file_contexts(lvm_t)
+ seutil_read_config(lvm_t)
+ seutil_read_file_contexts(lvm_t)
seutil_search_default_contexts(lvm_t)
seutil_sigchld_newrole(lvm_t)
@@ -86433,7 +137785,7 @@ index f8eeecd..7b9437a 100644
ifdef(`distro_redhat',`
# this is from the initrd:
-@@ -311,6 +339,11 @@ ifdef(`distro_redhat',`
+@@ -311,6 +336,11 @@ ifdef(`distro_redhat',`
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -86445,7 +137797,7 @@ index f8eeecd..7b9437a 100644
bootloader_rw_tmp_files(lvm_t)
')
-@@ -331,14 +364,26 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -331,14 +361,26 @@ optional_policy(`
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -86473,7 +137825,7 @@ index f8eeecd..7b9437a 100644
')
diff --git a/policy/modules/system/miscfiles.fc b/policy/modules/system/miscfiles.fc
-index fe3427d..242ed4e 100644
+index fe3427d..2a501db 100644
--- a/policy/modules/system/miscfiles.fc
+++ b/policy/modules/system/miscfiles.fc
@@ -9,8 +9,9 @@ ifdef(`distro_gentoo',`
@@ -86481,8 +137833,9 @@ index fe3427d..242ed4e 100644
#
/etc/avahi/etc/localtime -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:locale_t,s0)
-/etc/httpd/alias/[^/]*\.db(\.[^/]*)* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:cert_t,s0)
+-/etc/localtime -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:locale_t,s0)
+/etc/httpd/alias(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:cert_t,s0)
- /etc/localtime -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:locale_t,s0)
++/etc/localtime gen_context(system_u:object_r:locale_t,s0)
+/etc/locale.conf -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:locale_t,s0)
/etc/pki(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:cert_t,s0)
/etc/timezone -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:locale_t,s0)
@@ -86499,11 +137852,91 @@ index fe3427d..242ed4e 100644
/usr/man(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:man_t,s0)
/usr/share/fonts(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:fonts_t,s0)
+@@ -75,7 +71,6 @@ ifdef(`distro_redhat',`
+
+ /var/cache/fontconfig(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:fonts_cache_t,s0)
+ /var/cache/fonts(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:tetex_data_t,s0)
+-/var/cache/man(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:man_t,s0)
+
+ /var/named/chroot/etc/pki(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:cert_t,s0)
+
diff --git a/policy/modules/system/miscfiles.if b/policy/modules/system/miscfiles.if
-index 926ba65..b2a1675 100644
+index 926ba65..9cac7b3 100644
--- a/policy/modules/system/miscfiles.if
+++ b/policy/modules/system/miscfiles.if
-@@ -582,6 +582,26 @@ interface(`miscfiles_manage_man_pages',`
+@@ -106,6 +106,24 @@ interface(`miscfiles_manage_generic_cert_dirs',`
+
+ ########################################
+ ## <summary>
++## Dontaudit attempts to write generic SSL certificates.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`miscfiles_dontaudit_write_generic_cert_files',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type cert_t;
++ ')
++
++ dontaudit $1 cert_t:file write;
++')
++
++########################################
++## <summary>
+ ## Manage generic SSL certificates.
+ ## </summary>
+ ## <param name="domain">
+@@ -434,6 +452,7 @@ interface(`miscfiles_rw_localization',`
+ files_search_usr($1)
+ allow $1 locale_t:dir list_dir_perms;
+ rw_files_pattern($1, locale_t, locale_t)
++ manage_lnk_files_pattern($1, locale_t, locale_t)
+ ')
+
+ ########################################
+@@ -453,6 +472,7 @@ interface(`miscfiles_relabel_localization',`
+
+ files_search_usr($1)
+ relabel_files_pattern($1, locale_t, locale_t)
++ relabel_lnk_files_pattern($1, locale_t, locale_t)
+ ')
+
+ ########################################
+@@ -470,7 +490,6 @@ interface(`miscfiles_legacy_read_localization',`
+ type locale_t;
+ ')
+
+- miscfiles_read_localization($1)
+ allow $1 locale_t:file execute;
+ ')
+
+@@ -531,6 +550,10 @@ interface(`miscfiles_read_man_pages',`
+ allow $1 man_t:dir list_dir_perms;
+ read_files_pattern($1, man_t, man_t)
+ read_lnk_files_pattern($1, man_t, man_t)
++
++ optional_policy(`
++ mandb_read_cache_files($1)
++ ')
+ ')
+
+ ########################################
+@@ -557,6 +580,11 @@ interface(`miscfiles_delete_man_pages',`
+ delete_dirs_pattern($1, man_t, man_t)
+ delete_files_pattern($1, man_t, man_t)
+ delete_lnk_files_pattern($1, man_t, man_t)
++
++ optional_policy(`
++ mandb_setattr_cache_dirs($1)
++ mandb_delete_cache($1)
++ ')
+ ')
+
+ ########################################
+@@ -582,6 +610,30 @@ interface(`miscfiles_manage_man_pages',`
########################################
## <summary>
@@ -86523,6 +137956,10 @@ index 926ba65..b2a1675 100644
+ files_search_usr($1)
+ relabel_dirs_pattern($1, man_t, man_t)
+ relabel_files_pattern($1, man_t, man_t)
++
++ optional_policy(`
++ mandb_relabel_cache($1)
++ ')
+')
+
+########################################
@@ -86530,15 +137967,20 @@ index 926ba65..b2a1675 100644
## Read public files used for file
## transfer services.
## </summary>
-@@ -745,7 +765,6 @@ interface(`miscfiles_etc_filetrans_localization',`
+@@ -744,8 +796,10 @@ interface(`miscfiles_etc_filetrans_localization',`
+ type locale_t;
')
- files_etc_filetrans($1, locale_t, file)
+- files_etc_filetrans($1, locale_t, file)
-
++ files_etc_filetrans($1, locale_t, lnk_file)
++ files_etc_filetrans($1, locale_t, {lnk_file file}, "localtime" )
++ files_etc_filetrans($1, locale_t, file, "locale.conf" )
++ files_etc_filetrans($1, locale_t, file, "timezone" )
')
########################################
-@@ -769,3 +788,43 @@ interface(`miscfiles_manage_localization',`
+@@ -769,3 +823,43 @@ interface(`miscfiles_manage_localization',`
manage_lnk_files_pattern($1, locale_t, locale_t)
')
@@ -86564,7 +138006,7 @@ index 926ba65..b2a1675 100644
+ type public_content_t;
+ ')
+
-+ files_etc_filetrans($1, locale_t, file, "localtime")
++ files_etc_filetrans($1, locale_t, { lnk_file file }, "localtime")
+ files_etc_filetrans($1, locale_t, file, "locale.conf")
+ files_etc_filetrans($1, locale_t, file, "locale.conf.new")
+ files_var_filetrans($1, man_t, dir, "man")
@@ -86720,7 +138162,7 @@ index 350c450..2debedc 100644
+ files_kernel_modules_filetrans($1, modules_dep_t, file, "modules.dep.bin")
+')
diff --git a/policy/modules/system/modutils.te b/policy/modules/system/modutils.te
-index b4ff2f7..6555c9e 100644
+index b4ff2f7..0db04d2 100644
--- a/policy/modules/system/modutils.te
+++ b/policy/modules/system/modutils.te
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ policy_module(modutils, 1.13.0)
@@ -86860,7 +138302,7 @@ index b4ff2f7..6555c9e 100644
domain_signal_all_domains(insmod_t)
domain_use_interactive_fds(insmod_t)
-@@ -151,20 +163,30 @@ files_read_etc_runtime_files(insmod_t)
+@@ -151,30 +163,38 @@ files_read_etc_runtime_files(insmod_t)
files_read_etc_files(insmod_t)
files_read_usr_files(insmod_t)
files_exec_etc_files(insmod_t)
@@ -86891,7 +138333,8 @@ index b4ff2f7..6555c9e 100644
logging_send_syslog_msg(insmod_t)
logging_search_logs(insmod_t)
-@@ -173,8 +195,7 @@ miscfiles_read_localization(insmod_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(insmod_t)
seutil_read_file_contexts(insmod_t)
@@ -86901,7 +138344,7 @@ index b4ff2f7..6555c9e 100644
userdom_dontaudit_search_user_home_dirs(insmod_t)
kernel_domtrans_to(insmod_t, insmod_exec_t)
-@@ -184,28 +205,32 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -184,28 +204,32 @@ optional_policy(`
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -86941,7 +138384,7 @@ index b4ff2f7..6555c9e 100644
')
optional_policy(`
-@@ -225,6 +250,7 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -225,6 +249,7 @@ optional_policy(`
optional_policy(`
rpm_rw_pipes(insmod_t)
@@ -86949,7 +138392,7 @@ index b4ff2f7..6555c9e 100644
')
optional_policy(`
-@@ -233,6 +259,10 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -233,6 +258,10 @@ optional_policy(`
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -86960,9 +138403,11 @@ index b4ff2f7..6555c9e 100644
# cjp: why is this needed:
dev_rw_xserver_misc(insmod_t)
-@@ -293,9 +323,9 @@ logging_send_syslog_msg(update_modules_t)
+@@ -291,11 +320,10 @@ init_use_script_ptys(update_modules_t)
- miscfiles_read_localization(update_modules_t)
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(update_modules_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(update_modules_t)
-modutils_run_insmod(update_modules_t, update_modules_roles)
+#modutils_run_insmod(update_modules_t, update_modules_roles)
@@ -87005,10 +138450,10 @@ index 72c746e..f035d9f 100644
+/usr/sbin/umount\.ecryptfs_private -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:mount_ecryptfs_exec_t,s0)
+/usr/sbin/umount\.ecryptfs -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:mount_ecryptfs_exec_t,s0)
diff --git a/policy/modules/system/mount.if b/policy/modules/system/mount.if
-index 4584457..5b041ee 100644
+index 4584457..300c3f7 100644
--- a/policy/modules/system/mount.if
+++ b/policy/modules/system/mount.if
-@@ -16,6 +16,12 @@ interface(`mount_domtrans',`
+@@ -16,6 +16,13 @@ interface(`mount_domtrans',`
')
domtrans_pattern($1, mount_exec_t, mount_t)
@@ -87017,11 +138462,12 @@ index 4584457..5b041ee 100644
+ allow $1 mount_t:fd use;
+ ps_process_pattern(mount_t, $1)
+
++ allow mount_t $1:key write;
+ allow mount_t $1:unix_stream_socket { read write };
')
########################################
-@@ -38,11 +44,84 @@ interface(`mount_domtrans',`
+@@ -38,11 +45,103 @@ interface(`mount_domtrans',`
#
interface(`mount_run',`
gen_require(`
@@ -87105,10 +138551,29 @@ index 4584457..5b041ee 100644
+
+ allow $1 mount_var_run_t:file read_file_perms;
+ files_search_pids($1)
++')
++
++########################################
++## <summary>
++## Manage mount PID files.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`mount_manage_pid_files',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type mount_var_run_t;
++ ')
++
++ allow $1 mount_var_run_t:file manage_file_perms;
++ files_search_pids($1)
')
########################################
-@@ -91,7 +170,7 @@ interface(`mount_signal',`
+@@ -91,7 +190,7 @@ interface(`mount_signal',`
## </summary>
## <param name="domain">
## <summary>
@@ -87117,7 +138582,7 @@ index 4584457..5b041ee 100644
## </summary>
## </param>
#
-@@ -131,45 +210,138 @@ interface(`mount_send_nfs_client_request',`
+@@ -131,45 +230,138 @@ interface(`mount_send_nfs_client_request',`
########################################
## <summary>
@@ -87273,7 +138738,7 @@ index 4584457..5b041ee 100644
+ domtrans_pattern($1, mount_ecryptfs_exec_t, mount_ecryptfs_t)
')
diff --git a/policy/modules/system/mount.te b/policy/modules/system/mount.te
-index 63931f6..91137b6 100644
+index 63931f6..041c38f 100644
--- a/policy/modules/system/mount.te
+++ b/policy/modules/system/mount.te
@@ -10,35 +10,60 @@ policy_module(mount, 1.15.0)
@@ -87348,7 +138813,7 @@ index 63931f6..91137b6 100644
allow mount_t mount_loopback_t:file read_file_perms;
-@@ -49,9 +74,24 @@ can_exec(mount_t, mount_exec_t)
+@@ -49,9 +74,25 @@ can_exec(mount_t, mount_exec_t)
files_tmp_filetrans(mount_t, mount_tmp_t, { file dir })
@@ -87367,6 +138832,7 @@ index 63931f6..91137b6 100644
+kernel_read_network_state(mount_t)
kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(mount_t)
-kernel_dontaudit_getattr_core_if(mount_t)
++kernel_relabelfrom_unlabeled_fs(mount_t)
+kernel_manage_debugfs(mount_t)
+kernel_setsched(mount_t)
+kernel_use_fds(mount_t)
@@ -87374,7 +138840,7 @@ index 63931f6..91137b6 100644
kernel_dontaudit_write_debugfs_dirs(mount_t)
kernel_dontaudit_write_proc_dirs(mount_t)
# To load binfmt_misc kernel module
-@@ -60,31 +100,46 @@ kernel_request_load_module(mount_t)
+@@ -60,31 +101,46 @@ kernel_request_load_module(mount_t)
# required for mount.smbfs
corecmd_exec_bin(mount_t)
@@ -87424,7 +138890,7 @@ index 63931f6..91137b6 100644
files_read_isid_type_files(mount_t)
# For reading cert files
files_read_usr_files(mount_t)
-@@ -92,28 +147,42 @@ files_list_mnt(mount_t)
+@@ -92,28 +148,42 @@ files_list_mnt(mount_t)
files_dontaudit_write_all_mountpoints(mount_t)
files_dontaudit_setattr_all_mountpoints(mount_t)
@@ -87473,7 +138939,7 @@ index 63931f6..91137b6 100644
term_dontaudit_manage_pty_dirs(mount_t)
auth_use_nsswitch(mount_t)
-@@ -121,6 +190,8 @@ auth_use_nsswitch(mount_t)
+@@ -121,16 +191,20 @@ auth_use_nsswitch(mount_t)
init_use_fds(mount_t)
init_use_script_ptys(mount_t)
init_dontaudit_getattr_initctl(mount_t)
@@ -87482,7 +138948,10 @@ index 63931f6..91137b6 100644
logging_send_syslog_msg(mount_t)
-@@ -131,6 +202,9 @@ sysnet_use_portmap(mount_t)
+-miscfiles_read_localization(mount_t)
+
+ sysnet_use_portmap(mount_t)
+
seutil_read_config(mount_t)
userdom_use_all_users_fds(mount_t)
@@ -87504,7 +138973,7 @@ index 63931f6..91137b6 100644
+tunable_policy(`mount_anyfile',`
+ files_read_non_security_files(mount_t)
files_mounton_non_security(mount_t)
-+ files_rw_all_inherited_files(mount_t)
++ files_rw_inherited_non_security_files(mount_t)
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -87570,7 +139039,7 @@ index 63931f6..91137b6 100644
ifdef(`hide_broken_symptoms',`
# for a bug in the X server
rhgb_dontaudit_rw_stream_sockets(mount_t)
-@@ -193,21 +292,123 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -193,21 +292,121 @@ optional_policy(`
')
')
@@ -87668,7 +139137,6 @@ index 63931f6..91137b6 100644
+files_read_etc_files(showmount_t)
+files_read_etc_runtime_files(showmount_t)
+
-+miscfiles_read_localization(showmount_t)
+
+sysnet_dns_name_resolve(showmount_t)
+
@@ -87700,7 +139168,6 @@ index 63931f6..91137b6 100644
+
+auth_use_nsswitch(mount_ecryptfs_t)
+
-+miscfiles_read_localization(mount_ecryptfs_t)
diff --git a/policy/modules/system/netlabel.fc b/policy/modules/system/netlabel.fc
index b263a8a..9348c8c 100644
--- a/policy/modules/system/netlabel.fc
@@ -87773,7 +139240,7 @@ index d43f3b1..c4182e8 100644
+/etc/share/selinux/targeted(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:semanage_store_t,s0)
+/etc/share/selinux/mls(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:semanage_store_t,s0)
diff --git a/policy/modules/system/selinuxutil.if b/policy/modules/system/selinuxutil.if
-index 3822072..239ab62 100644
+index 3822072..702e0e0 100644
--- a/policy/modules/system/selinuxutil.if
+++ b/policy/modules/system/selinuxutil.if
@@ -192,11 +192,22 @@ interface(`seutil_domtrans_newrole',`
@@ -88248,7 +139715,7 @@ index 3822072..239ab62 100644
')
#######################################
-@@ -1137,3 +1486,58 @@ interface(`seutil_dontaudit_libselinux_linked',`
+@@ -1137,3 +1486,69 @@ interface(`seutil_dontaudit_libselinux_linked',`
selinux_dontaudit_get_fs_mount($1)
seutil_dontaudit_read_config($1)
')
@@ -88271,13 +139738,19 @@ index 3822072..239ab62 100644
+ ')
+ typeattribute $1 policy_manager_domain;
+
++ kernel_read_system_state($1)
++
+ # Running genhomedircon requires this for finding all users
+ auth_use_nsswitch($1)
+
+ mls_file_write_all_levels($1)
+ mls_file_read_all_levels($1)
+
++ selinux_get_enforce_mode($1)
++
+ seutil_manage_bin_policy($1)
++
++ logging_send_syslog_msg($1)
+')
+
+#######################################
@@ -88297,6 +139770,9 @@ index 3822072..239ab62 100644
+ ')
+ typeattribute $1 setfiles_domain;
+
++ kernel_read_system_state($1)
++ seutil_libselinux_linked($1)
++
+ files_relabel_all_files($1)
+
+ mls_file_read_all_levels($1)
@@ -88306,9 +139782,11 @@ index 3822072..239ab62 100644
+
+ # this is to satisfy the assertion:
+ auth_relabelto_shadow($1)
++
++ logging_send_syslog_msg($1)
+')
diff --git a/policy/modules/system/selinuxutil.te b/policy/modules/system/selinuxutil.te
-index ec01d0b..12ed3ea 100644
+index ec01d0b..51e91d2 100644
--- a/policy/modules/system/selinuxutil.te
+++ b/policy/modules/system/selinuxutil.te
@@ -11,14 +11,17 @@ gen_require(`
@@ -88446,14 +139924,14 @@ index ec01d0b..12ed3ea 100644
userdom_use_all_users_fds(checkpolicy_t)
ifdef(`distro_ubuntu',`
-@@ -188,13 +215,15 @@ term_list_ptys(load_policy_t)
+@@ -188,13 +215,13 @@ term_list_ptys(load_policy_t)
init_use_script_fds(load_policy_t)
init_use_script_ptys(load_policy_t)
+-
+-miscfiles_read_localization(load_policy_t)
+init_write_script_pipes(load_policy_t)
- miscfiles_read_localization(load_policy_t)
-
seutil_libselinux_linked(load_policy_t)
-userdom_use_user_terminals(load_policy_t)
@@ -88463,7 +139941,7 @@ index ec01d0b..12ed3ea 100644
ifdef(`distro_ubuntu',`
optional_policy(`
-@@ -205,6 +234,7 @@ ifdef(`distro_ubuntu',`
+@@ -205,6 +232,7 @@ ifdef(`distro_ubuntu',`
ifdef(`hide_broken_symptoms',`
# cjp: cover up stray file descriptors.
dontaudit load_policy_t selinux_config_t:file write;
@@ -88471,7 +139949,17 @@ index ec01d0b..12ed3ea 100644
optional_policy(`
unconfined_dontaudit_read_pipes(load_policy_t)
-@@ -220,7 +250,7 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -215,12 +243,17 @@ optional_policy(`
+ portage_dontaudit_use_fds(load_policy_t)
+ ')
+
++optional_policy(`
++ # pki is leaking
++ pki_dontaudit_write_log(load_policy_t)
++')
++
+ ########################################
+ #
# Newrole local policy
#
@@ -88480,7 +139968,7 @@ index ec01d0b..12ed3ea 100644
allow newrole_t self:process ~{ ptrace setcurrent setexec setfscreate setrlimit execmem execheap execstack };
allow newrole_t self:process setexec;
allow newrole_t self:fd use;
-@@ -232,7 +262,7 @@ allow newrole_t self:msgq create_msgq_perms;
+@@ -232,7 +265,7 @@ allow newrole_t self:msgq create_msgq_perms;
allow newrole_t self:msg { send receive };
allow newrole_t self:unix_dgram_socket sendto;
allow newrole_t self:unix_stream_socket { create_stream_socket_perms connectto };
@@ -88489,7 +139977,7 @@ index ec01d0b..12ed3ea 100644
read_files_pattern(newrole_t, default_context_t, default_context_t)
read_lnk_files_pattern(newrole_t, default_context_t, default_context_t)
-@@ -249,6 +279,7 @@ domain_use_interactive_fds(newrole_t)
+@@ -249,6 +282,7 @@ domain_use_interactive_fds(newrole_t)
# for when the user types "exec newrole" at the command line:
domain_sigchld_interactive_fds(newrole_t)
@@ -88497,7 +139985,7 @@ index ec01d0b..12ed3ea 100644
files_read_etc_files(newrole_t)
files_read_var_files(newrole_t)
files_read_var_symlinks(newrole_t)
-@@ -276,25 +307,39 @@ term_relabel_all_ptys(newrole_t)
+@@ -276,25 +310,38 @@ term_relabel_all_ptys(newrole_t)
term_getattr_unallocated_ttys(newrole_t)
term_dontaudit_use_unallocated_ttys(newrole_t)
@@ -88517,7 +140005,7 @@ index ec01d0b..12ed3ea 100644
-logging_send_syslog_msg(newrole_t)
-
- miscfiles_read_localization(newrole_t)
+-miscfiles_read_localization(newrole_t)
seutil_libselinux_linked(newrole_t)
@@ -88543,7 +140031,7 @@ index ec01d0b..12ed3ea 100644
ifdef(`distro_ubuntu',`
optional_policy(`
unconfined_domain(newrole_t)
-@@ -309,7 +354,7 @@ if(secure_mode) {
+@@ -309,7 +356,7 @@ if(secure_mode) {
userdom_spec_domtrans_all_users(newrole_t)
}
@@ -88552,7 +140040,7 @@ index ec01d0b..12ed3ea 100644
files_polyinstantiate_all(newrole_t)
')
-@@ -328,9 +373,13 @@ kernel_use_fds(restorecond_t)
+@@ -328,9 +375,13 @@ kernel_use_fds(restorecond_t)
kernel_rw_pipes(restorecond_t)
kernel_read_system_state(restorecond_t)
@@ -88567,7 +140055,7 @@ index ec01d0b..12ed3ea 100644
fs_list_inotifyfs(restorecond_t)
selinux_validate_context(restorecond_t)
-@@ -341,6 +390,7 @@ selinux_compute_user_contexts(restorecond_t)
+@@ -341,16 +392,17 @@ selinux_compute_user_contexts(restorecond_t)
files_relabel_non_auth_files(restorecond_t )
files_read_non_auth_files(restorecond_t)
@@ -88575,8 +140063,11 @@ index ec01d0b..12ed3ea 100644
auth_use_nsswitch(restorecond_t)
locallogin_dontaudit_use_fds(restorecond_t)
-@@ -351,6 +401,8 @@ miscfiles_read_localization(restorecond_t)
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(restorecond_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(restorecond_t)
+-
seutil_libselinux_linked(restorecond_t)
+userdom_read_user_home_content_symlinks(restorecond_t)
@@ -88611,7 +140102,7 @@ index ec01d0b..12ed3ea 100644
dev_dontaudit_list_all_dev_nodes(run_init_t)
domain_use_interactive_fds(run_init_t)
-@@ -398,14 +453,23 @@ selinux_compute_create_context(run_init_t)
+@@ -398,23 +453,30 @@ selinux_compute_create_context(run_init_t)
selinux_compute_relabel_context(run_init_t)
selinux_compute_user_contexts(run_init_t)
@@ -88637,7 +140128,8 @@ index ec01d0b..12ed3ea 100644
logging_send_syslog_msg(run_init_t)
-@@ -414,7 +478,7 @@ miscfiles_read_localization(run_init_t)
+-miscfiles_read_localization(run_init_t)
+-
seutil_libselinux_linked(run_init_t)
seutil_read_default_contexts(run_init_t)
@@ -88646,7 +140138,7 @@ index ec01d0b..12ed3ea 100644
ifndef(`direct_sysadm_daemon',`
ifdef(`distro_gentoo',`
-@@ -425,6 +489,19 @@ ifndef(`direct_sysadm_daemon',`
+@@ -425,6 +487,19 @@ ifndef(`direct_sysadm_daemon',`
')
')
@@ -88666,7 +140158,7 @@ index ec01d0b..12ed3ea 100644
ifdef(`distro_ubuntu',`
optional_policy(`
unconfined_domain(run_init_t)
-@@ -440,81 +517,87 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -440,81 +515,87 @@ optional_policy(`
# semodule local policy
#
@@ -88715,11 +140207,11 @@ index ec01d0b..12ed3ea 100644
-auth_use_nsswitch(semanage_t)
-
-locallogin_use_fds(semanage_t)
+-
+-logging_send_syslog_msg(semanage_t)
+# Admins are creating pp files in random locations
+files_read_non_security_files(semanage_t)
--logging_send_syslog_msg(semanage_t)
--
-miscfiles_read_localization(semanage_t)
-
-seutil_libselinux_linked(semanage_t)
@@ -88807,7 +140299,7 @@ index ec01d0b..12ed3ea 100644
')
########################################
-@@ -522,108 +605,184 @@ ifdef(`distro_ubuntu',`
+@@ -522,108 +603,180 @@ ifdef(`distro_ubuntu',`
# Setfiles local policy
#
@@ -88886,13 +140378,17 @@ index ec01d0b..12ed3ea 100644
+')
+
+optional_policy(`
++ # pki is leaking
++ pki_dontaudit_write_log(setfiles_t)
++')
++
++optional_policy(`
+ xserver_append_xdm_tmp_files(setfiles_t)
+')
-seutil_libselinux_linked(setfiles_t)
+ifdef(`hide_broken_symptoms',`
-
--userdom_use_all_users_fds(setfiles_t)
++
+ optional_policy(`
+ setroubleshoot_fixit_dontaudit_leaks(setfiles_t)
+ setroubleshoot_fixit_dontaudit_leaks(setsebool_t)
@@ -88903,7 +140399,8 @@ index ec01d0b..12ed3ea 100644
+ unconfined_domain(setfiles_t)
+ ')
+')
-+
+
+-userdom_use_all_users_fds(setfiles_t)
+########################################
+#
+# Setfiles common policy
@@ -88923,7 +140420,6 @@ index ec01d0b..12ed3ea 100644
+
+logging_send_audit_msgs(setfiles_domain)
+
-+kernel_read_system_state(setfiles_domain)
+kernel_relabelfrom_unlabeled_dirs(setfiles_domain)
+kernel_relabelfrom_unlabeled_files(setfiles_domain)
+kernel_relabelfrom_unlabeled_symlinks(setfiles_domain)
@@ -88937,6 +140433,9 @@ index ec01d0b..12ed3ea 100644
+kernel_read_network_state_symlinks(setfiles_domain)
+
+dev_relabel_all_dev_nodes(setfiles_domain)
++dev_dontaudit_rw_lvm_control(setfiles_domain)
++dev_dontaudit_read_rand(setfiles_domain)
++dev_dontaudit_read_urand(setfiles_domain)
+
+domain_use_interactive_fds(setfiles_domain)
+domain_read_all_domains_state(setfiles_domain)
@@ -88967,16 +140466,11 @@ index ec01d0b..12ed3ea 100644
+init_use_script_ptys(setfiles_domain)
+init_exec_script_files(setfiles_domain)
+
-+logging_send_syslog_msg(setfiles_domain)
-+
-+miscfiles_read_localization(setfiles_domain)
-+
-+seutil_libselinux_linked(setfiles_domain)
-+
+userdom_use_all_users_fds(setfiles_domain)
# for config files in a home directory
-userdom_read_user_home_content_files(setfiles_t)
+userdom_read_user_home_content_files(setfiles_domain)
++userdom_rw_inherited_user_home_content_files(setfiles_domain)
ifdef(`distro_debian',`
# udev tmpfs is populated with static device nodes
@@ -89010,9 +140504,9 @@ index ec01d0b..12ed3ea 100644
- optional_policy(`
- udev_dontaudit_rw_dgram_sockets(setfiles_t)
- ')
-+allow policy_manager_domain self:capability { dac_override sys_resource };
++allow policy_manager_domain self:capability { dac_override sys_nice sys_resource };
+dontaudit policy_manager_domain self:capability sys_tty_config;
-+allow policy_manager_domain self:process signal;
++allow policy_manager_domain self:process { signal setsched };
+allow policy_manager_domain self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
+allow policy_manager_domain self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms;
+allow policy_manager_domain self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms;
@@ -89029,7 +140523,6 @@ index ec01d0b..12ed3ea 100644
-optional_policy(`
- hotplug_use_fds(setfiles_t)
-')
-+logging_send_syslog_msg(policy_manager_domain)
+logging_send_audit_msgs(policy_manager_domain)
+
+# Domains that will manage policy
@@ -89039,7 +140532,6 @@ index ec01d0b..12ed3ea 100644
+allow policy_manager_domain semanage_tmp_t:file manage_file_perms;
+files_tmp_filetrans(policy_manager_domain, semanage_tmp_t, { file dir })
+
-+kernel_read_system_state(policy_manager_domain)
+kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(policy_manager_domain)
+
+corecmd_exec_bin(policy_manager_domain)
@@ -89056,18 +140548,13 @@ index ec01d0b..12ed3ea 100644
+fs_list_inotifyfs(policy_manager_domain)
+fs_getattr_all_fs(policy_manager_domain)
+
-+selinux_getattr_fs(policy_manager_domain)
+selinux_validate_context(policy_manager_domain)
-+selinux_get_enforce_mode(policy_manager_domain)
++selinux_read_policy(policy_manager_domain)
+
+term_use_all_inherited_terms(policy_manager_domain)
+
+locallogin_use_fds(policy_manager_domain)
+
-+logging_send_syslog_msg(policy_manager_domain)
-+
-+miscfiles_read_localization(policy_manager_domain)
-+
+seutil_search_default_contexts(policy_manager_domain)
+seutil_domtrans_loadpolicy(policy_manager_domain)
+seutil_read_config(policy_manager_domain)
@@ -89077,6 +140564,7 @@ index ec01d0b..12ed3ea 100644
+seutil_get_semanage_read_lock(policy_manager_domain)
+
+userdom_dontaudit_write_user_home_content_files(policy_manager_domain)
++userdom_use_user_ptys(policy_manager_domain)
diff --git a/policy/modules/system/setrans.fc b/policy/modules/system/setrans.fc
index bea4629..06e2834 100644
--- a/policy/modules/system/setrans.fc
@@ -89090,7 +140578,7 @@ index bea4629..06e2834 100644
/var/run/setrans(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:setrans_var_run_t,mls_systemhigh)
+/var/run/mcstransd\.pid gen_context(system_u:object_r:setrans_var_run_t,mls_systemhigh)
diff --git a/policy/modules/system/setrans.te b/policy/modules/system/setrans.te
-index 1447687..cdc0223 100644
+index 1447687..d5e6fb9 100644
--- a/policy/modules/system/setrans.te
+++ b/policy/modules/system/setrans.te
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ gen_require(`
@@ -89101,6 +140589,14 @@ index 1447687..cdc0223 100644
type setrans_initrc_exec_t;
init_script_file(setrans_initrc_exec_t)
+@@ -78,7 +79,6 @@ locallogin_dontaudit_use_fds(setrans_t)
+
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(setrans_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(setrans_t)
+
+ seutil_read_config(setrans_t)
+
diff --git a/policy/modules/system/sysnetwork.fc b/policy/modules/system/sysnetwork.fc
index 346a7cc..1285089 100644
--- a/policy/modules/system/sysnetwork.fc
@@ -89147,7 +140643,7 @@ index 346a7cc..1285089 100644
+
+/etc/firestarter/firestarter\.sh gen_context(system_u:object_r:dhcpc_helper_exec_t,s0)
diff --git a/policy/modules/system/sysnetwork.if b/policy/modules/system/sysnetwork.if
-index 41a1853..32a502e 100644
+index 41a1853..af08353 100644
--- a/policy/modules/system/sysnetwork.if
+++ b/policy/modules/system/sysnetwork.if
@@ -38,11 +38,47 @@ interface(`sysnet_domtrans_dhcpc',`
@@ -89359,14 +140855,23 @@ index 41a1853..32a502e 100644
## Read the DHCP configuration files.
## </summary>
## <param name="domain">
-@@ -662,7 +815,6 @@ interface(`sysnet_dns_name_resolve',`
+@@ -577,6 +730,7 @@ interface(`sysnet_read_dhcp_config',`
+ files_search_etc($1)
+ allow $1 dhcp_etc_t:dir list_dir_perms;
+ read_files_pattern($1, dhcp_etc_t, dhcp_etc_t)
++ allow $1 dhcp_etc_t:lnk_file read_lnk_file_perms;
+ ')
+
+ ########################################
+@@ -662,8 +816,6 @@ interface(`sysnet_dns_name_resolve',`
allow $1 self:udp_socket create_socket_perms;
allow $1 self:netlink_route_socket r_netlink_socket_perms;
- corenet_all_recvfrom_unlabeled($1)
- corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel($1)
+- corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel($1)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if($1)
corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if($1)
+ corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_node($1)
@@ -673,6 +825,8 @@ interface(`sysnet_dns_name_resolve',`
corenet_tcp_connect_dns_port($1)
corenet_sendrecv_dns_client_packets($1)
@@ -89376,15 +140881,16 @@ index 41a1853..32a502e 100644
sysnet_read_config($1)
optional_policy(`
-@@ -701,7 +855,6 @@ interface(`sysnet_use_ldap',`
+@@ -701,8 +855,6 @@ interface(`sysnet_use_ldap',`
allow $1 self:tcp_socket create_socket_perms;
- corenet_all_recvfrom_unlabeled($1)
- corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel($1)
+- corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel($1)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if($1)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_node($1)
-@@ -714,6 +867,9 @@ interface(`sysnet_use_ldap',`
+ corenet_tcp_sendrecv_ldap_port($1)
+@@ -714,6 +866,9 @@ interface(`sysnet_use_ldap',`
dev_read_urand($1)
sysnet_read_config($1)
@@ -89394,7 +140900,15 @@ index 41a1853..32a502e 100644
')
########################################
-@@ -747,3 +903,73 @@ interface(`sysnet_use_portmap',`
+@@ -735,7 +890,6 @@ interface(`sysnet_use_portmap',`
+ allow $1 self:udp_socket create_socket_perms;
+
+ corenet_all_recvfrom_unlabeled($1)
+- corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel($1)
+ corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if($1)
+ corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if($1)
+ corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_node($1)
+@@ -747,3 +901,73 @@ interface(`sysnet_use_portmap',`
sysnet_read_config($1)
')
@@ -89469,7 +140983,7 @@ index 41a1853..32a502e 100644
+ files_etc_filetrans($1, net_conf_t, file, "yp.conf")
+')
diff --git a/policy/modules/system/sysnetwork.te b/policy/modules/system/sysnetwork.te
-index ed363e1..272215f 100644
+index ed363e1..808e49e 100644
--- a/policy/modules/system/sysnetwork.te
+++ b/policy/modules/system/sysnetwork.te
@@ -5,8 +5,15 @@ policy_module(sysnetwork, 1.14.0)
@@ -89584,7 +141098,7 @@ index ed363e1..272215f 100644
domain_use_interactive_fds(dhcpc_t)
domain_dontaudit_read_all_domains_state(dhcpc_t)
-@@ -130,15 +148,21 @@ term_dontaudit_use_all_ptys(dhcpc_t)
+@@ -130,15 +148,20 @@ term_dontaudit_use_all_ptys(dhcpc_t)
term_dontaudit_use_unallocated_ttys(dhcpc_t)
term_dontaudit_use_generic_ptys(dhcpc_t)
@@ -89596,8 +141110,8 @@ index ed363e1..272215f 100644
logging_send_syslog_msg(dhcpc_t)
+-miscfiles_read_localization(dhcpc_t)
+miscfiles_read_generic_certs(dhcpc_t)
- miscfiles_read_localization(dhcpc_t)
-modutils_run_insmod(dhcpc_t, dhcpc_roles)
+#modutils_run_insmod(dhcpc_t, dhcpc_roles)
@@ -89608,7 +141122,7 @@ index ed363e1..272215f 100644
userdom_use_user_terminals(dhcpc_t)
userdom_dontaudit_search_user_home_dirs(dhcpc_t)
-@@ -153,8 +177,19 @@ ifdef(`distro_ubuntu',`
+@@ -153,8 +176,23 @@ ifdef(`distro_ubuntu',`
')
')
@@ -89616,20 +141130,24 @@ index ed363e1..272215f 100644
+# consoletype_run(dhcpc_t, dhcpc_roles)
+#')
+
- optional_policy(`
-- consoletype_run(dhcpc_t, dhcpc_roles)
++optional_policy(`
+ chronyd_initrc_domtrans(dhcpc_t)
+ chronyd_systemctl(dhcpc_t)
+ chronyd_read_keys(dhcpc_t)
+')
+
+optional_policy(`
++ consoletype_exec(dhcpc_t)
++')
++
+ optional_policy(`
+- consoletype_run(dhcpc_t, dhcpc_roles)
+ devicekit_dontaudit_rw_log(dhcpc_t)
+ devicekit_dontaudit_read_pid_files(dhcpc_t)
')
optional_policy(`
-@@ -169,11 +204,14 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -169,11 +207,14 @@ optional_policy(`
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -89645,7 +141163,7 @@ index ed363e1..272215f 100644
')
optional_policy(`
-@@ -187,25 +225,41 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -187,25 +228,41 @@ optional_policy(`
# for the dhcp client to run ping to check IP addresses
optional_policy(`
@@ -89667,7 +141185,7 @@ index ed363e1..272215f 100644
+optional_policy(`
+ networkmanager_domtrans(dhcpc_t)
+ networkmanager_read_pid_files(dhcpc_t)
-+ networkmanager_read_lib_files(dhcpc_t)
++ networkmanager_manage_lib(dhcpc_t)
+')
+
+optional_policy(`
@@ -89689,10 +141207,11 @@ index ed363e1..272215f 100644
')
optional_policy(`
-@@ -216,6 +270,11 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -215,7 +272,11 @@ optional_policy(`
+
optional_policy(`
seutil_sigchld_newrole(dhcpc_t)
- seutil_dontaudit_search_config(dhcpc_t)
+- seutil_dontaudit_search_config(dhcpc_t)
+ seutil_domtrans_setfiles(dhcpc_t)
+')
+optional_policy(`
@@ -89701,7 +141220,7 @@ index ed363e1..272215f 100644
')
optional_policy(`
-@@ -258,6 +317,7 @@ allow ifconfig_t self:msgq create_msgq_perms;
+@@ -258,6 +319,7 @@ allow ifconfig_t self:msgq create_msgq_perms;
allow ifconfig_t self:msg { send receive };
# Create UDP sockets, necessary when called from dhcpc
allow ifconfig_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms;
@@ -89709,7 +141228,7 @@ index ed363e1..272215f 100644
# for /sbin/ip
allow ifconfig_t self:packet_socket create_socket_perms;
allow ifconfig_t self:netlink_route_socket create_netlink_socket_perms;
-@@ -276,11 +336,17 @@ corenet_rw_tun_tap_dev(ifconfig_t)
+@@ -276,11 +338,18 @@ corenet_rw_tun_tap_dev(ifconfig_t)
dev_read_sysfs(ifconfig_t)
# for IPSEC setup:
dev_read_urand(ifconfig_t)
@@ -89720,6 +141239,7 @@ index ed363e1..272215f 100644
+read_files_pattern(ifconfig_t, dhcpc_state_t, dhcpc_state_t)
+
++files_dontaudit_rw_inherited_pipes(ifconfig_t)
+files_dontaudit_read_root_files(ifconfig_t)
files_read_etc_files(ifconfig_t)
files_read_etc_runtime_files(ifconfig_t)
@@ -89727,7 +141247,7 @@ index ed363e1..272215f 100644
fs_getattr_xattr_fs(ifconfig_t)
fs_search_auto_mountpoints(ifconfig_t)
-@@ -293,7 +359,7 @@ term_dontaudit_use_all_ptys(ifconfig_t)
+@@ -293,22 +362,22 @@ term_dontaudit_use_all_ptys(ifconfig_t)
term_dontaudit_use_ptmx(ifconfig_t)
term_dontaudit_use_generic_ptys(ifconfig_t)
@@ -89736,12 +141256,16 @@ index ed363e1..272215f 100644
init_use_fds(ifconfig_t)
init_use_script_ptys(ifconfig_t)
-@@ -304,11 +370,11 @@ logging_send_syslog_msg(ifconfig_t)
++init_rw_inherited_script_tmp_files(ifconfig_t)
- miscfiles_read_localization(ifconfig_t)
+ libs_read_lib_files(ifconfig_t)
--modutils_domtrans_insmod(ifconfig_t)
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(ifconfig_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(ifconfig_t)
-
+-modutils_domtrans_insmod(ifconfig_t)
+
seutil_use_runinit_fds(ifconfig_t)
-userdom_use_user_terminals(ifconfig_t)
@@ -89751,7 +141275,7 @@ index ed363e1..272215f 100644
userdom_use_all_users_fds(ifconfig_t)
ifdef(`distro_ubuntu',`
-@@ -317,7 +383,22 @@ ifdef(`distro_ubuntu',`
+@@ -317,7 +386,22 @@ ifdef(`distro_ubuntu',`
')
')
@@ -89774,7 +141298,7 @@ index ed363e1..272215f 100644
optional_policy(`
dev_dontaudit_rw_cardmgr(ifconfig_t)
')
-@@ -328,8 +409,14 @@ ifdef(`hide_broken_symptoms',`
+@@ -328,8 +412,14 @@ ifdef(`hide_broken_symptoms',`
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -89789,7 +141313,7 @@ index ed363e1..272215f 100644
')
optional_policy(`
-@@ -338,7 +425,15 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -338,7 +428,15 @@ optional_policy(`
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -89806,7 +141330,7 @@ index ed363e1..272215f 100644
')
optional_policy(`
-@@ -359,3 +454,9 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -359,3 +457,9 @@ optional_policy(`
xen_append_log(ifconfig_t)
xen_dontaudit_rw_unix_stream_sockets(ifconfig_t)
')
@@ -89818,10 +141342,10 @@ index ed363e1..272215f 100644
+')
diff --git a/policy/modules/system/systemd.fc b/policy/modules/system/systemd.fc
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..7da5bf6
+index 0000000..6d7c302
--- /dev/null
+++ b/policy/modules/system/systemd.fc
-@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+/bin/systemd-notify -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:systemd_notify_exec_t,s0)
+/bin/systemctl -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:systemd_systemctl_exec_t,s0)
+/bin/systemd-tty-ask-password-agent -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:systemd_passwd_agent_exec_t,s0)
@@ -89834,10 +141358,20 @@ index 0000000..7da5bf6
+/usr/bin/systemd-tty-ask-password-agent -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:systemd_passwd_agent_exec_t,s0)
+
+/usr/lib/systemd/system(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:systemd_unit_file_t,s0)
++/usr/lib/systemd/system/.*halt.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:power_unit_file_t,s0)
++/usr/lib/systemd/system/.*hibernate.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:power_unit_file_t,s0)
++/usr/lib/systemd/system/.*power.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:power_unit_file_t,s0)
++/usr/lib/systemd/system/.*reboot.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:power_unit_file_t,s0)
++/usr/lib/systemd/system/.*sleep.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:power_unit_file_t,s0)
++/usr/lib/systemd/system/.*shutdown.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:power_unit_file_t,s0)
++/usr/lib/systemd/system/.*suspend.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:power_unit_file_t,s0)
+/usr/lib/systemd/systemd-logind -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:systemd_logind_exec_t,s0)
+/usr/lib/systemd/systemd-logger -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:systemd_logger_exec_t,s0)
+/usr/lib/systemd/systemd-tmpfiles -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:systemd_tmpfiles_exec_t,s0)
+
++/var/lib/random-seed gen_context(system_u:object_r:random_seed_t,mls_systemhigh)
++/usr/var/lib/random-seed gen_context(system_u:object_r:random_seed_t,mls_systemhigh)
++
+/var/run/nologin gen_context(system_u:object_r:systemd_logind_var_run_t,s0)
+/var/run/systemd/seats(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:systemd_logind_var_run_t,s0)
+/var/run/systemd/sessions(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:systemd_logind_sessions_t,s0)
@@ -89848,10 +141382,10 @@ index 0000000..7da5bf6
+/var/run/initramfs(/.*)? <<none>>
diff --git a/policy/modules/system/systemd.if b/policy/modules/system/systemd.if
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..6d1582c
+index 0000000..5d53f08
--- /dev/null
+++ b/policy/modules/system/systemd.if
-@@ -0,0 +1,735 @@
+@@ -0,0 +1,924 @@
+## <summary>SELinux policy for systemd components</summary>
+
+#######################################
@@ -90326,6 +141860,60 @@ index 0000000..6d1582c
+ read_sock_files_pattern($1, systemd_passwd_var_run_t, systemd_passwd_var_run_t)
+')
+
++########################################
++## <summary>
++## Relabel to user home directories.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`systemd_relabelto_fifo_file_passwd_run',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type systemd_passwd_var_run_t;
++ ')
++
++ allow $1 systemd_passwd_var_run_t:fifo_file relabelto;
++')
++
++#######################################
++## <summary>
++## Relabel systemd unit directories
++## </summary>
++## <param name="script_file">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`systemd_relabel_unit_dirs',`
++ gen_require(`
++ attribute systemd_unit_file_type;
++ ')
++
++ relabel_dirs_pattern($1, systemd_unit_file_type, systemd_unit_file_type)
++')
++
++#######################################
++## <summary>
++## Relabel systemd unit files
++## </summary>
++## <param name="script_file">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`systemd_relabel_unit_files',`
++ gen_require(`
++ attribute systemd_unit_file_type;
++ ')
++
++ relabel_files_pattern($1, systemd_unit_file_type, systemd_unit_file_type)
++')
++
+#######################################
+## <summary>
+## Send generic signals to systemd_passwd_agent processes.
@@ -90343,6 +141931,8 @@ index 0000000..6d1582c
+ ')
+
+ init_search_pid_dirs($1)
++ manage_files_pattern($1, systemd_passwd_var_run_t, systemd_passwd_var_run_t)
++ manage_sock_files_pattern($1, systemd_passwd_var_run_t, systemd_passwd_var_run_t)
+ manage_fifo_files_pattern($1, systemd_passwd_var_run_t, systemd_passwd_var_run_t)
+
+ allow systemd_passwd_agent_t $1:process signull;
@@ -90455,11 +142045,46 @@ index 0000000..6d1582c
+ manage_lnk_files_pattern($1, systemd_unit_file_type, systemd_unit_file_type)
+')
+
++########################################
++## <summary>
++## Allow the specified domain to start all systemd services.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`systemd_start_all_services',`
++ gen_require(`
++ attribute systemd_unit_file_type;
++ ')
++
++ allow $1 systemd_unit_file_type:service start;
++')
++
++#######################################
++## <summary>
++## Allow the specified domain to reload all systemd services.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`systemd_reload_all_services',`
++ gen_require(`
++ attribute systemd_unit_file_type;
++ ')
++
++ allow $1 systemd_unit_file_type:service reload;
++')
+
+########################################
+## <summary>
-+## Allow the specified domain to connect to
-+## systemd_logger with a unix socket.
++## Allow the specified domain to modify the systemd configuration of
++## all systemd services
+## </summary>
+## <param name="domain">
+## <summary>
@@ -90473,6 +142098,27 @@ index 0000000..6d1582c
+ ')
+
+ allow $1 systemd_unit_file_type:service all_service_perms;
++ init_config_all_script_files($1)
++')
++
++
++########################################
++## <summary>
++## manage all systemd random seed file
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`systemd_manage_random_seed',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type random_seed_t;
++ ')
++
++ allow $1 random_seed_t:file manage_file_perms;
++ files_var_lib_filetrans($1, random_seed_t, file, "random_seed")
+')
+
+
@@ -90587,12 +142233,89 @@ index 0000000..6d1582c
+ allow $1 systemd_logind_t:system undefined;
+')
+
++########################################
++## <summary>
++## Configure generic unit files domain.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed to transition.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`systemd_config_generic_services',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type systemd_unit_file_t;
++ ')
++
++ systemd_exec_systemctl($1)
++ allow $1 systemd_unit_file_t:file read_file_perms;
++ allow $1 systemd_unit_file_t:service manage_service_perms;
++')
++
++########################################
++## <summary>
++## Configure power unit files domain.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed to transition.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`systemd_config_power_services',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type power_unit_file_t;
++ ')
++
++ systemd_exec_systemctl($1)
++ allow $1 power_unit_file_t:file read_file_perms;
++ allow $1 power_unit_file_t:service manage_service_perms;
++')
++
++########################################
++## <summary>
++## Start power unit files domain.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed to transition.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`systemd_start_power_services',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type power_unit_file_t;
++ ')
++
++ systemd_exec_systemctl($1)
++ allow $1 power_unit_file_t:service start;
++')
++
++#######################################
++## <summary>
++## Start power unit files domain.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed to transition.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`systemd_start_all_unit_files',`
++ gen_require(`
++ attribute systemd_unit_file_type;
++ ')
++
++ systemd_exec_systemctl($1)
++ allow $1 systemd_unit_file_type:service start;
++')
diff --git a/policy/modules/system/systemd.te b/policy/modules/system/systemd.te
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..62163a7
+index 0000000..9537426
--- /dev/null
+++ b/policy/modules/system/systemd.te
-@@ -0,0 +1,443 @@
+@@ -0,0 +1,450 @@
+policy_module(systemd, 1.0.0)
+
+#######################################
@@ -90606,11 +142329,11 @@ index 0000000..62163a7
+
+type systemd_logger_t;
+type systemd_logger_exec_t;
-+init_systemd_domain(systemd_logger_t, systemd_logger_exec_t)
++init_daemon_domain(systemd_logger_t, systemd_logger_exec_t)
+
+type systemd_logind_t;
+type systemd_logind_exec_t;
-+init_systemd_domain(systemd_logind_t, systemd_logind_exec_t)
++init_daemon_domain(systemd_logind_t, systemd_logind_exec_t)
+
+# /run/systemd/sessions
+type systemd_logind_sessions_t;
@@ -90623,6 +142346,9 @@ index 0000000..62163a7
+type systemd_logind_inhibit_var_run_t;
+files_pid_file(systemd_logind_inhibit_var_run_t)
+
++type random_seed_t;
++files_security_file(random_seed_t)
++
+# domain for systemd-tty-ask-password-agent and systemd-gnome-ask-password-agent
+# systemd components
+
@@ -90636,16 +142362,19 @@ index 0000000..62163a7
+# domain for systemd-tmpfiles component
+type systemd_tmpfiles_t;
+type systemd_tmpfiles_exec_t;
-+init_systemd_domain(systemd_tmpfiles_t, systemd_tmpfiles_exec_t)
++init_daemon_domain(systemd_tmpfiles_t, systemd_tmpfiles_exec_t)
+
+type systemd_notify_t;
+type systemd_notify_exec_t;
-+init_systemd_domain(systemd_notify_t, systemd_notify_exec_t)
++init_daemon_domain(systemd_notify_t, systemd_notify_exec_t)
+
+# type for systemd unit files
+type systemd_unit_file_t;
+systemd_unit_file(systemd_unit_file_t)
+
++type power_unit_file_t;
++systemd_unit_file(power_unit_file_t)
++
+# executable for systemctl
+type systemd_systemctl_exec_t;
+corecmd_executable_file(systemd_systemctl_exec_t)
@@ -90661,6 +142390,9 @@ index 0000000..62163a7
+allow systemd_logind_t self:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket create_socket_perms;
+allow systemd_logind_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms;
+
++mls_file_read_all_levels(systemd_logind_t)
++mls_file_write_all_levels(systemd_logind_t)
++
+manage_dirs_pattern(systemd_logind_t, { systemd_logind_sessions_t systemd_logind_var_run_t }, { systemd_logind_sessions_t systemd_logind_var_run_t })
+manage_files_pattern(systemd_logind_t, { systemd_logind_sessions_t systemd_logind_var_run_t }, { systemd_logind_var_run_t systemd_logind_sessions_t })
+manage_fifo_files_pattern(systemd_logind_t, systemd_logind_sessions_t, { systemd_logind_sessions_t systemd_logind_var_run_t })
@@ -90671,14 +142403,6 @@ index 0000000..62163a7
+manage_files_pattern(systemd_logind_t, systemd_logind_inhibit_var_run_t, systemd_logind_inhibit_var_run_t)
+manage_fifo_files_pattern(systemd_logind_t, systemd_logind_inhibit_var_run_t, systemd_logind_inhibit_var_run_t)
+manage_sock_files_pattern(systemd_logind_t, systemd_logind_inhibit_var_run_t, systemd_logind_inhibit_var_run_t)
-+init_named_pid_filetrans(systemd_logind_t, systemd_logind_inhibit_var_run_t, dir, "inhibit")
-+
-+init_status(systemd_logind_t)
-+init_signal(systemd_logind_t)
-+init_reboot(systemd_logind_t)
-+init_halt(systemd_logind_t)
-+init_undefined(systemd_logind_t)
-+init_signal_script(systemd_logind_t)
+
+kernel_read_system_state(systemd_logind_t)
+
@@ -90719,6 +142443,19 @@ index 0000000..62163a7
+
+term_use_unallocated_ttys(systemd_logind_t)
+
++init_named_pid_filetrans(systemd_logind_t, systemd_logind_inhibit_var_run_t, dir, "inhibit")
++
++init_status(systemd_logind_t)
++init_signal(systemd_logind_t)
++init_reboot(systemd_logind_t)
++init_halt(systemd_logind_t)
++init_undefined(systemd_logind_t)
++init_signal_script(systemd_logind_t)
++
++getty_systemctl(systemd_logind_t)
++
++systemd_config_generic_services(systemd_logind_t)
++
+# /run/user/.*
+# Actually only have proof of it creating dirs and symlinks (/run/user/$USER/X11/display)
+auth_manage_var_auth(systemd_logind_t)
@@ -90735,7 +142472,6 @@ index 0000000..62163a7
+logging_send_syslog_msg(systemd_logind_t)
+logging_stream_connect_syslog(systemd_logind_t)
+
-+miscfiles_read_localization(systemd_logind_t)
+
+udev_read_db(systemd_logind_t)
+udev_manage_rules_files(systemd_logind_t)
@@ -90759,13 +142495,14 @@ index 0000000..62163a7
+
+optional_policy(`
+ devicekit_dbus_chat_power(systemd_logind_t)
++ devicekit_dbus_chat_disk(systemd_logind_t)
+')
+
+optional_policy(`
+ # we label /run/user/$USER/dconf as config_home_t
+ gnome_manage_home_config_dirs(systemd_logind_t)
+ gnome_manage_home_config(systemd_logind_t)
-+ gnome_list_gkeyringd_tmp_dirs(systemd_logind_t)
++ gnome_manage_gkeyringd_tmp_dirs(systemd_logind_t)
+ gnome_manage_gstreamer_home_dirs(systemd_logind_t)
+')
+
@@ -90817,7 +142554,6 @@ index 0000000..62163a7
+logging_send_syslog_msg(systemd_passwd_agent_t)
+logging_stream_connect_syslog(systemd_passwd_agent_t)
+
-+miscfiles_read_localization(systemd_passwd_agent_t)
+
+userdom_use_user_ptys(systemd_passwd_agent_t)
+
@@ -90908,7 +142644,7 @@ index 0000000..62163a7
+miscfiles_filetrans_named_content(systemd_tmpfiles_t)
+miscfiles_manage_man_pages(systemd_tmpfiles_t)
+miscfiles_relabel_man_pages(systemd_tmpfiles_t)
-+miscfiles_read_localization(systemd_tmpfiles_t)
++miscfiles_delete_man_pages(systemd_tmpfiles_t)
+
+seutil_read_config(systemd_tmpfiles_t)
+seutil_read_file_contexts(systemd_tmpfiles_t)
@@ -90978,7 +142714,6 @@ index 0000000..62163a7
+
+init_rw_stream_sockets(systemd_notify_t)
+
-+miscfiles_read_localization(systemd_notify_t)
+
+optional_policy(`
+ readahead_manage_pid_files(systemd_notify_t)
@@ -91015,9 +142750,6 @@ index 0000000..62163a7
+logging_send_syslog_msg(systemd_logger_t)
+logging_stream_connect_syslog(systemd_logger_t)
+
-+miscfiles_read_localization(systemd_logger_t)
-+
-+
+########################################
+#
+# systemd_sysctl domains local policy
@@ -91034,8 +142766,6 @@ index 0000000..62163a7
+init_read_state(systemctl_domain)
+init_list_pid_dirs(systemctl_domain)
+init_use_fds(systemctl_domain)
-+
-+miscfiles_read_localization(systemctl_domain)
diff --git a/policy/modules/system/udev.fc b/policy/modules/system/udev.fc
index 2575393..49fd32e 100644
--- a/policy/modules/system/udev.fc
@@ -91308,7 +143038,7 @@ index 77a13a5..9a5a73f 100644
+')
+
diff --git a/policy/modules/system/udev.te b/policy/modules/system/udev.te
-index 29075b3..13f3949 100644
+index 29075b3..8d185fc 100644
--- a/policy/modules/system/udev.te
+++ b/policy/modules/system/udev.te
@@ -17,14 +17,12 @@ init_daemon_domain(udev_t, udev_exec_t)
@@ -91333,7 +143063,7 @@ index 29075b3..13f3949 100644
-allow udev_t self:capability { chown dac_override dac_read_search fowner fsetid sys_admin mknod net_raw net_admin sys_nice sys_rawio sys_resource setuid setgid sys_nice sys_ptrace };
+allow udev_t self:capability { chown dac_override dac_read_search fowner fsetid sys_admin mknod net_raw net_admin sys_nice sys_rawio sys_resource setuid setgid sys_nice };
-+allow udev_t self:capability2 { block_suspend };
++allow udev_t self:capability2 { block_suspend compromise_kernel };
dontaudit udev_t self:capability sys_tty_config;
-allow udev_t self:process ~{ setcurrent setexec setfscreate setrlimit execmem execstack execheap };
+
@@ -91436,7 +143166,7 @@ index 29075b3..13f3949 100644
mls_file_read_all_levels(udev_t)
mls_file_write_all_levels(udev_t)
-@@ -143,10 +157,12 @@ auth_use_nsswitch(udev_t)
+@@ -143,17 +157,20 @@ auth_use_nsswitch(udev_t)
init_read_utmp(udev_t)
init_dontaudit_write_utmp(udev_t)
init_getattr_initctl(udev_t)
@@ -91447,9 +143177,9 @@ index 29075b3..13f3949 100644
logging_send_audit_msgs(udev_t)
+logging_stream_connect_syslog(udev_t)
- miscfiles_read_localization(udev_t)
+-miscfiles_read_localization(udev_t)
miscfiles_read_hwdata(udev_t)
-@@ -154,6 +170,8 @@ miscfiles_read_hwdata(udev_t)
+
modutils_domtrans_insmod(udev_t)
# read modules.inputmap:
modutils_read_module_deps(udev_t)
@@ -91458,7 +143188,7 @@ index 29075b3..13f3949 100644
seutil_read_config(udev_t)
seutil_read_default_contexts(udev_t)
-@@ -169,6 +187,8 @@ sysnet_signal_dhcpc(udev_t)
+@@ -169,6 +186,8 @@ sysnet_signal_dhcpc(udev_t)
sysnet_manage_config(udev_t)
sysnet_etc_filetrans_config(udev_t)
@@ -91467,7 +143197,7 @@ index 29075b3..13f3949 100644
userdom_dontaudit_search_user_home_content(udev_t)
ifdef(`distro_gentoo',`
-@@ -178,16 +198,9 @@ ifdef(`distro_gentoo',`
+@@ -178,16 +197,9 @@ ifdef(`distro_gentoo',`
')
ifdef(`distro_redhat',`
@@ -91486,7 +143216,7 @@ index 29075b3..13f3949 100644
# for arping used for static IP addresses on PCMCIA ethernet
netutils_domtrans(udev_t)
-@@ -216,11 +229,16 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -216,11 +228,16 @@ optional_policy(`
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -91503,7 +143233,7 @@ index 29075b3..13f3949 100644
')
optional_policy(`
-@@ -230,10 +248,20 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -230,10 +247,20 @@ optional_policy(`
optional_policy(`
devicekit_read_pid_files(udev_t)
devicekit_dgram_send(udev_t)
@@ -91524,7 +143254,7 @@ index 29075b3..13f3949 100644
')
optional_policy(`
-@@ -259,6 +287,10 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -259,6 +286,10 @@ optional_policy(`
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -91535,10 +143265,14 @@ index 29075b3..13f3949 100644
openct_read_pid_files(udev_t)
openct_domtrans(udev_t)
')
-@@ -273,6 +305,11 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -273,6 +304,15 @@ optional_policy(`
')
optional_policy(`
++ radvd_read_pid_files(udev_t)
++')
++
++optional_policy(`
+ usbmuxd_domtrans(udev_t)
+ usbmuxd_stream_connect(udev_t)
+')
@@ -91547,7 +143281,7 @@ index 29075b3..13f3949 100644
unconfined_signal(udev_t)
')
-@@ -285,6 +322,7 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -285,6 +325,7 @@ optional_policy(`
kernel_read_xen_state(udev_t)
xen_manage_log(udev_t)
xen_read_image_files(udev_t)
@@ -92354,10 +144088,10 @@ index 0280b32..61f19e9 100644
-')
+attribute unconfined_services;
diff --git a/policy/modules/system/userdomain.fc b/policy/modules/system/userdomain.fc
-index db75976..ce61aed 100644
+index db75976..65191bd 100644
--- a/policy/modules/system/userdomain.fc
+++ b/policy/modules/system/userdomain.fc
-@@ -1,4 +1,20 @@
+@@ -1,4 +1,21 @@
HOME_DIR -d gen_context(system_u:object_r:user_home_dir_t,s0-mls_systemhigh)
+HOME_DIR -l gen_context(system_u:object_r:user_home_dir_t,s0-mls_systemhigh)
HOME_DIR/.+ gen_context(system_u:object_r:user_home_t,s0)
@@ -92365,6 +144099,7 @@ index db75976..ce61aed 100644
/tmp/gconfd-USER -d gen_context(system_u:object_r:user_tmp_t,s0)
+/root(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:admin_home_t,s0)
+/root/\.cert(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:home_cert_t,s0)
++/root/\.pki(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:home_cert_t,s0)
+/root/\.debug(/.*)? <<none>>
+/dev/shm/pulse-shm.* gen_context(system_u:object_r:user_tmpfs_t,s0)
+/dev/shm/mono.* gen_context(system_u:object_r:user_tmpfs_t,s0)
@@ -92380,7 +144115,7 @@ index db75976..ce61aed 100644
+
+/var/run/user(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:user_tmp_t,s0)
diff --git a/policy/modules/system/userdomain.if b/policy/modules/system/userdomain.if
-index e720dcd..512678a 100644
+index e720dcd..53ea674 100644
--- a/policy/modules/system/userdomain.if
+++ b/policy/modules/system/userdomain.if
@@ -30,9 +30,11 @@ template(`userdom_base_user_template',`
@@ -92396,7 +144131,7 @@ index e720dcd..512678a 100644
corecmd_shell_entry_type($1_t)
corecmd_bin_entry_type($1_t)
domain_user_exemption_target($1_t)
-@@ -44,79 +46,133 @@ template(`userdom_base_user_template',`
+@@ -44,79 +46,131 @@ template(`userdom_base_user_template',`
term_user_pty($1_t, user_devpts_t)
term_user_tty($1_t, user_tty_device_t)
@@ -92540,19 +144275,18 @@ index e720dcd..512678a 100644
- libs_exec_ld_so($1_t)
+ libs_exec_ld_so($1_usertype)
- miscfiles_read_localization($1_t)
+- miscfiles_read_localization($1_t)
miscfiles_read_generic_certs($1_t)
- sysnet_read_config($1_t)
+ miscfiles_read_all_certs($1_usertype)
-+ miscfiles_read_localization($1_usertype)
-+ miscfiles_read_man_pages($1_usertype)
+ miscfiles_read_public_files($1_usertype)
- tunable_policy(`allow_execmem',`
+ systemd_dbus_chat_logind($1_usertype)
+ systemd_read_logind_sessions_files($1_usertype)
+ systemd_write_inhibit_pipes($1_usertype)
++ systemd_write_inherited_logind_sessions_pipes($1_usertype)
+
+ tunable_policy(`deny_execmem',`', `
# Allow loading DSOs that require executable stack.
@@ -92581,7 +144315,7 @@ index e720dcd..512678a 100644
')
#######################################
-@@ -150,6 +206,8 @@ interface(`userdom_ro_home_role',`
+@@ -150,6 +204,8 @@ interface(`userdom_ro_home_role',`
type user_home_t, user_home_dir_t;
')
@@ -92590,7 +144324,7 @@ index e720dcd..512678a 100644
##############################
#
# Domain access to home dir
-@@ -167,27 +225,6 @@ interface(`userdom_ro_home_role',`
+@@ -167,27 +223,6 @@ interface(`userdom_ro_home_role',`
read_sock_files_pattern($2, { user_home_t user_home_dir_t }, user_home_t)
files_list_home($2)
@@ -92618,7 +144352,7 @@ index e720dcd..512678a 100644
')
#######################################
-@@ -219,8 +256,11 @@ interface(`userdom_ro_home_role',`
+@@ -219,8 +254,11 @@ interface(`userdom_ro_home_role',`
interface(`userdom_manage_home_role',`
gen_require(`
type user_home_t, user_home_dir_t;
@@ -92630,7 +144364,7 @@ index e720dcd..512678a 100644
##############################
#
# Domain access to home dir
-@@ -229,43 +269,47 @@ interface(`userdom_manage_home_role',`
+@@ -229,43 +267,47 @@ interface(`userdom_manage_home_role',`
type_member $2 user_home_dir_t:dir user_home_dir_t;
# full control of the home directory
@@ -92694,7 +144428,7 @@ index e720dcd..512678a 100644
')
')
-@@ -273,6 +317,25 @@ interface(`userdom_manage_home_role',`
+@@ -273,6 +315,25 @@ interface(`userdom_manage_home_role',`
## <summary>
## Manage user temporary files
## </summary>
@@ -92720,7 +144454,7 @@ index e720dcd..512678a 100644
## <param name="role">
## <summary>
## Role allowed access.
-@@ -287,17 +350,64 @@ interface(`userdom_manage_home_role',`
+@@ -287,17 +348,64 @@ interface(`userdom_manage_home_role',`
#
interface(`userdom_manage_tmp_role',`
gen_require(`
@@ -92790,7 +144524,7 @@ index e720dcd..512678a 100644
')
#######################################
-@@ -317,6 +427,7 @@ interface(`userdom_exec_user_tmp_files',`
+@@ -317,11 +425,31 @@ interface(`userdom_exec_user_tmp_files',`
')
exec_files_pattern($1, user_tmp_t, user_tmp_t)
@@ -92798,7 +144532,31 @@ index e720dcd..512678a 100644
files_search_tmp($1)
')
-@@ -348,59 +459,61 @@ interface(`userdom_exec_user_tmp_files',`
+ #######################################
+ ## <summary>
++## Manage user temporary file system files
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++## <rolebase/>
++#
++interface(`userdom_manage_tmpfs_files',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type user_tmpfs_t;
++ ')
++
++ allow $1 user_tmpfs_t:file manage_file_perms;
++')
++
++#######################################
++## <summary>
+ ## Role access for the user tmpfs type
+ ## that the user has full access.
+ ## </summary>
+@@ -348,59 +476,60 @@ interface(`userdom_exec_user_tmp_files',`
#
interface(`userdom_manage_tmpfs_role',`
gen_require(`
@@ -92865,7 +144623,6 @@ index e720dcd..512678a 100644
+ allow $1 self:udp_socket create_socket_perms;
- corenet_all_recvfrom_labeled($1_t, $1_t)
-+ corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel($1)
+ corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if($1)
+ corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if($1)
+ corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_node($1)
@@ -92890,7 +144647,7 @@ index e720dcd..512678a 100644
')
#######################################
-@@ -431,6 +544,7 @@ template(`userdom_xwindows_client_template',`
+@@ -431,6 +560,7 @@ template(`userdom_xwindows_client_template',`
dev_dontaudit_rw_dri($1_t)
# GNOME checks for usb and other devices:
dev_rw_usbfs($1_t)
@@ -92898,7 +144655,7 @@ index e720dcd..512678a 100644
xserver_user_x_domain_template($1, $1_t, user_tmpfs_t)
xserver_xsession_entry_type($1_t)
-@@ -463,8 +577,8 @@ template(`userdom_change_password_template',`
+@@ -463,8 +593,8 @@ template(`userdom_change_password_template',`
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -92909,16 +144666,17 @@ index e720dcd..512678a 100644
')
')
-@@ -491,7 +605,7 @@ template(`userdom_common_user_template',`
+@@ -491,7 +621,8 @@ template(`userdom_common_user_template',`
attribute unpriv_userdomain;
')
- userdom_basic_networking_template($1)
+ userdom_basic_networking($1_usertype)
++ corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel($1_t)
##############################
#
-@@ -501,73 +615,83 @@ template(`userdom_common_user_template',`
+@@ -501,41 +632,51 @@ template(`userdom_common_user_template',`
# evolution and gnome-session try to create a netlink socket
dontaudit $1_t self:netlink_socket { create ioctl read getattr write setattr append bind connect getopt setopt shutdown };
dontaudit $1_t self:netlink_route_socket { create ioctl read getattr write setattr append bind connect getopt setopt shutdown nlmsg_read nlmsg_write };
@@ -92928,10 +144686,9 @@ index e720dcd..512678a 100644
- allow $1_t unpriv_userdomain:fd use;
+ allow $1_usertype unpriv_userdomain:fd use;
-- kernel_read_system_state($1_t)
+ kernel_read_system_state($1_t)
- kernel_read_network_state($1_t)
- kernel_read_net_sysctls($1_t)
-+ kernel_read_system_state($1_usertype)
+ kernel_read_network_state($1_usertype)
+ kernel_read_software_raid_state($1_usertype)
+ kernel_read_net_sysctls($1_usertype)
@@ -92988,23 +144745,14 @@ index e720dcd..512678a 100644
+ application_getattr_socket($1_usertype)
- fs_rw_cgroup_files($1_t)
-+ logging_send_syslog_msg($1_usertype)
++ logging_send_syslog_msg($1_t)
+
-+ selinux_get_enforce_mode($1_usertype)
++ selinux_get_enforce_mode($1_t)
# cjp: some of this probably can be removed
-- selinux_get_fs_mount($1_t)
-- selinux_validate_context($1_t)
-- selinux_compute_access_vector($1_t)
-- selinux_compute_create_context($1_t)
-- selinux_compute_relabel_context($1_t)
-- selinux_compute_user_contexts($1_t)
-+ selinux_get_fs_mount($1_usertype)
-+ selinux_validate_context($1_usertype)
-+ selinux_compute_access_vector($1_usertype)
-+ selinux_compute_create_context($1_usertype)
-+ selinux_compute_relabel_context($1_usertype)
-+ selinux_compute_user_contexts($1_usertype)
+ selinux_get_fs_mount($1_t)
+@@ -546,100 +687,140 @@ template(`userdom_common_user_template',`
+ selinux_compute_user_contexts($1_t)
# for eject
- storage_getattr_fixed_disk_dev($1_t)
@@ -93016,7 +144764,7 @@ index e720dcd..512678a 100644
- auth_run_pam($1_t, $1_r)
- auth_run_utempter($1_t, $1_r)
+ auth_read_login_records($1_usertype)
-+ auth_run_pam($1_t,$1_r)
++ auth_run_pam_timestamp($1_t,$1_r)
+ auth_run_utempter($1_t,$1_r)
+ auth_filetrans_admin_home_content($1_t)
+ auth_filetrans_home_content($1_t)
@@ -93038,24 +144786,22 @@ index e720dcd..512678a 100644
# to this one.
seutil_dontaudit_signal_newrole($1_t)
- tunable_policy(`user_direct_mouse',`
+- tunable_policy(`user_direct_mouse',`
- dev_read_mouse($1_t)
-+ dev_read_mouse($1_usertype)
- ')
+- ')
++ term_getattr_all_ttys($1_t)
- tunable_policy(`user_ttyfile_stat',`
-@@ -575,71 +699,117 @@ template(`userdom_common_user_template',`
+- tunable_policy(`user_ttyfile_stat',`
+- term_getattr_all_ttys($1_t)
++ optional_policy(`
++ # Allow graphical boot to check battery lifespan
++ apm_stream_connect($1_usertype)
')
optional_policy(`
- alsa_manage_home_files($1_t)
- alsa_read_rw_config($1_t)
- alsa_relabel_home_files($1_t)
-+ # Allow graphical boot to check battery lifespan
-+ apm_stream_connect($1_usertype)
-+ ')
-+
-+ optional_policy(`
+ canna_stream_connect($1_usertype)
')
@@ -93075,29 +144821,35 @@ index e720dcd..512678a 100644
+ dbus_system_bus_client($1_usertype)
+
+ allow $1_usertype $1_usertype:dbus send_msg;
-+
-+ optional_policy(`
+
+ optional_policy(`
+- bluetooth_dbus_chat($1_t)
+ avahi_dbus_chat($1_usertype)
-+ ')
-+
-+ optional_policy(`
+ ')
+
+ optional_policy(`
+- evolution_dbus_chat($1_t)
+- evolution_alarm_dbus_chat($1_t)
+ policykit_dbus_chat($1_usertype)
-+ ')
-+
-+ optional_policy(`
+ ')
+
+ optional_policy(`
+- cups_dbus_chat_config($1_t)
+ bluetooth_dbus_chat($1_usertype)
-+ ')
-+
-+ optional_policy(`
+ ')
+
+ optional_policy(`
+- hal_dbus_chat($1_t)
+ consolekit_dbus_chat($1_usertype)
+ consolekit_read_log($1_usertype)
-+ ')
-+
-+ optional_policy(`
+ ')
+
+ optional_policy(`
+- networkmanager_dbus_chat($1_t)
+ devicekit_dbus_chat($1_usertype)
+ devicekit_dbus_chat_power($1_usertype)
+ devicekit_dbus_chat_disk($1_usertype)
-+ ')
+ ')
+
+ optional_policy(`
+ evolution_dbus_chat($1_usertype)
@@ -93107,61 +144859,55 @@ index e720dcd..512678a 100644
+ optional_policy(`
+ gnome_dbus_chat_gconfdefault($1_usertype)
+ ')
-
- optional_policy(`
-- bluetooth_dbus_chat($1_t)
++
++ optional_policy(`
+ hal_dbus_chat($1_usertype)
- ')
-
- optional_policy(`
-- evolution_dbus_chat($1_t)
-- evolution_alarm_dbus_chat($1_t)
++ ')
++
++ optional_policy(`
+ kde_dbus_chat_backlighthelper($1_usertype)
- ')
-
- optional_policy(`
-- cups_dbus_chat_config($1_t)
++ ')
++
++ optional_policy(`
+ modemmanager_dbus_chat($1_usertype)
- ')
-
- optional_policy(`
-- hal_dbus_chat($1_t)
++ ')
++
++ optional_policy(`
+ networkmanager_dbus_chat($1_usertype)
+ networkmanager_read_lib_files($1_usertype)
- ')
-
- optional_policy(`
-- networkmanager_dbus_chat($1_t)
++ ')
++
++ optional_policy(`
+ vpn_dbus_chat($1_usertype)
- ')
++ ')
++ ')
++
++ optional_policy(`
++ git_session_role($1_r, $1_usertype)
')
optional_policy(`
- inetd_use_fds($1_t)
- inetd_rw_tcp_sockets($1_t)
-+ git_session_role($1_r, $1_usertype)
-+ ')
-+
-+ optional_policy(`
+ inetd_use_fds($1_usertype)
+ inetd_rw_tcp_sockets($1_usertype)
-+ ')
-+
-+ optional_policy(`
-+ inn_read_config($1_usertype)
-+ inn_read_news_lib($1_usertype)
-+ inn_read_news_spool($1_usertype)
')
optional_policy(`
- inn_read_config($1_t)
- inn_read_news_lib($1_t)
- inn_read_news_spool($1_t)
-+ lircd_stream_connect($1_usertype)
++ inn_read_config($1_usertype)
++ inn_read_news_lib($1_usertype)
++ inn_read_news_spool($1_usertype)
')
optional_policy(`
- locate_read_lib_files($1_t)
++ lircd_stream_connect($1_usertype)
++ ')
++
++ optional_policy(`
+ locate_read_lib_files($1_usertype)
')
@@ -93180,11 +144926,11 @@ index e720dcd..512678a 100644
optional_policy(`
- tunable_policy(`allow_user_mysql_connect',`
-+ tunable_policy(`user_mysql_connect',`
++ tunable_policy(`selinuxuser_mysql_connect_enabled',`
mysql_stream_connect($1_t)
')
')
-@@ -651,40 +821,52 @@ template(`userdom_common_user_template',`
+@@ -651,40 +832,52 @@ template(`userdom_common_user_template',`
optional_policy(`
# to allow monitoring of pcmcia status
@@ -93203,7 +144949,7 @@ index e720dcd..512678a 100644
- tunable_policy(`allow_user_postgresql_connect',`
- postgresql_stream_connect($1_t)
- postgresql_tcp_connect($1_t)
-+ tunable_policy(`user_postgresql_connect',`
++ tunable_policy(`selinuxuser_postgresql_connect_enabled',`
+ postgresql_stream_connect($1_usertype)
+ postgresql_tcp_connect($1_usertype)
')
@@ -93249,7 +144995,7 @@ index e720dcd..512678a 100644
')
')
-@@ -709,17 +891,33 @@ template(`userdom_common_user_template',`
+@@ -709,17 +902,33 @@ template(`userdom_common_user_template',`
template(`userdom_login_user_template', `
gen_require(`
class context contains;
@@ -93260,7 +145006,9 @@ index e720dcd..512678a 100644
- userdom_manage_home_role($1_r, $1_t)
+ typeattribute $1_t login_userdomain;
-+
+
+- userdom_manage_tmp_role($1_r, $1_t)
+- userdom_manage_tmpfs_role($1_r, $1_t)
+ userdom_manage_home_role($1_r, $1_usertype)
+
+ userdom_manage_tmp_role($1_r, $1_usertype)
@@ -93268,9 +145016,7 @@ index e720dcd..512678a 100644
+
+ ifelse(`$1',`unconfined',`',`
+ gen_tunable($1_exec_content, true)
-
-- userdom_manage_tmp_role($1_r, $1_t)
-- userdom_manage_tmpfs_role($1_r, $1_t)
++
+ tunable_policy(`$1_exec_content',`
+ userdom_exec_user_tmp_files($1_usertype)
+ userdom_exec_user_home_content_files($1_usertype)
@@ -93288,16 +145034,20 @@ index e720dcd..512678a 100644
userdom_change_password_template($1)
-@@ -727,82 +925,95 @@ template(`userdom_login_user_template', `
+@@ -727,82 +936,100 @@ template(`userdom_login_user_template', `
#
# User domain Local policy
#
-
- allow $1_t self:capability { setgid chown fowner };
dontaudit $1_t self:capability { sys_nice fsetid };
--
++ allow $1_t self:process ~{ ptrace execmem execstack execheap };
++
++ tunable_policy(`selinuxuser_use_ssh_chroot',`
++ allow $1_t self:capability { setuid sys_chroot };
++ ')
+
- allow $1_t self:process ~{ setcurrent setexec setrlimit execmem execstack execheap };
-+ allow $1_t self:process ~{ ptrace setrlimit execmem execstack execheap };
dontaudit $1_t self:process setrlimit;
dontaudit $1_t self:netlink_route_socket { create ioctl read getattr write setattr append bind connect getopt setopt shutdown nlmsg_read nlmsg_write };
+ domain_dyntrans_type($1_t)
@@ -93372,56 +145122,56 @@ index e720dcd..512678a 100644
- miscfiles_exec_tetex_data($1_t)
+ miscfiles_read_tetex_data($1_usertype)
+ miscfiles_exec_tetex_data($1_usertype)
-
-- seutil_read_config($1_t)
++
+ seutil_read_config($1_usertype)
+ seutil_read_file_contexts($1_usertype)
+ seutil_read_default_contexts($1_usertype)
+ seutil_exec_setfiles($1_usertype)
++
++ optional_policy(`
++ cups_read_config($1_usertype)
++ cups_stream_connect($1_usertype)
++ cups_stream_connect_ptal($1_usertype)
++ ')
+
+- seutil_read_config($1_t)
++ optional_policy(`
++ kerberos_use($1_usertype)
++ kerberos_filetrans_home_content($1_usertype)
++ ')
optional_policy(`
- cups_read_config($1_t)
- cups_stream_connect($1_t)
- cups_stream_connect_ptal($1_t)
-+ cups_read_config($1_usertype)
-+ cups_stream_connect($1_usertype)
-+ cups_stream_connect_ptal($1_usertype)
++ mysql_filetrans_named_content($1_usertype)
')
optional_policy(`
- kerberos_use($1_t)
-+ kerberos_use($1_usertype)
-+ kerberos_filetrans_home_content($1_usertype)
++ mta_dontaudit_read_spool_symlinks($1_usertype)
')
optional_policy(`
- mta_dontaudit_read_spool_symlinks($1_t)
-+ mysql_filetrans_named_content($1_usertype)
++ quota_dontaudit_getattr_db($1_usertype)
')
optional_policy(`
- quota_dontaudit_getattr_db($1_t)
-+ mta_dontaudit_read_spool_symlinks($1_usertype)
++ rpm_read_db($1_usertype)
++ rpm_dontaudit_manage_db($1_usertype)
++ rpm_read_cache($1_usertype)
')
optional_policy(`
- rpm_read_db($1_t)
- rpm_dontaudit_manage_db($1_t)
-+ quota_dontaudit_getattr_db($1_usertype)
-+ ')
-+
-+ optional_policy(`
-+ rpm_read_db($1_usertype)
-+ rpm_dontaudit_manage_db($1_usertype)
-+ rpm_read_cache($1_usertype)
-+ ')
-+
-+ optional_policy(`
+ oddjob_run_mkhomedir($1_t, $1_r)
')
')
-@@ -834,6 +1045,12 @@ template(`userdom_restricted_user_template',`
+@@ -834,6 +1061,12 @@ template(`userdom_restricted_user_template',`
typeattribute $1_t unpriv_userdomain;
domain_interactive_fd($1_t)
@@ -93434,7 +145184,7 @@ index e720dcd..512678a 100644
##############################
#
# Local policy
-@@ -874,46 +1091,114 @@ template(`userdom_restricted_xwindows_user_template',`
+@@ -874,46 +1107,118 @@ template(`userdom_restricted_xwindows_user_template',`
# Local policy
#
@@ -93450,15 +145200,14 @@ index e720dcd..512678a 100644
+ dev_dontaudit_read_rand($1_usertype)
+ # temporarily allow since openoffice requires this
+ dev_read_rand($1_usertype)
-
-- logging_send_syslog_msg($1_t)
++
+ dev_read_video_dev($1_usertype)
+ dev_write_video_dev($1_usertype)
+ dev_rw_wireless($1_usertype)
+
+ libs_dontaudit_setattr_lib_files($1_usertype)
+
-+ tunable_policy(`user_rw_noexattrfile',`
++ tunable_policy(`selinuxuser_rw_noexattrfile',`
+ dev_rw_usbfs($1_t)
+ dev_rw_generic_usb_dev($1_usertype)
+
@@ -93469,8 +145218,8 @@ index e720dcd..512678a 100644
+ storage_raw_read_removable_device($1_usertype)
+ storage_raw_write_removable_device($1_usertype)
+ ')
-+
-+ logging_send_syslog_msg($1_usertype)
+
+ logging_send_syslog_msg($1_t)
logging_dontaudit_send_audit_msgs($1_t)
# Need to to this just so screensaver will work. Should be moved to screensaver domain
@@ -93533,10 +145282,13 @@ index e720dcd..512678a 100644
- cups_dbus_chat($1_t)
+ fprintd_dbus_chat($1_t)
')
- ')
-
- optional_policy(`
-- java_role($1_r, $1_t)
++
++ optional_policy(`
++ realmd_dbus_chat($1_t)
++ ')
++ ')
++
++ optional_policy(`
+ policykit_role($1_r, $1_usertype)
+ ')
+
@@ -93544,9 +145296,10 @@ index e720dcd..512678a 100644
+ pulseaudio_role($1_r, $1_usertype)
+ pulseaudio_filetrans_admin_home_content($1_usertype)
+ pulseaudio_filetrans_home_content($1_usertype)
-+ ')
-+
-+ optional_policy(`
+ ')
+
+ optional_policy(`
+- java_role($1_r, $1_t)
+ rtkit_scheduled($1_usertype)
')
@@ -93563,7 +145316,7 @@ index e720dcd..512678a 100644
')
')
-@@ -948,21 +1233,27 @@ template(`userdom_unpriv_user_template', `
+@@ -948,27 +1253,33 @@ template(`userdom_unpriv_user_template', `
#
# Inherit rules for ordinary users.
@@ -93594,7 +145347,14 @@ index e720dcd..512678a 100644
files_read_kernel_symbol_table($1_t)
ifndef(`enable_mls',`
-@@ -979,23 +1270,60 @@ template(`userdom_unpriv_user_template', `
+ fs_exec_noxattr($1_t)
+
+- tunable_policy(`user_rw_noexattrfile',`
++ tunable_policy(`selinuxuser_rw_noexattrfile',`
+ fs_manage_noxattr_fs_files($1_t)
+ fs_manage_noxattr_fs_dirs($1_t)
+ # Write floppies
+@@ -979,54 +1290,89 @@ template(`userdom_unpriv_user_template', `
')
')
@@ -93608,36 +145368,56 @@ index e720dcd..512678a 100644
# Allow users to run TCP servers (bind to ports and accept connection from
# the same domain and outside users) disabling this forces FTP passive mode
# and may change other protocols
-+
-+ tunable_policy(`user_share_music',`
-+ corenet_tcp_bind_daap_port($1_usertype)
-+ ')
-+
- tunable_policy(`user_tcp_server',`
+- tunable_policy(`user_tcp_server',`
- corenet_tcp_bind_generic_node($1_t)
- corenet_tcp_bind_generic_port($1_t)
-+ corenet_tcp_bind_all_unreserved_ports($1_usertype)
-+ ')
-+
-+ tunable_policy(`user_setrlimit',`
-+ allow $1_usertype self:process setrlimit;
-+ ')
+
-+ optional_policy(`
-+ cdrecord_role($1_r, $1_t)
-+ ')
-+
-+ optional_policy(`
-+ cron_role($1_r, $1_t)
++ tunable_policy(`selinuxuser_user_share_music',`
++ corenet_tcp_bind_daap_port($1_usertype)
+ ')
+
-+ optional_policy(`
-+ games_rw_data($1_usertype)
++ tunable_policy(`selinuxuser_tcp_server',`
++ corenet_tcp_bind_all_unreserved_ports($1_usertype)
')
optional_policy(`
- netutils_run_ping_cond($1_t, $1_r)
- netutils_run_traceroute_cond($1_t, $1_r)
++ cdrecord_role($1_r, $1_t)
+ ')
+
+- # Run pppd in pppd_t by default for user
+ optional_policy(`
+- ppp_run_cond($1_t, $1_r)
++ cron_role($1_r, $1_t)
+ ')
+
+ optional_policy(`
+- setroubleshoot_stream_connect($1_t)
++ games_rw_data($1_usertype)
+ ')
+-')
+
+-#######################################
+-## <summary>
+-## The template for creating an administrative user.
+-## </summary>
+-## <desc>
+-## <p>
+-## This template creates a user domain, types, and
+-## rules for the user's tty, pty, home directories,
+-## tmp, and tmpfs files.
+-## </p>
+-## <p>
+-## The privileges given to administrative users are:
+-## <ul>
+-## <li>Raw disk access</li>
+-## <li>Set all sysctls</li>
+-## <li>All kernel ring buffer controls</li>
+-## <li>Create, read, write, and delete all files but shadow</li>
+-## <li>Manage source and binary format SELinux policy</li>
+-## <li>Run insmod</li>
++ optional_policy(`
+ gpg_role($1_r, $1_usertype)
+ ')
+
@@ -93661,21 +145441,43 @@ index e720dcd..512678a 100644
+ optional_policy(`
+ postfix_run_postdrop($1_t, $1_r)
+ postfix_search_spool($1_t)
- ')
-
- # Run pppd in pppd_t by default for user
-@@ -1004,7 +1332,9 @@ template(`userdom_unpriv_user_template', `
- ')
-
- optional_policy(`
-- setroubleshoot_stream_connect($1_t)
++ ')
++
++ # Run pppd in pppd_t by default for user
++ optional_policy(`
++ ppp_run_cond($1_t, $1_r)
++ ')
++
++ optional_policy(`
+ vdagent_getattr_log($1_t)
+ vdagent_getattr_exec_files($1_t)
+ vdagent_stream_connect($1_t)
- ')
- ')
-
-@@ -1040,7 +1370,7 @@ template(`userdom_unpriv_user_template', `
++ ')
++')
++
++#######################################
++## <summary>
++## The template for creating an administrative user.
++## </summary>
++## <desc>
++## <p>
++## This template creates a user domain, types, and
++## rules for the user's tty, pty, home directories,
++## tmp, and tmpfs files.
++## </p>
++## <p>
++## The privileges given to administrative users are:
++## <ul>
++## <li>Raw disk access</li>
++## <li>Set all sysctls</li>
++## <li>All kernel ring buffer controls</li>
++## <li>Create, read, write, and delete all files but shadow</li>
++## <li>Manage source and binary format SELinux policy</li>
++## <li>Run insmod</li>
+ ## </ul>
+ ## </p>
+ ## </desc>
+@@ -1040,7 +1386,7 @@ template(`userdom_unpriv_user_template', `
template(`userdom_admin_user_template',`
gen_require(`
attribute admindomain;
@@ -93684,7 +145486,7 @@ index e720dcd..512678a 100644
')
##############################
-@@ -1067,6 +1397,7 @@ template(`userdom_admin_user_template',`
+@@ -1067,6 +1413,7 @@ template(`userdom_admin_user_template',`
#
allow $1_t self:capability ~{ sys_module audit_control audit_write };
@@ -93692,7 +145494,7 @@ index e720dcd..512678a 100644
allow $1_t self:process { setexec setfscreate };
allow $1_t self:netlink_audit_socket nlmsg_readpriv;
allow $1_t self:tun_socket create;
-@@ -1075,6 +1406,9 @@ template(`userdom_admin_user_template',`
+@@ -1075,6 +1422,9 @@ template(`userdom_admin_user_template',`
# Skip authentication when pam_rootok is specified.
allow $1_t self:passwd rootok;
@@ -93702,7 +145504,7 @@ index e720dcd..512678a 100644
kernel_read_software_raid_state($1_t)
kernel_getattr_core_if($1_t)
kernel_getattr_message_if($1_t)
-@@ -1089,6 +1423,7 @@ template(`userdom_admin_user_template',`
+@@ -1089,6 +1439,7 @@ template(`userdom_admin_user_template',`
kernel_sigstop_unlabeled($1_t)
kernel_signull_unlabeled($1_t)
kernel_sigchld_unlabeled($1_t)
@@ -93710,12 +145512,13 @@ index e720dcd..512678a 100644
corenet_tcp_bind_generic_port($1_t)
# allow setting up tunnels
-@@ -1106,10 +1441,13 @@ template(`userdom_admin_user_template',`
+@@ -1106,10 +1457,14 @@ template(`userdom_admin_user_template',`
dev_rename_all_blk_files($1_t)
dev_rename_all_chr_files($1_t)
dev_create_generic_symlinks($1_t)
+ dev_rw_generic_usb_dev($1_t)
+ dev_rw_usbfs($1_t)
++ dev_read_kmsg($1_t)
domain_setpriority_all_domains($1_t)
domain_read_all_domains_state($1_t)
@@ -93724,7 +145527,7 @@ index e720dcd..512678a 100644
domain_dontaudit_ptrace_all_domains($1_t)
# signal all domains:
domain_kill_all_domains($1_t)
-@@ -1120,29 +1458,38 @@ template(`userdom_admin_user_template',`
+@@ -1120,29 +1475,38 @@ template(`userdom_admin_user_template',`
domain_sigchld_all_domains($1_t)
# for lsof
domain_getattr_all_sockets($1_t)
@@ -93767,7 +145570,7 @@ index e720dcd..512678a 100644
# The following rule is temporary until such time that a complete
# policy management infrastructure is in place so that an administrator
-@@ -1152,6 +1499,8 @@ template(`userdom_admin_user_template',`
+@@ -1152,6 +1516,8 @@ template(`userdom_admin_user_template',`
# But presently necessary for installing the file_contexts file.
seutil_manage_bin_policy($1_t)
@@ -93776,18 +145579,26 @@ index e720dcd..512678a 100644
userdom_manage_user_home_content_dirs($1_t)
userdom_manage_user_home_content_files($1_t)
userdom_manage_user_home_content_symlinks($1_t)
-@@ -1166,6 +1515,10 @@ template(`userdom_admin_user_template',`
+@@ -1159,13 +1525,17 @@ template(`userdom_admin_user_template',`
+ userdom_manage_user_home_content_sockets($1_t)
+ userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans_user_home_content($1_t, { dir file lnk_file fifo_file sock_file })
+
+- tunable_policy(`user_rw_noexattrfile',`
++ tunable_policy(`selinuxuser_rw_noexattrfile',`
+ fs_manage_noxattr_fs_files($1_t)
+ fs_manage_noxattr_fs_dirs($1_t)
+ ',`
fs_read_noxattr_fs_files($1_t)
')
-+ tunable_policy(`user_tcp_server',`
++ tunable_policy(`selinuxuser_tcp_server',`
+ corenet_tcp_bind_all_unreserved_ports($1_t)
+ ')
+
optional_policy(`
postgresql_unconfined($1_t)
')
-@@ -1211,6 +1564,8 @@ template(`userdom_security_admin_template',`
+@@ -1211,6 +1581,8 @@ template(`userdom_security_admin_template',`
dev_relabel_all_dev_nodes($1)
files_create_boot_flag($1)
@@ -93796,7 +145607,7 @@ index e720dcd..512678a 100644
# Necessary for managing /boot/efi
fs_manage_dos_files($1)
-@@ -1223,8 +1578,10 @@ template(`userdom_security_admin_template',`
+@@ -1223,8 +1595,10 @@ template(`userdom_security_admin_template',`
selinux_set_enforce_mode($1)
selinux_set_all_booleans($1)
selinux_set_parameters($1)
@@ -93808,7 +145619,7 @@ index e720dcd..512678a 100644
auth_relabel_shadow($1)
init_exec($1)
-@@ -1235,13 +1592,19 @@ template(`userdom_security_admin_template',`
+@@ -1235,29 +1609,31 @@ template(`userdom_security_admin_template',`
logging_read_audit_config($1)
seutil_manage_bin_policy($1)
@@ -93832,11 +145643,14 @@ index e720dcd..512678a 100644
')
optional_policy(`
-@@ -1252,12 +1615,12 @@ template(`userdom_security_admin_template',`
- dmesg_exec($1)
+ consoletype_exec($1)
')
- optional_policy(`
+- dmesg_exec($1)
+- ')
+-
+- optional_policy(`
- ipsec_run_setkey($1, $2)
+ optional_policy(`
+ ipsec_run_setkey($1,$2)
@@ -93848,7 +145662,7 @@ index e720dcd..512678a 100644
')
optional_policy(`
-@@ -1317,12 +1680,15 @@ interface(`userdom_user_application_domain',`
+@@ -1317,12 +1693,15 @@ interface(`userdom_user_application_domain',`
interface(`userdom_user_home_content',`
gen_require(`
type user_home_t;
@@ -93865,20 +145679,17 @@ index e720dcd..512678a 100644
')
########################################
-@@ -1363,13 +1729,58 @@ interface(`userdom_user_tmpfs_file',`
+@@ -1363,6 +1742,51 @@ interface(`userdom_user_tmpfs_file',`
## <summary>
## Allow domain to attach to TUN devices created by administrative users.
## </summary>
--## <param name="domain">
+## <param name="type">
- ## <summary>
--## Domain allowed access.
++## <summary>
+## Type to be used as a file in the
+## generic temporary directory.
- ## </summary>
- ## </param>
- #
--interface(`userdom_attach_admin_tun_iface',`
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
+interface(`userdom_user_tmp_content',`
+ gen_require(`
+ attribute user_tmp_type;
@@ -93917,17 +145728,10 @@ index e720dcd..512678a 100644
+## <summary>
+## Allow domain to attach to TUN devices created by administrative users.
+## </summary>
-+## <param name="domain">
-+## <summary>
-+## Domain allowed access.
-+## </summary>
-+## </param>
-+#
-+interface(`userdom_attach_admin_tun_iface',`
- gen_require(`
- attribute admindomain;
- ')
-@@ -1467,11 +1878,31 @@ interface(`userdom_search_user_home_dirs',`
+ ## <param name="domain">
+ ## <summary>
+ ## Domain allowed access.
+@@ -1467,11 +1891,31 @@ interface(`userdom_search_user_home_dirs',`
')
allow $1 user_home_dir_t:dir search_dir_perms;
@@ -93959,7 +145763,7 @@ index e720dcd..512678a 100644
## Do not audit attempts to search user home directories.
## </summary>
## <desc>
-@@ -1513,6 +1944,14 @@ interface(`userdom_list_user_home_dirs',`
+@@ -1513,6 +1957,14 @@ interface(`userdom_list_user_home_dirs',`
allow $1 user_home_dir_t:dir list_dir_perms;
files_search_home($1)
@@ -93974,7 +145778,7 @@ index e720dcd..512678a 100644
')
########################################
-@@ -1528,9 +1967,11 @@ interface(`userdom_list_user_home_dirs',`
+@@ -1528,9 +1980,11 @@ interface(`userdom_list_user_home_dirs',`
interface(`userdom_dontaudit_list_user_home_dirs',`
gen_require(`
type user_home_dir_t;
@@ -93986,7 +145790,7 @@ index e720dcd..512678a 100644
')
########################################
-@@ -1587,6 +2028,42 @@ interface(`userdom_relabelto_user_home_dirs',`
+@@ -1587,6 +2041,42 @@ interface(`userdom_relabelto_user_home_dirs',`
allow $1 user_home_dir_t:dir relabelto;
')
@@ -94029,7 +145833,7 @@ index e720dcd..512678a 100644
########################################
## <summary>
## Create directories in the home dir root with
-@@ -1666,6 +2143,8 @@ interface(`userdom_dontaudit_search_user_home_content',`
+@@ -1666,6 +2156,8 @@ interface(`userdom_dontaudit_search_user_home_content',`
')
dontaudit $1 user_home_t:dir search_dir_perms;
@@ -94038,7 +145842,7 @@ index e720dcd..512678a 100644
')
########################################
-@@ -1680,10 +2159,12 @@ interface(`userdom_dontaudit_search_user_home_content',`
+@@ -1680,10 +2172,12 @@ interface(`userdom_dontaudit_search_user_home_content',`
#
interface(`userdom_list_user_home_content',`
gen_require(`
@@ -94053,7 +145857,7 @@ index e720dcd..512678a 100644
')
########################################
-@@ -1726,6 +2207,43 @@ interface(`userdom_delete_user_home_content_dirs',`
+@@ -1726,6 +2220,43 @@ interface(`userdom_delete_user_home_content_dirs',`
########################################
## <summary>
@@ -94097,7 +145901,7 @@ index e720dcd..512678a 100644
## Do not audit attempts to set the
## attributes of user home files.
## </summary>
-@@ -1745,6 +2263,25 @@ interface(`userdom_dontaudit_setattr_user_home_content_files',`
+@@ -1745,6 +2276,25 @@ interface(`userdom_dontaudit_setattr_user_home_content_files',`
########################################
## <summary>
@@ -94123,7 +145927,7 @@ index e720dcd..512678a 100644
## Mmap user home files.
## </summary>
## <param name="domain">
-@@ -1775,14 +2312,36 @@ interface(`userdom_mmap_user_home_content_files',`
+@@ -1775,14 +2325,36 @@ interface(`userdom_mmap_user_home_content_files',`
interface(`userdom_read_user_home_content_files',`
gen_require(`
type user_home_dir_t, user_home_t;
@@ -94161,7 +145965,7 @@ index e720dcd..512678a 100644
## Do not audit attempts to read user home files.
## </summary>
## <param name="domain">
-@@ -1793,11 +2352,14 @@ interface(`userdom_read_user_home_content_files',`
+@@ -1793,11 +2365,14 @@ interface(`userdom_read_user_home_content_files',`
#
interface(`userdom_dontaudit_read_user_home_content_files',`
gen_require(`
@@ -94179,29 +145983,83 @@ index e720dcd..512678a 100644
')
########################################
-@@ -1856,6 +2418,78 @@ interface(`userdom_delete_user_home_content_files',`
+@@ -1856,25 +2431,25 @@ interface(`userdom_delete_user_home_content_files',`
########################################
## <summary>
+-## Do not audit attempts to write user home files.
+## Delete all files in a user home subdirectory.
-+## </summary>
-+## <param name="domain">
-+## <summary>
+ ## </summary>
+ ## <param name="domain">
+ ## <summary>
+-## Domain to not audit.
+## Domain allowed access.
-+## </summary>
-+## </param>
-+#
+ ## </summary>
+ ## </param>
+ #
+-interface(`userdom_dontaudit_relabel_user_home_content_files',`
+interface(`userdom_delete_all_user_home_content_files',`
-+ gen_require(`
+ gen_require(`
+- type user_home_t;
+ attribute user_home_type;
-+ ')
-+
+ ')
+
+- dontaudit $1 user_home_t:file relabel_file_perms;
+ allow $1 user_home_type:file delete_file_perms;
+ ')
+
+ ########################################
+ ## <summary>
+-## Read user home subdirectory symbolic links.
++## Delete sock files in a user home subdirectory.
+ ## </summary>
+ ## <param name="domain">
+ ## <summary>
+@@ -1882,46 +2457,53 @@ interface(`userdom_dontaudit_relabel_user_home_content_files',`
+ ## </summary>
+ ## </param>
+ #
+-interface(`userdom_read_user_home_content_symlinks',`
++interface(`userdom_delete_user_home_content_sock_files',`
+ gen_require(`
+- type user_home_dir_t, user_home_t;
++ type user_home_t;
+ ')
+
+- read_lnk_files_pattern($1, { user_home_dir_t user_home_t }, user_home_t)
+- files_search_home($1)
++ allow $1 user_home_t:sock_file delete_file_perms;
+ ')
+
+ ########################################
+ ## <summary>
+-## Execute user home files.
++## Delete all sock files in a user home subdirectory.
+ ## </summary>
+ ## <param name="domain">
+ ## <summary>
+ ## Domain allowed access.
+ ## </summary>
+ ## </param>
+-## <rolecap/>
+ #
+-interface(`userdom_exec_user_home_content_files',`
++interface(`userdom_delete_all_user_home_content_sock_files',`
+ gen_require(`
+- type user_home_dir_t, user_home_t;
++ attribute user_home_type;
+ ')
+
+- files_search_home($1)
+- exec_files_pattern($1, { user_home_dir_t user_home_t }, user_home_t)
++ allow $1 user_home_type:sock_file delete_file_perms;
+')
-+
+
+- tunable_policy(`use_nfs_home_dirs',`
+- fs_exec_nfs_files($1)
+########################################
+## <summary>
-+## Delete sock files in a user home subdirectory.
++## Delete all files in a user home subdirectory.
+## </summary>
+## <param name="domain">
+## <summary>
@@ -94209,91 +146067,115 @@ index e720dcd..512678a 100644
+## </summary>
+## </param>
+#
-+interface(`userdom_delete_user_home_content_sock_files',`
++interface(`userdom_delete_all_user_home_content',`
+ gen_require(`
-+ type user_home_t;
++ attribute user_home_type;
+ ')
+
+- tunable_policy(`use_samba_home_dirs',`
+- fs_exec_cifs_files($1)
+- ')
++ allow $1 user_home_type:dir_file_class_set delete_file_perms;
+ ')
+
+ ########################################
+ ## <summary>
+-## Do not audit attempts to execute user home files.
++## Do not audit attempts to write user home files.
+ ## </summary>
+ ## <param name="domain">
+ ## <summary>
+@@ -1929,18 +2511,17 @@ interface(`userdom_exec_user_home_content_files',`
+ ## </summary>
+ ## </param>
+ #
+-interface(`userdom_dontaudit_exec_user_home_content_files',`
++interface(`userdom_dontaudit_relabel_user_home_content_files',`
+ gen_require(`
+ type user_home_t;
+ ')
+
+- dontaudit $1 user_home_t:file exec_file_perms;
++ dontaudit $1 user_home_t:file relabel_file_perms;
+ ')
+
+ ########################################
+ ## <summary>
+-## Create, read, write, and delete files
+-## in a user home subdirectory.
++## Read user home subdirectory symbolic links.
+ ## </summary>
+ ## <param name="domain">
+ ## <summary>
+@@ -1948,7 +2529,66 @@ interface(`userdom_dontaudit_exec_user_home_content_files',`
+ ## </summary>
+ ## </param>
+ #
+-interface(`userdom_manage_user_home_content_files',`
++interface(`userdom_read_user_home_content_symlinks',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type user_home_dir_t, user_home_t;
+ ')
+
-+ allow $1 user_home_t:sock_file delete_file_perms;
++ allow $1 { user_home_dir_t user_home_t }:lnk_file read_lnk_file_perms;
+')
+
+########################################
+## <summary>
-+## Delete all sock files in a user home subdirectory.
++## Execute user home files.
+## </summary>
+## <param name="domain">
+## <summary>
+## Domain allowed access.
+## </summary>
+## </param>
++## <rolecap/>
+#
-+interface(`userdom_delete_all_user_home_content_sock_files',`
++interface(`userdom_exec_user_home_content_files',`
+ gen_require(`
++ type user_home_dir_t;
+ attribute user_home_type;
+ ')
+
-+ allow $1 user_home_type:sock_file delete_file_perms;
-+')
++ files_search_home($1)
++ exec_files_pattern($1, { user_home_dir_t user_home_type }, user_home_type)
++ dontaudit $1 user_home_type:sock_file execute;
++ ')
+
+########################################
+## <summary>
-+## Delete all files in a user home subdirectory.
++## Do not audit attempts to execute user home files.
+## </summary>
+## <param name="domain">
+## <summary>
-+## Domain allowed access.
++## Domain to not audit.
+## </summary>
+## </param>
+#
-+interface(`userdom_delete_all_user_home_content',`
++interface(`userdom_dontaudit_exec_user_home_content_files',`
+ gen_require(`
-+ attribute user_home_type;
++ type user_home_t;
+ ')
+
-+ allow $1 user_home_type:dir_file_class_set delete_file_perms;
++ dontaudit $1 user_home_t:file exec_file_perms;
+')
+
+########################################
+## <summary>
- ## Do not audit attempts to write user home files.
- ## </summary>
- ## <param name="domain">
-@@ -1887,8 +2521,7 @@ interface(`userdom_read_user_home_content_symlinks',`
- type user_home_dir_t, user_home_t;
- ')
-
-- read_lnk_files_pattern($1, { user_home_dir_t user_home_t }, user_home_t)
-- files_search_home($1)
-+ allow $1 { user_home_dir_t user_home_t }:lnk_file read_lnk_file_perms;
- ')
-
- ########################################
-@@ -1904,20 +2537,14 @@ interface(`userdom_read_user_home_content_symlinks',`
- #
- interface(`userdom_exec_user_home_content_files',`
++## Create, read, write, and delete files
++## in a user home subdirectory.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`userdom_manage_user_home_content_files',`
gen_require(`
-- type user_home_dir_t, user_home_t;
-+ type user_home_dir_t;
-+ attribute user_home_type;
- ')
-
- files_search_home($1)
-- exec_files_pattern($1, { user_home_dir_t user_home_t }, user_home_t)
--
-- tunable_policy(`use_nfs_home_dirs',`
-- fs_exec_nfs_files($1)
-- ')
--
-- tunable_policy(`use_samba_home_dirs',`
-- fs_exec_cifs_files($1)
-+ exec_files_pattern($1, { user_home_dir_t user_home_type }, user_home_type)
-+ dontaudit $1 user_home_type:sock_file execute;
+ type user_home_dir_t, user_home_t;
')
--')
-
- ########################################
- ## <summary>
-@@ -2018,6 +2645,24 @@ interface(`userdom_delete_user_home_content_symlinks',`
+@@ -2018,6 +2658,24 @@ interface(`userdom_delete_user_home_content_symlinks',`
########################################
## <summary>
@@ -94318,7 +146200,7 @@ index e720dcd..512678a 100644
## Create, read, write, and delete named pipes
## in a user home subdirectory.
## </summary>
-@@ -2250,11 +2895,11 @@ interface(`userdom_dontaudit_manage_user_tmp_dirs',`
+@@ -2250,11 +2908,11 @@ interface(`userdom_dontaudit_manage_user_tmp_dirs',`
#
interface(`userdom_read_user_tmp_files',`
gen_require(`
@@ -94333,7 +146215,7 @@ index e720dcd..512678a 100644
files_search_tmp($1)
')
-@@ -2274,7 +2919,7 @@ interface(`userdom_dontaudit_read_user_tmp_files',`
+@@ -2274,7 +2932,7 @@ interface(`userdom_dontaudit_read_user_tmp_files',`
type user_tmp_t;
')
@@ -94342,7 +146224,7 @@ index e720dcd..512678a 100644
')
########################################
-@@ -2521,6 +3166,25 @@ interface(`userdom_tmp_filetrans_user_tmp',`
+@@ -2521,6 +3179,25 @@ interface(`userdom_tmp_filetrans_user_tmp',`
files_tmp_filetrans($1, user_tmp_t, $2, $3)
')
@@ -94368,7 +146250,7 @@ index e720dcd..512678a 100644
########################################
## <summary>
## Read user tmpfs files.
-@@ -2537,13 +3201,14 @@ interface(`userdom_read_user_tmpfs_files',`
+@@ -2537,13 +3214,14 @@ interface(`userdom_read_user_tmpfs_files',`
')
read_files_pattern($1, user_tmpfs_t, user_tmpfs_t)
@@ -94384,7 +146266,7 @@ index e720dcd..512678a 100644
## </summary>
## <param name="domain">
## <summary>
-@@ -2564,7 +3229,7 @@ interface(`userdom_rw_user_tmpfs_files',`
+@@ -2564,7 +3242,7 @@ interface(`userdom_rw_user_tmpfs_files',`
########################################
## <summary>
@@ -94393,7 +146275,7 @@ index e720dcd..512678a 100644
## </summary>
## <param name="domain">
## <summary>
-@@ -2572,19 +3237,17 @@ interface(`userdom_rw_user_tmpfs_files',`
+@@ -2572,14 +3250,30 @@ interface(`userdom_rw_user_tmpfs_files',`
## </summary>
## </param>
#
@@ -94407,32 +146289,11 @@ index e720dcd..512678a 100644
- allow $1 user_tmpfs_t:dir list_dir_perms;
- fs_search_tmpfs($1)
+ allow $1 user_tmpfs_t:file rw_inherited_file_perms;
- ')
-
- ########################################
- ## <summary>
--## Get the attributes of a user domain tty.
-+## Execute user tmpfs files.
- ## </summary>
- ## <param name="domain">
- ## <summary>
-@@ -2592,9 +3255,27 @@ interface(`userdom_manage_user_tmpfs_files',`
- ## </summary>
- ## </param>
- #
--interface(`userdom_getattr_user_ttys',`
-+interface(`userdom_execute_user_tmpfs_files',`
- gen_require(`
-- type user_tty_device_t;
-+ type user_tmpfs_t;
-+ ')
-+
-+ allow $1 user_tmpfs_t:file execute;
+')
+
+########################################
+## <summary>
-+## Get the attributes of a user domain tty.
++## Execute user tmpfs files.
+## </summary>
+## <param name="domain">
+## <summary>
@@ -94440,13 +146301,16 @@ index e720dcd..512678a 100644
+## </summary>
+## </param>
+#
-+interface(`userdom_getattr_user_ttys',`
++interface(`userdom_execute_user_tmpfs_files',`
+ gen_require(`
-+ type user_tty_device_t;
- ')
++ type user_tmpfs_t;
++ ')
++
++ allow $1 user_tmpfs_t:file execute;
+ ')
- allow $1 user_tty_device_t:chr_file getattr_chr_file_perms;
-@@ -2674,6 +3355,24 @@ interface(`userdom_use_user_ttys',`
+ ########################################
+@@ -2674,6 +3368,24 @@ interface(`userdom_use_user_ttys',`
########################################
## <summary>
@@ -94471,7 +146335,7 @@ index e720dcd..512678a 100644
## Read and write a user domain pty.
## </summary>
## <param name="domain">
-@@ -2692,22 +3391,34 @@ interface(`userdom_use_user_ptys',`
+@@ -2692,22 +3404,34 @@ interface(`userdom_use_user_ptys',`
########################################
## <summary>
@@ -94514,7 +146378,7 @@ index e720dcd..512678a 100644
## </desc>
## <param name="domain">
## <summary>
-@@ -2716,14 +3427,33 @@ interface(`userdom_use_user_ptys',`
+@@ -2716,14 +3440,33 @@ interface(`userdom_use_user_ptys',`
## </param>
## <infoflow type="both" weight="10"/>
#
@@ -94552,7 +146416,7 @@ index e720dcd..512678a 100644
')
########################################
-@@ -2742,8 +3472,27 @@ interface(`userdom_dontaudit_use_user_terminals',`
+@@ -2742,8 +3485,27 @@ interface(`userdom_dontaudit_use_user_terminals',`
type user_tty_device_t, user_devpts_t;
')
@@ -94582,7 +146446,7 @@ index e720dcd..512678a 100644
')
########################################
-@@ -2815,69 +3564,68 @@ interface(`userdom_spec_domtrans_unpriv_users',`
+@@ -2815,69 +3577,68 @@ interface(`userdom_spec_domtrans_unpriv_users',`
allow unpriv_userdomain $1:process sigchld;
')
@@ -94683,7 +146547,7 @@ index e720dcd..512678a 100644
## </summary>
## <param name="domain">
## <summary>
-@@ -2885,12 +3633,12 @@ interface(`userdom_manage_unpriv_user_semaphores',`
+@@ -2885,12 +3646,12 @@ interface(`userdom_manage_unpriv_user_semaphores',`
## </summary>
## </param>
#
@@ -94698,7 +146562,7 @@ index e720dcd..512678a 100644
')
########################################
-@@ -2954,7 +3702,7 @@ interface(`userdom_entry_spec_domtrans_unpriv_users',`
+@@ -2954,7 +3715,7 @@ interface(`userdom_entry_spec_domtrans_unpriv_users',`
domain_entry_file_spec_domtrans($1, unpriv_userdomain)
allow unpriv_userdomain $1:fd use;
@@ -94707,7 +146571,7 @@ index e720dcd..512678a 100644
allow unpriv_userdomain $1:process sigchld;
')
-@@ -2970,29 +3718,13 @@ interface(`userdom_entry_spec_domtrans_unpriv_users',`
+@@ -2970,29 +3731,13 @@ interface(`userdom_entry_spec_domtrans_unpriv_users',`
#
interface(`userdom_search_user_home_content',`
gen_require(`
@@ -94741,7 +146605,7 @@ index e720dcd..512678a 100644
')
########################################
-@@ -3074,7 +3806,7 @@ interface(`userdom_dontaudit_use_user_ptys',`
+@@ -3074,7 +3819,7 @@ interface(`userdom_dontaudit_use_user_ptys',`
type user_devpts_t;
')
@@ -94750,71 +146614,178 @@ index e720dcd..512678a 100644
')
########################################
-@@ -3129,7 +3861,45 @@ interface(`userdom_write_user_tmp_files',`
+@@ -3129,12 +3874,13 @@ interface(`userdom_write_user_tmp_files',`
type user_tmp_t;
')
- allow $1 user_tmp_t:file write_file_perms;
+ write_files_pattern($1, user_tmp_t, user_tmp_t)
+ ')
+
+ ########################################
+ ## <summary>
+-## Do not audit attempts to use user ttys.
++## Do not audit attempts to write users
++## temporary files.
+ ## </summary>
+ ## <param name="domain">
+ ## <summary>
+@@ -3142,36 +3888,37 @@ interface(`userdom_write_user_tmp_files',`
+ ## </summary>
+ ## </param>
+ #
+-interface(`userdom_dontaudit_use_user_ttys',`
++interface(`userdom_dontaudit_write_user_tmp_files',`
+ gen_require(`
+- type user_tty_device_t;
++ type user_tmp_t;
+ ')
+
+- dontaudit $1 user_tty_device_t:chr_file rw_file_perms;
++ dontaudit $1 user_tmp_t:file write;
+ ')
+
+ ########################################
+ ## <summary>
+-## Read the process state of all user domains.
++## Do not audit attempts to read/write users
++## temporary fifo files.
+ ## </summary>
+ ## <param name="domain">
+ ## <summary>
+-## Domain allowed access.
++## Domain to not audit.
+ ## </summary>
+ ## </param>
+ #
+-interface(`userdom_read_all_users_state',`
++interface(`userdom_dontaudit_rw_user_tmp_pipes',`
+ gen_require(`
+- attribute userdomain;
++ type user_tmp_t;
+ ')
+
+- read_files_pattern($1, userdomain, userdomain)
+- kernel_search_proc($1)
++ dontaudit $1 user_tmp_t:fifo_file rw_inherited_fifo_file_perms;
+ ')
+
+ ########################################
+ ## <summary>
+-## Get the attributes of all user domains.
++## Allow domain to read/write inherited users
++## fifo files.
+ ## </summary>
+ ## <param name="domain">
+ ## <summary>
+@@ -3179,40 +3926,96 @@ interface(`userdom_read_all_users_state',`
+ ## </summary>
+ ## </param>
+ #
+-interface(`userdom_getattr_all_users',`
++interface(`userdom_rw_inherited_user_pipes',`
+ gen_require(`
+ attribute userdomain;
+ ')
+
+- allow $1 userdomain:process getattr;
++ allow $1 userdomain:fifo_file rw_inherited_fifo_file_perms;
+ ')
+
+ ########################################
+ ## <summary>
+-## Inherit the file descriptors from all user domains
++## Do not audit attempts to use user ttys.
+ ## </summary>
+ ## <param name="domain">
+ ## <summary>
+-## Domain allowed access.
++## Domain to not audit.
+ ## </summary>
+ ## </param>
+ #
+-interface(`userdom_use_all_users_fds',`
++interface(`userdom_dontaudit_use_user_ttys',`
+ gen_require(`
+- attribute userdomain;
++ type user_tty_device_t;
+ ')
+
+- allow $1 userdomain:fd use;
++ dontaudit $1 user_tty_device_t:chr_file rw_inherited_file_perms;
+ ')
+
+ ########################################
+ ## <summary>
+-## Do not audit attempts to inherit the file
+-## descriptors from any user domains.
++## Read the process state of all user domains.
+ ## </summary>
+ ## <param name="domain">
+ ## <summary>
+-## Domain to not audit.
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`userdom_read_all_users_state',`
++ gen_require(`
++ attribute userdomain;
++ ')
++
++ read_files_pattern($1, userdomain, userdomain)
++ read_lnk_files_pattern($1,userdomain,userdomain)
++ kernel_search_proc($1)
+')
+
+########################################
+## <summary>
-+## Do not audit attempts to write users
-+## temporary files.
++## Get the attributes of all user domains.
+## </summary>
+## <param name="domain">
+## <summary>
-+## Domain to not audit.
++## Domain allowed access.
+## </summary>
+## </param>
+#
-+interface(`userdom_dontaudit_write_user_tmp_files',`
++interface(`userdom_getattr_all_users',`
+ gen_require(`
-+ type user_tmp_t;
++ attribute userdomain;
+ ')
+
-+ dontaudit $1 user_tmp_t:file write;
++ allow $1 userdomain:process getattr;
+')
+
+########################################
+## <summary>
-+## Do not audit attempts to read/write users
-+## temporary fifo files.
++## Inherit the file descriptors from all user domains
+## </summary>
+## <param name="domain">
+## <summary>
-+## Domain to not audit.
++## Domain allowed access.
+## </summary>
+## </param>
+#
-+interface(`userdom_dontaudit_rw_user_tmp_pipes',`
++interface(`userdom_use_all_users_fds',`
+ gen_require(`
-+ type user_tmp_t;
++ attribute userdomain;
+ ')
+
-+ dontaudit $1 user_tmp_t:fifo_file rw_inherited_fifo_file_perms;
- ')
-
- ########################################
-@@ -3147,7 +3917,7 @@ interface(`userdom_dontaudit_use_user_ttys',`
- type user_tty_device_t;
- ')
-
-- dontaudit $1 user_tty_device_t:chr_file rw_file_perms;
-+ dontaudit $1 user_tty_device_t:chr_file rw_inherited_file_perms;
- ')
-
- ########################################
-@@ -3166,6 +3936,7 @@ interface(`userdom_read_all_users_state',`
- ')
-
- read_files_pattern($1, userdomain, userdomain)
-+ read_lnk_files_pattern($1,userdomain,userdomain)
- kernel_search_proc($1)
- ')
-
-@@ -3242,6 +4013,42 @@ interface(`userdom_signal_all_users',`
++ allow $1 userdomain:fd use;
++')
++
++########################################
++## <summary>
++## Do not audit attempts to inherit the file
++## descriptors from any user domains.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain to not audit.
+ ## </summary>
+ ## </param>
+ #
+@@ -3242,6 +4045,42 @@ interface(`userdom_signal_all_users',`
allow $1 userdomain:process signal;
')
@@ -94857,7 +146828,7 @@ index e720dcd..512678a 100644
########################################
## <summary>
## Send a SIGCHLD signal to all user domains.
-@@ -3262,6 +4069,24 @@ interface(`userdom_sigchld_all_users',`
+@@ -3262,6 +4101,24 @@ interface(`userdom_sigchld_all_users',`
########################################
## <summary>
@@ -94882,7 +146853,7 @@ index e720dcd..512678a 100644
## Create keys for all user domains.
## </summary>
## <param name="domain">
-@@ -3296,3 +4121,1282 @@ interface(`userdom_dbus_send_all_users',`
+@@ -3296,3 +4153,1365 @@ interface(`userdom_dbus_send_all_users',`
allow $1 userdomain:dbus send_msg;
')
@@ -94938,12 +146909,6 @@ index e720dcd..512678a 100644
+## <summary>
+## Define this type as a Allow apps to set rlimits on userdomain
+## </summary>
-+## <param name="userdomain_prefix">
-+## <summary>
-+## The prefix of the user domain (e.g., user
-+## is the prefix for user_t).
-+## </summary>
-+## </param>
+## <param name="domain">
+## <summary>
+## Domain allowed access.
@@ -94954,11 +146919,11 @@ index e720dcd..512678a 100644
+ gen_require(`
+ attribute unpriv_userdomain, userdomain;
+ ')
-+ typeattribute $2 unpriv_userdomain;
-+ typeattribute $2 userdomain;
++ typeattribute $1 unpriv_userdomain;
++ typeattribute $1 userdomain;
+
-+ auth_use_nsswitch($2)
-+ ubac_constrained($2)
++ auth_use_nsswitch($1)
++ ubac_constrained($1)
+')
+
+########################################
@@ -95298,6 +147263,11 @@ index e720dcd..512678a 100644
+## The class of the object to be created.
+## </summary>
+## </param>
++## <param name="name" optional="true">
++## <summary>
++## The name of the object being created.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
+#
+interface(`userdom_admin_home_dir_filetrans',`
+ gen_require(`
@@ -95534,7 +147504,7 @@ index e720dcd..512678a 100644
+ attribute user_home_type;
+ ')
+
-+ dontaudit $1 user_home_type:file write_file_perms;
++ dontaudit $1 user_home_type:file write_inherited_file_perms;
+')
+
+########################################
@@ -95552,7 +147522,7 @@ index e720dcd..512678a 100644
+ attribute user_tmp_type;
+ ')
+
-+ dontaudit $1 user_tmp_type:file write_file_perms;
++ dontaudit $1 user_tmp_type:file write_inherited_file_perms;
+')
+
+########################################
@@ -95827,6 +147797,24 @@ index e720dcd..512678a 100644
+
+########################################
+## <summary>
++## Dontaudit attempt to set attributes on user temporary file system files.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain to not audit.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`userdom_dontaudit_setattr_user_tmpfs',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type user_tmpfs_t;
++ ')
++
++ dontaudit $1 user_tmpfs_t:file setattr;
++')
++
++########################################
++## <summary>
+## Read all inherited users files in /tmp
+## </summary>
+## <param name="domain">
@@ -95891,10 +147879,10 @@ index e720dcd..512678a 100644
+#
+interface(`userdom_rw_inherited_user_home_sock_files',`
+ gen_require(`
-+ type user_home_t;
++ attribute user_home_type;
+ ')
+
-+ allow $1 user_home_t:sock_file write;
++ allow $1 user_home_type:sock_file write;
+')
+
+########################################
@@ -96122,11 +148110,11 @@ index e720dcd..512678a 100644
+ userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans($1, home_cert_t, dir, ".cert")
+ userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans($1, home_cert_t, dir, ".pki")
+ userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans($1, home_cert_t, dir, "certificates")
-+ gnome_config_filetrans($1, home_cert_t, dir, "certificates")
+
-+ #optional_policy(`
-+ # gnome_admin_home_gconf_filetrans($1, home_bin_t, dir, "bin")
-+ #')
++ optional_policy(`
++ gnome_config_filetrans($1, home_cert_t, dir, "certificates")
++ #gnome_admin_home_gconf_filetrans($1, home_bin_t, dir, "bin")
++ ')
+')
+
+########################################
@@ -96165,11 +148153,77 @@ index e720dcd..512678a 100644
+
+ typeattribute $1 userdom_home_manager_type;
+')
++
++########################################
++## <summary>
++## Create objects in the temporary filesystem directory
++## with an automatic type transition to
++## the user temporary filesystem type.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++## <param name="object_class">
++## <summary>
++## The class of the object to be created.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++## <param name="name" optional="true">
++## <summary>
++## The name of the object being created.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`userdom_tmpfs_filetrans',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type user_tmpfs_t;
++ ')
++
++ fs_tmpfs_filetrans($1, user_tmpfs_t, $2, $3)
++')
++
++
++#######################################
++## <summary>
++## Create objects in the temporary filesystem directory
++## with an automatic type transition to
++## the user temporary filesystem type.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++## <param name="object_class">
++## <summary>
++## The class of the object to be created.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++## <param name="name" optional="true">
++## <summary>
++## The name of the object being created.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++## <param name="name" optional="true">
++## <summary>
++## The name of the object being created.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`userdom_tmpfs_filetrans_to',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type user_tmpfs_t;
++ ')
++
++ filetrans_pattern($1, user_tmpfs_t, $2, $3, $4)
++')
diff --git a/policy/modules/system/userdomain.te b/policy/modules/system/userdomain.te
-index 6a4bd85..a1a8acb 100644
+index 6a4bd85..4f23ca8 100644
--- a/policy/modules/system/userdomain.te
+++ b/policy/modules/system/userdomain.te
-@@ -7,17 +7,17 @@ policy_module(userdomain, 4.8.0)
+@@ -7,48 +7,42 @@ policy_module(userdomain, 4.8.0)
## <desc>
## <p>
@@ -96178,7 +148232,7 @@ index 6a4bd85..a1a8acb 100644
## </p>
## </desc>
-gen_tunable(allow_user_mysql_connect, false)
-+gen_tunable(user_mysql_connect, false)
++gen_tunable(selinuxuser_mysql_connect_enabled, false)
## <desc>
## <p>
@@ -96186,39 +148240,50 @@ index 6a4bd85..a1a8acb 100644
## </p>
## </desc>
-gen_tunable(allow_user_postgresql_connect, false)
-+gen_tunable(user_postgresql_connect, false)
++gen_tunable(selinuxuser_postgresql_connect_enabled, false)
## <desc>
## <p>
-@@ -43,12 +43,27 @@ gen_tunable(user_rw_noexattrfile, false)
+-## Allow regular users direct mouse access
++## Allow user to r/w files on filesystems
++## that do not have extended attributes (FAT, CDROM, FLOPPY)
+ ## </p>
+ ## </desc>
+-gen_tunable(user_direct_mouse, false)
++gen_tunable(selinuxuser_rw_noexattrfile, false)
## <desc>
## <p>
+-## Allow users to read system messages.
+## Allow user music sharing
-+## </p>
-+## </desc>
-+gen_tunable(user_share_music, false)
-+
-+## <desc>
-+## <p>
-+## Allow user processes to change their priority
-+## </p>
-+## </desc>
-+gen_tunable(user_setrlimit, false)
-+
-+## <desc>
-+## <p>
- ## Allow w to display everyone
## </p>
## </desc>
- gen_tunable(user_ttyfile_stat, false)
+-gen_tunable(user_dmesg, false)
++gen_tunable(selinuxuser_user_share_music, false)
+
+ ## <desc>
+ ## <p>
+-## Allow user to r/w files on filesystems
+-## that do not have extended attributes (FAT, CDROM, FLOPPY)
++## Allow user to use ssh chroot environment.
+ ## </p>
+ ## </desc>
+-gen_tunable(user_rw_noexattrfile, false)
+-
+-## <desc>
+-## <p>
+-## Allow w to display everyone
+-## </p>
+-## </desc>
+-gen_tunable(user_ttyfile_stat, false)
++gen_tunable(selinuxuser_use_ssh_chroot, false)
attribute admindomain;
+attribute login_userdomain;
# all user domains
attribute userdomain;
-@@ -59,6 +74,22 @@ attribute unpriv_userdomain;
+@@ -59,6 +53,22 @@ attribute unpriv_userdomain;
attribute untrusted_content_type;
attribute untrusted_content_tmp_type;
@@ -96241,7 +148306,7 @@ index 6a4bd85..a1a8acb 100644
type user_home_dir_t alias { staff_home_dir_t sysadm_home_dir_t secadm_home_dir_t auditadm_home_dir_t unconfined_home_dir_t };
fs_associate_tmpfs(user_home_dir_t)
files_type(user_home_dir_t)
-@@ -71,26 +102,121 @@ ubac_constrained(user_home_dir_t)
+@@ -71,26 +81,122 @@ ubac_constrained(user_home_dir_t)
type user_home_t alias { staff_home_t sysadm_home_t secadm_home_t auditadm_home_t unconfined_home_t };
typealias user_home_t alias { staff_untrusted_content_t sysadm_untrusted_content_t secadm_untrusted_content_t auditadm_untrusted_content_t unconfined_untrusted_content_t };
@@ -96261,7 +148326,7 @@ index 6a4bd85..a1a8acb 100644
-type user_tmp_t alias { staff_tmp_t sysadm_tmp_t secadm_tmp_t auditadm_tmp_t unconfined_tmp_t };
+type user_tmp_t, user_tmp_type;
-+typealias user_tmp_t alias { winbind_tmp_t sshd_tmp_t staff_tmp_t sysadm_tmp_t secadm_tmp_t auditadm_tmp_t unconfined_tmp_t };
++typealias user_tmp_t alias { screen_tmp_t winbind_tmp_t sshd_tmp_t staff_tmp_t sysadm_tmp_t secadm_tmp_t auditadm_tmp_t unconfined_tmp_t };
typealias user_tmp_t alias { staff_untrusted_content_tmp_t sysadm_untrusted_content_tmp_t secadm_untrusted_content_tmp_t auditadm_untrusted_content_tmp_t unconfined_untrusted_content_tmp_t };
files_tmp_file(user_tmp_t)
userdom_user_home_content(user_tmp_t)
@@ -96296,6 +148361,7 @@ index 6a4bd85..a1a8acb 100644
+')
+
+allow userdomain userdomain:process signull;
++allow userdomain userdomain:fifo_file rw_inherited_fifo_file_perms;
+
+# Nautilus causes this avc
+dontaudit unpriv_userdomain self:dir setattr;
@@ -96324,9 +148390,9 @@ index 6a4bd85..a1a8acb 100644
+ xserver_filetrans_home_content(userdomain)
+')
+
-+
+tunable_policy(`use_nfs_home_dirs',`
-+ fs_read_nfs_files(userdom_home_reader_type)
++ fs_list_auto_mountpoints(userdom_home_reader_type)
++ fs_read_nfs_files(userdom_home_reader_type)
+')
+
+tunable_policy(`use_samba_home_dirs',`
@@ -96397,7 +148463,7 @@ index e79d545..101086d 100644
')
diff --git a/policy/support/obj_perm_sets.spt b/policy/support/obj_perm_sets.spt
-index 6e91317..be530a5 100644
+index 6e91317..936a91d 100644
--- a/policy/support/obj_perm_sets.spt
+++ b/policy/support/obj_perm_sets.spt
@@ -28,8 +28,7 @@ define(`devfile_class_set', `{ chr_file blk_file }')
@@ -96419,7 +148485,7 @@ index 6e91317..be530a5 100644
#
# Permissions for creating and using sockets.
-@@ -153,12 +152,15 @@ define(`relabel_dir_perms',`{ getattr relabelfrom relabelto }')
+@@ -153,12 +152,16 @@ define(`relabel_dir_perms',`{ getattr relabelfrom relabelto }')
#
define(`getattr_file_perms',`{ getattr }')
define(`setattr_file_perms',`{ setattr }')
@@ -96429,16 +148495,18 @@ index 6e91317..be530a5 100644
define(`mmap_file_perms',`{ getattr open read execute ioctl }')
define(`exec_file_perms',`{ getattr open read execute ioctl execute_no_trans }')
-define(`append_file_perms',`{ getattr open append lock ioctl }')
+-define(`write_file_perms',`{ getattr open write append lock ioctl }')
+-define(`rw_file_perms',`{ getattr open read write append ioctl lock }')
+define(`append_inherited_file_perms',`{ getattr append }')
+define(`append_file_perms',`{ open lock ioctl append_inherited_file_perms }')
- define(`write_file_perms',`{ getattr open write append lock ioctl }')
--define(`rw_file_perms',`{ getattr open read write append ioctl lock }')
++define(`write_inherited_file_perms',`{ getattr write append lock ioctl }')
++define(`write_file_perms',`{ open write_inherited_file_perms }')
+define(`rw_inherited_file_perms',`{ getattr read write append ioctl lock }')
+define(`rw_file_perms',`{ open rw_inherited_file_perms }')
define(`create_file_perms',`{ getattr create open }')
define(`rename_file_perms',`{ getattr rename }')
define(`delete_file_perms',`{ getattr unlink }')
-@@ -179,7 +181,7 @@ define(`rw_lnk_file_perms',`{ getattr read write lock ioctl }')
+@@ -179,7 +182,7 @@ define(`rw_lnk_file_perms',`{ getattr read write lock ioctl }')
define(`create_lnk_file_perms',`{ create getattr }')
define(`rename_lnk_file_perms',`{ getattr rename }')
define(`delete_lnk_file_perms',`{ getattr unlink }')
@@ -96447,7 +148515,7 @@ index 6e91317..be530a5 100644
define(`relabelfrom_lnk_file_perms',`{ getattr relabelfrom }')
define(`relabelto_lnk_file_perms',`{ getattr relabelto }')
define(`relabel_lnk_file_perms',`{ getattr relabelfrom relabelto }')
-@@ -192,7 +194,8 @@ define(`setattr_fifo_file_perms',`{ setattr }')
+@@ -192,7 +195,8 @@ define(`setattr_fifo_file_perms',`{ setattr }')
define(`read_fifo_file_perms',`{ getattr open read lock ioctl }')
define(`append_fifo_file_perms',`{ getattr open append lock ioctl }')
define(`write_fifo_file_perms',`{ getattr open write append lock ioctl }')
@@ -96457,7 +148525,7 @@ index 6e91317..be530a5 100644
define(`create_fifo_file_perms',`{ getattr create open }')
define(`rename_fifo_file_perms',`{ getattr rename }')
define(`delete_fifo_file_perms',`{ getattr unlink }')
-@@ -208,7 +211,8 @@ define(`getattr_sock_file_perms',`{ getattr }')
+@@ -208,7 +212,8 @@ define(`getattr_sock_file_perms',`{ getattr }')
define(`setattr_sock_file_perms',`{ setattr }')
define(`read_sock_file_perms',`{ getattr open read }')
define(`write_sock_file_perms',`{ getattr write open append }')
@@ -96467,7 +148535,7 @@ index 6e91317..be530a5 100644
define(`create_sock_file_perms',`{ getattr create open }')
define(`rename_sock_file_perms',`{ getattr rename }')
define(`delete_sock_file_perms',`{ getattr unlink }')
-@@ -225,7 +229,8 @@ define(`setattr_blk_file_perms',`{ setattr }')
+@@ -225,7 +230,8 @@ define(`setattr_blk_file_perms',`{ setattr }')
define(`read_blk_file_perms',`{ getattr open read lock ioctl }')
define(`append_blk_file_perms',`{ getattr open append lock ioctl }')
define(`write_blk_file_perms',`{ getattr open write append lock ioctl }')
@@ -96477,7 +148545,7 @@ index 6e91317..be530a5 100644
define(`create_blk_file_perms',`{ getattr create }')
define(`rename_blk_file_perms',`{ getattr rename }')
define(`delete_blk_file_perms',`{ getattr unlink }')
-@@ -242,7 +247,8 @@ define(`setattr_chr_file_perms',`{ setattr }')
+@@ -242,7 +248,8 @@ define(`setattr_chr_file_perms',`{ setattr }')
define(`read_chr_file_perms',`{ getattr open read lock ioctl }')
define(`append_chr_file_perms',`{ getattr open append lock ioctl }')
define(`write_chr_file_perms',`{ getattr open write append lock ioctl }')
@@ -96487,7 +148555,7 @@ index 6e91317..be530a5 100644
define(`create_chr_file_perms',`{ getattr create }')
define(`rename_chr_file_perms',`{ getattr rename }')
define(`delete_chr_file_perms',`{ getattr unlink }')
-@@ -259,7 +265,8 @@ define(`relabel_chr_file_perms',`{ getattr relabelfrom relabelto }')
+@@ -259,7 +266,8 @@ define(`relabel_chr_file_perms',`{ getattr relabelfrom relabelto }')
#
# Use (read and write) terminals
#
@@ -96497,7 +148565,7 @@ index 6e91317..be530a5 100644
#
# Sockets
-@@ -271,3 +278,8 @@ define(`server_stream_socket_perms', `{ client_stream_socket_perms listen accept
+@@ -271,3 +279,8 @@ define(`server_stream_socket_perms', `{ client_stream_socket_perms listen accept
# Keys
#
define(`manage_key_perms', `{ create link read search setattr view write } ')
diff --git a/policy_contrib-rawhide.patch b/policy_contrib-rawhide.patch
index 78e36a3..fd42ade 100644
--- a/policy_contrib-rawhide.patch
+++ b/policy_contrib-rawhide.patch
@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
diff --git a/abrt.fc b/abrt.fc
-index 1bd5812..b5fe639 100644
+index 1bd5812..ad5baf5 100644
--- a/abrt.fc
+++ b/abrt.fc
-@@ -1,12 +1,16 @@
+@@ -1,20 +1,37 @@
/etc/abrt(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:abrt_etc_t,s0)
/etc/rc\.d/init\.d/abrt -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:abrt_initrc_exec_t,s0)
@@ -22,7 +22,9 @@ index 1bd5812..b5fe639 100644
/var/cache/abrt(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:abrt_var_cache_t,s0)
/var/cache/abrt-di(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:abrt_var_cache_t,s0)
-@@ -15,6 +19,19 @@
+
+-/var/log/abrt-logger -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:abrt_var_log_t,s0)
++/var/log/abrt-logger.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:abrt_var_log_t,s0)
/var/run/abrt\.pid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:abrt_var_run_t,s0)
/var/run/abrtd?\.lock -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:abrt_var_run_t,s0)
@@ -43,10 +45,39 @@ index 1bd5812..b5fe639 100644
+/var/cache/retrace-server(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:abrt_retrace_cache_t,s0)
+/var/spool/retrace-server(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:abrt_retrace_spool_t,s0)
diff --git a/abrt.if b/abrt.if
-index 0b827c5..ac79ca6 100644
+index 0b827c5..cce58bb 100644
--- a/abrt.if
+++ b/abrt.if
-@@ -71,12 +71,13 @@ interface(`abrt_read_state',`
+@@ -2,6 +2,28 @@
+
+ ######################################
+ ## <summary>
++## Creates types and rules for a basic
++## ABRT daemon domain.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="prefix">
++## <summary>
++## Prefix for the domain.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++template(`abrt_basic_types_template',`
++ gen_require(`
++ attribute abrt_domain;
++ ')
++
++ type $1_t, abrt_domain;
++ type $1_exec_t;
++
++ kernel_read_system_state($1_t)
++')
++
++######################################
++## <summary>
+ ## Execute abrt in the abrt domain.
+ ## </summary>
+ ## <param name="domain">
+@@ -71,12 +93,13 @@ interface(`abrt_read_state',`
type abrt_t;
')
@@ -61,7 +92,7 @@ index 0b827c5..ac79ca6 100644
## </summary>
## <param name="domain">
## <summary>
-@@ -160,8 +161,26 @@ interface(`abrt_run_helper',`
+@@ -160,8 +183,26 @@ interface(`abrt_run_helper',`
########################################
## <summary>
@@ -90,7 +121,7 @@ index 0b827c5..ac79ca6 100644
## </summary>
## <param name="domain">
## <summary>
-@@ -169,12 +188,33 @@ interface(`abrt_run_helper',`
+@@ -169,12 +210,52 @@ interface(`abrt_run_helper',`
## </summary>
## </param>
#
@@ -106,6 +137,25 @@ index 0b827c5..ac79ca6 100644
+
+########################################
+## <summary>
++## Read/Write inherited abrt cache
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`abrt_rw_inherited_cache',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type abrt_var_cache_t;
++ ')
++
++
++ allow $1 abrt_var_cache_t:file rw_inherited_file_perms;
++')
++
++########################################
++## <summary>
+## Manage abrt cache
+## </summary>
+## <param name="domain">
@@ -125,7 +175,7 @@ index 0b827c5..ac79ca6 100644
')
####################################
-@@ -253,6 +293,47 @@ interface(`abrt_manage_pid_files',`
+@@ -253,6 +334,47 @@ interface(`abrt_manage_pid_files',`
manage_files_pattern($1, abrt_var_run_t, abrt_var_run_t)
')
@@ -173,7 +223,7 @@ index 0b827c5..ac79ca6 100644
#####################################
## <summary>
## All of the rules required to administrate
-@@ -276,28 +357,135 @@ interface(`abrt_admin',`
+@@ -276,28 +398,135 @@ interface(`abrt_admin',`
type abrt_var_cache_t, abrt_var_log_t;
type abrt_var_run_t, abrt_tmp_t;
type abrt_initrc_exec_t;
@@ -316,14 +366,15 @@ index 0b827c5..ac79ca6 100644
+ dontaudit $1 abrt_t:sock_file write;
')
diff --git a/abrt.te b/abrt.te
-index 30861ec..981df33 100644
+index 30861ec..864d511 100644
--- a/abrt.te
+++ b/abrt.te
-@@ -5,13 +5,34 @@ policy_module(abrt, 1.2.0)
+@@ -5,13 +5,33 @@ policy_module(abrt, 1.2.0)
# Declarations
#
-type abrt_t;
+-type abrt_exec_t;
+## <desc>
+## <p>
+## Allow ABRT to modify public files
@@ -342,8 +393,7 @@ index 30861ec..981df33 100644
+
+attribute abrt_domain;
+
-+type abrt_t, abrt_domain;
- type abrt_exec_t;
++abrt_basic_types_template(abrt)
init_daemon_domain(abrt_t, abrt_exec_t)
type abrt_initrc_exec_t;
@@ -355,31 +405,30 @@ index 30861ec..981df33 100644
# etc files
type abrt_etc_t;
files_config_file(abrt_etc_t)
-@@ -32,9 +53,22 @@ files_type(abrt_var_cache_t)
+@@ -32,10 +52,20 @@ files_type(abrt_var_cache_t)
type abrt_var_run_t;
files_pid_file(abrt_var_run_t)
-+type abrt_dump_oops_t, abrt_domain;
-+type abrt_dump_oops_exec_t;
++abrt_basic_types_template(abrt_dump_oops)
+init_system_domain(abrt_dump_oops_t, abrt_dump_oops_exec_t)
+
+# type for abrt-handle-event to handle
+# ABRT event scripts
-+type abrt_handle_event_t, abrt_domain;
-+type abrt_handle_event_exec_t;
++abrt_basic_types_template(abrt_handle_event)
+application_domain(abrt_handle_event_t, abrt_handle_event_exec_t)
+role system_r types abrt_handle_event_t;
+
# type needed to allow all domains
# to handle /var/cache/abrt
-type abrt_helper_t;
+-type abrt_helper_exec_t;
+# type needed to allow all domains
+# to handle /var/cache/abrt
-+type abrt_helper_t, abrt_domain;
- type abrt_helper_exec_t;
++abrt_basic_types_template(abrt_helper)
application_domain(abrt_helper_t, abrt_helper_exec_t)
role system_r types abrt_helper_t;
-@@ -43,14 +77,40 @@ ifdef(`enable_mcs',`
+
+@@ -43,14 +73,36 @@ ifdef(`enable_mcs',`
init_ranged_daemon_domain(abrt_t, abrt_exec_t, s0 - mcs_systemhigh)
')
@@ -387,13 +436,11 @@ index 30861ec..981df33 100644
+# Support for ABRT retrace server
+#
+
-+type abrt_retrace_worker_t, abrt_domain;
-+type abrt_retrace_worker_exec_t;
++abrt_basic_types_template(abrt_retrace_worker)
+application_domain(abrt_retrace_worker_t, abrt_retrace_worker_exec_t)
+role system_r types abrt_retrace_worker_t;
+
-+type abrt_retrace_coredump_t, abrt_domain;
-+type abrt_retrace_coredump_exec_t;
++abrt_basic_types_template(abrt_retrace_coredump)
+application_domain(abrt_retrace_coredump_t, abrt_retrace_coredump_exec_t)
+role system_r types abrt_retrace_coredump_t;
+
@@ -404,9 +451,7 @@ index 30861ec..981df33 100644
+files_spool_file(abrt_retrace_spool_t)
+
+# Support abrt-watch log
-+
-+type abrt_watch_log_t, abrt_domain;
-+type abrt_watch_log_exec_t;
++abrt_basic_types_template(abrt_watch_log)
+init_daemon_domain(abrt_watch_log_t, abrt_watch_log_exec_t)
+
########################################
@@ -422,7 +467,7 @@ index 30861ec..981df33 100644
allow abrt_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms;
allow abrt_t self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
-@@ -59,6 +119,7 @@ allow abrt_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms;
+@@ -59,6 +111,7 @@ allow abrt_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms;
allow abrt_t self:netlink_route_socket r_netlink_socket_perms;
# abrt etc files
@@ -430,7 +475,7 @@ index 30861ec..981df33 100644
rw_files_pattern(abrt_t, abrt_etc_t, abrt_etc_t)
# log file
-@@ -68,7 +129,9 @@ logging_log_filetrans(abrt_t, abrt_var_log_t, file)
+@@ -68,7 +121,9 @@ logging_log_filetrans(abrt_t, abrt_var_log_t, file)
# abrt tmp files
manage_dirs_pattern(abrt_t, abrt_tmp_t, abrt_tmp_t)
manage_files_pattern(abrt_t, abrt_tmp_t, abrt_tmp_t)
@@ -440,7 +485,7 @@ index 30861ec..981df33 100644
# abrt var/cache files
manage_files_pattern(abrt_t, abrt_var_cache_t, abrt_var_cache_t)
-@@ -82,7 +145,10 @@ manage_files_pattern(abrt_t, abrt_var_run_t, abrt_var_run_t)
+@@ -82,10 +137,12 @@ manage_files_pattern(abrt_t, abrt_var_run_t, abrt_var_run_t)
manage_dirs_pattern(abrt_t, abrt_var_run_t, abrt_var_run_t)
manage_sock_files_pattern(abrt_t, abrt_var_run_t, abrt_var_run_t)
manage_lnk_files_pattern(abrt_t, abrt_var_run_t, abrt_var_run_t)
@@ -451,8 +496,11 @@ index 30861ec..981df33 100644
+kernel_request_load_module(abrt_t)
kernel_read_ring_buffer(abrt_t)
- kernel_read_system_state(abrt_t)
-@@ -93,7 +159,6 @@ corecmd_exec_shell(abrt_t)
+-kernel_read_system_state(abrt_t)
+ kernel_rw_kernel_sysctl(abrt_t)
+
+ corecmd_exec_bin(abrt_t)
+@@ -93,7 +150,6 @@ corecmd_exec_shell(abrt_t)
corecmd_read_all_executables(abrt_t)
corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(abrt_t)
@@ -460,7 +508,7 @@ index 30861ec..981df33 100644
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(abrt_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_node(abrt_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_port(abrt_t)
-@@ -104,6 +169,8 @@ corenet_tcp_connect_all_ports(abrt_t)
+@@ -104,6 +160,8 @@ corenet_tcp_connect_all_ports(abrt_t)
corenet_sendrecv_http_client_packets(abrt_t)
dev_getattr_all_chr_files(abrt_t)
@@ -469,7 +517,7 @@ index 30861ec..981df33 100644
dev_read_urand(abrt_t)
dev_rw_sysfs(abrt_t)
dev_dontaudit_read_raw_memory(abrt_t)
-@@ -113,7 +180,8 @@ domain_read_all_domains_state(abrt_t)
+@@ -113,7 +171,8 @@ domain_read_all_domains_state(abrt_t)
domain_signull_all_domains(abrt_t)
files_getattr_all_files(abrt_t)
@@ -479,7 +527,7 @@ index 30861ec..981df33 100644
files_read_var_symlinks(abrt_t)
files_read_var_lib_files(abrt_t)
files_read_usr_files(abrt_t)
-@@ -121,6 +189,9 @@ files_read_generic_tmp_files(abrt_t)
+@@ -121,6 +180,9 @@ files_read_generic_tmp_files(abrt_t)
files_read_kernel_modules(abrt_t)
files_dontaudit_list_default(abrt_t)
files_dontaudit_read_default_files(abrt_t)
@@ -489,17 +537,17 @@ index 30861ec..981df33 100644
fs_list_inotifyfs(abrt_t)
fs_getattr_all_fs(abrt_t)
-@@ -131,22 +202,31 @@ fs_read_nfs_files(abrt_t)
+@@ -131,22 +193,37 @@ fs_read_nfs_files(abrt_t)
fs_read_nfs_symlinks(abrt_t)
fs_search_all(abrt_t)
-sysnet_read_config(abrt_t)
-
logging_read_generic_logs(abrt_t)
--logging_send_syslog_msg(abrt_t)
-+
-+auth_use_nsswitch(abrt_t)
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(abrt_t)
++auth_use_nsswitch(abrt_t)
++
miscfiles_read_generic_certs(abrt_t)
-miscfiles_read_localization(abrt_t)
+miscfiles_read_public_files(abrt_t)
@@ -522,11 +570,16 @@ index 30861ec..981df33 100644
optional_policy(`
- nis_use_ypbind(abrt_t)
++ dmesg_domtrans(abrt_t)
++')
++
++optional_policy(`
+ mozilla_plugin_dontaudit_rw_tmp_files(abrt_t)
++ mozilla_plugin_read_rw_files(abrt_t)
')
optional_policy(`
-@@ -167,6 +247,7 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -167,6 +244,7 @@ optional_policy(`
rpm_exec(abrt_t)
rpm_dontaudit_manage_db(abrt_t)
rpm_manage_cache(abrt_t)
@@ -534,7 +587,7 @@ index 30861ec..981df33 100644
rpm_manage_pid_files(abrt_t)
rpm_read_db(abrt_t)
rpm_signull(abrt_t)
-@@ -178,9 +259,32 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -178,9 +256,36 @@ optional_policy(`
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -547,6 +600,10 @@ index 30861ec..981df33 100644
sssd_stream_connect(abrt_t)
')
++optional_policy(`
++ xserver_read_log(abrt_t)
++')
++
+#######################################
+#
+# abrt-handle-event local policy
@@ -567,7 +624,7 @@ index 30861ec..981df33 100644
########################################
#
# abrt--helper local policy
-@@ -200,23 +304,22 @@ files_var_filetrans(abrt_helper_t, abrt_var_cache_t, { file dir })
+@@ -200,9 +305,11 @@ files_var_filetrans(abrt_helper_t, abrt_var_cache_t, { file dir })
read_files_pattern(abrt_helper_t, abrt_var_run_t, abrt_var_run_t)
read_lnk_files_pattern(abrt_helper_t, abrt_var_run_t, abrt_var_run_t)
@@ -580,11 +637,10 @@ index 30861ec..981df33 100644
fs_list_inotifyfs(abrt_helper_t)
fs_getattr_all_fs(abrt_helper_t)
+@@ -211,12 +318,11 @@ auth_use_nsswitch(abrt_helper_t)
- auth_use_nsswitch(abrt_helper_t)
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(abrt_helper_t)
--logging_send_syslog_msg(abrt_helper_t)
--
-miscfiles_read_localization(abrt_helper_t)
-
term_dontaudit_use_all_ttys(abrt_helper_t)
@@ -596,7 +652,7 @@ index 30861ec..981df33 100644
userdom_dontaudit_read_user_home_content_files(abrt_helper_t)
userdom_dontaudit_read_user_tmp_files(abrt_helper_t)
dev_dontaudit_read_all_blk_files(abrt_helper_t)
-@@ -224,4 +327,146 @@ ifdef(`hide_broken_symptoms', `
+@@ -224,4 +330,149 @@ ifdef(`hide_broken_symptoms', `
dev_dontaudit_write_all_chr_files(abrt_helper_t)
dev_dontaudit_write_all_blk_files(abrt_helper_t)
fs_dontaudit_rw_anon_inodefs_files(abrt_helper_t)
@@ -638,6 +694,8 @@ index 30861ec..981df33 100644
+
+files_read_usr_files(abrt_retrace_coredump_t)
+
++logging_send_syslog_msg(abrt_retrace_coredump_t)
++
+sysnet_dns_name_resolve(abrt_retrace_coredump_t)
+
+# to install debuginfo packages
@@ -678,6 +736,8 @@ index 30861ec..981df33 100644
+
+files_read_usr_files(abrt_retrace_worker_t)
+
++logging_send_syslog_msg(abrt_retrace_worker_t)
++
+sysnet_dns_name_resolve(abrt_retrace_worker_t)
+
+optional_policy(`
@@ -704,6 +764,7 @@ index 30861ec..981df33 100644
+
+read_files_pattern(abrt_dump_oops_t, abrt_etc_t, abrt_etc_t)
+
++kernel_read_debugfs(abrt_dump_oops_t)
+kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(abrt_dump_oops_t)
+kernel_read_ring_buffer(abrt_dump_oops_t)
+
@@ -712,6 +773,7 @@ index 30861ec..981df33 100644
+fs_list_inotifyfs(abrt_dump_oops_t)
+
+logging_read_generic_logs(abrt_dump_oops_t)
++logging_send_syslog_msg(abrt_dump_oops_t)
+
+#######################################
+#
@@ -725,7 +787,10 @@ index 30861ec..981df33 100644
+
+domtrans_pattern(abrt_watch_log_t, abrt_dump_oops_exec_t, abrt_dump_oops_t)
+
++corecmd_exec_bin(abrt_watch_log_t)
++
+logging_read_all_logs(abrt_watch_log_t)
++logging_send_syslog_msg(abrt_watch_log_t)
+
+optional_policy(`
+ unconfined_domain(abrt_watch_log_t)
@@ -736,13 +801,7 @@ index 30861ec..981df33 100644
+# Local policy for all abrt domain
+#
+
-+kernel_read_system_state(abrt_domain)
-+
+files_read_etc_files(abrt_domain)
-+
-+logging_send_syslog_msg(abrt_domain)
-+
-+miscfiles_read_localization(abrt_domain)
diff --git a/accountsd.fc b/accountsd.fc
index 1adca53..18e0e41 100644
--- a/accountsd.fc
@@ -754,7 +813,7 @@ index 1adca53..18e0e41 100644
/var/lib/AccountsService(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:accountsd_var_lib_t,s0)
diff --git a/accountsd.if b/accountsd.if
-index c0f858d..d75aae9 100644
+index c0f858d..4a3dab6 100644
--- a/accountsd.if
+++ b/accountsd.if
@@ -5,9 +5,9 @@
@@ -778,7 +837,15 @@ index c0f858d..d75aae9 100644
## </summary>
## </param>
#
-@@ -118,28 +118,54 @@ interface(`accountsd_manage_lib_files',`
+@@ -93,6 +93,7 @@ interface(`accountsd_read_lib_files',`
+ ')
+
+ files_search_var_lib($1)
++ allow $1 accountsd_var_lib_t:dir list_dir_perms;
+ read_files_pattern($1, accountsd_var_lib_t, accountsd_var_lib_t)
+ ')
+
+@@ -118,28 +119,54 @@ interface(`accountsd_manage_lib_files',`
########################################
## <summary>
@@ -831,7 +898,7 @@ index c0f858d..d75aae9 100644
ps_process_pattern($1, accountsd_t)
+ tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',`
-+ allow $1 acountsd_t:process ptrace;
++ allow $1 accountsd_t:process ptrace;
+ ')
+
accountsd_manage_lib_files($1)
@@ -841,7 +908,7 @@ index c0f858d..d75aae9 100644
+ allow $1 accountsd_unit_file_t:service all_service_perms;
')
diff --git a/accountsd.te b/accountsd.te
-index 1632f10..1b42ac3 100644
+index 1632f10..074ebc9 100644
--- a/accountsd.te
+++ b/accountsd.te
@@ -1,5 +1,9 @@
@@ -854,7 +921,7 @@ index 1632f10..1b42ac3 100644
########################################
#
# Declarations
-@@ -7,35 +11,46 @@ policy_module(accountsd, 1.0.0)
+@@ -7,37 +11,48 @@ policy_module(accountsd, 1.0.0)
type accountsd_t;
type accountsd_exec_t;
@@ -901,9 +968,12 @@ index 1632f10..1b42ac3 100644
auth_read_shadow(accountsd_t)
+auth_read_login_records(accountsd_t)
- miscfiles_read_localization(accountsd_t)
+-miscfiles_read_localization(accountsd_t)
++init_dbus_chat(accountsd_t)
-@@ -50,8 +65,19 @@ usermanage_domtrans_passwd(accountsd_t)
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(accountsd_t)
+ logging_set_loginuid(accountsd_t)
+@@ -50,8 +65,20 @@ usermanage_domtrans_passwd(accountsd_t)
optional_policy(`
consolekit_read_log(accountsd_t)
@@ -919,6 +989,7 @@ index 1632f10..1b42ac3 100644
')
+
+optional_policy(`
++ xserver_read_xdm_tmp_files(accountsd_t)
+ xserver_read_state_xdm(accountsd_t)
+ xserver_dbus_chat_xdm(accountsd_t)
+ xserver_manage_xdm_etc_files(accountsd_t)
@@ -950,10 +1021,10 @@ index e66c296..993a1e9 100644
+ dontaudit $1 acct_data_t:dir list_dir_perms;
+')
diff --git a/acct.te b/acct.te
-index 63ef90e..622d6d3 100644
+index 63ef90e..31f524e 100644
--- a/acct.te
+++ b/acct.te
-@@ -49,12 +49,13 @@ corecmd_exec_shell(acct_t)
+@@ -49,20 +49,19 @@ corecmd_exec_shell(acct_t)
domain_use_interactive_fds(acct_t)
@@ -968,6 +1039,14 @@ index 63ef90e..622d6d3 100644
init_use_fds(acct_t)
init_use_script_ptys(acct_t)
init_exec_script_files(acct_t)
+
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(acct_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(acct_t)
+-
+ userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fds(acct_t)
+ userdom_dontaudit_search_user_home_dirs(acct_t)
+
diff --git a/ada.te b/ada.te
index 39c75fb..057d8b1 100644
--- a/ada.te
@@ -1001,7 +1080,7 @@ index 8559cdc..641044e 100644
# Allow afs_admin to restart the afs service
afs_initrc_domtrans($1)
diff --git a/afs.te b/afs.te
-index a496fde..e4b761b 100644
+index a496fde..8170a8c 100644
--- a/afs.te
+++ b/afs.te
@@ -71,6 +71,7 @@ role system_r types afs_vlserver_t;
@@ -1020,8 +1099,12 @@ index a496fde..e4b761b 100644
corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(afs_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(afs_t)
corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if(afs_t)
-@@ -107,6 +107,10 @@ miscfiles_read_localization(afs_t)
+@@ -103,10 +103,12 @@ fs_read_nfs_symlinks(afs_t)
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(afs_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(afs_t)
+-
sysnet_dns_name_resolve(afs_t)
+ifdef(`hide_broken_symptoms',`
@@ -1031,7 +1114,7 @@ index a496fde..e4b761b 100644
########################################
#
# AFS bossserver local policy
-@@ -140,7 +144,6 @@ domtrans_pattern(afs_bosserver_t, afs_vlserver_exec_t, afs_vlserver_t)
+@@ -140,7 +142,6 @@ domtrans_pattern(afs_bosserver_t, afs_vlserver_exec_t, afs_vlserver_t)
kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(afs_bosserver_t)
@@ -1039,7 +1122,15 @@ index a496fde..e4b761b 100644
corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(afs_bosserver_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(afs_bosserver_t)
corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if(afs_bosserver_t)
-@@ -202,7 +205,6 @@ corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_node(afs_fsserver_t)
+@@ -156,7 +157,6 @@ files_read_etc_files(afs_bosserver_t)
+ files_list_home(afs_bosserver_t)
+ files_read_usr_files(afs_bosserver_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(afs_bosserver_t)
+
+ seutil_read_config(afs_bosserver_t)
+
+@@ -202,7 +202,6 @@ corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_node(afs_fsserver_t)
corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_node(afs_fsserver_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_ports(afs_fsserver_t)
corenet_udp_sendrecv_all_ports(afs_fsserver_t)
@@ -1047,7 +1138,16 @@ index a496fde..e4b761b 100644
corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(afs_fsserver_t)
corenet_tcp_bind_generic_node(afs_fsserver_t)
corenet_udp_bind_generic_node(afs_fsserver_t)
-@@ -252,7 +254,6 @@ manage_files_pattern(afs_kaserver_t, afs_logfile_t, afs_logfile_t)
+@@ -225,8 +224,6 @@ init_dontaudit_use_script_fds(afs_fsserver_t)
+
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(afs_fsserver_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(afs_fsserver_t)
+-
+ seutil_read_config(afs_fsserver_t)
+
+ sysnet_read_config(afs_fsserver_t)
+@@ -252,7 +249,6 @@ manage_files_pattern(afs_kaserver_t, afs_logfile_t, afs_logfile_t)
kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(afs_kaserver_t)
@@ -1055,7 +1155,15 @@ index a496fde..e4b761b 100644
corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(afs_kaserver_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(afs_kaserver_t)
corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if(afs_kaserver_t)
-@@ -296,7 +297,6 @@ manage_files_pattern(afs_ptserver_t, afs_logfile_t, afs_logfile_t)
+@@ -270,7 +266,6 @@ files_read_etc_files(afs_kaserver_t)
+ files_list_home(afs_kaserver_t)
+ files_read_usr_files(afs_kaserver_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(afs_kaserver_t)
+
+ seutil_read_config(afs_kaserver_t)
+
+@@ -296,7 +291,6 @@ manage_files_pattern(afs_ptserver_t, afs_logfile_t, afs_logfile_t)
manage_files_pattern(afs_ptserver_t, afs_dbdir_t, afs_pt_db_t)
filetrans_pattern(afs_ptserver_t, afs_dbdir_t, afs_pt_db_t, file)
@@ -1063,7 +1171,15 @@ index a496fde..e4b761b 100644
corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(afs_ptserver_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(afs_ptserver_t)
corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if(afs_ptserver_t)
-@@ -334,7 +334,6 @@ manage_files_pattern(afs_vlserver_t, afs_logfile_t, afs_logfile_t)
+@@ -310,7 +304,6 @@ corenet_sendrecv_afs_pt_server_packets(afs_ptserver_t)
+
+ files_read_etc_files(afs_ptserver_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(afs_ptserver_t)
+
+ sysnet_read_config(afs_ptserver_t)
+
+@@ -334,7 +327,6 @@ manage_files_pattern(afs_vlserver_t, afs_logfile_t, afs_logfile_t)
manage_files_pattern(afs_vlserver_t, afs_dbdir_t, afs_vl_db_t)
filetrans_pattern(afs_vlserver_t, afs_dbdir_t, afs_vl_db_t, file)
@@ -1071,6 +1187,14 @@ index a496fde..e4b761b 100644
corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(afs_vlserver_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(afs_vlserver_t)
corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if(afs_vlserver_t)
+@@ -348,7 +340,6 @@ corenet_sendrecv_afs_vl_server_packets(afs_vlserver_t)
+
+ files_read_etc_files(afs_vlserver_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(afs_vlserver_t)
+
+ sysnet_read_config(afs_vlserver_t)
+
diff --git a/aiccu.if b/aiccu.if
index 184c9a8..8f77bf5 100644
--- a/aiccu.if
@@ -1091,7 +1215,7 @@ index 184c9a8..8f77bf5 100644
domain_system_change_exemption($1)
role_transition $2 aiccu_initrc_exec_t system_r;
diff --git a/aiccu.te b/aiccu.te
-index 6d685ba..df6924b 100644
+index 6d685ba..5a3021d 100644
--- a/aiccu.te
+++ b/aiccu.te
@@ -44,10 +44,11 @@ kernel_read_system_state(aiccu_t)
@@ -1107,15 +1231,18 @@ index 6d685ba..df6924b 100644
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_sixxsconfig_port(aiccu_t)
corenet_tcp_bind_generic_node(aiccu_t)
corenet_tcp_connect_sixxsconfig_port(aiccu_t)
-@@ -62,6 +63,8 @@ dev_read_urand(aiccu_t)
+@@ -62,9 +63,9 @@ dev_read_urand(aiccu_t)
files_read_etc_files(aiccu_t)
+-logging_send_syslog_msg(aiccu_t)
+auth_read_passwd(aiccu_t)
-+
- logging_send_syslog_msg(aiccu_t)
- miscfiles_read_localization(aiccu_t)
+-miscfiles_read_localization(aiccu_t)
++logging_send_syslog_msg(aiccu_t)
+
+ optional_policy(`
+ modutils_domtrans_insmod(aiccu_t)
diff --git a/aide.fc b/aide.fc
index 7798464..62ccdc6 100644
--- a/aide.fc
@@ -1146,10 +1273,18 @@ index 838d25b..33981e0 100644
admin_pattern($1, aide_db_t)
diff --git a/aide.te b/aide.te
-index 2509dd2..7ada82f 100644
+index 2509dd2..88d5615 100644
--- a/aide.te
+++ b/aide.te
-@@ -32,6 +32,13 @@ manage_files_pattern(aide_t, aide_log_t, aide_log_t)
+@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ policy_module(aide, 1.6.0)
+ type aide_t;
+ type aide_exec_t;
+ application_domain(aide_t, aide_exec_t)
++cron_system_entry(aide_t, aide_exec_t)
+
+ # log files
+ type aide_log_t;
+@@ -32,6 +33,13 @@ manage_files_pattern(aide_t, aide_log_t, aide_log_t)
logging_log_filetrans(aide_t, aide_log_t, file)
files_read_all_files(aide_t)
@@ -1163,7 +1298,7 @@ index 2509dd2..7ada82f 100644
logging_send_audit_msgs(aide_t)
# AIDE can be configured to log to syslog
-@@ -39,4 +46,4 @@ logging_send_syslog_msg(aide_t)
+@@ -39,4 +47,4 @@ logging_send_syslog_msg(aide_t)
seutil_use_newrole_fds(aide_t)
@@ -1201,7 +1336,7 @@ index 0370dba..c2d68a4 100644
domain_system_change_exemption($1)
role_transition $2 aisexec_initrc_exec_t system_r;
diff --git a/aisexec.te b/aisexec.te
-index 50b9b48..7fa5ec1 100644
+index 50b9b48..bd0ccb4 100644
--- a/aisexec.te
+++ b/aisexec.te
@@ -64,6 +64,7 @@ files_pid_filetrans(aisexec_t, aisexec_var_run_t, { file sock_file })
@@ -1212,7 +1347,16 @@ index 50b9b48..7fa5ec1 100644
corenet_udp_bind_netsupport_port(aisexec_t)
corenet_tcp_bind_reserved_port(aisexec_t)
-@@ -89,6 +90,10 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -79,8 +80,6 @@ init_rw_script_tmp_files(aisexec_t)
+
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(aisexec_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(aisexec_t)
+-
+ userdom_rw_unpriv_user_semaphores(aisexec_t)
+ userdom_rw_unpriv_user_shared_mem(aisexec_t)
+
+@@ -89,6 +88,10 @@ optional_policy(`
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -1333,10 +1477,10 @@ index 0000000..7abe946
+')
diff --git a/ajaxterm.te b/ajaxterm.te
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..3d0fd88
+index 0000000..8ba128b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ajaxterm.te
-@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+policy_module(ajaxterm, 1.0.0)
+
+########################################
@@ -1388,8 +1532,6 @@ index 0000000..3d0fd88
+files_read_etc_files(ajaxterm_t)
+files_read_usr_files(ajaxterm_t)
+
-+miscfiles_read_localization(ajaxterm_t)
-+
+sysnet_dns_name_resolve(ajaxterm_t)
+
+#######################################
@@ -1503,7 +1645,7 @@ index 1392679..64e685f 100644
+ ps_process_pattern($1, alsa_t)
+')
diff --git a/alsa.te b/alsa.te
-index dc1b088..d1f2a62 100644
+index dc1b088..33678e4 100644
--- a/alsa.te
+++ b/alsa.te
@@ -22,6 +22,9 @@ files_type(alsa_var_lib_t)
@@ -1524,8 +1666,17 @@ index dc1b088..d1f2a62 100644
files_read_usr_files(alsa_t)
term_dontaudit_use_console(alsa_t)
+@@ -72,8 +74,6 @@ init_use_fds(alsa_t)
+
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(alsa_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(alsa_t)
+-
+ userdom_manage_unpriv_user_semaphores(alsa_t)
+ userdom_manage_unpriv_user_shared_mem(alsa_t)
+ userdom_search_user_home_dirs(alsa_t)
diff --git a/amanda.te b/amanda.te
-index d8b5abe..e12641f 100644
+index d8b5abe..a4f5d3a 100644
--- a/amanda.te
+++ b/amanda.te
@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ optional_policy(`
@@ -1577,9 +1728,11 @@ index d8b5abe..e12641f 100644
files_read_etc_runtime_files(amanda_recover_t)
files_search_tmp(amanda_recover_t)
files_search_pids(amanda_recover_t)
-@@ -207,5 +204,10 @@ logging_search_logs(amanda_recover_t)
+@@ -205,7 +202,11 @@ fstools_signal(amanda_t)
- miscfiles_read_localization(amanda_recover_t)
+ logging_search_logs(amanda_recover_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(amanda_recover_t)
-userdom_use_user_terminals(amanda_recover_t)
+userdom_use_inherited_user_terminals(amanda_recover_t)
@@ -1590,7 +1743,7 @@ index d8b5abe..e12641f 100644
+ fstools_signal(amanda_t)
+')
diff --git a/amavis.fc b/amavis.fc
-index 446ee16..33c0147 100644
+index 446ee16..2346f65 100644
--- a/amavis.fc
+++ b/amavis.fc
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
@@ -1601,11 +1754,8 @@ index 446ee16..33c0147 100644
/usr/sbin/amavisd.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:amavis_exec_t,s0)
/usr/lib/AntiVir/antivir -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:amavis_exec_t,s0)
-@@ -10,9 +11,10 @@ ifdef(`distro_debian',`
- /usr/sbin/amavisd-new-cronjob -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:amavis_exec_t,s0)
- ')
+@@ -12,7 +13,7 @@ ifdef(`distro_debian',`
-+/var/opt/f-secure(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:amavis_var_lib_t,s0)
/var/amavis(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:amavis_var_lib_t,s0)
/var/lib/amavis(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:amavis_var_lib_t,s0)
-/var/log/amavisd\.log -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:amavis_var_log_t,s0)
@@ -1614,10 +1764,45 @@ index 446ee16..33c0147 100644
/var/spool/amavisd(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:amavis_spool_t,s0)
/var/virusmails(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:amavis_quarantine_t,s0)
diff --git a/amavis.if b/amavis.if
-index e31d92a..1aa0718 100644
+index e31d92a..5cb091a 100644
--- a/amavis.if
+++ b/amavis.if
-@@ -202,6 +202,7 @@ interface(`amavis_create_pid_files',`
+@@ -57,6 +57,7 @@ interface(`amavis_read_spool_files',`
+
+ files_search_spool($1)
+ read_files_pattern($1, amavis_spool_t, amavis_spool_t)
++ allow $1 amavis_spool_t:dir list_dir_perms;
+ ')
+
+ ########################################
+@@ -150,6 +151,26 @@ interface(`amavis_read_lib_files',`
+
+ ########################################
+ ## <summary>
++## Read and write amavis lib files.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`amavis_rw_lib_files',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type amavis_var_lib_t;
++ ')
++
++ rw_files_pattern($1, amavis_var_lib_t, amavis_var_lib_t)
++ allow $1 amavis_var_lib_t:dir list_dir_perms;
++ files_search_var_lib($1)
++')
++
++########################################
++## <summary>
+ ## Create, read, write, and delete
+ ## amavis lib files.
+ ## </summary>
+@@ -202,6 +223,7 @@ interface(`amavis_create_pid_files',`
type amavis_var_run_t;
')
@@ -1625,7 +1810,7 @@ index e31d92a..1aa0718 100644
allow $1 amavis_var_run_t:file create_file_perms;
files_search_pids($1)
')
-@@ -231,9 +232,13 @@ interface(`amavis_admin',`
+@@ -231,9 +253,13 @@ interface(`amavis_admin',`
type amavis_initrc_exec_t;
')
@@ -1641,7 +1826,7 @@ index e31d92a..1aa0718 100644
domain_system_change_exemption($1)
role_transition $2 amavis_initrc_exec_t system_r;
diff --git a/amavis.te b/amavis.te
-index 505309b..6cc4f4f 100644
+index 505309b..58c37b3 100644
--- a/amavis.te
+++ b/amavis.te
@@ -5,6 +5,13 @@ policy_module(amavis, 1.14.0)
@@ -1689,7 +1874,17 @@ index 505309b..6cc4f4f 100644
# var/lib files for amavis
manage_dirs_pattern(amavis_t, amavis_var_lib_t, amavis_var_lib_t)
-@@ -107,7 +116,6 @@ kernel_dontaudit_read_system_state(amavis_t)
+@@ -98,16 +107,15 @@ manage_sock_files_pattern(amavis_t, amavis_var_run_t, amavis_var_run_t)
+ files_pid_filetrans(amavis_t, amavis_var_run_t, { dir file sock_file })
+
+ kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(amavis_t)
++kernel_read_system_state(amavis_t)
+ # amavis tries to access /proc/self/stat, /etc/shadow and /root - perl...
+ kernel_dontaudit_list_proc(amavis_t)
+ kernel_dontaudit_read_proc_symlinks(amavis_t)
+-kernel_dontaudit_read_system_state(amavis_t)
+
+ # find perl
corecmd_exec_bin(amavis_t)
corecmd_exec_shell(amavis_t)
@@ -1723,9 +1918,11 @@ index 505309b..6cc4f4f 100644
# uses uptime which reads utmp - redhat bug 561383
init_read_utmp(amavis_t)
init_stream_connect_script(amavis_t)
-@@ -148,21 +160,27 @@ logging_send_syslog_msg(amavis_t)
+@@ -146,23 +158,32 @@ init_stream_connect_script(amavis_t)
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(amavis_t)
+
miscfiles_read_generic_certs(amavis_t)
- miscfiles_read_localization(amavis_t)
+-miscfiles_read_localization(amavis_t)
-sysnet_dns_name_resolve(amavis_t)
sysnet_use_ldap(amavis_t)
@@ -1736,14 +1933,17 @@ index 505309b..6cc4f4f 100644
-cron_use_fds(amavis_t)
-cron_use_system_job_fds(amavis_t)
-cron_rw_pipes(amavis_t)
--
--mta_read_config(amavis_t)
+tunable_policy(`amavis_use_jit',`
+ allow amavis_t self:process execmem;
+',`
+ dontaudit amavis_t self:process execmem;
+')
+-mta_read_config(amavis_t)
++optional_policy(`
++ antivirus_domain_template(amavis_t)
++')
+
optional_policy(`
clamav_stream_connect(amavis_t)
clamav_domtrans_clamscan(amavis_t)
@@ -1758,7 +1958,7 @@ index 505309b..6cc4f4f 100644
')
optional_policy(`
-@@ -171,11 +189,16 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -171,11 +192,16 @@ optional_policy(`
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -1775,11 +1975,13 @@ index 505309b..6cc4f4f 100644
')
optional_policy(`
-@@ -188,6 +211,10 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -188,6 +214,12 @@ optional_policy(`
')
optional_policy(`
+ snmp_manage_var_lib_files(amavis_t)
++ snmp_manage_var_lib_dirs(amavis_t)
++ snmp_stream_connect(amavis_t)
+')
+
+optional_policy(`
@@ -1800,10 +2002,34 @@ index 057abb0..c75e9e9 100644
optional_policy(`
nscd_dontaudit_search_pid(amtu_t)
diff --git a/anaconda.te b/anaconda.te
-index e81bdbd..63ab279 100644
+index e81bdbd..e3a396b 100644
--- a/anaconda.te
+++ b/anaconda.te
-@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ modutils_domtrans_insmod(anaconda_t)
+@@ -1,5 +1,9 @@
+ policy_module(anaconda, 1.6.0)
+
++gen_require(`
++ class passwd { passwd chfn chsh rootok crontab };
++')
++
+ ########################################
+ #
+ # Declarations
+@@ -17,27 +21,23 @@ role system_r types anaconda_t;
+ #
+
+ allow anaconda_t self:process execmem;
++allow anaconda_t self:passwd { rootok passwd chfn chsh };
+
+ kernel_domtrans_to(anaconda_t, anaconda_exec_t)
+
+ init_domtrans_script(anaconda_t)
+
+-libs_domtrans_ldconfig(anaconda_t)
+-
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(anaconda_t)
+
+ modutils_domtrans_insmod(anaconda_t)
modutils_domtrans_depmod(anaconda_t)
seutil_domtrans_semanage(anaconda_t)
@@ -1811,7 +2037,15 @@ index e81bdbd..63ab279 100644
userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans_user_home_content(anaconda_t, { dir file lnk_file fifo_file sock_file })
-@@ -51,7 +52,7 @@ optional_policy(`
+ optional_policy(`
+- kudzu_domtrans(anaconda_t)
+-')
+-
+-optional_policy(`
+ rpm_domtrans(anaconda_t)
+ rpm_domtrans_script(anaconda_t)
+ ')
+@@ -51,9 +51,6 @@ optional_policy(`
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -1819,12 +2053,89 @@ index e81bdbd..63ab279 100644
+ unconfined_domain_noaudit(anaconda_t)
')
- optional_policy(`
+-optional_policy(`
+- usermanage_domtrans_admin_passwd(anaconda_t)
+-')
+diff --git a/antivirus.fc b/antivirus.fc
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..e9a09f0
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/antivirus.fc
+@@ -0,0 +1 @@
++/var/opt/f-secure(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:antivirus_db_t,s0)
+diff --git a/antivirus.if b/antivirus.if
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..fe0cdf0
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/antivirus.if
+@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
++## <summary>SELinux policy for antivirus programs.</summary>
++
++######################################
++## <summary>
++## Creates types and rules for a basic
++## antivirus domain.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="prefix">
++## <summary>
++## Prefix for the domain.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`antivirus_domain_template',`
++ gen_require(`
++ attribute antivirus_domain;
++ ')
++
++ typeattribute $1 antivirus_domain;
++')
+diff --git a/antivirus.te b/antivirus.te
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..feabdf3
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/antivirus.te
+@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
++policy_module(antivirus, 1.0.0)
++
++########################################
++#
++# Declarations
++#
++
++## <desc>
++## <p>
++## Allow antivirus programs to read non security files on a system
++## </p>
++## </desc>
++gen_tunable(antivirus_can_scan_system, false)
++
++attribute antivirus_domain;
++
++type antivirus_db_t;
++files_type(antivirus_db_t)
++
++########################################
++#
++# antivirus domain local policy
++#
++
++manage_files_pattern(antivirus_domain, antivirus_db_t, antivirus_db_t)
++manage_dirs_pattern(antivirus_domain, antivirus_db_t, antivirus_db_t)
++
++optional_policy(`
++ amavis_manage_spool_files(antivirus_domain)
++')
++
++tunable_policy(`antivirus_can_scan_system',`
++ files_read_non_security_files(antivirus_domain)
++ files_getattr_all_pipes(antivirus_domain)
++ files_getattr_all_sockets(antivirus_domain)
++')
diff --git a/apache.fc b/apache.fc
-index fd9fa07..9416b51 100644
+index fd9fa07..cca43af 100644
--- a/apache.fc
+++ b/apache.fc
-@@ -1,39 +1,54 @@
+@@ -1,20 +1,37 @@
HOME_DIR/((www)|(web)|(public_html))(/.+)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_user_content_t,s0)
+HOME_DIR/((www)|(web)|(public_html))/cgi-bin(/.+)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_user_script_exec_t,s0)
+HOME_DIR/((www)|(web)|(public_html))(/.*)?/\.htaccess -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_user_htaccess_t,s0)
@@ -1835,6 +2146,8 @@ index fd9fa07..9416b51 100644
-/etc/drupal(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_sys_rw_content_t,s0)
+/etc/cherokee(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_config_t,s0)
+/etc/drupal.* gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_sys_rw_content_t,s0)
++/etc/owncloud/config\.php -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_sys_rw_content_t,s0)
++/etc/horde(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_sys_rw_content_t,s0)
/etc/htdig(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_sys_content_t,s0)
/etc/httpd(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_config_t,s0)
/etc/httpd/conf/keytab -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_keytab_t,s0)
@@ -1849,15 +2162,19 @@ index fd9fa07..9416b51 100644
/etc/vhosts -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_config_t,s0)
+/etc/WebCalendar(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_sys_rw_content_t,s0)
/etc/zabbix/web(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_sys_rw_content_t,s0)
-
-+/usr/lib/systemd/system/httpd.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_unit_file_t,s0)
-+/usr/lib/systemd/system/jetty.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_unit_file_t,s0)
++/etc/z-push(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_sys_rw_content_t,s0)
+
-+/usr/libexec/httpd-ssl-pass-dialog -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_passwd_exec_t,s0)
++/usr/.*\.cgi -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_sys_script_exec_t,s0)
++/opt/.*\.cgi -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_sys_script_exec_t,s0)
++/usr/lib/systemd/system/httpd.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_unit_file_t,s0)
++/usr/lib/systemd/system/jetty.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_unit_file_t,s0)
++/usr/lib/systemd/system/php-fpm.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_unit_file_t,s0)
+
++/usr/libexec/httpd-ssl-pass-dialog -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_passwd_exec_t,s0)
+
/srv/([^/]*/)?www(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_sys_content_t,s0)
/srv/gallery2(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_sys_content_t,s0)
-
+@@ -22,20 +39,25 @@ HOME_DIR/((www)|(web)|(public_html))(/.+)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_u
/usr/bin/htsslpass -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_helper_exec_t,s0)
/usr/bin/mongrel_rails -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_exec_t,s0)
@@ -1886,8 +2203,11 @@ index fd9fa07..9416b51 100644
+/usr/sbin/httpd\.event -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_exec_t,s0)
/usr/sbin/httpd(\.worker)? -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_exec_t,s0)
/usr/sbin/lighttpd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_exec_t,s0)
++/usr/sbin/php-fpm -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_exec_t,s0)
/usr/sbin/rotatelogs -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_rotatelogs_exec_t,s0)
-@@ -43,8 +58,9 @@ ifdef(`distro_suse', `
+ /usr/sbin/suexec -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_suexec_exec_t,s0)
+
+@@ -43,8 +65,9 @@ ifdef(`distro_suse', `
/usr/sbin/httpd2-.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_exec_t,s0)
')
@@ -1899,7 +2219,7 @@ index fd9fa07..9416b51 100644
/usr/share/htdig(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_sys_content_t,s0)
/usr/share/icecast(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_sys_content_t,s0)
/usr/share/mythweb(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_sys_content_t,s0)
-@@ -54,9 +70,12 @@ ifdef(`distro_suse', `
+@@ -54,9 +77,13 @@ ifdef(`distro_suse', `
/usr/share/ntop/html(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_sys_content_t,s0)
/usr/share/openca/htdocs(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_sys_content_t,s0)
/usr/share/selinux-policy[^/]*/html(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_sys_content_t,s0)
@@ -1909,16 +2229,18 @@ index fd9fa07..9416b51 100644
/usr/share/wordpress/wp-content/uploads(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_sys_rw_content_t,s0)
+/usr/share/wordpress/wp-content/upgrade(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_sys_rw_content_t,s0)
+/usr/share/wordpress/wp-includes/.*\.php -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_sys_script_exec_t,s0)
++/usr/share/z-push(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_sys_content_t,s0)
/var/cache/httpd(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_cache_t,s0)
/var/cache/lighttpd(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_cache_t,s0)
-@@ -73,31 +92,43 @@ ifdef(`distro_suse', `
+@@ -73,31 +100,50 @@ ifdef(`distro_suse', `
/var/cache/ssl.*\.sem -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_cache_t,s0)
/var/lib/cacti/rra(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_sys_content_t,s0)
+/var/lib/cherokee(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_var_lib_t,s0)
/var/lib/dav(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_var_lib_t,s0)
-/var/lib/drupal(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_sys_rw_content_t,s0)
++/var/lib/php(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_var_lib_t,s0)
+/var/lib/dokuwiki(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_sys_rw_content_t,s0)
+/var/lib/drupal.* gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_sys_rw_content_t,s0)
/var/lib/htdig(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_sys_content_t,s0)
@@ -1926,8 +2248,12 @@ index fd9fa07..9416b51 100644
+/var/lib/lighttpd(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_var_lib_t,s0)
/var/lib/php/session(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_var_run_t,s0)
/var/lib/squirrelmail/prefs(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_squirrelmail_t,s0)
++/var/lib/openshift/\.httpd\.d(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_config_t,s0)
++/var/lib/openshift/\.log/httpd(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_log_t,s0)
++/var/lib/stickshift/\.httpd\.d(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_config_t,s0)
+/var/lib/svn(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_sys_rw_content_t,s0)
+/var/lib/trac(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_sys_content_t,s0)
++/var/lib/z-push(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_var_lib_t,s0)
/var/log/apache(2)?(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_log_t,s0)
/var/log/apache-ssl(2)?(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_log_t,s0)
@@ -1936,12 +2262,14 @@ index fd9fa07..9416b51 100644
-/var/log/httpd(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_log_t,s0)
-/var/log/lighttpd(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_log_t,s0)
-/var/log/piranha(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_log_t,s0)
+-
+/var/log/cherokee(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_log_t,s0)
+/var/log/httpd(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_log_t,s0)
+/var/log/lighttpd(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_log_t,s0)
++/var/log/php-fpm(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_log_t,s0)
+/var/log/roundcubemail(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_log_t,s0)
+/var/log/suphp\.log.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_log_t,s0)
-
++/var/log/z-push(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_sys_rw_content_t,s0)
ifdef(`distro_debian', `
/var/log/horde2(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_log_t,s0)
')
@@ -1955,12 +2283,13 @@ index fd9fa07..9416b51 100644
/var/run/httpd.* gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_var_run_t,s0)
/var/run/lighttpd(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_var_run_t,s0)
/var/run/mod_.* gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_var_run_t,s0)
++/var/run/php-fpm(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_var_run_t,s0)
/var/run/wsgi.* -s gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_var_run_t,s0)
+/var/run/user/apache(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_tmp_t,s0)
/var/spool/gosa(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_sys_rw_content_t,s0)
/var/spool/squirrelmail(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:squirrelmail_spool_t,s0)
-@@ -109,3 +140,25 @@ ifdef(`distro_debian', `
+@@ -109,3 +155,34 @@ ifdef(`distro_debian', `
/var/www/cgi-bin(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_sys_script_exec_t,s0)
/var/www/icons(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_sys_content_t,s0)
/var/www/perl(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_sys_script_exec_t,s0)
@@ -1978,6 +2307,15 @@ index fd9fa07..9416b51 100644
+
+/var/www/moodledata(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_sys_rw_content_t,s0)
+
++/var/www/openshift/console/tmp(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_tmp_t,s0)
++/var/www/openshift/console/log(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_log_t,s0)
++
++/var/www/openshift/broker/httpd/logs(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_log_t,s0)
++/var/www/openshift/console/httpd/logs(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_log_t,s0)
++/var/www/openshift/broker/httpd/run(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_var_run_t,s0)
++/var/www/openshift/console/httpd/run(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_var_run_t,s0)
++
++/var/www/stickshift/[^/]*/log(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_log_t,s0)
+/var/www/svn(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_sys_rw_content_t,s0)
+/var/www/svn/hooks(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_sys_script_exec_t,s0)
+/var/www/svn/conf(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_sys_content_t,s0)
@@ -1987,10 +2325,10 @@ index fd9fa07..9416b51 100644
+/var/run/dirsrv/admin-serv.* gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_var_run_t,s0)
+/opt/dirsrv/var/run/dirsrv/dsgw/cookies(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_var_run_t,s0)
diff --git a/apache.if b/apache.if
-index 6480167..d30bdbf 100644
+index 6480167..7b2ad39 100644
--- a/apache.if
+++ b/apache.if
-@@ -13,62 +13,46 @@
+@@ -13,68 +13,55 @@
#
template(`apache_content_template',`
gen_require(`
@@ -2025,6 +2363,8 @@ index 6480167..d30bdbf 100644
domain_type(httpd_$1_script_t)
role system_r types httpd_$1_script_t;
++ kernel_read_system_state(httpd_$1_script_t)
++
# This type is used for executable scripts files
type httpd_$1_script_exec_t, httpd_script_exec_type; # customizable;
- corecmd_shell_entry_type(httpd_$1_script_t)
@@ -2066,7 +2406,14 @@ index 6480167..d30bdbf 100644
can_exec(httpd_$1_script_t, httpd_$1_script_exec_t)
allow httpd_$1_script_t httpd_$1_script_exec_t:dir list_dir_perms;
-@@ -86,40 +70,6 @@ template(`apache_content_template',`
+ allow httpd_$1_script_t httpd_$1_ra_content_t:dir { list_dir_perms add_entry_dir_perms };
+ read_files_pattern(httpd_$1_script_t, httpd_$1_ra_content_t, httpd_$1_ra_content_t)
+ append_files_pattern(httpd_$1_script_t, httpd_$1_ra_content_t, httpd_$1_ra_content_t)
++ create_files_pattern(httpd_$1_script_t, httpd_$1_ra_content_t, httpd_$1_ra_content_t)
+ read_lnk_files_pattern(httpd_$1_script_t, httpd_$1_ra_content_t, httpd_$1_ra_content_t)
+
+ allow httpd_$1_script_t httpd_$1_content_t:dir list_dir_perms;
+@@ -86,40 +73,6 @@ template(`apache_content_template',`
manage_lnk_files_pattern(httpd_$1_script_t, httpd_$1_rw_content_t, httpd_$1_rw_content_t)
manage_fifo_files_pattern(httpd_$1_script_t, httpd_$1_rw_content_t, httpd_$1_rw_content_t)
manage_sock_files_pattern(httpd_$1_script_t, httpd_$1_rw_content_t, httpd_$1_rw_content_t)
@@ -2107,7 +2454,7 @@ index 6480167..d30bdbf 100644
# Allow the web server to run scripts and serve pages
tunable_policy(`httpd_builtin_scripting',`
-@@ -128,68 +78,25 @@ template(`apache_content_template',`
+@@ -128,68 +81,26 @@ template(`apache_content_template',`
manage_lnk_files_pattern(httpd_t, httpd_$1_rw_content_t, httpd_$1_rw_content_t)
rw_sock_files_pattern(httpd_t, httpd_$1_rw_content_t, httpd_$1_rw_content_t)
@@ -2115,6 +2462,7 @@ index 6480167..d30bdbf 100644
+ allow httpd_t httpd_$1_ra_content_t:dir { add_entry_dir_perms };
read_files_pattern(httpd_t, httpd_$1_ra_content_t, httpd_$1_ra_content_t)
append_files_pattern(httpd_t, httpd_$1_ra_content_t, httpd_$1_ra_content_t)
++ create_files_pattern(httpd_t, httpd_$1_ra_content_t, httpd_$1_ra_content_t)
read_lnk_files_pattern(httpd_t, httpd_$1_ra_content_t, httpd_$1_ra_content_t)
- allow httpd_t httpd_$1_content_t:dir list_dir_perms;
@@ -2181,7 +2529,7 @@ index 6480167..d30bdbf 100644
')
')
-@@ -211,9 +118,8 @@ template(`apache_content_template',`
+@@ -211,9 +122,8 @@ template(`apache_content_template',`
interface(`apache_role',`
gen_require(`
attribute httpdcontent;
@@ -2193,7 +2541,7 @@ index 6480167..d30bdbf 100644
')
role $1 types httpd_user_script_t;
-@@ -234,6 +140,13 @@ interface(`apache_role',`
+@@ -234,6 +144,13 @@ interface(`apache_role',`
relabel_files_pattern($2, httpd_user_ra_content_t, httpd_user_ra_content_t)
relabel_lnk_files_pattern($2, httpd_user_ra_content_t, httpd_user_ra_content_t)
@@ -2207,7 +2555,7 @@ index 6480167..d30bdbf 100644
manage_dirs_pattern($2, httpd_user_rw_content_t, httpd_user_rw_content_t)
manage_files_pattern($2, httpd_user_rw_content_t, httpd_user_rw_content_t)
manage_lnk_files_pattern($2, httpd_user_rw_content_t, httpd_user_rw_content_t)
-@@ -248,6 +161,9 @@ interface(`apache_role',`
+@@ -248,6 +165,9 @@ interface(`apache_role',`
relabel_files_pattern($2, httpd_user_script_exec_t, httpd_user_script_exec_t)
relabel_lnk_files_pattern($2, httpd_user_script_exec_t, httpd_user_script_exec_t)
@@ -2217,7 +2565,7 @@ index 6480167..d30bdbf 100644
tunable_policy(`httpd_enable_cgi',`
# If a user starts a script by hand it gets the proper context
domtrans_pattern($2, httpd_user_script_exec_t, httpd_user_script_t)
-@@ -317,6 +233,25 @@ interface(`apache_domtrans',`
+@@ -317,6 +237,25 @@ interface(`apache_domtrans',`
domtrans_pattern($1, httpd_exec_t, httpd_t)
')
@@ -2243,7 +2591,7 @@ index 6480167..d30bdbf 100644
#######################################
## <summary>
## Send a generic signal to apache.
-@@ -405,7 +340,7 @@ interface(`apache_dontaudit_rw_fifo_file',`
+@@ -405,7 +344,7 @@ interface(`apache_dontaudit_rw_fifo_file',`
type httpd_t;
')
@@ -2252,7 +2600,7 @@ index 6480167..d30bdbf 100644
')
########################################
-@@ -487,7 +422,7 @@ interface(`apache_setattr_cache_dirs',`
+@@ -487,7 +426,7 @@ interface(`apache_setattr_cache_dirs',`
type httpd_cache_t;
')
@@ -2261,7 +2609,7 @@ index 6480167..d30bdbf 100644
')
########################################
-@@ -531,6 +466,25 @@ interface(`apache_rw_cache_files',`
+@@ -531,6 +470,25 @@ interface(`apache_rw_cache_files',`
########################################
## <summary>
## Allow the specified domain to delete
@@ -2287,7 +2635,7 @@ index 6480167..d30bdbf 100644
## Apache cache.
## </summary>
## <param name="domain">
-@@ -549,6 +503,26 @@ interface(`apache_delete_cache_files',`
+@@ -549,6 +507,26 @@ interface(`apache_delete_cache_files',`
########################################
## <summary>
@@ -2314,7 +2662,61 @@ index 6480167..d30bdbf 100644
## Allow the specified domain to read
## apache configuration files.
## </summary>
-@@ -699,7 +673,7 @@ interface(`apache_dontaudit_append_log',`
+@@ -641,6 +619,27 @@ interface(`apache_run_helper',`
+
+ ########################################
+ ## <summary>
++## dontaudit attempts to read
++## apache log files.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++## <rolecap/>
++#
++interface(`apache_dontaudit_read_log',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type httpd_log_t;
++ ')
++
++ dontaudit $1 httpd_log_t:file read_file_perms;
++ dontaudit $1 httpd_log_t:lnk_file read_lnk_file_perms;
++')
++
++########################################
++## <summary>
+ ## Allow the specified domain to read
+ ## apache log files.
+ ## </summary>
+@@ -683,6 +682,25 @@ interface(`apache_append_log',`
+ append_files_pattern($1, httpd_log_t, httpd_log_t)
+ ')
+
++#######################################
++## <summary>
++## Allow the specified domain to write
++## to apache log files.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`apache_write_log',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type httpd_log_t;
++ ')
++
++ allow $1 httpd_log_t:file write;
++')
++
+ ########################################
+ ## <summary>
+ ## Do not audit attempts to append to the
+@@ -699,7 +717,7 @@ interface(`apache_dontaudit_append_log',`
type httpd_log_t;
')
@@ -2323,7 +2725,7 @@ index 6480167..d30bdbf 100644
')
########################################
-@@ -745,6 +719,25 @@ interface(`apache_dontaudit_search_modules',`
+@@ -745,6 +763,25 @@ interface(`apache_dontaudit_search_modules',`
########################################
## <summary>
@@ -2349,7 +2751,7 @@ index 6480167..d30bdbf 100644
## Allow the specified domain to list
## the contents of the apache modules
## directory.
-@@ -761,6 +754,7 @@ interface(`apache_list_modules',`
+@@ -761,6 +798,7 @@ interface(`apache_list_modules',`
')
allow $1 httpd_modules_t:dir list_dir_perms;
@@ -2357,7 +2759,7 @@ index 6480167..d30bdbf 100644
')
########################################
-@@ -802,6 +796,43 @@ interface(`apache_domtrans_rotatelogs',`
+@@ -802,6 +840,43 @@ interface(`apache_domtrans_rotatelogs',`
domtrans_pattern($1, httpd_rotatelogs_exec_t, httpd_rotatelogs_t)
')
@@ -2401,7 +2803,7 @@ index 6480167..d30bdbf 100644
########################################
## <summary>
## Allow the specified domain to list
-@@ -819,6 +850,7 @@ interface(`apache_list_sys_content',`
+@@ -819,6 +894,7 @@ interface(`apache_list_sys_content',`
')
list_dirs_pattern($1, httpd_sys_content_t, httpd_sys_content_t)
@@ -2409,7 +2811,7 @@ index 6480167..d30bdbf 100644
files_search_var($1)
')
-@@ -846,6 +878,74 @@ interface(`apache_manage_sys_content',`
+@@ -846,6 +922,74 @@ interface(`apache_manage_sys_content',`
manage_lnk_files_pattern($1, httpd_sys_content_t, httpd_sys_content_t)
')
@@ -2484,7 +2886,7 @@ index 6480167..d30bdbf 100644
########################################
## <summary>
## Execute all web scripts in the system
-@@ -862,7 +962,12 @@ interface(`apache_manage_sys_content',`
+@@ -862,7 +1006,12 @@ interface(`apache_manage_sys_content',`
interface(`apache_domtrans_sys_script',`
gen_require(`
attribute httpdcontent;
@@ -2498,7 +2900,7 @@ index 6480167..d30bdbf 100644
')
tunable_policy(`httpd_enable_cgi && httpd_unified',`
-@@ -921,9 +1026,10 @@ interface(`apache_domtrans_all_scripts',`
+@@ -921,9 +1070,10 @@ interface(`apache_domtrans_all_scripts',`
## </param>
## <param name="role">
## <summary>
@@ -2510,7 +2912,7 @@ index 6480167..d30bdbf 100644
#
interface(`apache_run_all_scripts',`
gen_require(`
-@@ -950,7 +1056,7 @@ interface(`apache_read_squirrelmail_data',`
+@@ -950,7 +1100,7 @@ interface(`apache_read_squirrelmail_data',`
type httpd_squirrelmail_t;
')
@@ -2519,7 +2921,7 @@ index 6480167..d30bdbf 100644
')
########################################
-@@ -1091,6 +1197,25 @@ interface(`apache_read_tmp_files',`
+@@ -1091,6 +1241,25 @@ interface(`apache_read_tmp_files',`
read_files_pattern($1, httpd_tmp_t, httpd_tmp_t)
')
@@ -2545,7 +2947,7 @@ index 6480167..d30bdbf 100644
########################################
## <summary>
## Dontaudit attempts to write
-@@ -1107,7 +1232,7 @@ interface(`apache_dontaudit_write_tmp_files',`
+@@ -1107,7 +1276,7 @@ interface(`apache_dontaudit_write_tmp_files',`
type httpd_tmp_t;
')
@@ -2554,7 +2956,7 @@ index 6480167..d30bdbf 100644
')
########################################
-@@ -1148,14 +1273,31 @@ interface(`apache_cgi_domain',`
+@@ -1148,14 +1317,31 @@ interface(`apache_cgi_domain',`
########################################
## <summary>
@@ -2570,7 +2972,7 @@ index 6480167..d30bdbf 100644
## </summary>
## </param>
+#
-+interface(`httpd_systemctl',`
++interface(`apache_systemctl',`
+ gen_require(`
+ type httpd_t;
+ type httpd_unit_file_t;
@@ -2590,7 +2992,7 @@ index 6480167..d30bdbf 100644
## <param name="domain">
## <summary>
## Domain allowed access.
-@@ -1170,19 +1312,21 @@ interface(`apache_cgi_domain',`
+@@ -1170,19 +1356,21 @@ interface(`apache_cgi_domain',`
#
interface(`apache_admin',`
gen_require(`
@@ -2619,7 +3021,7 @@ index 6480167..d30bdbf 100644
init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, httpd_initrc_exec_t)
domain_system_change_exemption($1)
role_transition $2 httpd_initrc_exec_t system_r;
-@@ -1191,10 +1335,10 @@ interface(`apache_admin',`
+@@ -1191,10 +1379,10 @@ interface(`apache_admin',`
apache_manage_all_content($1)
miscfiles_manage_public_files($1)
@@ -2632,7 +3034,7 @@ index 6480167..d30bdbf 100644
admin_pattern($1, httpd_log_t)
admin_pattern($1, httpd_modules_t)
-@@ -1205,14 +1349,88 @@ interface(`apache_admin',`
+@@ -1205,14 +1393,106 @@ interface(`apache_admin',`
admin_pattern($1, httpd_var_run_t)
files_pid_filetrans($1, httpd_var_run_t, file)
@@ -2651,7 +3053,7 @@ index 6480167..d30bdbf 100644
admin_pattern($1, httpd_php_tmp_t)
admin_pattern($1, httpd_suexec_tmp_t)
+
-+ httpd_systemctl($1)
++ apache_systemctl($1)
+ admin_pattern($1, httpd_unit_file_t)
+ allow $1 httpd_unit_file_t:service all_service_perms;
+
@@ -2705,6 +3107,24 @@ index 6480167..d30bdbf 100644
+
+########################################
+## <summary>
++## Allow any httpd_exec_t to be an entrypoint of this domain
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++## <rolecap/>
++#
++interface(`apache_entrypoint',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type httpd_exec_t;
++ ')
++ allow $1 httpd_exec_t:file entrypoint;
++')
++
++########################################
++## <summary>
+## Transition to apache home content
+## </summary>
+## <param name="domain">
@@ -2727,7 +3147,7 @@ index 6480167..d30bdbf 100644
+ filetrans_pattern($1, { httpd_user_content_t httpd_user_script_exec_t }, httpd_user_htaccess_t, file, ".htaccess")
')
diff --git a/apache.te b/apache.te
-index 0833afb..4664751 100644
+index 0833afb..2864927 100644
--- a/apache.te
+++ b/apache.te
@@ -18,6 +18,8 @@ policy_module(apache, 2.4.0)
@@ -2854,7 +3274,7 @@ index 0833afb..4664751 100644
## Allow httpd to read home directories
## </p>
## </desc>
-@@ -100,6 +173,20 @@ gen_tunable(httpd_enable_homedirs, false)
+@@ -100,6 +173,27 @@ gen_tunable(httpd_enable_homedirs, false)
## <desc>
## <p>
@@ -2872,10 +3292,17 @@ index 0833afb..4664751 100644
+
+## <desc>
+## <p>
++## Allow Apache to query NS records
++## </p>
++## </desc>
++gen_tunable(httpd_verify_dns, false)
++
++## <desc>
++## <p>
## Allow httpd daemon to change its resource limits
## </p>
## </desc>
-@@ -114,6 +201,13 @@ gen_tunable(httpd_ssi_exec, false)
+@@ -114,6 +208,13 @@ gen_tunable(httpd_ssi_exec, false)
## <desc>
## <p>
@@ -2889,7 +3316,7 @@ index 0833afb..4664751 100644
## Unify HTTPD to communicate with the terminal.
## Needed for entering the passphrase for certificates at
## the terminal.
-@@ -130,12 +224,26 @@ gen_tunable(httpd_unified, false)
+@@ -130,12 +231,26 @@ gen_tunable(httpd_unified, false)
## <desc>
## <p>
@@ -2916,7 +3343,7 @@ index 0833afb..4664751 100644
## <p>
## Allow httpd to run gpg
## </p>
-@@ -149,12 +257,28 @@ gen_tunable(httpd_use_gpg, false)
+@@ -149,12 +264,28 @@ gen_tunable(httpd_use_gpg, false)
## </desc>
gen_tunable(httpd_use_nfs, false)
@@ -2945,7 +3372,18 @@ index 0833afb..4664751 100644
attribute httpd_script_exec_type;
attribute httpd_user_script_exec_type;
-@@ -173,7 +297,7 @@ files_type(httpd_cache_t)
+@@ -163,6 +294,10 @@ attribute httpd_script_domains;
+
+ type httpd_t;
+ type httpd_exec_t;
++ifdef(`distro_redhat',`
++ typealias httpd_t alias phpfpm_t;
++ typealias httpd_exec_t alias phpfpm_exec_t;
++')
+ init_daemon_domain(httpd_t, httpd_exec_t)
+ role system_r types httpd_t;
+
+@@ -173,7 +308,7 @@ files_type(httpd_cache_t)
# httpd_config_t is the type given to the configuration files
type httpd_config_t;
@@ -2954,17 +3392,27 @@ index 0833afb..4664751 100644
type httpd_helper_t;
type httpd_helper_exec_t;
-@@ -184,6 +308,9 @@ role system_r types httpd_helper_t;
+@@ -184,10 +319,19 @@ role system_r types httpd_helper_t;
type httpd_initrc_exec_t;
init_script_file(httpd_initrc_exec_t)
+type httpd_unit_file_t;
++ifdef(`distro_redhat',`
++ typealias httpd_unit_file_t alias phpfpm_unit_file_t;
++')
+systemd_unit_file(httpd_unit_file_t)
+
type httpd_lock_t;
files_lock_file(httpd_lock_t)
-@@ -223,7 +350,21 @@ files_tmp_file(httpd_suexec_tmp_t)
+ type httpd_log_t;
++ifdef(`distro_redhat',`
++ typealias httpd_log_t alias phpfpm_log_t;
++')
+ logging_log_file(httpd_log_t)
+
+ # httpd_modules_t is the type given to module files (libraries)
+@@ -223,7 +367,21 @@ files_tmp_file(httpd_suexec_tmp_t)
# setup the system domain for system CGI scripts
apache_content_template(sys)
@@ -2987,7 +3435,7 @@ index 0833afb..4664751 100644
type httpd_tmp_t;
files_tmp_file(httpd_tmp_t)
-@@ -233,6 +374,11 @@ files_tmpfs_file(httpd_tmpfs_t)
+@@ -233,6 +391,11 @@ files_tmpfs_file(httpd_tmpfs_t)
apache_content_template(user)
ubac_constrained(httpd_user_script_t)
@@ -2999,7 +3447,7 @@ index 0833afb..4664751 100644
userdom_user_home_content(httpd_user_content_t)
userdom_user_home_content(httpd_user_htaccess_t)
userdom_user_home_content(httpd_user_script_exec_t)
-@@ -240,6 +386,7 @@ userdom_user_home_content(httpd_user_ra_content_t)
+@@ -240,6 +403,7 @@ userdom_user_home_content(httpd_user_ra_content_t)
userdom_user_home_content(httpd_user_rw_content_t)
typeattribute httpd_user_script_t httpd_script_domains;
typealias httpd_user_content_t alias { httpd_staff_content_t httpd_sysadm_content_t };
@@ -3007,8 +3455,13 @@ index 0833afb..4664751 100644
typealias httpd_user_content_t alias { httpd_auditadm_content_t httpd_secadm_content_t };
typealias httpd_user_content_t alias { httpd_staff_script_ro_t httpd_sysadm_script_ro_t };
typealias httpd_user_content_t alias { httpd_auditadm_script_ro_t httpd_secadm_script_ro_t };
-@@ -261,14 +408,23 @@ files_type(httpd_var_lib_t)
+@@ -259,16 +423,28 @@ type httpd_var_lib_t;
+ files_type(httpd_var_lib_t)
+
type httpd_var_run_t;
++ifdef(`distro_redhat',`
++ typealias httpd_var_run_t alias phpfpm_var_run_t;
++')
files_pid_file(httpd_var_run_t)
+# Removal of fastcgi, will cause problems without the following
@@ -3031,7 +3484,7 @@ index 0833afb..4664751 100644
########################################
#
# Apache server local policy
-@@ -288,11 +444,13 @@ allow httpd_t self:unix_dgram_socket { create_socket_perms sendto };
+@@ -288,11 +464,13 @@ allow httpd_t self:unix_dgram_socket { create_socket_perms sendto };
allow httpd_t self:unix_stream_socket { create_stream_socket_perms connectto };
allow httpd_t self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
allow httpd_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms;
@@ -3045,7 +3498,15 @@ index 0833afb..4664751 100644
# Allow the httpd_t to read the web servers config files
allow httpd_t httpd_config_t:dir list_dir_perms;
-@@ -336,8 +494,10 @@ allow httpd_t httpd_sys_script_t:unix_stream_socket connectto;
+@@ -305,6 +483,7 @@ allow httpd_t httpd_lock_t:file manage_file_perms;
+ files_lock_filetrans(httpd_t, httpd_lock_t, file)
+
+ allow httpd_t httpd_log_t:dir setattr;
++create_dirs_pattern(httpd_t, httpd_log_t, httpd_log_t)
+ create_files_pattern(httpd_t, httpd_log_t, httpd_log_t)
+ append_files_pattern(httpd_t, httpd_log_t, httpd_log_t)
+ read_files_pattern(httpd_t, httpd_log_t, httpd_log_t)
+@@ -336,8 +515,10 @@ allow httpd_t httpd_sys_script_t:unix_stream_socket connectto;
manage_dirs_pattern(httpd_t, httpd_tmp_t, httpd_tmp_t)
manage_files_pattern(httpd_t, httpd_tmp_t, httpd_tmp_t)
@@ -3057,7 +3518,7 @@ index 0833afb..4664751 100644
manage_dirs_pattern(httpd_t, httpd_tmpfs_t, httpd_tmpfs_t)
manage_files_pattern(httpd_t, httpd_tmpfs_t, httpd_tmpfs_t)
-@@ -346,8 +506,9 @@ manage_fifo_files_pattern(httpd_t, httpd_tmpfs_t, httpd_tmpfs_t)
+@@ -346,8 +527,9 @@ manage_fifo_files_pattern(httpd_t, httpd_tmpfs_t, httpd_tmpfs_t)
manage_sock_files_pattern(httpd_t, httpd_tmpfs_t, httpd_tmpfs_t)
fs_tmpfs_filetrans(httpd_t, httpd_tmpfs_t, { dir file lnk_file sock_file fifo_file })
@@ -3068,19 +3529,18 @@ index 0833afb..4664751 100644
setattr_dirs_pattern(httpd_t, httpd_var_run_t, httpd_var_run_t)
manage_dirs_pattern(httpd_t, httpd_var_run_t, httpd_var_run_t)
-@@ -362,8 +523,10 @@ manage_lnk_files_pattern(httpd_t, squirrelmail_spool_t, squirrelmail_spool_t)
+@@ -362,8 +544,9 @@ manage_lnk_files_pattern(httpd_t, squirrelmail_spool_t, squirrelmail_spool_t)
kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(httpd_t)
# for modules that want to access /proc/meminfo
kernel_read_system_state(httpd_t)
+kernel_read_network_state(httpd_t)
-+kernel_read_network_state(httpd_t)
+kernel_search_network_sysctl(httpd_t)
-corenet_all_recvfrom_unlabeled(httpd_t)
corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(httpd_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(httpd_t)
corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if(httpd_t)
-@@ -372,11 +535,19 @@ corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_node(httpd_t)
+@@ -372,11 +555,19 @@ corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_node(httpd_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_ports(httpd_t)
corenet_udp_sendrecv_all_ports(httpd_t)
corenet_tcp_bind_generic_node(httpd_t)
@@ -3101,7 +3561,7 @@ index 0833afb..4664751 100644
dev_read_sysfs(httpd_t)
dev_read_rand(httpd_t)
-@@ -385,9 +556,14 @@ dev_rw_crypto(httpd_t)
+@@ -385,9 +576,14 @@ dev_rw_crypto(httpd_t)
fs_getattr_all_fs(httpd_t)
fs_search_auto_mountpoints(httpd_t)
@@ -3116,8 +3576,11 @@ index 0833afb..4664751 100644
# execute perl
corecmd_exec_bin(httpd_t)
corecmd_exec_shell(httpd_t)
-@@ -398,59 +574,112 @@ files_dontaudit_getattr_all_pids(httpd_t)
+@@ -396,61 +592,112 @@ domain_use_interactive_fds(httpd_t)
+
+ files_dontaudit_getattr_all_pids(httpd_t)
files_read_usr_files(httpd_t)
++files_exec_usr_files(httpd_t)
files_list_mnt(httpd_t)
files_search_spool(httpd_t)
+files_read_var_symlinks(httpd_t)
@@ -3148,14 +3611,14 @@ index 0833afb..4664751 100644
+
logging_send_syslog_msg(httpd_t)
- miscfiles_read_localization(httpd_t)
+-miscfiles_read_localization(httpd_t)
miscfiles_read_fonts(httpd_t)
miscfiles_read_public_files(httpd_t)
miscfiles_read_generic_certs(httpd_t)
+-
+-seutil_dontaudit_search_config(httpd_t)
+miscfiles_read_tetex_data(httpd_t)
- seutil_dontaudit_search_config(httpd_t)
-
userdom_use_unpriv_users_fds(httpd_t)
-tunable_policy(`allow_httpd_anon_write',`
@@ -3234,7 +3697,7 @@ index 0833afb..4664751 100644
')
tunable_policy(`httpd_enable_cgi && httpd_use_nfs',`
-@@ -461,27 +690,61 @@ tunable_policy(`httpd_enable_cgi && httpd_use_cifs',`
+@@ -461,27 +708,61 @@ tunable_policy(`httpd_enable_cgi && httpd_use_cifs',`
fs_cifs_domtrans(httpd_t, httpd_sys_script_t)
')
@@ -3298,7 +3761,7 @@ index 0833afb..4664751 100644
tunable_policy(`httpd_enable_homedirs && use_samba_home_dirs',`
fs_read_cifs_files(httpd_t)
fs_read_cifs_symlinks(httpd_t)
-@@ -491,7 +754,22 @@ tunable_policy(`httpd_can_sendmail',`
+@@ -491,7 +772,22 @@ tunable_policy(`httpd_can_sendmail',`
# allow httpd to connect to mail servers
corenet_tcp_connect_smtp_port(httpd_t)
corenet_sendrecv_smtp_client_packets(httpd_t)
@@ -3321,7 +3784,7 @@ index 0833afb..4664751 100644
')
tunable_policy(`httpd_setrlimit',`
-@@ -511,9 +789,19 @@ tunable_policy(`httpd_ssi_exec',`
+@@ -511,9 +807,19 @@ tunable_policy(`httpd_ssi_exec',`
# to run correctly without this permission, so the permission
# are dontaudited here.
tunable_policy(`httpd_tty_comm',`
@@ -3342,7 +3805,7 @@ index 0833afb..4664751 100644
')
optional_policy(`
-@@ -525,6 +813,9 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -525,6 +831,9 @@ optional_policy(`
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -3352,7 +3815,7 @@ index 0833afb..4664751 100644
cobbler_search_lib(httpd_t)
')
-@@ -540,6 +831,24 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -540,6 +849,24 @@ optional_policy(`
daemontools_service_domain(httpd_t, httpd_exec_t)
')
@@ -3377,7 +3840,7 @@ index 0833afb..4664751 100644
optional_policy(`
dbus_system_bus_client(httpd_t)
-@@ -549,13 +858,24 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -549,13 +876,24 @@ optional_policy(`
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -3403,7 +3866,7 @@ index 0833afb..4664751 100644
')
optional_policy(`
-@@ -573,7 +893,21 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -573,7 +911,21 @@ optional_policy(`
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -3425,7 +3888,7 @@ index 0833afb..4664751 100644
mysql_stream_connect(httpd_t)
mysql_rw_db_sockets(httpd_t)
-@@ -584,6 +918,7 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -584,6 +936,7 @@ optional_policy(`
optional_policy(`
nagios_read_config(httpd_t)
@@ -3433,26 +3896,31 @@ index 0833afb..4664751 100644
')
optional_policy(`
-@@ -594,6 +929,33 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -594,6 +947,42 @@ optional_policy(`
')
optional_policy(`
-+ pwauth_domtrans(httpd_t)
++ openshift_search_lib(httpd_t)
++ openshift_initrc_signull(httpd_t)
++ openshift_initrc_signal(httpd_t)
+')
+
+optional_policy(`
-+ tunable_policy(`httpd_run_stickshift', `
-+ allow httpd_t self:capability { fowner fsetid sys_resource };
-+ allow httpd_t self:process setexec;
-+ passenger_exec(httpd_t)
-+ passenger_manage_pid_content(httpd_t)
-+ passenger_manage_lib_files(httpd_t)
-+ ',`
-+ passenger_domtrans(httpd_t)
-+ passenger_manage_pid_content(httpd_t)
-+ passenger_read_lib_files(httpd_t)
-+ passenger_stream_connect(httpd_t)
-+ ')
++ passenger_exec(httpd_t)
++ passenger_manage_pid_content(httpd_t)
++')
++
++optional_policy(`
++ pcscd_read_pub_files(httpd_t)
++')
++
++optional_policy(`
++ pki_apache_domain_signal(httpd_t)
++ pki_apache_domain_signal(httpd_t)
++ pki_manage_apache_run(httpd_t)
++ pki_manage_apache_config_files(httpd_t)
++ pki_manage_apache_log_files(httpd_t)
++ pki_manage_apache_lib(httpd_t)
+')
+
+optional_policy(`
@@ -3460,6 +3928,10 @@ index 0833afb..4664751 100644
+')
+
+optional_policy(`
++ pwauth_domtrans(httpd_t)
++')
++
++optional_policy(`
+ rpc_search_nfs_state_data(httpd_t)
+')
+
@@ -3467,7 +3939,7 @@ index 0833afb..4664751 100644
# Allow httpd to work with postgresql
postgresql_stream_connect(httpd_t)
postgresql_unpriv_client(httpd_t)
-@@ -608,6 +970,11 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -608,6 +997,11 @@ optional_policy(`
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -3479,7 +3951,7 @@ index 0833afb..4664751 100644
snmp_dontaudit_read_snmp_var_lib_files(httpd_t)
snmp_dontaudit_write_snmp_var_lib_files(httpd_t)
')
-@@ -620,6 +987,12 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -620,6 +1014,12 @@ optional_policy(`
yam_read_content(httpd_t)
')
@@ -3492,20 +3964,52 @@ index 0833afb..4664751 100644
########################################
#
# Apache helper local policy
-@@ -633,7 +1006,11 @@ allow httpd_helper_t httpd_log_t:file append_file_perms;
+@@ -633,7 +1033,43 @@ allow httpd_helper_t httpd_log_t:file append_file_perms;
logging_send_syslog_msg(httpd_helper_t)
-userdom_use_user_terminals(httpd_helper_t)
+userdom_use_inherited_user_terminals(httpd_helper_t)
+
++tunable_policy(`httpd_verify_dns',`
++ corenet_udp_bind_all_ephemeral_ports(httpd_t)
++')
++
++tunable_policy(`httpd_run_stickshift', `
++ allow httpd_t self:capability { fowner fsetid sys_resource };
++ dontaudit httpd_t self:capability sys_ptrace;
++ allow httpd_t self:process setexec;
++
++ files_dontaudit_getattr_all_files(httpd_t)
++ domain_dontaudit_read_all_domains_state(httpd_t)
++ domain_getpgid_all_domains(httpd_t)
++')
++
++optional_policy(`
++ tunable_policy(`httpd_run_stickshift', `
++ passenger_manage_lib_files(httpd_t)
++ passenger_getattr_log_files(httpd_t)
++ ',`
++ passenger_domtrans(httpd_t)
++ passenger_read_lib_files(httpd_t)
++ passenger_stream_connect(httpd_t)
++ passenger_manage_tmp_files(httpd_t)
++ ')
++')
++
++optional_policy(`
++ tunable_policy(`httpd_run_stickshift', `
++ oddjob_dbus_chat(httpd_t)
++ ')
++')
++
+tunable_policy(`httpd_tty_comm',`
+ userdom_use_inherited_user_terminals(httpd_helper_t)
+')
########################################
#
-@@ -671,28 +1048,30 @@ libs_exec_lib_files(httpd_php_t)
+@@ -671,28 +1107,30 @@ libs_exec_lib_files(httpd_php_t)
userdom_use_unpriv_users_fds(httpd_php_t)
tunable_policy(`httpd_can_network_connect_db',`
@@ -3549,7 +4053,7 @@ index 0833afb..4664751 100644
')
########################################
-@@ -702,6 +1081,7 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -702,6 +1140,7 @@ optional_policy(`
allow httpd_suexec_t self:capability { setuid setgid };
allow httpd_suexec_t self:process signal_perms;
@@ -3557,7 +4061,7 @@ index 0833afb..4664751 100644
allow httpd_suexec_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
domtrans_pattern(httpd_t, httpd_suexec_exec_t, httpd_suexec_t)
-@@ -716,19 +1096,27 @@ manage_dirs_pattern(httpd_suexec_t, httpd_suexec_tmp_t, httpd_suexec_tmp_t)
+@@ -716,19 +1155,27 @@ manage_dirs_pattern(httpd_suexec_t, httpd_suexec_tmp_t, httpd_suexec_tmp_t)
manage_files_pattern(httpd_suexec_t, httpd_suexec_tmp_t, httpd_suexec_tmp_t)
files_tmp_filetrans(httpd_suexec_t, httpd_suexec_tmp_t, { file dir })
@@ -3586,15 +4090,25 @@ index 0833afb..4664751 100644
files_read_usr_files(httpd_suexec_t)
files_dontaudit_search_pids(httpd_suexec_t)
files_search_home(httpd_suexec_t)
-@@ -745,7 +1133,6 @@ tunable_policy(`httpd_can_network_connect',`
+@@ -738,15 +1185,14 @@ auth_use_nsswitch(httpd_suexec_t)
+ logging_search_logs(httpd_suexec_t)
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(httpd_suexec_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(httpd_suexec_t)
+ miscfiles_read_public_files(httpd_suexec_t)
+
++corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(httpd_suexec_t)
++
+ tunable_policy(`httpd_can_network_connect',`
allow httpd_suexec_t self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
allow httpd_suexec_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms;
- corenet_all_recvfrom_unlabeled(httpd_suexec_t)
- corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(httpd_suexec_t)
+- corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(httpd_suexec_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(httpd_suexec_t)
corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if(httpd_suexec_t)
-@@ -757,13 +1144,31 @@ tunable_policy(`httpd_can_network_connect',`
+ corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_node(httpd_suexec_t)
+@@ -757,13 +1203,31 @@ tunable_policy(`httpd_can_network_connect',`
corenet_sendrecv_all_client_packets(httpd_suexec_t)
')
@@ -3627,7 +4141,7 @@ index 0833afb..4664751 100644
fs_read_nfs_files(httpd_suexec_t)
fs_read_nfs_symlinks(httpd_suexec_t)
fs_exec_nfs_files(httpd_suexec_t)
-@@ -786,6 +1191,25 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -786,6 +1250,25 @@ optional_policy(`
dontaudit httpd_suexec_t httpd_t:unix_stream_socket { read write };
')
@@ -3653,7 +4167,7 @@ index 0833afb..4664751 100644
########################################
#
# Apache system script local policy
-@@ -806,12 +1230,17 @@ read_lnk_files_pattern(httpd_sys_script_t, squirrelmail_spool_t, squirrelmail_sp
+@@ -806,12 +1289,17 @@ read_lnk_files_pattern(httpd_sys_script_t, squirrelmail_spool_t, squirrelmail_sp
kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(httpd_sys_script_t)
@@ -3671,7 +4185,7 @@ index 0833afb..4664751 100644
ifdef(`distro_redhat',`
allow httpd_sys_script_t httpd_log_t:file append_file_perms;
')
-@@ -820,18 +1249,49 @@ tunable_policy(`httpd_can_sendmail',`
+@@ -820,18 +1308,50 @@ tunable_policy(`httpd_can_sendmail',`
mta_send_mail(httpd_sys_script_t)
')
@@ -3707,6 +4221,8 @@ index 0833afb..4664751 100644
+ fs_exec_nfs_files(httpd_suexec_t)
+')
+
++corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(httpd_sys_script_t)
++
tunable_policy(`httpd_enable_cgi && httpd_can_network_connect',`
allow httpd_sys_script_t self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
allow httpd_sys_script_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms;
@@ -3714,13 +4230,13 @@ index 0833afb..4664751 100644
- corenet_tcp_bind_all_nodes(httpd_sys_script_t)
- corenet_udp_bind_all_nodes(httpd_sys_script_t)
- corenet_all_recvfrom_unlabeled(httpd_sys_script_t)
-+ corenet_tcp_bind_generic_node(httpd_sys_script_t)
-+ corenet_udp_bind_generic_node(httpd_sys_script_t)
- corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(httpd_sys_script_t)
+- corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(httpd_sys_script_t)
- corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_if(httpd_sys_script_t)
- corenet_udp_sendrecv_all_if(httpd_sys_script_t)
- corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_nodes(httpd_sys_script_t)
- corenet_udp_sendrecv_all_nodes(httpd_sys_script_t)
++ corenet_tcp_bind_generic_node(httpd_sys_script_t)
++ corenet_udp_bind_generic_node(httpd_sys_script_t)
+ corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(httpd_sys_script_t)
+ corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if(httpd_sys_script_t)
+ corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_node(httpd_sys_script_t)
@@ -3728,7 +4244,7 @@ index 0833afb..4664751 100644
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_ports(httpd_sys_script_t)
corenet_udp_sendrecv_all_ports(httpd_sys_script_t)
corenet_tcp_connect_all_ports(httpd_sys_script_t)
-@@ -839,14 +1299,39 @@ tunable_policy(`httpd_enable_cgi && httpd_can_network_connect',`
+@@ -839,14 +1359,39 @@ tunable_policy(`httpd_enable_cgi && httpd_can_network_connect',`
')
tunable_policy(`httpd_enable_homedirs',`
@@ -3769,7 +4285,13 @@ index 0833afb..4664751 100644
tunable_policy(`httpd_enable_homedirs && use_samba_home_dirs',`
fs_read_cifs_files(httpd_sys_script_t)
fs_read_cifs_symlinks(httpd_sys_script_t)
-@@ -859,10 +1344,20 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -854,15 +1399,26 @@ tunable_policy(`httpd_enable_homedirs && use_samba_home_dirs',`
+
+ optional_policy(`
+ clamav_domtrans_clamscan(httpd_sys_script_t)
++ clamav_domtrans_clamscan(httpd_t)
+ ')
+
optional_policy(`
mysql_stream_connect(httpd_sys_script_t)
mysql_rw_db_sockets(httpd_sys_script_t)
@@ -3790,7 +4312,7 @@ index 0833afb..4664751 100644
')
########################################
-@@ -878,7 +1373,6 @@ kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(httpd_rotatelogs_t)
+@@ -878,11 +1434,9 @@ kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(httpd_rotatelogs_t)
kernel_dontaudit_list_proc(httpd_rotatelogs_t)
kernel_dontaudit_read_proc_symlinks(httpd_rotatelogs_t)
@@ -3798,7 +4320,11 @@ index 0833afb..4664751 100644
logging_search_logs(httpd_rotatelogs_t)
-@@ -908,11 +1402,144 @@ optional_policy(`
+-miscfiles_read_localization(httpd_rotatelogs_t)
+
+ ########################################
+ #
+@@ -908,11 +1462,138 @@ optional_policy(`
tunable_policy(`httpd_enable_cgi && httpd_unified',`
allow httpd_user_script_t httpdcontent:file entrypoint;
@@ -3816,7 +4342,7 @@ index 0833afb..4664751 100644
+ userdom_search_user_home_content(httpd_t)
+ userdom_search_user_home_content(httpd_suexec_t)
+ userdom_search_user_home_content(httpd_user_script_t)
- ')
++')
+
+tunable_policy(`httpd_read_user_content',`
+ userdom_read_user_home_content_files(httpd_t)
@@ -3846,7 +4372,6 @@ index 0833afb..4664751 100644
+auth_use_nsswitch(httpd_passwd_t)
+
+miscfiles_read_certs(httpd_passwd_t)
-+miscfiles_read_localization(httpd_passwd_t)
+
+systemd_manage_passwd_run(httpd_passwd_t)
+systemd_manage_passwd_run(httpd_t)
@@ -3886,7 +4411,6 @@ index 0833afb..4664751 100644
+miscfiles_read_fonts(httpd_script_type)
+miscfiles_read_public_files(httpd_script_type)
+
-+seutil_dontaudit_search_config(httpd_script_type)
+allow httpd_t httpd_script_type:unix_stream_socket connectto;
+
+allow httpd_t httpd_script_exec_type:file read_file_perms;
@@ -3903,8 +4427,6 @@ index 0833afb..4664751 100644
+
+dontaudit httpd_script_type httpd_t:tcp_socket { read write };
+
-+kernel_read_system_state(httpd_script_type)
-+
+dev_read_urand(httpd_script_type)
+
+fs_getattr_xattr_fs(httpd_script_type)
@@ -3914,7 +4436,6 @@ index 0833afb..4664751 100644
+
+libs_read_lib_files(httpd_script_type)
+
-+miscfiles_read_localization(httpd_script_type)
+allow httpd_script_type httpd_sys_content_t:dir search_dir_perms;
+
+tunable_policy(`httpd_enable_cgi && nis_enabled',`
@@ -3944,8 +4465,7 @@ index 0833afb..4664751 100644
+ corenet_tcp_connect_keystone_port(httpd_sys_script_t)
+ corenet_tcp_connect_all_ephemeral_ports(httpd_t)
+ corenet_tcp_connect_glance_port(httpd_sys_script_t)
-+')
-+
+ ')
diff --git a/apcupsd.fc b/apcupsd.fc
index cd07b96..f3506be 100644
--- a/apcupsd.fc
@@ -4031,7 +4551,7 @@ index e342775..1fedbe5 100644
+ allow $1 apcupsd_unit_file_t:service all_service_perms;
')
diff --git a/apcupsd.te b/apcupsd.te
-index d052bf0..08bd1c9 100644
+index d052bf0..48f0ce4 100644
--- a/apcupsd.te
+++ b/apcupsd.te
@@ -24,6 +24,9 @@ files_tmp_file(apcupsd_tmp_t)
@@ -4052,7 +4572,7 @@ index d052bf0..08bd1c9 100644
corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(apcupsd_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(apcupsd_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_node(apcupsd_t)
-@@ -76,24 +78,31 @@ files_etc_filetrans_etc_runtime(apcupsd_t, file)
+@@ -76,24 +78,29 @@ files_etc_filetrans_etc_runtime(apcupsd_t, file)
# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=240805
term_use_unallocated_ttys(apcupsd_t)
@@ -4062,11 +4582,11 @@ index d052bf0..08bd1c9 100644
init_rw_utmp(apcupsd_t)
init_telinit(apcupsd_t)
+-logging_send_syslog_msg(apcupsd_t)
+auth_read_passwd(apcupsd_t)
-+
- logging_send_syslog_msg(apcupsd_t)
- miscfiles_read_localization(apcupsd_t)
+-miscfiles_read_localization(apcupsd_t)
++logging_send_syslog_msg(apcupsd_t)
sysnet_dns_name_resolve(apcupsd_t)
@@ -4085,7 +4605,7 @@ index d052bf0..08bd1c9 100644
mta_send_mail(apcupsd_t)
mta_system_content(apcupsd_tmp_t)
')
-@@ -113,7 +122,6 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -113,7 +120,6 @@ optional_policy(`
allow httpd_apcupsd_cgi_script_t self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
allow httpd_apcupsd_cgi_script_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms;
@@ -4094,7 +4614,7 @@ index d052bf0..08bd1c9 100644
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(httpd_apcupsd_cgi_script_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_node(httpd_apcupsd_cgi_script_t)
diff --git a/apm.fc b/apm.fc
-index 0123777..f2f0c35 100644
+index 0123777..5bfd421 100644
--- a/apm.fc
+++ b/apm.fc
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
@@ -4102,6 +4622,14 @@ index 0123777..f2f0c35 100644
#
# /usr
+@@ -14,6 +15,7 @@
+ /var/log/acpid.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:apmd_log_t,s0)
+
+ /var/run/\.?acpid\.socket -s gen_context(system_u:object_r:apmd_var_run_t,s0)
++/var/run/acpid\.pid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:apmd_var_run_t,s0)
+ /var/run/apmd\.pid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:apmd_var_run_t,s0)
+ /var/run/powersaved\.pid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:apmd_var_run_t,s0)
+ /var/run/powersave_socket -s gen_context(system_u:object_r:apmd_var_run_t,s0)
diff --git a/apm.if b/apm.if
index 1ea99b2..0b668ae 100644
--- a/apm.if
@@ -4147,7 +4675,7 @@ index 1ea99b2..0b668ae 100644
+ ps_process_pattern($1, apmd_t)
')
diff --git a/apm.te b/apm.te
-index 1c8c27e..35d798f 100644
+index 1c8c27e..4c09721 100644
--- a/apm.te
+++ b/apm.te
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ policy_module(apm, 1.11.0)
@@ -4198,7 +4726,16 @@ index 1c8c27e..35d798f 100644
dev_read_realtime_clock(apmd_t)
dev_read_urand(apmd_t)
dev_rw_apm_bios(apmd_t)
-@@ -114,6 +121,8 @@ files_dontaudit_getattr_all_symlinks(apmd_t) # Excessive?
+@@ -96,8 +103,6 @@ fs_dontaudit_getattr_all_symlinks(apmd_t) # Excessive?
+ fs_dontaudit_getattr_all_pipes(apmd_t) # Excessive?
+ fs_dontaudit_getattr_all_sockets(apmd_t) # Excessive?
+
+-selinux_search_fs(apmd_t)
+-
+ corecmd_exec_all_executables(apmd_t)
+
+ domain_read_all_domains_state(apmd_t)
+@@ -114,6 +119,8 @@ files_dontaudit_getattr_all_symlinks(apmd_t) # Excessive?
files_dontaudit_getattr_all_pipes(apmd_t) # Excessive?
files_dontaudit_getattr_all_sockets(apmd_t) # Excessive?
@@ -4207,15 +4744,22 @@ index 1c8c27e..35d798f 100644
init_domtrans_script(apmd_t)
init_rw_utmp(apmd_t)
init_telinit(apmd_t)
-@@ -131,6 +140,7 @@ modutils_domtrans_insmod(apmd_t)
+@@ -124,13 +131,12 @@ libs_exec_lib_files(apmd_t)
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(apmd_t)
+ logging_send_audit_msgs(apmd_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(apmd_t)
+ miscfiles_read_hwdata(apmd_t)
+
+ modutils_domtrans_insmod(apmd_t)
modutils_read_module_config(apmd_t)
- seutil_dontaudit_read_config(apmd_t)
+-seutil_dontaudit_read_config(apmd_t)
+seutil_sigchld_newrole(apmd_t)
userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fds(apmd_t)
userdom_dontaudit_search_user_home_dirs(apmd_t)
-@@ -142,9 +152,8 @@ ifdef(`distro_redhat',`
+@@ -142,9 +148,8 @@ ifdef(`distro_redhat',`
can_exec(apmd_t, apmd_var_run_t)
@@ -4226,7 +4770,7 @@ index 1c8c27e..35d798f 100644
')
optional_policy(`
-@@ -155,6 +164,15 @@ ifdef(`distro_redhat',`
+@@ -155,6 +160,15 @@ ifdef(`distro_redhat',`
netutils_domtrans(apmd_t)
')
@@ -4242,7 +4786,7 @@ index 1c8c27e..35d798f 100644
',`
# for ifconfig which is run all the time
kernel_dontaudit_search_sysctl(apmd_t)
-@@ -181,6 +199,12 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -181,6 +195,12 @@ optional_policy(`
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -4255,23 +4799,21 @@ index 1c8c27e..35d798f 100644
dbus_system_bus_client(apmd_t)
optional_policy(`
-@@ -209,8 +233,13 @@ optional_policy(`
- pcmcia_domtrans_cardctl(apmd_t)
+@@ -210,7 +230,11 @@ optional_policy(`
')
-+
-+optional_policy(`
+ optional_policy(`
+- seutil_sigchld_newrole(apmd_t)
+ shutdown_domtrans(apmd_t)
+')
+
- optional_policy(`
-- seutil_sigchld_newrole(apmd_t)
++optional_policy(`
+ systemd_dbus_chat_logind(apmd_t)
')
optional_policy(`
diff --git a/apt.te b/apt.te
-index 8555315..5bb2477 100644
+index 8555315..af9bcbe 100644
--- a/apt.te
+++ b/apt.te
@@ -94,7 +94,6 @@ kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(apt_t)
@@ -4282,7 +4824,7 @@ index 8555315..5bb2477 100644
corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(apt_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(apt_t)
corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if(apt_t)
-@@ -121,7 +120,7 @@ fs_getattr_all_fs(apt_t)
+@@ -121,20 +120,18 @@ fs_getattr_all_fs(apt_t)
term_create_pty(apt_t, apt_devpts_t)
term_list_ptys(apt_t)
@@ -4291,7 +4833,12 @@ index 8555315..5bb2477 100644
libs_exec_ld_so(apt_t)
libs_exec_lib_files(apt_t)
-@@ -134,7 +133,7 @@ seutil_use_newrole_fds(apt_t)
+
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(apt_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(apt_t)
+-
+ seutil_use_newrole_fds(apt_t)
sysnet_read_config(apt_t)
@@ -4374,7 +4921,7 @@ index c804110..06a516f 100644
+ allow $1 arpwatch_unit_file_t:service all_service_perms;
')
diff --git a/arpwatch.te b/arpwatch.te
-index 804135f..762c50a 100644
+index 804135f..8d012f7 100644
--- a/arpwatch.te
+++ b/arpwatch.te
@@ -21,6 +21,9 @@ files_tmp_file(arpwatch_tmp_t)
@@ -4418,6 +4965,15 @@ index 804135f..762c50a 100644
files_read_usr_files(arpwatch_t)
files_search_var_lib(arpwatch_t)
+@@ -82,8 +85,6 @@ auth_use_nsswitch(arpwatch_t)
+
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(arpwatch_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(arpwatch_t)
+-
+ userdom_dontaudit_search_user_home_dirs(arpwatch_t)
+ userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fds(arpwatch_t)
+
diff --git a/asterisk.if b/asterisk.if
index b6168fd..313c6e4 100644
--- a/asterisk.if
@@ -4438,7 +4994,7 @@ index b6168fd..313c6e4 100644
domain_system_change_exemption($1)
role_transition $2 asterisk_initrc_exec_t system_r;
diff --git a/asterisk.te b/asterisk.te
-index 159610b..ae334b4 100644
+index 159610b..164b672 100644
--- a/asterisk.te
+++ b/asterisk.te
@@ -20,10 +20,11 @@ type asterisk_log_t;
@@ -4515,7 +5071,13 @@ index 159610b..ae334b4 100644
fs_getattr_all_fs(asterisk_t)
fs_list_inotifyfs(asterisk_t)
-@@ -143,6 +149,10 @@ userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fds(asterisk_t)
+@@ -137,12 +143,14 @@ auth_use_nsswitch(asterisk_t)
+
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(asterisk_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(asterisk_t)
+-
+ userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fds(asterisk_t)
userdom_dontaudit_search_user_home_dirs(asterisk_t)
optional_policy(`
@@ -4526,6 +5088,192 @@ index 159610b..ae334b4 100644
mysql_stream_connect(asterisk_t)
')
+diff --git a/authconfig.fc b/authconfig.fc
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..86bbf21
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/authconfig.fc
+@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
++/usr/share/authconfig/authconfig.py -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:authconfig_exec_t,s0)
++
++/var/lib/authconfig(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:authconfig_var_lib_t,s0)
+diff --git a/authconfig.if b/authconfig.if
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..98ab9ed
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/authconfig.if
+@@ -0,0 +1,132 @@
++
++## <summary>policy for authconfig</summary>
++
++########################################
++## <summary>
++## Execute TEMPLATE in the authconfig domin.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed to transition.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`authconfig_domtrans',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type authconfig_t, authconfig_exec_t;
++ ')
++
++ corecmd_search_bin($1)
++ domtrans_pattern($1, authconfig_exec_t, authconfig_t)
++')
++
++########################################
++## <summary>
++## Search authconfig lib directories.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`authconfig_search_lib',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type authconfig_var_lib_t;
++ ')
++
++ allow $1 authconfig_var_lib_t:dir search_dir_perms;
++ files_search_var_lib($1)
++')
++
++########################################
++## <summary>
++## Read authconfig lib files.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`authconfig_read_lib_files',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type authconfig_var_lib_t;
++ ')
++
++ files_search_var_lib($1)
++ read_files_pattern($1, authconfig_var_lib_t, authconfig_var_lib_t)
++')
++
++########################################
++## <summary>
++## Manage authconfig lib files.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`authconfig_manage_lib_files',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type authconfig_var_lib_t;
++ ')
++
++ files_search_var_lib($1)
++ manage_files_pattern($1, authconfig_var_lib_t, authconfig_var_lib_t)
++')
++
++########################################
++## <summary>
++## Manage authconfig lib directories.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`authconfig_manage_lib_dirs',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type authconfig_var_lib_t;
++ ')
++
++ files_search_var_lib($1)
++ manage_dirs_pattern($1, authconfig_var_lib_t, authconfig_var_lib_t)
++')
++
++
++########################################
++## <summary>
++## All of the rules required to administrate
++## an authconfig environment
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++## <param name="role">
++## <summary>
++## Role allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++## <rolecap/>
++#
++interface(`authconfig_admin',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type authconfig_t;
++ type authconfig_var_lib_t;
++ ')
++
++ allow $1 authconfig_t:process { ptrace signal_perms };
++ ps_process_pattern($1, authconfig_t)
++
++ files_search_var_lib($1)
++ admin_pattern($1, authconfig_var_lib_t)
++ optional_policy(`
++ systemd_passwd_agent_exec($1)
++ systemd_read_fifo_file_passwd_run($1)
++ ')
++')
+diff --git a/authconfig.te b/authconfig.te
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..aeea7cf
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/authconfig.te
+@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
++policy_module(authconfig, 1.0.0)
++
++########################################
++#
++# Declarations
++#
++
++type authconfig_t;
++type authconfig_exec_t;
++application_domain(authconfig_t, authconfig_exec_t)
++
++type authconfig_var_lib_t;
++files_type(authconfig_var_lib_t)
++
++########################################
++#
++# authconfig local policy
++#
++allow authconfig_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms;
++allow authconfig_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
++
++manage_dirs_pattern(authconfig_t, authconfig_var_lib_t, authconfig_var_lib_t)
++manage_files_pattern(authconfig_t, authconfig_var_lib_t, authconfig_var_lib_t)
++manage_lnk_files_pattern(authconfig_t, authconfig_var_lib_t, authconfig_var_lib_t)
++files_var_lib_filetrans(authconfig_t, authconfig_var_lib_t, { dir file lnk_file })
++
++domain_use_interactive_fds(authconfig_t)
++
++files_read_etc_files(authconfig_t)
++
++init_domtrans_script(authconfig_t)
++
++unconfined_domain_noaudit(authconfig_t)
diff --git a/automount.fc b/automount.fc
index f16ab68..e4178a4 100644
--- a/automount.fc
@@ -4611,7 +5359,7 @@ index d80a16b..ef740ef 100644
+ allow $1 automount_unit_file_t:service all_service_perms;
')
diff --git a/automount.te b/automount.te
-index 39799db..3192298 100644
+index 39799db..6264256 100644
--- a/automount.te
+++ b/automount.te
@@ -22,6 +22,9 @@ type automount_tmp_t;
@@ -4624,7 +5372,17 @@ index 39799db..3192298 100644
########################################
#
# Local policy
-@@ -64,6 +67,7 @@ kernel_read_network_state(automount_t)
+@@ -56,14 +59,17 @@ manage_fifo_files_pattern(automount_t, automount_var_run_t, automount_var_run_t)
+ files_pid_filetrans(automount_t, automount_var_run_t, { file fifo_file })
+
+ kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(automount_t)
++kernel_read_vm_sysctls(automount_t)
+ kernel_read_irq_sysctls(automount_t)
+ kernel_read_fs_sysctls(automount_t)
+ kernel_read_proc_symlinks(automount_t)
+ kernel_read_system_state(automount_t)
+ kernel_read_network_state(automount_t)
++kernel_search_vm_sysctl(automount_t)
kernel_list_proc(automount_t)
kernel_dontaudit_search_xen_state(automount_t)
@@ -4632,7 +5390,7 @@ index 39799db..3192298 100644
files_search_boot(automount_t)
# Automount is slowly adding all mount functionality internally
files_search_all(automount_t)
-@@ -79,7 +83,6 @@ fs_search_all(automount_t)
+@@ -79,7 +85,6 @@ fs_search_all(automount_t)
corecmd_exec_bin(automount_t)
corecmd_exec_shell(automount_t)
@@ -4640,7 +5398,7 @@ index 39799db..3192298 100644
corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(automount_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(automount_t)
corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if(automount_t)
-@@ -113,7 +116,6 @@ files_dontaudit_write_var_dirs(automount_t)
+@@ -113,7 +118,6 @@ files_dontaudit_write_var_dirs(automount_t)
files_getattr_all_dirs(automount_t)
files_list_mnt(automount_t)
files_getattr_home_dir(automount_t)
@@ -4648,8 +5406,11 @@ index 39799db..3192298 100644
files_read_etc_runtime_files(automount_t)
# for if the mount point is not labelled
files_getattr_isid_type_dirs(automount_t)
-@@ -143,10 +145,6 @@ logging_search_logs(automount_t)
- miscfiles_read_localization(automount_t)
+@@ -140,13 +144,8 @@ auth_use_nsswitch(automount_t)
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(automount_t)
+ logging_search_logs(automount_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(automount_t)
miscfiles_read_generic_certs(automount_t)
-# Run mount in the mount_t domain.
@@ -4659,7 +5420,7 @@ index 39799db..3192298 100644
userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fds(automount_t)
userdom_dontaudit_search_user_home_dirs(automount_t)
-@@ -155,6 +153,13 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -155,6 +154,13 @@ optional_policy(`
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -4747,7 +5508,7 @@ index 61c74bc..17b3ecc 100644
+ allow $1 avahi_unit_file_t:service all_service_perms;
')
diff --git a/avahi.te b/avahi.te
-index a7a0e71..258486d 100644
+index a7a0e71..34bc1be 100644
--- a/avahi.te
+++ b/avahi.te
@@ -17,6 +17,10 @@ files_pid_file(avahi_var_lib_t)
@@ -4784,7 +5545,14 @@ index a7a0e71..258486d 100644
files_read_etc_runtime_files(avahi_t)
files_read_usr_files(avahi_t)
-@@ -92,6 +96,8 @@ sysnet_domtrans_ifconfig(avahi_t)
+@@ -85,13 +89,14 @@ init_signull_script(avahi_t)
+
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(avahi_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(avahi_t)
+ miscfiles_read_generic_certs(avahi_t)
+
+ sysnet_domtrans_ifconfig(avahi_t)
sysnet_manage_config(avahi_t)
sysnet_etc_filetrans_config(avahi_t)
@@ -4793,7 +5561,7 @@ index a7a0e71..258486d 100644
userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fds(avahi_t)
userdom_dontaudit_search_user_home_dirs(avahi_t)
-@@ -104,6 +110,10 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -104,6 +109,10 @@ optional_policy(`
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -4834,6 +5602,72 @@ index 283ff0d..53f9ba1 100644
## Read and write awstats unnamed pipes.
## </summary>
## <param name="domain">
+diff --git a/awstats.te b/awstats.te
+index 6bd3ad3..9cd42eb 100644
+--- a/awstats.te
++++ b/awstats.te
+@@ -5,6 +5,13 @@ policy_module(awstats, 1.4.0)
+ # Declarations
+ #
+
++## <desc>
++## <p>
++## Allow awstats to purge Apache logs
++## </p>
++## </desc>
++gen_tunable(awstats_purge_apache_log, false)
++
+ type awstats_t;
+ type awstats_exec_t;
+ domain_type(awstats_t)
+@@ -17,8 +24,6 @@ files_tmp_file(awstats_tmp_t)
+ type awstats_var_lib_t;
+ files_type(awstats_var_lib_t)
+
+-apache_content_template(awstats)
+-
+ ########################################
+ #
+ # awstats policy
+@@ -55,11 +60,15 @@ libs_read_lib_files(awstats_t)
+
+ logging_read_generic_logs(awstats_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(awstats_t)
+-
+ sysnet_dns_name_resolve(awstats_t)
+
+-apache_read_log(awstats_t)
++tunable_policy(`awstats_purge_apache_log',`
++ apache_write_log(awstats_t)
++')
++
++optional_policy(`
++ apache_read_log(awstats_t)
++')
+
+ optional_policy(`
+ cron_system_entry(awstats_t, awstats_exec_t)
+@@ -79,7 +88,16 @@ optional_policy(`
+ # awstats cgi script policy
+ #
+
+-allow httpd_awstats_script_t awstats_var_lib_t:dir list_dir_perms;
++optional_policy(`
++ apache_content_template(awstats)
++ apache_read_log(httpd_awstats_script_t)
++
++ manage_dirs_pattern(httpd_awstats_script_t, awstats_tmp_t, awstats_tmp_t)
++ manage_files_pattern(httpd_awstats_script_t, awstats_tmp_t, awstats_tmp_t)
++ files_tmp_filetrans(httpd_awstats_script_t, awstats_tmp_t, { dir file })
+
+-read_files_pattern(httpd_awstats_script_t, awstats_var_lib_t, awstats_var_lib_t)
+-files_search_var_lib(httpd_awstats_script_t)
++ allow httpd_awstats_script_t awstats_var_lib_t:dir list_dir_perms;
++
++ read_files_pattern(httpd_awstats_script_t, awstats_var_lib_t, awstats_var_lib_t)
++ files_search_var_lib(httpd_awstats_script_t)
++')
diff --git a/backup.te b/backup.te
index 0bfc958..81fc8bd 100644
--- a/backup.te
@@ -4855,6 +5689,18 @@ index 0bfc958..81fc8bd 100644
optional_policy(`
cron_system_entry(backup_t, backup_exec_t)
+diff --git a/bacula.te b/bacula.te
+index fc4ba2a..813e5c1 100644
+--- a/bacula.te
++++ b/bacula.te
+@@ -111,7 +111,6 @@ domain_use_interactive_fds(bacula_admin_t)
+
+ files_read_etc_files(bacula_admin_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(bacula_admin_t)
+
+ sysnet_dns_name_resolve(bacula_admin_t)
+
diff --git a/bcfg2.fc b/bcfg2.fc
index f5413da..9e06a9d 100644
--- a/bcfg2.fc
@@ -4926,7 +5772,7 @@ index b289d93..070f22b 100644
+ ')
')
diff --git a/bcfg2.te b/bcfg2.te
-index cf8e59f..4c6b5cf 100644
+index cf8e59f..ad57d4a 100644
--- a/bcfg2.te
+++ b/bcfg2.te
@@ -15,6 +15,9 @@ init_script_file(bcfg2_initrc_exec_t)
@@ -4939,6 +5785,21 @@ index cf8e59f..4c6b5cf 100644
type bcfg2_var_run_t;
files_pid_file(bcfg2_var_run_t)
+@@ -36,6 +39,8 @@ files_pid_filetrans(bcfg2_t, bcfg2_var_run_t, file )
+
+ kernel_read_system_state(bcfg2_t)
+
++corenet_tcp_bind_cyphesis_port(bcfg2_t)
++
+ corecmd_exec_bin(bcfg2_t)
+
+ dev_read_urand(bcfg2_t)
+@@ -47,5 +52,3 @@ files_read_usr_files(bcfg2_t)
+ auth_use_nsswitch(bcfg2_t)
+
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(bcfg2_t)
+-
+-miscfiles_read_localization(bcfg2_t)
diff --git a/bind.fc b/bind.fc
index 59aa54f..b01072c 100644
--- a/bind.fc
@@ -4956,7 +5817,7 @@ index 59aa54f..b01072c 100644
/usr/sbin/lwresd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:named_exec_t,s0)
/usr/sbin/named -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:named_exec_t,s0)
diff --git a/bind.if b/bind.if
-index 44a1e3d..9b50c13 100644
+index 44a1e3d..bc50fd6 100644
--- a/bind.if
+++ b/bind.if
@@ -20,6 +20,29 @@ interface(`bind_initrc_domtrans',`
@@ -4989,7 +5850,15 @@ index 44a1e3d..9b50c13 100644
## Execute ndc in the ndc domain.
## </summary>
## <param name="domain">
-@@ -186,7 +209,7 @@ interface(`bind_write_config',`
+@@ -167,6 +190,7 @@ interface(`bind_read_config',`
+ type named_conf_t;
+ ')
+
++ allow $1 named_conf_t:dir list_dir_perms;
+ read_files_pattern($1, named_conf_t, named_conf_t)
+ ')
+
+@@ -186,7 +210,7 @@ interface(`bind_write_config',`
')
write_files_pattern($1, named_conf_t, named_conf_t)
@@ -4998,7 +5867,7 @@ index 44a1e3d..9b50c13 100644
')
########################################
-@@ -210,6 +233,25 @@ interface(`bind_manage_config_dirs',`
+@@ -210,6 +234,25 @@ interface(`bind_manage_config_dirs',`
########################################
## <summary>
@@ -5024,7 +5893,7 @@ index 44a1e3d..9b50c13 100644
## Search the BIND cache directory.
## </summary>
## <param name="domain">
-@@ -266,7 +308,7 @@ interface(`bind_setattr_pid_dirs',`
+@@ -266,7 +309,7 @@ interface(`bind_setattr_pid_dirs',`
type named_var_run_t;
')
@@ -5033,7 +5902,7 @@ index 44a1e3d..9b50c13 100644
')
########################################
-@@ -284,7 +326,7 @@ interface(`bind_setattr_zone_dirs',`
+@@ -284,7 +327,7 @@ interface(`bind_setattr_zone_dirs',`
type named_zone_t;
')
@@ -5042,7 +5911,7 @@ index 44a1e3d..9b50c13 100644
')
########################################
-@@ -308,6 +350,27 @@ interface(`bind_read_zone',`
+@@ -308,6 +351,27 @@ interface(`bind_read_zone',`
########################################
## <summary>
@@ -5070,7 +5939,7 @@ index 44a1e3d..9b50c13 100644
## Manage BIND zone files.
## </summary>
## <param name="domain">
-@@ -359,18 +422,26 @@ interface(`bind_udp_chat_named',`
+@@ -359,18 +423,26 @@ interface(`bind_udp_chat_named',`
interface(`bind_admin',`
gen_require(`
type named_t, named_tmp_t, named_log_t;
@@ -5103,7 +5972,7 @@ index 44a1e3d..9b50c13 100644
bind_run_ndc($1, $2)
init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, named_initrc_exec_t)
-@@ -391,9 +462,12 @@ interface(`bind_admin',`
+@@ -391,9 +463,12 @@ interface(`bind_admin',`
admin_pattern($1, named_zone_t)
admin_pattern($1, dnssec_t)
@@ -5119,7 +5988,7 @@ index 44a1e3d..9b50c13 100644
+ allow $1 named_unit_file_t:service all_service_perms;
')
diff --git a/bind.te b/bind.te
-index 0968cb4..398a7eb 100644
+index 0968cb4..70bebb1 100644
--- a/bind.te
+++ b/bind.te
@@ -6,6 +6,13 @@ policy_module(bind, 1.11.0)
@@ -5191,7 +6060,13 @@ index 0968cb4..398a7eb 100644
files_read_etc_runtime_files(named_t)
fs_getattr_all_fs(named_t)
-@@ -147,6 +157,10 @@ miscfiles_read_generic_certs(named_t)
+@@ -141,12 +151,15 @@ auth_use_nsswitch(named_t)
+
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(named_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(named_t)
+ miscfiles_read_generic_certs(named_t)
+
userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fds(named_t)
userdom_dontaudit_search_user_home_dirs(named_t)
@@ -5202,7 +6077,7 @@ index 0968cb4..398a7eb 100644
tunable_policy(`named_write_master_zones',`
manage_dirs_pattern(named_t, named_zone_t, named_zone_t)
manage_files_pattern(named_t, named_zone_t, named_zone_t)
-@@ -154,6 +168,12 @@ tunable_policy(`named_write_master_zones',`
+@@ -154,6 +167,12 @@ tunable_policy(`named_write_master_zones',`
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -5215,7 +6090,23 @@ index 0968cb4..398a7eb 100644
init_dbus_chat_script(named_t)
sysnet_dbus_chat_dhcpc(named_t)
-@@ -211,13 +231,13 @@ allow ndc_t dnssec_t:lnk_file { getattr read };
+@@ -168,6 +187,7 @@ optional_policy(`
+
+ optional_policy(`
+ kerberos_keytab_template(named, named_t)
++ kerberos_tmp_filetrans_host_rcache(named_t, "DNS_25")
+ ')
+
+ optional_policy(`
+@@ -199,6 +219,7 @@ optional_policy(`
+
+ # cjp: why net_admin?!
+ allow ndc_t self:capability { dac_override net_admin };
++allow ndc_t self:capability2 block_suspend;
+ allow ndc_t self:process { fork signal_perms };
+ allow ndc_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms;
+ allow ndc_t self:unix_stream_socket { connect create_stream_socket_perms };
+@@ -211,13 +232,13 @@ allow ndc_t dnssec_t:lnk_file { getattr read };
stream_connect_pattern(ndc_t, named_var_run_t, named_var_run_t, named_t)
allow ndc_t named_conf_t:file read_file_perms;
@@ -5231,7 +6122,7 @@ index 0968cb4..398a7eb 100644
corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(ndc_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(ndc_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_node(ndc_t)
-@@ -228,11 +248,12 @@ corenet_sendrecv_rndc_client_packets(ndc_t)
+@@ -228,28 +249,26 @@ corenet_sendrecv_rndc_client_packets(ndc_t)
domain_use_interactive_fds(ndc_t)
@@ -5245,16 +6136,15 @@ index 0968cb4..398a7eb 100644
init_use_fds(ndc_t)
init_use_script_ptys(ndc_t)
-@@ -240,16 +261,15 @@ logging_send_syslog_msg(ndc_t)
-
- miscfiles_read_localization(ndc_t)
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(ndc_t)
--sysnet_read_config(ndc_t)
--sysnet_dns_name_resolve(ndc_t)
+-miscfiles_read_localization(ndc_t)
+userdom_use_inherited_user_terminals(ndc_t)
+ sysnet_read_config(ndc_t)
+-sysnet_dns_name_resolve(ndc_t)
+-
-userdom_use_user_terminals(ndc_t)
-+sysnet_read_config(ndc_t)
term_dontaudit_use_console(ndc_t)
@@ -5303,10 +6193,10 @@ index de0bd67..1df2048 100644
domain_system_change_exemption($1)
role_transition $2 bitlbee_initrc_exec_t system_r;
diff --git a/bitlbee.te b/bitlbee.te
-index f4e7ad3..9aaf3f6 100644
+index f4e7ad3..8e85e9d 100644
--- a/bitlbee.te
+++ b/bitlbee.te
-@@ -22,36 +22,56 @@ files_tmp_file(bitlbee_tmp_t)
+@@ -22,36 +22,57 @@ files_tmp_file(bitlbee_tmp_t)
type bitlbee_var_t;
files_type(bitlbee_var_t)
@@ -5354,8 +6244,9 @@ index f4e7ad3..9aaf3f6 100644
+manage_files_pattern(bitlbee_t, bitlbee_var_run_t, bitlbee_var_run_t)
+manage_sock_files_pattern(bitlbee_t, bitlbee_var_run_t, bitlbee_var_run_t)
+files_pid_filetrans(bitlbee_t, bitlbee_var_run_t, { dir file sock_file })
-+
++
kernel_read_system_state(bitlbee_t)
++kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(bitlbee_t)
-corenet_all_recvfrom_unlabeled(bitlbee_t)
corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if(bitlbee_t)
@@ -5368,7 +6259,7 @@ index f4e7ad3..9aaf3f6 100644
# Allow bitlbee to connect to jabber servers
corenet_tcp_connect_jabber_client_port(bitlbee_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_jabber_client_port(bitlbee_t)
-@@ -69,11 +89,15 @@ corenet_tcp_connect_http_port(bitlbee_t)
+@@ -69,11 +90,15 @@ corenet_tcp_connect_http_port(bitlbee_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_http_port(bitlbee_t)
corenet_tcp_connect_http_cache_port(bitlbee_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_http_cache_port(bitlbee_t)
@@ -5385,10 +6276,12 @@ index f4e7ad3..9aaf3f6 100644
files_search_pids(bitlbee_t)
# grant read-only access to the user help files
files_read_usr_files(bitlbee_t)
-@@ -86,8 +110,6 @@ logging_send_syslog_msg(bitlbee_t)
+@@ -84,10 +109,6 @@ auth_use_nsswitch(bitlbee_t)
- miscfiles_read_localization(bitlbee_t)
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(bitlbee_t)
+-miscfiles_read_localization(bitlbee_t)
+-
-sysnet_dns_name_resolve(bitlbee_t)
-
optional_policy(`
@@ -5404,10 +6297,10 @@ index 6355318..98ba16a 100644
/var/lib/blueman(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:blueman_var_lib_t,s0)
diff --git a/blueman.te b/blueman.te
-index 70969fa..2734ef8 100644
+index 70969fa..4d18e6e 100644
--- a/blueman.te
+++ b/blueman.te
-@@ -7,7 +7,6 @@ policy_module(blueman, 1.0.0)
+@@ -7,23 +7,35 @@ policy_module(blueman, 1.0.0)
type blueman_t;
type blueman_exec_t;
@@ -5415,7 +6308,49 @@ index 70969fa..2734ef8 100644
init_daemon_domain(blueman_t, blueman_exec_t)
type blueman_var_lib_t;
-@@ -44,3 +43,15 @@ miscfiles_read_localization(blueman_t)
+ files_type(blueman_var_lib_t)
+
++type blueman_var_run_t;
++files_pid_file(blueman_var_run_t)
++
+ ########################################
+ #
+ # blueman local policy
+ #
++
++allow blueman_t self:capability { net_admin sys_nice };
++allow blueman_t self:process { signal_perms setsched };
++
+ allow blueman_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms;
+
+ manage_dirs_pattern(blueman_t, blueman_var_lib_t, blueman_var_lib_t)
+ manage_files_pattern(blueman_t, blueman_var_lib_t, blueman_var_lib_t)
+ files_var_lib_filetrans(blueman_t, blueman_var_lib_t, dir)
+
++manage_dirs_pattern(blueman_t, blueman_var_run_t, blueman_var_run_t)
++manage_files_pattern(blueman_t, blueman_var_run_t, blueman_var_run_t)
++files_pid_filetrans(blueman_t, blueman_var_run_t, { dir file })
++
+ kernel_read_system_state(blueman_t)
++kernel_request_load_module(blueman_t)
++kernel_read_net_sysctls(blueman_t)
+
+ corecmd_exec_bin(blueman_t)
+
+@@ -34,13 +46,36 @@ dev_rw_wireless(blueman_t)
+ domain_use_interactive_fds(blueman_t)
+
+ files_read_usr_files(blueman_t)
++files_list_tmp(blueman_t)
+
+ auth_use_nsswitch(blueman_t)
+
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(blueman_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(blueman_t)
++sysnet_domtrans_ifconfig(blueman_t)
++sysnet_dns_name_resolve(blueman_t)
+
optional_policy(`
avahi_domtrans(blueman_t)
')
@@ -5425,10 +6360,19 @@ index 70969fa..2734ef8 100644
+')
+
+optional_policy(`
++ dnsmasq_domtrans(blueman_t)
++ dnsmasq_read_pid_files(blueman_t)
++')
++
++optional_policy(`
+ gnome_search_gconf(blueman_t)
+')
+
+optional_policy(`
++ iptables_domtrans(blueman_t)
++')
++
++optional_policy(`
+ xserver_read_state_xdm(blueman_t)
+')
diff --git a/bluetooth.fc b/bluetooth.fc
@@ -5445,7 +6389,7 @@ index dc687e6..e0255eb 100644
# /usr
#
diff --git a/bluetooth.if b/bluetooth.if
-index 3e45431..540f783 100644
+index 3e45431..758bd64 100644
--- a/bluetooth.if
+++ b/bluetooth.if
@@ -27,7 +27,11 @@ interface(`bluetooth_role',`
@@ -5556,10 +6500,11 @@ index 3e45431..540f783 100644
gen_require(`
- type bluetooth_t, bluetooth_tmp_t, bluetooth_lock_t;
- type bluetooth_spool_t, bluetooth_var_lib_t, bluetooth_var_run_t;
-+ type bluetooth_t, bluetooth_lock_t;
-+ type bluetooth_var_lib_t, bluetooth_var_run_t, bluetooth_initrc_exec_t;
- type bluetooth_conf_t, bluetooth_conf_rw_t;
+- type bluetooth_conf_t, bluetooth_conf_rw_t;
- type bluetooth_initrc_exec_t;
++ type bluetooth_t, bluetooth_lock_t, bluetooth_spool_t;
++ type bluetooth_var_lib_t, bluetooth_var_run_t, bluetooth_initrc_exec_t;
++ type bluetooth_conf_t, bluetooth_conf_rw_t, bluetooth_tmp_t;
+ type bluetooth_unit_file_t;
')
@@ -5584,7 +6529,7 @@ index 3e45431..540f783 100644
+ allow $1 bluetooth_unit_file_t:service all_service_perms;
')
diff --git a/bluetooth.te b/bluetooth.te
-index d3019b3..f3834be 100644
+index d3019b3..aed14bb 100644
--- a/bluetooth.te
+++ b/bluetooth.te
@@ -4,12 +4,13 @@ policy_module(bluetooth, 3.4.0)
@@ -5628,7 +6573,15 @@ index d3019b3..f3834be 100644
files_read_etc_runtime_files(bluetooth_t)
files_read_usr_files(bluetooth_t)
-@@ -144,6 +146,10 @@ userdom_dontaudit_use_user_terminals(bluetooth_t)
+@@ -135,7 +137,6 @@ auth_use_nsswitch(bluetooth_t)
+
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(bluetooth_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(bluetooth_t)
+ miscfiles_read_fonts(bluetooth_t)
+ miscfiles_read_hwdata(bluetooth_t)
+
+@@ -144,6 +145,10 @@ userdom_dontaudit_use_user_terminals(bluetooth_t)
userdom_dontaudit_search_user_home_dirs(bluetooth_t)
optional_policy(`
@@ -5639,7 +6592,7 @@ index d3019b3..f3834be 100644
dbus_system_bus_client(bluetooth_t)
dbus_connect_system_bus(bluetooth_t)
-@@ -212,11 +218,12 @@ corecmd_exec_shell(bluetooth_helper_t)
+@@ -212,17 +217,16 @@ corecmd_exec_shell(bluetooth_helper_t)
domain_read_all_domains_state(bluetooth_helper_t)
@@ -5653,6 +6606,12 @@ index d3019b3..f3834be 100644
locallogin_dontaudit_use_fds(bluetooth_helper_t)
logging_send_syslog_msg(bluetooth_helper_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(bluetooth_helper_t)
+-
+ sysnet_read_config(bluetooth_helper_t)
+
+ optional_policy(`
diff --git a/boinc.fc b/boinc.fc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bda740a
@@ -5673,10 +6632,10 @@ index 0000000..bda740a
+/var/log/boinc\.log.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:boinc_log_t,s0)
diff --git a/boinc.if b/boinc.if
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..9d891b7
+index 0000000..fbcef10
--- /dev/null
+++ b/boinc.if
-@@ -0,0 +1,188 @@
+@@ -0,0 +1,206 @@
+## <summary>policy for boinc</summary>
+
+########################################
@@ -5715,6 +6674,24 @@ index 0000000..9d891b7
+ init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, boinc_initrc_exec_t)
+')
+
++#######################################
++## <summary>
++## Dontaudit getattr on boinc lib files.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`boinc_dontaudit_getattr_lib',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type boinc_var_lib_t;
++ ')
++
++ dontaudit $1 boinc_var_lib_t:file getattr;
++')
++
+########################################
+## <summary>
+## Search boinc lib directories.
@@ -5844,7 +6821,7 @@ index 0000000..9d891b7
+ ps_process_pattern($1, boinc_t)
+
+ tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',`
-+ allow $1 boic_t:process ptrace;
++ allow $1 boinc_t:process ptrace;
+ ')
+
+ boinc_initrc_domtrans($1)
@@ -5867,7 +6844,7 @@ index 0000000..9d891b7
+')
diff --git a/boinc.te b/boinc.te
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..53e5ceb
+index 0000000..0a7e857
--- /dev/null
+++ b/boinc.te
@@ -0,0 +1,199 @@
@@ -5924,8 +6901,6 @@ index 0000000..53e5ceb
+manage_files_pattern(boinc_domain, boinc_var_lib_t, boinc_var_lib_t)
+manage_lnk_files_pattern(boinc_domain, boinc_var_lib_t, boinc_var_lib_t)
+
-+# needs read /proc/interrupts
-+kernel_read_system_state(boinc_domain)
+
+corecmd_exec_bin(boinc_domain)
+corecmd_exec_shell(boinc_domain)
@@ -5944,7 +6919,6 @@ index 0000000..53e5ceb
+fs_getattr_all_fs(boinc_domain)
+
+miscfiles_read_fonts(boinc_domain)
-+miscfiles_read_localization(boinc_domain)
+
+optional_policy(`
+ sysnet_dns_name_resolve(boinc_domain)
@@ -5981,6 +6955,8 @@ index 0000000..53e5ceb
+manage_files_pattern(boinc_t, boinc_log_t, boinc_log_t)
+logging_log_filetrans(boinc_t, boinc_log_t, { file })
+
++# needs read /proc/interrupts
++kernel_read_system_state(boinc_t)
+kernel_search_vm_sysctl(boinc_t)
+
+files_getattr_all_dirs(boinc_t)
@@ -6000,6 +6976,7 @@ index 0000000..53e5ceb
+corenet_tcp_connect_boinc_port(boinc_t)
+corenet_tcp_connect_http_port(boinc_t)
+corenet_tcp_connect_http_cache_port(boinc_t)
++corenet_tcp_connect_squid_port(boinc_t)
+
+files_dontaudit_getattr_boot_dirs(boinc_t)
+
@@ -6103,6 +7080,18 @@ index 2c2cdb6..73b3814 100644
+ brctl_domtrans($1)
+ role $2 types brctl_t;
+')
+diff --git a/brctl.te b/brctl.te
+index 9a62a1d..283f4fa 100644
+--- a/brctl.te
++++ b/brctl.te
+@@ -36,7 +36,6 @@ files_read_etc_files(brctl_t)
+
+ term_dontaudit_use_console(brctl_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(brctl_t)
+
+ optional_policy(`
+ xen_append_log(brctl_t)
diff --git a/bugzilla.if b/bugzilla.if
index de89d0f..86e4ee7 100644
--- a/bugzilla.if
@@ -6179,7 +7168,7 @@ index 048abbf..dece084 100644
diff --git a/cachefilesd.fc b/cachefilesd.fc
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..a561ce0
+index 0000000..aa03fc8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/cachefilesd.fc
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
@@ -6216,7 +7205,7 @@ index 0000000..a561ce0
+
+/var/fscache(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:cachefiles_var_t,s0)
+
-+/var/run/cachefilesd\.pid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:cachefiles_var_t,s0)
++/var/run/cachefilesd\.pid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:cachefilesd_var_run_t,s0)
diff --git a/cachefilesd.if b/cachefilesd.if
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3b41945
@@ -6260,10 +7249,10 @@ index 0000000..3b41945
+')
diff --git a/cachefilesd.te b/cachefilesd.te
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..40fd0ad
+index 0000000..3eda1b1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/cachefilesd.te
-@@ -0,0 +1,145 @@
+@@ -0,0 +1,144 @@
+###############################################################################
+#
+# Copyright (C) 2006, 2010 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
@@ -6366,7 +7355,6 @@ index 0000000..40fd0ad
+
+# Basic access
+files_read_etc_files(cachefilesd_t)
-+miscfiles_read_localization(cachefilesd_t)
+logging_send_syslog_msg(cachefilesd_t)
+init_dontaudit_use_script_ptys(cachefilesd_t)
+term_dontaudit_use_generic_ptys(cachefilesd_t)
@@ -6410,7 +7398,7 @@ index 0000000..40fd0ad
+
+init_sigchld_script(cachefiles_kernel_t)
diff --git a/calamaris.te b/calamaris.te
-index b13fb66..5409f59 100644
+index b13fb66..8926e84 100644
--- a/calamaris.te
+++ b/calamaris.te
@@ -39,7 +39,6 @@ kernel_read_system_state(calamaris_t)
@@ -6429,6 +7417,15 @@ index b13fb66..5409f59 100644
files_read_usr_files(calamaris_t)
files_read_var_files(calamaris_t)
files_read_etc_runtime_files(calamaris_t)
+@@ -62,8 +60,6 @@ auth_use_nsswitch(calamaris_t)
+
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(calamaris_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(calamaris_t)
+-
+ userdom_dontaudit_list_user_home_dirs(calamaris_t)
+
+ optional_policy(`
diff --git a/callweaver.fc b/callweaver.fc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3e15c63
@@ -6816,10 +7813,10 @@ index 0000000..e07d3b8
+')
diff --git a/callweaver.te b/callweaver.te
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..4129562
+index 0000000..978f92f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/callweaver.te
-@@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
+@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
+policy_module(callweaver,1.0.0)
+
+########################################
@@ -6895,7 +7892,6 @@ index 0000000..4129562
+
+auth_use_nsswitch(callweaver_t)
+
-+miscfiles_read_localization(callweaver_t)
diff --git a/canna.fc b/canna.fc
index 5432d0e..f77df02 100644
--- a/canna.fc
@@ -6926,7 +7922,7 @@ index 4a26b0c..00b64dc 100644
domain_system_change_exemption($1)
role_transition $2 canna_initrc_exec_t system_r;
diff --git a/canna.te b/canna.te
-index 1d25efe..2ae3894 100644
+index 1d25efe..910b94c 100644
--- a/canna.te
+++ b/canna.te
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ allow canna_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
@@ -6946,6 +7942,15 @@ index 1d25efe..2ae3894 100644
corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(canna_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(canna_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_node(canna_t)
+@@ -73,8 +72,6 @@ files_dontaudit_read_root_files(canna_t)
+
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(canna_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(canna_t)
+-
+ sysnet_read_config(canna_t)
+
+ userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fds(canna_t)
diff --git a/ccs.fc b/ccs.fc
index 8a7177d..bc4f6e7 100644
--- a/ccs.fc
@@ -6959,7 +7964,7 @@ index 8a7177d..bc4f6e7 100644
/var/run/cluster/ccsd\.pid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:ccs_var_run_t,s0)
/var/run/cluster/ccsd\.sock -s gen_context(system_u:object_r:ccs_var_run_t,s0)
diff --git a/ccs.te b/ccs.te
-index 4c90b57..ee0e749 100644
+index 4c90b57..30265d4 100644
--- a/ccs.te
+++ b/ccs.te
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ type ccs_exec_t;
@@ -6997,7 +8002,7 @@ index 4c90b57..ee0e749 100644
corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(ccs_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(ccs_t)
corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if(ccs_t)
-@@ -97,6 +96,7 @@ files_read_etc_files(ccs_t)
+@@ -97,11 +96,10 @@ files_read_etc_files(ccs_t)
files_read_etc_runtime_files(ccs_t)
init_rw_script_tmp_files(ccs_t)
@@ -7005,7 +8010,12 @@ index 4c90b57..ee0e749 100644
logging_send_syslog_msg(ccs_t)
-@@ -118,5 +118,10 @@ optional_policy(`
+-miscfiles_read_localization(ccs_t)
+-
+ sysnet_dns_name_resolve(ccs_t)
+
+ userdom_manage_unpriv_user_shared_mem(ccs_t)
+@@ -118,5 +116,10 @@ optional_policy(`
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -7017,19 +8027,22 @@ index 4c90b57..ee0e749 100644
unconfined_use_fds(ccs_t)
')
diff --git a/cdrecord.te b/cdrecord.te
-index 4626931..1194d69 100644
+index 4626931..93e1495 100644
--- a/cdrecord.te
+++ b/cdrecord.te
-@@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ logging_send_syslog_msg(cdrecord_t)
- miscfiles_read_localization(cdrecord_t)
+@@ -52,10 +52,8 @@ storage_write_scsi_generic(cdrecord_t)
+
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(cdrecord_t)
+-miscfiles_read_localization(cdrecord_t)
+-
# write to the user domain tty.
-userdom_use_user_terminals(cdrecord_t)
+userdom_use_inherited_user_terminals(cdrecord_t)
userdom_read_user_home_content_files(cdrecord_t)
# Handle nfs home dirs
-@@ -108,11 +108,7 @@ tunable_policy(`cdrecord_read_content',`
+@@ -108,11 +106,7 @@ tunable_policy(`cdrecord_read_content',`
userdom_dontaudit_read_user_home_content_files(cdrecord_t)
')
@@ -7074,10 +8087,10 @@ index fa62787..4230c25 100644
miscfiles_manage_generic_cert_files($1)
diff --git a/certmaster.te b/certmaster.te
-index 3384132..7ffa8f0 100644
+index 3384132..e40c81c 100644
--- a/certmaster.te
+++ b/certmaster.te
-@@ -53,13 +53,15 @@ files_pid_filetrans(certmaster_t ,certmaster_var_run_t, { file sock_file })
+@@ -53,19 +53,20 @@ files_pid_filetrans(certmaster_t ,certmaster_var_run_t, { file sock_file })
# read meminfo
kernel_read_system_state(certmaster_t)
@@ -7095,6 +8108,12 @@ index 3384132..7ffa8f0 100644
files_list_var(certmaster_t)
files_search_var_lib(certmaster_t)
+ auth_use_nsswitch(certmaster_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(certmaster_t)
+
+ miscfiles_manage_generic_cert_dirs(certmaster_t)
+ miscfiles_manage_generic_cert_files(certmaster_t)
diff --git a/certmonger.fc b/certmonger.fc
index 5ad1a52..e66fcf6 100644
--- a/certmonger.fc
@@ -7135,10 +8154,10 @@ index 7a6e5ba..7475aa5 100644
admin_pattern($1, certmonger_var_run_t)
')
diff --git a/certmonger.te b/certmonger.te
-index c3e3f79..df11794 100644
+index c3e3f79..89db900 100644
--- a/certmonger.te
+++ b/certmonger.te
-@@ -18,12 +18,17 @@ files_pid_file(certmonger_var_run_t)
+@@ -18,13 +18,19 @@ files_pid_file(certmonger_var_run_t)
type certmonger_var_lib_t;
files_type(certmonger_var_lib_t)
@@ -7151,13 +8170,16 @@ index c3e3f79..df11794 100644
#
-allow certmonger_t self:capability { kill sys_nice };
+-allow certmonger_t self:process { getsched setsched sigkill };
+allow certmonger_t self:capability { dac_override dac_read_search setgid setuid kill sys_nice };
+dontaudit certmonger_t self:capability sys_tty_config;
++allow certmonger_t self:capability2 block_suspend;
+
- allow certmonger_t self:process { getsched setsched sigkill };
++allow certmonger_t self:process { getsched setsched sigkill signal };
allow certmonger_t self:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
allow certmonger_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
-@@ -38,25 +43,47 @@ manage_dirs_pattern(certmonger_t, certmonger_var_run_t, certmonger_var_run_t)
+ allow certmonger_t self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
+@@ -38,25 +44,52 @@ manage_dirs_pattern(certmonger_t, certmonger_var_run_t, certmonger_var_run_t)
manage_files_pattern(certmonger_t, certmonger_var_run_t, certmonger_var_run_t)
files_pid_filetrans(certmonger_t, certmonger_var_run_t, { file dir })
@@ -7172,6 +8194,7 @@ index c3e3f79..df11794 100644
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_ports(certmonger_t)
corenet_tcp_connect_certmaster_port(certmonger_t)
+corenet_tcp_connect_http_port(certmonger_t)
++corenet_tcp_connect_http_cache_port(certmonger_t)
+corenet_tcp_connect_pki_ca_port(certmonger_t)
dev_read_urand(certmonger_t)
@@ -7182,6 +8205,8 @@ index c3e3f79..df11794 100644
files_read_usr_files(certmonger_t)
files_list_tmp(certmonger_t)
++fs_search_cgroup_dirs(certmonger_t)
++
+auth_use_nsswitch(certmonger_t)
+auth_rw_cache(certmonger_t)
+
@@ -7189,16 +8214,19 @@ index c3e3f79..df11794 100644
+
logging_send_syslog_msg(certmonger_t)
- miscfiles_read_localization(certmonger_t)
+-miscfiles_read_localization(certmonger_t)
miscfiles_manage_generic_cert_files(certmonger_t)
-sysnet_dns_name_resolve(certmonger_t)
++systemd_exec_systemctl(certmonger_t)
++
+userdom_search_user_home_content(certmonger_t)
+
+optional_policy(`
+ apache_search_config(certmonger_t)
+ apache_signal(certmonger_t)
+ apache_signull(certmonger_t)
++ apache_systemctl(certmonger_t)
+')
+
+optional_policy(`
@@ -7207,7 +8235,7 @@ index c3e3f79..df11794 100644
optional_policy(`
dbus_system_bus_client(certmonger_t)
-@@ -64,9 +91,42 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -64,9 +97,46 @@ optional_policy(`
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -7226,6 +8254,10 @@ index c3e3f79..df11794 100644
pcscd_stream_connect(certmonger_t)
')
+
++optional_policy(`
++ pki_rw_tomcat_cert(certmonger_t)
++')
++
+########################################
+#
+# certmonger_unconfined_script_t local policy
@@ -7251,10 +8283,10 @@ index c3e3f79..df11794 100644
+ unconfined_domain(certmonger_unconfined_t)
+')
diff --git a/certwatch.te b/certwatch.te
-index e07cef5..0945e02 100644
+index e07cef5..55051ce 100644
--- a/certwatch.te
+++ b/certwatch.te
-@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ files_list_tmp(certwatch_t)
+@@ -27,15 +27,15 @@ files_list_tmp(certwatch_t)
fs_list_inotifyfs(certwatch_t)
auth_manage_cache(certwatch_t)
@@ -7262,9 +8294,9 @@ index e07cef5..0945e02 100644
auth_var_filetrans_cache(certwatch_t)
logging_send_syslog_msg(certwatch_t)
-@@ -34,8 +35,8 @@ logging_send_syslog_msg(certwatch_t)
+
miscfiles_read_all_certs(certwatch_t)
- miscfiles_read_localization(certwatch_t)
+-miscfiles_read_localization(certwatch_t)
-userdom_use_user_terminals(certwatch_t)
-userdom_dontaudit_list_user_home_dirs(certwatch_t)
@@ -7293,10 +8325,10 @@ index 0000000..4c52fa3
+
diff --git a/cfengine.if b/cfengine.if
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..2972c77
+index 0000000..f3c23e9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/cfengine.if
-@@ -0,0 +1,143 @@
+@@ -0,0 +1,146 @@
+
+## <summary>policy for cfengine</summary>
+
@@ -7325,6 +8357,9 @@ index 0000000..2972c77
+ type cfengine_$1_exec_t;
+ init_daemon_domain(cfengine_$1_t, cfengine_$1_exec_t)
+
++ kernel_read_system_state(cfengine_$1_t)
++
++ logging_send_syslog_msg(cfengine_$1_t)
+')
+
+########################################
@@ -7442,10 +8477,10 @@ index 0000000..2972c77
+')
diff --git a/cfengine.te b/cfengine.te
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..0de6133
+index 0000000..5b123e1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/cfengine.te
-@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
+@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
+policy_module(cfengine, 1.0.0)
+
+########################################
@@ -7485,19 +8520,12 @@ index 0000000..0de6133
+manage_dirs_pattern(cfengine_domain, cfengine_var_log_t,cfengine_var_log_t)
+logging_log_filetrans(cfengine_domain,cfengine_var_log_t,{ dir file })
+
-+kernel_read_system_state(cfengine_domain)
-+
+corecmd_exec_bin(cfengine_domain)
+corecmd_exec_shell(cfengine_domain)
+
+dev_read_urand(cfengine_domain)
+dev_read_sysfs(cfengine_domain)
+
-+
-+logging_send_syslog_msg(cfengine_domain)
-+
-+miscfiles_read_localization(cfengine_domain)
-+
+sysnet_dns_name_resolve(cfengine_domain)
+sysnet_domtrans_ifconfig(cfengine_domain)
+
@@ -7563,7 +8591,7 @@ index b6bb46c..9a2bf65 100644
+/var/log/cgrulesengd\.log.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:cgred_log_t,s0)
/var/run/cgred.* gen_context(system_u:object_r:cgred_var_run_t,s0)
diff --git a/cgroup.if b/cgroup.if
-index 33facaf..c624aaa 100644
+index 33facaf..11700ae 100644
--- a/cgroup.if
+++ b/cgroup.if
@@ -171,15 +171,27 @@ interface(`cgroup_admin',`
@@ -7576,7 +8604,7 @@ index 33facaf..c624aaa 100644
- allow $1 cgconfig_t:process { ptrace signal_perms };
+ tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',`
-+ allow $1 cglcear_t:process ptrace;
++ allow $1 cgclear_t:process ptrace;
+ ')
+
+ allow $1 cgconfig_t:process signal_perms;
@@ -7598,7 +8626,7 @@ index 33facaf..c624aaa 100644
admin_pattern($1, cgrules_etc_t)
files_list_etc($1)
diff --git a/cgroup.te b/cgroup.te
-index 806191a..8c30667 100644
+index 806191a..d962a82 100644
--- a/cgroup.te
+++ b/cgroup.te
@@ -25,8 +25,8 @@ files_pid_file(cgred_var_run_t)
@@ -7612,17 +8640,20 @@ index 806191a..8c30667 100644
init_daemon_domain(cgconfig_t, cgconfig_exec_t)
type cgconfig_initrc_exec_t;
-@@ -42,6 +42,9 @@ files_config_file(cgconfig_etc_t)
+@@ -42,8 +42,12 @@ files_config_file(cgconfig_etc_t)
allow cgclear_t self:capability { dac_read_search dac_override sys_admin };
+read_files_pattern(cgclear_t, cgconfig_etc_t, cgconfig_etc_t)
+
-+
kernel_read_system_state(cgclear_t)
++auth_use_nsswitch(cgclear_t)
++
domain_setpriority_all_domains(cgclear_t)
-@@ -64,7 +67,6 @@ kernel_list_unlabeled(cgconfig_t)
+
+ fs_manage_cgroup_dirs(cgclear_t)
+@@ -64,7 +68,6 @@ kernel_list_unlabeled(cgconfig_t)
kernel_read_system_state(cgconfig_t)
# /etc/nsswitch.conf, /etc/passwd
@@ -7630,7 +8661,7 @@ index 806191a..8c30667 100644
fs_manage_cgroup_dirs(cgconfig_t)
fs_manage_cgroup_files(cgconfig_t)
-@@ -72,12 +74,15 @@ fs_mount_cgroup(cgconfig_t)
+@@ -72,12 +75,15 @@ fs_mount_cgroup(cgconfig_t)
fs_mounton_cgroup(cgconfig_t)
fs_unmount_cgroup(cgconfig_t)
@@ -7647,7 +8678,7 @@ index 806191a..8c30667 100644
allow cgred_t self:netlink_socket { write bind create read };
allow cgred_t self:unix_dgram_socket { write create connect };
-@@ -86,6 +91,9 @@ logging_log_filetrans(cgred_t, cgred_log_t, file)
+@@ -86,12 +92,16 @@ logging_log_filetrans(cgred_t, cgred_log_t, file)
allow cgred_t cgrules_etc_t:file read_file_perms;
@@ -7657,7 +8688,14 @@ index 806191a..8c30667 100644
# rc script creates pid file
manage_files_pattern(cgred_t, cgred_var_run_t, cgred_var_run_t)
manage_sock_files_pattern(cgred_t, cgred_var_run_t, cgred_var_run_t)
-@@ -100,10 +108,11 @@ files_getattr_all_files(cgred_t)
+ files_pid_filetrans(cgred_t, cgred_var_run_t, { file sock_file })
+
+ kernel_read_system_state(cgred_t)
++kernel_read_all_sysctls(cgred_t)
+
+ domain_read_all_domains_state(cgred_t)
+ domain_setpriority_all_domains(cgred_t)
+@@ -100,10 +110,9 @@ files_getattr_all_files(cgred_t)
files_getattr_all_sockets(cgred_t)
files_read_all_symlinks(cgred_t)
# /etc/group
@@ -7665,11 +8703,11 @@ index 806191a..8c30667 100644
fs_write_cgroup_files(cgred_t)
+-logging_send_syslog_msg(cgred_t)
+auth_use_nsswitch(cgred_t)
-+
- logging_send_syslog_msg(cgred_t)
- miscfiles_read_localization(cgred_t)
+-miscfiles_read_localization(cgred_t)
++logging_send_syslog_msg(cgred_t)
diff --git a/chrome.fc b/chrome.fc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..88107d7
@@ -7824,10 +8862,10 @@ index 0000000..efebae7
+')
diff --git a/chrome.te b/chrome.te
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..dc13756
+index 0000000..6298388
--- /dev/null
+++ b/chrome.te
-@@ -0,0 +1,182 @@
+@@ -0,0 +1,193 @@
+policy_module(chrome,1.0.0)
+
+########################################
@@ -7880,16 +8918,21 @@ index 0000000..dc13756
+
+fs_manage_cgroup_dirs(chrome_sandbox_t)
+fs_manage_cgroup_files(chrome_sandbox_t)
++fs_read_dos_files(chrome_sandbox_t)
++fs_read_hugetlbfs_files(chrome_sandbox_t)
+
+corecmd_exec_bin(chrome_sandbox_t)
+
+corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(chrome_sandbox_t)
++corenet_tcp_connect_asterisk_port(chrome_sandbox_t)
+corenet_tcp_connect_flash_port(chrome_sandbox_t)
+corenet_tcp_connect_streaming_port(chrome_sandbox_t)
+corenet_tcp_connect_pulseaudio_port(chrome_sandbox_t)
+corenet_tcp_connect_http_port(chrome_sandbox_t)
+corenet_tcp_connect_http_cache_port(chrome_sandbox_t)
++corenet_tcp_connect_msnp_port(chrome_sandbox_t)
+corenet_tcp_connect_squid_port(chrome_sandbox_t)
++corenet_tcp_connect_tor_socks_port(chrome_sandbox_t)
+corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(chrome_sandbox_t)
+corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_node(chrome_sandbox_t)
+corenet_tcp_connect_ipp_port(chrome_sandbox_t)
@@ -7918,7 +8961,6 @@ index 0000000..dc13756
+# This one we should figure a way to make it more secure
+userdom_manage_home_certs(chrome_sandbox_t)
+
-+miscfiles_read_localization(chrome_sandbox_t)
+miscfiles_read_fonts(chrome_sandbox_t)
+
+sysnet_dns_name_resolve(chrome_sandbox_t)
@@ -7929,6 +8971,10 @@ index 0000000..dc13756
+')
+
+optional_policy(`
++ mozilla_write_user_home_files(chrome_sandbox_t)
++')
++
++optional_policy(`
+ xserver_use_user_fonts(chrome_sandbox_t)
+ xserver_user_x_domain_template(chrome_sandbox, chrome_sandbox_t, chrome_sandbox_tmpfs_t)
+')
@@ -7968,13 +9014,15 @@ index 0000000..dc13756
+# chrome_sandbox_nacl local policy
+#
+
-+allow chrome_sandbox_nacl_t self:process { execmem setsched };
++allow chrome_sandbox_nacl_t self:process { execmem setsched sigkill sigstop signull signal };
++
+allow chrome_sandbox_nacl_t self:fifo_file manage_fifo_file_perms;
+allow chrome_sandbox_nacl_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
+allow chrome_sandbox_nacl_t self:shm create_shm_perms;
+allow chrome_sandbox_nacl_t self:unix_dgram_socket { create_socket_perms sendto };
+allow chrome_sandbox_nacl_t chrome_sandbox_t:unix_stream_socket { getattr write read };
+allow chrome_sandbox_t chrome_sandbox_nacl_t:unix_stream_socket { getattr write read };
++allow chrome_sandbox_nacl_t chrome_sandbox_t:unix_dgram_socket { read write };
+
+allow chrome_sandbox_nacl_t chrome_sandbox_t:shm rw_shm_perms;
+allow chrome_sandbox_nacl_t chrome_sandbox_tmpfs_t:file rw_inherited_file_perms;
@@ -7990,16 +9038,17 @@ index 0000000..dc13756
+domtrans_pattern(chrome_sandbox_t, chrome_sandbox_nacl_exec_t, chrome_sandbox_nacl_t)
+ps_process_pattern(chrome_sandbox_t, chrome_sandbox_nacl_t)
+
++kernel_read_state(chrome_sandbox_nacl_t)
+kernel_read_system_state(chrome_sandbox_nacl_t)
+
++corecmd_sbin_entry_type(chrome_sandbox_nacl_t)
++
+dev_read_urand(chrome_sandbox_nacl_t)
+dev_read_sysfs(chrome_sandbox_nacl_t)
+
+files_read_etc_files(chrome_sandbox_nacl_t)
+
-+miscfiles_read_localization(chrome_sandbox_nacl_t)
-+
-+corecmd_sbin_entry_type(chrome_sandbox_nacl_t)
++init_read_state(chrome_sandbox_nacl_t)
+
+userdom_use_inherited_user_ptys(chrome_sandbox_nacl_t)
+userdom_rw_inherited_user_tmpfs_files(chrome_sandbox_nacl_t)
@@ -8232,7 +9281,7 @@ index 9a0da94..113eae2 100644
+ allow $1 chronyd_unit_file_t:service all_service_perms;
')
diff --git a/chronyd.te b/chronyd.te
-index fa82327..898d0db 100644
+index fa82327..ab88d78 100644
--- a/chronyd.te
+++ b/chronyd.te
@@ -15,6 +15,12 @@ init_script_file(chronyd_initrc_exec_t)
@@ -8275,27 +9324,27 @@ index fa82327..898d0db 100644
-files_pid_filetrans(chronyd_t, chronyd_var_run_t, file)
+manage_sock_files_pattern(chronyd_t, chronyd_var_run_t, chronyd_var_run_t)
+files_pid_filetrans(chronyd_t, chronyd_var_run_t, { dir file sock_file })
-
++
+kernel_read_system_state(chronyd_t)
+kernel_read_network_state(chronyd_t)
+
+corecmd_exec_shell(chronyd_t)
-+
+
+corenet_udp_bind_generic_node(chronyd_t)
corenet_udp_bind_ntp_port(chronyd_t)
# bind to udp/323
corenet_udp_bind_chronyd_port(chronyd_t)
-@@ -63,6 +81,8 @@ logging_send_syslog_msg(chronyd_t)
+@@ -61,7 +79,7 @@ auth_use_nsswitch(chronyd_t)
- miscfiles_read_localization(chronyd_t)
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(chronyd_t)
+-miscfiles_read_localization(chronyd_t)
+mta_send_mail(chronyd_t)
-+
+
optional_policy(`
gpsd_rw_shm(chronyd_t)
- ')
diff --git a/cipe.te b/cipe.te
-index 8e1ef38..aae1260 100644
+index 8e1ef38..08b238c 100644
--- a/cipe.te
+++ b/cipe.te
@@ -28,7 +28,6 @@ kernel_read_system_state(ciped_t)
@@ -8306,10 +9355,26 @@ index 8e1ef38..aae1260 100644
corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(ciped_t)
corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if(ciped_t)
corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_node(ciped_t)
+@@ -53,8 +52,6 @@ fs_search_auto_mountpoints(ciped_t)
+
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(ciped_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(ciped_t)
+-
+ sysnet_read_config(ciped_t)
+
+ userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fds(ciped_t)
diff --git a/clamav.fc b/clamav.fc
-index e8e9a21..22986ef 100644
+index e8e9a21..9c47777 100644
--- a/clamav.fc
+++ b/clamav.fc
+@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
+ /etc/clamav(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:clamd_etc_t,s0)
+-/etc/rc\.d/init\.d/clamd-wrapper -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:clamd_initrc_exec_t,s0)
++/etc/rc\.d/init\.d/clamd.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:clamd_initrc_exec_t,s0)
+
+ /usr/bin/clamscan -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:clamscan_exec_t,s0)
+ /usr/bin/clamdscan -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:clamscan_exec_t,s0)
@@ -8,9 +8,13 @@
/usr/sbin/clamd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:clamd_exec_t,s0)
/usr/sbin/clamav-milter -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:clamd_exec_t,s0)
@@ -8460,7 +9525,7 @@ index bbac14a..99c5cca 100644
+
')
diff --git a/clamav.te b/clamav.te
-index a10350e..47f77db 100644
+index a10350e..a28f16e 100644
--- a/clamav.te
+++ b/clamav.te
@@ -1,9 +1,23 @@
@@ -8553,10 +9618,12 @@ index a10350e..47f77db 100644
files_read_etc_runtime_files(clamd_t)
files_search_spool(clamd_t)
-@@ -127,13 +147,6 @@ logging_send_syslog_msg(clamd_t)
+@@ -125,30 +145,51 @@ auth_use_nsswitch(clamd_t)
- miscfiles_read_localization(clamd_t)
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(clamd_t)
+-miscfiles_read_localization(clamd_t)
+-
-cron_use_fds(clamd_t)
-cron_use_system_job_fds(clamd_t)
-cron_rw_pipes(clamd_t)
@@ -8567,7 +9634,9 @@ index a10350e..47f77db 100644
optional_policy(`
amavis_read_lib_files(clamd_t)
amavis_read_spool_files(clamd_t)
-@@ -142,13 +155,31 @@ optional_policy(`
+- amavis_spool_filetrans(clamd_t, clamd_var_run_t, sock_file)
++ amavis_spool_filetrans(clamd_t, clamd_var_run_t, { file dir sock_file })
+ amavis_create_pid_files(clamd_t)
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -8597,10 +9666,22 @@ index a10350e..47f77db 100644
+',`
dontaudit clamd_t self:process execmem;
+ dontaudit clamscan_t self:process execmem;
++')
++
++optional_policy(`
++ antivirus_domain_template(clamd_t)
++')
++
++optional_policy(`
++ antivirus_domain_template(clamscan_t)
++')
++
++optional_policy(`
++ antivirus_domain_template(freshclam_t)
')
########################################
-@@ -178,17 +209,25 @@ files_pid_filetrans(freshclam_t, clamd_var_run_t, file)
+@@ -178,17 +219,27 @@ files_pid_filetrans(freshclam_t, clamd_var_run_t, file)
# log files (own logfiles only)
manage_files_pattern(freshclam_t, freshclam_var_log_t, freshclam_var_log_t)
@@ -8611,6 +9692,7 @@ index a10350e..47f77db 100644
logging_log_filetrans(freshclam_t, freshclam_var_log_t, file)
-corenet_all_recvfrom_unlabeled(freshclam_t)
++kernel_dontaudit_list_proc(freshclam_t)
+kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(freshclam_t)
+kernel_read_network_state(freshclam_t)
+kernel_read_system_state(freshclam_t)
@@ -8624,21 +9706,27 @@ index a10350e..47f77db 100644
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_ports(freshclam_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_clamd_port(freshclam_t)
corenet_tcp_connect_http_port(freshclam_t)
++corenet_tcp_connect_http_cache_port(freshclam_t)
+corenet_tcp_connect_clamd_port(freshclam_t)
+corenet_tcp_connect_squid_port(freshclam_t)
corenet_sendrecv_http_client_packets(freshclam_t)
dev_read_rand(freshclam_t)
-@@ -196,7 +235,6 @@ dev_read_urand(freshclam_t)
+@@ -196,27 +247,32 @@ dev_read_urand(freshclam_t)
domain_use_interactive_fds(freshclam_t)
-files_read_etc_files(freshclam_t)
++files_search_var_lib(freshclam_t)
files_read_etc_runtime_files(freshclam_t)
++files_read_usr_files(freshclam_t)
auth_use_nsswitch(freshclam_t)
-@@ -207,16 +245,22 @@ miscfiles_read_localization(freshclam_t)
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(freshclam_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(freshclam_t)
+-
clamav_stream_connect(freshclam_t)
-optional_policy(`
@@ -8664,7 +9752,7 @@ index a10350e..47f77db 100644
########################################
#
# clamscam local policy
-@@ -242,17 +286,35 @@ files_tmp_filetrans(clamscan_t, clamscan_tmp_t, { file dir })
+@@ -242,15 +298,39 @@ files_tmp_filetrans(clamscan_t, clamscan_tmp_t, { file dir })
manage_files_pattern(clamscan_t, clamd_var_lib_t, clamd_var_lib_t)
allow clamscan_t clamd_var_lib_t:dir list_dir_perms;
@@ -8672,6 +9760,7 @@ index a10350e..47f77db 100644
+read_files_pattern(clamscan_t, clamd_var_run_t, clamd_var_run_t)
+allow clamscan_t clamd_var_run_t:dir list_dir_perms;
+
++kernel_dontaudit_list_proc(clamscan_t)
+kernel_read_system_state(clamscan_t)
+
corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(clamscan_t)
@@ -8693,35 +9782,38 @@ index a10350e..47f77db 100644
+ files_read_non_security_files(clamscan_t)
+ files_getattr_all_pipes(clamscan_t)
+ files_getattr_all_sockets(clamscan_t)
++
++ files_read_non_security_files(clamd_t)
++ files_getattr_all_pipes(clamd_t)
++ files_getattr_all_sockets(clamd_t)
+')
+
kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(clamscan_t)
+kernel_read_system_state(clamscan_t)
--files_read_etc_files(clamscan_t)
+ files_read_etc_files(clamscan_t)
files_read_etc_runtime_files(clamscan_t)
- files_search_var_lib(clamscan_t)
+@@ -259,15 +339,15 @@ files_search_var_lib(clamscan_t)
+ init_read_utmp(clamscan_t)
+ init_dontaudit_write_utmp(clamscan_t)
-@@ -264,10 +326,15 @@ miscfiles_read_public_files(clamscan_t)
+-miscfiles_read_localization(clamscan_t)
+ miscfiles_read_public_files(clamscan_t)
clamav_stream_connect(clamscan_t)
-mta_send_mail(clamscan_t)
+sysnet_read_config(clamscan_t)
-+
-+optional_policy(`
-+ mta_send_mail(clamscan_t)
-+ mta_read_queue(clamscan_t)
-+')
optional_policy(`
- amavis_read_spool_files(clamscan_t)
-+ amavis_manage_spool_files(clamscan_t)
++ mta_send_mail(clamscan_t)
++ mta_read_queue(clamscan_t)
')
optional_policy(`
diff --git a/clockspeed.te b/clockspeed.te
-index b40f3f7..c0f501a 100644
+index b40f3f7..e8c9c35 100644
--- a/clockspeed.te
+++ b/clockspeed.te
@@ -26,7 +26,6 @@ allow clockspeed_cli_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms;
@@ -8732,16 +9824,18 @@ index b40f3f7..c0f501a 100644
corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(clockspeed_cli_t)
corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if(clockspeed_cli_t)
corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_node(clockspeed_cli_t)
-@@ -38,7 +37,7 @@ files_read_etc_files(clockspeed_cli_t)
+@@ -36,9 +35,8 @@ corenet_sendrecv_ntp_client_packets(clockspeed_cli_t)
+ files_list_var_lib(clockspeed_cli_t)
+ files_read_etc_files(clockspeed_cli_t)
- miscfiles_read_localization(clockspeed_cli_t)
+-miscfiles_read_localization(clockspeed_cli_t)
-userdom_use_user_terminals(clockspeed_cli_t)
+userdom_use_inherited_user_terminals(clockspeed_cli_t)
########################################
#
-@@ -53,7 +52,6 @@ allow clockspeed_srv_t self:unix_stream_socket create_socket_perms;
+@@ -53,7 +51,6 @@ allow clockspeed_srv_t self:unix_stream_socket create_socket_perms;
manage_files_pattern(clockspeed_srv_t, clockspeed_var_lib_t, clockspeed_var_lib_t)
manage_fifo_files_pattern(clockspeed_srv_t, clockspeed_var_lib_t, clockspeed_var_lib_t)
@@ -8749,12 +9843,33 @@ index b40f3f7..c0f501a 100644
corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(clockspeed_srv_t)
corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if(clockspeed_srv_t)
corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_node(clockspeed_srv_t)
+@@ -65,7 +62,6 @@ corenet_sendrecv_clockspeed_server_packets(clockspeed_srv_t)
+ files_read_etc_files(clockspeed_srv_t)
+ files_list_var_lib(clockspeed_srv_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(clockspeed_srv_t)
+
+ optional_policy(`
+ daemontools_service_domain(clockspeed_srv_t, clockspeed_srv_exec_t)
+diff --git a/clogd.te b/clogd.te
+index 6077339..d44d33f 100644
+--- a/clogd.te
++++ b/clogd.te
+@@ -46,8 +46,6 @@ storage_raw_write_fixed_disk(clogd_t)
+
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(clogd_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(clogd_t)
+-
+ optional_policy(`
+ aisexec_stream_connect(clogd_t)
+ corosync_stream_connect(clogd_t)
diff --git a/cloudform.fc b/cloudform.fc
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..61ab864
+index 0000000..8a40857
--- /dev/null
+++ b/cloudform.fc
-@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+/etc/rc\.d/init\.d/iwhd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:iwhd_initrc_exec_t,s0)
+/etc/rc\.d/init\.d/mongod -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:mongod_initrc_exec_t,s0)
+
@@ -8770,6 +9885,8 @@ index 0000000..61ab864
+/var/log/deltacloud-core(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:deltacloudd_log_t,s0)
+/var/log/iwhd\.log.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:iwhd_log_t,s0)
+/var/log/mongodb(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:mongod_log_t,s0)
++/var/log/mongo(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:mongod_log_t,s0)
++/var/log/mongo/mongod\.log.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:mongod_log_t,s0)
+/var/log/aeolus-conductor/dbomatic\.log.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:mongod_log_t,s0)
+
+/var/run/mongodb(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:mongod_var_run_t,s0)
@@ -8777,10 +9894,10 @@ index 0000000..61ab864
+/var/run/iwhd\.pid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:iwhd_var_run_t,s0)
diff --git a/cloudform.if b/cloudform.if
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..7f55959
+index 0000000..8ac848b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/cloudform.if
-@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+## <summary>cloudform policy</summary>
+
+#######################################
@@ -8802,6 +9919,8 @@ index 0000000..7f55959
+ type $1_t, cloudform_domain;
+ type $1_exec_t;
+ init_daemon_domain($1_t, $1_exec_t)
++
++ kernel_read_system_state($1_t)
+')
+
+######################################
@@ -8823,7 +9942,7 @@ index 0000000..7f55959
+')
diff --git a/cloudform.te b/cloudform.te
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..7e1d71e
+index 0000000..1e73280
--- /dev/null
+++ b/cloudform.te
@@ -0,0 +1,199 @@
@@ -8883,17 +10002,15 @@ index 0000000..7e1d71e
+allow cloudform_domain self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms;
+allow cloudform_domain self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
+
-+kernel_read_system_state(cloudform_domain)
-+
+dev_read_rand(cloudform_domain)
+dev_read_urand(cloudform_domain)
++dev_read_sysfs(cloudform_domain)
+
+files_read_etc_files(cloudform_domain)
+
+auth_read_passwd(cloudform_domain)
+
+miscfiles_read_certs(cloudform_domain)
-+miscfiles_read_localization(cloudform_domain)
+
+########################################
+#
@@ -8988,6 +10105,7 @@ index 0000000..7e1d71e
+manage_dirs_pattern(mongod_t, mongod_log_t, mongod_log_t)
+manage_files_pattern(mongod_t, mongod_log_t, mongod_log_t)
+logging_log_filetrans(mongod_t, mongod_log_t, file, "dbomatic.log")
++logging_log_filetrans(mongod_t, mongod_log_t, file, "mongod.log")
+
+manage_dirs_pattern(mongod_t, mongod_var_lib_t, mongod_var_lib_t)
+manage_files_pattern(mongod_t, mongod_var_lib_t, mongod_var_lib_t)
@@ -9014,6 +10132,8 @@ index 0000000..7e1d71e
+
+files_read_usr_files(mongod_t)
+
++fs_getattr_all_fs(mongod_t)
++
+optional_policy(`
+ mysql_stream_connect(mongod_t)
+')
@@ -9025,9 +10145,8 @@ index 0000000..7e1d71e
+optional_policy(`
+ sysnet_dns_name_resolve(mongod_t)
+')
-+
diff --git a/cmirrord.if b/cmirrord.if
-index f8463c0..126b293 100644
+index f8463c0..cc4d9ef 100644
--- a/cmirrord.if
+++ b/cmirrord.if
@@ -70,10 +70,11 @@ interface(`cmirrord_rw_shm',`
@@ -9052,12 +10171,25 @@ index f8463c0..126b293 100644
ps_process_pattern($1, cmirrord_t)
+ tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',`
-+ allow $1 cmorrord_t:process ptrace;
++ allow $1 cmirrord_t:process ptrace;
+ ')
+
cmirrord_initrc_domtrans($1)
domain_system_change_exemption($1)
role_transition $2 cmirrord_initrc_exec_t system_r;
+diff --git a/cmirrord.te b/cmirrord.te
+index 28fdd8a..5605ed7 100644
+--- a/cmirrord.te
++++ b/cmirrord.te
+@@ -51,8 +51,6 @@ seutil_read_file_contexts(cmirrord_t)
+
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(cmirrord_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(cmirrord_t)
+-
+ optional_policy(`
+ corosync_stream_connect(cmirrord_t)
+ ')
diff --git a/cobbler.fc b/cobbler.fc
index 1cf6c4e..0858f92 100644
--- a/cobbler.fc
@@ -9318,7 +10450,7 @@ index 116d60f..e2c6ec6 100644
+ allow $1 cobblerd_unit_file_t:service all_service_perms;
')
diff --git a/cobbler.te b/cobbler.te
-index 0258b48..abff100 100644
+index 0258b48..c68160d 100644
--- a/cobbler.te
+++ b/cobbler.te
@@ -6,13 +6,35 @@ policy_module(cobbler, 1.1.0)
@@ -9408,7 +10540,7 @@ index 0258b48..abff100 100644
append_files_pattern(cobblerd_t, cobbler_var_log_t, cobbler_var_log_t)
create_files_pattern(cobblerd_t, cobbler_var_log_t, cobbler_var_log_t)
-@@ -52,57 +92,132 @@ read_files_pattern(cobblerd_t, cobbler_var_log_t, cobbler_var_log_t)
+@@ -52,57 +92,131 @@ read_files_pattern(cobblerd_t, cobbler_var_log_t, cobbler_var_log_t)
setattr_files_pattern(cobblerd_t, cobbler_var_log_t, cobbler_var_log_t)
logging_log_filetrans(cobblerd_t, cobbler_var_log_t, file)
@@ -9456,7 +10588,8 @@ index 0258b48..abff100 100644
files_list_tmp(cobblerd_t)
-# read /etc/nsswitch.conf
-files_read_etc_files(cobblerd_t)
-+
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(cobblerd_t)
+# read from mounted images (install media)
+fs_read_iso9660_files(cobblerd_t)
+
@@ -9467,8 +10600,7 @@ index 0258b48..abff100 100644
+term_use_console(cobblerd_t)
+
+logging_send_syslog_msg(cobblerd_t)
-
- miscfiles_read_localization(cobblerd_t)
++
miscfiles_read_public_files(cobblerd_t)
+selinux_get_enforce_mode(cobblerd_t)
@@ -9544,7 +10676,7 @@ index 0258b48..abff100 100644
')
optional_policy(`
-@@ -110,12 +225,21 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -110,12 +224,21 @@ optional_policy(`
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -9569,13 +10701,20 @@ index 0258b48..abff100 100644
')
########################################
-@@ -124,5 +248,6 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -123,6 +246,10 @@ optional_policy(`
+ # Cobbler web local policy.
#
- apache_content_template(cobbler)
-+list_dirs_pattern(cobblerd_t, httpd_cobbler_content_t, httpd_cobbler_content_t)
- manage_dirs_pattern(cobblerd_t, httpd_cobbler_content_rw_t, httpd_cobbler_content_rw_t)
- manage_files_pattern(cobblerd_t, httpd_cobbler_content_rw_t, httpd_cobbler_content_rw_t)
+-apache_content_template(cobbler)
+-manage_dirs_pattern(cobblerd_t, httpd_cobbler_content_rw_t, httpd_cobbler_content_rw_t)
+-manage_files_pattern(cobblerd_t, httpd_cobbler_content_rw_t, httpd_cobbler_content_rw_t)
++optional_policy(`
++ apache_content_template(cobbler)
++
++ list_dirs_pattern(cobblerd_t, httpd_cobbler_content_t, httpd_cobbler_content_t)
++ manage_dirs_pattern(cobblerd_t, httpd_cobbler_content_rw_t, httpd_cobbler_content_rw_t)
++ manage_files_pattern(cobblerd_t, httpd_cobbler_content_rw_t, httpd_cobbler_content_rw_t)
++')
diff --git a/collectd.fc b/collectd.fc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2e1007b
@@ -9789,10 +10928,10 @@ index 0000000..40415f8
+
diff --git a/collectd.te b/collectd.te
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..6cefd75
+index 0000000..cb6dbe6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/collectd.te
-@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
+@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
+policy_module(collectd, 1.0.0)
+
+########################################
@@ -9860,8 +10999,6 @@ index 0000000..6cefd75
+
+fs_getattr_all_fs(collectd_t)
+
-+miscfiles_read_localization(collectd_t)
-+
+logging_send_syslog_msg(collectd_t)
+
+sysnet_dns_name_resolve(collectd_t)
@@ -9928,7 +11065,7 @@ index 733e4e6..fa2c3cb 100644
+ ps_process_pattern($1, colord_t)
+')
diff --git a/colord.te b/colord.te
-index 74505cc..5861f7d 100644
+index 74505cc..10d9a27 100644
--- a/colord.te
+++ b/colord.te
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ policy_module(colord, 1.0.0)
@@ -9985,7 +11122,7 @@ index 74505cc..5861f7d 100644
dev_read_video_dev(colord_t)
dev_write_video_dev(colord_t)
dev_rw_printer(colord_t)
-@@ -62,22 +76,37 @@ dev_rw_generic_usb_dev(colord_t)
+@@ -62,22 +76,36 @@ dev_rw_generic_usb_dev(colord_t)
domain_use_interactive_fds(colord_t)
files_list_mnt(colord_t)
@@ -10007,13 +11144,13 @@ index 74505cc..5861f7d 100644
+
logging_send_syslog_msg(colord_t)
- miscfiles_read_localization(colord_t)
-
--sysnet_dns_name_resolve(colord_t)
+-miscfiles_read_localization(colord_t)
+fs_getattr_tmpfs(colord_t)
+userdom_rw_user_tmpfs_files(colord_t)
-+
+
+-sysnet_dns_name_resolve(colord_t)
+userdom_home_reader(colord_t)
++userdom_read_inherited_user_home_content_files(colord_t)
tunable_policy(`use_nfs_home_dirs',`
+ fs_getattr_nfs(colord_t)
@@ -10025,7 +11162,7 @@ index 74505cc..5861f7d 100644
fs_read_cifs_files(colord_t)
')
-@@ -89,6 +118,12 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -89,6 +117,12 @@ optional_policy(`
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -10038,7 +11175,7 @@ index 74505cc..5861f7d 100644
policykit_dbus_chat(colord_t)
policykit_domtrans_auth(colord_t)
policykit_read_lib(colord_t)
-@@ -96,5 +131,19 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -96,5 +130,19 @@ optional_policy(`
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -10059,7 +11196,7 @@ index 74505cc..5861f7d 100644
+ zoneminder_rw_tmpfs_files(colord_t)
+')
diff --git a/comsat.te b/comsat.te
-index 3d121fd..b4cfef9 100644
+index 3d121fd..b64c98c 100644
--- a/comsat.te
+++ b/comsat.te
@@ -39,7 +39,6 @@ kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(comsat_t)
@@ -10078,6 +11215,15 @@ index 3d121fd..b4cfef9 100644
files_list_usr(comsat_t)
files_search_spool(comsat_t)
files_search_home(comsat_t)
+@@ -63,8 +61,6 @@ init_dontaudit_write_utmp(comsat_t)
+
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(comsat_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(comsat_t)
+-
+ userdom_dontaudit_getattr_user_ttys(comsat_t)
+
+ mta_getattr_spool(comsat_t)
diff --git a/condor.fc b/condor.fc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b3a5b51
@@ -10107,10 +11253,10 @@ index 0000000..b3a5b51
+/var/run/condor(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:condor_var_run_t,s0)
diff --git a/condor.if b/condor.if
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..e4ef32f
+index 0000000..8424fdb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/condor.if
-@@ -0,0 +1,387 @@
+@@ -0,0 +1,393 @@
+
+## <summary>policy for condor</summary>
+
@@ -10143,6 +11289,12 @@ index 0000000..e4ef32f
+
+ domtrans_pattern(condor_master_t, condor_$1_exec_t, condor_$1_t)
+ allow condor_master_t condor_$1_exec_t:file ioctl;
++
++ kernel_read_system_state(condor_$1_t)
++
++ auth_use_nsswitch(condor_$1_t)
++
++ logging_send_syslog_msg(condor_$1_t)
+')
+
+########################################
@@ -10500,10 +11652,10 @@ index 0000000..e4ef32f
+')
diff --git a/condor.te b/condor.te
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..d39573f
+index 0000000..c2bc300
--- /dev/null
+++ b/condor.te
-@@ -0,0 +1,241 @@
+@@ -0,0 +1,240 @@
+policy_module(condor, 1.0.0)
+
+########################################
@@ -10530,6 +11682,9 @@ index 0000000..d39573f
+condor_domain_template(startd)
+condor_domain_template(procd)
+
++type condor_master_tmp_t;
++files_tmp_file(condor_master_tmp_t)
++
+type condor_schedd_tmp_t;
+files_tmp_file(condor_schedd_tmp_t)
+
@@ -10577,16 +11732,17 @@ index 0000000..d39573f
+manage_files_pattern(condor_domain, condor_var_lib_t, condor_var_lib_t)
+files_var_lib_filetrans(condor_domain, condor_var_lib_t, { dir file })
+
++manage_dirs_pattern(condor_domain, condor_var_lock_t, condor_var_lock_t)
+manage_files_pattern(condor_domain, condor_var_lock_t, condor_var_lock_t)
-+files_lock_filetrans(condor_domain, condor_var_lock_t, file)
++files_lock_filetrans(condor_domain, condor_var_lock_t, { dir file })
+
+manage_dirs_pattern(condor_domain, condor_var_run_t, condor_var_run_t)
+manage_files_pattern(condor_domain, condor_var_run_t, condor_var_run_t)
+manage_fifo_files_pattern(condor_domain, condor_var_run_t, condor_var_run_t)
+files_pid_filetrans(condor_domain, condor_var_run_t, { dir file fifo_file })
+
-+kernel_read_system_state(condor_domain)
+kernel_read_network_state(condor_domain)
++kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(condor_domain)
+
+corecmd_exec_bin(condor_domain)
+corecmd_exec_shell(condor_domain)
@@ -10602,10 +11758,6 @@ index 0000000..d39573f
+
+files_read_etc_files(condor_domain)
+
-+logging_send_syslog_msg(condor_domain)
-+
-+miscfiles_read_localization(condor_domain)
-+
+tunable_policy(`condor_domain_can_network_connect',`
+ corenet_tcp_connect_all_ports(condor_domain)
+')
@@ -10625,14 +11777,22 @@ index 0000000..d39573f
+
+allow condor_master_t self:capability { setuid setgid dac_override sys_ptrace };
+
-+allow condor_master_t condor_domain:process signal;
++allow condor_master_t condor_domain:process { sigkill signal };
++
++manage_dirs_pattern(condor_master_t, condor_master_tmp_t, condor_master_tmp_t)
++manage_files_pattern(condor_master_t, condor_master_tmp_t, condor_master_tmp_t)
++files_tmp_filetrans(condor_master_t, condor_master_tmp_t, { file dir })
+
+corenet_tcp_bind_condor_port(condor_master_t)
+corenet_udp_bind_condor_port(condor_master_t)
++corenet_tcp_connect_amqp_port(condor_master_t)
+
+domain_read_all_domains_state(condor_master_t)
+
-+auth_use_nsswitch(condor_master_t)
++optional_policy(`
++ mta_send_mail(condor_master_t)
++ mta_read_config(condor_master_t)
++')
+
+######################################
+#
@@ -10646,8 +11806,6 @@ index 0000000..d39573f
+
+kernel_read_network_state(condor_collector_t)
+
-+auth_use_nsswitch(condor_collector_t)
-+
+#####################################
+#
+# condor negotiator local policy
@@ -10658,8 +11816,6 @@ index 0000000..d39573f
+
+corenet_tcp_connect_all_ephemeral_ports(condor_negotiator_t)
+
-+auth_use_nsswitch(condor_negotiator_t)
-+
+######################################
+#
+# condor procd local policy
@@ -10667,6 +11823,9 @@ index 0000000..d39573f
+
+allow condor_procd_t self:capability { fowner chown dac_override sys_ptrace };
+
++allow condor_procd_t self:capability kill;
++allow condor_procd_t condor_startd_t:process sigkill;
++
+domain_read_all_domains_state(condor_procd_t)
+
+#######################################
@@ -10689,12 +11848,8 @@ index 0000000..d39573f
+files_tmp_filetrans(condor_schedd_t, condor_schedd_tmp_t, { file dir })
+allow condor_schedd_t condor_schedd_tmp_t:file { relabelfrom relabelto };
+
-+kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(condor_schedd_t)
-+
+corenet_tcp_connect_all_ephemeral_ports(condor_schedd_t)
+
-+auth_use_nsswitch(condor_schedd_t)
-+
+#####################################
+#
+# condor startd local policy
@@ -10715,14 +11870,10 @@ index 0000000..d39573f
+
+can_exec(condor_startd_t, condor_startd_exec_t)
+
-+kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(condor_startd_t)
-+
+domain_read_all_domains_state(condor_startd_t)
+
+mcs_process_set_categories(condor_startd_t)
+
-+auth_use_nsswitch(condor_startd_t)
-+
+init_domtrans_script(condor_startd_t)
+init_initrc_domain(condor_startd_t)
+
@@ -10878,7 +12029,7 @@ index fd15dfe..aac1e5d 100644
+ ps_process_pattern($1, consolekit_t)
+')
diff --git a/consolekit.te b/consolekit.te
-index 6f2896d..5a5a3bb 100644
+index 6f2896d..ca0b28a 100644
--- a/consolekit.te
+++ b/consolekit.te
@@ -15,12 +15,19 @@ logging_log_file(consolekit_log_t)
@@ -10911,12 +12062,13 @@ index 6f2896d..5a5a3bb 100644
files_read_usr_files(consolekit_t)
# needs to read /var/lib/dbus/machine-id
files_read_var_lib_files(consolekit_t)
-@@ -69,15 +74,17 @@ logging_send_audit_msgs(consolekit_t)
-
- miscfiles_read_localization(consolekit_t)
+@@ -67,17 +72,17 @@ init_rw_utmp(consolekit_t)
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(consolekit_t)
+ logging_send_audit_msgs(consolekit_t)
+-miscfiles_read_localization(consolekit_t)
+systemd_exec_systemctl(consolekit_t)
-+
+
+userdom_read_all_users_state(consolekit_t)
userdom_dontaudit_read_user_home_content_files(consolekit_t)
+userdom_dontaudit_getattr_admin_home_files(consolekit_t)
@@ -10934,7 +12086,7 @@ index 6f2896d..5a5a3bb 100644
')
optional_policy(`
-@@ -97,7 +104,7 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -97,7 +102,7 @@ optional_policy(`
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -10943,7 +12095,7 @@ index 6f2896d..5a5a3bb 100644
')
optional_policy(`
-@@ -108,9 +115,10 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -108,9 +113,10 @@ optional_policy(`
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -10956,7 +12108,7 @@ index 6f2896d..5a5a3bb 100644
xserver_read_xdm_pid(consolekit_t)
xserver_read_user_xauth(consolekit_t)
xserver_non_drawing_client(consolekit_t)
-@@ -126,6 +134,5 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -126,6 +132,5 @@ optional_policy(`
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -10964,35 +12116,29 @@ index 6f2896d..5a5a3bb 100644
unconfined_stream_connect(consolekit_t)
')
diff --git a/corosync.fc b/corosync.fc
-index 3a6d7eb..45bf29b 100644
+index 3a6d7eb..1bb208a 100644
--- a/corosync.fc
+++ b/corosync.fc
-@@ -1,12 +1,22 @@
+@@ -1,12 +1,14 @@
/etc/rc\.d/init\.d/corosync -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:corosync_initrc_exec_t,s0)
-+/etc/rc\.d/init\.d/heartbeat -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:corosync_initrc_exec_t,s0)
-+
+
+-/usr/sbin/corosync -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:corosync_exec_t,s0)
+/usr/lib/systemd/system/corosync.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:corosync_unit_file_t,s0)
- /usr/sbin/corosync -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:corosync_exec_t,s0)
+-/usr/sbin/ccs_tool -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:corosync_exec_t,s0)
++/usr/sbin/corosync -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:corosync_exec_t,s0)
+/usr/sbin/corosync-notifyd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:corosync_exec_t,s0)
- /usr/sbin/ccs_tool -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:corosync_exec_t,s0)
-+/usr/sbin/cman_tool -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:corosync_exec_t,s0)
-+
-+/usr/lib(64)?/heartbeat/heartbeat -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:corosync_exec_t,s0)
-
/var/lib/corosync(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:corosync_var_lib_t,s0)
-+/var/lib/heartbeat(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:corosync_var_lib_t,s0)
-/var/log/cluster/corosync\.log -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:corosync_var_log_t,s0)
+/var/log/cluster/corosync\.log.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:corosync_var_log_t,s0)
/var/run/cman_.* -s gen_context(system_u:object_r:corosync_var_run_t,s0)
/var/run/corosync\.pid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:corosync_var_run_t,s0)
-+/var/run/heartbeat(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:corosync_var_run_t,s0)
+/var/run/rsctmp(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:corosync_var_run_t,s0)
diff --git a/corosync.if b/corosync.if
-index 5220c9d..25babd6 100644
+index 5220c9d..885b25d 100644
--- a/corosync.if
+++ b/corosync.if
@@ -18,6 +18,25 @@ interface(`corosync_domtrans',`
@@ -11021,7 +12167,7 @@ index 5220c9d..25babd6 100644
#######################################
## <summary>
## Allow the specified domain to read corosync's log files.
-@@ -52,12 +71,37 @@ interface(`corosync_read_log',`
+@@ -52,14 +71,58 @@ interface(`corosync_read_log',`
interface(`corosync_stream_connect',`
gen_require(`
type corosync_t, corosync_var_run_t;
@@ -11033,6 +12179,25 @@ index 5220c9d..25babd6 100644
stream_connect_pattern($1, corosync_var_run_t, corosync_var_run_t, corosync_t)
')
+ ######################################
+ ## <summary>
++## Allow the specified domain to read/write corosync's tmpfs files.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`corosync_rw_tmpfs',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type corosync_tmpfs_t;
++ ')
++
++ rw_files_pattern($1, corosync_tmpfs_t, corosync_tmpfs_t)
++
++')
++
+########################################
+## <summary>
+## Execute corosync server in the corosync domain.
@@ -11056,10 +12221,12 @@ index 5220c9d..25babd6 100644
+ ps_process_pattern($1, corosync_t)
+')
+
- ######################################
- ## <summary>
++######################################
++## <summary>
## All of the rules required to administrate
-@@ -80,11 +124,16 @@ interface(`corosyncd_admin',`
+ ## an corosync environment
+ ## </summary>
+@@ -80,11 +143,16 @@ interface(`corosyncd_admin',`
type corosync_t, corosync_var_lib_t, corosync_var_log_t;
type corosync_var_run_t, corosync_tmp_t, corosync_tmpfs_t;
type corosync_initrc_exec_t;
@@ -11077,7 +12244,7 @@ index 5220c9d..25babd6 100644
init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, corosync_initrc_exec_t)
domain_system_change_exemption($1)
role_transition $2 corosync_initrc_exec_t system_r;
-@@ -103,4 +152,8 @@ interface(`corosyncd_admin',`
+@@ -103,4 +171,8 @@ interface(`corosyncd_admin',`
files_list_pids($1)
admin_pattern($1, corosync_var_run_t)
@@ -11087,7 +12254,7 @@ index 5220c9d..25babd6 100644
+ allow $1 corosync_unit_file_t:service all_service_perms;
')
diff --git a/corosync.te b/corosync.te
-index 04969e5..628bbf2 100644
+index 04969e5..65c8353 100644
--- a/corosync.te
+++ b/corosync.te
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ policy_module(corosync, 1.0.0)
@@ -11112,7 +12279,7 @@ index 04969e5..628bbf2 100644
-allow corosync_t self:capability { sys_nice sys_resource ipc_lock };
-allow corosync_t self:process { setrlimit setsched signal };
-+allow corosync_t self:capability { dac_override setuid setgid sys_nice sys_admin sys_resource ipc_lock };
++allow corosync_t self:capability { dac_override fowner setuid setgid sys_nice sys_admin sys_resource ipc_lock };
+# for hearbeat
+allow corosync_t self:capability { net_raw chown };
+allow corosync_t self:process { setpgid setrlimit setsched signal signull };
@@ -11121,7 +12288,8 @@ index 04969e5..628bbf2 100644
allow corosync_t self:sem create_sem_perms;
+allow corosync_t self:shm create_shm_perms;
allow corosync_t self:unix_stream_socket { create_stream_socket_perms connectto };
- allow corosync_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms;
+-allow corosync_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms;
++allow corosync_t self:unix_dgram_socket { create_socket_perms sendto };
allow corosync_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms;
+can_exec(corosync_t, corosync_exec_t)
@@ -11143,7 +12311,7 @@ index 04969e5..628bbf2 100644
manage_files_pattern(corosync_t, corosync_var_log_t, corosync_var_log_t)
manage_sock_files_pattern(corosync_t, corosync_var_log_t, corosync_var_log_t)
-@@ -60,11 +71,16 @@ logging_log_filetrans(corosync_t, corosync_var_log_t, { sock_file file })
+@@ -60,44 +71,93 @@ logging_log_filetrans(corosync_t, corosync_var_log_t, { sock_file file })
manage_files_pattern(corosync_t, corosync_var_run_t, corosync_var_run_t)
manage_sock_files_pattern(corosync_t, corosync_var_run_t, corosync_var_run_t)
@@ -11153,15 +12321,17 @@ index 04969e5..628bbf2 100644
kernel_read_system_state(corosync_t)
+kernel_read_network_state(corosync_t)
-+kernel_read_net_sysctls(corosync_t)
-+kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(corosync_t)
++kernel_read_all_sysctls(corosync_t)
corecmd_exec_bin(corosync_t)
+corecmd_exec_shell(corosync_t)
corenet_udp_bind_netsupport_port(corosync_t)
++corenet_tcp_connect_saphostctrl_port(corosync_t)
+
+ dev_read_urand(corosync_t)
++dev_read_sysfs(corosync_t)
-@@ -73,9 +89,11 @@ dev_read_urand(corosync_t)
domain_read_all_domains_state(corosync_t)
files_manage_mounttab(corosync_t)
@@ -11173,10 +12343,10 @@ index 04969e5..628bbf2 100644
init_read_script_state(corosync_t)
init_rw_script_tmp_files(corosync_t)
-@@ -83,19 +101,49 @@ logging_send_syslog_msg(corosync_t)
-
- miscfiles_read_localization(corosync_t)
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(corosync_t)
+-miscfiles_read_localization(corosync_t)
+-
+userdom_read_user_tmp_files(corosync_t)
+userdom_delete_user_tmpfs_files(corosync_t)
userdom_rw_user_tmpfs_files(corosync_t)
@@ -11195,13 +12365,18 @@ index 04969e5..628bbf2 100644
- rhcs_rw_dlm_controld_semaphores(corosync_t)
+ cmirrord_rw_shm(corosync_t)
+')
-+
+
+- rhcs_rw_fenced_semaphores(corosync_t)
+optional_policy(`
-+ dbus_system_bus_client(corosync_t)
++ consoletype_exec(corosync_t)
+')
-- rhcs_rw_fenced_semaphores(corosync_t)
+- rhcs_rw_gfs_controld_semaphores(corosync_t)
+optional_policy(`
++ dbus_system_bus_client(corosync_t)
+ ')
+
+ optional_policy(`
+ drbd_domtrans(corosync_t)
+')
+
@@ -11209,8 +12384,7 @@ index 04969e5..628bbf2 100644
+ lvm_rw_clvmd_tmpfs_files(corosync_t)
+ lvm_delete_clvmd_tmpfs_files(corosync_t)
+')
-
-- rhcs_rw_gfs_controld_semaphores(corosync_t)
++
+optional_policy(`
+ qpidd_rw_shm(corosync_t)
+')
@@ -11224,9 +12398,20 @@ index 04969e5..628bbf2 100644
+ rhcs_read_cluster_lib_files(corosync_t)
+ rhcs_manage_cluster_lib_files(corosync_t)
+ rhcs_relabel_cluster_lib_files(corosync_t)
++')
++
++optional_policy(`
++ # should be removed in F19
++ # workaround because we switch hearbeat from corosync to rgmanager
++ rgmanager_manage_files(corosync_t)
++
+ rgmanager_manage_tmpfs_files(corosync_t)
')
-
- optional_policy(`
++
++optional_policy(`
++ rpc_search_nfs_state_data(corosync_t)
++')
++
diff --git a/couchdb.fc b/couchdb.fc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..196461b
@@ -11496,10 +12681,10 @@ index 0000000..3e17383
+')
diff --git a/couchdb.te b/couchdb.te
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..7fa117a
+index 0000000..4b0535f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/couchdb.te
-@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
+@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
+policy_module(couchdb, 1.0.0)
+
+########################################
@@ -11583,7 +12768,6 @@ index 0000000..7fa117a
+
+libs_exec_lib_files(couchdb_t)
+
-+miscfiles_read_localization(couchdb_t)
diff --git a/courier.fc b/courier.fc
index 47dfa07..1beadbd 100644
--- a/courier.fc
@@ -11613,7 +12797,7 @@ index 47dfa07..1beadbd 100644
ifdef(`distro_gentoo',`
/usr/lib/courier-imap/couriertcpd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:courier_tcpd_exec_t,s0)
diff --git a/courier.if b/courier.if
-index 9971337..476f1e2 100644
+index 9971337..4078c26 100644
--- a/courier.if
+++ b/courier.if
@@ -50,7 +50,6 @@ template(`courier_domain_template',`
@@ -11624,7 +12808,16 @@ index 9971337..476f1e2 100644
corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(courier_$1_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(courier_$1_t)
corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if(courier_$1_t)
-@@ -104,6 +103,25 @@ interface(`courier_domtrans_authdaemon',`
+@@ -90,7 +89,7 @@ template(`courier_domain_template',`
+ ## Execute the courier authentication daemon with
+ ## a domain transition.
+ ## </summary>
+-## <param name="prefix">
++## <param name="domain">
+ ## <summary>
+ ## Domain allowed to transition.
+ ## </summary>
+@@ -104,12 +103,31 @@ interface(`courier_domtrans_authdaemon',`
domtrans_pattern($1, courier_authdaemon_exec_t, courier_authdaemon_t)
')
@@ -11650,6 +12843,22 @@ index 9971337..476f1e2 100644
########################################
## <summary>
## Execute the courier POP3 and IMAP server with
+ ## a domain transition.
+ ## </summary>
+-## <param name="prefix">
++## <param name="domain">
+ ## <summary>
+ ## Domain allowed to transition.
+ ## </summary>
+@@ -127,7 +145,7 @@ interface(`courier_domtrans_pop',`
+ ## <summary>
+ ## Read courier config files
+ ## </summary>
+-## <param name="prefix">
++## <param name="domain">
+ ## <summary>
+ ## Domain allowed access.
+ ## </summary>
@@ -138,6 +156,7 @@ interface(`courier_read_config',`
type courier_etc_t;
')
@@ -11658,6 +12867,15 @@ index 9971337..476f1e2 100644
read_files_pattern($1, courier_etc_t, courier_etc_t)
')
+@@ -146,7 +165,7 @@ interface(`courier_read_config',`
+ ## Create, read, write, and delete courier
+ ## spool directories.
+ ## </summary>
+-## <param name="prefix">
++## <param name="domain">
+ ## <summary>
+ ## Domain allowed access.
+ ## </summary>
@@ -157,6 +176,7 @@ interface(`courier_manage_spool_dirs',`
type courier_spool_t;
')
@@ -11666,6 +12884,15 @@ index 9971337..476f1e2 100644
manage_dirs_pattern($1, courier_spool_t, courier_spool_t)
')
+@@ -165,7 +185,7 @@ interface(`courier_manage_spool_dirs',`
+ ## Create, read, write, and delete courier
+ ## spool files.
+ ## </summary>
+-## <param name="prefix">
++## <param name="domains">
+ ## <summary>
+ ## Domain allowed access.
+ ## </summary>
@@ -176,6 +196,7 @@ interface(`courier_manage_spool_files',`
type courier_spool_t;
')
@@ -11692,7 +12919,7 @@ index 9971337..476f1e2 100644
')
diff --git a/courier.te b/courier.te
-index d034450..8478094 100644
+index d034450..820c10b 100644
--- a/courier.te
+++ b/courier.te
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ courier_domain_template(pcp)
@@ -11704,14 +12931,32 @@ index d034450..8478094 100644
courier_domain_template(tcpd)
-@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ allow courier_pop_t courier_authdaemon_t:process sigchld;
+@@ -68,7 +68,6 @@ auth_domtrans_chk_passwd(courier_authdaemon_t)
+
+ libs_read_lib_files(courier_authdaemon_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(courier_authdaemon_t)
+
+ # should not be needed!
+ userdom_search_user_home_dirs(courier_authdaemon_t)
+@@ -95,9 +94,8 @@ allow courier_pop_t courier_authdaemon_t:process sigchld;
allow courier_pop_t courier_tcpd_t:{ unix_stream_socket tcp_socket } rw_stream_socket_perms;
# inherits file handle - should it?
-allow courier_pop_t courier_var_lib_t:file { read write };
+allow courier_pop_t courier_var_lib_t:file rw_inherited_file_perms;
- miscfiles_read_localization(courier_pop_t)
+-miscfiles_read_localization(courier_pop_t)
+
+ courier_domtrans_authdaemon(courier_pop_t)
+
+@@ -132,7 +130,6 @@ corenet_sendrecv_pop_server_packets(courier_tcpd_t)
+ dev_read_rand(courier_tcpd_t)
+ dev_read_urand(courier_tcpd_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(courier_tcpd_t)
+
+ courier_domtrans_pop(courier_tcpd_t)
diff --git a/cpucontrol.fc b/cpucontrol.fc
index 789c8c7..d1723f5 100644
@@ -11726,7 +12971,7 @@ index 789c8c7..d1723f5 100644
/usr/sbin/cpuspeed -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:cpuspeed_exec_t,s0)
/usr/sbin/powernowd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:cpuspeed_exec_t,s0)
diff --git a/cpucontrol.te b/cpucontrol.te
-index 13d2f63..a048c53 100644
+index 13d2f63..1a00094 100644
--- a/cpucontrol.te
+++ b/cpucontrol.te
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ type cpucontrol_exec_t;
@@ -11738,8 +12983,17 @@ index 13d2f63..a048c53 100644
type cpuspeed_t;
type cpuspeed_exec_t;
+@@ -105,8 +105,6 @@ init_use_script_ptys(cpuspeed_t)
+
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(cpuspeed_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(cpuspeed_t)
+-
+ userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fds(cpuspeed_t)
+
+ optional_policy(`
diff --git a/cpufreqselector.te b/cpufreqselector.te
-index f77d58a..3d78ee8 100644
+index f77d58a..f3d98a9 100644
--- a/cpufreqselector.te
+++ b/cpufreqselector.te
@@ -14,9 +14,10 @@ application_domain(cpufreqselector_t, cpufreqselector_exec_t)
@@ -11754,13 +13008,13 @@ index f77d58a..3d78ee8 100644
kernel_read_system_state(cpufreqselector_t)
-@@ -27,13 +28,16 @@ corecmd_search_bin(cpufreqselector_t)
+@@ -27,13 +28,15 @@ corecmd_search_bin(cpufreqselector_t)
dev_rw_sysfs(cpufreqselector_t)
+-miscfiles_read_localization(cpufreqselector_t)
+kernel_read_system_state(cpufreqselector_t)
+
- miscfiles_read_localization(cpufreqselector_t)
userdom_read_all_users_state(cpufreqselector_t)
-userdom_dontaudit_search_user_home_dirs(cpufreqselector_t)
@@ -11772,7 +13026,7 @@ index f77d58a..3d78ee8 100644
optional_policy(`
consolekit_dbus_chat(cpufreqselector_t)
-@@ -53,3 +57,7 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -53,3 +56,7 @@ optional_policy(`
policykit_read_lib(cpufreqselector_t)
policykit_read_reload(cpufreqselector_t)
')
@@ -11844,88 +13098,98 @@ index 3559a05..224142a 100644
/var/spool/cron/atjobs -d gen_context(system_u:object_r:cron_spool_t,s0)
/var/spool/cron/atjobs/[^/]* -- <<none>>
diff --git a/cron.if b/cron.if
-index 6e12dc7..bd94df7 100644
+index 6e12dc7..b006818 100644
--- a/cron.if
+++ b/cron.if
-@@ -12,6 +12,11 @@
+@@ -12,12 +12,17 @@
## </param>
#
template(`cron_common_crontab_template',`
+ gen_require(`
-+ type crond_t, crond_var_run_t, crontab_exec_t;
-+ type cron_spool_t, user_cron_spool_t;
++ attribute crontab_domain;
++ type crontab_exec_t;
+ ')
+
##############################
#
# Declarations
-@@ -30,11 +35,15 @@ template(`cron_common_crontab_template',`
+ #
- # dac_override is to create the file in the directory under /tmp
- allow $1_t self:capability { fowner setuid setgid chown dac_override };
-- allow $1_t self:process { setsched signal_perms };
-+ allow $1_t self:process { getcap setsched signal_perms };
- allow $1_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms;
+- type $1_t;
++ type $1_t, crontab_domain;
+ userdom_user_application_domain($1_t, crontab_exec_t)
+
+ type $1_tmp_t;
+@@ -28,63 +33,19 @@ template(`cron_common_crontab_template',`
+ # Local policy
+ #
+- # dac_override is to create the file in the directory under /tmp
+- allow $1_t self:capability { fowner setuid setgid chown dac_override };
+- allow $1_t self:process { setsched signal_perms };
+- allow $1_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms;
+-
- allow $1_t $1_tmp_t:file manage_file_perms;
- files_tmp_filetrans($1_t, $1_tmp_t, file)
-+ allow $1_t crond_t:process signal;
-+ allow $1_t crond_var_run_t:file read_file_perms;
-+
+-
+- # create files in /var/spool/cron
+- manage_files_pattern($1_t, { cron_spool_t user_cron_spool_t }, user_cron_spool_t)
+- filetrans_pattern($1_t, cron_spool_t, user_cron_spool_t, file)
+- files_list_spool($1_t)
+-
+- # crontab signals crond by updating the mtime on the spooldir
+- allow $1_t cron_spool_t:dir setattr;
+ manage_dirs_pattern($1_t, $1_tmp_t, $1_tmp_t)
+ manage_files_pattern($1_t, $1_tmp_t, $1_tmp_t)
+ files_tmp_filetrans($1_t, $1_tmp_t, { dir file })
- # create files in /var/spool/cron
- manage_files_pattern($1_t, { cron_spool_t user_cron_spool_t }, user_cron_spool_t)
-@@ -42,7 +51,7 @@ template(`cron_common_crontab_template',`
- files_list_spool($1_t)
-
- # crontab signals crond by updating the mtime on the spooldir
-- allow $1_t cron_spool_t:dir setattr;
-+ allow $1_t cron_spool_t:dir setattr_dir_perms;
-
kernel_read_system_state($1_t)
-@@ -50,6 +59,8 @@ template(`cron_common_crontab_template',`
- selinux_dontaudit_search_fs($1_t)
-
- fs_getattr_xattr_fs($1_t)
-+ fs_manage_cgroup_dirs($1_t)
-+ fs_manage_cgroup_files($1_t)
-
- domain_use_interactive_fds($1_t)
-
-@@ -58,12 +69,16 @@ template(`cron_common_crontab_template',`
- files_dontaudit_search_pids($1_t)
-
+- # for the checks used by crontab -u
+- selinux_dontaudit_search_fs($1_t)
+-
+- fs_getattr_xattr_fs($1_t)
+-
+- domain_use_interactive_fds($1_t)
+-
+- files_read_etc_files($1_t)
+- files_read_usr_files($1_t)
+- files_dontaudit_search_pids($1_t)
+-
auth_domtrans_chk_passwd($1_t)
-+ auth_rw_var_auth($1_t)
+ auth_use_nsswitch($1_t)
logging_send_syslog_msg($1_t)
- logging_send_audit_msgs($1_t)
-+ logging_set_loginuid($1_t)
-
- init_dontaudit_write_utmp($1_t)
- init_read_utmp($1_t)
-+ init_read_state($1_t)
+- logging_send_audit_msgs($1_t)
+-
+- init_dontaudit_write_utmp($1_t)
+- init_read_utmp($1_t)
+-
+- miscfiles_read_localization($1_t)
- miscfiles_read_localization($1_t)
+- seutil_read_config($1_t)
++ userdom_home_reader($1_t)
-@@ -72,9 +87,10 @@ template(`cron_common_crontab_template',`
- userdom_manage_user_tmp_dirs($1_t)
- userdom_manage_user_tmp_files($1_t)
- # Access terminals.
+- userdom_manage_user_tmp_dirs($1_t)
+- userdom_manage_user_tmp_files($1_t)
+- # Access terminals.
- userdom_use_user_terminals($1_t)
-+ userdom_use_inherited_user_terminals($1_t)
- # Read user crontabs
- userdom_read_user_home_content_files($1_t)
-+ userdom_read_user_home_content_symlinks($1_t)
+- # Read user crontabs
+- userdom_read_user_home_content_files($1_t)
+-
+- tunable_policy(`fcron_crond',`
+- # fcron wants an instant update of a crontab change for the administrator
+- # also crontab does a security check for crontab -u
+- dontaudit $1_t crond_t:process signal;
+- ')
+-
+- optional_policy(`
+- nscd_socket_use($1_t)
+- ')
+ ')
- tunable_policy(`fcron_crond',`
- # fcron wants an instant update of a crontab change for the administrator
-@@ -101,10 +117,12 @@ template(`cron_common_crontab_template',`
+ ########################################
+@@ -101,10 +62,12 @@ template(`cron_common_crontab_template',`
## User domain for the role
## </summary>
## </param>
@@ -11938,7 +13202,7 @@ index 6e12dc7..bd94df7 100644
')
role $1 types { cronjob_t crontab_t };
-@@ -115,9 +133,20 @@ interface(`cron_role',`
+@@ -115,9 +78,20 @@ interface(`cron_role',`
# Transition from the user domain to the derived domain.
domtrans_pattern($2, crontab_exec_t, crontab_t)
@@ -11960,7 +13224,7 @@ index 6e12dc7..bd94df7 100644
# Run helper programs as the user domain
#corecmd_bin_domtrans(crontab_t, $2)
-@@ -150,29 +179,21 @@ interface(`cron_role',`
+@@ -150,29 +124,21 @@ interface(`cron_role',`
## User domain for the role
## </summary>
## </param>
@@ -11997,7 +13261,7 @@ index 6e12dc7..bd94df7 100644
optional_policy(`
gen_require(`
-@@ -180,9 +201,8 @@ interface(`cron_unconfined_role',`
+@@ -180,9 +146,8 @@ interface(`cron_unconfined_role',`
')
dbus_stub(unconfined_cronjob_t)
@@ -12008,7 +13272,7 @@ index 6e12dc7..bd94df7 100644
')
########################################
-@@ -199,6 +219,7 @@ interface(`cron_unconfined_role',`
+@@ -199,10 +164,12 @@ interface(`cron_unconfined_role',`
## User domain for the role
## </summary>
## </param>
@@ -12016,7 +13280,12 @@ index 6e12dc7..bd94df7 100644
#
interface(`cron_admin_role',`
gen_require(`
-@@ -219,7 +240,10 @@ interface(`cron_admin_role',`
+ type cronjob_t, crontab_exec_t, admin_crontab_t, admin_crontab_tmp_t;
++ type user_cron_spool_t, crond_t;
+ class passwd crontab;
+ ')
+
+@@ -219,7 +186,18 @@ interface(`cron_admin_role',`
# crontab shows up in user ps
ps_process_pattern($2, admin_crontab_t)
@@ -12025,10 +13294,18 @@ index 6e12dc7..bd94df7 100644
+ tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',`
+ allow $2 admin_crontab_t:process ptrace;
+ ')
++
++ allow $2 crond_t:process sigchld;
++ allow crond_t $2:process transition;
++
++ dontaudit crond_t $2:process { noatsecure siginh rlimitinh };
++
++ # needs to be authorized SELinux context for cron
++ allow $2 user_cron_spool_t:file entrypoint;
# Run helper programs as the user domain
#corecmd_bin_domtrans(admin_crontab_t, $2)
-@@ -263,6 +287,9 @@ interface(`cron_system_entry',`
+@@ -263,6 +241,9 @@ interface(`cron_system_entry',`
domtrans_pattern(crond_t, $2, $1)
role system_r types $1;
@@ -12038,7 +13315,7 @@ index 6e12dc7..bd94df7 100644
')
########################################
-@@ -303,7 +330,7 @@ interface(`cron_exec',`
+@@ -303,7 +284,7 @@ interface(`cron_exec',`
########################################
## <summary>
@@ -12047,7 +13324,7 @@ index 6e12dc7..bd94df7 100644
## </summary>
## <param name="domain">
## <summary>
-@@ -321,6 +348,29 @@ interface(`cron_initrc_domtrans',`
+@@ -321,6 +302,29 @@ interface(`cron_initrc_domtrans',`
########################################
## <summary>
@@ -12077,7 +13354,7 @@ index 6e12dc7..bd94df7 100644
## Inherit and use a file descriptor
## from the cron daemon.
## </summary>
-@@ -358,6 +408,24 @@ interface(`cron_sigchld',`
+@@ -358,6 +362,24 @@ interface(`cron_sigchld',`
########################################
## <summary>
@@ -12102,7 +13379,7 @@ index 6e12dc7..bd94df7 100644
## Read a cron daemon unnamed pipe.
## </summary>
## <param name="domain">
-@@ -376,6 +444,47 @@ interface(`cron_read_pipes',`
+@@ -376,6 +398,47 @@ interface(`cron_read_pipes',`
########################################
## <summary>
@@ -12150,7 +13427,7 @@ index 6e12dc7..bd94df7 100644
## Do not audit attempts to write cron daemon unnamed pipes.
## </summary>
## <param name="domain">
-@@ -407,7 +516,43 @@ interface(`cron_rw_pipes',`
+@@ -407,7 +470,43 @@ interface(`cron_rw_pipes',`
type crond_t;
')
@@ -12195,7 +13472,7 @@ index 6e12dc7..bd94df7 100644
')
########################################
-@@ -467,6 +612,25 @@ interface(`cron_search_spool',`
+@@ -467,6 +566,25 @@ interface(`cron_search_spool',`
########################################
## <summary>
@@ -12221,7 +13498,7 @@ index 6e12dc7..bd94df7 100644
## Manage pid files used by cron
## </summary>
## <param name="domain">
-@@ -480,6 +644,7 @@ interface(`cron_manage_pid_files',`
+@@ -480,6 +598,7 @@ interface(`cron_manage_pid_files',`
type crond_var_run_t;
')
@@ -12229,7 +13506,7 @@ index 6e12dc7..bd94df7 100644
manage_files_pattern($1, crond_var_run_t, crond_var_run_t)
')
-@@ -535,7 +700,7 @@ interface(`cron_write_system_job_pipes',`
+@@ -535,7 +654,7 @@ interface(`cron_write_system_job_pipes',`
type system_cronjob_t;
')
@@ -12238,7 +13515,7 @@ index 6e12dc7..bd94df7 100644
')
########################################
-@@ -553,7 +718,7 @@ interface(`cron_rw_system_job_pipes',`
+@@ -553,7 +672,7 @@ interface(`cron_rw_system_job_pipes',`
type system_cronjob_t;
')
@@ -12247,7 +13524,7 @@ index 6e12dc7..bd94df7 100644
')
########################################
-@@ -586,11 +751,14 @@ interface(`cron_rw_system_job_stream_sockets',`
+@@ -586,11 +705,14 @@ interface(`cron_rw_system_job_stream_sockets',`
#
interface(`cron_read_system_job_tmp_files',`
gen_require(`
@@ -12263,7 +13540,7 @@ index 6e12dc7..bd94df7 100644
')
########################################
-@@ -626,7 +794,47 @@ interface(`cron_dontaudit_append_system_job_tmp_files',`
+@@ -626,7 +748,47 @@ interface(`cron_dontaudit_append_system_job_tmp_files',`
interface(`cron_dontaudit_write_system_job_tmp_files',`
gen_require(`
type system_cronjob_tmp_t;
@@ -12312,7 +13589,7 @@ index 6e12dc7..bd94df7 100644
+ manage_files_pattern($1, system_cronjob_var_lib_t, system_cronjob_var_lib_t)
')
diff --git a/cron.te b/cron.te
-index b357856..2af4e88 100644
+index b357856..2a711bd 100644
--- a/cron.te
+++ b/cron.te
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
@@ -12321,7 +13598,7 @@ index b357856..2af4e88 100644
gen_require(`
class passwd rootok;
-@@ -10,18 +10,18 @@ gen_require(`
+@@ -10,35 +10,36 @@ gen_require(`
#
## <desc>
@@ -12348,7 +13625,10 @@ index b357856..2af4e88 100644
## </desc>
gen_tunable(fcron_crond, false)
-@@ -31,14 +31,14 @@ type anacron_exec_t;
++attribute crontab_domain;
+ attribute cron_spool_type;
+
+ type anacron_exec_t;
application_executable_file(anacron_exec_t)
type cron_spool_t;
@@ -12365,7 +13645,7 @@ index b357856..2af4e88 100644
# var/log files
type cron_log_t;
-@@ -61,11 +61,17 @@ domain_cron_exemption_source(crond_t)
+@@ -61,11 +62,17 @@ domain_cron_exemption_source(crond_t)
type crond_initrc_exec_t;
init_script_file(crond_initrc_exec_t)
@@ -12383,7 +13663,7 @@ index b357856..2af4e88 100644
type crontab_exec_t;
application_executable_file(crontab_exec_t)
-@@ -79,14 +85,16 @@ typealias crontab_t alias { user_crontab_t staff_crontab_t };
+@@ -79,14 +86,16 @@ typealias crontab_t alias { user_crontab_t staff_crontab_t };
typealias crontab_t alias { auditadm_crontab_t secadm_crontab_t };
typealias crontab_tmp_t alias { user_crontab_tmp_t staff_crontab_tmp_t };
typealias crontab_tmp_t alias { auditadm_crontab_tmp_t secadm_crontab_tmp_t };
@@ -12401,7 +13681,7 @@ index b357856..2af4e88 100644
type system_cronjob_lock_t alias system_crond_lock_t;
files_lock_file(system_cronjob_lock_t)
-@@ -94,10 +102,6 @@ files_lock_file(system_cronjob_lock_t)
+@@ -94,10 +103,6 @@ files_lock_file(system_cronjob_lock_t)
type system_cronjob_tmp_t alias system_crond_tmp_t;
files_tmp_file(system_cronjob_tmp_t)
@@ -12412,7 +13692,7 @@ index b357856..2af4e88 100644
type unconfined_cronjob_t;
domain_type(unconfined_cronjob_t)
domain_cron_exemption_target(unconfined_cronjob_t)
-@@ -106,8 +110,20 @@ domain_cron_exemption_target(unconfined_cronjob_t)
+@@ -106,8 +111,20 @@ domain_cron_exemption_target(unconfined_cronjob_t)
type user_cron_spool_t, cron_spool_type;
typealias user_cron_spool_t alias { staff_cron_spool_t sysadm_cron_spool_t unconfined_cron_spool_t };
typealias user_cron_spool_t alias { auditadm_cron_spool_t secadm_cron_spool_t };
@@ -12434,7 +13714,7 @@ index b357856..2af4e88 100644
########################################
#
-@@ -115,7 +131,7 @@ ubac_constrained(user_cron_spool_t)
+@@ -115,7 +132,7 @@ ubac_constrained(user_cron_spool_t)
#
# Allow our crontab domain to unlink a user cron spool file.
@@ -12443,7 +13723,7 @@ index b357856..2af4e88 100644
# Manipulate other users crontab.
selinux_get_fs_mount(admin_crontab_t)
-@@ -125,7 +141,7 @@ selinux_compute_create_context(admin_crontab_t)
+@@ -125,7 +142,7 @@ selinux_compute_create_context(admin_crontab_t)
selinux_compute_relabel_context(admin_crontab_t)
selinux_compute_user_contexts(admin_crontab_t)
@@ -12452,7 +13732,7 @@ index b357856..2af4e88 100644
# fcron wants an instant update of a crontab change for the administrator
# also crontab does a security check for crontab -u
allow admin_crontab_t self:process setfscreate;
-@@ -136,9 +152,9 @@ tunable_policy(`fcron_crond', `
+@@ -136,9 +153,9 @@ tunable_policy(`fcron_crond', `
# Cron daemon local policy
#
@@ -12464,7 +13744,7 @@ index b357856..2af4e88 100644
allow crond_t self:process { setexec setfscreate };
allow crond_t self:fd use;
allow crond_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms;
-@@ -151,6 +167,7 @@ allow crond_t self:sem create_sem_perms;
+@@ -151,6 +168,7 @@ allow crond_t self:sem create_sem_perms;
allow crond_t self:msgq create_msgq_perms;
allow crond_t self:msg { send receive };
allow crond_t self:key { search write link };
@@ -12472,7 +13752,7 @@ index b357856..2af4e88 100644
manage_files_pattern(crond_t, cron_log_t, cron_log_t)
logging_log_filetrans(crond_t, cron_log_t, file)
-@@ -187,27 +204,47 @@ fs_list_inotifyfs(crond_t)
+@@ -187,27 +205,47 @@ fs_list_inotifyfs(crond_t)
# need auth_chkpwd to check for locked accounts.
auth_domtrans_chk_passwd(crond_t)
@@ -12521,7 +13801,12 @@ index b357856..2af4e88 100644
logging_send_syslog_msg(crond_t)
logging_set_loginuid(crond_t)
-@@ -220,20 +257,23 @@ miscfiles_read_localization(crond_t)
+@@ -215,25 +253,27 @@ seutil_read_config(crond_t)
+ seutil_read_default_contexts(crond_t)
+ seutil_sigchld_newrole(crond_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(crond_t)
+
userdom_use_unpriv_users_fds(crond_t)
# Not sure why this is needed
userdom_list_user_home_dirs(crond_t)
@@ -12701,8 +13986,13 @@ index b357856..2af4e88 100644
init_use_script_fds(system_cronjob_t)
init_read_utmp(system_cronjob_t)
-@@ -413,8 +496,10 @@ miscfiles_manage_man_pages(system_cronjob_t)
+@@ -408,23 +491,23 @@ logging_read_generic_logs(system_cronjob_t)
+ logging_send_audit_msgs(system_cronjob_t)
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(system_cronjob_t)
+-miscfiles_read_localization(system_cronjob_t)
+-miscfiles_manage_man_pages(system_cronjob_t)
+-
seutil_read_config(system_cronjob_t)
-ifdef(`distro_redhat', `
@@ -12713,7 +14003,19 @@ index b357856..2af4e88 100644
# via redirection of standard out.
optional_policy(`
rpm_manage_log(system_cronjob_t)
-@@ -439,6 +524,8 @@ optional_policy(`
+ ')
+ ')
+
++selinux_get_fs_mount(system_cronjob_t)
++
+ tunable_policy(`cron_can_relabel',`
+ seutil_domtrans_setfiles(system_cronjob_t)
+ ',`
+- selinux_get_fs_mount(system_cronjob_t)
+ selinux_validate_context(system_cronjob_t)
+ selinux_compute_access_vector(system_cronjob_t)
+ selinux_compute_create_context(system_cronjob_t)
+@@ -439,6 +522,8 @@ optional_policy(`
apache_read_config(system_cronjob_t)
apache_read_log(system_cronjob_t)
apache_read_sys_content(system_cronjob_t)
@@ -12722,7 +14024,7 @@ index b357856..2af4e88 100644
')
optional_policy(`
-@@ -446,6 +533,14 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -446,6 +531,14 @@ optional_policy(`
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -12737,7 +14039,7 @@ index b357856..2af4e88 100644
ftp_read_log(system_cronjob_t)
')
-@@ -456,6 +551,10 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -456,6 +549,10 @@ optional_policy(`
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -12748,7 +14050,7 @@ index b357856..2af4e88 100644
lpd_list_spool(system_cronjob_t)
')
-@@ -464,7 +563,9 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -464,7 +561,9 @@ optional_policy(`
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -12758,7 +14060,7 @@ index b357856..2af4e88 100644
')
optional_policy(`
-@@ -472,6 +573,10 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -472,6 +571,10 @@ optional_policy(`
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -12769,7 +14071,7 @@ index b357856..2af4e88 100644
postfix_read_config(system_cronjob_t)
')
-@@ -480,7 +585,7 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -480,7 +583,7 @@ optional_policy(`
prelink_manage_lib(system_cronjob_t)
prelink_manage_log(system_cronjob_t)
prelink_read_cache(system_cronjob_t)
@@ -12778,7 +14080,7 @@ index b357856..2af4e88 100644
')
optional_policy(`
-@@ -495,6 +600,7 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -495,6 +598,7 @@ optional_policy(`
optional_policy(`
spamassassin_manage_lib_files(system_cronjob_t)
@@ -12786,7 +14088,7 @@ index b357856..2af4e88 100644
')
optional_policy(`
-@@ -502,7 +608,18 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -502,7 +606,18 @@ optional_policy(`
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -12805,7 +14107,7 @@ index b357856..2af4e88 100644
userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans_user_home_content(system_cronjob_t, { dir file lnk_file fifo_file sock_file })
')
-@@ -542,7 +659,6 @@ kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(cronjob_t)
+@@ -542,7 +657,6 @@ kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(cronjob_t)
# ps does not need to access /boot when run from cron
files_dontaudit_search_boot(cronjob_t)
@@ -12813,7 +14115,15 @@ index b357856..2af4e88 100644
corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(cronjob_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(cronjob_t)
corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if(cronjob_t)
-@@ -595,9 +711,12 @@ userdom_manage_user_home_content_sockets(cronjob_t)
+@@ -579,7 +693,6 @@ logging_search_logs(cronjob_t)
+
+ seutil_read_config(cronjob_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(cronjob_t)
+
+ userdom_manage_user_tmp_files(cronjob_t)
+ userdom_manage_user_tmp_symlinks(cronjob_t)
+@@ -595,9 +708,12 @@ userdom_manage_user_home_content_sockets(cronjob_t)
#userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans_user_home_content(cronjob_t, notdevfile_class_set)
list_dirs_pattern(crond_t, user_cron_spool_t, user_cron_spool_t)
@@ -12827,12 +14137,87 @@ index b357856..2af4e88 100644
allow crond_t user_cron_spool_t:file manage_file_perms;
')
+@@ -626,3 +742,74 @@ optional_policy(`
+
+ unconfined_domain(unconfined_cronjob_t)
+ ')
++
++##############################
++#
++# crontab common policy
++#
++
++# dac_override is to create the file in the directory under /tmp
++allow crontab_domain self:capability { fowner setuid setgid chown dac_override };
++allow crontab_domain self:process { getcap setsched signal_perms };
++allow crontab_domain self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms;
++
++allow crontab_domain crond_t:process signal;
++allow crontab_domain crond_var_run_t:file read_file_perms;
++
++# create files in /var/spool/cron
++manage_files_pattern(crontab_domain, { cron_spool_t user_cron_spool_t }, user_cron_spool_t)
++filetrans_pattern(crontab_domain, cron_spool_t, user_cron_spool_t, file)
++files_list_spool(crontab_domain)
++
++# crontab signals crond by updating the mtime on the spooldir
++allow crontab_domain cron_spool_t:dir setattr_dir_perms;
++
++# for the checks used by crontab -u
++selinux_dontaudit_search_fs(crontab_domain)
++
++fs_getattr_xattr_fs(crontab_domain)
++fs_manage_cgroup_dirs(crontab_domain)
++fs_manage_cgroup_files(crontab_domain)
++
++domain_use_interactive_fds(crontab_domain)
++
++files_read_etc_files(crontab_domain)
++files_read_usr_files(crontab_domain)
++files_dontaudit_search_pids(crontab_domain)
++
++fs_dontaudit_rw_anon_inodefs_files(crontab_domain)
++
++auth_rw_var_auth(crontab_domain)
++
++logging_send_audit_msgs(crontab_domain)
++logging_set_loginuid(crontab_domain)
++
++init_dontaudit_write_utmp(crontab_domain)
++init_read_utmp(crontab_domain)
++init_read_state(crontab_domain)
++
++
++seutil_read_config(crontab_domain)
++
++userdom_manage_user_tmp_dirs(crontab_domain)
++userdom_manage_user_tmp_files(crontab_domain)
++# Access terminals.
++userdom_use_inherited_user_terminals(crontab_domain)
++# Read user crontabs
++userdom_read_user_home_content_files(crontab_domain)
++userdom_read_user_home_content_symlinks(crontab_domain)
++
++tunable_policy(`fcron_crond',`
++ # fcron wants an instant update of a crontab change for the administrator
++ # also crontab does a security check for crontab -u
++ dontaudit crontab_domain crond_t:process signal;
++')
++
++optional_policy(`
++ ssh_dontaudit_use_ptys(crontab_domain)
++')
++
++optional_policy(`
++ openshift_dontaudit_rw_inherited_fifo_files(crontab_domain)
++ openshift_transition(system_cronjob_t)
++')
diff --git a/ctdbd.fc b/ctdbd.fc
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..2db6b61
+index 0000000..255568d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ctdbd.fc
-@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+
+/etc/rc\.d/init\.d/ctdb -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:ctdbd_initrc_exec_t,s0)
+
@@ -12840,7 +14225,8 @@ index 0000000..2db6b61
+
+/usr/sbin/ctdbd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:ctdbd_exec_t,s0)
+
-+/var/log/log\.ctdb -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:ctdbd_log_t,s0)
++/var/log/log\.ctdb.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:ctdbd_log_t,s0)
++/var/log/ctdb\.log.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:ctdbd_log_t,s0)
+
+/var/spool/ctdb(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:ctdbd_spool_t,s0)
+
@@ -13118,7 +14504,7 @@ index 0000000..4f7d237
+
diff --git a/ctdbd.te b/ctdbd.te
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..284fbae
+index 0000000..33656de
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ctdbd.te
@@ -0,0 +1,114 @@
@@ -13208,12 +14594,12 @@ index 0000000..284fbae
+files_read_etc_files(ctdbd_t)
+files_search_all_mountpoints(ctdbd_t)
+
++auth_use_nsswitch(ctdbd_t)
++
+logging_send_syslog_msg(ctdbd_t)
+
-+miscfiles_read_localization(ctdbd_t)
+miscfiles_read_public_files(ctdbd_t)
+
-+
+optional_policy(`
+ consoletype_exec(ctdbd_t)
+')
@@ -13237,7 +14623,7 @@ index 0000000..284fbae
+ sysnet_domtrans_ifconfig(ctdbd_t)
+')
diff --git a/cups.fc b/cups.fc
-index 848bb92..624fc09 100644
+index 848bb92..600efa5 100644
--- a/cups.fc
+++ b/cups.fc
@@ -19,7 +19,10 @@
@@ -13251,16 +14637,20 @@ index 848bb92..624fc09 100644
/opt/gutenprint/ppds(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:cupsd_rw_etc_t,s0)
-@@ -52,6 +55,7 @@
+@@ -52,18 +55,32 @@
/var/lib/cups/certs -d gen_context(system_u:object_r:cupsd_rw_etc_t,s0)
/var/lib/cups/certs/.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:cupsd_rw_etc_t,s0)
+/usr/lib/bjlib(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:cupsd_rw_etc_t,mls_systemhigh)
/var/lib/hp(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:hplip_var_lib_t,s0)
++/var/lib/iscan(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:cupsd_rw_etc_t,s0)
-@@ -60,10 +64,18 @@
+ /var/log/cups(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:cupsd_log_t,s0)
+ /var/log/turboprint.* gen_context(system_u:object_r:cupsd_log_t,s0)
++/var/log/hp(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:hplip_var_log_t,s0)
++
/var/ccpd(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:cupsd_var_run_t,s0)
/var/ekpd(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:cupsd_var_run_t,s0)
-/var/run/cups(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:cupsd_var_run_t,s0)
@@ -13274,13 +14664,15 @@ index 848bb92..624fc09 100644
+
+/usr/Brother/fax/.*\.log.* gen_context(system_u:object_r:cupsd_log_t,s0)
+/usr/Brother/(.*/)?inf(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:cupsd_rw_etc_t,s0)
++/etc/opt/Brother/(.*/)?inf(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:cupsd_rw_etc_t,s0)
+/usr/Printer/(.*/)?inf(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:cupsd_rw_etc_t,s0)
+
+/usr/local/linuxprinter/ppd(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:cupsd_rw_etc_t,s0)
+
++/etc/opt/brother/Printers/(.*/)?inf(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:cupsd_rw_etc_t,s0)
+/opt/brother/Printers(.*/)?inf(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:cupsd_rw_etc_t,s0)
diff --git a/cups.if b/cups.if
-index 305ddf4..11d010a 100644
+index 305ddf4..f3cd95f 100644
--- a/cups.if
+++ b/cups.if
@@ -9,6 +9,11 @@
@@ -13365,7 +14757,16 @@ index 305ddf4..11d010a 100644
init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, cupsd_initrc_exec_t)
domain_system_change_exemption($1)
role_transition $2 cupsd_initrc_exec_t system_r;
-@@ -350,9 +384,42 @@ interface(`cups_admin',`
+@@ -341,18 +375,53 @@ interface(`cups_admin',`
+
+ admin_pattern($1, cupsd_lpd_var_run_t)
+
+- admin_pattern($1, cupsd_spool_t)
+- files_list_spool($1)
+-
+ admin_pattern($1, cupsd_tmp_t)
+ files_list_tmp($1)
+
admin_pattern($1, cupsd_var_run_t)
files_list_pids($1)
@@ -13394,22 +14795,27 @@ index 305ddf4..11d010a 100644
+#
+interface(`cups_filetrans_named_content',`
+ gen_require(`
-+ type cups_rw_etc_t;
-+ type cups_etc_t;
-+ ')
-+
-+ filetrans_pattern($1, cups_etc_t, cups_rw_etc_t, file, "classes.conf")
-+ filetrans_pattern($1, cups_etc_t, cups_rw_etc_t, file, "printers.conf")
-+ filetrans_pattern($1, cups_etc_t, cups_rw_etc_t, file, "printers.conf.O")
-+ filetrans_pattern($1, cups_etc_t, cups_rw_etc_t, file, "cupsd.conf")
-+ filetrans_pattern($1, cups_etc_t, cups_rw_etc_t, file, "cupsd.conf.default")
-+ filetrans_pattern($1, cups_etc_t, cups_rw_etc_t, file, "lpoptions")
-+ filetrans_pattern($1, cups_etc_t, cups_rw_etc_t, file, "subscriptions.conf")
-+ filetrans_pattern($1, cups_etc_t, cups_rw_etc_t, file, "subscriptions.conf.O")
-+ filetrans_pattern($1, cups_etc_t, cups_rw_etc_t, file, "ppds.dat")
++ type cupsd_rw_etc_t;
++ type cupsd_etc_t;
++ ')
++
++ filetrans_pattern($1, cupsd_etc_t, cupsd_rw_etc_t, file, "classes.conf")
++ filetrans_pattern($1, cupsd_etc_t, cupsd_rw_etc_t, file, "printers.conf")
++ filetrans_pattern($1, cupsd_etc_t, cupsd_rw_etc_t, file, "printers.conf.O")
++ filetrans_pattern($1, cupsd_etc_t, cupsd_rw_etc_t, file, "cupsd.conf")
++ filetrans_pattern($1, cupsd_etc_t, cupsd_rw_etc_t, file, "cupsd.conf.default")
++ filetrans_pattern($1, cupsd_etc_t, cupsd_rw_etc_t, file, "lpoptions")
++ filetrans_pattern($1, cupsd_etc_t, cupsd_rw_etc_t, file, "subscriptions.conf")
++ filetrans_pattern($1, cupsd_etc_t, cupsd_rw_etc_t, file, "subscriptions.conf.O")
++ filetrans_pattern($1, cupsd_etc_t, cupsd_rw_etc_t, file, "subscriptions.conf.N")
++ filetrans_pattern($1, cupsd_etc_t, cupsd_rw_etc_t, file, "ppds.dat")
++ files_etc_filetrans($1, cupsd_rw_etc_t, file, "ppds.dat")
++ files_etc_filetrans($1, cupsd_rw_etc_t, dir, "inf")
++ files_usr_filetrans($1, cupsd_rw_etc_t, dir, "inf")
++ corecmd_bin_filetrans($1, cupsd_rw_etc_t, dir, "inf")
')
diff --git a/cups.te b/cups.te
-index e5a8924..4965460 100644
+index e5a8924..e12c890 100644
--- a/cups.te
+++ b/cups.te
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ files_pid_file(cupsd_config_var_run_t)
@@ -13430,7 +14836,17 @@ index e5a8924..4965460 100644
type hplip_t;
type hplip_exec_t;
init_daemon_domain(hplip_t, hplip_exec_t)
-@@ -104,6 +108,7 @@ ifdef(`enable_mls',`
+@@ -75,6 +79,9 @@ files_tmp_file(hplip_tmp_t)
+ type hplip_var_lib_t;
+ files_type(hplip_var_lib_t)
+
++type hplip_var_log_t;
++logging_log_file(hplip_var_log_t)
++
+ type hplip_var_run_t;
+ files_pid_file(hplip_var_run_t)
+
+@@ -104,6 +111,7 @@ ifdef(`enable_mls',`
# /usr/lib/cups/backend/serial needs sys_admin(?!)
allow cupsd_t self:capability { ipc_lock sys_admin dac_override dac_read_search kill setgid setuid fsetid net_bind_service fowner chown dac_override sys_rawio sys_resource sys_tty_config };
dontaudit cupsd_t self:capability { sys_tty_config net_admin };
@@ -13438,7 +14854,7 @@ index e5a8924..4965460 100644
allow cupsd_t self:process { getpgid setpgid setsched signal_perms };
allow cupsd_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms;
allow cupsd_t self:unix_stream_socket { create_stream_socket_perms connectto };
-@@ -123,6 +128,7 @@ read_lnk_files_pattern(cupsd_t, cupsd_etc_t, cupsd_etc_t)
+@@ -123,6 +131,7 @@ read_lnk_files_pattern(cupsd_t, cupsd_etc_t, cupsd_etc_t)
files_search_etc(cupsd_t)
manage_files_pattern(cupsd_t, cupsd_interface_t, cupsd_interface_t)
@@ -13446,7 +14862,7 @@ index e5a8924..4965460 100644
manage_dirs_pattern(cupsd_t, cupsd_etc_t, cupsd_rw_etc_t)
manage_files_pattern(cupsd_t, cupsd_etc_t, cupsd_rw_etc_t)
-@@ -137,6 +143,7 @@ allow cupsd_t cupsd_exec_t:lnk_file read_lnk_file_perms;
+@@ -137,6 +146,7 @@ allow cupsd_t cupsd_exec_t:lnk_file read_lnk_file_perms;
allow cupsd_t cupsd_lock_t:file manage_file_perms;
files_lock_filetrans(cupsd_t, cupsd_lock_t, file)
@@ -13454,7 +14870,7 @@ index e5a8924..4965460 100644
manage_files_pattern(cupsd_t, cupsd_log_t, cupsd_log_t)
allow cupsd_t cupsd_log_t:dir setattr;
logging_log_filetrans(cupsd_t, cupsd_log_t, { file dir })
-@@ -146,11 +153,12 @@ manage_files_pattern(cupsd_t, cupsd_tmp_t, cupsd_tmp_t)
+@@ -146,11 +156,12 @@ manage_files_pattern(cupsd_t, cupsd_tmp_t, cupsd_tmp_t)
manage_fifo_files_pattern(cupsd_t, cupsd_tmp_t, cupsd_tmp_t)
files_tmp_filetrans(cupsd_t, cupsd_tmp_t, { file dir fifo_file })
@@ -13469,7 +14885,7 @@ index e5a8924..4965460 100644
allow cupsd_t hplip_t:process { signal sigkill };
-@@ -159,14 +167,13 @@ read_files_pattern(cupsd_t, hplip_etc_t, hplip_etc_t)
+@@ -159,14 +170,13 @@ read_files_pattern(cupsd_t, hplip_etc_t, hplip_etc_t)
allow cupsd_t hplip_var_run_t:file read_file_perms;
stream_connect_pattern(cupsd_t, ptal_var_run_t, ptal_var_run_t, ptal_t)
@@ -13485,7 +14901,7 @@ index e5a8924..4965460 100644
corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(cupsd_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(cupsd_t)
corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if(cupsd_t)
-@@ -211,6 +218,7 @@ mls_rangetrans_target(cupsd_t)
+@@ -211,6 +221,7 @@ mls_rangetrans_target(cupsd_t)
mls_socket_write_all_levels(cupsd_t)
mls_fd_use_all_levels(cupsd_t)
@@ -13493,7 +14909,7 @@ index e5a8924..4965460 100644
term_use_unallocated_ttys(cupsd_t)
term_search_ptys(cupsd_t)
-@@ -220,11 +228,12 @@ corecmd_exec_bin(cupsd_t)
+@@ -220,11 +231,12 @@ corecmd_exec_bin(cupsd_t)
domain_use_interactive_fds(cupsd_t)
@@ -13507,20 +14923,29 @@ index e5a8924..4965460 100644
# for /var/lib/defoma
files_read_var_lib_files(cupsd_t)
files_list_world_readable(cupsd_t)
-@@ -270,12 +279,6 @@ files_dontaudit_list_home(cupsd_t)
+@@ -258,7 +270,6 @@ libs_exec_lib_files(cupsd_t)
+ logging_send_audit_msgs(cupsd_t)
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(cupsd_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(cupsd_t)
+ # invoking ghostscript needs to read fonts
+ miscfiles_read_fonts(cupsd_t)
+ miscfiles_setattr_fonts_cache_dirs(cupsd_t)
+@@ -269,12 +280,7 @@ sysnet_exec_ifconfig(cupsd_t)
+ files_dontaudit_list_home(cupsd_t)
userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fds(cupsd_t)
userdom_dontaudit_search_user_home_content(cupsd_t)
-
+-
-# Write to /var/spool/cups.
-lpd_manage_spool(cupsd_t)
-lpd_read_config(cupsd_t)
-lpd_exec_lpr(cupsd_t)
-lpd_relabel_spool(cupsd_t)
--
++userdom_search_admin_dir(cupsd_t)
+
optional_policy(`
apm_domtrans_client(cupsd_t)
- ')
-@@ -287,6 +290,8 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -287,6 +293,8 @@ optional_policy(`
optional_policy(`
dbus_system_bus_client(cupsd_t)
@@ -13529,7 +14954,7 @@ index e5a8924..4965460 100644
userdom_dbus_send_all_users(cupsd_t)
optional_policy(`
-@@ -297,8 +302,10 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -297,8 +305,10 @@ optional_policy(`
hal_dbus_chat(cupsd_t)
')
@@ -13540,7 +14965,7 @@ index e5a8924..4965460 100644
')
')
-@@ -311,10 +318,23 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -311,10 +321,23 @@ optional_policy(`
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -13564,7 +14989,7 @@ index e5a8924..4965460 100644
mta_send_mail(cupsd_t)
')
-@@ -322,6 +342,8 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -322,6 +345,8 @@ optional_policy(`
# cups execs smbtool which reads samba_etc_t files
samba_read_config(cupsd_t)
samba_rw_var_files(cupsd_t)
@@ -13573,7 +14998,25 @@ index e5a8924..4965460 100644
')
optional_policy(`
-@@ -371,8 +393,9 @@ files_tmp_filetrans(cupsd_config_t, cupsd_tmp_t, { lnk_file file dir })
+@@ -336,12 +361,16 @@ optional_policy(`
+ udev_read_db(cupsd_t)
+ ')
+
++optional_policy(`
++ virt_rw_chr_files(cupsd_t)
++')
++
+ ########################################
+ #
+ # Cups configuration daemon local policy
+ #
+
+-allow cupsd_config_t self:capability { chown dac_override sys_tty_config };
++allow cupsd_config_t self:capability { chown dac_override setuid setgid sys_tty_config };
+ dontaudit cupsd_config_t self:capability sys_tty_config;
+ allow cupsd_config_t self:process { getsched signal_perms };
+ allow cupsd_config_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms;
+@@ -371,8 +400,9 @@ files_tmp_filetrans(cupsd_config_t, cupsd_tmp_t, { lnk_file file dir })
allow cupsd_config_t cupsd_var_run_t:file read_file_perms;
@@ -13584,7 +15027,7 @@ index e5a8924..4965460 100644
domtrans_pattern(cupsd_config_t, hplip_exec_t, hplip_t)
-@@ -381,7 +404,6 @@ read_files_pattern(cupsd_config_t, hplip_etc_t, hplip_etc_t)
+@@ -381,7 +411,6 @@ read_files_pattern(cupsd_config_t, hplip_etc_t, hplip_etc_t)
kernel_read_system_state(cupsd_config_t)
kernel_read_all_sysctls(cupsd_config_t)
@@ -13592,7 +15035,7 @@ index e5a8924..4965460 100644
corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(cupsd_config_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(cupsd_config_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_node(cupsd_config_t)
-@@ -407,7 +429,6 @@ domain_use_interactive_fds(cupsd_config_t)
+@@ -407,7 +436,6 @@ domain_use_interactive_fds(cupsd_config_t)
domain_dontaudit_search_all_domains_state(cupsd_config_t)
files_read_usr_files(cupsd_config_t)
@@ -13600,8 +15043,15 @@ index e5a8924..4965460 100644
files_read_etc_runtime_files(cupsd_config_t)
files_read_var_symlinks(cupsd_config_t)
-@@ -425,11 +446,11 @@ seutil_dontaudit_search_config(cupsd_config_t)
+@@ -418,18 +446,15 @@ auth_use_nsswitch(cupsd_config_t)
+
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(cupsd_config_t)
+-miscfiles_read_localization(cupsd_config_t)
+ miscfiles_read_hwdata(cupsd_config_t)
+
+-seutil_dontaudit_search_config(cupsd_config_t)
+-
userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fds(cupsd_config_t)
userdom_dontaudit_search_user_home_dirs(cupsd_config_t)
+userdom_rw_user_tmp_files(cupsd_config_t)
@@ -13614,7 +15064,7 @@ index e5a8924..4965460 100644
ifdef(`distro_redhat',`
optional_policy(`
rpm_read_db(cupsd_config_t)
-@@ -453,6 +474,10 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -453,6 +478,10 @@ optional_policy(`
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -13625,7 +15075,7 @@ index e5a8924..4965460 100644
hal_domtrans(cupsd_config_t)
hal_read_tmp_files(cupsd_config_t)
hal_dontaudit_use_fds(hplip_t)
-@@ -467,6 +492,10 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -467,6 +496,10 @@ optional_policy(`
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -13636,7 +15086,7 @@ index e5a8924..4965460 100644
policykit_dbus_chat(cupsd_config_t)
userdom_read_all_users_state(cupsd_config_t)
')
-@@ -526,7 +555,6 @@ kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(cupsd_lpd_t)
+@@ -526,7 +559,6 @@ kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(cupsd_lpd_t)
kernel_read_system_state(cupsd_lpd_t)
kernel_read_network_state(cupsd_lpd_t)
@@ -13644,7 +15094,7 @@ index e5a8924..4965460 100644
corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(cupsd_lpd_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(cupsd_lpd_t)
corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if(cupsd_lpd_t)
-@@ -537,13 +565,13 @@ corenet_udp_sendrecv_all_ports(cupsd_lpd_t)
+@@ -537,19 +569,18 @@ corenet_udp_sendrecv_all_ports(cupsd_lpd_t)
corenet_tcp_bind_generic_node(cupsd_lpd_t)
corenet_udp_bind_generic_node(cupsd_lpd_t)
corenet_tcp_connect_ipp_port(cupsd_lpd_t)
@@ -13659,7 +15109,13 @@ index e5a8924..4965460 100644
auth_use_nsswitch(cupsd_lpd_t)
-@@ -577,7 +605,6 @@ fs_rw_anon_inodefs_files(cups_pdf_t)
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(cupsd_lpd_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(cupsd_lpd_t)
+ miscfiles_setattr_fonts_cache_dirs(cupsd_lpd_t)
+
+ cups_stream_connect(cupsd_lpd_t)
+@@ -577,7 +608,6 @@ fs_rw_anon_inodefs_files(cups_pdf_t)
kernel_read_system_state(cups_pdf_t)
@@ -13667,9 +15123,11 @@ index e5a8924..4965460 100644
files_read_usr_files(cups_pdf_t)
corecmd_exec_shell(cups_pdf_t)
-@@ -587,23 +614,22 @@ auth_use_nsswitch(cups_pdf_t)
+@@ -585,25 +615,23 @@ corecmd_exec_bin(cups_pdf_t)
- miscfiles_read_localization(cups_pdf_t)
+ auth_use_nsswitch(cups_pdf_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(cups_pdf_t)
miscfiles_read_fonts(cups_pdf_t)
+miscfiles_setattr_fonts_cache_dirs(cups_pdf_t)
@@ -13700,15 +15158,35 @@ index e5a8924..4965460 100644
')
########################################
-@@ -647,7 +673,6 @@ files_pid_filetrans(hplip_t, hplip_var_run_t, file)
+@@ -635,9 +663,16 @@ read_files_pattern(hplip_t, hplip_etc_t, hplip_etc_t)
+ read_lnk_files_pattern(hplip_t, hplip_etc_t, hplip_etc_t)
+ files_search_etc(hplip_t)
+
++allow hplip_t cupsd_unit_file_t:file read_file_perms;
++
+ manage_files_pattern(hplip_t, hplip_var_lib_t, hplip_var_lib_t)
+ manage_lnk_files_pattern(hplip_t, hplip_var_lib_t, hplip_var_lib_t)
+
++manage_files_pattern(hplip_t, hplip_var_log_t,hplip_var_log_t)
++manage_fifo_files_pattern(hplip_t, hplip_var_log_t,hplip_var_log_t)
++manage_dirs_pattern(hplip_t, hplip_var_log_t,hplip_var_log_t)
++logging_log_filetrans(hplip_t,hplip_var_log_t,{ dir fifo_file file })
++
+ manage_fifo_files_pattern(hplip_t, hplip_tmp_t, hplip_tmp_t)
+ files_tmp_filetrans(hplip_t, hplip_tmp_t, fifo_file )
+
+@@ -647,7 +682,9 @@ files_pid_filetrans(hplip_t, hplip_var_run_t, file)
kernel_read_system_state(hplip_t)
kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(hplip_t)
-corenet_all_recvfrom_unlabeled(hplip_t)
++# for python
++corecmd_exec_bin(hplip_t)
++
corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(hplip_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(hplip_t)
corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if(hplip_t)
-@@ -661,10 +686,10 @@ corenet_tcp_bind_generic_node(hplip_t)
+@@ -661,10 +698,10 @@ corenet_tcp_bind_generic_node(hplip_t)
corenet_udp_bind_generic_node(hplip_t)
corenet_tcp_bind_hplip_port(hplip_t)
corenet_tcp_connect_hplip_port(hplip_t)
@@ -13722,20 +15200,38 @@ index e5a8924..4965460 100644
dev_read_sysfs(hplip_t)
dev_rw_printer(hplip_t)
-@@ -682,9 +707,11 @@ corecmd_exec_bin(hplip_t)
+@@ -673,31 +710,34 @@ dev_read_rand(hplip_t)
+ dev_rw_generic_usb_dev(hplip_t)
+ dev_rw_usbfs(hplip_t)
+-fs_getattr_all_fs(hplip_t)
+-fs_search_auto_mountpoints(hplip_t)
+-fs_rw_anon_inodefs_files(hplip_t)
+-
+-# for python
+-corecmd_exec_bin(hplip_t)
+-
domain_use_interactive_fds(hplip_t)
--files_read_etc_files(hplip_t)
+ files_read_etc_files(hplip_t)
files_read_etc_runtime_files(hplip_t)
files_read_usr_files(hplip_t)
+files_dontaudit_write_usr_dirs(hplip_t)
+
+-logging_send_syslog_msg(hplip_t)
++fs_getattr_all_fs(hplip_t)
++fs_search_auto_mountpoints(hplip_t)
++fs_rw_anon_inodefs_files(hplip_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(hplip_t)
++term_use_ptmx(hplip_t)
+
+auth_read_passwd(hplip_t)
++
++logging_send_syslog_msg(hplip_t)
- logging_send_syslog_msg(hplip_t)
+ sysnet_read_config(hplip_t)
-@@ -695,9 +722,12 @@ sysnet_read_config(hplip_t)
userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fds(hplip_t)
userdom_dontaudit_search_user_home_dirs(hplip_t)
userdom_dontaudit_search_user_home_content(hplip_t)
@@ -13750,7 +15246,7 @@ index e5a8924..4965460 100644
optional_policy(`
dbus_system_bus_client(hplip_t)
-@@ -743,7 +773,6 @@ kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(ptal_t)
+@@ -743,7 +783,6 @@ kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(ptal_t)
kernel_list_proc(ptal_t)
kernel_read_proc_symlinks(ptal_t)
@@ -13758,7 +15254,7 @@ index e5a8924..4965460 100644
corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(ptal_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(ptal_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_node(ptal_t)
-@@ -760,7 +789,6 @@ fs_search_auto_mountpoints(ptal_t)
+@@ -760,13 +799,10 @@ fs_search_auto_mountpoints(ptal_t)
domain_use_interactive_fds(ptal_t)
@@ -13766,6 +15262,12 @@ index e5a8924..4965460 100644
files_read_etc_runtime_files(ptal_t)
logging_send_syslog_msg(ptal_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(ptal_t)
+-
+ sysnet_read_config(ptal_t)
+
+ userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fds(ptal_t)
diff --git a/cvs.if b/cvs.if
index c43ff4c..5da88b5 100644
--- a/cvs.if
@@ -13816,7 +15318,7 @@ index c43ff4c..5da88b5 100644
init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, cvs_initrc_exec_t)
domain_system_change_exemption($1)
diff --git a/cvs.te b/cvs.te
-index 88e7e97..fee2106 100644
+index 88e7e97..b475317 100644
--- a/cvs.te
+++ b/cvs.te
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ policy_module(cvs, 1.9.0)
@@ -13850,7 +15352,7 @@ index 88e7e97..fee2106 100644
corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(cvs_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(cvs_t)
corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if(cvs_t)
-@@ -76,11 +75,12 @@ auth_use_nsswitch(cvs_t)
+@@ -76,21 +75,22 @@ auth_use_nsswitch(cvs_t)
corecmd_exec_bin(cvs_t)
corecmd_exec_shell(cvs_t)
@@ -13864,8 +15366,8 @@ index 88e7e97..fee2106 100644
logging_send_syslog_msg(cvs_t)
logging_send_audit_msgs(cvs_t)
-@@ -88,9 +88,11 @@ miscfiles_read_localization(cvs_t)
-
+-miscfiles_read_localization(cvs_t)
+-
mta_send_mail(cvs_t)
+userdom_dontaudit_search_user_home_dirs(cvs_t)
@@ -13877,14 +15379,14 @@ index 88e7e97..fee2106 100644
allow cvs_t self:capability dac_override;
auth_tunable_read_shadow(cvs_t)
')
-@@ -112,4 +114,5 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -112,4 +112,5 @@ optional_policy(`
read_files_pattern(httpd_cvs_script_t, cvs_data_t, cvs_data_t)
manage_dirs_pattern(httpd_cvs_script_t, cvs_tmp_t, cvs_tmp_t)
manage_files_pattern(httpd_cvs_script_t, cvs_tmp_t, cvs_tmp_t)
+ files_tmp_filetrans(httpd_cvs_script_t, cvs_tmp_t, { file dir })
')
diff --git a/cyphesis.te b/cyphesis.te
-index 25897c9..8cf56de 100644
+index 25897c9..814bdae 100644
--- a/cyphesis.te
+++ b/cyphesis.te
@@ -48,7 +48,6 @@ kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(cyphesis_t)
@@ -13895,11 +15397,46 @@ index 25897c9..8cf56de 100644
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(cyphesis_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_node(cyphesis_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_ports(cyphesis_t)
+@@ -66,8 +65,6 @@ files_read_usr_files(cyphesis_t)
+
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(cyphesis_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(cyphesis_t)
+-
+ sysnet_dns_name_resolve(cyphesis_t)
+
+ # cyphesis wants to talk to avahi via dbus
diff --git a/cyrus.if b/cyrus.if
-index e4e86d0..7c30655 100644
+index e4e86d0..4203ea9 100644
--- a/cyrus.if
+++ b/cyrus.if
-@@ -62,9 +62,13 @@ interface(`cyrus_admin',`
+@@ -20,6 +20,25 @@ interface(`cyrus_manage_data',`
+ manage_files_pattern($1, cyrus_var_lib_t, cyrus_var_lib_t)
+ ')
+
++#######################################
++## <summary>
++## Allow write cyrus data files.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`cyrus_write_data',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type cyrus_var_lib_t;
++ ')
++
++ files_search_var_lib($1)
++ write_files_pattern($1, cyrus_var_lib_t, cyrus_var_lib_t)
++')
++
+ ########################################
+ ## <summary>
+ ## Connect to Cyrus using a unix domain stream socket.
+@@ -62,9 +81,13 @@ interface(`cyrus_admin',`
type cyrus_var_run_t, cyrus_initrc_exec_t;
')
@@ -13915,7 +15452,7 @@ index e4e86d0..7c30655 100644
domain_system_change_exemption($1)
role_transition $2 cyrus_initrc_exec_t system_r;
diff --git a/cyrus.te b/cyrus.te
-index 097fdcc..373c8ca 100644
+index 097fdcc..fb6e6da 100644
--- a/cyrus.te
+++ b/cyrus.te
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ files_pid_file(cyrus_var_run_t)
@@ -13951,7 +15488,15 @@ index 097fdcc..373c8ca 100644
files_read_etc_runtime_files(cyrus_t)
files_read_usr_files(cyrus_t)
-@@ -119,6 +118,10 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -103,7 +102,6 @@ libs_exec_lib_files(cyrus_t)
+
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(cyrus_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(cyrus_t)
+ miscfiles_read_generic_certs(cyrus_t)
+
+ sysnet_read_config(cyrus_t)
+@@ -119,6 +117,10 @@ optional_policy(`
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -13962,7 +15507,7 @@ index 097fdcc..373c8ca 100644
kerberos_keytab_template(cyrus, cyrus_t)
')
-@@ -135,6 +138,7 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -135,6 +137,7 @@ optional_policy(`
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -13980,7 +15525,7 @@ index ce3e676..0158314 100644
')
+
diff --git a/daemontools.te b/daemontools.te
-index dcc5f1c..18c3048 100644
+index dcc5f1c..c6fa5c0 100644
--- a/daemontools.te
+++ b/daemontools.te
@@ -38,7 +38,10 @@ files_type(svc_svc_t)
@@ -14023,8 +15568,14 @@ index dcc5f1c..18c3048 100644
files_read_etc_files(svc_start_t)
files_read_etc_runtime_files(svc_start_t)
files_search_var(svc_start_t)
+@@ -114,5 +126,3 @@ daemontools_domtrans_run(svc_start_t)
+ daemontools_manage_svc(svc_start_t)
+
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(svc_start_t)
+-
+-miscfiles_read_localization(svc_start_t)
diff --git a/dante.te b/dante.te
-index 9636326..9101895 100644
+index 9636326..637fc71 100644
--- a/dante.te
+++ b/dante.te
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ type dante_exec_t;
@@ -14052,6 +15603,15 @@ index 9636326..9101895 100644
dev_read_sysfs(dante_t)
+@@ -62,8 +60,6 @@ init_write_utmp(dante_t)
+
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(dante_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(dante_t)
+-
+ sysnet_read_config(dante_t)
+
+ userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fds(dante_t)
diff --git a/dbadm.te b/dbadm.te
index 1875064..2adc35f 100644
--- a/dbadm.te
@@ -14082,7 +15642,7 @@ index 1875064..2adc35f 100644
+ sudo_role_template(dbadm, dbadm_r, dbadm_t)
+')
diff --git a/dbskk.te b/dbskk.te
-index 1445f97..566797c 100644
+index 1445f97..8ca064c 100644
--- a/dbskk.te
+++ b/dbskk.te
@@ -47,7 +47,6 @@ kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(dbskkd_t)
@@ -14093,7 +15653,7 @@ index 1445f97..566797c 100644
corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(dbskkd_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(dbskkd_t)
corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if(dbskkd_t)
-@@ -60,7 +59,6 @@ dev_read_urand(dbskkd_t)
+@@ -60,10 +59,7 @@ dev_read_urand(dbskkd_t)
fs_getattr_xattr_fs(dbskkd_t)
@@ -14101,6 +15661,9 @@ index 1445f97..566797c 100644
auth_use_nsswitch(dbskkd_t)
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(dbskkd_t)
+-
+-miscfiles_read_localization(dbskkd_t)
diff --git a/dbus.fc b/dbus.fc
index e6345ce..31f269b 100644
--- a/dbus.fc
@@ -14114,7 +15677,7 @@ index e6345ce..31f269b 100644
/usr/bin/dbus-daemon(-1)? -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:dbusd_exec_t,s0)
diff --git a/dbus.if b/dbus.if
-index fb4bf82..115133d 100644
+index fb4bf82..126d543 100644
--- a/dbus.if
+++ b/dbus.if
@@ -41,9 +41,9 @@ interface(`dbus_stub',`
@@ -14129,7 +15692,7 @@ index fb4bf82..115133d 100644
')
##############################
-@@ -52,117 +52,41 @@ template(`dbus_role_template',`
+@@ -52,117 +52,47 @@ template(`dbus_role_template',`
#
type $1_dbusd_t, session_bus_type;
@@ -14139,6 +15702,10 @@ index fb4bf82..115133d 100644
ubac_constrained($1_dbusd_t)
role $2 types $1_dbusd_t;
++ kernel_read_system_state($1_dbusd_t)
++
++ selinux_get_fs_mount($1_dbusd_t)
++
+ userdom_home_manager($1_dbusd_t)
+
##############################
@@ -14198,7 +15765,7 @@ index fb4bf82..115133d 100644
- corecmd_read_bin_files($1_dbusd_t)
- corecmd_read_bin_pipes($1_dbusd_t)
- corecmd_read_bin_sockets($1_dbusd_t)
--
+
- corenet_all_recvfrom_unlabeled($1_dbusd_t)
- corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel($1_dbusd_t)
- corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if($1_dbusd_t)
@@ -14230,10 +15797,10 @@ index fb4bf82..115133d 100644
- selinux_compute_user_contexts($1_dbusd_t)
-
- auth_read_pam_console_data($1_dbusd_t)
-- auth_use_nsswitch($1_dbusd_t)
--
+ auth_use_nsswitch($1_dbusd_t)
+
- logging_send_audit_msgs($1_dbusd_t)
-- logging_send_syslog_msg($1_dbusd_t)
+ logging_send_syslog_msg($1_dbusd_t)
-
- miscfiles_read_localization($1_dbusd_t)
-
@@ -14241,7 +15808,7 @@ index fb4bf82..115133d 100644
- seutil_read_default_contexts($1_dbusd_t)
-
- term_use_all_terms($1_dbusd_t)
-
+-
- userdom_read_user_home_content_files($1_dbusd_t)
-
- ifdef(`hide_broken_symptoms', `
@@ -14256,11 +15823,10 @@ index fb4bf82..115133d 100644
- xserver_use_xdm_fds($1_dbusd_t)
- xserver_rw_xdm_pipes($1_dbusd_t)
- ')
-+ auth_use_nsswitch($1_dbusd_t)
')
#######################################
-@@ -181,11 +105,12 @@ interface(`dbus_system_bus_client',`
+@@ -181,11 +111,12 @@ interface(`dbus_system_bus_client',`
type system_dbusd_t, system_dbusd_t;
type system_dbusd_var_run_t, system_dbusd_var_lib_t;
class dbus send_msg;
@@ -14274,7 +15840,7 @@ index fb4bf82..115133d 100644
read_files_pattern($1, system_dbusd_var_lib_t, system_dbusd_var_lib_t)
files_search_var_lib($1)
-@@ -198,6 +123,34 @@ interface(`dbus_system_bus_client',`
+@@ -198,6 +129,34 @@ interface(`dbus_system_bus_client',`
#######################################
## <summary>
@@ -14309,7 +15875,7 @@ index fb4bf82..115133d 100644
## Template for creating connections to
## a user DBUS.
## </summary>
-@@ -219,7 +172,7 @@ interface(`dbus_session_bus_client',`
+@@ -219,7 +178,7 @@ interface(`dbus_session_bus_client',`
# For connecting to the bus
allow $1 session_bus_type:unix_stream_socket connectto;
@@ -14318,7 +15884,7 @@ index fb4bf82..115133d 100644
')
########################################
-@@ -324,6 +277,11 @@ interface(`dbus_connect_session_bus',`
+@@ -324,6 +283,11 @@ interface(`dbus_connect_session_bus',`
## Allow a application domain to be started
## by the session dbus.
## </summary>
@@ -14330,7 +15896,7 @@ index fb4bf82..115133d 100644
## <param name="domain">
## <summary>
## Type to be used as a domain.
-@@ -338,13 +296,13 @@ interface(`dbus_connect_session_bus',`
+@@ -338,13 +302,13 @@ interface(`dbus_connect_session_bus',`
#
interface(`dbus_session_domain',`
gen_require(`
@@ -14348,7 +15914,7 @@ index fb4bf82..115133d 100644
')
########################################
-@@ -423,27 +381,16 @@ interface(`dbus_system_bus_unconfined',`
+@@ -423,27 +387,16 @@ interface(`dbus_system_bus_unconfined',`
#
interface(`dbus_system_domain',`
gen_require(`
@@ -14378,7 +15944,7 @@ index fb4bf82..115133d 100644
')
########################################
-@@ -466,26 +413,25 @@ interface(`dbus_use_system_bus_fds',`
+@@ -466,26 +419,25 @@ interface(`dbus_use_system_bus_fds',`
########################################
## <summary>
@@ -14411,7 +15977,7 @@ index fb4bf82..115133d 100644
## </summary>
## <param name="domain">
## <summary>
-@@ -493,10 +439,51 @@ interface(`dbus_dontaudit_system_bus_rw_tcp_sockets',`
+@@ -493,10 +445,51 @@ interface(`dbus_dontaudit_system_bus_rw_tcp_sockets',`
## </summary>
## </param>
#
@@ -14467,7 +16033,7 @@ index fb4bf82..115133d 100644
+ dontaudit $1 session_bus_type:dbus send_msg;
')
diff --git a/dbus.te b/dbus.te
-index 625cb32..cfe6dbd 100644
+index 625cb32..087cecf 100644
--- a/dbus.te
+++ b/dbus.te
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ gen_require(`
@@ -14510,7 +16076,7 @@ index 625cb32..cfe6dbd 100644
kernel_read_system_state(system_dbusd_t)
kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(system_dbusd_t)
-@@ -83,6 +86,8 @@ kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(system_dbusd_t)
+@@ -83,11 +86,16 @@ kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(system_dbusd_t)
dev_read_urand(system_dbusd_t)
dev_read_sysfs(system_dbusd_t)
@@ -14519,7 +16085,15 @@ index 625cb32..cfe6dbd 100644
fs_getattr_all_fs(system_dbusd_t)
fs_list_inotifyfs(system_dbusd_t)
fs_search_auto_mountpoints(system_dbusd_t)
-@@ -110,17 +115,20 @@ auth_read_pam_console_data(system_dbusd_t)
+ fs_dontaudit_list_nfs(system_dbusd_t)
+
++storage_rw_inherited_fixed_disk_dev(system_dbusd_t)
++storage_rw_inherited_removable_device(system_dbusd_t)
++
+ mls_fd_use_all_levels(system_dbusd_t)
+ mls_rangetrans_target(system_dbusd_t)
+ mls_file_read_all_levels(system_dbusd_t)
+@@ -110,22 +118,25 @@ auth_read_pam_console_data(system_dbusd_t)
corecmd_list_bin(system_dbusd_t)
corecmd_read_bin_pipes(system_dbusd_t)
corecmd_read_bin_sockets(system_dbusd_t)
@@ -14538,10 +16112,16 @@ index 625cb32..cfe6dbd 100644
+init_bin_domtrans_spec(system_dbusd_t)
init_domtrans_script(system_dbusd_t)
+init_rw_stream_sockets(system_dbusd_t)
++init_status(system_dbusd_t)
logging_send_audit_msgs(system_dbusd_t)
logging_send_syslog_msg(system_dbusd_t)
-@@ -135,11 +143,31 @@ seutil_sigchld_newrole(system_dbusd_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(system_dbusd_t)
+ miscfiles_read_generic_certs(system_dbusd_t)
+
+ seutil_read_config(system_dbusd_t)
+@@ -135,11 +146,35 @@ seutil_sigchld_newrole(system_dbusd_t)
userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fds(system_dbusd_t)
userdom_dontaudit_search_user_home_dirs(system_dbusd_t)
@@ -14556,12 +16136,16 @@ index 625cb32..cfe6dbd 100644
+')
+
+optional_policy(`
-+ gnome_exec_gconf(system_dbusd_t)
-+ gnome_read_inherited_home_icc_data_files(system_dbusd_t)
++ cpufreqselector_dbus_chat(system_dbusd_t)
+')
+
+optional_policy(`
-+ cpufreqselector_dbus_chat(system_dbusd_t)
++ getty_start_services(system_dbusd_t)
++')
++
++optional_policy(`
++ gnome_exec_gconf(system_dbusd_t)
++ gnome_read_inherited_home_icc_data_files(system_dbusd_t)
+')
+
+optional_policy(`
@@ -14573,13 +16157,17 @@ index 625cb32..cfe6dbd 100644
policykit_dbus_chat(system_dbusd_t)
policykit_domtrans_auth(system_dbusd_t)
policykit_search_lib(system_dbusd_t)
-@@ -150,12 +178,161 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -150,12 +185,162 @@ optional_policy(`
')
optional_policy(`
+ systemd_use_fds_logind(system_dbusd_t)
+ systemd_write_inherited_logind_sessions_pipes(system_dbusd_t)
+ systemd_write_inhibit_pipes(system_dbusd_t)
++# These are caused by broken systemd patch
++ systemd_start_power_services(system_dbusd_t)
++ systemd_config_all_services(system_dbusd_t)
++ files_config_all_files(system_dbusd_t)
+')
+
+optional_policy(`
@@ -14602,6 +16190,7 @@ index 625cb32..cfe6dbd 100644
+dbus_system_bus_client(system_bus_type)
+dbus_connect_system_bus(system_bus_type)
+
++init_status(system_bus_type)
+init_stream_connect(system_bus_type)
+init_dgram_send(system_bus_type)
+init_use_fds(system_bus_type)
@@ -14652,7 +16241,6 @@ index 625cb32..cfe6dbd 100644
+manage_files_pattern(session_bus_type, session_dbusd_tmp_t, session_dbusd_tmp_t)
+files_tmp_filetrans(session_bus_type, session_dbusd_tmp_t, { file dir })
+
-+kernel_read_system_state(session_bus_type)
+kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(session_bus_type)
+
+corecmd_list_bin(session_bus_type)
@@ -14661,7 +16249,6 @@ index 625cb32..cfe6dbd 100644
+corecmd_read_bin_pipes(session_bus_type)
+corecmd_read_bin_sockets(session_bus_type)
+
-+corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(session_bus_type)
+corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(session_bus_type)
+corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_node(session_bus_type)
+corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_ports(session_bus_type)
@@ -14682,7 +16269,6 @@ index 625cb32..cfe6dbd 100644
+fs_list_inotifyfs(session_bus_type)
+fs_dontaudit_list_nfs(session_bus_type)
+
-+selinux_get_fs_mount(session_bus_type)
+selinux_validate_context(session_bus_type)
+selinux_compute_access_vector(session_bus_type)
+selinux_compute_create_context(session_bus_type)
@@ -14692,9 +16278,6 @@ index 625cb32..cfe6dbd 100644
+auth_read_pam_console_data(session_bus_type)
+
+logging_send_audit_msgs(session_bus_type)
-+logging_send_syslog_msg(session_bus_type)
-+
-+miscfiles_read_localization(session_bus_type)
+
+seutil_read_config(session_bus_type)
+seutil_read_default_contexts(session_bus_type)
@@ -14705,6 +16288,8 @@ index 625cb32..cfe6dbd 100644
+userdom_manage_user_home_content_dirs(session_bus_type)
+userdom_manage_user_home_content_files(session_bus_type)
+userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans_user_home_content(session_bus_type, { dir file })
++userdom_manage_tmpfs_files(session_bus_type, file)
++userdom_tmpfs_filetrans(session_bus_type, file)
+
+optional_policy(`
+ gnome_read_gconf_home_files(session_bus_type)
@@ -14748,7 +16333,7 @@ index 784753e..bf65e7d 100644
stream_connect_pattern($1, dcc_var_t, dccifd_var_run_t, dccifd_t)
')
diff --git a/dcc.te b/dcc.te
-index 5178337..a087ad2 100644
+index 5178337..46bbbed 100644
--- a/dcc.te
+++ b/dcc.te
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ type dcc_var_t;
@@ -14760,7 +16345,7 @@ index 5178337..a087ad2 100644
type dccd_t;
type dccd_exec_t;
-@@ -95,13 +95,11 @@ allow cdcc_t dcc_var_t:dir list_dir_perms;
+@@ -95,22 +95,18 @@ allow cdcc_t dcc_var_t:dir list_dir_perms;
read_files_pattern(cdcc_t, dcc_var_t, dcc_var_t)
read_lnk_files_pattern(cdcc_t, dcc_var_t, dcc_var_t)
@@ -14774,16 +16359,17 @@ index 5178337..a087ad2 100644
files_read_etc_runtime_files(cdcc_t)
auth_use_nsswitch(cdcc_t)
-@@ -110,7 +108,7 @@ logging_send_syslog_msg(cdcc_t)
- miscfiles_read_localization(cdcc_t)
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(cdcc_t)
+-miscfiles_read_localization(cdcc_t)
+-
-userdom_use_user_terminals(cdcc_t)
+userdom_use_inherited_user_terminals(cdcc_t)
########################################
#
-@@ -134,14 +132,12 @@ read_lnk_files_pattern(dcc_client_t, dcc_var_t, dcc_var_t)
+@@ -134,14 +130,12 @@ read_lnk_files_pattern(dcc_client_t, dcc_var_t, dcc_var_t)
kernel_read_system_state(dcc_client_t)
@@ -14798,16 +16384,18 @@ index 5178337..a087ad2 100644
files_read_etc_runtime_files(dcc_client_t)
fs_getattr_all_fs(dcc_client_t)
-@@ -152,7 +148,7 @@ logging_send_syslog_msg(dcc_client_t)
+@@ -150,9 +144,7 @@ auth_use_nsswitch(dcc_client_t)
- miscfiles_read_localization(dcc_client_t)
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(dcc_client_t)
+-miscfiles_read_localization(dcc_client_t)
+-
-userdom_use_user_terminals(dcc_client_t)
+userdom_use_inherited_user_terminals(dcc_client_t)
optional_policy(`
amavis_read_spool_files(dcc_client_t)
-@@ -182,13 +178,11 @@ manage_lnk_files_pattern(dcc_dbclean_t, dcc_var_t, dcc_var_t)
+@@ -182,22 +174,18 @@ manage_lnk_files_pattern(dcc_dbclean_t, dcc_var_t, dcc_var_t)
kernel_read_system_state(dcc_dbclean_t)
@@ -14821,16 +16409,17 @@ index 5178337..a087ad2 100644
files_read_etc_runtime_files(dcc_dbclean_t)
auth_use_nsswitch(dcc_dbclean_t)
-@@ -197,7 +191,7 @@ logging_send_syslog_msg(dcc_dbclean_t)
- miscfiles_read_localization(dcc_dbclean_t)
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(dcc_dbclean_t)
+-miscfiles_read_localization(dcc_dbclean_t)
+-
-userdom_use_user_terminals(dcc_dbclean_t)
+userdom_use_inherited_user_terminals(dcc_dbclean_t)
########################################
#
-@@ -238,7 +232,6 @@ files_pid_filetrans(dccd_t, dccd_var_run_t, { dir file })
+@@ -238,7 +226,6 @@ files_pid_filetrans(dccd_t, dccd_var_run_t, { dir file })
kernel_read_system_state(dccd_t)
kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(dccd_t)
@@ -14838,7 +16427,7 @@ index 5178337..a087ad2 100644
corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(dccd_t)
corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if(dccd_t)
corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_node(dccd_t)
-@@ -251,7 +244,6 @@ dev_read_sysfs(dccd_t)
+@@ -251,7 +238,6 @@ dev_read_sysfs(dccd_t)
domain_use_interactive_fds(dccd_t)
@@ -14846,7 +16435,16 @@ index 5178337..a087ad2 100644
files_read_etc_runtime_files(dccd_t)
fs_getattr_all_fs(dccd_t)
-@@ -306,7 +298,6 @@ files_pid_filetrans(dccifd_t, dccifd_var_run_t, file)
+@@ -261,8 +247,6 @@ auth_use_nsswitch(dccd_t)
+
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(dccd_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(dccd_t)
+-
+ userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fds(dccd_t)
+ userdom_dontaudit_search_user_home_dirs(dccd_t)
+
+@@ -306,7 +290,6 @@ files_pid_filetrans(dccifd_t, dccifd_var_run_t, file)
kernel_read_system_state(dccifd_t)
kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(dccifd_t)
@@ -14854,7 +16452,7 @@ index 5178337..a087ad2 100644
corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(dccifd_t)
corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if(dccifd_t)
corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_node(dccifd_t)
-@@ -316,7 +307,6 @@ dev_read_sysfs(dccifd_t)
+@@ -316,7 +299,6 @@ dev_read_sysfs(dccifd_t)
domain_use_interactive_fds(dccifd_t)
@@ -14862,7 +16460,16 @@ index 5178337..a087ad2 100644
files_read_etc_runtime_files(dccifd_t)
fs_getattr_all_fs(dccifd_t)
-@@ -370,7 +360,6 @@ files_pid_filetrans(dccm_t, dccm_var_run_t, file)
+@@ -326,8 +308,6 @@ auth_use_nsswitch(dccifd_t)
+
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(dccifd_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(dccifd_t)
+-
+ userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fds(dccifd_t)
+ userdom_dontaudit_search_user_home_dirs(dccifd_t)
+
+@@ -370,7 +350,6 @@ files_pid_filetrans(dccm_t, dccm_var_run_t, file)
kernel_read_system_state(dccm_t)
kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(dccm_t)
@@ -14870,7 +16477,7 @@ index 5178337..a087ad2 100644
corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(dccm_t)
corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if(dccm_t)
corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_node(dccm_t)
-@@ -380,7 +369,6 @@ dev_read_sysfs(dccm_t)
+@@ -380,7 +359,6 @@ dev_read_sysfs(dccm_t)
domain_use_interactive_fds(dccm_t)
@@ -14878,6 +16485,15 @@ index 5178337..a087ad2 100644
files_read_etc_runtime_files(dccm_t)
fs_getattr_all_fs(dccm_t)
+@@ -390,8 +368,6 @@ auth_use_nsswitch(dccm_t)
+
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(dccm_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(dccm_t)
+-
+ userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fds(dccm_t)
+ userdom_dontaudit_search_user_home_dirs(dccm_t)
+
diff --git a/ddclient.if b/ddclient.if
index 0a1a61b..64742c6 100644
--- a/ddclient.if
@@ -14904,7 +16520,7 @@ index 0a1a61b..64742c6 100644
domain_system_change_exemption($1)
role_transition $2 ddclient_initrc_exec_t system_r;
diff --git a/ddclient.te b/ddclient.te
-index 24ba98a..0918edc 100644
+index 24ba98a..318a5a1 100644
--- a/ddclient.te
+++ b/ddclient.te
@@ -18,6 +18,9 @@ init_script_file(ddclient_initrc_exec_t)
@@ -14964,7 +16580,7 @@ index 24ba98a..0918edc 100644
corenet_tcp_connect_all_ports(ddclient_t)
corenet_sendrecv_all_client_packets(ddclient_t)
-@@ -89,10 +100,14 @@ files_read_usr_files(ddclient_t)
+@@ -89,9 +100,11 @@ files_read_usr_files(ddclient_t)
fs_getattr_all_fs(ddclient_t)
fs_search_auto_mountpoints(ddclient_t)
@@ -14972,20 +16588,20 @@ index 24ba98a..0918edc 100644
+
logging_send_syslog_msg(ddclient_t)
- miscfiles_read_localization(ddclient_t)
-
+-miscfiles_read_localization(ddclient_t)
+mta_send_mail(ddclient_t)
-+
+
sysnet_exec_ifconfig(ddclient_t)
sysnet_read_config(ddclient_t)
-
diff --git a/ddcprobe.te b/ddcprobe.te
-index 5e062bc..3cbfffb 100644
+index 5e062bc..c85c30d 100644
--- a/ddcprobe.te
+++ b/ddcprobe.te
-@@ -42,10 +42,14 @@ libs_read_lib_files(ddcprobe_t)
+@@ -40,12 +40,15 @@ term_use_all_ptys(ddcprobe_t)
+
+ libs_read_lib_files(ddcprobe_t)
- miscfiles_read_localization(ddcprobe_t)
+-miscfiles_read_localization(ddcprobe_t)
-modutils_read_module_deps(ddcprobe_t)
-
@@ -15045,7 +16661,7 @@ index 567865f..b5e9376 100644
admin_pattern($1, denyhosts_var_lock_t)
')
diff --git a/denyhosts.te b/denyhosts.te
-index 8ba9425..3db40ba 100644
+index 8ba9425..2030529 100644
--- a/denyhosts.te
+++ b/denyhosts.te
@@ -25,6 +25,9 @@ logging_log_file(denyhosts_var_log_t)
@@ -15058,7 +16674,7 @@ index 8ba9425..3db40ba 100644
allow denyhosts_t self:netlink_route_socket create_netlink_socket_perms;
allow denyhosts_t self:tcp_socket create_socket_perms;
-@@ -43,24 +46,30 @@ read_files_pattern(denyhosts_t, denyhosts_var_log_t, denyhosts_var_log_t)
+@@ -43,26 +46,30 @@ read_files_pattern(denyhosts_t, denyhosts_var_log_t, denyhosts_var_log_t)
setattr_files_pattern(denyhosts_t, denyhosts_var_log_t, denyhosts_var_log_t)
logging_log_filetrans(denyhosts_t, denyhosts_var_log_t, file)
@@ -15087,11 +16703,13 @@ index 8ba9425..3db40ba 100644
# /var/log/secure
logging_read_generic_logs(denyhosts_t)
+-
+-miscfiles_read_localization(denyhosts_t)
+logging_send_syslog_msg(denyhosts_t)
- miscfiles_read_localization(denyhosts_t)
-
-@@ -70,3 +79,7 @@ sysnet_etc_filetrans_config(denyhosts_t)
+ sysnet_manage_config(denyhosts_t)
+ sysnet_etc_filetrans_config(denyhosts_t)
+@@ -70,3 +77,7 @@ sysnet_etc_filetrans_config(denyhosts_t)
optional_policy(`
cron_system_entry(denyhosts_t, denyhosts_exec_t)
')
@@ -15136,7 +16754,7 @@ index 9af85c8..5483806 100644
+/var/run/udisks.* gen_context(system_u:object_r:devicekit_var_run_t,s0)
/var/run/upower(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:devicekit_var_run_t,s0)
diff --git a/devicekit.if b/devicekit.if
-index f706b99..aa049fc 100644
+index f706b99..3b4f593 100644
--- a/devicekit.if
+++ b/devicekit.if
@@ -20,6 +20,24 @@ interface(`devicekit_domtrans',`
@@ -15423,11 +17041,11 @@ index f706b99..aa049fc 100644
+ ')
+
+ files_pid_filetrans($1, devicekit_var_run_t, dir, "pm-utils")
-+ #logging_log_filetrans($1, devicekit_var_log_t, file, "pm-powersave.log")
-+ #logging_log_filetrans($1, devicekit_var_log_t, file, "pm-suspend.log")
++ logging_log_filetrans($1, devicekit_var_log_t, file, "pm-powersave.log")
++ logging_log_filetrans($1, devicekit_var_log_t, file, "pm-suspend.log")
')
diff --git a/devicekit.te b/devicekit.te
-index 1819518..84a3fbd 100644
+index 1819518..1363f96 100644
--- a/devicekit.te
+++ b/devicekit.te
@@ -7,15 +7,15 @@ policy_module(devicekit, 1.2.0)
@@ -15459,20 +17077,20 @@ index 1819518..84a3fbd 100644
########################################
#
# DeviceKit local policy
-@@ -42,11 +45,11 @@ kernel_read_system_state(devicekit_t)
+@@ -42,11 +45,10 @@ kernel_read_system_state(devicekit_t)
dev_read_sysfs(devicekit_t)
dev_read_urand(devicekit_t)
-files_read_etc_files(devicekit_t)
- miscfiles_read_localization(devicekit_t)
+-miscfiles_read_localization(devicekit_t)
optional_policy(`
+ dbus_system_domain(devicekit_t, devicekit_exec_t)
dbus_system_bus_client(devicekit_t)
allow devicekit_t devicekit_disk_t:dbus send_msg;
-@@ -62,7 +65,8 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -62,7 +64,8 @@ optional_policy(`
# DeviceKit disk local policy
#
@@ -15482,7 +17100,7 @@ index 1819518..84a3fbd 100644
allow devicekit_disk_t self:process { getsched signal_perms };
allow devicekit_disk_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms;
allow devicekit_disk_t self:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket create_socket_perms;
-@@ -75,10 +79,14 @@ manage_dirs_pattern(devicekit_disk_t, devicekit_var_lib_t, devicekit_var_lib_t)
+@@ -75,10 +78,14 @@ manage_dirs_pattern(devicekit_disk_t, devicekit_var_lib_t, devicekit_var_lib_t)
manage_files_pattern(devicekit_disk_t, devicekit_var_lib_t, devicekit_var_lib_t)
files_var_lib_filetrans(devicekit_disk_t, devicekit_var_lib_t, dir)
@@ -15497,7 +17115,7 @@ index 1819518..84a3fbd 100644
kernel_getattr_message_if(devicekit_disk_t)
kernel_read_fs_sysctls(devicekit_disk_t)
kernel_read_network_state(devicekit_disk_t)
-@@ -97,6 +105,7 @@ dev_getattr_usbfs_dirs(devicekit_disk_t)
+@@ -97,6 +104,7 @@ dev_getattr_usbfs_dirs(devicekit_disk_t)
dev_manage_generic_files(devicekit_disk_t)
dev_getattr_all_chr_files(devicekit_disk_t)
dev_getattr_mtrr_dev(devicekit_disk_t)
@@ -15505,7 +17123,7 @@ index 1819518..84a3fbd 100644
domain_getattr_all_pipes(devicekit_disk_t)
domain_getattr_all_sockets(devicekit_disk_t)
-@@ -105,14 +114,16 @@ domain_read_all_domains_state(devicekit_disk_t)
+@@ -105,14 +113,16 @@ domain_read_all_domains_state(devicekit_disk_t)
files_dontaudit_read_all_symlinks(devicekit_disk_t)
files_getattr_all_sockets(devicekit_disk_t)
@@ -15524,7 +17142,7 @@ index 1819518..84a3fbd 100644
fs_list_inotifyfs(devicekit_disk_t)
fs_manage_fusefs_dirs(devicekit_disk_t)
fs_mount_all_fs(devicekit_disk_t)
-@@ -127,16 +138,20 @@ storage_raw_write_fixed_disk(devicekit_disk_t)
+@@ -127,16 +137,18 @@ storage_raw_write_fixed_disk(devicekit_disk_t)
storage_raw_read_removable_device(devicekit_disk_t)
storage_raw_write_removable_device(devicekit_disk_t)
@@ -15533,9 +17151,8 @@ index 1819518..84a3fbd 100644
auth_use_nsswitch(devicekit_disk_t)
+-miscfiles_read_localization(devicekit_disk_t)
+logging_send_syslog_msg(devicekit_disk_t)
-+
- miscfiles_read_localization(devicekit_disk_t)
userdom_read_all_users_state(devicekit_disk_t)
userdom_search_user_home_dirs(devicekit_disk_t)
@@ -15546,7 +17163,7 @@ index 1819518..84a3fbd 100644
dbus_system_bus_client(devicekit_disk_t)
allow devicekit_disk_t devicekit_t:dbus send_msg;
-@@ -170,6 +185,10 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -170,6 +182,10 @@ optional_policy(`
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -15557,7 +17174,7 @@ index 1819518..84a3fbd 100644
udev_domtrans(devicekit_disk_t)
udev_read_db(devicekit_disk_t)
')
-@@ -178,55 +197,84 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -178,55 +194,84 @@ optional_policy(`
virt_manage_images(devicekit_disk_t)
')
@@ -15575,6 +17192,7 @@ index 1819518..84a3fbd 100644
-allow devicekit_power_t self:capability { dac_override net_admin sys_admin sys_tty_config sys_nice sys_ptrace };
-allow devicekit_power_t self:process getsched;
+allow devicekit_power_t self:capability { dac_override net_admin sys_admin sys_tty_config sys_nice };
++allow devicekit_power_t self:capability2 compromise_kernel;
+allow devicekit_power_t self:process { getsched signal_perms };
allow devicekit_power_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms;
allow devicekit_power_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms;
@@ -15638,17 +17256,17 @@ index 1819518..84a3fbd 100644
auth_use_nsswitch(devicekit_power_t)
- miscfiles_read_localization(devicekit_power_t)
-
-+seutil_exec_setfiles(devicekit_power_t)
+-miscfiles_read_localization(devicekit_power_t)
+
++seutil_exec_setfiles(devicekit_power_t)
+
sysnet_read_config(devicekit_power_t)
sysnet_domtrans_ifconfig(devicekit_power_t)
+sysnet_domtrans_dhcpc(devicekit_power_t)
userdom_read_all_users_state(devicekit_power_t)
-@@ -235,10 +283,16 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -235,10 +280,16 @@ optional_policy(`
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -15665,7 +17283,7 @@ index 1819518..84a3fbd 100644
dbus_system_bus_client(devicekit_power_t)
allow devicekit_power_t devicekit_t:dbus send_msg;
-@@ -261,14 +315,21 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -261,14 +312,21 @@ optional_policy(`
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -15688,7 +17306,7 @@ index 1819518..84a3fbd 100644
policykit_dbus_chat(devicekit_power_t)
policykit_domtrans_auth(devicekit_power_t)
policykit_read_lib(devicekit_power_t)
-@@ -276,9 +337,31 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -276,9 +334,31 @@ optional_policy(`
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -15810,7 +17428,7 @@ index 5e2cea8..2ab8a14 100644
+ allow $1 dhcpd_unit_file_t:service all_service_perms;
')
diff --git a/dhcp.te b/dhcp.te
-index ed07b26..624922d 100644
+index ed07b26..bed6b0d 100644
--- a/dhcp.te
+++ b/dhcp.te
@@ -19,6 +19,9 @@ init_daemon_domain(dhcpd_t, dhcpd_exec_t)
@@ -15828,7 +17446,7 @@ index ed07b26..624922d 100644
#
-allow dhcpd_t self:capability { net_raw sys_resource };
-+allow dhcpd_t self:capability { dac_override sys_chroot net_raw setgid setuid sys_resource };
++allow dhcpd_t self:capability { chown dac_override sys_chroot net_raw setgid setuid sys_resource };
dontaudit dhcpd_t self:capability { net_admin sys_tty_config };
-allow dhcpd_t self:process signal_perms;
+allow dhcpd_t self:process { getcap setcap signal_perms };
@@ -15860,7 +17478,14 @@ index ed07b26..624922d 100644
files_read_usr_files(dhcpd_t)
files_read_etc_runtime_files(dhcpd_t)
files_search_var_lib(dhcpd_t)
-@@ -110,12 +111,21 @@ sysnet_read_dhcp_config(dhcpd_t)
+@@ -103,19 +104,26 @@ auth_use_nsswitch(dhcpd_t)
+
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(dhcpd_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(dhcpd_t)
+-
+ sysnet_read_dhcp_config(dhcpd_t)
+
userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fds(dhcpd_t)
userdom_dontaudit_search_user_home_dirs(dhcpd_t)
@@ -15902,7 +17527,7 @@ index a0d23ce..83a7ca5 100644
init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, dictd_initrc_exec_t)
domain_system_change_exemption($1)
diff --git a/dictd.te b/dictd.te
-index d2d9359..4202e56 100644
+index d2d9359..b14ece6 100644
--- a/dictd.te
+++ b/dictd.te
@@ -45,7 +45,6 @@ files_pid_filetrans(dictd_t, dictd_var_run_t, file)
@@ -15913,7 +17538,7 @@ index d2d9359..4202e56 100644
corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(dictd_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(dictd_t)
corenet_raw_sendrecv_generic_if(dictd_t)
-@@ -66,30 +65,21 @@ fs_search_auto_mountpoints(dictd_t)
+@@ -66,30 +65,19 @@ fs_search_auto_mountpoints(dictd_t)
domain_use_interactive_fds(dictd_t)
@@ -15924,14 +17549,14 @@ index d2d9359..4202e56 100644
# for checking for nscd
files_dontaudit_search_pids(dictd_t)
+-logging_send_syslog_msg(dictd_t)
+-
+-miscfiles_read_localization(dictd_t)
+auth_use_nsswitch(dictd_t)
-+
- logging_send_syslog_msg(dictd_t)
-
- miscfiles_read_localization(dictd_t)
-sysnet_read_config(dictd_t)
--
++logging_send_syslog_msg(dictd_t)
+
userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fds(dictd_t)
optional_policy(`
@@ -16109,10 +17734,10 @@ index 0000000..332a1c9
+')
diff --git a/dirsrv-admin.te b/dirsrv-admin.te
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..58b4422
+index 0000000..a3d076f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dirsrv-admin.te
-@@ -0,0 +1,143 @@
+@@ -0,0 +1,144 @@
+policy_module(dirsrv-admin,1.0.0)
+
+########################################
@@ -16166,7 +17791,6 @@ index 0000000..58b4422
+
+logging_search_logs(dirsrvadmin_t)
+
-+miscfiles_read_localization(dirsrvadmin_t)
+
+# Needed for stop and restart scripts
+dirsrv_read_var_run(dirsrvadmin_t)
@@ -16214,18 +17838,20 @@ index 0000000..58b4422
+ manage_dirs_pattern(httpd_dirsrvadmin_script_t, dirsrvadmin_tmp_t, dirsrvadmin_tmp_t)
+ files_tmp_filetrans(httpd_dirsrvadmin_script_t, dirsrvadmin_tmp_t, { file dir })
+
-+ # The CGI scripts must be able to manage dirsrv-admin
-+ dirsrvadmin_run_exec(httpd_dirsrvadmin_script_t)
-+ dirsrvadmin_manage_config(httpd_dirsrvadmin_script_t)
-+ dirsrv_domtrans(httpd_dirsrvadmin_script_t)
-+ dirsrv_signal(httpd_dirsrvadmin_script_t)
-+ dirsrv_signull(httpd_dirsrvadmin_script_t)
-+ dirsrv_manage_log(httpd_dirsrvadmin_script_t)
-+ dirsrv_manage_var_lib(httpd_dirsrvadmin_script_t)
-+ dirsrv_pid_filetrans(httpd_dirsrvadmin_script_t)
-+ dirsrv_manage_var_run(httpd_dirsrvadmin_script_t)
-+ dirsrv_manage_config(httpd_dirsrvadmin_script_t)
-+ dirsrv_read_share(httpd_dirsrvadmin_script_t)
++ optional_policy(`
++ # The CGI scripts must be able to manage dirsrv-admin
++ dirsrvadmin_run_exec(httpd_dirsrvadmin_script_t)
++ dirsrvadmin_manage_config(httpd_dirsrvadmin_script_t)
++ dirsrv_domtrans(httpd_dirsrvadmin_script_t)
++ dirsrv_signal(httpd_dirsrvadmin_script_t)
++ dirsrv_signull(httpd_dirsrvadmin_script_t)
++ dirsrv_manage_log(httpd_dirsrvadmin_script_t)
++ dirsrv_manage_var_lib(httpd_dirsrvadmin_script_t)
++ dirsrv_pid_filetrans(httpd_dirsrvadmin_script_t)
++ dirsrv_manage_var_run(httpd_dirsrvadmin_script_t)
++ dirsrv_manage_config(httpd_dirsrvadmin_script_t)
++ dirsrv_read_share(httpd_dirsrvadmin_script_t)
++ ')
+')
+
+#######################################
@@ -16501,10 +18127,10 @@ index 0000000..b214253
+')
diff --git a/dirsrv.te b/dirsrv.te
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..da10216
+index 0000000..7f0b4f6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dirsrv.te
-@@ -0,0 +1,196 @@
+@@ -0,0 +1,193 @@
+policy_module(dirsrv,1.0.0)
+
+########################################
@@ -16626,8 +18252,6 @@ index 0000000..da10216
+
+logging_send_syslog_msg(dirsrv_t)
+
-+miscfiles_read_localization(dirsrv_t)
-+
+sysnet_dns_name_resolve(dirsrv_t)
+
+optional_policy(`
@@ -16689,7 +18313,6 @@ index 0000000..da10216
+fs_getattr_tmpfs(dirsrv_snmp_t)
+fs_search_tmpfs(dirsrv_snmp_t)
+
-+miscfiles_read_localization(dirsrv_snmp_t)
+
+sysnet_read_config(dirsrv_snmp_t)
+sysnet_dns_name_resolve(dirsrv_snmp_t)
@@ -16702,7 +18325,7 @@ index 0000000..da10216
+ snmp_stream_connect(dirsrv_snmp_t)
+')
diff --git a/distcc.te b/distcc.te
-index 54d93e8..e4110c4 100644
+index 54d93e8..16d2e18 100644
--- a/distcc.te
+++ b/distcc.te
@@ -44,7 +44,6 @@ files_pid_filetrans(distccd_t, distccd_var_run_t, file)
@@ -16713,6 +18336,15 @@ index 54d93e8..e4110c4 100644
corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(distccd_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(distccd_t)
corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if(distccd_t)
+@@ -73,8 +72,6 @@ libs_exec_lib_files(distccd_t)
+
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(distccd_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(distccd_t)
+-
+ sysnet_read_config(distccd_t)
+
+ userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fds(distccd_t)
diff --git a/djbdns.if b/djbdns.if
index ade3079..41a21f1 100644
--- a/djbdns.if
@@ -16762,7 +18394,7 @@ index d6356b5..5db989e 100644
-userdom_use_user_terminals(dmidecode_t)
+userdom_use_inherited_user_terminals(dmidecode_t)
diff --git a/dnsmasq.fc b/dnsmasq.fc
-index b886676..3d5ca2b 100644
+index b886676..fb3b2d6 100644
--- a/dnsmasq.fc
+++ b/dnsmasq.fc
@@ -1,12 +1,14 @@
@@ -16779,7 +18411,8 @@ index b886676..3d5ca2b 100644
-/var/log/dnsmasq\.log gen_context(system_u:object_r:dnsmasq_var_log_t,s0)
+/var/log/dnsmasq.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:dnsmasq_var_log_t,s0)
- /var/run/dnsmasq\.pid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:dnsmasq_var_run_t,s0)
+-/var/run/dnsmasq\.pid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:dnsmasq_var_run_t,s0)
++/var/run/dnsmasq.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:dnsmasq_var_run_t,s0)
/var/run/libvirt/network(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:dnsmasq_var_run_t,s0)
diff --git a/dnsmasq.if b/dnsmasq.if
index 9bd812b..53f895e 100644
@@ -16995,7 +18628,7 @@ index 9bd812b..53f895e 100644
+ allow $1 dnsmasq_unit_file_t:service all_service_perms;
')
diff --git a/dnsmasq.te b/dnsmasq.te
-index fdaeeba..ec15389 100644
+index fdaeeba..a29af29 100644
--- a/dnsmasq.te
+++ b/dnsmasq.te
@@ -24,6 +24,9 @@ logging_log_file(dnsmasq_var_log_t)
@@ -17034,7 +18667,16 @@ index fdaeeba..ec15389 100644
files_read_etc_runtime_files(dnsmasq_t)
fs_getattr_all_fs(dnsmasq_t)
-@@ -96,7 +100,20 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -86,8 +90,6 @@ auth_use_nsswitch(dnsmasq_t)
+
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(dnsmasq_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(dnsmasq_t)
+-
+ userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fds(dnsmasq_t)
+ userdom_dontaudit_search_user_home_dirs(dnsmasq_t)
+
+@@ -96,7 +98,21 @@ optional_policy(`
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -17047,6 +18689,7 @@ index fdaeeba..ec15389 100644
+')
+
+optional_policy(`
++ networkmanager_read_conf(dnsmasq_t)
+ networkmanager_read_pid_files(dnsmasq_t)
+')
+
@@ -17055,7 +18698,7 @@ index fdaeeba..ec15389 100644
')
optional_policy(`
-@@ -113,5 +130,7 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -113,5 +129,7 @@ optional_policy(`
optional_policy(`
virt_manage_lib_files(dnsmasq_t)
@@ -17144,10 +18787,10 @@ index 0000000..a952041
+')
diff --git a/dnssec.te b/dnssec.te
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..98ba6e1
+index 0000000..25daf6c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dnssec.te
-@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+policy_module(dnssec, 1.0.0)
+
+########################################
@@ -17198,8 +18841,6 @@ index 0000000..98ba6e1
+
+auth_read_passwd(dnssec_trigger_t)
+
-+miscfiles_read_localization(dnssec_trigger_t)
-+
+sysnet_dns_name_resolve(dnssec_trigger_t)
+sysnet_manage_config(dnssec_trigger_t)
+
@@ -17210,9 +18851,18 @@ index 0000000..98ba6e1
+
+
diff --git a/dovecot.fc b/dovecot.fc
-index 3a3ecb2..c5c1e32 100644
+index 3a3ecb2..4448055 100644
--- a/dovecot.fc
+++ b/dovecot.fc
+@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
+ #
+ # /etc
+ #
+-/etc/dovecot(/.*)?* gen_context(system_u:object_r:dovecot_etc_t,s0)
++/etc/dovecot(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:dovecot_etc_t,s0)
+ /etc/dovecot\.conf.* gen_context(system_u:object_r:dovecot_etc_t,s0)
+ /etc/dovecot\.passwd.* gen_context(system_u:object_r:dovecot_passwd_t,s0)
+
@@ -24,12 +24,13 @@ ifdef(`distro_debian',`
ifdef(`distro_debian', `
@@ -17237,12 +18887,34 @@ index 3a3ecb2..c5c1e32 100644
/var/lib/dovecot(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:dovecot_var_lib_t,s0)
diff --git a/dovecot.if b/dovecot.if
-index e1d7dc5..df96c0d 100644
+index e1d7dc5..66d42bb 100644
--- a/dovecot.if
+++ b/dovecot.if
-@@ -1,5 +1,24 @@
+@@ -1,5 +1,46 @@
## <summary>Dovecot POP and IMAP mail server</summary>
++######################################
++## <summary>
++## Creates types and rules for a basic
++## dovecot daemon domain.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="prefix">
++## <summary>
++## Prefix for the domain.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++template(`dovecot_basic_types_template',`
++ gen_require(`
++ attribute dovecot_domain;
++ ')
++
++ type $1_t, dovecot_domain;
++ type $1_exec_t;
++
++ kernel_read_system_state($1_t)
++')
++
+#######################################
+## <summary>
+## Connect to dovecot unix domain stream socket.
@@ -17265,7 +18937,7 @@ index e1d7dc5..df96c0d 100644
########################################
## <summary>
## Connect to dovecot auth unix domain stream socket.
-@@ -16,6 +35,7 @@ interface(`dovecot_stream_connect_auth',`
+@@ -16,6 +57,7 @@ interface(`dovecot_stream_connect_auth',`
type dovecot_auth_t, dovecot_var_run_t;
')
@@ -17273,7 +18945,7 @@ index e1d7dc5..df96c0d 100644
stream_connect_pattern($1, dovecot_var_run_t, dovecot_var_run_t, dovecot_auth_t)
')
-@@ -52,6 +72,7 @@ interface(`dovecot_manage_spool',`
+@@ -52,6 +94,7 @@ interface(`dovecot_manage_spool',`
type dovecot_spool_t;
')
@@ -17281,7 +18953,7 @@ index e1d7dc5..df96c0d 100644
manage_files_pattern($1, dovecot_spool_t, dovecot_spool_t)
manage_lnk_files_pattern($1, dovecot_spool_t, dovecot_spool_t)
')
-@@ -74,6 +95,25 @@ interface(`dovecot_dontaudit_unlink_lib_files',`
+@@ -74,6 +117,25 @@ interface(`dovecot_dontaudit_unlink_lib_files',`
dontaudit $1 dovecot_var_lib_t:file unlink;
')
@@ -17307,7 +18979,7 @@ index e1d7dc5..df96c0d 100644
########################################
## <summary>
## All of the rules required to administrate
-@@ -93,16 +133,17 @@ interface(`dovecot_dontaudit_unlink_lib_files',`
+@@ -93,16 +155,17 @@ interface(`dovecot_dontaudit_unlink_lib_files',`
#
interface(`dovecot_admin',`
gen_require(`
@@ -17332,7 +19004,7 @@ index e1d7dc5..df96c0d 100644
init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, dovecot_initrc_exec_t)
domain_system_change_exemption($1)
-@@ -112,8 +153,11 @@ interface(`dovecot_admin',`
+@@ -112,8 +175,11 @@ interface(`dovecot_admin',`
files_list_etc($1)
admin_pattern($1, dovecot_etc_t)
@@ -17346,7 +19018,7 @@ index e1d7dc5..df96c0d 100644
files_list_spool($1)
admin_pattern($1, dovecot_spool_t)
-@@ -121,6 +165,9 @@ interface(`dovecot_admin',`
+@@ -121,6 +187,9 @@ interface(`dovecot_admin',`
files_list_var_lib($1)
admin_pattern($1, dovecot_var_lib_t)
@@ -17357,19 +19029,37 @@ index e1d7dc5..df96c0d 100644
admin_pattern($1, dovecot_var_run_t)
diff --git a/dovecot.te b/dovecot.te
-index 2df7766..6f21882 100644
+index 2df7766..d4e008b 100644
--- a/dovecot.te
+++ b/dovecot.te
-@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ type dovecot_auth_tmp_t;
+@@ -4,12 +4,12 @@ policy_module(dovecot, 1.14.0)
+ #
+ # Declarations
+ #
+-type dovecot_t;
+-type dovecot_exec_t;
++attribute dovecot_domain;
++
++dovecot_basic_types_template(dovecot)
+ init_daemon_domain(dovecot_t, dovecot_exec_t)
+
+-type dovecot_auth_t;
+-type dovecot_auth_exec_t;
++dovecot_basic_types_template(dovecot_auth)
+ domain_type(dovecot_auth_t)
+ domain_entry_file(dovecot_auth_t, dovecot_auth_exec_t)
+ role system_r types dovecot_auth_t;
+@@ -18,14 +18,16 @@ type dovecot_auth_tmp_t;
files_tmp_file(dovecot_auth_tmp_t)
type dovecot_cert_t;
-files_type(dovecot_cert_t)
+miscfiles_cert_type(dovecot_cert_t)
- type dovecot_deliver_t;
- type dovecot_deliver_exec_t;
-@@ -26,6 +26,9 @@ domain_type(dovecot_deliver_t)
+-type dovecot_deliver_t;
+-type dovecot_deliver_exec_t;
++dovecot_basic_types_template(dovecot_deliver)
+ domain_type(dovecot_deliver_t)
domain_entry_file(dovecot_deliver_t, dovecot_deliver_exec_t)
role system_r types dovecot_deliver_t;
@@ -17379,7 +19069,7 @@ index 2df7766..6f21882 100644
type dovecot_etc_t;
files_config_file(dovecot_etc_t)
-@@ -36,7 +39,7 @@ type dovecot_passwd_t;
+@@ -36,7 +38,7 @@ type dovecot_passwd_t;
files_type(dovecot_passwd_t)
type dovecot_spool_t;
@@ -17388,7 +19078,34 @@ index 2df7766..6f21882 100644
type dovecot_tmp_t;
files_tmp_file(dovecot_tmp_t)
-@@ -56,9 +59,9 @@ files_pid_file(dovecot_var_run_t)
+@@ -51,17 +53,37 @@ logging_log_file(dovecot_var_log_t)
+ type dovecot_var_run_t;
+ files_pid_file(dovecot_var_run_t)
+
++#######################################
++#
++# dovecot domain local policy
++#
++
++allow dovecot_domain self:capability2 block_suspend;
++
++allow dovecot_domain self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms;
++allow dovecot_domain self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms;
++
++kernel_read_all_sysctls(dovecot_domain)
++
++corecmd_exec_bin(dovecot_domain)
++corecmd_exec_shell(dovecot_domain)
++
++dev_read_sysfs(dovecot_domain)
++dev_read_rand(dovecot_domain)
++dev_read_urand(dovecot_domain)
++
++# Dovecot now has quota support and it uses getmntent() to find the mountpoints.
++files_read_etc_runtime_files(dovecot_domain)
++
+ ########################################
+ #
# dovecot local policy
#
@@ -17396,11 +19113,14 @@ index 2df7766..6f21882 100644
+allow dovecot_t self:capability { dac_override dac_read_search chown fsetid kill net_bind_service setgid setuid sys_chroot };
dontaudit dovecot_t self:capability sys_tty_config;
-allow dovecot_t self:process { setrlimit signal_perms getcap setcap };
+-allow dovecot_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms;
+allow dovecot_t self:process { setrlimit signal_perms getcap setcap setsched };
- allow dovecot_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms;
allow dovecot_t self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
- allow dovecot_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms;
-@@ -72,7 +75,9 @@ allow dovecot_t dovecot_cert_t:dir list_dir_perms;
+-allow dovecot_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms;
+ allow dovecot_t self:unix_stream_socket { create_stream_socket_perms connectto };
+
+ domtrans_pattern(dovecot_t, dovecot_auth_exec_t, dovecot_auth_t)
+@@ -72,7 +94,9 @@ allow dovecot_t dovecot_cert_t:dir list_dir_perms;
read_files_pattern(dovecot_t, dovecot_cert_t, dovecot_cert_t)
read_lnk_files_pattern(dovecot_t, dovecot_cert_t, dovecot_cert_t)
@@ -17411,7 +19131,7 @@ index 2df7766..6f21882 100644
files_search_etc(dovecot_t)
can_exec(dovecot_t, dovecot_exec_t)
-@@ -94,15 +99,16 @@ manage_dirs_pattern(dovecot_t, dovecot_spool_t, dovecot_spool_t)
+@@ -94,15 +118,13 @@ manage_dirs_pattern(dovecot_t, dovecot_spool_t, dovecot_spool_t)
manage_files_pattern(dovecot_t, dovecot_spool_t, dovecot_spool_t)
manage_lnk_files_pattern(dovecot_t, dovecot_spool_t, dovecot_spool_t)
@@ -17420,17 +19140,17 @@ index 2df7766..6f21882 100644
manage_lnk_files_pattern(dovecot_t, dovecot_var_run_t, dovecot_var_run_t)
manage_sock_files_pattern(dovecot_t, dovecot_var_run_t, dovecot_var_run_t)
-files_pid_filetrans(dovecot_t, dovecot_var_run_t, file)
+-
+-kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(dovecot_t)
+-kernel_read_system_state(dovecot_t)
+manage_fifo_files_pattern(dovecot_t, dovecot_var_run_t, dovecot_var_run_t)
+files_pid_filetrans(dovecot_t, dovecot_var_run_t, { dir file fifo_file })
- kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(dovecot_t)
- kernel_read_system_state(dovecot_t)
-
-corenet_all_recvfrom_unlabeled(dovecot_t)
corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(dovecot_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(dovecot_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_node(dovecot_t)
-@@ -110,6 +116,7 @@ corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_ports(dovecot_t)
+@@ -110,41 +132,36 @@ corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_ports(dovecot_t)
corenet_tcp_bind_generic_node(dovecot_t)
corenet_tcp_bind_mail_port(dovecot_t)
corenet_tcp_bind_pop_port(dovecot_t)
@@ -17438,52 +19158,73 @@ index 2df7766..6f21882 100644
corenet_tcp_bind_sieve_port(dovecot_t)
corenet_tcp_connect_all_ports(dovecot_t)
corenet_tcp_connect_postgresql_port(dovecot_t)
-@@ -128,13 +135,14 @@ corecmd_exec_bin(dovecot_t)
+ corenet_sendrecv_pop_server_packets(dovecot_t)
+ corenet_sendrecv_all_client_packets(dovecot_t)
+-dev_read_sysfs(dovecot_t)
+-dev_read_urand(dovecot_t)
+-
+ fs_getattr_all_fs(dovecot_t)
+ fs_getattr_all_dirs(dovecot_t)
+ fs_search_auto_mountpoints(dovecot_t)
+ fs_list_inotifyfs(dovecot_t)
+
+-corecmd_exec_bin(dovecot_t)
+-
domain_use_interactive_fds(dovecot_t)
-files_read_etc_files(dovecot_t)
files_search_spool(dovecot_t)
files_search_tmp(dovecot_t)
files_dontaudit_list_default(dovecot_t)
+-# Dovecot now has quota support and it uses getmntent() to find the mountpoints.
+-files_read_etc_runtime_files(dovecot_t)
+files_dontaudit_search_all_dirs(dovecot_t)
- # Dovecot now has quota support and it uses getmntent() to find the mountpoints.
- files_read_etc_runtime_files(dovecot_t)
files_search_all_mountpoints(dovecot_t)
+files_read_var_lib_files(dovecot_t)
init_getattr_utmp(dovecot_t)
-@@ -145,6 +153,7 @@ logging_send_syslog_msg(dovecot_t)
+ auth_use_nsswitch(dovecot_t)
+
+-logging_send_syslog_msg(dovecot_t)
+-
miscfiles_read_generic_certs(dovecot_t)
- miscfiles_read_localization(dovecot_t)
+-miscfiles_read_localization(dovecot_t)
++logging_send_syslog_msg(dovecot_t)
++
+userdom_home_manager(dovecot_t)
userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fds(dovecot_t)
userdom_manage_user_home_content_dirs(dovecot_t)
userdom_manage_user_home_content_files(dovecot_t)
-@@ -153,6 +162,7 @@ userdom_manage_user_home_content_pipes(dovecot_t)
+@@ -153,10 +170,23 @@ userdom_manage_user_home_content_pipes(dovecot_t)
userdom_manage_user_home_content_sockets(dovecot_t)
userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans_user_home_content(dovecot_t, { dir file lnk_file fifo_file sock_file })
-+mta_manage_home_rw(dovecot_t)
- mta_manage_spool(dovecot_t)
-
- optional_policy(`
-@@ -160,10 +170,24 @@ optional_policy(`
- ')
+-mta_manage_spool(dovecot_t)
++optional_policy(`
++ mta_manage_home_rw(dovecot_t)
++ mta_manage_spool(dovecot_t)
++')
++
++optional_policy(`
++ kerberos_keytab_template(dovecot_t, dovecot_t)
++ kerberos_tmp_filetrans_host_rcache(dovecot_t, "imap_0")
++')
optional_policy(`
+- kerberos_keytab_template(dovecot, dovecot_t)
+ gnome_manage_data(dovecot_t)
+')
+
+optional_policy(`
+ postfix_manage_private_sockets(dovecot_t)
+ postfix_search_spool(dovecot_t)
-+')
-+
-+optional_policy(`
- postgresql_stream_connect(dovecot_t)
+ ')
+
+ optional_policy(`
+@@ -164,6 +194,11 @@ optional_policy(`
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -17495,18 +19236,19 @@ index 2df7766..6f21882 100644
seutil_sigchld_newrole(dovecot_t)
')
-@@ -180,8 +204,8 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -180,16 +215,17 @@ optional_policy(`
# dovecot auth local policy
#
-allow dovecot_auth_t self:capability { chown dac_override setgid setuid };
-allow dovecot_auth_t self:process { signal_perms getcap setcap };
+-allow dovecot_auth_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms;
+-allow dovecot_auth_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms;
+allow dovecot_auth_t self:capability { chown dac_override ipc_lock setgid setuid sys_nice };
+allow dovecot_auth_t self:process { getsched setsched signal_perms getcap setcap };
- allow dovecot_auth_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms;
- allow dovecot_auth_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms;
allow dovecot_auth_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
-@@ -190,6 +214,9 @@ allow dovecot_auth_t dovecot_t:unix_stream_socket { connectto rw_stream_socket_p
+
+ allow dovecot_auth_t dovecot_t:unix_stream_socket { connectto rw_stream_socket_perms };
read_files_pattern(dovecot_auth_t, dovecot_passwd_t, dovecot_passwd_t)
@@ -17516,35 +19258,44 @@ index 2df7766..6f21882 100644
manage_dirs_pattern(dovecot_auth_t, dovecot_auth_tmp_t, dovecot_auth_tmp_t)
manage_files_pattern(dovecot_auth_t, dovecot_auth_tmp_t, dovecot_auth_tmp_t)
files_tmp_filetrans(dovecot_auth_t, dovecot_auth_tmp_t, { file dir })
-@@ -201,22 +228,25 @@ dovecot_stream_connect_auth(dovecot_auth_t)
- kernel_read_all_sysctls(dovecot_auth_t)
- kernel_read_system_state(dovecot_auth_t)
+@@ -198,31 +234,24 @@ allow dovecot_auth_t dovecot_var_run_t:dir list_dir_perms;
+ manage_sock_files_pattern(dovecot_auth_t, dovecot_var_run_t, dovecot_var_run_t)
+ dovecot_stream_connect_auth(dovecot_auth_t)
-+corecmd_exec_bin(dovecot_auth_t)
-+
+-kernel_read_all_sysctls(dovecot_auth_t)
+-kernel_read_system_state(dovecot_auth_t)
+-
logging_send_audit_msgs(dovecot_auth_t)
- logging_send_syslog_msg(dovecot_auth_t)
-
-+dev_search_sysfs(dovecot_auth_t)
- dev_read_urand(dovecot_auth_t)
+-logging_send_syslog_msg(dovecot_auth_t)
+-
+-dev_read_urand(dovecot_auth_t)
auth_domtrans_chk_passwd(dovecot_auth_t)
auth_use_nsswitch(dovecot_auth_t)
-files_read_etc_files(dovecot_auth_t)
- files_read_etc_runtime_files(dovecot_auth_t)
+-files_read_etc_runtime_files(dovecot_auth_t)
++logging_send_syslog_msg(dovecot_auth_t)
++
files_search_pids(dovecot_auth_t)
files_read_usr_files(dovecot_auth_t)
files_read_usr_symlinks(dovecot_auth_t)
files_read_var_lib_files(dovecot_auth_t)
files_search_tmp(dovecot_auth_t)
-files_read_var_lib_files(dovecot_t)
-+
+
+-init_rw_utmp(dovecot_auth_t)
+fs_getattr_xattr_fs(dovecot_auth_t)
- init_rw_utmp(dovecot_auth_t)
+-miscfiles_read_localization(dovecot_auth_t)
++init_rw_utmp(dovecot_auth_t)
+
+-seutil_dontaudit_search_config(dovecot_auth_t)
++sysnet_use_ldap(dovecot_auth_t)
-@@ -236,6 +266,8 @@ optional_policy(`
+ optional_policy(`
+ kerberos_use(dovecot_auth_t)
+@@ -236,6 +265,8 @@ optional_policy(`
optional_policy(`
mysql_search_db(dovecot_auth_t)
mysql_stream_connect(dovecot_auth_t)
@@ -17553,7 +19304,7 @@ index 2df7766..6f21882 100644
')
optional_policy(`
-@@ -243,6 +275,8 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -243,6 +274,8 @@ optional_policy(`
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -17562,53 +19313,50 @@ index 2df7766..6f21882 100644
postfix_search_spool(dovecot_auth_t)
')
-@@ -250,23 +284,42 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -250,25 +283,32 @@ optional_policy(`
#
# dovecot deliver local policy
#
-+
-+allow dovecot_deliver_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms;
- allow dovecot_deliver_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms;
+-allow dovecot_deliver_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms;
allow dovecot_deliver_t dovecot_t:process signull;
-allow dovecot_deliver_t dovecot_etc_t:file read_file_perms;
+-allow dovecot_deliver_t dovecot_var_run_t:dir list_dir_perms;
+allow dovecot_deliver_t dovecot_etc_t:dir list_dir_perms;
+read_files_pattern(dovecot_deliver_t, dovecot_etc_t, dovecot_etc_t)
+read_lnk_files_pattern(dovecot_deliver_t, dovecot_etc_t, dovecot_etc_t)
-+
+
+-kernel_read_all_sysctls(dovecot_deliver_t)
+-kernel_read_system_state(dovecot_deliver_t)
+allow dovecot_deliver_t dovecot_cert_t:dir search_dir_perms;
-+
+
+-files_read_etc_files(dovecot_deliver_t)
+-files_read_etc_runtime_files(dovecot_deliver_t)
+append_files_pattern(dovecot_deliver_t, dovecot_var_log_t, dovecot_var_log_t)
+
+manage_dirs_pattern(dovecot_deliver_t, dovecot_deliver_tmp_t, dovecot_deliver_tmp_t)
+manage_files_pattern(dovecot_deliver_t, dovecot_deliver_tmp_t, dovecot_deliver_tmp_t)
+files_tmp_filetrans(dovecot_deliver_t, dovecot_deliver_tmp_t, { file dir })
+
- allow dovecot_deliver_t dovecot_var_run_t:dir list_dir_perms;
++allow dovecot_deliver_t dovecot_var_run_t:dir list_dir_perms;
+read_files_pattern(dovecot_deliver_t, dovecot_var_run_t, dovecot_var_run_t)
+read_sock_files_pattern(dovecot_deliver_t, dovecot_var_run_t, dovecot_var_run_t)
+dovecot_stream_connect(dovecot_deliver_t)
+
+can_exec(dovecot_deliver_t, dovecot_deliver_exec_t)
- kernel_read_all_sysctls(dovecot_deliver_t)
- kernel_read_system_state(dovecot_deliver_t)
-
--files_read_etc_files(dovecot_deliver_t)
-+corecmd_exec_bin(dovecot_deliver_t)
-+
- files_read_etc_runtime_files(dovecot_deliver_t)
-
auth_use_nsswitch(dovecot_deliver_t)
++logging_append_all_logs(dovecot_deliver_t)
logging_send_syslog_msg(dovecot_deliver_t)
-logging_search_logs(dovecot_auth_t)
-+logging_append_all_logs(dovecot_deliver_t)
+-
+-miscfiles_read_localization(dovecot_deliver_t)
- miscfiles_read_localization(dovecot_deliver_t)
+ dovecot_stream_connect_auth(dovecot_deliver_t)
-@@ -283,24 +336,21 @@ userdom_manage_user_home_content_pipes(dovecot_deliver_t)
+@@ -283,24 +323,22 @@ userdom_manage_user_home_content_pipes(dovecot_deliver_t)
userdom_manage_user_home_content_sockets(dovecot_deliver_t)
userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans_user_home_content(dovecot_deliver_t, { dir file lnk_file fifo_file sock_file })
@@ -17623,6 +19371,11 @@ index 2df7766..6f21882 100644
+
+optional_policy(`
+ gnome_manage_data(dovecot_deliver_t)
++')
++
++optional_policy(`
++ mta_mailserver_delivery(dovecot_deliver_t)
++ mta_read_queue(dovecot_deliver_t)
')
-tunable_policy(`use_samba_home_dirs',`
@@ -17632,10 +19385,6 @@ index 2df7766..6f21882 100644
- fs_manage_cifs_dirs(dovecot_t)
- fs_manage_cifs_files(dovecot_t)
- fs_manage_cifs_symlinks(dovecot_t)
-+mta_manage_spool(dovecot_deliver_t)
-+mta_read_queue(dovecot_deliver_t)
-+mta_manage_home_rw(dovecot_deliver_t)
-+
+optional_policy(`
+ postfix_use_fds_master(dovecot_deliver_t)
')
@@ -17671,7 +19420,7 @@ index 4d32b42..78736d8 100644
########################################
diff --git a/dpkg.te b/dpkg.te
-index 52725c4..c751c48 100644
+index 52725c4..934ce11 100644
--- a/dpkg.te
+++ b/dpkg.te
@@ -5,8 +5,8 @@ policy_module(dpkg, 1.10.0)
@@ -17727,10 +19476,11 @@ index 52725c4..c751c48 100644
logging_send_syslog_msg(dpkg_t)
-@@ -196,19 +200,30 @@ domain_signull_all_domains(dpkg_t)
+@@ -195,20 +199,30 @@ domain_signal_all_domains(dpkg_t)
+ domain_signull_all_domains(dpkg_t)
files_read_etc_runtime_files(dpkg_t)
files_exec_usr_files(dpkg_t)
- miscfiles_read_localization(dpkg_t)
+-miscfiles_read_localization(dpkg_t)
-modutils_run_depmod(dpkg_t, dpkg_roles)
-modutils_run_insmod(dpkg_t, dpkg_roles)
-seutil_run_loadpolicy(dpkg_t, dpkg_roles)
@@ -17764,10 +19514,18 @@ index 52725c4..c751c48 100644
########################################
#
# dpkg-script Local policy
-@@ -302,15 +317,15 @@ logging_send_syslog_msg(dpkg_script_t)
+@@ -296,21 +310,20 @@ init_use_script_fds(dpkg_script_t)
- miscfiles_read_localization(dpkg_script_t)
+ libs_exec_ld_so(dpkg_script_t)
+ libs_exec_lib_files(dpkg_script_t)
+-libs_run_ldconfig(dpkg_script_t, dpkg_roles)
++libs_domtrans_ldconfig(dpkg_script_t)
++#libs_run_ldconfig(dpkg_script_t, dpkg_roles)
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(dpkg_script_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(dpkg_script_t)
+-
-modutils_run_depmod(dpkg_script_t, dpkg_roles)
-modutils_run_insmod(dpkg_script_t, dpkg_roles)
+#modutils_run_depmod(dpkg_script_t, dpkg_roles)
@@ -17785,7 +19543,7 @@ index 52725c4..c751c48 100644
allow dpkg_script_t self:process execmem;
')
-@@ -319,9 +334,9 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -319,9 +332,9 @@ optional_policy(`
apt_use_fds(dpkg_script_t)
')
@@ -17798,7 +19556,7 @@ index 52725c4..c751c48 100644
optional_policy(`
mta_send_mail(dpkg_script_t)
-@@ -335,7 +350,7 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -335,7 +348,7 @@ optional_policy(`
unconfined_domain(dpkg_script_t)
')
@@ -17963,10 +19721,10 @@ index 0000000..659d051
+
diff --git a/drbd.te b/drbd.te
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..f09fbb3
+index 0000000..2f3efe7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drbd.te
-@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+policy_module(drbd, 1.0.0)
+
+########################################
@@ -18016,7 +19774,6 @@ index 0000000..f09fbb3
+
+storage_raw_read_fixed_disk(drbd_t)
+
-+miscfiles_read_localization(drbd_t)
+
+sysnet_dns_name_resolve(drbd_t)
diff --git a/dspam.fc b/dspam.fc
@@ -18316,7 +20073,7 @@ index 0000000..a446210
+')
diff --git a/dspam.te b/dspam.te
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..2d75555
+index 0000000..2b91a78
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dspam.te
@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
@@ -18369,16 +20126,18 @@ index 0000000..2d75555
+
+manage_dirs_pattern(dspam_t, dspam_var_run_t, dspam_var_run_t)
+manage_files_pattern(dspam_t, dspam_var_run_t, dspam_var_run_t)
++manage_sock_files_pattern(dspam_t, dspam_var_run_t, dspam_var_run_t)
+
+manage_sock_files_pattern(dspam_t, dspam_tmp_t, dspam_tmp_t)
+files_tmp_filetrans(dspam_t, dspam_tmp_t, { sock_file })
+
-+# need to add the port tcp/10026 to corenetwork.te.in
-+#allow dspam_t port_t:tcp_socket name_connect;
-+
++corenet_tcp_connect_spamd_port(dspam_t)
++corenet_tcp_bind_spamd_port(dspam_t)
+
+auth_use_nsswitch(dspam_t)
+
++files_search_spool(dspam_t)
++
+# for RHEL5
+libs_use_ld_so(dspam_t)
+libs_use_shared_libs(dspam_t)
@@ -18386,8 +20145,6 @@ index 0000000..2d75555
+
+logging_send_syslog_msg(dspam_t)
+
-+miscfiles_read_localization(dspam_t)
-+
+optional_policy(`
+ mysql_tcp_connect(dspam_t)
+ mysql_search_db(dspam_t)
@@ -18413,9 +20170,18 @@ index 0000000..2d75555
+')
+
diff --git a/entropyd.te b/entropyd.te
-index b6ac808..63ba594 100644
+index b6ac808..6235eb0 100644
--- a/entropyd.te
+++ b/entropyd.te
+@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ manage_files_pattern(entropyd_t, entropyd_var_run_t, entropyd_var_run_t)
+ files_pid_filetrans(entropyd_t, entropyd_var_run_t, file)
+
+ kernel_rw_kernel_sysctl(entropyd_t)
+-kernel_list_proc(entropyd_t)
++kernel_read_system_state(entropyd_t)
+ kernel_read_proc_symlinks(entropyd_t)
+
+ dev_read_sysfs(entropyd_t)
@@ -42,7 +42,6 @@ dev_write_urand(entropyd_t)
dev_read_rand(entropyd_t)
dev_write_rand(entropyd_t)
@@ -18424,17 +20190,17 @@ index b6ac808..63ba594 100644
files_read_usr_files(entropyd_t)
fs_getattr_all_fs(entropyd_t)
-@@ -52,6 +51,8 @@ domain_use_interactive_fds(entropyd_t)
+@@ -52,7 +51,7 @@ domain_use_interactive_fds(entropyd_t)
logging_send_syslog_msg(entropyd_t)
+-miscfiles_read_localization(entropyd_t)
+auth_use_nsswitch(entropyd_t)
-+
- miscfiles_read_localization(entropyd_t)
userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fds(entropyd_t)
+ userdom_dontaudit_search_user_home_dirs(entropyd_t)
diff --git a/evolution.te b/evolution.te
-index 73cb712..c87a548 100644
+index 73cb712..2c6f3bc 100644
--- a/evolution.te
+++ b/evolution.te
@@ -146,7 +146,6 @@ corecmd_exec_shell(evolution_t)
@@ -18445,7 +20211,7 @@ index 73cb712..c87a548 100644
corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(evolution_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(evolution_t)
corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if(evolution_t)
-@@ -181,19 +180,19 @@ dev_read_urand(evolution_t)
+@@ -181,19 +180,17 @@ dev_read_urand(evolution_t)
domain_dontaudit_read_all_domains_state(evolution_t)
@@ -18456,18 +20222,18 @@ index 73cb712..c87a548 100644
fs_search_auto_mountpoints(evolution_t)
+-logging_send_syslog_msg(evolution_t)
+auth_use_nsswitch(evolution_t)
-+
- logging_send_syslog_msg(evolution_t)
- miscfiles_read_localization(evolution_t)
+-miscfiles_read_localization(evolution_t)
++logging_send_syslog_msg(evolution_t)
sysnet_read_config(evolution_t)
-sysnet_dns_name_resolve(evolution_t)
udev_read_state(evolution_t)
-@@ -201,7 +200,7 @@ userdom_rw_user_tmp_files(evolution_t)
+@@ -201,7 +198,7 @@ userdom_rw_user_tmp_files(evolution_t)
userdom_manage_user_tmp_dirs(evolution_t)
userdom_manage_user_tmp_sockets(evolution_t)
userdom_manage_user_tmp_files(evolution_t)
@@ -18476,7 +20242,7 @@ index 73cb712..c87a548 100644
# FIXME: suppress access to .local/.icons/.themes until properly implemented
# FIXME: suppress access to .gaim/blist.xml (buddy list synchronization)
# until properly implemented
-@@ -357,11 +356,12 @@ allow evolution_alarm_t evolution_server_orbit_tmp_t:sock_file write;
+@@ -357,12 +354,12 @@ allow evolution_alarm_t evolution_server_orbit_tmp_t:sock_file write;
dev_read_urand(evolution_alarm_t)
@@ -18485,12 +20251,13 @@ index 73cb712..c87a548 100644
fs_search_auto_mountpoints(evolution_alarm_t)
+-miscfiles_read_localization(evolution_alarm_t)
+auth_use_nsswitch(evolution_alarm_t)
+
- miscfiles_read_localization(evolution_alarm_t)
# Access evolution home
-@@ -439,12 +439,13 @@ corecmd_exec_bin(evolution_exchange_t)
+ userdom_search_user_home_dirs(evolution_alarm_t)
+@@ -439,13 +436,13 @@ corecmd_exec_bin(evolution_exchange_t)
dev_read_urand(evolution_exchange_t)
@@ -18500,12 +20267,13 @@ index 73cb712..c87a548 100644
# Access evolution home
fs_search_auto_mountpoints(evolution_exchange_t)
+-miscfiles_read_localization(evolution_exchange_t)
+auth_use_nsswitch(evolution_exchange_t)
+
- miscfiles_read_localization(evolution_exchange_t)
userdom_write_user_tmp_sockets(evolution_exchange_t)
-@@ -506,7 +507,6 @@ kernel_read_system_state(evolution_server_t)
+ # Access evolution home
+@@ -506,7 +503,6 @@ kernel_read_system_state(evolution_server_t)
corecmd_exec_shell(evolution_server_t)
# Obtain weather data via http (read server name from xml file in /usr)
@@ -18513,7 +20281,7 @@ index 73cb712..c87a548 100644
corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(evolution_server_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(evolution_server_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_node(evolution_server_t)
-@@ -519,19 +519,19 @@ corenet_sendrecv_http_cache_client_packets(evolution_server_t)
+@@ -519,19 +515,18 @@ corenet_sendrecv_http_cache_client_packets(evolution_server_t)
dev_read_urand(evolution_server_t)
@@ -18523,9 +20291,9 @@ index 73cb712..c87a548 100644
fs_search_auto_mountpoints(evolution_server_t)
+-miscfiles_read_localization(evolution_server_t)
+auth_use_nsswitch(evolution_server_t)
+
- miscfiles_read_localization(evolution_server_t)
# Look in /etc/pki
miscfiles_read_generic_certs(evolution_server_t)
@@ -18535,7 +20303,7 @@ index 73cb712..c87a548 100644
sysnet_use_ldap(evolution_server_t)
# Access evolution home
-@@ -573,7 +573,6 @@ allow evolution_webcal_t evolution_webcal_tmpfs_t:sock_file manage_sock_file_per
+@@ -573,7 +568,6 @@ allow evolution_webcal_t evolution_webcal_tmpfs_t:sock_file manage_sock_file_per
allow evolution_webcal_t evolution_webcal_tmpfs_t:fifo_file manage_fifo_file_perms;
fs_tmpfs_filetrans(evolution_webcal_t, evolution_webcal_tmpfs_t, { dir file lnk_file sock_file fifo_file })
@@ -18543,7 +20311,7 @@ index 73cb712..c87a548 100644
corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(evolution_webcal_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(evolution_webcal_t)
corenet_raw_sendrecv_generic_if(evolution_webcal_t)
-@@ -586,9 +585,9 @@ corenet_tcp_connect_http_port(evolution_webcal_t)
+@@ -586,9 +580,9 @@ corenet_tcp_connect_http_port(evolution_webcal_t)
corenet_sendrecv_http_client_packets(evolution_webcal_t)
corenet_sendrecv_http_cache_client_packets(evolution_webcal_t)
@@ -18674,7 +20442,7 @@ index 6bef7f8..ba138e8 100644
+ admin_pattern($1, exim_var_run_t)
+')
diff --git a/exim.te b/exim.te
-index f28f64b..775ec11 100644
+index f28f64b..91758d5 100644
--- a/exim.te
+++ b/exim.te
@@ -35,11 +35,14 @@ mta_mailserver_user_agent(exim_t)
@@ -18715,7 +20483,15 @@ index f28f64b..775ec11 100644
files_read_etc_runtime_files(exim_t)
files_getattr_all_mountpoints(exim_t)
-@@ -162,6 +164,10 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -119,7 +121,6 @@ auth_use_nsswitch(exim_t)
+
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(exim_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(exim_t)
+ miscfiles_read_generic_certs(exim_t)
+
+ userdom_dontaudit_search_user_home_dirs(exim_t)
+@@ -162,6 +163,10 @@ optional_policy(`
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -18726,7 +20502,7 @@ index f28f64b..775ec11 100644
kerberos_keytab_template(exim, exim_t)
')
-@@ -171,6 +177,10 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -171,6 +176,10 @@ optional_policy(`
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -18737,7 +20513,7 @@ index f28f64b..775ec11 100644
tunable_policy(`exim_can_connect_db',`
mysql_stream_connect(exim_t)
')
-@@ -184,6 +194,7 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -184,6 +193,7 @@ optional_policy(`
optional_policy(`
procmail_domtrans(exim_t)
@@ -18857,7 +20633,7 @@ index f590a1f..b1b13b0 100644
+ admin_pattern($1, fail2ban_tmp_t)
')
diff --git a/fail2ban.te b/fail2ban.te
-index 2a69e5e..d552523 100644
+index 2a69e5e..5dccf2c 100644
--- a/fail2ban.te
+++ b/fail2ban.te
@@ -23,12 +23,19 @@ files_type(fail2ban_var_lib_t)
@@ -18919,8 +20695,12 @@ index 2a69e5e..d552523 100644
files_read_etc_runtime_files(fail2ban_t)
files_read_usr_files(fail2ban_t)
files_list_var(fail2ban_t)
-@@ -85,6 +96,9 @@ miscfiles_read_localization(fail2ban_t)
+@@ -81,10 +92,11 @@ auth_use_nsswitch(fail2ban_t)
+ logging_read_all_logs(fail2ban_t)
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(fail2ban_t)
+-miscfiles_read_localization(fail2ban_t)
+-
mta_send_mail(fail2ban_t)
+sysnet_manage_config(fail2ban_t)
@@ -18929,7 +20709,7 @@ index 2a69e5e..d552523 100644
optional_policy(`
apache_read_log(fail2ban_t)
')
-@@ -94,5 +108,44 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -94,5 +106,43 @@ optional_policy(`
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -18968,7 +20748,6 @@ index 2a69e5e..d552523 100644
+
+auth_read_passwd(fail2ban_client_t)
+
-+miscfiles_read_localization(fail2ban_client_t)
+
+optional_policy(`
+ gnome_dontaudit_search_config(fail2ban_client_t)
@@ -19081,10 +20860,10 @@ index 0000000..33508c1
+
diff --git a/fcoemon.te b/fcoemon.te
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..1f39a80
+index 0000000..724ca0d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/fcoemon.te
-@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+policy_module(fcoemon, 1.0.0)
+
+########################################
@@ -19125,14 +20904,12 @@ index 0000000..1f39a80
+
+logging_send_syslog_msg(fcoemon_t)
+
-+miscfiles_read_localization(fcoemon_t)
-+
+optional_policy(`
+ lldpad_dgram_send(fcoemon_t)
+')
+
diff --git a/fetchmail.fc b/fetchmail.fc
-index 39928d5..65dc228 100644
+index 39928d5..6c24c84 100644
--- a/fetchmail.fc
+++ b/fetchmail.fc
@@ -1,3 +1,9 @@
@@ -19145,12 +20922,24 @@ index 39928d5..65dc228 100644
#
# /etc
+@@ -14,6 +20,7 @@
+ #
+ # /var
+ #
++/var/log/fetchmail.* gen_context(system_u:object_r:fetchmail_log_t,s0)
+ /var/lib/fetchmail(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:fetchmail_uidl_cache_t,s0)
+ /var/mail/\.fetchmail-UIDL-cache -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:fetchmail_uidl_cache_t,s0)
+ /var/run/fetchmail/.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:fetchmail_var_run_t,s0)
diff --git a/fetchmail.if b/fetchmail.if
-index 6537214..8629354 100644
+index 6537214..406d62b 100644
--- a/fetchmail.if
+++ b/fetchmail.if
-@@ -18,7 +18,11 @@ interface(`fetchmail_admin',`
- type fetchmail_var_run_t;
+@@ -15,14 +15,20 @@
+ interface(`fetchmail_admin',`
+ gen_require(`
+ type fetchmail_t, fetchmail_etc_t, fetchmail_uidl_cache_t;
+- type fetchmail_var_run_t;
++ type fetchmail_var_run_t, fetchmail_log_t;
')
+ allow $1 fetchmail_t:process signal_perms;
@@ -19161,21 +20950,38 @@ index 6537214..8629354 100644
files_list_etc($1)
admin_pattern($1, fetchmail_etc_t)
+
++ admin_pattern($1, fetchmail_log_t)
++
+ admin_pattern($1, fetchmail_uidl_cache_t)
+
+ files_list_pids($1)
diff --git a/fetchmail.te b/fetchmail.te
-index ac6626e..3f6d630 100644
+index ac6626e..656f329 100644
--- a/fetchmail.te
+++ b/fetchmail.te
-@@ -10,6 +10,9 @@ type fetchmail_exec_t;
+@@ -10,6 +10,12 @@ type fetchmail_exec_t;
init_daemon_domain(fetchmail_t, fetchmail_exec_t)
application_executable_file(fetchmail_exec_t)
+type fetchmail_home_t;
+userdom_user_home_content(fetchmail_home_t)
+
++type fetchmail_log_t;
++logging_log_file(fetchmail_log_t)
++
type fetchmail_var_run_t;
files_pid_file(fetchmail_var_run_t)
-@@ -41,6 +44,11 @@ manage_dirs_pattern(fetchmail_t, fetchmail_var_run_t, fetchmail_var_run_t)
+@@ -37,10 +43,19 @@ allow fetchmail_t fetchmail_etc_t:file read_file_perms;
+ allow fetchmail_t fetchmail_uidl_cache_t:file manage_file_perms;
+ mta_spool_filetrans(fetchmail_t, fetchmail_uidl_cache_t, file)
+
++manage_dirs_pattern(fetchmail_t, fetchmail_log_t, fetchmail_log_t)
++manage_files_pattern(fetchmail_t, fetchmail_log_t, fetchmail_log_t)
++logging_log_filetrans(fetchmail_t, fetchmail_log_t, { dir file })
++
+ manage_dirs_pattern(fetchmail_t, fetchmail_var_run_t, fetchmail_var_run_t)
manage_files_pattern(fetchmail_t, fetchmail_var_run_t, fetchmail_var_run_t)
files_pid_filetrans(fetchmail_t, fetchmail_var_run_t, { dir file })
@@ -19187,7 +20993,7 @@ index ac6626e..3f6d630 100644
kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(fetchmail_t)
kernel_list_proc(fetchmail_t)
kernel_getattr_proc_files(fetchmail_t)
-@@ -51,7 +59,6 @@ kernel_dontaudit_read_system_state(fetchmail_t)
+@@ -51,7 +66,6 @@ kernel_dontaudit_read_system_state(fetchmail_t)
corecmd_exec_bin(fetchmail_t)
corecmd_exec_shell(fetchmail_t)
@@ -19195,7 +21001,19 @@ index ac6626e..3f6d630 100644
corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(fetchmail_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(fetchmail_t)
corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if(fetchmail_t)
-@@ -88,6 +95,10 @@ userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fds(fetchmail_t)
+@@ -77,9 +91,10 @@ fs_search_auto_mountpoints(fetchmail_t)
+
+ domain_use_interactive_fds(fetchmail_t)
+
++auth_read_passwd(fetchmail_t)
++
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(fetchmail_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(fetchmail_t)
+ miscfiles_read_generic_certs(fetchmail_t)
+
+ sysnet_read_config(fetchmail_t)
+@@ -88,6 +103,10 @@ userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fds(fetchmail_t)
userdom_dontaudit_search_user_home_dirs(fetchmail_t)
optional_policy(`
@@ -19207,7 +21025,7 @@ index ac6626e..3f6d630 100644
')
diff --git a/finger.te b/finger.te
-index 9b7036a..7bd5266 100644
+index 9b7036a..864b94a 100644
--- a/finger.te
+++ b/finger.te
@@ -46,7 +46,6 @@ logging_log_filetrans(fingerd_t, fingerd_log_t, file)
@@ -19234,6 +21052,14 @@ index 9b7036a..7bd5266 100644
files_read_etc_runtime_files(fingerd_t)
init_read_utmp(fingerd_t)
+@@ -85,7 +84,6 @@ mta_getattr_spool(fingerd_t)
+
+ sysnet_read_config(fingerd_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(fingerd_t)
+
+ # stop it accessing sub-directories, prevents checking a Maildir for new mail,
+ # have to change this when we create a type for Maildir
diff --git a/firewalld.fc b/firewalld.fc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f440549
@@ -19391,10 +21217,10 @@ index 0000000..c4c7510
+')
diff --git a/firewalld.te b/firewalld.te
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..b3727f1
+index 0000000..a7fcf3c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/firewalld.te
-@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
+@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
+
+policy_module(firewalld,1.0.0)
+
@@ -19462,15 +21288,18 @@ index 0000000..b3727f1
+
+logging_send_syslog_msg(firewalld_t)
+
-+miscfiles_read_localization(firewalld_t)
++sysnet_dns_name_resolve(firewalld_t)
+
-+seutil_exec_setfiles(firewalld_t)
-+seutil_read_file_contexts(firewalld_t)
++sysnet_read_config(firewalld_t)
+
+optional_policy(`
+ dbus_system_domain(firewalld_t, firewalld_exec_t)
+
+ optional_policy(`
++ devicekit_dbus_chat_power(firewalld_t)
++ ')
++
++ optional_policy(`
+ policykit_dbus_chat(firewalld_t)
+ ')
+
@@ -19544,10 +21373,10 @@ index 0000000..2bd5790
+')
diff --git a/firewallgui.te b/firewallgui.te
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..3d0c142
+index 0000000..6bd855e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/firewallgui.te
-@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+policy_module(firewallgui,1.0.0)
+
+########################################
@@ -19595,7 +21424,6 @@ index 0000000..3d0c142
+
+auth_use_nsswitch(firewallgui_t)
+
-+miscfiles_read_localization(firewallgui_t)
+
+seutil_read_config(firewallgui_t)
+
@@ -19661,10 +21489,24 @@ index 8fa451c..f3a67c9 100644
')
diff --git a/firstboot.te b/firstboot.te
-index c4d8998..65ce250 100644
+index c4d8998..0647c46 100644
--- a/firstboot.te
+++ b/firstboot.te
-@@ -33,10 +33,12 @@ allow firstboot_t self:passwd rootok;
+@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
+ policy_module(firstboot, 1.12.0)
+
+ gen_require(`
+- class passwd rootok;
++ class passwd { passwd chfn chsh rootok crontab };
+ ')
+
+ ########################################
+@@ -29,14 +29,16 @@ allow firstboot_t self:process setfscreate;
+ allow firstboot_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms;
+ allow firstboot_t self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
+ allow firstboot_t self:unix_stream_socket { connect create };
+-allow firstboot_t self:passwd rootok;
++allow firstboot_t self:passwd { rootok passwd chfn chsh };
allow firstboot_t firstboot_etc_t:file read_file_perms;
@@ -19687,59 +21529,68 @@ index c4d8998..65ce250 100644
init_domtrans_script(firstboot_t)
init_rw_utmp(firstboot_t)
-@@ -75,12 +79,10 @@ logging_send_syslog_msg(firstboot_t)
+@@ -73,14 +77,10 @@ locallogin_use_fds(firstboot_t)
+
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(firstboot_t)
- miscfiles_read_localization(firstboot_t)
+-miscfiles_read_localization(firstboot_t)
++sysnet_dns_name_resolve(firstboot_t)
-modutils_domtrans_insmod(firstboot_t)
-modutils_domtrans_depmod(firstboot_t)
-modutils_read_module_config(firstboot_t)
-modutils_read_module_deps(firstboot_t)
-+sysnet_dns_name_resolve(firstboot_t)
-+
+userdom_use_inherited_user_terminals(firstboot_t)
-userdom_use_user_terminals(firstboot_t)
# Add/remove user home directories
userdom_manage_user_home_content_dirs(firstboot_t)
userdom_manage_user_home_content_files(firstboot_t)
-@@ -103,8 +105,18 @@ optional_policy(`
- ')
+@@ -91,10 +91,6 @@ userdom_home_filetrans_user_home_dir(firstboot_t)
+ userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans_user_home_content(firstboot_t, { dir file lnk_file fifo_file sock_file })
optional_policy(`
-+ iptables_domtrans(firstboot_t)
-+')
-+
-+optional_policy(`
- nis_use_ypbind(firstboot_t)
+- consoletype_domtrans(firstboot_t)
+-')
+-
+-optional_policy(`
+ dbus_system_bus_client(firstboot_t)
+
+ optional_policy(`
+@@ -103,7 +99,10 @@ optional_policy(`
')
-+optional_policy(`
+
+ optional_policy(`
+- nis_use_ypbind(firstboot_t)
+ modutils_domtrans_insmod(firstboot_t)
+ modutils_domtrans_depmod(firstboot_t)
+ modutils_read_module_config(firstboot_t)
+ modutils_read_module_deps(firstboot_t)
-+')
+ ')
optional_policy(`
- samba_rw_config(firstboot_t)
-@@ -113,7 +125,7 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -113,18 +112,11 @@ optional_policy(`
optional_policy(`
unconfined_domtrans(firstboot_t)
# The big hammer
- unconfined_domain(firstboot_t)
+-')
+-
+-optional_policy(`
+- usermanage_domtrans_chfn(firstboot_t)
+- usermanage_domtrans_groupadd(firstboot_t)
+- usermanage_domtrans_passwd(firstboot_t)
+- usermanage_domtrans_useradd(firstboot_t)
+- usermanage_domtrans_admin_passwd(firstboot_t)
+ unconfined_domain_noaudit(firstboot_t)
')
optional_policy(`
-@@ -125,6 +137,7 @@ optional_policy(`
- ')
-
- optional_policy(`
+ gnome_admin_home_gconf_filetrans(firstboot_t, dir)
gnome_manage_config(firstboot_t)
')
-@@ -132,4 +145,5 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -132,4 +124,5 @@ optional_policy(`
xserver_domtrans(firstboot_t)
xserver_rw_shm(firstboot_t)
xserver_unconfined(firstboot_t)
@@ -19755,7 +21606,7 @@ index ebad8c4..640293e 100644
')
-
diff --git a/fprintd.te b/fprintd.te
-index 7df52c7..d27d645 100644
+index 7df52c7..46499bd 100644
--- a/fprintd.te
+++ b/fprintd.te
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ policy_module(fprintd, 1.1.0)
@@ -19780,7 +21631,7 @@ index 7df52c7..d27d645 100644
manage_dirs_pattern(fprintd_t, fprintd_var_lib_t, fprintd_var_lib_t)
manage_files_pattern(fprintd_t, fprintd_var_lib_t, fprintd_var_lib_t)
-@@ -33,7 +34,6 @@ dev_list_usbfs(fprintd_t)
+@@ -33,14 +34,12 @@ dev_list_usbfs(fprintd_t)
dev_rw_generic_usb_dev(fprintd_t)
dev_read_sysfs(fprintd_t)
@@ -19788,7 +21639,14 @@ index 7df52c7..d27d645 100644
files_read_usr_files(fprintd_t)
fs_getattr_all_fs(fprintd_t)
-@@ -50,8 +50,13 @@ optional_policy(`
+
+ auth_use_nsswitch(fprintd_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(fprintd_t)
+
+ userdom_use_user_ptys(fprintd_t)
+ userdom_read_all_users_state(fprintd_t)
+@@ -50,8 +49,17 @@ optional_policy(`
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -19801,6 +21659,10 @@ index 7df52c7..d27d645 100644
policykit_dbus_chat(fprintd_t)
policykit_domtrans_auth(fprintd_t)
+ policykit_dbus_chat_auth(fprintd_t)
++')
++
++optional_policy(`
++ xserver_read_state_xdm(fprintd_t)
')
diff --git a/ftp.fc b/ftp.fc
index 69dcd2a..4d97da7 100644
@@ -19918,7 +21780,7 @@ index 9d3201b..6e75e3d 100644
+ allow $1 ftpd_unit_file_t:service all_service_perms;
')
diff --git a/ftp.te b/ftp.te
-index 80026bb..3045d40 100644
+index 80026bb..30968b3 100644
--- a/ftp.te
+++ b/ftp.te
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ policy_module(ftp, 1.14.0)
@@ -20014,15 +21876,7 @@ index 80026bb..3045d40 100644
########################################
#
# anon-sftp local policy
-@@ -122,6 +158,7 @@ ifdef(`enable_mcs',`
-
- files_read_etc_files(anon_sftpd_t)
-
-+miscfiles_read_localization(anon_sftpd_t)
- miscfiles_read_public_files(anon_sftpd_t)
-
- tunable_policy(`sftpd_anon_write',`
-@@ -133,7 +170,7 @@ tunable_policy(`sftpd_anon_write',`
+@@ -133,7 +169,7 @@ tunable_policy(`sftpd_anon_write',`
# ftpd local policy
#
@@ -20031,7 +21885,7 @@ index 80026bb..3045d40 100644
dontaudit ftpd_t self:capability sys_tty_config;
allow ftpd_t self:process { getcap getpgid setcap setsched setrlimit signal_perms };
allow ftpd_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms;
-@@ -151,7 +188,6 @@ files_lock_filetrans(ftpd_t, ftpd_lock_t, file)
+@@ -151,7 +187,6 @@ files_lock_filetrans(ftpd_t, ftpd_lock_t, file)
manage_dirs_pattern(ftpd_t, ftpd_tmp_t, ftpd_tmp_t)
manage_files_pattern(ftpd_t, ftpd_tmp_t, ftpd_tmp_t)
@@ -20039,7 +21893,7 @@ index 80026bb..3045d40 100644
manage_dirs_pattern(ftpd_t, ftpd_tmpfs_t, ftpd_tmpfs_t)
manage_files_pattern(ftpd_t, ftpd_tmpfs_t, ftpd_tmpfs_t)
-@@ -163,13 +199,13 @@ fs_tmpfs_filetrans(ftpd_t, ftpd_tmpfs_t, { dir file lnk_file sock_file fifo_file
+@@ -163,13 +198,13 @@ fs_tmpfs_filetrans(ftpd_t, ftpd_tmpfs_t, { dir file lnk_file sock_file fifo_file
manage_dirs_pattern(ftpd_t, ftpd_var_run_t, ftpd_var_run_t)
manage_files_pattern(ftpd_t, ftpd_var_run_t, ftpd_var_run_t)
manage_sock_files_pattern(ftpd_t, ftpd_var_run_t, ftpd_var_run_t)
@@ -20055,7 +21909,7 @@ index 80026bb..3045d40 100644
# Create and modify /var/log/xferlog.
manage_files_pattern(ftpd_t, xferlog_t, xferlog_t)
-@@ -177,14 +213,13 @@ logging_log_filetrans(ftpd_t, xferlog_t, file)
+@@ -177,14 +212,13 @@ logging_log_filetrans(ftpd_t, xferlog_t, file)
kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(ftpd_t)
kernel_read_system_state(ftpd_t)
@@ -20071,7 +21925,7 @@ index 80026bb..3045d40 100644
corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(ftpd_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(ftpd_t)
corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if(ftpd_t)
-@@ -196,9 +231,8 @@ corenet_tcp_bind_generic_node(ftpd_t)
+@@ -196,9 +230,8 @@ corenet_tcp_bind_generic_node(ftpd_t)
corenet_tcp_bind_ftp_port(ftpd_t)
corenet_tcp_bind_ftp_data_port(ftpd_t)
corenet_tcp_bind_generic_port(ftpd_t)
@@ -20083,7 +21937,7 @@ index 80026bb..3045d40 100644
corenet_sendrecv_ftp_server_packets(ftpd_t)
domain_use_interactive_fds(ftpd_t)
-@@ -212,13 +246,11 @@ fs_search_auto_mountpoints(ftpd_t)
+@@ -212,13 +245,11 @@ fs_search_auto_mountpoints(ftpd_t)
fs_getattr_all_fs(ftpd_t)
fs_search_fusefs(ftpd_t)
@@ -20099,7 +21953,18 @@ index 80026bb..3045d40 100644
init_rw_utmp(ftpd_t)
-@@ -237,31 +269,39 @@ sysnet_use_ldap(ftpd_t)
+@@ -226,42 +257,47 @@ logging_send_audit_msgs(ftpd_t)
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(ftpd_t)
+ logging_set_loginuid(ftpd_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(ftpd_t)
+ miscfiles_read_public_files(ftpd_t)
+
+-seutil_dontaudit_search_config(ftpd_t)
+-
+ sysnet_read_config(ftpd_t)
+ sysnet_use_ldap(ftpd_t)
+
userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fds(ftpd_t)
userdom_dontaudit_search_user_home_dirs(ftpd_t)
@@ -20146,7 +22011,7 @@ index 80026bb..3045d40 100644
')
tunable_policy(`ftp_home_dir',`
-@@ -270,10 +310,13 @@ tunable_policy(`ftp_home_dir',`
+@@ -270,10 +306,13 @@ tunable_policy(`ftp_home_dir',`
# allow access to /home
files_list_home(ftpd_t)
userdom_read_user_home_content_files(ftpd_t)
@@ -20164,7 +22029,7 @@ index 80026bb..3045d40 100644
')
tunable_policy(`ftp_home_dir && use_nfs_home_dirs',`
-@@ -309,10 +352,35 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -309,10 +348,35 @@ optional_policy(`
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -20201,7 +22066,7 @@ index 80026bb..3045d40 100644
')
optional_policy(`
-@@ -347,16 +415,17 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -347,16 +411,17 @@ optional_policy(`
# Allow ftpdctl to talk to ftpd over a socket connection
stream_connect_pattern(ftpdctl_t, ftpd_var_run_t, ftpd_var_run_t, ftpd_t)
@@ -20221,11 +22086,10 @@ index 80026bb..3045d40 100644
########################################
#
-@@ -365,18 +434,33 @@ userdom_use_user_terminals(ftpdctl_t)
+@@ -365,18 +430,34 @@ userdom_use_user_terminals(ftpdctl_t)
files_read_etc_files(sftpd_t)
-+miscfiles_read_localization(sftpd_t)
+
# allow read access to /home by default
userdom_read_user_home_content_files(sftpd_t)
@@ -20238,8 +22102,10 @@ index 80026bb..3045d40 100644
+ files_manage_non_security_files(sftpd_t)
+')
+
-+tunable_policy(`sftpd_write_ssh_home',`
-+ ssh_manage_home_files(sftpd_t)
++optional_policy(`
++ tunable_policy(`sftpd_write_ssh_home',`
++ ssh_manage_home_files(sftpd_t)
++ ')
+')
tunable_policy(`sftpd_enable_homedirs',`
@@ -20258,21 +22124,21 @@ index 80026bb..3045d40 100644
')
tunable_policy(`sftpd_enable_homedirs && use_nfs_home_dirs',`
-@@ -394,19 +478,7 @@ tunable_policy(`sftpd_enable_homedirs && use_samba_home_dirs',`
+@@ -394,19 +475,7 @@ tunable_policy(`sftpd_enable_homedirs && use_samba_home_dirs',`
tunable_policy(`sftpd_full_access',`
allow sftpd_t self:capability { dac_override dac_read_search };
fs_read_noxattr_fs_files(sftpd_t)
- files_manage_non_auth_files(sftpd_t)
--')
--
++ files_manage_non_security_files(sftpd_t)
+ ')
+
-tunable_policy(`use_samba_home_dirs',`
- # allow read access to /home by default
- fs_list_cifs(sftpd_t)
- fs_read_cifs_files(sftpd_t)
- fs_read_cifs_symlinks(sftpd_t)
-+ files_manage_non_security_files(sftpd_t)
- ')
-
+-')
+-
-tunable_policy(`use_nfs_home_dirs',`
- # allow read access to /home by default
- fs_list_nfs(sftpd_t)
@@ -20281,10 +22147,19 @@ index 80026bb..3045d40 100644
-')
+userdom_home_reader(sftpd_t)
diff --git a/games.te b/games.te
-index b73d33c..0c56ca4 100644
+index b73d33c..ffacbd2 100644
--- a/games.te
+++ b/games.te
-@@ -120,7 +120,6 @@ kernel_read_system_state(games_t)
+@@ -75,8 +75,6 @@ init_use_script_ptys(games_srv_t)
+
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(games_srv_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(games_srv_t)
+-
+ userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fds(games_srv_t)
+
+ userdom_dontaudit_search_user_home_dirs(games_srv_t)
+@@ -120,7 +118,6 @@ kernel_read_system_state(games_t)
corecmd_exec_bin(games_t)
@@ -20292,7 +22167,17 @@ index b73d33c..0c56ca4 100644
corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(games_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(games_t)
corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if(games_t)
-@@ -163,7 +162,7 @@ userdom_manage_user_tmp_sockets(games_t)
+@@ -151,9 +148,6 @@ init_dontaudit_rw_utmp(games_t)
+
+ logging_dontaudit_search_logs(games_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_man_pages(games_t)
+-miscfiles_read_localization(games_t)
+-
+ sysnet_read_config(games_t)
+
+ userdom_manage_user_tmp_dirs(games_t)
+@@ -163,7 +157,7 @@ userdom_manage_user_tmp_sockets(games_t)
# Suppress .icons denial until properly implemented
userdom_dontaudit_read_user_home_content_files(games_t)
@@ -20302,7 +22187,7 @@ index b73d33c..0c56ca4 100644
')
diff --git a/gatekeeper.te b/gatekeeper.te
-index 99a94de..a0f0d2c 100644
+index 99a94de..8b84eda 100644
--- a/gatekeeper.te
+++ b/gatekeeper.te
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ allow gatekeeper_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms;
@@ -20322,8 +22207,17 @@ index 99a94de..a0f0d2c 100644
corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(gatekeeper_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(gatekeeper_t)
corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if(gatekeeper_t)
+@@ -79,8 +78,6 @@ fs_search_auto_mountpoints(gatekeeper_t)
+
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(gatekeeper_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(gatekeeper_t)
+-
+ sysnet_read_config(gatekeeper_t)
+
+ userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fds(gatekeeper_t)
diff --git a/gift.te b/gift.te
-index 4975343..5aab51a 100644
+index 4975343..1c20b64 100644
--- a/gift.te
+++ b/gift.te
@@ -52,7 +52,6 @@ domtrans_pattern(gift_t, giftd_exec_t, giftd_t)
@@ -20361,7 +22255,11 @@ index 4975343..5aab51a 100644
corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(giftd_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(giftd_t)
corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if(giftd_t)
-@@ -129,16 +117,5 @@ miscfiles_read_localization(giftd_t)
+@@ -125,20 +113,8 @@ files_read_usr_files(giftd_t)
+ # Read /etc/mtab
+ files_read_etc_runtime_files(giftd_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(giftd_t)
sysnet_read_config(giftd_t)
@@ -20401,7 +22299,7 @@ index 13e72a7..a4dc0b9 100644
/var/www/git/gitweb\.cgi -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_git_script_exec_t,s0)
+/var/www/gitweb-caching/gitweb\.cgi -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_git_script_exec_t,s0)
diff --git a/git.if b/git.if
-index b0242d9..5126181 100644
+index b0242d9..407e79d 100644
--- a/git.if
+++ b/git.if
@@ -15,9 +15,9 @@
@@ -20518,7 +22416,6 @@ index b0242d9..5126181 100644
+ files_read_etc_files($1_t)
+ files_dontaudit_search_home($1_t)
+
-+ miscfiles_read_localization($1_t)
+
+ git_rwx_generic_system_content($1_t)
+
@@ -20804,6 +22701,7 @@ index b0242d9..5126181 100644
+
+ list_dirs_pattern($1, git_sys_content_t, git_sys_content_t)
+ read_files_pattern($1, git_sys_content_t, git_sys_content_t)
++ read_lnk_files_pattern($1, git_sys_content_t, git_sys_content_t)
+ files_search_var_lib($1)
+
+ tunable_policy(`git_system_use_cifs',`
@@ -20921,26 +22819,39 @@ index b0242d9..5126181 100644
+ userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans($1, git_user_content_t, dir, "public_git")
+')
diff --git a/git.te b/git.te
-index 6e8e1f3..aa176c4 100644
+index 6e8e1f3..decdda3 100644
--- a/git.te
+++ b/git.te
-@@ -31,6 +31,15 @@ gen_tunable(git_cgi_use_nfs, false)
+@@ -31,20 +31,21 @@ gen_tunable(git_cgi_use_nfs, false)
## <desc>
## <p>
+-## Determine whether calling user domains
+-## can execute Git daemon in the
+-## git_session_t domain.
+## Determine whether Git session daemon
+## can bind TCP sockets to all
+## unreserved ports.
-+## </p>
-+## </desc>
+ ## </p>
+ ## </desc>
+-gen_tunable(git_session_users, false)
+gen_tunable(git_session_bind_all_unreserved_ports, false)
-+
-+## <desc>
-+## <p>
- ## Determine whether calling user domains
- ## can execute Git daemon in the
- ## git_session_t domain.
-@@ -71,6 +80,10 @@ gen_tunable(git_system_use_cifs, false)
+
+ ## <desc>
+ ## <p>
+-## Determine whether Git session daemons
+-## can send syslog messages.
++## Determine whether calling user domains
++## can execute Git daemon in the
++## git_session_t domain.
+ ## </p>
+ ## </desc>
+-gen_tunable(git_session_send_syslog_msg, false)
++gen_tunable(git_session_users, false)
+
+ ## <desc>
+ ## <p>
+@@ -71,6 +72,10 @@ gen_tunable(git_system_use_cifs, false)
gen_tunable(git_system_use_nfs, false)
attribute git_daemon;
@@ -20951,7 +22862,7 @@ index 6e8e1f3..aa176c4 100644
apache_content_template(git)
-@@ -79,13 +92,16 @@ type gitd_exec_t;
+@@ -79,13 +84,16 @@ type gitd_exec_t;
inetd_service_domain(git_system_t, gitd_exec_t)
type git_session_t, git_daemon;
@@ -20971,27 +22882,34 @@ index 6e8e1f3..aa176c4 100644
########################################
#
-@@ -99,7 +115,6 @@ read_files_pattern(git_session_t, git_user_content_t, git_user_content_t)
+@@ -98,8 +106,9 @@ list_dirs_pattern(git_session_t, git_user_content_t, git_user_content_t)
+ read_files_pattern(git_session_t, git_user_content_t, git_user_content_t)
userdom_search_user_home_dirs(git_session_t)
++kernel_read_system_state(git_session_t)
++
corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(git_session_t)
-corenet_all_recvfrom_unlabeled(git_session_t)
corenet_tcp_bind_generic_node(git_session_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(git_session_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_node(git_session_t)
-@@ -112,6 +127,11 @@ auth_use_nsswitch(git_session_t)
+@@ -112,10 +121,13 @@ auth_use_nsswitch(git_session_t)
userdom_use_user_terminals(git_session_t)
+-tunable_policy(`git_session_send_syslog_msg',`
+- logging_send_syslog_msg(git_session_t)
+tunable_policy(`git_session_bind_all_unreserved_ports',`
+ corenet_tcp_bind_all_unreserved_ports(git_session_t)
+ corenet_sendrecv_generic_server_packets(git_session_t)
-+')
-+
- tunable_policy(`git_session_send_syslog_msg',`
- logging_send_syslog_msg(git_session_t)
')
-@@ -133,8 +153,8 @@ tunable_policy(`use_samba_home_dirs',`
+
++logging_send_syslog_msg(git_session_t)
++
+ tunable_policy(`use_nfs_home_dirs',`
+ fs_read_nfs_files(git_session_t)
+ ',`
+@@ -133,10 +145,12 @@ tunable_policy(`use_samba_home_dirs',`
# Git system policy
#
@@ -21001,8 +22919,12 @@ index 6e8e1f3..aa176c4 100644
+read_files_pattern(git_system_t, git_content, git_content)
files_search_var_lib(git_system_t)
++kernel_read_system_state(git_system_t)
++
auth_use_nsswitch(git_system_t)
-@@ -174,8 +194,8 @@ tunable_policy(`git_system_use_nfs',`
+
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(git_system_t)
+@@ -174,8 +188,8 @@ tunable_policy(`git_system_use_nfs',`
# Git CGI policy
#
@@ -21013,10 +22935,19 @@ index 6e8e1f3..aa176c4 100644
files_search_var_lib(httpd_git_script_t)
files_dontaudit_getattr_tmp_dirs(httpd_git_script_t)
-@@ -226,3 +246,10 @@ files_read_usr_files(git_daemon)
+@@ -217,12 +231,16 @@ tunable_policy(`git_cgi_use_nfs',`
+
+ allow git_daemon self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms;
+
+-kernel_read_system_state(git_daemon)
+-
+ corecmd_exec_bin(git_daemon)
+
+ files_read_usr_files(git_daemon)
+
fs_search_auto_mountpoints(git_daemon)
- miscfiles_read_localization(git_daemon)
+-miscfiles_read_localization(git_daemon)
+
+########################################
+#
@@ -21024,8 +22955,18 @@ index 6e8e1f3..aa176c4 100644
+#
+git_role_template(git_shell)
+gen_user(git_shell_u, user, git_shell_r, s0, s0)
+diff --git a/gitosis.fc b/gitosis.fc
+index 24f6441..4de3a6b 100644
+--- a/gitosis.fc
++++ b/gitosis.fc
+@@ -6,4 +6,4 @@ ifdef(`distro_debian',`
+ /usr/bin/gl-auth-command -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:gitosis_exec_t,s0)
+
+ /var/lib/gitosis(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:gitosis_var_lib_t,s0)
+-/var/lib/gitolite(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:gitosis_var_lib_t,s0)
++/var/lib/gitolite(3)?(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:gitosis_var_lib_t,s0)
diff --git a/gitosis.te b/gitosis.te
-index 0eb75f4..eed6dda 100644
+index 0eb75f4..3607a5b 100644
--- a/gitosis.te
+++ b/gitosis.te
@@ -5,6 +5,13 @@ policy_module(gitosis, 1.3.0)
@@ -21042,8 +22983,11 @@ index 0eb75f4..eed6dda 100644
type gitosis_t;
type gitosis_exec_t;
application_domain(gitosis_t, gitosis_exec_t)
-@@ -39,3 +46,9 @@ files_search_var_lib(gitosis_t)
- miscfiles_read_localization(gitosis_t)
+@@ -36,6 +43,11 @@ files_read_etc_files(gitosis_t)
+ files_read_usr_files(gitosis_t)
+ files_search_var_lib(gitosis_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(gitosis_t)
sysnet_read_config(gitosis_t)
+
@@ -21053,10 +22997,38 @@ index 0eb75f4..eed6dda 100644
+ mta_send_mail(gitosis_t)
+')
diff --git a/glance.if b/glance.if
-index 7ff9d6d..6b0a7ff 100644
+index 7ff9d6d..b1c97f2 100644
--- a/glance.if
+++ b/glance.if
-@@ -24,9 +24,9 @@ interface(`glance_domtrans_registry',`
+@@ -1,5 +1,27 @@
+ ## <summary>policy for glance</summary>
+
++#######################################
++## <summary>
++## Creates types and rules for a basic
++## glance daemon domain.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="prefix">
++## <summary>
++## Prefix for the domain.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++template(`glance_basic_types_template',`
++ gen_require(`
++ attribute glance_domain;
++ ')
++
++ type $1_t, glance_domain;
++ type $1_exec_t;
++
++ kernel_read_system_state($1_t)
++')
++
+ ########################################
+ ## <summary>
+ ## Transition to glance registry.
+@@ -24,9 +46,9 @@ interface(`glance_domtrans_registry',`
## Transition to glance api.
## </summary>
## <param name="domain">
@@ -21068,7 +23040,7 @@ index 7ff9d6d..6b0a7ff 100644
## </param>
#
interface(`glance_domtrans_api',`
-@@ -238,6 +238,10 @@ interface(`glance_admin',`
+@@ -238,6 +260,10 @@ interface(`glance_admin',`
allow $1 glance_registry_t:process signal_perms;
ps_process_pattern($1, glance_registry_t)
@@ -21080,12 +23052,38 @@ index 7ff9d6d..6b0a7ff 100644
allow $1 glance_api_t:process signal_perms;
ps_process_pattern($1, glance_api_t)
diff --git a/glance.te b/glance.te
-index 4afb81f..40df3ea 100644
+index 4afb81f..efff577 100644
--- a/glance.te
+++ b/glance.te
-@@ -57,12 +57,17 @@ manage_files_pattern(glance_domain, glance_var_run_t, glance_var_run_t)
- kernel_read_system_state(glance_domain)
+@@ -7,8 +7,7 @@ policy_module(glance, 1.0.0)
+
+ attribute glance_domain;
+
+-type glance_registry_t, glance_domain;
+-type glance_registry_exec_t;
++glance_basic_types_template(glance_registry)
+ init_daemon_domain(glance_registry_t, glance_registry_exec_t)
+
+ type glance_registry_initrc_exec_t;
+@@ -17,8 +16,10 @@ init_script_file(glance_registry_initrc_exec_t)
+ type glance_registry_tmp_t;
+ files_tmp_file(glance_registry_tmp_t)
+
+-type glance_api_t, glance_domain;
+-type glance_api_exec_t;
++type glance_registry_tmpfs_t;
++files_tmpfs_file(glance_registry_tmpfs_t)
++
++glance_basic_types_template(glance_api)
+ init_daemon_domain(glance_api_t, glance_api_exec_t)
+
+ type glance_api_initrc_exec_t;
+@@ -54,16 +55,18 @@ manage_files_pattern(glance_domain, glance_var_lib_t, glance_var_lib_t)
+ manage_dirs_pattern(glance_domain, glance_var_run_t, glance_var_run_t)
+ manage_files_pattern(glance_domain, glance_var_run_t, glance_var_run_t)
+-kernel_read_system_state(glance_domain)
+-
corecmd_exec_bin(glance_domain)
+corecmd_exec_shell(glance_domain)
@@ -21094,15 +23092,22 @@ index 4afb81f..40df3ea 100644
files_read_etc_files(glance_domain)
files_read_usr_files(glance_domain)
+-miscfiles_read_localization(glance_domain)
+auth_read_passwd(glance_domain)
+
+libs_exec_ldconfig(glance_domain)
+
- miscfiles_read_localization(glance_domain)
optional_policy(`
-@@ -80,6 +85,15 @@ files_tmp_filetrans(glance_registry_t, glance_registry_tmp_t, { file dir })
+ sysnet_dns_name_resolve(glance_domain)
+@@ -78,8 +81,20 @@ manage_dirs_pattern(glance_registry_t, glance_registry_tmp_t, glance_registry_tm
+ manage_files_pattern(glance_registry_t, glance_registry_tmp_t, glance_registry_tmp_t)
+ files_tmp_filetrans(glance_registry_t, glance_registry_tmp_t, { file dir })
++manage_dirs_pattern(glance_registry_t, glance_registry_tmpfs_t, glance_registry_tmpfs_t)
++manage_files_pattern(glance_registry_t, glance_registry_tmpfs_t, glance_registry_tmpfs_t)
++fs_tmpfs_filetrans(glance_registry_t, glance_registry_tmpfs_t,{ dir file })
++
corenet_tcp_bind_generic_node(glance_registry_t)
corenet_tcp_bind_glance_registry_port(glance_registry_t)
+corenet_tcp_connect_mysqld_port(glance_registry_t)
@@ -21110,14 +23115,13 @@ index 4afb81f..40df3ea 100644
+
+logging_send_syslog_msg(glance_registry_t)
+
-+
+optional_policy(`
+ mysql_stream_connect(glance_registry_t)
+')
########################################
#
-@@ -94,11 +108,11 @@ can_exec(glance_api_t, glance_tmp_t)
+@@ -94,11 +109,15 @@ can_exec(glance_api_t, glance_tmp_t)
corecmd_exec_shell(glance_api_t)
corenet_tcp_bind_generic_node(glance_api_t)
@@ -21129,8 +23133,11 @@ index 4afb81f..40df3ea 100644
dev_read_urand(glance_api_t)
fs_getattr_xattr_fs(glance_api_t)
--
+
-libs_exec_ldconfig(glance_api_t)
++optional_policy(`
++ mysql_stream_connect(glance_api_t)
++')
diff --git a/glusterd.fc b/glusterd.fc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6418e39
@@ -21307,10 +23314,10 @@ index 0000000..e15bbb0
+
diff --git a/glusterd.te b/glusterd.te
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..81fda2d
+index 0000000..d35f2b0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/glusterd.te
-@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
+@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
+policy_module(glusterd, 1.0.0)
+
+########################################
@@ -21409,16 +23416,14 @@ index 0000000..81fda2d
+
+logging_send_syslog_msg(glusterd_t)
+
-+miscfiles_read_localization(glusterd_t)
-+
+sysnet_read_config(glusterd_t)
+
+userdom_manage_user_home_dirs(glusterd_t)
diff --git a/gnome.fc b/gnome.fc
-index 00a19e3..17006fc 100644
+index 00a19e3..5a2dbfd 100644
--- a/gnome.fc
+++ b/gnome.fc
-@@ -1,9 +1,54 @@
+@@ -1,9 +1,57 @@
-HOME_DIR/\.config/gtk-.* gen_context(system_u:object_r:gnome_home_t,s0)
+HOME_DIR/\.cache(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:cache_home_t,s0)
+HOME_DIR/\.color/icc(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:icc_data_home_t,s0)
@@ -21433,10 +23438,12 @@ index 00a19e3..17006fc 100644
+HOME_DIR/\.grl-metadata-store gen_context(system_u:object_r:gstreamer_home_t,s0)
+HOME_DIR/\.grl-bookmarks gen_context(system_u:object_r:gstreamer_home_t,s0)
+HOME_DIR/\.gstreamer-.* gen_context(system_u:object_r:gstreamer_home_t,s0)
++HOME_DIR/cache/gstreamer-.* gen_context(system_u:object_r:gstreamer_home_t,s0)
+HOME_DIR/\.orc(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:gstreamer_home_t,s0)
+HOME_DIR/\.local.* gen_context(system_u:object_r:gconf_home_t,s0)
+HOME_DIR/\.local/share(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:data_home_t,s0)
+HOME_DIR/\.local/share/icc(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:icc_data_home_t,s0)
++HOME_DIR/\.local/share/keyrings(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:gkeyringd_gnome_home_t,s0)
+HOME_DIR/\.Xdefaults gen_context(system_u:object_r:config_home_t,s0)
+HOME_DIR/\.xine(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:config_home_t,s0)
+
@@ -21453,6 +23460,7 @@ index 00a19e3..17006fc 100644
+/root/\.gnome2(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:gnome_home_t,s0)
+/root/\.gnome2/keyrings(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:gkeyringd_gnome_home_t,s0)
+/root/\.gstreamer-.* gen_context(system_u:object_r:gstreamer_home_t,s0)
++/root/cache/gstreamer-.* gen_context(system_u:object_r:gstreamer_home_t,s0)
+/root/\.local.* gen_context(system_u:object_r:gconf_home_t,s0)
+/root/\.local/share(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:data_home_t,s0)
+/root/\.local/share/icc(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:icc_data_home_t,s0)
@@ -21476,10 +23484,10 @@ index 00a19e3..17006fc 100644
+/usr/libexec/gnome-system-monitor-mechanism -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:gnomesystemmm_exec_t,s0)
+/usr/libexec/kde(3|4)/ksysguardprocesslist_helper -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:gnomesystemmm_exec_t,s0)
diff --git a/gnome.if b/gnome.if
-index f5afe78..7861fc8 100644
+index f5afe78..2a96043 100644
--- a/gnome.if
+++ b/gnome.if
-@@ -1,44 +1,937 @@
+@@ -1,44 +1,1048 @@
## <summary>GNU network object model environment (GNOME)</summary>
-############################################################
@@ -21523,11 +23531,6 @@ index f5afe78..7861fc8 100644
+## <summary>
+## The role template for the gnome-keyring-daemon.
+## </summary>
-+## <param name="user_domain">
-+## <summary>
-+## The user domain associated with the role.
-+## </summary>
-+## </param>
+## <param name="user_prefix">
+## <summary>
+## The user prefix.
@@ -21538,6 +23541,11 @@ index f5afe78..7861fc8 100644
+## The user role.
+## </summary>
+## </param>
++## <param name="user_domain">
++## <summary>
++## The user domain associated with the role.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
+#
+interface(`gnome_role_gkeyringd',`
+ gen_require(`
@@ -21572,10 +23580,14 @@ index f5afe78..7861fc8 100644
+ allow $3 $1_gkeyringd_t:fd use;
+ allow $3 $1_gkeyringd_t:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms;
+
++ kernel_read_system_state($1_gkeyringd_t)
++
+ ps_process_pattern($1_gkeyringd_t, $3)
+
+ auth_use_nsswitch($1_gkeyringd_t)
+
++ logging_send_syslog_msg($1_gkeyringd_t)
++
+ ps_process_pattern($3, $1_gkeyringd_t)
+ allow $3 $1_gkeyringd_t:process signal_perms;
+ dontaudit $3 gkeyringd_exec_t:file entrypoint;
@@ -21590,6 +23602,7 @@ index f5afe78..7861fc8 100644
+ gnome_home_dir_filetrans($1_gkeyringd_t)
+ gnome_manage_generic_home_dirs($1_gkeyringd_t)
+ gnome_read_generic_data_home_files($1_gkeyringd_t)
++ gnome_read_generic_data_home_dirs($1_gkeyringd_t)
+
+ optional_policy(`
+ telepathy_mission_control_read_state($1_gkeyringd_t)
@@ -21597,6 +23610,35 @@ index f5afe78..7861fc8 100644
+ ')
+')
+
++#######################################
++## <summary>
++## Allow domain to run gkeyring in the $1_gkeyringd_t domain.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="user_prefix">
++## <summary>
++## The user prefix.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++## <param name="user_role">
++## <summary>
++## The user role.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++## <param name="user_domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`gnome_run_gkeyringd',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type $1_gkeyringd_t;
++ type gkeyringd_exec_t;
++ ')
++ role $2 types $1_gkeyringd_t;
++ domtrans_pattern($3, gkeyringd_exec_t, $1_gkeyringd_t)
++')
++
+########################################
+## <summary>
+## gconf connection template.
@@ -21730,6 +23772,7 @@ index f5afe78..7861fc8 100644
+ allow $1 gnome_home_type:dir manage_dir_perms;
+ allow $1 gnome_home_type:file manage_file_perms;
+ allow $1 gnome_home_type:lnk_file manage_lnk_file_perms;
++ allow $1 gnome_home_type:sock_file manage_sock_file_perms;
+ userdom_search_user_home_dirs($1)
+')
+
@@ -21772,6 +23815,11 @@ index f5afe78..7861fc8 100644
+## The class of the object to be created.
+## </summary>
+## </param>
++## <param name="name" optional="true">
++## <summary>
++## The name of the object being created.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
+#
+interface(`gnome_cache_filetrans',`
+ gen_require(`
@@ -21803,6 +23851,11 @@ index f5afe78..7861fc8 100644
+## The class of the object to be created.
+## </summary>
+## </param>
++## <param name="name" optional="true">
++## <summary>
++## The name of the object being created.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
+#
+interface(`gnome_config_filetrans',`
+ gen_require(`
@@ -21986,6 +24039,11 @@ index f5afe78..7861fc8 100644
+## The class of the object to be created.
+## </summary>
+## </param>
++## <param name="name" optional="true">
++## <summary>
++## The name of the object being created.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
+#
+interface(`gnome_data_filetrans',`
+ gen_require(`
@@ -22014,6 +24072,24 @@ index f5afe78..7861fc8 100644
+ read_files_pattern($1, { gconf_home_t data_home_t }, data_home_t)
+')
+
++######################################
++## <summary>
++## Read generic data home dirs.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`gnome_read_generic_data_home_dirs',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type data_home_t, gconf_home_t;
++ ')
++
++ list_dirs_pattern($1, { gconf_home_t data_home_t }, data_home_t)
++')
++
+#######################################
+## <summary>
+## Manage gconf data home files
@@ -22090,13 +24166,18 @@ index f5afe78..7861fc8 100644
+## The class of the object to be created.
+## </summary>
+## </param>
++## <param name="name" optional="true">
++## <summary>
++## The name of the object being created.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
+#
+interface(`gnome_admin_home_gconf_filetrans',`
+ gen_require(`
+ type gconf_home_t;
+ ')
+
-+ userdom_admin_home_dir_filetrans($1, gconf_home_t, $2)
++ userdom_admin_home_dir_filetrans($1, gconf_home_t, $2, $3)
+')
+
+########################################
@@ -22258,6 +24339,25 @@ index f5afe78..7861fc8 100644
+ allow $1 gkeyringd_tmp_t:dir list_dir_perms;
+')
+
++#######################################
++## <summary>
++## Manage gkeyringd temporary directories.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`gnome_manage_gkeyringd_tmp_dirs',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type gkeyringd_tmp_t;
++ ')
++
++ files_search_tmp($1)
++ manage_dirs_pattern($1, gkeyringd_tmp_t, gkeyringd_tmp_t)
++')
++
+########################################
+## <summary>
+## search gconf homedir (.local)
@@ -22339,76 +24439,94 @@ index f5afe78..7861fc8 100644
+## Append gconf home files
+## </summary>
+## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`gnome_append_gconf_home_files',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type gconf_home_t;
++ ')
++
++ append_files_pattern($1, gconf_home_t, gconf_home_t)
++')
++
++########################################
++## <summary>
++## manage gconf home files
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
## <summary>
-## Role allowed access
+## Domain allowed access.
## </summary>
## </param>
+#
-+interface(`gnome_append_gconf_home_files',`
++interface(`gnome_manage_gconf_home_files',`
+ gen_require(`
+ type gconf_home_t;
+ ')
+
-+ append_files_pattern($1, gconf_home_t, gconf_home_t)
++ allow $1 gconf_home_t:dir list_dir_perms;
++ manage_files_pattern($1, gconf_home_t, gconf_home_t)
+')
+
+########################################
+## <summary>
-+## manage gconf home files
++## Connect to gnome over a unix stream socket.
+## </summary>
## <param name="domain">
## <summary>
-## User domain for the role
+## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++## <param name="user_domain">
++## <summary>
++## The type of the user domain.
## </summary>
## </param>
#
-interface(`gnome_role',`
-+interface(`gnome_manage_gconf_home_files',`
++interface(`gnome_stream_connect',`
gen_require(`
- type gconfd_t, gconfd_exec_t;
- type gconf_tmp_t;
-+ type gconf_home_t;
++ attribute gnome_home_type;
')
- role $1 types gconfd_t;
-+ allow $1 gconf_home_t:dir list_dir_perms;
-+ manage_files_pattern($1, gconf_home_t, gconf_home_t)
++ # Connect to pulseaudit server
++ stream_connect_pattern($1, gnome_home_type, gnome_home_type, $2)
+')
+
+########################################
+## <summary>
-+## Connect to gnome over a unix stream socket.
++## list gnome homedir content (.config)
+## </summary>
+## <param name="domain">
+## <summary>
+## Domain allowed access.
+## </summary>
+## </param>
-+## <param name="user_domain">
-+## <summary>
-+## The type of the user domain.
-+## </summary>
-+## </param>
+#
-+interface(`gnome_stream_connect',`
++interface(`gnome_list_home_config',`
+ gen_require(`
-+ attribute gnome_home_type;
++ type config_home_t;
+ ')
- domain_auto_trans($2, gconfd_exec_t, gconfd_t)
- allow gconfd_t $2:fd use;
- allow gconfd_t $2:fifo_file write;
- allow gconfd_t $2:unix_stream_socket connectto;
-+ # Connect to pulseaudit server
-+ stream_connect_pattern($1, gnome_home_type, gnome_home_type, $2)
++ allow $1 config_home_t:dir list_dir_perms;
+')
- ps_process_pattern($2, gconfd_t)
+########################################
+## <summary>
-+## list gnome homedir content (.config)
++## Set attributes of gnome homedir content (.config)
+## </summary>
+## <param name="domain">
+## <summary>
@@ -22416,7 +24534,7 @@ index f5afe78..7861fc8 100644
+## </summary>
+## </param>
+#
-+interface(`gnome_list_home_config',`
++interface(`gnome_setattr_home_config',`
+ gen_require(`
+ type config_home_t;
+ ')
@@ -22424,63 +24542,37 @@ index f5afe78..7861fc8 100644
- #gnome_stream_connect_gconf_template($1, $2)
- read_files_pattern($2, gconf_tmp_t, gconf_tmp_t)
- allow $2 gconfd_t:unix_stream_socket connectto;
-+ allow $1 config_home_t:dir list_dir_perms;
++ setattr_dirs_pattern($1, config_home_t, config_home_t)
++ userdom_search_user_home_dirs($1)
')
########################################
## <summary>
-## Execute gconf programs in
-## in the caller domain.
-+## Set attributes of gnome homedir content (.config)
++## read gnome homedir content (.config)
## </summary>
## <param name="domain">
## <summary>
-@@ -46,37 +939,74 @@ interface(`gnome_role',`
+@@ -46,37 +1050,91 @@ interface(`gnome_role',`
## </summary>
## </param>
#
-interface(`gnome_exec_gconf',`
-+interface(`gnome_setattr_home_config',`
++interface(`gnome_read_home_config',`
gen_require(`
- type gconfd_exec_t;
+ type config_home_t;
')
- can_exec($1, gconfd_exec_t)
-+ setattr_dirs_pattern($1, config_home_t, config_home_t)
-+ userdom_search_user_home_dirs($1)
- ')
-
- ########################################
- ## <summary>
--## Read gconf config files.
-+## read gnome homedir content (.config)
- ## </summary>
--## <param name="user_domain">
-+## <param name="domain">
- ## <summary>
- ## Domain allowed access.
- ## </summary>
- ## </param>
- #
--template(`gnome_read_gconf_config',`
-+interface(`gnome_read_home_config',`
- gen_require(`
-- type gconf_etc_t;
-+ type config_home_t;
- ')
-
-- allow $1 gconf_etc_t:dir list_dir_perms;
-- read_files_pattern($1, gconf_etc_t, gconf_etc_t)
-- files_search_etc($1)
+ list_dirs_pattern($1, config_home_t, config_home_t)
+ read_files_pattern($1, config_home_t, config_home_t)
+ read_lnk_files_pattern($1, config_home_t, config_home_t)
- ')
-
- #######################################
- ## <summary>
--## Create, read, write, and delete gconf config files.
++')
++
++#######################################
++## <summary>
+## delete gnome homedir content (.config)
+## </summary>
+## <param name="domain">
@@ -22513,32 +24605,36 @@ index f5afe78..7861fc8 100644
+ ')
+
+ setattr_dirs_pattern($1, config_home_t, config_home_t)
-+')
-+
-+########################################
-+## <summary>
+ ')
+
+ ########################################
+ ## <summary>
+-## Read gconf config files.
+## manage gnome homedir content (.config)
## </summary>
- ## <param name="domain">
+-## <param name="user_domain">
++## <param name="domain">
## <summary>
-@@ -84,37 +1014,53 @@ template(`gnome_read_gconf_config',`
+ ## Domain allowed access.
## </summary>
## </param>
#
--interface(`gnome_manage_gconf_config',`
+-template(`gnome_read_gconf_config',`
+interface(`gnome_manage_home_config',`
gen_require(`
- type gconf_etc_t;
+ type config_home_t;
')
-- manage_files_pattern($1, gconf_etc_t, gconf_etc_t)
+- allow $1 gconf_etc_t:dir list_dir_perms;
+- read_files_pattern($1, gconf_etc_t, gconf_etc_t)
- files_search_etc($1)
+ manage_files_pattern($1, config_home_t, config_home_t)
-+')
-+
-+#######################################
-+## <summary>
+ ')
+
+ #######################################
+ ## <summary>
+-## Create, read, write, and delete gconf config files.
+## delete gnome homedir content (.config)
+## </summary>
+## <param name="domain">
@@ -22553,51 +24649,52 @@ index f5afe78..7861fc8 100644
+ ')
+
+ delete_dirs_pattern($1, config_home_t, config_home_t)
- ')
-
- ########################################
- ## <summary>
--## gconf connection template.
++')
++
++########################################
++## <summary>
+## manage gnome homedir content (.config)
## </summary>
--## <param name="user_domain">
-+## <param name="domain">
+ ## <param name="domain">
## <summary>
- ## Domain allowed access.
+@@ -84,37 +1142,107 @@ template(`gnome_read_gconf_config',`
## </summary>
## </param>
#
--interface(`gnome_stream_connect_gconf',`
+-interface(`gnome_manage_gconf_config',`
+interface(`gnome_manage_home_config_dirs',`
gen_require(`
-- type gconfd_t, gconf_tmp_t;
+- type gconf_etc_t;
+ type config_home_t;
')
-- read_files_pattern($1, gconf_tmp_t, gconf_tmp_t)
-- allow $1 gconfd_t:unix_stream_socket connectto;
+- manage_files_pattern($1, gconf_etc_t, gconf_etc_t)
+- files_search_etc($1)
+ manage_dirs_pattern($1, config_home_t, config_home_t)
')
########################################
## <summary>
--## Run gconfd in gconfd domain.
+-## gconf connection template.
+## manage gstreamer home content files.
## </summary>
- ## <param name="domain">
+-## <param name="user_domain">
++## <param name="domain">
## <summary>
-@@ -122,17 +1068,80 @@ interface(`gnome_stream_connect_gconf',`
+ ## Domain allowed access.
## </summary>
## </param>
#
--interface(`gnome_domtrans_gconfd',`
+-interface(`gnome_stream_connect_gconf',`
+interface(`gnome_manage_gstreamer_home_files',`
gen_require(`
-- type gconfd_t, gconfd_exec_t;
+- type gconfd_t, gconf_tmp_t;
+ type gstreamer_home_t;
')
-- domtrans_pattern($1, gconfd_exec_t, gconfd_t)
+- read_files_pattern($1, gconf_tmp_t, gconf_tmp_t)
+- allow $1 gconfd_t:unix_stream_socket connectto;
++ manage_dirs_pattern($1, gstreamer_home_t, gstreamer_home_t)
+ manage_files_pattern($1, gstreamer_home_t, gstreamer_home_t)
+ gnome_filetrans_gstreamer_home_content($1)
+')
@@ -22640,10 +24737,18 @@ index f5afe78..7861fc8 100644
+ userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans($1, gstreamer_home_t, file, ".grl-podcasts")
+ userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans($1, gstreamer_home_t, dir, ".gstreamer-0.12")
+ userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans($1, gstreamer_home_t, dir, ".gstreamer-0.10")
++ userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans($1, gstreamer_home_t, dir, ".gstreamer-1.0")
++ userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans($1, gstreamer_home_t, dir, ".gstreamer-1.2")
+ userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans($1, gstreamer_home_t, dir, ".gstreamer-10")
+ userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans($1, gstreamer_home_t, dir, ".gstreamer-12")
+ userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans($1, gstreamer_home_t, dir, ".orc")
+ userdom_user_tmp_filetrans($1, gstreamer_home_t, dir, ".orc")
++ gnome_cache_filetrans($1, gstreamer_home_t, dir, "gstreamer-0.12")
++ gnome_cache_filetrans($1, gstreamer_home_t, dir, "gstreamer-0.10")
++ gnome_cache_filetrans($1, gstreamer_home_t, dir, "gstreamer-1.0")
++ gnome_cache_filetrans($1, gstreamer_home_t, dir, "gstreamer-1.2")
++ gnome_cache_filetrans($1, gstreamer_home_t, dir, "gstreamer-10")
++ gnome_cache_filetrans($1, gstreamer_home_t, dir, "gstreamer-12")
+')
+
+#######################################
@@ -22666,41 +24771,57 @@ index f5afe78..7861fc8 100644
########################################
## <summary>
--## Set attributes of Gnome config dirs.
+-## Run gconfd in gconfd domain.
+## Read/Write all inherited gnome home config
## </summary>
## <param name="domain">
## <summary>
-@@ -140,51 +1149,302 @@ interface(`gnome_domtrans_gconfd',`
+@@ -122,17 +1250,36 @@ interface(`gnome_stream_connect_gconf',`
## </summary>
## </param>
#
--interface(`gnome_setattr_config_dirs',`
+-interface(`gnome_domtrans_gconfd',`
+interface(`gnome_rw_inherited_config',`
gen_require(`
-- type gnome_home_t;
+- type gconfd_t, gconfd_exec_t;
+ attribute gnome_home_type;
')
-- setattr_dirs_pattern($1, gnome_home_t, gnome_home_t)
-- files_search_home($1)
+- domtrans_pattern($1, gconfd_exec_t, gconfd_t)
+ allow $1 gnome_home_type:file rw_inherited_file_perms;
')
########################################
## <summary>
--## Read gnome homedir content (.config)
+-## Set attributes of Gnome config dirs.
++## Dontaudit Read/Write all inherited gnome home config
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain to not audit.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`gnome_dontaudit_rw_inherited_config',`
++ gen_require(`
++ attribute gnome_home_type;
++ ')
++
++ dontaudit $1 gnome_home_type:file rw_inherited_file_perms;
++')
++
++########################################
++## <summary>
+## Send and receive messages from
+## gconf system service over dbus.
## </summary>
--## <param name="user_domain">
-+## <param name="domain">
+ ## <param name="domain">
## <summary>
- ## Domain allowed access.
+@@ -140,51 +1287,279 @@ interface(`gnome_domtrans_gconfd',`
## </summary>
## </param>
#
--template(`gnome_read_config',`
+-interface(`gnome_setattr_config_dirs',`
+interface(`gnome_dbus_chat_gconfdefault',`
gen_require(`
- type gnome_home_t;
@@ -22708,16 +24829,15 @@ index f5afe78..7861fc8 100644
+ class dbus send_msg;
')
-- list_dirs_pattern($1, gnome_home_t, gnome_home_t)
-- read_files_pattern($1, gnome_home_t, gnome_home_t)
-- read_lnk_files_pattern($1, gnome_home_t, gnome_home_t)
+- setattr_dirs_pattern($1, gnome_home_t, gnome_home_t)
+- files_search_home($1)
+ allow $1 gconfdefaultsm_t:dbus send_msg;
+ allow gconfdefaultsm_t $1:dbus send_msg;
')
########################################
## <summary>
--## manage gnome homedir content (.config)
+-## Read gnome homedir content (.config)
+## Send and receive messages from
+## gkeyringd over dbus.
## </summary>
@@ -22728,27 +24848,34 @@ index f5afe78..7861fc8 100644
## </summary>
## </param>
#
--interface(`gnome_manage_config',`
+-template(`gnome_read_config',`
+interface(`gnome_dbus_chat_gkeyringd',`
-+ gen_require(`
+ gen_require(`
+- type gnome_home_t;
+ attribute gkeyringd_domain;
+ class dbus send_msg;
-+ ')
-+
+ ')
+
+- list_dirs_pattern($1, gnome_home_t, gnome_home_t)
+- read_files_pattern($1, gnome_home_t, gnome_home_t)
+- read_lnk_files_pattern($1, gnome_home_t, gnome_home_t)
+ allow $1 gkeyringd_domain:dbus send_msg;
+ allow gkeyringd_domain $1:dbus send_msg;
-+')
-+
-+########################################
-+## <summary>
+ ')
+
+ ########################################
+ ## <summary>
+-## manage gnome homedir content (.config)
+## Send signull signal to gkeyringd processes.
-+## </summary>
+ ## </summary>
+-## <param name="user_domain">
+## <param name="domain">
-+## <summary>
-+## Domain allowed access.
-+## </summary>
-+## </param>
-+#
+ ## <summary>
+ ## Domain allowed access.
+ ## </summary>
+ ## </param>
+ #
+-interface(`gnome_manage_config',`
+interface(`gnome_signull_gkeyringd',`
+ gen_require(`
+ attribute gkeyringd_domain;
@@ -22876,7 +25003,7 @@ index f5afe78..7861fc8 100644
+gen_require(`
+ type config_home_t;
+ type cache_home_t;
-+ type gstreamer_home_t;
++ type dbus_home_t;
+ type gconf_home_t;
+ type gnome_home_t;
+ type data_home_t, icc_data_home_t;
@@ -22887,28 +25014,22 @@ index f5afe78..7861fc8 100644
+ userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans($1, config_home_t, file, ".Xdefaults")
+ userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans($1, config_home_t, dir, ".xine")
+ userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans($1, cache_home_t, dir, ".cache")
++ userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans($1, dbus_home_t, dir, ".dbus")
+ userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans($1, cache_home_t, dir, ".nv")
+ userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans($1, config_home_t, dir, ".kde")
+ userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans($1, gconf_home_t, dir, ".gconf")
+ userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans($1, gconf_home_t, dir, ".gconfd")
+ userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans($1, gconf_home_t, dir, ".local")
+ userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans($1, gnome_home_t, dir, ".gnome2")
-+ userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans($1, gstreamer_home_t, dir, ".orc")
-+ userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans($1, gstreamer_home_t, dir, ".gstreamer-0.12")
-+ userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans($1, gstreamer_home_t, dir, ".gstreamer-0.10")
-+ userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans($1, gstreamer_home_t, dir, ".gstreamer-10")
-+ userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans($1, gstreamer_home_t, dir, ".gstreamer-12")
-+ userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans($1, gstreamer_home_t, dir, ".grl-bookmarks")
-+ userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans($1, gstreamer_home_t, dir, ".grl-metadata-store")
-+ userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans($1, gstreamer_home_t, file, ".grl-podcasts")
+
+ # ~/.color/icc: legacy
+ userdom_user_home_content_filetrans($1, icc_data_home_t, dir, "icc")
+ filetrans_pattern($1, gnome_home_t, gkeyringd_gnome_home_t, dir, "keyrings")
++ filetrans_pattern($1, data_home_t, gkeyringd_gnome_home_t, dir, "keyrings")
+ filetrans_pattern($1, gconf_home_t, data_home_t, dir, "share")
+ filetrans_pattern($1, data_home_t, icc_data_home_t, dir, "icc")
+ userdom_user_tmp_filetrans($1, config_home_t, dir, "dconf")
-+ userdom_user_tmp_filetrans($1, gstreamer_home_t, dir, ".orc")
++ gnome_filetrans_gstreamer_home_content($1)
+')
+
+########################################
@@ -22927,6 +25048,7 @@ index f5afe78..7861fc8 100644
+gen_require(`
+ type config_home_t;
+ type cache_home_t;
++ type dbus_home_t;
+ type gstreamer_home_t;
+ type gconf_home_t;
+ type gnome_home_t;
@@ -22937,6 +25059,7 @@ index f5afe78..7861fc8 100644
+ userdom_admin_home_dir_filetrans($1, config_home_t, file, ".Xdefaults")
+ userdom_admin_home_dir_filetrans($1, config_home_t, dir, ".xine")
+ userdom_admin_home_dir_filetrans($1, cache_home_t, dir, ".cache")
++ userdom_admin_home_dir_filetrans($1, dbus_home_t, dir, ".dbus")
+ userdom_admin_home_dir_filetrans($1, config_home_t, dir, ".kde")
+ userdom_admin_home_dir_filetrans($1, gconf_home_t, dir, ".gconf")
+ userdom_admin_home_dir_filetrans($1, gconf_home_t, dir, ".gconfd")
@@ -22947,7 +25070,7 @@ index f5afe78..7861fc8 100644
+ userdom_admin_home_dir_filetrans($1, icc_data_home_t, dir, "icc")
+')
+
-+######################################
++#####################################
+## <summary>
+## Execute gnome-keyring executable
+## in the specified domain.
@@ -22991,7 +25114,7 @@ index f5afe78..7861fc8 100644
+ type_transition $1 gkeyringd_exec_t:process $2;
+')
diff --git a/gnome.te b/gnome.te
-index 783c5fb..9d2b881 100644
+index 783c5fb..7757943 100644
--- a/gnome.te
+++ b/gnome.te
@@ -6,11 +6,31 @@ policy_module(gnome, 2.2.0)
@@ -23062,7 +25185,15 @@ index 783c5fb..9d2b881 100644
##############################
#
# Local Policy
-@@ -73,3 +114,165 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -57,7 +98,6 @@ dev_read_urand(gconfd_t)
+
+ files_read_etc_files(gconfd_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(gconfd_t)
+
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(gconfd_t)
+
+@@ -73,3 +113,163 @@ optional_policy(`
xserver_use_xdm_fds(gconfd_t)
xserver_rw_xdm_pipes(gconfd_t)
')
@@ -23081,7 +25212,6 @@ index 783c5fb..9d2b881 100644
+files_read_etc_files(gconfdefaultsm_t)
+files_read_usr_files(gconfdefaultsm_t)
+
-+miscfiles_read_localization(gconfdefaultsm_t)
+
+gnome_manage_gconf_home_files(gconfdefaultsm_t)
+gnome_manage_gconf_config(gconfdefaultsm_t)
@@ -23120,6 +25250,8 @@ index 783c5fb..9d2b881 100644
+allow gnomesystemmm_t self:capability sys_nice;
+allow gnomesystemmm_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms;
+
++rw_files_pattern(gnomesystemmm_t, config_usr_t, config_usr_t)
++
+kernel_read_system_state(gnomesystemmm_t)
+
+corecmd_search_bin(gnomesystemmm_t)
@@ -23135,9 +25267,9 @@ index 783c5fb..9d2b881 100644
+
+fs_getattr_xattr_fs(gnomesystemmm_t)
+
-+logging_send_syslog_msg(gnomesystemmm_t)
++auth_read_passwd(gnomesystemmm_t)
+
-+miscfiles_read_localization(gnomesystemmm_t)
++logging_send_syslog_msg(gnomesystemmm_t)
+
+userdom_read_all_users_state(gnomesystemmm_t)
+userdom_dontaudit_search_admin_dir(gnomesystemmm_t)
@@ -23151,6 +25283,10 @@ index 783c5fb..9d2b881 100644
+')
+
+optional_policy(`
++ gnome_read_home_config(gnomesystemmm_t)
++')
++
++optional_policy(`
+ nscd_dontaudit_search_pid(gnomesystemmm_t)
+')
+
@@ -23171,7 +25307,7 @@ index 783c5fb..9d2b881 100644
+allow gkeyringd_domain self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms;
+allow gkeyringd_domain self:unix_stream_socket { connectto accept listen };
+
-+dontaudit gkeyringd_domain config_home_t:file write;
++allow gkeyringd_domain config_home_t:file write;
+
+manage_dirs_pattern(gkeyringd_domain, gkeyringd_gnome_home_t, gkeyringd_gnome_home_t)
+manage_files_pattern(gkeyringd_domain, gkeyringd_gnome_home_t, gkeyringd_gnome_home_t)
@@ -23182,7 +25318,6 @@ index 783c5fb..9d2b881 100644
+files_tmp_filetrans(gkeyringd_domain, gkeyringd_tmp_t, dir)
+userdom_user_tmp_filetrans(gkeyringd_domain, gkeyringd_tmp_t, { sock_file dir })
+
-+kernel_read_system_state(gkeyringd_domain)
+kernel_read_crypto_sysctls(gkeyringd_domain)
+
+corecmd_search_bin(gkeyringd_domain)
@@ -23199,12 +25334,6 @@ index 783c5fb..9d2b881 100644
+fs_getattr_xattr_fs(gkeyringd_domain)
+fs_getattr_tmpfs(gkeyringd_domain)
+
-+selinux_getattr_fs(gkeyringd_domain)
-+
-+logging_send_syslog_msg(gkeyringd_domain)
-+
-+miscfiles_read_localization(gkeyringd_domain)
-+
+userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans(gkeyringd_domain, gnome_home_t, dir)
+
+optional_policy(`
@@ -23229,10 +25358,11 @@ index 783c5fb..9d2b881 100644
+
+userdom_use_inherited_user_terminals(gnomedomain)
diff --git a/gnomeclock.fc b/gnomeclock.fc
-index 462de63..5df751b 100644
+index 462de63..5d92f4e 100644
--- a/gnomeclock.fc
+++ b/gnomeclock.fc
-@@ -1,2 +1,6 @@
+@@ -1,2 +1,7 @@
++/usr/lib/systemd/systemd-timedated -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:gnomeclock_exec_t,s0)
+
/usr/libexec/gnome-clock-applet-mechanism -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:gnomeclock_exec_t,s0)
@@ -23269,10 +25399,10 @@ index 671d8fd..25c7ab8 100644
+ dontaudit gnomeclock_t $1:dbus send_msg;
+')
diff --git a/gnomeclock.te b/gnomeclock.te
-index 4fde46b..eb8918a 100644
+index 4fde46b..d58acfc 100644
--- a/gnomeclock.te
+++ b/gnomeclock.te
-@@ -7,26 +7,37 @@ policy_module(gnomeclock, 1.0.0)
+@@ -7,38 +7,84 @@ policy_module(gnomeclock, 1.0.0)
type gnomeclock_t;
type gnomeclock_exec_t;
@@ -23286,7 +25416,7 @@ index 4fde46b..eb8918a 100644
-allow gnomeclock_t self:capability { sys_nice sys_time sys_ptrace };
-allow gnomeclock_t self:process { getattr getsched };
-+allow gnomeclock_t self:capability { sys_nice sys_time };
++allow gnomeclock_t self:capability { sys_nice sys_time dac_override };
+allow gnomeclock_t self:process { getattr getsched signal };
allow gnomeclock_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms;
allow gnomeclock_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
@@ -23299,10 +25429,13 @@ index 4fde46b..eb8918a 100644
+corecmd_dontaudit_access_check_bin(gnomeclock_t)
+
+corenet_tcp_connect_time_port(gnomeclock_t)
++
++dev_rw_realtime_clock(gnomeclock_t)
++dev_read_urand(gnomeclock_t)
++dev_write_kmsg(gnomeclock_t)
++dev_read_sysfs(gnomeclock_t)
-files_read_etc_files(gnomeclock_t)
-+dev_read_sysfs(gnomeclock_t)
-+
+files_read_etc_runtime_files(gnomeclock_t)
files_read_usr_files(gnomeclock_t)
@@ -23311,11 +25444,15 @@ index 4fde46b..eb8918a 100644
auth_use_nsswitch(gnomeclock_t)
-clock_domtrans(gnomeclock_t)
++init_dbus_chat(gnomeclock_t)
++
++logging_stream_connect_syslog(gnomeclock_t)
+logging_send_syslog_msg(gnomeclock_t)
- miscfiles_read_localization(gnomeclock_t)
+-miscfiles_read_localization(gnomeclock_t)
miscfiles_manage_localization(gnomeclock_t)
-@@ -35,10 +46,38 @@ miscfiles_etc_filetrans_localization(gnomeclock_t)
+ miscfiles_etc_filetrans_localization(gnomeclock_t)
+
userdom_read_all_users_state(gnomeclock_t)
optional_policy(`
@@ -23323,6 +25460,7 @@ index 4fde46b..eb8918a 100644
+')
+
+optional_policy(`
++ clock_read_adjtime(gnomeclock_t)
+ clock_domtrans(gnomeclock_t)
+')
+
@@ -23340,6 +25478,7 @@ index 4fde46b..eb8918a 100644
+
+optional_policy(`
+ gnome_manage_usr_config(gnomeclock_t)
++ gnome_manage_home_config(gnomeclock_t)
+')
+
+optional_policy(`
@@ -23355,20 +25494,26 @@ index 4fde46b..eb8918a 100644
policykit_domtrans_auth(gnomeclock_t)
policykit_read_lib(gnomeclock_t)
diff --git a/gpg.fc b/gpg.fc
-index 5207fc2..2dd4ff9 100644
+index 5207fc2..c02fa56 100644
--- a/gpg.fc
+++ b/gpg.fc
-@@ -1,6 +1,8 @@
+@@ -1,10 +1,13 @@
HOME_DIR/\.gnupg(/.+)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:gpg_secret_t,s0)
HOME_DIR/\.gnupg/log-socket gen_context(system_u:object_r:gpg_agent_tmp_t,s0)
++/etc/mail/spamassassin/sa-update-keys(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:gpg_secret_t,s0)
++
+/root/\.gnupg(/.+)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:gpg_secret_t,s0)
+
/usr/bin/gpg(2)? -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:gpg_exec_t,s0)
/usr/bin/gpgsm -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:gpg_exec_t,s0)
/usr/bin/gpg-agent -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:gpg_agent_exec_t,s0)
+-/usr/bin/kgpg -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:gpg_exec_t,s0)
+ /usr/bin/pinentry.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:pinentry_exec_t,s0)
+
+ /usr/lib/gnupg/.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:gpg_exec_t,s0)
diff --git a/gpg.if b/gpg.if
-index 6d50300..46cc164 100644
+index 6d50300..2f0feca 100644
--- a/gpg.if
+++ b/gpg.if
@@ -54,15 +54,16 @@ interface(`gpg_role',`
@@ -23455,8 +25600,30 @@ index 6d50300..46cc164 100644
########################################
## <summary>
## Send generic signals to user gpg processes.
+@@ -179,3 +218,21 @@ interface(`gpg_list_user_secrets',`
+ list_dirs_pattern($1, gpg_secret_t, gpg_secret_t)
+ userdom_search_user_home_dirs($1)
+ ')
++
++########################################
++## <summary>
++## Transition to gpg named home content
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`gpg_filetrans_home_content',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type gpg_secret_t;
++ ')
++
++ userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans($1, gpg_secret_t, dir, ".gnupg")
++')
diff --git a/gpg.te b/gpg.te
-index 72a113e..2af9ab1 100644
+index 72a113e..29063e5 100644
--- a/gpg.te
+++ b/gpg.te
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ policy_module(gpg, 2.6.0)
@@ -23559,15 +25726,18 @@ index 72a113e..2af9ab1 100644
manage_dirs_pattern(gpg_t, gpg_agent_tmp_t, gpg_agent_tmp_t)
manage_files_pattern(gpg_t, gpg_agent_tmp_t, gpg_agent_tmp_t)
-@@ -77,6 +100,7 @@ domtrans_pattern(gpg_t, gpg_agent_exec_t, gpg_agent_t)
+@@ -77,16 +100,16 @@ domtrans_pattern(gpg_t, gpg_agent_exec_t, gpg_agent_t)
domtrans_pattern(gpg_t, gpg_helper_exec_t, gpg_helper_t)
allow gpg_t gpg_secret_t:dir create_dir_perms;
+manage_sock_files_pattern(gpg_t, gpg_secret_t, gpg_secret_t)
manage_files_pattern(gpg_t, gpg_secret_t, gpg_secret_t)
manage_lnk_files_pattern(gpg_t, gpg_secret_t, gpg_secret_t)
- userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans(gpg_t, gpg_secret_t, dir)
-@@ -86,7 +110,6 @@ kernel_read_sysctl(gpg_t)
+-userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans(gpg_t, gpg_secret_t, dir)
++userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans(gpg_t, gpg_secret_t, dir, ".gnupg")
+
+ kernel_read_sysctl(gpg_t)
+
corecmd_exec_shell(gpg_t)
corecmd_exec_bin(gpg_t)
@@ -23583,10 +25753,12 @@ index 72a113e..2af9ab1 100644
files_read_usr_files(gpg_t)
files_dontaudit_search_var(gpg_t)
-@@ -116,22 +138,26 @@ logging_send_syslog_msg(gpg_t)
+@@ -114,24 +136,23 @@ auth_use_nsswitch(gpg_t)
- miscfiles_read_localization(gpg_t)
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(gpg_t)
+-miscfiles_read_localization(gpg_t)
+-
-userdom_use_user_terminals(gpg_t)
+userdom_use_inherited_user_terminals(gpg_t)
# sign/encrypt user files
@@ -23598,27 +25770,26 @@ index 72a113e..2af9ab1 100644
userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans_user_home_content(gpg_t, file)
+userdom_stream_connect(gpg_t)
- mta_write_config(gpg_t)
+-mta_write_config(gpg_t)
++mta_manage_config(gpg_t)
++mta_read_spool(gpg_t)
-tunable_policy(`use_nfs_home_dirs',`
- fs_manage_nfs_dirs(gpg_t)
- fs_manage_nfs_files(gpg_t)
+-')
+userdom_home_manager(gpg_t)
-+
-+optional_policy(`
-+ gnome_read_config(gpg_t)
-+ gnome_stream_connect_gkeyringd(gpg_t)
- ')
-tunable_policy(`use_samba_home_dirs',`
- fs_manage_cifs_dirs(gpg_t)
- fs_manage_cifs_files(gpg_t)
+optional_policy(`
-+ mta_read_spool(gpg_t)
++ gnome_read_config(gpg_t)
++ gnome_stream_connect_gkeyringd(gpg_t)
')
optional_policy(`
-@@ -140,15 +166,19 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -140,15 +161,19 @@ optional_policy(`
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -23642,7 +25813,7 @@ index 72a113e..2af9ab1 100644
########################################
#
# GPG helper local policy
-@@ -166,7 +196,6 @@ allow gpg_helper_t self:udp_socket { connect connected_socket_perms };
+@@ -166,7 +191,6 @@ allow gpg_helper_t self:udp_socket { connect connected_socket_perms };
dontaudit gpg_helper_t gpg_secret_t:file read;
@@ -23650,7 +25821,7 @@ index 72a113e..2af9ab1 100644
corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(gpg_helper_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(gpg_helper_t)
corenet_raw_sendrecv_generic_if(gpg_helper_t)
-@@ -180,11 +209,10 @@ corenet_tcp_bind_generic_node(gpg_helper_t)
+@@ -180,11 +204,10 @@ corenet_tcp_bind_generic_node(gpg_helper_t)
corenet_udp_bind_generic_node(gpg_helper_t)
corenet_tcp_connect_all_ports(gpg_helper_t)
@@ -23663,7 +25834,7 @@ index 72a113e..2af9ab1 100644
tunable_policy(`use_nfs_home_dirs',`
fs_dontaudit_rw_nfs_files(gpg_helper_t)
-@@ -198,15 +226,17 @@ tunable_policy(`use_samba_home_dirs',`
+@@ -198,15 +221,17 @@ tunable_policy(`use_samba_home_dirs',`
#
# GPG agent local policy
#
@@ -23682,7 +25853,7 @@ index 72a113e..2af9ab1 100644
manage_files_pattern(gpg_agent_t, gpg_secret_t, gpg_secret_t)
manage_lnk_files_pattern(gpg_agent_t, gpg_secret_t, gpg_secret_t)
-@@ -223,6 +253,7 @@ corecmd_read_bin_symlinks(gpg_agent_t)
+@@ -223,43 +248,34 @@ corecmd_read_bin_symlinks(gpg_agent_t)
corecmd_search_bin(gpg_agent_t)
corecmd_exec_shell(gpg_agent_t)
@@ -23690,8 +25861,10 @@ index 72a113e..2af9ab1 100644
dev_read_urand(gpg_agent_t)
domain_use_interactive_fds(gpg_agent_t)
-@@ -232,34 +263,25 @@ fs_dontaudit_list_inotifyfs(gpg_agent_t)
- miscfiles_read_localization(gpg_agent_t)
+
+ fs_dontaudit_list_inotifyfs(gpg_agent_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(gpg_agent_t)
# Write to the user domain tty.
-userdom_use_user_terminals(gpg_agent_t)
@@ -23729,7 +25902,7 @@ index 72a113e..2af9ab1 100644
optional_policy(`
mozilla_dontaudit_rw_user_home_files(gpg_agent_t)
-@@ -294,10 +316,10 @@ fs_tmpfs_filetrans(gpg_pinentry_t, gpg_pinentry_tmpfs_t, { file dir })
+@@ -294,10 +310,10 @@ fs_tmpfs_filetrans(gpg_pinentry_t, gpg_pinentry_tmpfs_t, { file dir })
# read /proc/meminfo
kernel_read_system_state(gpg_pinentry_t)
@@ -23741,7 +25914,7 @@ index 72a113e..2af9ab1 100644
corenet_sendrecv_pulseaudio_client_packets(gpg_pinentry_t)
corenet_tcp_bind_generic_node(gpg_pinentry_t)
corenet_tcp_connect_pulseaudio_port(gpg_pinentry_t)
-@@ -310,7 +332,6 @@ dev_read_rand(gpg_pinentry_t)
+@@ -310,7 +326,6 @@ dev_read_rand(gpg_pinentry_t)
files_read_usr_files(gpg_pinentry_t)
# read /etc/X11/qtrc
@@ -23749,7 +25922,12 @@ index 72a113e..2af9ab1 100644
fs_dontaudit_list_inotifyfs(gpg_pinentry_t)
fs_getattr_tmpfs(gpg_pinentry_t)
-@@ -325,13 +346,15 @@ miscfiles_read_localization(gpg_pinentry_t)
+@@ -320,18 +335,19 @@ auth_use_nsswitch(gpg_pinentry_t)
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(gpg_pinentry_t)
+
+ miscfiles_read_fonts(gpg_pinentry_t)
+-miscfiles_read_localization(gpg_pinentry_t)
+
# for .Xauthority
userdom_read_user_home_content_files(gpg_pinentry_t)
userdom_read_user_tmpfs_files(gpg_pinentry_t)
@@ -23770,7 +25948,7 @@ index 72a113e..2af9ab1 100644
')
optional_policy(`
-@@ -340,6 +363,12 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -340,6 +356,12 @@ optional_policy(`
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -23783,7 +25961,7 @@ index 72a113e..2af9ab1 100644
pulseaudio_exec(gpg_pinentry_t)
pulseaudio_rw_home_files(gpg_pinentry_t)
pulseaudio_setattr_home_dir(gpg_pinentry_t)
-@@ -349,4 +378,28 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -349,4 +371,27 @@ optional_policy(`
optional_policy(`
xserver_user_x_domain_template(gpg_pinentry, gpg_pinentry_t, gpg_pinentry_tmpfs_t)
@@ -23804,7 +25982,6 @@ index 72a113e..2af9ab1 100644
+
+files_read_usr_files(gpg_web_t)
+
-+miscfiles_read_localization(gpg_web_t)
+
+apache_dontaudit_rw_tmp_files(gpg_web_t)
+apache_manage_sys_content_rw(gpg_web_t)
@@ -23853,7 +26030,7 @@ index 7d97298..d6b2959 100644
+ allow $1 gpmctl_t:sock_file setattr_sock_file_perms;
')
diff --git a/gpm.te b/gpm.te
-index a627b34..c4cfc6d 100644
+index a627b34..0120907 100644
--- a/gpm.te
+++ b/gpm.te
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ type gpm_exec_t;
@@ -23865,8 +26042,12 @@ index a627b34..c4cfc6d 100644
type gpm_tmp_t;
files_tmp_file(gpm_tmp_t)
-@@ -69,6 +69,7 @@ miscfiles_read_localization(gpm_t)
+@@ -65,10 +65,9 @@ domain_use_interactive_fds(gpm_t)
+
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(gpm_t)
+-miscfiles_read_localization(gpm_t)
+-
userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fds(gpm_t)
userdom_dontaudit_search_user_home_dirs(gpm_t)
+userdom_use_inherited_user_terminals(gpm_t)
@@ -23874,7 +26055,7 @@ index a627b34..c4cfc6d 100644
optional_policy(`
seutil_sigchld_newrole(gpm_t)
diff --git a/gpsd.te b/gpsd.te
-index 03742d8..27e518c 100644
+index 03742d8..4fefc6e 100644
--- a/gpsd.te
+++ b/gpsd.te
@@ -24,8 +24,9 @@ files_pid_file(gpsd_var_run_t)
@@ -23889,7 +26070,7 @@ index 03742d8..27e518c 100644
allow gpsd_t self:shm create_shm_perms;
allow gpsd_t self:unix_dgram_socket { create_socket_perms sendto };
allow gpsd_t self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
-@@ -38,16 +39,24 @@ manage_files_pattern(gpsd_t, gpsd_var_run_t, gpsd_var_run_t)
+@@ -38,22 +39,34 @@ manage_files_pattern(gpsd_t, gpsd_var_run_t, gpsd_var_run_t)
manage_sock_files_pattern(gpsd_t, gpsd_var_run_t, gpsd_var_run_t)
files_pid_filetrans(gpsd_t, gpsd_var_run_t, { file sock_file })
@@ -23916,19 +26097,17 @@ index 03742d8..27e518c 100644
auth_use_nsswitch(gpsd_t)
-@@ -56,6 +65,12 @@ logging_send_syslog_msg(gpsd_t)
- miscfiles_read_localization(gpsd_t)
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(gpsd_t)
- optional_policy(`
+-miscfiles_read_localization(gpsd_t)
++optional_policy(`
+ chronyd_rw_shm(gpsd_t)
+ chronyd_stream_connect(gpsd_t)
+ chronyd_dgram_send(gpsd_t)
+')
-+
-+optional_policy(`
- dbus_system_bus_client(gpsd_t)
- ')
+ optional_policy(`
+ dbus_system_bus_client(gpsd_t)
diff --git a/guest.te b/guest.te
index 1cb7311..1de82b2 100644
--- a/guest.te
@@ -23951,7 +26130,7 @@ index 1cb7311..1de82b2 100644
+
+gen_user(guest_u, user, guest_r, s0, s0)
diff --git a/hadoop.if b/hadoop.if
-index 2d0b4e1..7bbebf5 100644
+index 2d0b4e1..6649814 100644
--- a/hadoop.if
+++ b/hadoop.if
@@ -89,7 +89,6 @@ template(`hadoop_domain_template',`
@@ -23962,7 +26141,23 @@ index 2d0b4e1..7bbebf5 100644
corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(hadoop_$1_t)
corenet_tcp_bind_all_nodes(hadoop_$1_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(hadoop_$1_t)
-@@ -224,14 +223,21 @@ interface(`hadoop_role',`
+@@ -120,7 +119,6 @@ template(`hadoop_domain_template',`
+ logging_send_audit_msgs(hadoop_$1_t)
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(hadoop_$1_t)
+
+- miscfiles_read_localization(hadoop_$1_t)
+
+ sysnet_read_config(hadoop_$1_t)
+
+@@ -191,7 +189,6 @@ template(`hadoop_domain_template',`
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(hadoop_$1_initrc_t)
+ logging_send_audit_msgs(hadoop_$1_initrc_t)
+
+- miscfiles_read_localization(hadoop_$1_initrc_t)
+
+ userdom_dontaudit_search_user_home_dirs(hadoop_$1_initrc_t)
+
+@@ -224,14 +221,21 @@ interface(`hadoop_role',`
hadoop_domtrans($2)
role $1 types hadoop_t;
@@ -23987,7 +26182,7 @@ index 2d0b4e1..7bbebf5 100644
########################################
diff --git a/hadoop.te b/hadoop.te
-index c81c58a..63e344b 100644
+index c81c58a..86e3d1d 100644
--- a/hadoop.te
+++ b/hadoop.te
@@ -123,7 +123,6 @@ kernel_read_system_state(hadoop_t)
@@ -23998,7 +26193,7 @@ index c81c58a..63e344b 100644
corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(hadoop_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(hadoop_t)
corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if(hadoop_t)
-@@ -151,20 +150,23 @@ dev_read_urand(hadoop_t)
+@@ -151,20 +150,22 @@ dev_read_urand(hadoop_t)
domain_use_interactive_fds(hadoop_t)
files_dontaudit_search_spool(hadoop_t)
@@ -24011,7 +26206,6 @@ index c81c58a..63e344b 100644
+auth_use_nsswitch(hadoop_t)
-sysnet_read_config(hadoop_t)
-+miscfiles_read_localization(hadoop_t)
-userdom_use_user_terminals(hadoop_t)
+userdom_use_inherited_user_terminals(hadoop_t)
@@ -24028,7 +26222,7 @@ index c81c58a..63e344b 100644
optional_policy(`
nis_use_ypbind(hadoop_t)
-@@ -311,7 +313,6 @@ kernel_read_system_state(zookeeper_t)
+@@ -311,7 +312,6 @@ kernel_read_system_state(zookeeper_t)
corecmd_exec_bin(zookeeper_t)
corecmd_exec_shell(zookeeper_t)
@@ -24036,16 +26230,16 @@ index c81c58a..63e344b 100644
corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(zookeeper_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(zookeeper_t)
corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if(zookeeper_t)
-@@ -333,20 +334,19 @@ dev_read_urand(zookeeper_t)
+@@ -333,20 +333,18 @@ dev_read_urand(zookeeper_t)
domain_use_interactive_fds(zookeeper_t)
-files_read_etc_files(zookeeper_t)
files_read_usr_files(zookeeper_t)
+-miscfiles_read_localization(zookeeper_t)
+auth_use_nsswitch(zookeeper_t)
+
- miscfiles_read_localization(zookeeper_t)
sysnet_read_config(zookeeper_t)
@@ -24061,7 +26255,7 @@ index c81c58a..63e344b 100644
')
########################################
-@@ -393,7 +393,6 @@ kernel_read_system_state(zookeeper_server_t)
+@@ -393,7 +391,6 @@ kernel_read_system_state(zookeeper_server_t)
corecmd_exec_bin(zookeeper_server_t)
corecmd_exec_shell(zookeeper_server_t)
@@ -24069,7 +26263,7 @@ index c81c58a..63e344b 100644
corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(zookeeper_server_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(zookeeper_server_t)
corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if(zookeeper_server_t)
-@@ -421,7 +420,6 @@ dev_read_rand(zookeeper_server_t)
+@@ -421,15 +418,14 @@ dev_read_rand(zookeeper_server_t)
dev_read_sysfs(zookeeper_server_t)
dev_read_urand(zookeeper_server_t)
@@ -24077,8 +26271,11 @@ index c81c58a..63e344b 100644
files_read_usr_files(zookeeper_server_t)
fs_getattr_xattr_fs(zookeeper_server_t)
-@@ -432,4 +430,6 @@ miscfiles_read_localization(zookeeper_server_t)
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(zookeeper_server_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(zookeeper_server_t)
+-
sysnet_read_config(zookeeper_server_t)
-java_exec(zookeeper_server_t)
@@ -24124,7 +26321,7 @@ index 7cf6763..9d2be6b 100644
+ dontaudit $1 hald_var_run_t:file read_inherited_file_perms;
+')
diff --git a/hal.te b/hal.te
-index e0476cb..551070a 100644
+index e0476cb..0caa5ba 100644
--- a/hal.te
+++ b/hal.te
@@ -54,6 +54,9 @@ files_pid_file(hald_var_run_t)
@@ -24170,7 +26367,15 @@ index e0476cb..551070a 100644
files_rw_etc_runtime_files(hald_t)
files_manage_mnt_dirs(hald_t)
files_manage_mnt_files(hald_t)
-@@ -372,7 +374,6 @@ dev_setattr_generic_usb_dev(hald_acl_t)
+@@ -201,7 +203,6 @@ logging_send_audit_msgs(hald_t)
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(hald_t)
+ logging_search_logs(hald_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(hald_t)
+ miscfiles_read_hwdata(hald_t)
+
+ modutils_domtrans_insmod(hald_t)
+@@ -372,7 +373,6 @@ dev_setattr_generic_usb_dev(hald_acl_t)
dev_setattr_usbfs_files(hald_acl_t)
files_read_usr_files(hald_acl_t)
@@ -24178,7 +26383,16 @@ index e0476cb..551070a 100644
fs_getattr_all_fs(hald_acl_t)
-@@ -418,7 +419,6 @@ dev_write_raw_memory(hald_mac_t)
+@@ -385,8 +385,6 @@ auth_use_nsswitch(hald_acl_t)
+
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(hald_acl_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(hald_acl_t)
+-
+ optional_policy(`
+ policykit_dbus_chat(hald_acl_t)
+ policykit_domtrans_auth(hald_acl_t)
+@@ -418,14 +416,11 @@ dev_write_raw_memory(hald_mac_t)
dev_read_sysfs(hald_mac_t)
files_read_usr_files(hald_mac_t)
@@ -24186,15 +26400,33 @@ index e0476cb..551070a 100644
auth_use_nsswitch(hald_mac_t)
-@@ -465,7 +465,6 @@ write_files_pattern(hald_keymap_t, hald_log_t, hald_log_t)
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(hald_mac_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(hald_mac_t)
+-
+ ########################################
+ #
+ # Local hald sonypic policy
+@@ -446,7 +441,6 @@ write_files_pattern(hald_sonypic_t, hald_log_t, hald_log_t)
+
+ files_read_usr_files(hald_sonypic_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(hald_sonypic_t)
+
+ ########################################
+ #
+@@ -465,10 +459,8 @@ write_files_pattern(hald_keymap_t, hald_log_t, hald_log_t)
dev_rw_input_dev(hald_keymap_t)
-files_read_etc_files(hald_keymap_t)
files_read_usr_files(hald_keymap_t)
- miscfiles_read_localization(hald_keymap_t)
-@@ -504,7 +503,6 @@ kernel_search_network_sysctl(hald_dccm_t)
+-miscfiles_read_localization(hald_keymap_t)
+
+ ########################################
+ #
+@@ -504,7 +496,6 @@ kernel_search_network_sysctl(hald_dccm_t)
dev_read_urand(hald_dccm_t)
@@ -24202,6 +26434,23 @@ index e0476cb..551070a 100644
corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(hald_dccm_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(hald_dccm_t)
corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if(hald_dccm_t)
+@@ -518,14 +509,12 @@ corenet_udp_bind_dhcpc_port(hald_dccm_t)
+ corenet_tcp_bind_ftp_port(hald_dccm_t)
+ corenet_tcp_bind_dccm_port(hald_dccm_t)
+
+-logging_send_syslog_msg(hald_dccm_t)
+-
+ files_read_usr_files(hald_dccm_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(hald_dccm_t)
+-
+ hal_dontaudit_rw_dgram_sockets(hald_dccm_t)
+
++logging_send_syslog_msg(hald_dccm_t)
++
+ optional_policy(`
+ dbus_system_bus_client(hald_dccm_t)
+ ')
diff --git a/hddtemp.if b/hddtemp.if
index 87b4531..901d905 100644
--- a/hddtemp.if
@@ -24231,7 +26480,7 @@ index 87b4531..901d905 100644
+ files_list_etc($1)
')
diff --git a/hddtemp.te b/hddtemp.te
-index c234b32..ab1fb3c 100644
+index c234b32..41d985d 100644
--- a/hddtemp.te
+++ b/hddtemp.te
@@ -28,7 +28,6 @@ allow hddtemp_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms;
@@ -24242,7 +26491,7 @@ index c234b32..ab1fb3c 100644
corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(hddtemp_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(hddtemp_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_node(hddtemp_t)
-@@ -38,12 +37,15 @@ corenet_tcp_bind_hddtemp_port(hddtemp_t)
+@@ -38,12 +37,13 @@ corenet_tcp_bind_hddtemp_port(hddtemp_t)
corenet_sendrecv_hddtemp_server_packets(hddtemp_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_hddtemp_port(hddtemp_t)
@@ -24255,13 +26504,13 @@ index c234b32..ab1fb3c 100644
+storage_raw_read_removable_device(hddtemp_t)
logging_send_syslog_msg(hddtemp_t)
- miscfiles_read_localization(hddtemp_t)
-
+-miscfiles_read_localization(hddtemp_t)
+-
+optional_policy(`
+ sysnet_dns_name_resolve(hddtemp_t)
+')
diff --git a/howl.te b/howl.te
-index 6ad2d3c..2ef178b 100644
+index 6ad2d3c..b23d54a 100644
--- a/howl.te
+++ b/howl.te
@@ -33,7 +33,6 @@ kernel_request_load_module(howl_t)
@@ -24272,8 +26521,17 @@ index 6ad2d3c..2ef178b 100644
corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(howl_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(howl_t)
corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if(howl_t)
+@@ -60,8 +59,6 @@ init_rw_utmp(howl_t)
+
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(howl_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(howl_t)
+-
+ sysnet_read_config(howl_t)
+
+ userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fds(howl_t)
diff --git a/i18n_input.te b/i18n_input.te
-index 5fc89c4..15d18ae 100644
+index 5fc89c4..087c2d0 100644
--- a/i18n_input.te
+++ b/i18n_input.te
@@ -36,7 +36,6 @@ can_exec(i18n_input_t, i18n_input_exec_t)
@@ -24284,7 +26542,13 @@ index 5fc89c4..15d18ae 100644
corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(i18n_input_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(i18n_input_t)
corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if(i18n_input_t)
-@@ -74,16 +73,7 @@ sysnet_read_config(i18n_input_t)
+@@ -68,22 +67,11 @@ init_stream_connect_script(i18n_input_t)
+
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(i18n_input_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(i18n_input_t)
+-
+ sysnet_read_config(i18n_input_t)
userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fds(i18n_input_t)
userdom_read_user_home_content_files(i18n_input_t)
@@ -24325,7 +26589,7 @@ index ecab47a..6eddc6d 100644
-
')
diff --git a/icecast.te b/icecast.te
-index fdb7e9a..4a5401f 100644
+index fdb7e9a..b910581 100644
--- a/icecast.te
+++ b/icecast.te
@@ -5,6 +5,14 @@ policy_module(icecast, 1.1.0)
@@ -24343,7 +26607,7 @@ index fdb7e9a..4a5401f 100644
type icecast_t;
type icecast_exec_t;
init_daemon_domain(icecast_t, icecast_exec_t)
-@@ -39,19 +47,26 @@ files_pid_filetrans(icecast_t, icecast_var_run_t, { file dir })
+@@ -39,18 +47,24 @@ files_pid_filetrans(icecast_t, icecast_var_run_t, { file dir })
kernel_read_system_state(icecast_t)
@@ -24367,13 +26631,12 @@ index fdb7e9a..4a5401f 100644
-
auth_use_nsswitch(icecast_t)
- miscfiles_read_localization(icecast_t)
-
--sysnet_dns_name_resolve(icecast_t)
+-miscfiles_read_localization(icecast_t)
-
+-sysnet_dns_name_resolve(icecast_t)
+
optional_policy(`
apache_read_sys_content(icecast_t)
- ')
diff --git a/ifplugd.if b/ifplugd.if
index dfb4232..35343f8 100644
--- a/ifplugd.if
@@ -24394,7 +26657,7 @@ index dfb4232..35343f8 100644
init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, ifplugd_initrc_exec_t)
diff --git a/ifplugd.te b/ifplugd.te
-index 978c32f..0e03f2a 100644
+index 978c32f..05927a7 100644
--- a/ifplugd.te
+++ b/ifplugd.te
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ init_daemon_domain(ifplugd_t, ifplugd_exec_t)
@@ -24415,7 +26678,7 @@ index 978c32f..0e03f2a 100644
allow ifplugd_t self:process { signal signull };
allow ifplugd_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms;
allow ifplugd_t self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
-@@ -54,8 +54,9 @@ corecmd_exec_bin(ifplugd_t)
+@@ -54,15 +54,14 @@ corecmd_exec_bin(ifplugd_t)
# reading of hardware information
dev_read_sysfs(ifplugd_t)
@@ -24426,6 +26689,13 @@ index 978c32f..0e03f2a 100644
auth_use_nsswitch(ifplugd_t)
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(ifplugd_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(ifplugd_t)
+-
+ netutils_domtrans(ifplugd_t)
+ # transition to ifconfig & dhcpc
+ sysnet_domtrans_ifconfig(ifplugd_t)
diff --git a/imaze.fc b/imaze.fc
index 8d455ba..58729cb 100644
--- a/imaze.fc
@@ -24437,7 +26707,7 @@ index 8d455ba..58729cb 100644
-/var/log/imaze\.log -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:imazesrv_log_t,s0)
+/var/log/imaze\.log.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:imazesrv_log_t,s0)
diff --git a/imaze.te b/imaze.te
-index 0778af8..3a0bead 100644
+index 0778af8..66fb4ae 100644
--- a/imaze.te
+++ b/imaze.te
@@ -54,7 +54,6 @@ kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(imazesrv_t)
@@ -24448,6 +26718,15 @@ index 0778af8..3a0bead 100644
corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(imazesrv_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(imazesrv_t)
corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if(imazesrv_t)
+@@ -79,8 +78,6 @@ fs_search_auto_mountpoints(imazesrv_t)
+
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(imazesrv_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(imazesrv_t)
+-
+ sysnet_read_config(imazesrv_t)
+
+ userdom_use_unpriv_users_fds(imazesrv_t)
diff --git a/inetd.fc b/inetd.fc
index 39d5baa..4288778 100644
--- a/inetd.fc
@@ -24476,7 +26755,7 @@ index df48e5e..161814e 100644
########################################
diff --git a/inetd.te b/inetd.te
-index 10f25d3..65e06e4 100644
+index 10f25d3..ec4cd54 100644
--- a/inetd.te
+++ b/inetd.te
@@ -38,9 +38,9 @@ ifdef(`enable_mcs',`
@@ -24530,7 +26809,7 @@ index 10f25d3..65e06e4 100644
corenet_sendrecv_swat_server_packets(inetd_t)
corenet_sendrecv_tftp_server_packets(inetd_t)
-@@ -137,7 +139,6 @@ corecmd_read_bin_symlinks(inetd_t)
+@@ -137,20 +139,20 @@ corecmd_read_bin_symlinks(inetd_t)
domain_use_interactive_fds(inetd_t)
@@ -24538,7 +26817,12 @@ index 10f25d3..65e06e4 100644
files_read_etc_runtime_files(inetd_t)
auth_use_nsswitch(inetd_t)
-@@ -150,7 +151,10 @@ miscfiles_read_localization(inetd_t)
+
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(inetd_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(inetd_t)
+-
+ # xinetd needs MLS override privileges to work
mls_fd_share_all_levels(inetd_t)
mls_socket_read_to_clearance(inetd_t)
mls_socket_write_to_clearance(inetd_t)
@@ -24549,7 +26833,7 @@ index 10f25d3..65e06e4 100644
sysnet_read_config(inetd_t)
-@@ -177,6 +181,10 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -177,6 +179,10 @@ optional_policy(`
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -24560,7 +26844,7 @@ index 10f25d3..65e06e4 100644
udev_read_db(inetd_t)
')
-@@ -210,7 +218,6 @@ kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(inetd_child_t)
+@@ -210,7 +216,6 @@ kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(inetd_child_t)
kernel_read_system_state(inetd_child_t)
kernel_read_network_state(inetd_child_t)
@@ -24568,7 +26852,7 @@ index 10f25d3..65e06e4 100644
corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(inetd_child_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(inetd_child_t)
corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if(inetd_child_t)
-@@ -223,7 +230,6 @@ dev_read_urand(inetd_child_t)
+@@ -223,15 +228,12 @@ dev_read_urand(inetd_child_t)
fs_getattr_xattr_fs(inetd_child_t)
@@ -24576,10 +26860,27 @@ index 10f25d3..65e06e4 100644
files_read_etc_runtime_files(inetd_child_t)
auth_use_nsswitch(inetd_child_t)
+
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(inetd_child_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(inetd_child_t)
+-
+ sysnet_read_config(inetd_child_t)
+
+ optional_policy(`
diff --git a/inn.if b/inn.if
-index ebc9e0d..2c4b5da 100644
+index ebc9e0d..617f52f 100644
--- a/inn.if
+++ b/inn.if
+@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@
+ #
+ interface(`inn_exec',`
+ gen_require(`
+- type innd_t;
++ type innd_exec_t;
+ ')
+
+ can_exec($1, innd_exec_t)
@@ -93,6 +93,7 @@ interface(`inn_read_config',`
type innd_etc_t;
')
@@ -24624,7 +26925,7 @@ index ebc9e0d..2c4b5da 100644
init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, innd_initrc_exec_t)
domain_system_change_exemption($1)
diff --git a/inn.te b/inn.te
-index 7311364..0a5f8e0 100644
+index 7311364..28012eb 100644
--- a/inn.te
+++ b/inn.te
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ policy_module(inn, 1.10.0)
@@ -24675,7 +26976,15 @@ index 7311364..0a5f8e0 100644
corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(innd_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(innd_t)
corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if(innd_t)
-@@ -105,6 +107,7 @@ sysnet_read_config(innd_t)
+@@ -97,14 +99,11 @@ files_read_usr_files(innd_t)
+
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(innd_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(innd_t)
+-
+-seutil_dontaudit_search_config(innd_t)
+-
+ sysnet_read_config(innd_t)
userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fds(innd_t)
userdom_dontaudit_search_user_home_dirs(innd_t)
@@ -24684,14 +26993,15 @@ index 7311364..0a5f8e0 100644
mta_send_mail(innd_t)
diff --git a/irc.fc b/irc.fc
-index 65ece18..6bfdfd3 100644
+index 65ece18..7e7873c 100644
--- a/irc.fc
+++ b/irc.fc
-@@ -2,10 +2,14 @@
+@@ -2,10 +2,15 @@
# /home
#
HOME_DIR/\.ircmotd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:irc_home_t,s0)
+HOME_DIR/\.irssi(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:irssi_home_t,s0)
++HOME_DIR/irclogs(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:irssi_home_t,s0)
+
+/etc/irssi\.conf -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:irssi_etc_t,s0)
@@ -24703,7 +27013,7 @@ index 65ece18..6bfdfd3 100644
+/usr/bin/irssi -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:irssi_exec_t,s0)
/usr/bin/tinyirc -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:irc_exec_t,s0)
diff --git a/irc.if b/irc.if
-index 4f9dc90..81a0fc6 100644
+index 4f9dc90..2af9361 100644
--- a/irc.if
+++ b/irc.if
@@ -18,9 +18,11 @@
@@ -24718,7 +27028,7 @@ index 4f9dc90..81a0fc6 100644
# Transition from the user domain to the derived domain.
domtrans_pattern($2, irc_exec_t, irc_t)
-@@ -28,4 +30,17 @@ interface(`irc_role',`
+@@ -28,4 +30,39 @@ interface(`irc_role',`
# allow ps to show irc
ps_process_pattern($2, irc_t)
allow $2 irc_t:process signal;
@@ -24735,9 +27045,31 @@ index 4f9dc90..81a0fc6 100644
+ relabel_dirs_pattern($2, irssi_home_t, irssi_home_t)
+ relabel_files_pattern($2, irssi_home_t, irssi_home_t)
+ relabel_lnk_files_pattern($2, irssi_home_t, irssi_home_t)
++
++ irc_filetrans_home_content($2)
++')
++
++########################################
++## <summary>
++## Transition to alsa named content
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`irc_filetrans_home_content',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type irc_home_t;
++ ')
++
++ userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans($1, irc_home_t, file, ".ircmotd")
++ userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans($1, irc_home_t, dir, ".irssi")
++ userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans($1, irc_home_t, dir, "irclogs")
')
diff --git a/irc.te b/irc.te
-index 6e2dbd2..8216600 100644
+index 6e2dbd2..73e129e 100644
--- a/irc.te
+++ b/irc.te
@@ -19,7 +19,31 @@ userdom_user_home_content(irc_home_t)
@@ -24773,6 +27105,15 @@ index 6e2dbd2..8216600 100644
########################################
#
+@@ -33,7 +57,7 @@ allow irc_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms;
+ manage_dirs_pattern(irc_t, irc_home_t, irc_home_t)
+ manage_files_pattern(irc_t, irc_home_t, irc_home_t)
+ manage_lnk_files_pattern(irc_t, irc_home_t, irc_home_t)
+-userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans(irc_t, irc_home_t, { dir file lnk_file })
++irc_filetrans_home_content(irc_t)
+
+ # access files under /tmp
+ manage_dirs_pattern(irc_t, irc_tmp_t, irc_tmp_t)
@@ -45,7 +69,6 @@ files_tmp_filetrans(irc_t, irc_tmp_t, { file dir lnk_file sock_file fifo_file })
kernel_read_proc_symlinks(irc_t)
@@ -24781,7 +27122,15 @@ index 6e2dbd2..8216600 100644
corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(irc_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(irc_t)
corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if(irc_t)
-@@ -83,20 +106,75 @@ seutil_use_newrole_fds(irc_t)
+@@ -75,7 +98,6 @@ term_list_ptys(irc_t)
+ init_read_utmp(irc_t)
+ init_dontaudit_lock_utmp(irc_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(irc_t)
+
+ # Inherit and use descriptors from newrole.
+ seutil_use_newrole_fds(irc_t)
+@@ -83,20 +105,74 @@ seutil_use_newrole_fds(irc_t)
sysnet_read_config(irc_t)
# Write to the user domain tty.
@@ -24816,7 +27165,7 @@ index 6e2dbd2..8216600 100644
+manage_dirs_pattern(irssi_t, irssi_home_t, irssi_home_t)
+manage_files_pattern(irssi_t, irssi_home_t, irssi_home_t)
+manage_lnk_files_pattern(irssi_t, irssi_home_t, irssi_home_t)
-+userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans(irssi_t, irssi_home_t, { dir file lnk_file })
++irc_filetrans_home_content(irssi_t)
+userdom_search_user_home_dirs(irssi_t)
+
+kernel_read_system_state(irssi_t)
@@ -24850,7 +27199,6 @@ index 6e2dbd2..8216600 100644
+
+auth_use_nsswitch(irssi_t)
+
-+miscfiles_read_localization(irssi_t)
+
+userdom_use_inherited_user_terminals(irssi_t)
+
@@ -24868,7 +27216,7 @@ index 6e2dbd2..8216600 100644
+ automount_dontaudit_getattr_tmp_dirs(irssi_t)
')
diff --git a/ircd.te b/ircd.te
-index 75ab1e2..a65b1a3 100644
+index 75ab1e2..603ea55 100644
--- a/ircd.te
+++ b/ircd.te
@@ -49,7 +49,6 @@ kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(ircd_t)
@@ -24879,8 +27227,17 @@ index 75ab1e2..a65b1a3 100644
corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(ircd_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(ircd_t)
corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if(ircd_t)
+@@ -73,8 +72,6 @@ fs_search_auto_mountpoints(ircd_t)
+
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(ircd_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(ircd_t)
+-
+ sysnet_read_config(ircd_t)
+
+ userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fds(ircd_t)
diff --git a/irqbalance.te b/irqbalance.te
-index 9aeeaf9..3cf4e02 100644
+index 9aeeaf9..a91de65 100644
--- a/irqbalance.te
+++ b/irqbalance.te
@@ -19,6 +19,12 @@ files_pid_file(irqbalance_var_run_t)
@@ -24896,11 +27253,20 @@ index 9aeeaf9..3cf4e02 100644
allow irqbalance_t self:process { getcap setcap signal_perms };
allow irqbalance_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms;
+@@ -42,8 +48,6 @@ domain_use_interactive_fds(irqbalance_t)
+
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(irqbalance_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(irqbalance_t)
+-
+ userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fds(irqbalance_t)
+ userdom_dontaudit_search_user_home_dirs(irqbalance_t)
+
diff --git a/iscsi.fc b/iscsi.fc
-index 14d9670..6825edc 100644
+index 14d9670..e94b352 100644
--- a/iscsi.fc
+++ b/iscsi.fc
-@@ -1,7 +1,16 @@
+@@ -1,7 +1,17 @@
/sbin/iscsid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:iscsid_exec_t,s0)
/sbin/brcm_iscsiuio -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:iscsid_exec_t,s0)
+/sbin/iscsiuio -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:iscsid_exec_t,s0)
@@ -24914,12 +27280,13 @@ index 14d9670..6825edc 100644
+/var/log/iscsiuio\.log.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:iscsi_log_t,s0)
+
/var/run/iscsid\.pid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:iscsi_var_run_t,s0)
++/var/run/iscsiuio\.pid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:iscsi_var_run_t,s0)
+
+/usr/sbin/iscsid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:iscsid_exec_t,s0)
+/usr/sbin/brcm_iscsiuio -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:iscsid_exec_t,s0)
+/usr/sbin/iscsiuio -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:iscsid_exec_t,s0)
diff --git a/iscsi.te b/iscsi.te
-index 8bcfa2f..3e10359 100644
+index 8bcfa2f..f71614d 100644
--- a/iscsi.te
+++ b/iscsi.te
@@ -31,7 +31,6 @@ files_pid_file(iscsi_var_run_t)
@@ -24958,6 +27325,15 @@ index 8bcfa2f..3e10359 100644
auth_use_nsswitch(iscsid_t)
+@@ -90,8 +91,6 @@ init_stream_connect_script(iscsid_t)
+
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(iscsid_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(iscsid_t)
+-
+ optional_policy(`
+ tgtd_manage_semaphores(iscsid_t)
+ ')
diff --git a/isnsd.fc b/isnsd.fc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3e29080
@@ -25161,10 +27537,10 @@ index 0000000..1b3514a
+
diff --git a/isnsd.te b/isnsd.te
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..a0f2f83
+index 0000000..951fbae
--- /dev/null
+++ b/isnsd.te
-@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+policy_module(isnsd, 1.0.0)
+
+########################################
@@ -25194,6 +27570,7 @@ index 0000000..a0f2f83
+allow isnsd_t self:process { signal };
+
+allow isnsd_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms;
++allow isnsd_t self:tcp_socket { listen };
+allow isnsd_t self:udp_socket { listen };
+allow isnsd_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
+
@@ -25215,10 +27592,7 @@ index 0000000..a0f2f83
+
+logging_send_syslog_msg(isnsd_t)
+
-+miscfiles_read_localization(isnsd_t)
-+
+sysnet_dns_name_resolve(isnsd_t)
-+
diff --git a/jabber.fc b/jabber.fc
index da6f4b4..bd02cc8 100644
--- a/jabber.fc
@@ -25250,10 +27624,10 @@ index da6f4b4..bd02cc8 100644
+
+/var/spool/pyicq-t(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:pyicqt_var_spool_t,s0)
diff --git a/jabber.if b/jabber.if
-index 9878499..8643cd3 100644
+index 9878499..01673a4 100644
--- a/jabber.if
+++ b/jabber.if
-@@ -1,8 +1,71 @@
+@@ -1,8 +1,114 @@
## <summary>Jabber instant messaging server</summary>
-########################################
@@ -25282,6 +27656,11 @@ index 9878499..8643cd3 100644
+ type $1_exec_t;
+ init_daemon_domain($1_t, $1_exec_t)
+
++ kernel_read_system_state($1_t)
++
++ corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel($1_t)
++
++ logging_send_syslog_msg($1_t)
+')
+
+#######################################
@@ -25321,18 +27700,15 @@ index 9878499..8643cd3 100644
+')
+
+#######################################
- ## <summary>
--## Connect to jabber over a TCP socket (Deprecated)
++## <summary>
+## Read jabberd lib files.
- ## </summary>
- ## <param name="domain">
- ## <summary>
-@@ -10,8 +73,51 @@
- ## </summary>
- ## </param>
- #
--interface(`jabber_tcp_connect',`
-- refpolicywarn(`$0($*) has been deprecated.')
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
+interface(`jabberd_read_lib_files',`
+ gen_require(`
+ type jabberd_var_lib_t;
@@ -25361,16 +27737,19 @@ index 9878499..8643cd3 100644
+')
+
+#######################################
-+## <summary>
+ ## <summary>
+-## Connect to jabber over a TCP socket (Deprecated)
+## Create, read, write, and delete
+## jabberd lib files.
-+## </summary>
-+## <param name="domain">
-+## <summary>
-+## Domain allowed access.
-+## </summary>
-+## </param>
-+#
+ ## </summary>
+ ## <param name="domain">
+ ## <summary>
+@@ -10,8 +116,13 @@
+ ## </summary>
+ ## </param>
+ #
+-interface(`jabber_tcp_connect',`
+- refpolicywarn(`$0($*) has been deprecated.')
+interface(`jabberd_manage_lib_files',`
+ gen_require(`
+ type jabberd_var_lib_t;
@@ -25381,7 +27760,7 @@ index 9878499..8643cd3 100644
')
########################################
-@@ -33,24 +139,25 @@ interface(`jabber_tcp_connect',`
+@@ -33,24 +144,25 @@ interface(`jabber_tcp_connect',`
#
interface(`jabber_admin',`
gen_require(`
@@ -25417,10 +27796,10 @@ index 9878499..8643cd3 100644
- admin_pattern($1, jabberd_var_run_t)
')
diff --git a/jabber.te b/jabber.te
-index 53e53ca..92520eb 100644
+index 53e53ca..c1ce1b7 100644
--- a/jabber.te
+++ b/jabber.te
-@@ -1,94 +1,153 @@
+@@ -1,94 +1,146 @@
-policy_module(jabber, 1.9.0)
+policy_module(jabber, 1.8.0)
@@ -25557,8 +27936,8 @@ index 53e53ca..92520eb 100644
optional_policy(`
- seutil_sigchld_newrole(jabberd_t)
+ udev_read_db(jabberd_t)
- ')
-
++')
++
+######################################
+#
+# Local policy for pyicq-t
@@ -25589,12 +27968,12 @@ index 53e53ca..92520eb 100644
+libs_use_shared_libs(pyicqt_t)
+
+# needed for pyicq-t-mysql
++optional_policy(`
++ corenet_tcp_connect_mysqld_port(pyicqt_t)
+ ')
+
optional_policy(`
- udev_read_db(jabberd_t)
-+ corenet_tcp_connect_mysqld_port(pyicqt_t)
-+')
-+
-+optional_policy(`
+ sysnet_use_ldap(pyicqt_t)
')
+
@@ -25608,9 +27987,6 @@ index 53e53ca..92520eb 100644
+allow jabberd_domain self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
+allow jabberd_domain self:udp_socket create_socket_perms;
+
-+kernel_read_system_state(jabberd_domain)
-+
-+corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(jabberd_domain)
+corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(jabberd_domain)
+corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if(jabberd_domain)
+corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_node(jabberd_domain)
@@ -25626,10 +28002,6 @@ index 53e53ca..92520eb 100644
+files_read_etc_files(jabberd_domain)
+files_read_etc_runtime_files(jabberd_domain)
+
-+logging_send_syslog_msg(jabberd_domain)
-+
-+miscfiles_read_localization(jabberd_domain)
-+
+sysnet_read_config(jabberd_domain)
diff --git a/java.fc b/java.fc
index bc1a419..f630930 100644
@@ -25645,7 +28017,7 @@ index bc1a419..f630930 100644
ifdef(`distro_redhat',`
diff --git a/java.te b/java.te
-index ff52c16..22a761a 100644
+index ff52c16..bdb4610 100644
--- a/java.te
+++ b/java.te
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ policy_module(java, 2.6.0)
@@ -25665,7 +28037,15 @@ index ff52c16..22a761a 100644
corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(java_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(java_t)
corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if(java_t)
-@@ -108,7 +107,7 @@ userdom_manage_user_home_content_sockets(java_t)
+@@ -91,7 +90,6 @@ fs_dontaudit_rw_tmpfs_files(java_t)
+
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(java_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(java_t)
+ # Read global fonts and font config
+ miscfiles_read_fonts(java_t)
+
+@@ -108,7 +106,7 @@ userdom_manage_user_home_content_sockets(java_t)
userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans_user_home_content(java_t, { file lnk_file sock_file fifo_file })
userdom_write_user_tmp_sockets(java_t)
@@ -26140,10 +28520,10 @@ index 0000000..868c7d0
+')
diff --git a/jockey.te b/jockey.te
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..9632221
+index 0000000..03a01b4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/jockey.te
-@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+policy_module(jockey, 1.0.0)
+
+########################################
@@ -26176,6 +28556,8 @@ index 0000000..9632221
+manage_dirs_pattern(jockey_t, jockey_var_log_t, jockey_var_log_t)
+logging_log_filetrans(jockey_t, jockey_var_log_t, { file dir })
+
++kernel_read_system_state(jockey_t)
++
+corecmd_exec_bin(jockey_t)
+corecmd_exec_shell(jockey_t)
+
@@ -26189,15 +28571,20 @@ index 0000000..9632221
+files_read_etc_files(jockey_t)
+files_read_usr_files(jockey_t)
+
-+miscfiles_read_localization(jockey_t)
++auth_read_passwd(jockey_t)
+
+optional_policy(`
+ dbus_system_domain(jockey_t, jockey_exec_t)
+')
+
+optional_policy(`
++ gnome_dontaudit_search_config(jockey_t)
++')
++
++optional_policy(`
+ modutils_domtrans_insmod(jockey_t)
+ modutils_read_module_config(jockey_t)
++ modutils_list_module_config(jockey_t)
+')
diff --git a/kde.fc b/kde.fc
new file mode 100644
@@ -26236,10 +28623,10 @@ index 0000000..cf65577
+')
diff --git a/kde.te b/kde.te
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..3d7b011
+index 0000000..7b4b5ff
--- /dev/null
+++ b/kde.te
-@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+policy_module(kde,1.0.0)
+
+########################################
@@ -26270,8 +28657,6 @@ index 0000000..3d7b011
+
+logging_send_syslog_msg(kdebacklighthelper_t)
+
-+miscfiles_read_localization(kdebacklighthelper_t)
-+
+optional_policy(`
+ dbus_system_domain(kdebacklighthelper_t, kdebacklighthelper_exec_t)
+')
@@ -26285,7 +28670,7 @@ index 0000000..3d7b011
+')
+
diff --git a/kdump.fc b/kdump.fc
-index c66934f..dd91210 100644
+index c66934f..1906ffe 100644
--- a/kdump.fc
+++ b/kdump.fc
@@ -3,3 +3,11 @@
@@ -26294,7 +28679,7 @@ index c66934f..dd91210 100644
/sbin/kexec -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:kdump_exec_t,s0)
+
+
-+/usr/lib/systemd/system/kdump\.service -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:kdumpctl_unit_file_t,s0)
++/usr/lib/systemd/system/kdump\.service -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:kdump_unit_file_t,s0)
+
+/usr/bin/kdumpctl -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:kdumpctl_exec_t,s0)
+/usr/sbin/kdump -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:kdump_exec_t,s0)
@@ -26414,14 +28799,14 @@ index 4198ff5..d1ab262 100644
+ allow $1 kdump_unit_file_t:service all_service_perms;
')
diff --git a/kdump.te b/kdump.te
-index b29d8e2..c1b4a64 100644
+index b29d8e2..f177074 100644
--- a/kdump.te
+++ b/kdump.te
-@@ -15,6 +15,20 @@ files_config_file(kdump_etc_t)
+@@ -15,15 +15,28 @@ files_config_file(kdump_etc_t)
type kdump_initrc_exec_t;
init_script_file(kdump_initrc_exec_t)
-+type kdump_unit_file_t;
++type kdump_unit_file_t alias kdumpctl_unit_file_t;
+systemd_unit_file(kdump_unit_file_t)
+
+type kdumpctl_t;
@@ -26429,16 +28814,16 @@ index b29d8e2..c1b4a64 100644
+init_daemon_domain(kdumpctl_t, kdumpctl_exec_t)
+init_initrc_domain(kdumpctl_t)
+
-+type kdumpctl_unit_file_t;
-+systemd_unit_file(kdumpctl_unit_file_t)
-+
+type kdumpctl_tmp_t;
+files_tmp_file(kdumpctl_tmp_t)
+
#####################################
#
# kdump local policy
-@@ -24,6 +38,7 @@ allow kdump_t self:capability { sys_boot dac_override };
+ #
+
+ allow kdump_t self:capability { sys_boot dac_override };
++allow kdump_t self:capability2 compromise_kernel;
read_files_pattern(kdump_t, kdump_etc_t, kdump_etc_t)
@@ -26446,7 +28831,7 @@ index b29d8e2..c1b4a64 100644
files_read_etc_runtime_files(kdump_t)
files_read_kernel_img(kdump_t)
-@@ -36,3 +51,84 @@ dev_read_framebuffer(kdump_t)
+@@ -36,3 +49,88 @@ dev_read_framebuffer(kdump_t)
dev_read_sysfs(kdump_t)
term_use_console(kdump_t)
@@ -26460,16 +28845,18 @@ index b29d8e2..c1b4a64 100644
+
+kdump_domtrans(kdumpctl_t)
+
-+allow kdumpctl_t self:capability dac_override;
++allow kdumpctl_t self:capability { dac_override sys_chroot };
+allow kdumpctl_t self:process setfscreate;
+
+allow kdumpctl_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms;
+allow kdumpctl_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
+
+manage_dirs_pattern(kdumpctl_t, kdumpctl_tmp_t, kdumpctl_tmp_t)
++manage_chr_files_pattern(kdumpctl_t, kdumpctl_tmp_t, kdumpctl_tmp_t)
+manage_files_pattern(kdumpctl_t, kdumpctl_tmp_t, kdumpctl_tmp_t)
+manage_lnk_files_pattern(kdumpctl_t, kdumpctl_tmp_t, kdumpctl_tmp_t)
+files_tmp_filetrans(kdumpctl_t, kdumpctl_tmp_t, { file dir lnk_file })
++can_exec(kdumpctl_t, kdumpctl_tmp_t)
+
+read_files_pattern(kdumpctl_t, kdump_etc_t, kdump_etc_t)
+
@@ -26492,6 +28879,7 @@ index b29d8e2..c1b4a64 100644
+files_getattr_all_dirs(kdumpctl_t)
+
+fs_getattr_all_fs(kdumpctl_t)
++fs_search_all(kdumpctl_t)
+
+application_executable_ioctl(kdumpctl_t)
+
@@ -26499,12 +28887,13 @@ index b29d8e2..c1b4a64 100644
+
+init_exec(kdumpctl_t)
+systemd_exec_systemctl(kdumpctl_t)
++systemd_read_unit_files(kdumpctl_t)
+
+libs_exec_ld_so(kdumpctl_t)
+
+logging_send_syslog_msg(kdumpctl_t)
-+
-+miscfiles_read_localization(kdumpctl_t)
++# Need log file from /var/log/dracut.log
++logging_write_generic_logs(kdumpctl_t)
+
+optional_policy(`
+ gpg_exec(kdumpctl_t)
@@ -26531,11 +28920,39 @@ index b29d8e2..c1b4a64 100644
+optional_policy(`
+ unconfined_domain(kdumpctl_t)
+')
+diff --git a/kdumpgui.if b/kdumpgui.if
+index d6af9b0..8b1d9c2 100644
+--- a/kdumpgui.if
++++ b/kdumpgui.if
+@@ -1,2 +1,23 @@
+ ## <summary>system-config-kdump GUI</summary>
+
++########################################
++## <summary>
++## Send and receive messages from
++## kdumpgui over dbus.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`kdumpgui_dbus_chat',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type kdumpgui_t;
++ class dbus send_msg;
++ ')
++
++ allow $1 kdumpgui_t:dbus send_msg;
++ allow kdumpgui_t $1:dbus send_msg;
++')
++
diff --git a/kdumpgui.te b/kdumpgui.te
-index 0c52f60..38c154f 100644
+index 0c52f60..96f687c 100644
--- a/kdumpgui.te
+++ b/kdumpgui.te
-@@ -7,7 +7,10 @@ policy_module(kdumpgui, 1.1.0)
+@@ -7,25 +7,36 @@ policy_module(kdumpgui, 1.1.0)
type kdumpgui_t;
type kdumpgui_exec_t;
@@ -26547,40 +28964,64 @@ index 0c52f60..38c154f 100644
######################################
#
-@@ -18,6 +21,10 @@ allow kdumpgui_t self:capability { net_admin sys_admin sys_rawio };
+ # system-config-kdump local policy
+ #
+
+-allow kdumpgui_t self:capability { net_admin sys_admin sys_rawio };
++allow kdumpgui_t self:capability { net_admin sys_admin sys_nice sys_rawio };
allow kdumpgui_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms;
allow kdumpgui_t self:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket create_socket_perms;
-
++allow kdumpgui_t self:process { setsched sigkill };
++
+manage_dirs_pattern(kdumpgui_t, kdumpgui_tmp_t, kdumpgui_tmp_t)
+manage_files_pattern(kdumpgui_t, kdumpgui_tmp_t, kdumpgui_tmp_t)
+files_tmp_filetrans(kdumpgui_t, kdumpgui_tmp_t, { dir file })
-+
+
kernel_read_system_state(kdumpgui_t)
kernel_read_network_state(kdumpgui_t)
++kernel_getattr_core_if(kdumpgui_t)
+
+ corecmd_exec_bin(kdumpgui_t)
+ corecmd_exec_shell(kdumpgui_t)
+
+ dev_dontaudit_getattr_all_chr_files(kdumpgui_t)
+ dev_read_sysfs(kdumpgui_t)
++dev_read_urand(kdumpgui_t)
++dev_getattr_all_blk_files(kdumpgui_t)
-@@ -36,6 +43,8 @@ files_manage_etc_runtime_files(kdumpgui_t)
+ files_manage_boot_files(kdumpgui_t)
+ files_manage_boot_symlinks(kdumpgui_t)
+@@ -36,28 +47,52 @@ files_manage_etc_runtime_files(kdumpgui_t)
files_etc_filetrans_etc_runtime(kdumpgui_t, file)
files_read_usr_files(kdumpgui_t)
+fs_read_dos_files(kdumpgui_t)
++fs_getattr_all_fs(kdumpgui_t)
++fs_list_hugetlbfs(kdumpgui_t)
+
storage_raw_read_fixed_disk(kdumpgui_t)
storage_raw_write_fixed_disk(kdumpgui_t)
++storage_getattr_removable_dev(kdumpgui_t)
-@@ -45,19 +54,36 @@ logging_send_syslog_msg(kdumpgui_t)
+ auth_use_nsswitch(kdumpgui_t)
- miscfiles_read_localization(kdumpgui_t)
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(kdumpgui_t)
++logging_list_logs(kdumpgui_t)
++logging_read_generic_logs(kdumpgui_t)
+-miscfiles_read_localization(kdumpgui_t)
+mount_exec(kdumpgui_t)
-+
- init_dontaudit_read_all_script_files(kdumpgui_t)
+ init_dontaudit_read_all_script_files(kdumpgui_t)
++init_access_check(kdumpgui_t)
++
+userdom_dontaudit_search_admin_dir(kdumpgui_t)
+
+optional_policy(`
+ bootloader_exec(kdumpgui_t)
++ bootloader_rw_config(kdumpgui_t)
+')
-+
+
optional_policy(`
consoletype_exec(kdumpgui_t)
')
@@ -26605,10 +29046,10 @@ index 0c52f60..38c154f 100644
optional_policy(`
diff --git a/kerberos.fc b/kerberos.fc
-index 3525d24..de533f9 100644
+index 3525d24..8c702c9 100644
--- a/kerberos.fc
+++ b/kerberos.fc
-@@ -13,13 +13,13 @@ HOME_DIR/\.k5login -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:krb5_home_t,s0)
+@@ -13,13 +13,14 @@ HOME_DIR/\.k5login -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:krb5_home_t,s0)
/etc/rc\.d/init\.d/krb524d -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:kerberos_initrc_exec_t,s0)
/etc/rc\.d/init\.d/krb5kdc -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:kerberos_initrc_exec_t,s0)
@@ -26618,6 +29059,7 @@ index 3525d24..de533f9 100644
+/usr/(kerberos/)?sbin/kadmind -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:kadmind_exec_t,s0)
/usr/kerberos/sbin/kadmin\.local -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:kadmind_exec_t,s0)
/usr/kerberos/sbin/kpropd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:kpropd_exec_t,s0)
++/usr/sbin/kpropd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:kpropd_exec_t,s0)
-/usr/local/var/krb5kdc(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:krb5kdc_conf_t,s0)
-/usr/local/var/krb5kdc/principal.* gen_context(system_u:object_r:krb5kdc_principal_t,s0)
@@ -26626,7 +29068,7 @@ index 3525d24..de533f9 100644
/var/kerberos/krb5kdc(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:krb5kdc_conf_t,s0)
/var/kerberos/krb5kdc/from_master.* gen_context(system_u:object_r:krb5kdc_lock_t,s0)
-@@ -27,7 +27,15 @@ HOME_DIR/\.k5login -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:krb5_home_t,s0)
+@@ -27,7 +28,17 @@ HOME_DIR/\.k5login -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:krb5_home_t,s0)
/var/kerberos/krb5kdc/principal.* gen_context(system_u:object_r:krb5kdc_principal_t,s0)
/var/kerberos/krb5kdc/principal.*\.ok gen_context(system_u:object_r:krb5kdc_lock_t,s0)
@@ -26634,23 +29076,27 @@ index 3525d24..de533f9 100644
-/var/log/kadmin(d)?\.log gen_context(system_u:object_r:kadmind_log_t,s0)
+/var/log/krb5kdc\.log.* gen_context(system_u:object_r:krb5kdc_log_t,s0)
+/var/log/kadmin(d)?\.log.* gen_context(system_u:object_r:kadmind_log_t,s0)
-+
-+/var/cache/krb5rcache(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:krb5_host_rcache_t,s0)
++/var/cache/krb5rcache(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:krb5_host_rcache_t,s0)
++
++/var/tmp/DNS_25 -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:krb5_host_rcache_t,s0)
/var/tmp/host_0 -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:krb5_host_rcache_t,s0)
+/var/tmp/HTTP_23 -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:krb5_host_rcache_t,s0)
+/var/tmp/HTTP_48 -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:krb5_host_rcache_t,s0)
-+/var/tmp/nfs_0 -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:krb5_host_rcache_t,s0)
++/var/tmp/imap_0 -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:krb5_host_rcache_t,s0)
++/var/tmp/nfs_0 -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:krb5_host_rcache_t,s0)
+/var/tmp/ldapmap1_0 -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:krb5_host_rcache_t,s0)
+/var/tmp/ldap_487 -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:krb5_host_rcache_t,s0)
+/var/tmp/ldap_55 -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:krb5_host_rcache_t,s0)
diff --git a/kerberos.if b/kerberos.if
-index 604f67b..71b1df2 100644
+index 604f67b..138e1e2 100644
--- a/kerberos.if
+++ b/kerberos.if
-@@ -84,11 +84,10 @@ interface(`kerberos_use',`
+@@ -82,14 +82,11 @@ interface(`kerberos_use',`
+ #kerberos libraries are attempting to set the correct file context
+ dontaudit $1 self:process setfscreate;
selinux_dontaudit_validate_context($1)
- seutil_dontaudit_read_file_contexts($1)
+- seutil_dontaudit_read_file_contexts($1)
- tunable_policy(`allow_kerberos',`
+ tunable_policy(`kerberos_enabled',`
@@ -26658,10 +29104,11 @@ index 604f67b..71b1df2 100644
allow $1 self:udp_socket create_socket_perms;
- corenet_all_recvfrom_unlabeled($1)
- corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel($1)
+- corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel($1)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if($1)
corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if($1)
-@@ -103,11 +102,12 @@ interface(`kerberos_use',`
+ corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_node($1)
+@@ -103,11 +100,12 @@ interface(`kerberos_use',`
corenet_sendrecv_kerberos_client_packets($1)
corenet_sendrecv_ocsp_client_packets($1)
@@ -26676,7 +29123,7 @@ index 604f67b..71b1df2 100644
pcscd_stream_connect($1)
')
')
-@@ -218,6 +218,25 @@ interface(`kerberos_rw_keytab',`
+@@ -218,6 +216,30 @@ interface(`kerberos_rw_keytab',`
########################################
## <summary>
@@ -26687,6 +29134,11 @@ index 604f67b..71b1df2 100644
+## Domain allowed access.
+## </summary>
+## </param>
++## <param name="name" optional="true">
++## <summary>
++## The name of the object being created.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
+#
+interface(`kerberos_etc_filetrans_keytab',`
+ gen_require(`
@@ -26702,7 +29154,21 @@ index 604f67b..71b1df2 100644
## Create a derived type for kerberos keytab
## </summary>
## <param name="prefix">
-@@ -282,42 +301,21 @@ interface(`kerberos_manage_host_rcache',`
+@@ -235,8 +257,13 @@ template(`kerberos_keytab_template',`
+ type $1_keytab_t;
+ files_type($1_keytab_t)
+
++ allow $2 self:process setfscreate;
+ allow $2 $1_keytab_t:file read_file_perms;
+
++ seutil_read_file_contexts($2)
++ seutil_read_config($2)
++ selinux_get_enforce_mode($2)
++
+ kerberos_read_keytab($2)
+ kerberos_use($2)
+ ')
+@@ -282,42 +309,21 @@ interface(`kerberos_manage_host_rcache',`
# does not work in conditionals
domain_obj_id_change_exemption($1)
@@ -26748,7 +29214,7 @@ index 604f67b..71b1df2 100644
## All of the rules required to administrate
## an kerberos environment
## </summary>
-@@ -338,18 +336,22 @@ interface(`kerberos_admin',`
+@@ -338,18 +344,22 @@ interface(`kerberos_admin',`
type kadmind_t, krb5kdc_t, kerberos_initrc_exec_t;
type kadmind_log_t, kadmind_tmp_t, kadmind_var_run_t;
type krb5_conf_t, krb5_keytab_t, krb5kdc_conf_t;
@@ -26776,7 +29242,7 @@ index 604f67b..71b1df2 100644
ps_process_pattern($1, kpropd_t)
init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, kerberos_initrc_exec_t)
-@@ -378,3 +380,114 @@ interface(`kerberos_admin',`
+@@ -378,3 +388,121 @@ interface(`kerberos_admin',`
admin_pattern($1, krb5kdc_var_run_t)
')
@@ -26791,6 +29257,11 @@ index 604f67b..71b1df2 100644
+## Domain allowed access.
+## </summary>
+## </param>
++## <param name="name" optional="true">
++## <summary>
++## The name of the object being created.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
+#
+interface(`kerberos_tmp_filetrans_host_rcache',`
+ gen_require(`
@@ -26883,16 +29354,18 @@ index 604f67b..71b1df2 100644
+ kerberos_etc_filetrans_keytab($1, "krb5.keytab")
+ kerberos_filetrans_admin_home_content($1)
+
++ kerberos_tmp_filetrans_host_rcache($1, "DNS_25")
+ kerberos_tmp_filetrans_host_rcache($1, "host_0")
+ kerberos_tmp_filetrans_host_rcache($1, "HTTP_23")
+ kerberos_tmp_filetrans_host_rcache($1, "HTTP_48")
++ kerberos_tmp_filetrans_host_rcache($1, "imap_0")
+ kerberos_tmp_filetrans_host_rcache($1, "nfs_0")
+ kerberos_tmp_filetrans_host_rcache($1, "ldapmap1_0")
+ kerberos_tmp_filetrans_host_rcache($1, "ldap_487")
+ kerberos_tmp_filetrans_host_rcache($1, "ldap_55")
+')
diff --git a/kerberos.te b/kerberos.te
-index 6a95faf..9e9473d 100644
+index 6a95faf..6127834 100644
--- a/kerberos.te
+++ b/kerberos.te
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ policy_module(kerberos, 1.11.0)
@@ -26933,36 +29406,42 @@ index 6a95faf..9e9473d 100644
# types for KDC principal file(s)
type krb5kdc_principal_t;
-@@ -80,7 +81,7 @@ files_pid_file(krb5kdc_var_run_t)
+@@ -79,8 +80,9 @@ files_pid_file(krb5kdc_var_run_t)
+
# Use capabilities. Surplus capabilities may be allowed.
allow kadmind_t self:capability { setuid setgid chown fowner dac_override sys_nice };
++allow kadmind_t self:capability2 block_suspend;
dontaudit kadmind_t self:capability sys_tty_config;
-allow kadmind_t self:process { setfscreate signal_perms };
+allow kadmind_t self:process { setfscreate setsched getsched signal_perms };
allow kadmind_t self:netlink_route_socket r_netlink_socket_perms;
allow kadmind_t self:unix_dgram_socket { connect create write };
allow kadmind_t self:tcp_socket connected_stream_socket_perms;
-@@ -93,9 +94,9 @@ allow kadmind_t krb5_conf_t:file read_file_perms;
+@@ -92,10 +94,9 @@ logging_log_filetrans(kadmind_t, kadmind_log_t, file)
+ allow kadmind_t krb5_conf_t:file read_file_perms;
dontaudit kadmind_t krb5_conf_t:file write;
- read_files_pattern(kadmind_t, krb5kdc_conf_t, krb5kdc_conf_t)
+-read_files_pattern(kadmind_t, krb5kdc_conf_t, krb5kdc_conf_t)
-dontaudit kadmind_t krb5kdc_conf_t:file { write setattr };
-+dontaudit kadmind_t krb5kdc_conf_t:file { write_file_perms setattr_file_perms };
++manage_files_pattern(kadmind_t, krb5kdc_conf_t, krb5kdc_conf_t)
-allow kadmind_t krb5kdc_lock_t:file { rw_file_perms setattr };
+allow kadmind_t krb5kdc_lock_t:file { rw_file_perms setattr_file_perms };
allow kadmind_t krb5kdc_principal_t:file manage_file_perms;
filetrans_pattern(kadmind_t, krb5kdc_conf_t, krb5kdc_principal_t, file)
-@@ -115,7 +116,6 @@ kernel_read_network_state(kadmind_t)
+@@ -115,7 +116,9 @@ kernel_read_network_state(kadmind_t)
kernel_read_proc_symlinks(kadmind_t)
kernel_read_system_state(kadmind_t)
-corenet_all_recvfrom_unlabeled(kadmind_t)
++corecmd_exec_bin(kadmind_t)
++corecmd_exec_shell(kadmind_t)
++
corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(kadmind_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(kadmind_t)
corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if(kadmind_t)
-@@ -126,10 +126,13 @@ corenet_udp_sendrecv_all_ports(kadmind_t)
+@@ -126,10 +129,14 @@ corenet_udp_sendrecv_all_ports(kadmind_t)
corenet_tcp_bind_generic_node(kadmind_t)
corenet_udp_bind_generic_node(kadmind_t)
corenet_tcp_bind_kerberos_admin_port(kadmind_t)
@@ -26973,18 +29452,30 @@ index 6a95faf..9e9473d 100644
corenet_dontaudit_tcp_bind_all_reserved_ports(kadmind_t)
corenet_sendrecv_kerberos_admin_server_packets(kadmind_t)
+corenet_sendrecv_kerberos_password_server_packets(kadmind_t)
++corenet_tcp_connect_kprop_port(kadmind_t)
dev_read_sysfs(kadmind_t)
dev_read_rand(kadmind_t)
-@@ -149,6 +152,7 @@ selinux_validate_context(kadmind_t)
+@@ -137,6 +144,7 @@ dev_read_urand(kadmind_t)
+
+ fs_getattr_all_fs(kadmind_t)
+ fs_search_auto_mountpoints(kadmind_t)
++fs_rw_anon_inodefs_files(kadmind_t)
+
+ domain_use_interactive_fds(kadmind_t)
+
+@@ -149,8 +157,9 @@ selinux_validate_context(kadmind_t)
logging_send_syslog_msg(kadmind_t)
+-miscfiles_read_localization(kadmind_t)
+miscfiles_read_generic_certs(kadmind_t)
- miscfiles_read_localization(kadmind_t)
++seutil_read_config(kadmind_t)
seutil_read_file_contexts(kadmind_t)
-@@ -164,6 +168,10 @@ optional_policy(`
+
+ sysnet_read_config(kadmind_t)
+@@ -164,10 +173,18 @@ optional_policy(`
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -26995,7 +29486,23 @@ index 6a95faf..9e9473d 100644
nis_use_ypbind(kadmind_t)
')
-@@ -197,13 +205,12 @@ can_exec(krb5kdc_t, krb5kdc_exec_t)
+ optional_policy(`
++ sssd_read_public_files(kadmind_t)
++')
++
++optional_policy(`
+ seutil_sigchld_newrole(kadmind_t)
+ ')
+
+@@ -182,6 +199,7 @@ optional_policy(`
+
+ # Use capabilities. Surplus capabilities may be allowed.
+ allow krb5kdc_t self:capability { setuid setgid net_admin chown fowner dac_override sys_nice };
++allow krb5kdc_t self:capability2 block_suspend;
+ dontaudit krb5kdc_t self:capability sys_tty_config;
+ allow krb5kdc_t self:process { setfscreate setsched getsched signal_perms };
+ allow krb5kdc_t self:netlink_route_socket r_netlink_socket_perms;
+@@ -197,13 +215,12 @@ can_exec(krb5kdc_t, krb5kdc_exec_t)
read_files_pattern(krb5kdc_t, krb5kdc_conf_t, krb5kdc_conf_t)
dontaudit krb5kdc_t krb5kdc_conf_t:file write;
@@ -27011,7 +29518,7 @@ index 6a95faf..9e9473d 100644
manage_dirs_pattern(krb5kdc_t, krb5kdc_tmp_t, krb5kdc_tmp_t)
manage_files_pattern(krb5kdc_t, krb5kdc_tmp_t, krb5kdc_tmp_t)
-@@ -221,7 +228,6 @@ kernel_search_network_sysctl(krb5kdc_t)
+@@ -221,7 +238,6 @@ kernel_search_network_sysctl(krb5kdc_t)
corecmd_exec_bin(krb5kdc_t)
@@ -27019,15 +29526,24 @@ index 6a95faf..9e9473d 100644
corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(krb5kdc_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(krb5kdc_t)
corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if(krb5kdc_t)
-@@ -253,6 +259,7 @@ selinux_validate_context(krb5kdc_t)
+@@ -242,6 +258,7 @@ dev_read_urand(krb5kdc_t)
+
+ fs_getattr_all_fs(krb5kdc_t)
+ fs_search_auto_mountpoints(krb5kdc_t)
++fs_rw_anon_inodefs_files(krb5kdc_t)
+
+ domain_use_interactive_fds(krb5kdc_t)
+
+@@ -253,7 +270,7 @@ selinux_validate_context(krb5kdc_t)
logging_send_syslog_msg(krb5kdc_t)
+-miscfiles_read_localization(krb5kdc_t)
+miscfiles_read_generic_certs(krb5kdc_t)
- miscfiles_read_localization(krb5kdc_t)
seutil_read_file_contexts(krb5kdc_t)
-@@ -268,6 +275,10 @@ optional_policy(`
+
+@@ -268,6 +285,10 @@ optional_policy(`
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -27038,7 +29554,18 @@ index 6a95faf..9e9473d 100644
nis_use_ypbind(krb5kdc_t)
')
-@@ -308,7 +319,6 @@ files_tmp_filetrans(kpropd_t, krb5kdc_tmp_t, { file dir })
+@@ -276,6 +297,10 @@ optional_policy(`
+ ')
+
+ optional_policy(`
++ sssd_read_public_files(krb5kdc_t)
++')
++
++optional_policy(`
+ udev_read_db(krb5kdc_t)
+ ')
+
+@@ -308,7 +333,6 @@ files_tmp_filetrans(kpropd_t, krb5kdc_tmp_t, { file dir })
corecmd_exec_bin(kpropd_t)
@@ -27046,17 +29573,27 @@ index 6a95faf..9e9473d 100644
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(kpropd_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_node(kpropd_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_ports(kpropd_t)
+@@ -324,8 +348,6 @@ selinux_validate_context(kpropd_t)
+
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(kpropd_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(kpropd_t)
+-
+ seutil_read_file_contexts(kpropd_t)
+
+ sysnet_dns_name_resolve(kpropd_t)
diff --git a/kerneloops.if b/kerneloops.if
-index 835b16b..8a98c76 100644
+index 835b16b..5992eb1 100644
--- a/kerneloops.if
+++ b/kerneloops.if
-@@ -99,17 +99,20 @@ interface(`kerneloops_manage_tmp_files',`
+@@ -99,17 +99,21 @@ interface(`kerneloops_manage_tmp_files',`
#
interface(`kerneloops_admin',`
gen_require(`
- type kerneloops_t, kerneloops_initrc_exec_t;
- type kerneloops_tmp_t;
+ type kerneloops_t, kerneloops_initrc_exec_t, kerneloops_tmp_t;
++ type kerneloops_initrc_exec_t;
')
- allow $1 kerneloops_t:process { ptrace signal_perms };
@@ -27075,7 +29612,7 @@ index 835b16b..8a98c76 100644
admin_pattern($1, kerneloops_tmp_t)
')
diff --git a/kerneloops.te b/kerneloops.te
-index 6b35547..c52c60a 100644
+index 6b35547..5c641b9 100644
--- a/kerneloops.te
+++ b/kerneloops.te
@@ -32,7 +32,6 @@ kernel_read_ring_buffer(kerneloops_t)
@@ -27086,7 +29623,7 @@ index 6b35547..c52c60a 100644
corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(kerneloops_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(kerneloops_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_node(kerneloops_t)
-@@ -40,7 +39,6 @@ corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_ports(kerneloops_t)
+@@ -40,15 +39,12 @@ corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_ports(kerneloops_t)
corenet_tcp_bind_http_port(kerneloops_t)
corenet_tcp_connect_http_port(kerneloops_t)
@@ -27094,6 +29631,14 @@ index 6b35547..c52c60a 100644
auth_use_nsswitch(kerneloops_t)
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(kerneloops_t)
+ logging_read_generic_logs(kerneloops_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(kerneloops_t)
+-
+ optional_policy(`
+ dbus_system_domain(kerneloops_t, kerneloops_exec_t)
+ ')
diff --git a/keyboardd.fc b/keyboardd.fc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..485aacc
@@ -27149,10 +29694,10 @@ index 0000000..6134ef2
+')
diff --git a/keyboardd.te b/keyboardd.te
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..21e49e3
+index 0000000..081ae84
--- /dev/null
+++ b/keyboardd.te
-@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+
+policy_module(keyboardd, 1.0.0)
+
@@ -27178,7 +29723,6 @@ index 0000000..21e49e3
+
+files_read_etc_files(keyboardd_t)
+
-+miscfiles_read_localization(keyboardd_t)
diff --git a/keystone.fc b/keystone.fc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..408d6c0
@@ -27418,10 +29962,10 @@ index 0000000..f20248c
+')
diff --git a/keystone.te b/keystone.te
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..1b3d4d9
+index 0000000..a6606f3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/keystone.te
-@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
+policy_module(keystone, 1.0.0)
+
+########################################
@@ -27486,7 +30030,6 @@ index 0000000..1b3d4d9
+
+libs_exec_ldconfig(keystone_t)
+
-+miscfiles_read_localization(keystone_t)
+
+optional_policy(`
+ mysql_stream_connect(keystone_t)
@@ -27508,10 +30051,10 @@ index c18c920..582f7f3 100644
kismet_manage_pid_files($1)
kismet_manage_lib($1)
diff --git a/kismet.te b/kismet.te
-index 9dd6880..ba8021c 100644
+index 9dd6880..77c768b 100644
--- a/kismet.te
+++ b/kismet.te
-@@ -74,24 +74,22 @@ kernel_read_network_state(kismet_t)
+@@ -74,24 +74,21 @@ kernel_read_network_state(kismet_t)
corecmd_exec_bin(kismet_t)
@@ -27532,7 +30075,7 @@ index 9dd6880..ba8021c 100644
-files_read_etc_files(kismet_t)
files_read_usr_files(kismet_t)
- miscfiles_read_localization(kismet_t)
+-miscfiles_read_localization(kismet_t)
-userdom_use_user_terminals(kismet_t)
+userdom_use_inherited_user_terminals(kismet_t)
@@ -27573,7 +30116,7 @@ index 6fd0b4c..568f842 100644
files_list_pids($1)
admin_pattern($1, ksmtuned_var_run_t)
diff --git a/ksmtuned.te b/ksmtuned.te
-index a73b7a1..9707887 100644
+index a73b7a1..d143b12 100644
--- a/ksmtuned.te
+++ b/ksmtuned.te
@@ -9,6 +9,9 @@ type ksmtuned_t;
@@ -27601,7 +30144,7 @@ index a73b7a1..9707887 100644
manage_files_pattern(ksmtuned_t, ksmtuned_var_run_t, ksmtuned_var_run_t)
files_pid_filetrans(ksmtuned_t, ksmtuned_var_run_t, file)
-@@ -31,9 +38,18 @@ kernel_read_system_state(ksmtuned_t)
+@@ -31,9 +38,16 @@ kernel_read_system_state(ksmtuned_t)
dev_rw_sysfs(ksmtuned_t)
domain_read_all_domains_state(ksmtuned_t)
@@ -27614,15 +30157,14 @@ index a73b7a1..9707887 100644
+mls_file_read_to_clearance(ksmtuned_t)
+
+term_use_all_inherited_terms(ksmtuned_t)
-+
-+auth_use_nsswitch(ksmtuned_t)
-files_read_etc_files(ksmtuned_t)
-+logging_send_syslog_msg(ksmtuned_t)
++auth_use_nsswitch(ksmtuned_t)
- miscfiles_read_localization(ksmtuned_t)
+-miscfiles_read_localization(ksmtuned_t)
++logging_send_syslog_msg(ksmtuned_t)
diff --git a/ktalk.te b/ktalk.te
-index ca5cfdf..76d60be 100644
+index ca5cfdf..a4457d0 100644
--- a/ktalk.te
+++ b/ktalk.te
@@ -52,7 +52,6 @@ kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(ktalkd_t)
@@ -27633,7 +30175,7 @@ index ca5cfdf..76d60be 100644
corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(ktalkd_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(ktalkd_t)
corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if(ktalkd_t)
-@@ -65,10 +64,9 @@ dev_read_urand(ktalkd_t)
+@@ -65,15 +64,12 @@ dev_read_urand(ktalkd_t)
fs_getattr_xattr_fs(ktalkd_t)
@@ -27645,6 +30187,11 @@ index ca5cfdf..76d60be 100644
auth_use_nsswitch(ktalkd_t)
+ init_read_utmp(ktalkd_t)
+
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(ktalkd_t)
+-
+-miscfiles_read_localization(ktalkd_t)
diff --git a/kudzu.fc b/kudzu.fc
index dd88f74..3317a0c 100644
--- a/kudzu.fc
@@ -27656,7 +30203,7 @@ index dd88f74..3317a0c 100644
+/usr/sbin/kmodule -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:kudzu_exec_t,s0)
/usr/sbin/kudzu -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:kudzu_exec_t,s0)
diff --git a/kudzu.te b/kudzu.te
-index 4f7bd3c..481fbc0 100644
+index 4f7bd3c..74cc11d 100644
--- a/kudzu.te
+++ b/kudzu.te
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ files_pid_file(kudzu_var_run_t)
@@ -27668,16 +30215,18 @@ index 4f7bd3c..481fbc0 100644
dontaudit kudzu_t self:capability sys_tty_config;
allow kudzu_t self:process { signal_perms execmem };
allow kudzu_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms;
-@@ -111,15 +111,9 @@ logging_send_syslog_msg(kudzu_t)
- miscfiles_read_hwdata(kudzu_t)
- miscfiles_read_localization(kudzu_t)
+@@ -109,17 +109,10 @@ libs_read_lib_files(kudzu_t)
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(kudzu_t)
+ miscfiles_read_hwdata(kudzu_t)
+-miscfiles_read_localization(kudzu_t)
+-
-modutils_read_module_config(kudzu_t)
-modutils_read_module_deps(kudzu_t)
-modutils_rename_module_config(kudzu_t)
-modutils_delete_module_config(kudzu_t)
-modutils_domtrans_insmod(kudzu_t)
--
+
sysnet_read_config(kudzu_t)
-userdom_use_user_terminals(kudzu_t)
@@ -27685,7 +30234,7 @@ index 4f7bd3c..481fbc0 100644
userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fds(kudzu_t)
userdom_search_user_home_dirs(kudzu_t)
-@@ -128,6 +122,14 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -128,6 +121,14 @@ optional_policy(`
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -27910,10 +30459,10 @@ index 0000000..562d25b
+')
diff --git a/l2tpd.te b/l2tpd.te
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..20d7de2
+index 0000000..1e292d4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/l2tpd.te
-@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
+@@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
+policy_module(l2tpd, 1.0.0)
+
+########################################
@@ -27989,6 +30538,7 @@ index 0000000..20d7de2
+
+term_use_ptmx(l2tpd_t)
+term_use_generic_ptys(l2tpd_t)
++term_setattr_generic_ptys(l2tpd_t)
+
+# prol2tpc
+corecmd_exec_bin(l2tpd_t)
@@ -28005,8 +30555,6 @@ index 0000000..20d7de2
+
+logging_send_syslog_msg(l2tpd_t)
+
-+miscfiles_read_localization(l2tpd_t)
-+
+sysnet_dns_name_resolve(l2tpd_t)
+
+optional_policy(`
@@ -28015,13 +30563,14 @@ index 0000000..20d7de2
+ ppp_kill(l2tpd_t)
+')
diff --git a/ldap.fc b/ldap.fc
-index c62f23e..04b74f0 100644
+index c62f23e..40c6b4d 100644
--- a/ldap.fc
+++ b/ldap.fc
-@@ -1,6 +1,10 @@
+@@ -1,6 +1,11 @@
/etc/ldap/slapd\.conf -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:slapd_etc_t,s0)
-/etc/rc\.d/init\.d/ldap -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:slapd_initrc_exec_t,s0)
++/etc/openldap/certs(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:slapd_cert_t,s0)
+/etc/openldap/slapd\.d(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:slapd_db_t,s0)
+
+/etc/rc\.d/init\.d/slapd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:slapd_initrc_exec_t,s0)
@@ -28159,7 +30708,7 @@ index d6b7b2d..bc0ccb3 100644
+ allow $1 ldap_unit_file_t:service all_service_perms;
')
diff --git a/ldap.te b/ldap.te
-index 64fd1ff..5e4a8db 100644
+index 64fd1ff..3ee778a 100644
--- a/ldap.te
+++ b/ldap.te
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ type slapd_exec_t;
@@ -28224,7 +30773,7 @@ index 64fd1ff..5e4a8db 100644
corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(slapd_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(slapd_t)
corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if(slapd_t)
-@@ -100,12 +116,12 @@ fs_search_auto_mountpoints(slapd_t)
+@@ -100,23 +116,25 @@ fs_search_auto_mountpoints(slapd_t)
domain_use_interactive_fds(slapd_t)
@@ -28238,7 +30787,11 @@ index 64fd1ff..5e4a8db 100644
logging_send_syslog_msg(slapd_t)
-@@ -117,6 +133,9 @@ userdom_dontaudit_search_user_home_dirs(slapd_t)
+ miscfiles_read_generic_certs(slapd_t)
+-miscfiles_read_localization(slapd_t)
+
+ userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fds(slapd_t)
+ userdom_dontaudit_search_user_home_dirs(slapd_t)
optional_policy(`
kerberos_keytab_template(slapd, slapd_t)
@@ -28263,7 +30816,7 @@ index 057a4e4..57491fc 100644
/var/lib/likewise-open/\.lwiod -s gen_context(system_u:object_r:lwiod_var_socket_t,s0)
/var/lib/likewise-open/\.regsd -s gen_context(system_u:object_r:lwregd_var_socket_t,s0)
diff --git a/likewise.if b/likewise.if
-index 771e04b..81d98b3 100644
+index 771e04b..1072aea 100644
--- a/likewise.if
+++ b/likewise.if
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ template(`likewise_domain_template',`
@@ -28275,6 +30828,14 @@ index 771e04b..81d98b3 100644
manage_files_pattern($1_t, $1_var_run_t, $1_var_run_t)
files_pid_filetrans($1_t, $1_var_run_t, file)
+@@ -82,7 +82,6 @@ template(`likewise_domain_template',`
+
+ logging_send_syslog_msg($1_t)
+
+- miscfiles_read_localization($1_t)
+ ')
+
+ ########################################
diff --git a/likewise.te b/likewise.te
index 5ba6cc2..e3f65d6 100644
--- a/likewise.te
@@ -28367,7 +30928,7 @@ index 418cc81..cdb2561 100644
init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, lircd_initrc_exec_t)
domain_system_change_exemption($1)
diff --git a/lircd.te b/lircd.te
-index 6a78de1..8db7d14 100644
+index 6a78de1..57f0aa2 100644
--- a/lircd.te
+++ b/lircd.te
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ type lircd_initrc_exec_t;
@@ -28387,7 +30948,15 @@ index 6a78de1..8db7d14 100644
allow lircd_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms;
allow lircd_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms;
allow lircd_t self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
-@@ -44,18 +45,20 @@ corenet_tcp_bind_lirc_port(lircd_t)
+@@ -38,27 +39,29 @@ files_pid_filetrans(lircd_t, lircd_var_run_t, { dir file })
+ # /dev/lircd socket
+ dev_filetrans(lircd_t, lircd_var_run_t, sock_file)
+
++kernel_request_load_module(lircd_t)
++
+ corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(lircd_t)
+ corenet_tcp_bind_generic_node(lircd_t)
+ corenet_tcp_bind_lirc_port(lircd_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_ports(lircd_t)
corenet_tcp_connect_lirc_port(lircd_t)
@@ -28410,6 +30979,9 @@ index 6a78de1..8db7d14 100644
logging_send_syslog_msg(lircd_t)
+-miscfiles_read_localization(lircd_t)
+-
+ sysnet_dns_name_resolve(lircd_t)
diff --git a/livecd.if b/livecd.if
index ae29d9f..fb7869e 100644
--- a/livecd.if
@@ -28457,7 +31029,7 @@ index ae29d9f..fb7869e 100644
########################################
diff --git a/livecd.te b/livecd.te
-index 008f718..7a944b5 100644
+index 008f718..2a9d6c0 100644
--- a/livecd.te
+++ b/livecd.te
@@ -5,13 +5,14 @@ policy_module(livecd, 1.2.0)
@@ -28478,37 +31050,30 @@ index 008f718..7a944b5 100644
type livecd_tmp_t;
files_tmp_file(livecd_tmp_t)
-@@ -29,15 +30,27 @@ manage_dirs_pattern(livecd_t, livecd_tmp_t, livecd_tmp_t)
- manage_files_pattern(livecd_t, livecd_tmp_t, livecd_tmp_t)
+@@ -21,7 +22,7 @@ files_tmp_file(livecd_tmp_t)
+ # livecd local policy
+ #
+
+-dontaudit livecd_t self:capability2 mac_admin;
++allow livecd_t self:capability2 mac_admin;
+
+ domain_ptrace_all_domains(livecd_t)
+
+@@ -30,14 +31,5 @@ manage_files_pattern(livecd_t, livecd_tmp_t, livecd_tmp_t)
files_tmp_filetrans(livecd_t, livecd_tmp_t, { dir file })
-+dev_filetrans_all_named_dev(livecd_t)
-+storage_filetrans_all_named_dev(livecd_t)
-+term_filetrans_all_named_dev(livecd_t)
-+
-+sysnet_filetrans_named_content(livecd_t)
-+
-+#optional_policy(`
-+# mount_run(livecd_t, livecd_roles)
-+# seutil_run_setfiles_mac(livecd_t, livecd_roles)
-+#')
-+
optional_policy(`
- mount_run(livecd_t, livecd_roles)
-+ ssh_filetrans_admin_home_content(livecd_t)
- ')
-
- optional_policy(`
-- hal_dbus_chat(livecd_t)
+ unconfined_domain_noaudit(livecd_t)
')
-
- optional_policy(`
+-
+-optional_policy(`
+- hal_dbus_chat(livecd_t)
+-')
+-
+-optional_policy(`
- unconfined_domain(livecd_t)
-+ # Allow SELinux aware applications to request rpm_script execution
-+ rpm_transition_script(livecd_t)
-+ rpm_domtrans(livecd_t)
- ')
+-')
-
diff --git a/lldpad.fc b/lldpad.fc
new file mode 100644
@@ -28733,10 +31298,10 @@ index 0000000..6550968
+
diff --git a/lldpad.te b/lldpad.te
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..b7f4268
+index 0000000..c38f564
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lldpad.te
-@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
+@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+policy_module(lldpad, 1.0.0)
+
+########################################
@@ -28802,8 +31367,6 @@ index 0000000..b7f4268
+
+logging_send_syslog_msg(lldpad_t)
+
-+miscfiles_read_localization(lldpad_t)
-+
+userdom_dgram_send(lldpad_t)
+
+optional_policy(`
@@ -28820,10 +31383,10 @@ index 8549f9f..68be454 100644
+/usr/bin/loadkeys -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:loadkeys_exec_t,s0)
+/usr/bin/unikeys -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:loadkeys_exec_t,s0)
diff --git a/loadkeys.te b/loadkeys.te
-index 2523758..09669b6 100644
+index 2523758..96308b5 100644
--- a/loadkeys.te
+++ b/loadkeys.te
-@@ -31,6 +31,8 @@ files_read_etc_runtime_files(loadkeys_t)
+@@ -31,14 +31,15 @@ files_read_etc_runtime_files(loadkeys_t)
term_dontaudit_use_console(loadkeys_t)
term_use_unallocated_ttys(loadkeys_t)
@@ -28832,16 +31395,16 @@ index 2523758..09669b6 100644
init_dontaudit_use_fds(loadkeys_t)
init_dontaudit_use_script_ptys(loadkeys_t)
-@@ -38,7 +40,7 @@ locallogin_use_fds(loadkeys_t)
+ locallogin_use_fds(loadkeys_t)
- miscfiles_read_localization(loadkeys_t)
+-miscfiles_read_localization(loadkeys_t)
-userdom_use_user_ttys(loadkeys_t)
+userdom_use_inherited_user_ttys(loadkeys_t)
userdom_list_user_home_content(loadkeys_t)
ifdef(`hide_broken_symptoms',`
-@@ -46,5 +48,9 @@ ifdef(`hide_broken_symptoms',`
+@@ -46,5 +47,9 @@ ifdef(`hide_broken_symptoms',`
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -28863,7 +31426,7 @@ index 572b5db..1e55f43 100644
+userdom_use_inherited_user_terminals(lockdev_t)
+
diff --git a/logrotate.te b/logrotate.te
-index 7090dae..ea589dd 100644
+index 7090dae..9f51d10 100644
--- a/logrotate.te
+++ b/logrotate.te
@@ -29,9 +29,7 @@ files_type(logrotate_var_lib_t)
@@ -28925,15 +31488,20 @@ index 7090dae..ea589dd 100644
# cjp: why is this needed?
init_domtrans_script(logrotate_t)
-@@ -116,17 +118,18 @@ miscfiles_read_localization(logrotate_t)
-
- seutil_dontaudit_read_config(logrotate_t)
+@@ -112,21 +114,20 @@ logging_send_audit_msgs(logrotate_t)
+ # cjp: why is this needed?
+ logging_exec_all_logs(logrotate_t)
--userdom_use_user_terminals(logrotate_t)
+-miscfiles_read_localization(logrotate_t)
+systemd_exec_systemctl(logrotate_t)
+systemd_getattr_unit_files(logrotate_t)
++systemd_start_all_unit_files(logrotate_t)
++systemd_reload_all_services(logrotate_t)
+init_stream_connect(logrotate_t)
-+
+
+-seutil_dontaudit_read_config(logrotate_t)
+-
+-userdom_use_user_terminals(logrotate_t)
+userdom_use_inherited_user_terminals(logrotate_t)
userdom_list_user_home_dirs(logrotate_t)
userdom_use_unpriv_users_fds(logrotate_t)
@@ -28942,7 +31510,7 @@ index 7090dae..ea589dd 100644
-cron_search_spool(logrotate_t)
-
-mta_send_mail(logrotate_t)
-+userdom_dontaudit_list_admin_dir(logrotate_t)
++userdom_list_admin_dir(logrotate_t)
+userdom_dontaudit_getattr_user_home_content(logrotate_t)
ifdef(`distro_debian', `
@@ -28951,7 +31519,7 @@ index 7090dae..ea589dd 100644
# for savelog
can_exec(logrotate_t, logrotate_exec_t)
-@@ -138,7 +141,7 @@ ifdef(`distro_debian', `
+@@ -138,7 +139,7 @@ ifdef(`distro_debian', `
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -28960,7 +31528,7 @@ index 7090dae..ea589dd 100644
')
optional_policy(`
-@@ -154,6 +157,10 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -154,6 +155,10 @@ optional_policy(`
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -28971,7 +31539,7 @@ index 7090dae..ea589dd 100644
asterisk_domtrans(logrotate_t)
')
-@@ -162,10 +169,20 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -162,10 +167,20 @@ optional_policy(`
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -28992,7 +31560,7 @@ index 7090dae..ea589dd 100644
cups_domtrans(logrotate_t)
')
-@@ -178,6 +195,10 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -178,6 +193,10 @@ optional_policy(`
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -29003,7 +31571,7 @@ index 7090dae..ea589dd 100644
icecast_signal(logrotate_t)
')
-@@ -194,15 +215,19 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -194,15 +213,19 @@ optional_policy(`
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -29024,7 +31592,19 @@ index 7090dae..ea589dd 100644
optional_policy(`
samba_exec_log(logrotate_t)
-@@ -228,3 +253,14 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -217,6 +240,11 @@ optional_policy(`
+ ')
+
+ optional_policy(`
++ openvswitch_read_pid_files(logrotate_t)
++ openvswitch_domtrans(logrotate_t)
++')
++
++optional_policy(`
+ squid_domtrans(logrotate_t)
+ ')
+
+@@ -228,3 +256,14 @@ optional_policy(`
optional_policy(`
varnishd_manage_log(logrotate_t)
')
@@ -29056,7 +31636,7 @@ index 3c7b1e8..1e155f5 100644
+
+/var/run/epylog\.pid gen_context(system_u:object_r:logwatch_var_run_t,s0)
diff --git a/logwatch.te b/logwatch.te
-index 75ce30f..7f05283 100644
+index 75ce30f..061b725 100644
--- a/logwatch.te
+++ b/logwatch.te
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ policy_module(logwatch, 1.11.0)
@@ -29100,7 +31680,11 @@ index 75ce30f..7f05283 100644
files_read_usr_files(logwatch_t)
files_search_spool(logwatch_t)
files_search_mnt(logwatch_t)
-@@ -70,6 +80,10 @@ fs_getattr_all_fs(logwatch_t)
+@@ -67,9 +77,14 @@ files_dontaudit_search_boot(logwatch_t)
+ files_dontaudit_search_all_dirs(logwatch_t)
+
+ fs_getattr_all_fs(logwatch_t)
++fs_getattr_all_dirs(logwatch_t)
fs_dontaudit_list_auto_mountpoints(logwatch_t)
fs_list_inotifyfs(logwatch_t)
@@ -29111,8 +31695,12 @@ index 75ce30f..7f05283 100644
term_dontaudit_getattr_pty_dirs(logwatch_t)
term_dontaudit_list_ptys(logwatch_t)
-@@ -88,15 +102,17 @@ miscfiles_read_localization(logwatch_t)
+@@ -84,19 +99,19 @@ libs_read_lib_files(logwatch_t)
+ logging_read_all_logs(logwatch_t)
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(logwatch_t)
+-miscfiles_read_localization(logwatch_t)
+-
selinux_dontaudit_getattr_dir(logwatch_t)
-sysnet_dns_name_resolve(logwatch_t)
@@ -29131,7 +31719,7 @@ index 75ce30f..7f05283 100644
files_getattr_all_file_type_fs(logwatch_t)
')
-@@ -145,3 +161,24 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -145,3 +160,24 @@ optional_policy(`
samba_read_log(logwatch_t)
samba_read_share_files(logwatch_t)
')
@@ -29250,7 +31838,7 @@ index a4f32f5..628b63c 100644
## in the caller domain.
## </summary>
diff --git a/lpd.te b/lpd.te
-index a03b63a..bffcbdb 100644
+index a03b63a..99e8d96 100644
--- a/lpd.te
+++ b/lpd.te
@@ -45,14 +45,14 @@ userdom_user_tmp_file(lpr_tmp_t)
@@ -29321,7 +31909,7 @@ index a03b63a..bffcbdb 100644
corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(lpd_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(lpd_t)
corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if(lpd_t)
-@@ -197,7 +195,6 @@ files_list_var_lib(lpd_t)
+@@ -197,12 +195,10 @@ files_list_var_lib(lpd_t)
files_read_var_lib_files(lpd_t)
files_read_var_lib_symlinks(lpd_t)
# config files for lpd are of type etc_t, probably should change this
@@ -29329,7 +31917,12 @@ index a03b63a..bffcbdb 100644
logging_send_syslog_msg(lpd_t)
-@@ -236,9 +233,9 @@ can_exec(lpr_t, lpr_exec_t)
+ miscfiles_read_fonts(lpd_t)
+-miscfiles_read_localization(lpd_t)
+
+ sysnet_read_config(lpd_t)
+
+@@ -236,9 +232,9 @@ can_exec(lpr_t, lpr_exec_t)
# Allow lpd to read, rename, and unlink spool files.
allow lpd_t print_spool_t:file { read_file_perms rename_file_perms delete_file_perms };
@@ -29340,7 +31933,7 @@ index a03b63a..bffcbdb 100644
corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(lpr_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(lpr_t)
corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if(lpr_t)
-@@ -256,7 +253,6 @@ domain_use_interactive_fds(lpr_t)
+@@ -256,7 +252,6 @@ domain_use_interactive_fds(lpr_t)
files_search_spool(lpr_t)
# for lpd config files (should have a new type)
@@ -29348,7 +31941,12 @@ index a03b63a..bffcbdb 100644
# for test print
files_read_usr_files(lpr_t)
#Added to cover read_content macro
-@@ -275,19 +271,21 @@ miscfiles_read_localization(lpr_t)
+@@ -271,23 +266,25 @@ term_use_generic_ptys(lpr_t)
+
+ auth_use_nsswitch(lpr_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(lpr_t)
++miscfiles_read_fonts(lpr_t)
userdom_read_user_tmp_symlinks(lpr_t)
# Write to the user domain tty.
@@ -29375,7 +31973,7 @@ index a03b63a..bffcbdb 100644
# Send SIGHUP to lpd.
allow lpr_t lpd_t:process signal;
-@@ -305,17 +303,7 @@ tunable_policy(`use_lpd_server',`
+@@ -305,17 +302,7 @@ tunable_policy(`use_lpd_server',`
read_lnk_files_pattern(lpr_t, printconf_t, printconf_t)
')
@@ -29394,7 +31992,7 @@ index a03b63a..bffcbdb 100644
optional_policy(`
cups_read_config(lpr_t)
-@@ -324,5 +312,13 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -324,5 +311,13 @@ optional_policy(`
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -29454,7 +32052,7 @@ index 1083f98..c7daa85 100644
+/var/spool/mailman.* gen_context(system_u:object_r:mailman_data_t,s0)
')
diff --git a/mailman.if b/mailman.if
-index 67c7fdd..20fded2 100644
+index 67c7fdd..2f226de 100644
--- a/mailman.if
+++ b/mailman.if
@@ -54,7 +54,6 @@ template(`mailman_domain_template', `
@@ -29474,7 +32072,15 @@ index 67c7fdd..20fded2 100644
files_list_var(mailman_$1_t)
files_list_var_lib(mailman_$1_t)
files_read_var_lib_symlinks(mailman_$1_t)
-@@ -108,6 +107,31 @@ interface(`mailman_domtrans',`
+@@ -87,7 +86,6 @@ template(`mailman_domain_template', `
+
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(mailman_$1_t)
+
+- miscfiles_read_localization(mailman_$1_t)
+ ')
+
+ #######################################
+@@ -108,6 +106,31 @@ interface(`mailman_domtrans',`
domtrans_pattern($1, mailman_mail_exec_t, mailman_mail_t)
')
@@ -29507,7 +32113,7 @@ index 67c7fdd..20fded2 100644
## <summary>
## Execute mailman CGI scripts in the
diff --git a/mailman.te b/mailman.te
-index 22265f0..ad18986 100644
+index 22265f0..da52800 100644
--- a/mailman.te
+++ b/mailman.te
@@ -19,6 +19,9 @@ logging_log_file(mailman_log_t)
@@ -29520,7 +32126,26 @@ index 22265f0..ad18986 100644
mailman_domain_template(mail)
init_daemon_domain(mailman_mail_t, mailman_mail_exec_t)
-@@ -69,6 +72,16 @@ manage_dirs_pattern(mailman_mail_t, mailman_archive_t, mailman_archive_t)
+@@ -54,6 +57,9 @@ optional_policy(`
+ apache_search_sys_script_state(mailman_cgi_t)
+ apache_read_config(mailman_cgi_t)
+ apache_dontaudit_rw_stream_sockets(mailman_cgi_t)
++
++ postfix_read_config(mailman_cgi_t)
++
+ ')
+
+ ########################################
+@@ -62,13 +68,23 @@ optional_policy(`
+ #
+
+ allow mailman_mail_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms;
+-allow mailman_mail_t self:process { signal signull };
+-allow mailman_mail_t self:capability { kill dac_override setuid setgid sys_tty_config };
++allow mailman_mail_t self:process { setsched signal signull };
++allow mailman_mail_t self:capability { kill dac_override setuid setgid sys_nice sys_tty_config };
+
+ manage_dirs_pattern(mailman_mail_t, mailman_archive_t, mailman_archive_t)
manage_files_pattern(mailman_mail_t, mailman_archive_t, mailman_archive_t)
manage_lnk_files_pattern(mailman_mail_t, mailman_archive_t, mailman_archive_t)
@@ -29537,7 +32162,7 @@ index 22265f0..ad18986 100644
files_search_spool(mailman_mail_t)
fs_rw_anon_inodefs_files(mailman_mail_t)
-@@ -81,11 +94,16 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -81,11 +97,16 @@ optional_policy(`
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -29554,7 +32179,16 @@ index 22265f0..ad18986 100644
')
########################################
-@@ -104,6 +122,8 @@ manage_lnk_files_pattern(mailman_queue_t, mailman_archive_t, mailman_archive_t)
+@@ -94,7 +115,7 @@ optional_policy(`
+ #
+
+ allow mailman_queue_t self:capability { setgid setuid };
+-allow mailman_queue_t self:process signal;
++allow mailman_queue_t self:process { setsched signal_perms };
+ allow mailman_queue_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms;
+ allow mailman_queue_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms;
+
+@@ -104,13 +125,12 @@ manage_lnk_files_pattern(mailman_queue_t, mailman_archive_t, mailman_archive_t)
kernel_read_proc_symlinks(mailman_queue_t)
@@ -29563,6 +32197,13 @@ index 22265f0..ad18986 100644
auth_domtrans_chk_passwd(mailman_queue_t)
files_dontaudit_search_pids(mailman_queue_t)
+
+-# for su
+-seutil_dontaudit_search_config(mailman_queue_t)
+-
+ # some of the following could probably be changed to dontaudit, someone who
+ # knows mailman well should test this out and send the changes
+ userdom_search_user_home_dirs(mailman_queue_t)
@@ -125,4 +145,4 @@ optional_policy(`
optional_policy(`
@@ -29656,10 +32297,10 @@ index 0000000..bd1d48e
+')
diff --git a/mailscanner.te b/mailscanner.te
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..5b84980
+index 0000000..45f3262
--- /dev/null
+++ b/mailscanner.te
-@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
+@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
+policy_module(mailscanner, 1.0.0)
+
+########################################
@@ -29699,7 +32340,7 @@ index 0000000..5b84980
+
+manage_dirs_pattern(mscan_t, mscan_tmp_t, mscan_tmp_t)
+manage_files_pattern(mscan_t, mscan_tmp_t, mscan_tmp_t)
-+files_tmp_filetrans(mscan_t, mscan_tmp_t, dir)
++files_tmp_filetrans(mscan_t, mscan_tmp_t, { dir file })
+
+can_exec(mscan_t, mscan_exec_t)
+
@@ -29727,8 +32368,6 @@ index 0000000..5b84980
+
+logging_send_syslog_msg(mscan_t)
+
-+miscfiles_read_localization(mscan_t)
-+
+optional_policy(`
+ clamav_domtrans_clamscan(mscan_t)
+ clamav_manage_clamd_pid(mscan_t)
@@ -29893,7 +32532,7 @@ index 0000000..050157a
+')
diff --git a/man2html.te b/man2html.te
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..863c57c
+index 0000000..29b79eb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/man2html.te
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
@@ -29904,8 +32543,6 @@ index 0000000..863c57c
+# Declarations
+#
+
-+apache_content_template(man2html)
-+
+type httpd_man2html_script_cache_t;
+files_type(httpd_man2html_script_cache_t)
+
@@ -29914,141 +32551,61 @@ index 0000000..863c57c
+# httpd_man2html_script local policy
+#
+
-+allow httpd_man2html_script_t self:process { fork };
++optional_policy(`
+
++ apache_content_template(man2html)
+
-+manage_dirs_pattern(httpd_man2html_script_t, httpd_man2html_script_cache_t, httpd_man2html_script_cache_t)
-+manage_files_pattern(httpd_man2html_script_t, httpd_man2html_script_cache_t, httpd_man2html_script_cache_t)
-+manage_lnk_files_pattern(httpd_man2html_script_t, httpd_man2html_script_cache_t, httpd_man2html_script_cache_t)
-+files_var_filetrans(httpd_man2html_script_t, httpd_man2html_script_cache_t, { dir file })
++ allow httpd_man2html_script_t self:process { fork };
+
-+domain_use_interactive_fds(httpd_man2html_script_t)
++ manage_dirs_pattern(httpd_man2html_script_t, httpd_man2html_script_cache_t, httpd_man2html_script_cache_t)
++ manage_files_pattern(httpd_man2html_script_t, httpd_man2html_script_cache_t, httpd_man2html_script_cache_t)
++ manage_lnk_files_pattern(httpd_man2html_script_t, httpd_man2html_script_cache_t, httpd_man2html_script_cache_t)
++ files_var_filetrans(httpd_man2html_script_t, httpd_man2html_script_cache_t, { dir file })
+
-+files_read_etc_files(httpd_man2html_script_t)
++ domain_use_interactive_fds(httpd_man2html_script_t)
+
-+miscfiles_read_localization(httpd_man2html_script_t)
-diff --git a/matahari.fc b/matahari.fc
++ files_read_etc_files(httpd_man2html_script_t)
++')
+diff --git a/mandb.fc b/mandb.fc
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..515def0
+index 0000000..75b9968
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/matahari.fc
-@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
-+/etc/rc\.d/init\.d/matahari-host -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:matahari_initrc_exec_t,s0)
-+/etc/rc\.d/init\.d/matahari-net -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:matahari_initrc_exec_t,s0)
-+/etc/rc\.d/init\.d/matahari-service -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:matahari_initrc_exec_t,s0)
-+/etc/rc\.d/init\.d/matahari-sysconfig -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:matahari_initrc_exec_t,s0)
-+/etc/rc\.d/init.d/matahari-sysconfig-console -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:matahari_initrc_exec_t,s0)
-+
-+/usr/lib/systemd/system/matahari-host.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:matahari_hostd_unit_file_t,s0)
-+/usr/lib/systemd/system/matahari-network.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:matahari_netd_unit_file_t,s0)
-+/usr/lib/systemd/system/matahari-rpc.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:matahari_rpcd_unit_file_t,s0)
-+/usr/lib/systemd/system/matahari-service.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:matahari_serviced_unit_file_t,s0)
-+/usr/lib/systemd/system/matahari-sysconfig.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:matahari_sysconfigd_unit_file_t,s0)
-+/usr/lib/systemd/system/matahari-sysconfig-console.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:matahari_sysconfigd_unit_file_t,s0)
-+
-+
-+/usr/sbin/matahari-hostd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:matahari_hostd_exec_t,s0)
-+/usr/sbin/matahari-dbus-hostd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:matahari_hostd_exec_t,s0)
-+/usr/sbin/matahari-qmf-hostd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:matahari_hostd_exec_t,s0)
-+
-+/usr/sbin/matahari-qmf-sysconfigd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:matahari_sysconfigd_exec_t,s0)
-+/usr/sbin/matahari-dbus-sysconfigd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:matahari_sysconfigd_exec_t,s0)
-+/usr/sbin/matahari-qmf-sysconfig-consoled -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:matahari_sysconfigd_exec_t,s0)
-+
-+/usr/sbin/matahari-netd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:matahari_netd_exec_t,s0)
-+/usr/sbin/matahari-dbus-networkd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:matahari_netd_exec_t,s0)
-+/usr/sbin/matahari-qmf-networkd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:matahari_netd_exec_t,s0)
-+
-+/usr/sbin/matahari-qmf-rpcd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:matahari_rpcd_exec_t,s0)
-+
-+/usr/sbin/matahari-serviced -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:matahari_serviced_exec_t,s0)
-+/usr/sbin/matahari-dbus-serviced -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:matahari_serviced_exec_t,s0)
-+/usr/sbin/matahari-qmf-serviced -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:matahari_serviced_exec_t,s0)
-+
-+/var/lib/matahari(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:matahari_var_lib_t,s0)
++++ b/mandb.fc
+@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
++/usr/bin/mandb -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:mandb_exec_t,s0)
+
-+/var/run/matahari(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:matahari_var_run_t,s0)
-+/var/run/matahari\.pid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:matahari_var_run_t,s0)
-+/var/run/matahari-broker\.pid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:matahari_var_run_t,s0)
-diff --git a/matahari.if b/matahari.if
++/var/cache/man(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:mandb_cache_t,s0)
+diff --git a/mandb.if b/mandb.if
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..1ec1c97
+index 0000000..4a4e899
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/matahari.if
-@@ -0,0 +1,291 @@
-+## <summary>policy for matahari</summary>
++++ b/mandb.if
+@@ -0,0 +1,187 @@
+
-+######################################
-+## <summary>
-+## Creates types and rules for a basic
-+## matahari init daemon domain.
-+## </summary>
-+## <param name="prefix">
-+## <summary>
-+## Prefix for the domain.
-+## </summary>
-+## </param>
-+#
-+template(`matahari_domain_template',`
-+ gen_require(`
-+ attribute matahari_domain;
-+ ')
-+
-+ ##############################
-+ #
-+ # Declarations
-+ #
-+
-+ type matahari_$1_t, matahari_domain;
-+ type matahari_$1_exec_t;
-+ init_daemon_domain(matahari_$1_t, matahari_$1_exec_t)
-+
-+ type matahari_$1_unit_file_t;
-+ systemd_unit_file(matahari_$1_unit_file_t)
-+')
++## <summary>policy for mandb</summary>
+
+########################################
+## <summary>
-+## Search matahari lib directories.
++## Transition to mandb.
+## </summary>
+## <param name="domain">
-+## <summary>
-+## Domain allowed access.
-+## </summary>
-+## </param>
-+#
-+interface(`matahari_search_lib',`
-+ gen_require(`
-+ type matahari_var_lib_t;
-+ ')
-+
-+ allow $1 matahari_var_lib_t:dir search_dir_perms;
-+ files_search_var_lib($1)
-+')
-+
-+########################################
+## <summary>
-+## Read matahari lib files.
++## Domain allowed to transition.
+## </summary>
-+## <param name="domain">
-+## <summary>
-+## Domain allowed access.
-+## </summary>
+## </param>
+#
-+interface(`matahari_read_lib_files',`
++interface(`mandb_domtrans',`
+ gen_require(`
-+ type matahari_var_lib_t;
++ type mandb_t, mandb_exec_t;
+ ')
+
-+ files_search_var_lib($1)
-+ read_files_pattern($1, matahari_var_lib_t, matahari_var_lib_t)
++ corecmd_search_bin($1)
++ domtrans_pattern($1, mandb_exec_t, mandb_t)
+')
+
+########################################
+## <summary>
-+## Create, read, write, and delete
-+## matahari lib files.
++## Search mandb cache directories.
+## </summary>
+## <param name="domain">
+## <summary>
@@ -30056,18 +32613,18 @@ index 0000000..1ec1c97
+## </summary>
+## </param>
+#
-+interface(`matahari_manage_lib_files',`
++interface(`mandb_search_cache',`
+ gen_require(`
-+ type matahari_var_lib_t;
++ type mandb_cache_t;
+ ')
+
-+ files_search_var_lib($1)
-+ manage_files_pattern($1, matahari_var_lib_t, matahari_var_lib_t)
++ allow $1 mandb_cache_t:dir search_dir_perms;
++ files_search_var($1)
+')
+
+########################################
+## <summary>
-+## Manage matahari lib dirs files.
++## Read mandb cache files.
+## </summary>
+## <param name="domain">
+## <summary>
@@ -30075,18 +32632,18 @@ index 0000000..1ec1c97
+## </summary>
+## </param>
+#
-+interface(`matahari_manage_lib_dirs',`
++interface(`mandb_read_cache_files',`
+ gen_require(`
-+ type matahari_var_lib_t;
++ type mandb_cache_t;
+ ')
+
-+ files_search_var_lib($1)
-+ manage_dirs_pattern($1, matahari_var_lib_t, matahari_var_lib_t)
++ files_search_var($1)
++ read_files_pattern($1, mandb_cache_t, mandb_cache_t)
+')
+
+########################################
+## <summary>
-+## Read matahari PID files.
++## Relabel mandb cache files/directories
+## </summary>
+## <param name="domain">
+## <summary>
@@ -30094,18 +32651,18 @@ index 0000000..1ec1c97
+## </summary>
+## </param>
+#
-+interface(`matahari_read_pid_files',`
++interface(`mandb_relabel_cache',`
+ gen_require(`
-+ type matahari_var_run_t;
++ type mandb_cache_t;
+ ')
+
-+ files_search_pids($1)
-+ allow $1 matahari_var_run_t:file read_file_perms;
++ allow $1 mandb_cache_t:dir relabel_dir_perms;
++ allow $1 mandb_cache_t:file relabel_file_perms;
+')
+
+########################################
+## <summary>
-+## Read matahari PID files.
++## Set attributes on mandb cache files.
+## </summary>
+## <param name="domain">
+## <summary>
@@ -30113,274 +32670,145 @@ index 0000000..1ec1c97
+## </summary>
+## </param>
+#
-+interface(`matahari_manage_pid_files',`
++interface(`mandb_setattr_cache_dirs',`
+ gen_require(`
-+ type matahari_var_run_t;
++ type mandb_cache_t;
+ ')
+
-+ files_search_pids($1)
-+ manage_files_pattern($1, matahari_var_run_t, matahari_var_run_t)
++ files_search_var($1)
++ allow $1 mandb_cache_t:dir setattr;
+')
+
+########################################
+## <summary>
-+## Execute a domain transition to run matahari_hostd.
++## Delete mandb cache files.
+## </summary>
+## <param name="domain">
-+## <summary>
++## <summary>
+## Domain allowed access.
-+## </summary>
++## </summary>
+## </param>
+#
-+interface(`matahari_hostd_domtrans',`
++interface(`mandb_delete_cache',`
+ gen_require(`
-+ type matahari_hostd_t, matahari_hostd_exec_t;
++ type mandb_cache_t;
+ ')
+
-+ domtrans_pattern($1, matahari_hostd_exec_t, matahari_hostd_t)
++ files_search_var($1)
++ allow $1 mandb_cache_t:dir list_dir_perms;
++ delete_dirs_pattern($1, mandb_cache_t, mandb_cache_t)
++ delete_files_pattern($1, mandb_cache_t, mandb_cache_t)
++ delete_lnk_files_pattern($1, mandb_cache_t, mandb_cache_t)
+')
+
+########################################
+## <summary>
-+## Execute a domain transition to run matahari_netd.
++## Create, read, write, and delete
++## mandb cache files.
+## </summary>
+## <param name="domain">
-+## <summary>
++## <summary>
+## Domain allowed access.
-+## </summary>
++## </summary>
+## </param>
+#
-+interface(`matahari_netd_domtrans',`
++interface(`mandb_manage_cache_files',`
+ gen_require(`
-+ type matahari_netd_t, matahari_netd_exec_t;
++ type mandb_cache_t;
+ ')
+
-+ domtrans_pattern($1, matahari_netd_exec_t, matahari_netd_t)
++ files_search_var($1)
++ manage_files_pattern($1, mandb_cache_t, mandb_cache_t)
+')
+
+########################################
+## <summary>
-+## Execute a domain transition to run matahari_serviced.
++## Manage mandb cache dirs.
+## </summary>
+## <param name="domain">
-+## <summary>
++## <summary>
+## Domain allowed access.
-+## </summary>
++## </summary>
+## </param>
+#
-+interface(`matahari_serviced_domtrans',`
++interface(`mandb_manage_cache_dirs',`
+ gen_require(`
-+ type matahari_serviced_t, matahari_serviced_exec_t;
++ type mandb_cache_t;
+ ')
+
-+ domtrans_pattern($1, matahari_serviced_exec_t, matahari_serviced_t)
++ files_search_var($1)
++ manage_dirs_pattern($1, mandb_cache_t, mandb_cache_t)
+')
+
-+#######################################
-+## <summary>
-+## Execute matahari services in the matahari domains.
-+## </summary>
-+## <param name="domain">
-+## <summary>
-+## Domain allowed to transition.
-+## </summary>
-+## </param>
-+#
-+interface(`matahari_systemctl',`
-+ gen_require(`
-+ type matahari_hostd_t;
-+ type matahari_netd_t;
-+ type matahari_serviced_t;
-+ type matahari_sysconfigd_t;
-+ type matahari_hostd_unit_file_t;
-+ type matahari_netd_unit_file_t;
-+ type matahari_serviced_unit_file_t;
-+ type matahari_sysconfigd_unit_file_t;
-+ attribute matahari_domain;
-+ ')
-+
-+ systemd_exec_systemctl($1)
-+
-+ allow $1 matahari_hostd_unit_file_t:file read_file_perms;
-+ allow $1 matahari_netd_unit_file_t:file read_file_perms;
-+ allow $1 matahari_serviced_unit_file_t:file read_file_perms;
-+ allow $1 matahari_sysconfigd_unit_file_t:file read_file_perms;
-+
-+ allow $1 matahari_hostd_unit_file_t:service manage_service_perms;
-+ allow $1 matahari_netd_unit_file_t:service manage_service_perms;
-+ allow $1 matahari_serviced_unit_file_t:service manage_service_perms;
-+ allow $1 matahari_sysconfigd_unit_file_t:service manage_service_perms;
-+
-+ ps_process_pattern($1, matahari_domain)
-+')
+
+########################################
+## <summary>
+## All of the rules required to administrate
-+## an matahari environment
++## an mandb environment
+## </summary>
+## <param name="domain">
+## <summary>
+## Domain allowed access.
+## </summary>
+## </param>
-+## <param name="role">
-+## <summary>
-+## Role allowed access.
-+## </summary>
-+## </param>
-+## <rolecap/>
+#
-+interface(`matahari_admin',`
++interface(`mandb_admin',`
+ gen_require(`
-+ type matahari_initrc_exec_t, matahari_hostd_t;
-+ type matahari_netd_t, matahari_serviced_t, matahari_sysconfigd_t;
-+ type matahari_var_lib_t, matahari_var_run_t;
-+ attribute matahari_domain;
-+ type matahari_hostd_unit_file_t;
-+ type matahari_netd_unit_file_t;
-+ type matahari_serviced_unit_file_t;
-+ type matahari_sysconfigd_unit_file_t;
++ type mandb_t;
++ type mandb_cache_t;
+ ')
+
-+ init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, matahari_initrc_exec_t)
-+ domain_system_change_exemption($1)
-+ role_transition $2 matahari_initrc_exec_t system_r;
-+ allow $2 system_r;
-+
-+ allow $1 matahari_domain:process { ptrace signal_perms };
-+ ps_process_pattern($1, matahari_domain)
++ allow $1 mandb_t:process { ptrace signal_perms };
++ ps_process_pattern($1, mandb_t)
+
-+ files_search_var_lib($1)
-+ admin_pattern($1, matahari_var_lib_t)
-+
-+ files_search_pids($1)
-+ admin_pattern($1, matahari_var_run_t)
-+
-+ matahari_systemctl($1)
-+ admin_pattern($1, matahari_hostd_unit_file_t)
-+ allow $1 matahari_hostd_unit_file_t:service all_service_perms;
-+ admin_pattern($1, matahari_netd_unit_file_t)
-+ allow $1 matahari_netd_unit_file_t:service all_service_perms;
-+ admin_pattern($1, matahari_serviced_unit_file_t)
-+ allow $1 matahari_serviced_unit_file_t:service all_service_perms;
-+ admin_pattern($1, matahari_sysconfigd_unit_file_t)
-+ allow $1 matahari_sysconfigd_unit_file_t:service all_service_perms;
-+')
-diff --git a/matahari.te b/matahari.te
++ files_search_var($1)
++ admin_pattern($1, mandb_cache_t)
++ optional_policy(`
++ systemd_passwd_agent_exec($1)
++ systemd_read_fifo_file_passwd_run($1)
++ ')
++')
+diff --git a/mandb.te b/mandb.te
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..d1ba3e7
+index 0000000..8cc45e7
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/matahari.te
-@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
-+policy_module(matahari,1.0.0)
++++ b/mandb.te
+@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
++policy_module(mandb, 1.0.0)
+
+########################################
+#
+# Declarations
+#
+
-+attribute matahari_domain;
-+
-+matahari_domain_template(hostd)
-+matahari_domain_template(netd)
-+matahari_domain_template(rpcd)
-+matahari_domain_template(serviced)
-+matahari_domain_template(sysconfigd)
-+
-+type matahari_initrc_exec_t;
-+init_script_file(matahari_initrc_exec_t)
-+
-+type matahari_var_lib_t;
-+files_type(matahari_var_lib_t)
-+
-+type matahari_var_run_t;
-+files_pid_file(matahari_var_run_t)
-+
-+########################################
-+#
-+# matahari_hostd local policy
-+#
-+
-+dev_read_sysfs(matahari_hostd_t)
-+dev_rw_mtrr(matahari_hostd_t)
-+
-+domain_use_interactive_fds(matahari_hostd_t)
-+domain_read_all_domains_state(matahari_hostd_t)
-+
-+optional_policy(`
-+ dbus_system_bus_client(matahari_hostd_t)
-+')
-+
-+########################################
-+#
-+# matahari_netd local policy
-+#
-+
-+domain_use_interactive_fds(matahari_netd_t)
-+
-+optional_policy(`
-+ dbus_system_bus_client(matahari_netd_t)
-+')
-+
-+
-+#######################################
-+#
-+# matahari_rpcd local policy
-+#
-+
-+corecmd_exec_bin(matahari_rpcd_t)
-+corecmd_exec_shell(matahari_rpcd_t)
-+
-+auth_read_passwd(matahari_rpcd_t)
++type mandb_t;
++type mandb_exec_t;
++init_daemon_domain(mandb_t, mandb_exec_t)
++cron_system_entry(mandb_t, mandb_exec_t)
+
-+files_read_usr_files(matahari_rpcd_t)
++type mandb_cache_t;
++files_type(mandb_cache_t)
+
+########################################
+#
-+# matahari_serviced local policy
++# mandb local policy
+#
-+allow matahari_serviced_t self:process setpgid;
-+
-+dev_read_sysfs(matahari_serviced_t)
-+
-+domain_use_interactive_fds(matahari_serviced_t)
-+
-+init_domtrans_script(matahari_serviced_t)
-+
-+systemd_config_all_services(matahari_serviced_t)
-+
-+########################################
-+#
-+# matahari_sysconfigd local policy
-+#
-+dev_read_sysfs(matahari_sysconfigd_t)
-+
-+#######################################
-+#
-+# matahari domain local policy
-+#
-+allow matahari_domain self:capability sys_nice;
-+allow matahari_domain self:process setsched;
-+allow matahari_domain self:process signal;
-+allow matahari_domain self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms;
-+allow matahari_domain self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
-+
-+kernel_read_system_state(matahari_domain)
-+kernel_read_network_state(matahari_domain)
-+
-+corenet_tcp_connect_matahari_port(matahari_domain)
++allow mandb_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms;
++allow mandb_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
++allow mandb_t self:process signal;
+
-+dev_read_urand(matahari_domain)
++manage_dirs_pattern(mandb_t, mandb_cache_t, mandb_cache_t)
++manage_files_pattern(mandb_t, mandb_cache_t, mandb_cache_t)
++manage_lnk_files_pattern(mandb_t, mandb_cache_t, mandb_cache_t)
++files_var_filetrans(mandb_t, mandb_cache_t, { dir file lnk_file })
+
-+files_read_etc_files(matahari_domain)
-+files_read_etc_runtime_files(matahari_domain)
++kernel_read_system_state(mandb_t)
+
-+logging_send_syslog_msg(matahari_domain)
++corecmd_exec_bin(mandb_t)
+
-+miscfiles_read_localization(matahari_domain)
++domain_use_interactive_fds(mandb_t)
+
-+sysnet_dns_name_resolve(matahari_domain)
++files_read_etc_files(mandb_t)
diff --git a/mcelog.fc b/mcelog.fc
index 56c43c0..409bbfc 100644
--- a/mcelog.fc
@@ -30392,7 +32820,7 @@ index 56c43c0..409bbfc 100644
+
+/var/run/mcelog.* gen_context(system_u:object_r:mcelog_var_run_t,s0)
diff --git a/mcelog.te b/mcelog.te
-index 5671977..a4a5f20 100644
+index 5671977..99a63b2 100644
--- a/mcelog.te
+++ b/mcelog.te
@@ -7,8 +7,14 @@ policy_module(mcelog, 1.1.0)
@@ -30411,7 +32839,7 @@ index 5671977..a4a5f20 100644
########################################
#
-@@ -17,16 +23,35 @@ cron_system_entry(mcelog_t, mcelog_exec_t)
+@@ -17,16 +23,33 @@ cron_system_entry(mcelog_t, mcelog_exec_t)
allow mcelog_t self:capability sys_admin;
@@ -30442,11 +32870,175 @@ index 5671977..a4a5f20 100644
+
logging_send_syslog_msg(mcelog_t)
- miscfiles_read_localization(mcelog_t)
-+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(mcelog_t)
+optional_policy(`
+ cron_system_entry(mcelog_t, mcelog_exec_t)
+')
+diff --git a/mcollective.fc b/mcollective.fc
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..821bf88
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/mcollective.fc
+@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
++/etc/mcollective/facts\.yaml -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:mcollective_etc_rw_t,s0)
++
++/usr/libexec/mcollective/update_yaml\.rb -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:mcollective_exec_t,s0)
+diff --git a/mcollective.if b/mcollective.if
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..e76a9b5
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/mcollective.if
+@@ -0,0 +1,114 @@
++
++## <summary>policy for mcollective</summary>
++
++########################################
++## <summary>
++## Execute TEMPLATE in the mcollective domin.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed to transition.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`mcollective_domtrans',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type mcollective_t, mcollective_exec_t;
++ ')
++
++ corecmd_search_bin($1)
++ domtrans_pattern($1, mcollective_exec_t, mcollective_t)
++')
++
++########################################
++## <summary>
++## Search mcollective conf directories.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`mcollective_search_conf',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type mcollective_etc_rw_t;
++ ')
++
++ allow $1 mcollective_etc_rw_t:dir search_dir_perms;
++ files_search_etc($1)
++')
++
++########################################
++## <summary>
++## Read mcollective conf files.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`mcollective_read_conf_files',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type mcollective_etc_rw_t;
++ ')
++
++ allow $1 mcollective_etc_rw_t:dir list_dir_perms;
++ read_files_pattern($1, mcollective_etc_rw_t, mcollective_etc_rw_t)
++ files_search_etc($1)
++')
++
++########################################
++## <summary>
++## Manage mcollective conf files.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`mcollective_manage_conf_files',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type mcollective_etc_rw_t;
++ ')
++
++ manage_files_pattern($1, mcollective_etc_rw_t, mcollective_etc_rw_t)
++ files_search_etc($1)
++')
++
++
++########################################
++## <summary>
++## All of the rules required to administrate
++## an mcollective environment
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++## <param name="role">
++## <summary>
++## Role allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++## <rolecap/>
++#
++interface(`mcollective_admin',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type mcollective_t;
++ type mcollective_etc_rw_t;
++ ')
++
++ allow $1 mcollective_t:process { ptrace signal_perms };
++ ps_process_pattern($1, mcollective_t)
++
++ files_search_etc($1)
++ admin_pattern($1, mcollective_etc_rw_t)
++ optional_policy(`
++ systemd_passwd_agent_exec($1)
++ systemd_read_fifo_file_passwd_run($1)
++ ')
++')
+diff --git a/mcollective.te b/mcollective.te
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..5dd171f
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/mcollective.te
+@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
++policy_module(mcollective, 1.0.0)
++
++########################################
++#
++# Declarations
++#
++
++type mcollective_t;
++type mcollective_exec_t;
++init_daemon_domain(mcollective_t, mcollective_exec_t)
++cron_system_entry(mcollective_t, mcollective_exec_t)
++
++permissive mcollective_t;
++
++type mcollective_etc_rw_t;
++files_type(mcollective_etc_rw_t)
++
++########################################
++#
++# mcollective local policy
++#
++allow mcollective_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms;
++allow mcollective_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
++
++manage_files_pattern(mcollective_t, mcollective_etc_rw_t, mcollective_etc_rw_t)
++files_etc_filetrans(mcollective_t, mcollective_etc_rw_t, file, "facts.yaml")
++
++domain_use_interactive_fds(mcollective_t)
++
++files_read_etc_files(mcollective_t)
diff --git a/mediawiki.if b/mediawiki.if
index 98d28b4..1c1d012 100644
--- a/mediawiki.if
@@ -30492,6 +33084,30 @@ index 98d28b4..1c1d012 100644
+
+ delete_files_pattern($1, httpd_mediawiki_tmp_t, httpd_mediawiki_tmp_t)
+')
+diff --git a/mediawiki.te b/mediawiki.te
+index d7cb9e4..7e81838 100644
+--- a/mediawiki.te
++++ b/mediawiki.te
+@@ -5,13 +5,16 @@ policy_module(mediawiki, 1.0.0)
+ # Declarations
+ #
+
+-apache_content_template(mediawiki)
++optional_policy(`
++
++ apache_content_template(mediawiki)
+
+ ########################################
+ #
+ # mediawiki local policy
+ #
+
+-files_search_var_lib(httpd_mediawiki_script_t)
++ files_search_var_lib(httpd_mediawiki_script_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_tetex_data(httpd_mediawiki_script_t)
++ miscfiles_read_tetex_data(httpd_mediawiki_script_t)
++')
diff --git a/memcached.fc b/memcached.fc
index 4d69477..d3b4f39 100644
--- a/memcached.fc
@@ -30576,7 +33192,7 @@ index db4fd6f..650014e 100644
admin_pattern($1, memcached_var_run_t)
')
diff --git a/memcached.te b/memcached.te
-index b681608..27460d5 100644
+index b681608..9c4fc55 100644
--- a/memcached.te
+++ b/memcached.te
@@ -28,7 +28,6 @@ allow memcached_t self:udp_socket { create_socket_perms listen };
@@ -30602,14 +33218,20 @@ index b681608..27460d5 100644
term_dontaudit_use_all_ptys(memcached_t)
term_dontaudit_use_all_ttys(memcached_t)
+@@ -55,4 +54,3 @@ term_dontaudit_use_console(memcached_t)
+
+ auth_use_nsswitch(memcached_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(memcached_t)
diff --git a/milter.fc b/milter.fc
-index 1ec5a6c..06beeb2 100644
+index 1ec5a6c..64ac6f0 100644
--- a/milter.fc
+++ b/milter.fc
-@@ -1,13 +1,21 @@
+@@ -1,15 +1,26 @@
+/etc/mail/dkim-milter/keys(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:dkim_milter_private_key_t,s0)
+
+/usr/sbin/dkim-filter -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:dkim_milter_exec_t,s0)
++/usr/sbin/opendkim -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:dkim_milter_exec_t,s0)
/usr/sbin/milter-greylist -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:greylist_milter_exec_t,s0)
-/usr/sbin/milter-regex -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:regex_milter_exec_t,s0)
+/usr/sbin/sqlgrey -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:greylist_milter_exec_t,s0)
@@ -30618,7 +33240,7 @@ index 1ec5a6c..06beeb2 100644
+/var/lib/dkim-milter(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:dkim_milter_data_t,s0)
/var/lib/milter-greylist(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:greylist_milter_data_t,s0)
-+/var/lib/sqlgrey(/.*)? -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:greylist_milter_data_t,s0)
++/var/lib/sqlgrey(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:greylist_milter_data_t,s0)
/var/lib/spamass-milter(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:spamass_milter_state_t,s0)
+/var/run/dkim-milter(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:dkim_milter_data_t,s0)
@@ -30628,9 +33250,13 @@ index 1ec5a6c..06beeb2 100644
+/var/run/sqlgrey\.pid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:greylist_milter_data_t,s0)
/var/run/spamass-milter(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:spamass_milter_data_t,s0)
/var/run/spamass-milter\.pid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:spamass_milter_data_t,s0)
++/var/run/opendkim(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:dkim_milter_data_t,s0)
+ /var/spool/milter-regex(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:regex_milter_data_t,s0)
+ /var/spool/postfix/spamass(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:spamass_milter_data_t,s0)
++/var/spool/opendkim(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:dkim_milter_data_t,s0)
diff --git a/milter.if b/milter.if
-index ee72cbe..bf5fc09 100644
+index ee72cbe..bdf319a 100644
--- a/milter.if
+++ b/milter.if
@@ -24,9 +24,13 @@ template(`milter_template',`
@@ -30648,7 +33274,7 @@ index ee72cbe..bf5fc09 100644
# Allow communication with MTA over a TCP socket
allow $1_milter_t self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
-@@ -36,6 +40,8 @@ template(`milter_template',`
+@@ -36,12 +40,13 @@ template(`milter_template',`
# Create other data files and directories in the data directory
manage_files_pattern($1_milter_t, $1_milter_data_t, $1_milter_data_t)
@@ -30657,7 +33283,13 @@ index ee72cbe..bf5fc09 100644
corenet_tcp_bind_generic_node($1_milter_t)
corenet_tcp_bind_milter_port($1_milter_t)
-@@ -61,6 +67,7 @@ interface(`milter_stream_connect_all',`
+ files_read_etc_files($1_milter_t)
+
+- miscfiles_read_localization($1_milter_t)
+
+ logging_send_syslog_msg($1_milter_t)
+ ')
+@@ -61,6 +66,7 @@ interface(`milter_stream_connect_all',`
attribute milter_data_type, milter_domains;
')
@@ -30665,7 +33297,7 @@ index ee72cbe..bf5fc09 100644
getattr_dirs_pattern($1, milter_data_type, milter_data_type)
stream_connect_pattern($1, milter_data_type, milter_data_type, milter_domains)
')
-@@ -86,6 +93,24 @@ interface(`milter_getattr_all_sockets',`
+@@ -86,6 +92,24 @@ interface(`milter_getattr_all_sockets',`
########################################
## <summary>
@@ -30690,7 +33322,7 @@ index ee72cbe..bf5fc09 100644
## Manage spamassassin milter state
## </summary>
## <param name="domain">
-@@ -104,3 +129,22 @@ interface(`milter_manage_spamass_state',`
+@@ -104,3 +128,22 @@ interface(`milter_manage_spamass_state',`
manage_dirs_pattern($1, spamass_milter_state_t, spamass_milter_state_t)
manage_lnk_files_pattern($1, spamass_milter_state_t, spamass_milter_state_t)
')
@@ -30714,7 +33346,7 @@ index ee72cbe..bf5fc09 100644
+ delete_files_pattern($1, dkim_milter_data_t, dkim_milter_data_t)
+')
diff --git a/milter.te b/milter.te
-index 26101cb..01ef5a5 100644
+index 26101cb..64c2969 100644
--- a/milter.te
+++ b/milter.te
@@ -9,6 +9,13 @@ policy_module(milter, 1.4.0)
@@ -30731,7 +33363,7 @@ index 26101cb..01ef5a5 100644
# currently-supported milters are milter-greylist, milter-regex and spamass-milter
milter_template(greylist)
milter_template(regex)
-@@ -20,6 +27,24 @@ milter_template(spamass)
+@@ -20,6 +27,26 @@ milter_template(spamass)
type spamass_milter_state_t;
files_type(spamass_milter_state_t)
@@ -30747,6 +33379,8 @@ index 26101cb..01ef5a5 100644
+
+read_files_pattern(dkim_milter_t, dkim_milter_private_key_t, dkim_milter_private_key_t)
+
++kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(dkim_milter_t)
++
+auth_use_nsswitch(dkim_milter_t)
+
+sysnet_dns_name_resolve(dkim_milter_t)
@@ -30756,7 +33390,7 @@ index 26101cb..01ef5a5 100644
########################################
#
# milter-greylist local policy
-@@ -33,11 +58,25 @@ files_type(spamass_milter_state_t)
+@@ -33,11 +60,25 @@ files_type(spamass_milter_state_t)
allow greylist_milter_t self:capability { chown dac_override setgid setuid sys_nice };
allow greylist_milter_t self:process { setsched getsched };
@@ -30782,11 +33416,10 @@ index 26101cb..01ef5a5 100644
# Allow the milter to read a GeoIP database in /usr/share
files_read_usr_files(greylist_milter_t)
# The milter runs from /var/lib/milter-greylist and maintains files there
-@@ -49,6 +88,15 @@ auth_use_nsswitch(greylist_milter_t)
+@@ -49,6 +90,14 @@ auth_use_nsswitch(greylist_milter_t)
# Config is in /etc/mail/greylist.conf
mta_read_config(greylist_milter_t)
-+miscfiles_read_localization(greylist_milter_t)
+
+sysnet_read_config(greylist_milter_t)
+
@@ -30798,6 +33431,15 @@ index 26101cb..01ef5a5 100644
########################################
#
# milter-regex local policy
+@@ -88,6 +137,8 @@ corecmd_exec_shell(spamass_milter_t)
+ corecmd_read_bin_symlinks(spamass_milter_t)
+ corecmd_search_bin(spamass_milter_t)
+
++auth_use_nsswitch(spamass_milter_t)
++
+ mta_send_mail(spamass_milter_t)
+
+ # The main job of the milter is to pipe spam through spamc and act on the result
diff --git a/mock.fc b/mock.fc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8d0e473
@@ -31124,10 +33766,10 @@ index 0000000..7f6f2d6
+')
diff --git a/mock.te b/mock.te
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..00d38c5
+index 0000000..ecfd7be
--- /dev/null
+++ b/mock.te
-@@ -0,0 +1,251 @@
+@@ -0,0 +1,247 @@
+policy_module(mock,1.0.0)
+
+## <desc>
@@ -31171,7 +33813,7 @@ index 0000000..00d38c5
+# mock local policy
+#
+
-+allow mock_t self:capability { sys_admin setfcap setuid sys_chroot chown audit_write dac_override sys_nice mknod fsetid setgid fowner };
++allow mock_t self:capability { sys_admin sys_ptrace setfcap setuid sys_chroot chown audit_write dac_override sys_nice mknod fsetid setgid fowner };
+allow mock_t self:process { siginh noatsecure signal_perms transition rlimitinh setsched setpgid };
+# Needed because mock can run java and mono withing build environment
+allow mock_t self:process { execmem execstack };
@@ -31251,8 +33893,6 @@ index 0000000..00d38c5
+logging_send_audit_msgs(mock_t)
+logging_send_syslog_msg(mock_t)
+
-+miscfiles_read_localization(mock_t)
-+
+userdom_use_user_ptys(mock_t)
+
+files_search_home(mock_t)
@@ -31285,7 +33925,7 @@ index 0000000..00d38c5
+')
+
+optional_policy(`
-+ mount_domtrans(mock_t)
++ mount_exec(mock_t)
+')
+
+optional_policy(`
@@ -31374,13 +34014,11 @@ index 0000000..00d38c5
+
+libs_exec_ldconfig(mock_build_t)
+
-+miscfiles_read_localization(mock_build_t)
-+
+tunable_policy(`mock_enable_homedirs',`
+ userdom_read_user_home_content_files(mock_build_t)
+')
diff --git a/modemmanager.te b/modemmanager.te
-index b3ace16..35c92dd 100644
+index b3ace16..41f9aa5 100644
--- a/modemmanager.te
+++ b/modemmanager.te
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ policy_module(modemmanager, 1.1.0)
@@ -31402,7 +34040,7 @@ index b3ace16..35c92dd 100644
allow modemmanager_t self:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
allow modemmanager_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
allow modemmanager_t self:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket create_socket_perms;
-@@ -28,13 +29,31 @@ dev_rw_modem(modemmanager_t)
+@@ -28,13 +29,29 @@ dev_rw_modem(modemmanager_t)
files_read_etc_files(modemmanager_t)
@@ -31410,10 +34048,9 @@ index b3ace16..35c92dd 100644
+term_use_generic_ptys(modemmanager_t)
+term_use_unallocated_ttys(modemmanager_t) # this should be reproduced, might have been mislabelled usbtty_device_t
+term_use_usb_ttys(modemmanager_t)
-+
-+xserver_read_state_xdm(modemmanager_t)
- miscfiles_read_localization(modemmanager_t)
+-miscfiles_read_localization(modemmanager_t)
++xserver_read_state_xdm(modemmanager_t)
logging_send_syslog_msg(modemmanager_t)
@@ -31481,30 +34118,68 @@ index 657a9fc..7022903 100644
admin_pattern($1, httpd_mojomojo_script_t)
admin_pattern($1, httpd_mojomojo_content_t)
diff --git a/mojomojo.te b/mojomojo.te
-index 83f002c..ed69996 100644
+index 83f002c..d09878d 100644
--- a/mojomojo.te
+++ b/mojomojo.te
-@@ -7,6 +7,9 @@ policy_module(mojomojo, 1.0.0)
-
- apache_content_template(mojomojo)
+@@ -5,32 +5,42 @@ policy_module(mojomojo, 1.0.0)
+ # Declarations
+ #
+-apache_content_template(mojomojo)
++
+type httpd_mojomojo_tmp_t;
+files_tmp_file(httpd_mojomojo_tmp_t)
-+
+
########################################
#
# mojomojo local policy
-@@ -14,6 +17,10 @@ apache_content_template(mojomojo)
+ #
- allow httpd_mojomojo_script_t httpd_t:unix_stream_socket rw_stream_socket_perms;
+-allow httpd_mojomojo_script_t httpd_t:unix_stream_socket rw_stream_socket_perms;
++optional_policy(`
++ apache_content_template(mojomojo)
+
+-corenet_tcp_connect_postgresql_port(httpd_mojomojo_script_t)
+-corenet_tcp_connect_mysqld_port(httpd_mojomojo_script_t)
+-corenet_tcp_connect_smtp_port(httpd_mojomojo_script_t)
+-corenet_sendrecv_postgresql_client_packets(httpd_mojomojo_script_t)
+-corenet_sendrecv_mysqld_client_packets(httpd_mojomojo_script_t)
+-corenet_sendrecv_smtp_client_packets(httpd_mojomojo_script_t)
++ allow httpd_mojomojo_script_t httpd_t:unix_stream_socket rw_stream_socket_perms;
+
+-files_search_var_lib(httpd_mojomojo_script_t)
++ manage_dirs_pattern(httpd_mojomojo_script_t, httpd_mojomojo_tmp_t, httpd_mojomojo_tmp_t)
++ manage_files_pattern(httpd_mojomojo_script_t, httpd_mojomojo_tmp_t, httpd_mojomojo_tmp_t)
++ files_tmp_filetrans(httpd_mojomojo_script_t, httpd_mojomojo_tmp_t, { file dir })
+
+-sysnet_dns_name_resolve(httpd_mojomojo_script_t)
++ corenet_tcp_connect_postgresql_port(httpd_mojomojo_script_t)
++ corenet_tcp_connect_mysqld_port(httpd_mojomojo_script_t)
++ corenet_tcp_connect_smtp_port(httpd_mojomojo_script_t)
++ corenet_sendrecv_postgresql_client_packets(httpd_mojomojo_script_t)
++ corenet_sendrecv_mysqld_client_packets(httpd_mojomojo_script_t)
++ corenet_sendrecv_smtp_client_packets(httpd_mojomojo_script_t)
+
+-mta_send_mail(httpd_mojomojo_script_t)
++ files_search_var_lib(httpd_mojomojo_script_t)
-+manage_dirs_pattern(httpd_mojomojo_script_t, httpd_mojomojo_tmp_t, httpd_mojomojo_tmp_t)
-+manage_files_pattern(httpd_mojomojo_script_t, httpd_mojomojo_tmp_t, httpd_mojomojo_tmp_t)
-+files_tmp_filetrans(httpd_mojomojo_script_t, httpd_mojomojo_tmp_t, { file dir })
+-optional_policy(`
+- mysql_stream_connect(httpd_mojomojo_script_t)
+-')
++ sysnet_dns_name_resolve(httpd_mojomojo_script_t)
+
+-optional_policy(`
+- postgresql_stream_connect(httpd_mojomojo_script_t)
++ mta_send_mail(httpd_mojomojo_script_t)
+
- corenet_tcp_connect_postgresql_port(httpd_mojomojo_script_t)
- corenet_tcp_connect_mysqld_port(httpd_mojomojo_script_t)
- corenet_tcp_connect_smtp_port(httpd_mojomojo_script_t)
++ optional_policy(`
++ mysql_stream_connect(httpd_mojomojo_script_t)
++ ')
++
++ optional_policy(`
++ postgresql_stream_connect(httpd_mojomojo_script_t)
++ ')
+ ')
diff --git a/mono.te b/mono.te
index dff0f12..ecab36d 100644
--- a/mono.te
@@ -31519,7 +34194,7 @@ index dff0f12..ecab36d 100644
init_dbus_chat_script(mono_t)
diff --git a/monop.te b/monop.te
-index 6647a35..4c5bf65 100644
+index 6647a35..f3b35e1 100644
--- a/monop.te
+++ b/monop.te
@@ -42,7 +42,6 @@ kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(monopd_t)
@@ -31530,6 +34205,15 @@ index 6647a35..4c5bf65 100644
corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(monopd_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(monopd_t)
corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if(monopd_t)
+@@ -65,8 +64,6 @@ fs_search_auto_mountpoints(monopd_t)
+
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(monopd_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(monopd_t)
+-
+ sysnet_read_config(monopd_t)
+
+ userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fds(monopd_t)
diff --git a/mozilla.fc b/mozilla.fc
index 3a73e74..60e7237 100644
--- a/mozilla.fc
@@ -31593,7 +34277,7 @@ index 3a73e74..60e7237 100644
+/usr/lib/nspluginwrapper/plugin-config -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:mozilla_plugin_config_exec_t,s0)
+')
diff --git a/mozilla.if b/mozilla.if
-index b397fde..25a03ce 100644
+index b397fde..c7c031d 100644
--- a/mozilla.if
+++ b/mozilla.if
@@ -18,10 +18,11 @@
@@ -31680,7 +34364,7 @@ index b397fde..25a03ce 100644
allow mozilla_plugin_t $1:process signull;
')
-@@ -224,6 +265,31 @@ interface(`mozilla_run_plugin',`
+@@ -224,6 +265,32 @@ interface(`mozilla_run_plugin',`
mozilla_domtrans_plugin($1)
role $2 types mozilla_plugin_t;
@@ -31701,6 +34385,7 @@ index b397fde..25a03ce 100644
+interface(`mozilla_role_plugin',`
+ gen_require(`
+ type mozilla_plugin_t;
++ type mozilla_plugin_config_t;
+ ')
+
+ role $1 types mozilla_plugin_t;
@@ -31712,7 +34397,7 @@ index b397fde..25a03ce 100644
')
########################################
-@@ -265,9 +331,27 @@ interface(`mozilla_rw_tcp_sockets',`
+@@ -265,9 +332,27 @@ interface(`mozilla_rw_tcp_sockets',`
allow $1 mozilla_t:tcp_socket rw_socket_perms;
')
@@ -31741,7 +34426,7 @@ index b397fde..25a03ce 100644
## </summary>
## <param name="domain">
## <summary>
-@@ -275,28 +359,100 @@ interface(`mozilla_rw_tcp_sockets',`
+@@ -275,28 +360,118 @@ interface(`mozilla_rw_tcp_sockets',`
## </summary>
## </param>
#
@@ -31776,7 +34461,7 @@ index b397fde..25a03ce 100644
- allow $1 mozilla_plugin_tmpfs_t:file unlink;
+ dontaudit $1 mozilla_plugin_t:unix_stream_socket { read write };
- ')
++')
+
+#######################################
+## <summary>
@@ -31794,7 +34479,7 @@ index b397fde..25a03ce 100644
+ ')
+
+ dontaudit $1 mozilla_plugin_tmp_t:file { read write };
-+')
+ ')
+
+########################################
+## <summary>
@@ -31818,6 +34503,24 @@ index b397fde..25a03ce 100644
+
+########################################
+## <summary>
++## read mozilla_plugin rw files.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`mozilla_plugin_read_rw_files',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type mozilla_plugin_rw_t;
++ ')
++
++ read_files_pattern($1, mozilla_plugin_rw_t, mozilla_plugin_rw_t)
++')
++
++########################################
++## <summary>
+## Create mozilla content in the user home directory
+## with an correct label.
+## </summary>
@@ -31850,10 +34553,22 @@ index b397fde..25a03ce 100644
+')
+
diff --git a/mozilla.te b/mozilla.te
-index d4fcb75..b1d28b7 100644
+index d4fcb75..72efe21 100644
--- a/mozilla.te
+++ b/mozilla.te
-@@ -12,14 +12,22 @@ policy_module(mozilla, 2.6.0)
+@@ -7,19 +7,34 @@ policy_module(mozilla, 2.6.0)
+
+ ## <desc>
+ ## <p>
++## Allow mozilla plugin domain to connect to the network using TCP.
++## </p>
++## </desc>
++gen_tunable(mozilla_plugin_can_network_connect, false)
++
++## <desc>
++## <p>
+ ## Allow confined web browsers to read home directory content
+ ## </p>
## </desc>
gen_tunable(mozilla_read_content, false)
@@ -31878,7 +34593,7 @@ index d4fcb75..b1d28b7 100644
type mozilla_conf_t;
files_config_file(mozilla_conf_t)
-@@ -32,14 +40,26 @@ userdom_user_home_content(mozilla_home_t)
+@@ -32,14 +47,26 @@ userdom_user_home_content(mozilla_home_t)
type mozilla_plugin_t;
type mozilla_plugin_exec_t;
application_domain(mozilla_plugin_t, mozilla_plugin_exec_t)
@@ -31906,7 +34621,7 @@ index d4fcb75..b1d28b7 100644
type mozilla_tmp_t;
userdom_user_tmp_file(mozilla_tmp_t)
-@@ -100,7 +120,6 @@ corecmd_exec_shell(mozilla_t)
+@@ -100,7 +127,6 @@ corecmd_exec_shell(mozilla_t)
corecmd_exec_bin(mozilla_t)
# Browse the web, connect to printer
@@ -31914,7 +34629,7 @@ index d4fcb75..b1d28b7 100644
corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(mozilla_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(mozilla_t)
corenet_raw_sendrecv_generic_if(mozilla_t)
-@@ -110,6 +129,7 @@ corenet_tcp_sendrecv_http_port(mozilla_t)
+@@ -110,6 +136,7 @@ corenet_tcp_sendrecv_http_port(mozilla_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_http_cache_port(mozilla_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_squid_port(mozilla_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_ftp_port(mozilla_t)
@@ -31922,7 +34637,7 @@ index d4fcb75..b1d28b7 100644
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_ipp_port(mozilla_t)
corenet_tcp_connect_http_port(mozilla_t)
corenet_tcp_connect_http_cache_port(mozilla_t)
-@@ -140,7 +160,6 @@ domain_dontaudit_read_all_domains_state(mozilla_t)
+@@ -140,7 +167,6 @@ domain_dontaudit_read_all_domains_state(mozilla_t)
files_read_etc_runtime_files(mozilla_t)
files_read_usr_files(mozilla_t)
@@ -31930,7 +34645,12 @@ index d4fcb75..b1d28b7 100644
# /var/lib
files_read_var_lib_files(mozilla_t)
# interacting with gstreamer
-@@ -155,38 +174,31 @@ fs_rw_tmpfs_files(mozilla_t)
+@@ -151,42 +177,34 @@ files_dontaudit_getattr_boot_dirs(mozilla_t)
+ fs_dontaudit_getattr_all_fs(mozilla_t)
+ fs_search_auto_mountpoints(mozilla_t)
+ fs_list_inotifyfs(mozilla_t)
+-fs_rw_tmpfs_files(mozilla_t)
++fs_rw_inherited_tmpfs_files(mozilla_t)
term_dontaudit_getattr_pty_dirs(mozilla_t)
@@ -31939,15 +34659,15 @@ index d4fcb75..b1d28b7 100644
logging_send_syslog_msg(mozilla_t)
miscfiles_read_fonts(mozilla_t)
- miscfiles_read_localization(mozilla_t)
+-miscfiles_read_localization(mozilla_t)
miscfiles_dontaudit_setattr_fonts_dirs(mozilla_t)
-# Browse the web, connect to printer
-sysnet_dns_name_resolve(mozilla_t)
+-
+-userdom_use_user_ptys(mozilla_t)
+userdom_use_inherited_user_ptys(mozilla_t)
--userdom_use_user_ptys(mozilla_t)
--
-mozilla_run_plugin(mozilla_t, mozilla_roles)
+#mozilla_run_plugin(mozilla_t, mozilla_roles)
@@ -31978,7 +34698,7 @@ index d4fcb75..b1d28b7 100644
# Uploads, local html
tunable_policy(`mozilla_read_content && use_nfs_home_dirs',`
-@@ -263,6 +275,7 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -263,6 +281,7 @@ optional_policy(`
optional_policy(`
gnome_stream_connect_gconf(mozilla_t)
gnome_manage_config(mozilla_t)
@@ -31986,7 +34706,7 @@ index d4fcb75..b1d28b7 100644
')
optional_policy(`
-@@ -283,7 +296,8 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -283,7 +302,8 @@ optional_policy(`
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -31996,7 +34716,7 @@ index d4fcb75..b1d28b7 100644
pulseaudio_stream_connect(mozilla_t)
pulseaudio_manage_home_files(mozilla_t)
')
-@@ -297,25 +311,35 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -297,65 +317,100 @@ optional_policy(`
# mozilla_plugin local policy
#
@@ -32004,7 +34724,7 @@ index d4fcb75..b1d28b7 100644
-allow mozilla_plugin_t self:process { setsched signal_perms execmem };
-allow mozilla_plugin_t self:fifo_file manage_fifo_file_perms;
-allow mozilla_plugin_t self:unix_stream_socket { connectto create_stream_socket_perms };
-+dontaudit mozilla_plugin_t self:capability { sys_nice sys_tty_config };
++dontaudit mozilla_plugin_t self:capability { ipc_lock sys_nice sys_tty_config };
+
+allow mozilla_plugin_t self:process { setpgid getsched setsched signal_perms execmem execstack setrlimit };
+allow mozilla_plugin_t self:netlink_route_socket r_netlink_socket_perms;
@@ -32033,21 +34753,22 @@ index d4fcb75..b1d28b7 100644
-files_tmp_filetrans(mozilla_plugin_t, mozilla_plugin_tmp_t, { dir file fifo_file })
-userdom_user_tmp_filetrans(mozilla_plugin_t, mozilla_plugin_tmp_t, { dir file fifo_file })
+manage_sock_files_pattern(mozilla_plugin_t, mozilla_plugin_tmp_t, mozilla_plugin_tmp_t)
-+files_tmp_filetrans(mozilla_plugin_t, mozilla_plugin_tmp_t, { dir file fifo_file sock_file })
++files_tmp_filetrans(mozilla_plugin_t, mozilla_plugin_tmp_t, { dir file fifo_file sock_file lnk_file })
+userdom_user_tmp_filetrans(mozilla_plugin_t, mozilla_plugin_tmp_t, { dir file fifo_file sock_file })
+xserver_xdm_tmp_filetrans(mozilla_plugin_t, mozilla_plugin_tmp_t, { dir file fifo_file sock_file lnk_file })
+can_exec(mozilla_plugin_t, mozilla_plugin_tmp_t)
manage_files_pattern(mozilla_plugin_t, mozilla_plugin_tmpfs_t, mozilla_plugin_tmpfs_t)
manage_lnk_files_pattern(mozilla_plugin_t, mozilla_plugin_tmpfs_t, mozilla_plugin_tmpfs_t)
-@@ -323,31 +347,48 @@ manage_fifo_files_pattern(mozilla_plugin_t, mozilla_plugin_tmpfs_t, mozilla_plug
+ manage_fifo_files_pattern(mozilla_plugin_t, mozilla_plugin_tmpfs_t, mozilla_plugin_tmpfs_t)
manage_sock_files_pattern(mozilla_plugin_t, mozilla_plugin_tmpfs_t, mozilla_plugin_tmpfs_t)
fs_tmpfs_filetrans(mozilla_plugin_t, mozilla_plugin_tmpfs_t, { file lnk_file sock_file fifo_file })
-
++userdom_tmpfs_filetrans_to(mozilla_plugin_t, mozilla_plugin_tmpfs_t, { file lnk_file sock_file fifo_file })
++
+allow mozilla_plugin_t mozilla_plugin_rw_t:dir list_dir_perms;
+read_lnk_files_pattern(mozilla_plugin_t, mozilla_plugin_rw_t, mozilla_plugin_rw_t)
+read_files_pattern(mozilla_plugin_t, mozilla_plugin_rw_t, mozilla_plugin_rw_t)
-+
+
can_exec(mozilla_plugin_t, mozilla_exec_t)
-kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(mozilla_plugin_t)
@@ -32065,6 +34786,7 @@ index d4fcb75..b1d28b7 100644
-corenet_all_recvfrom_unlabeled(mozilla_plugin_t)
-corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(mozilla_plugin_t)
-corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_node(mozilla_plugin_t)
++corenet_tcp_connect_asterisk_port(mozilla_plugin_t)
corenet_tcp_connect_generic_port(mozilla_plugin_t)
-corenet_tcp_connect_pulseaudio_port(mozilla_plugin_t)
+corenet_tcp_connect_flash_port(mozilla_plugin_t)
@@ -32073,16 +34795,20 @@ index d4fcb75..b1d28b7 100644
+corenet_tcp_connect_gatekeeper_port(mozilla_plugin_t)
corenet_tcp_connect_http_cache_port(mozilla_plugin_t)
-corenet_tcp_connect_squid_port(mozilla_plugin_t)
++corenet_tcp_connect_ipsecnat_port(mozilla_plugin_t)
corenet_tcp_connect_ipp_port(mozilla_plugin_t)
+corenet_tcp_connect_ircd_port(mozilla_plugin_t)
+corenet_tcp_connect_jabber_client_port(mozilla_plugin_t)
corenet_tcp_connect_mmcc_port(mozilla_plugin_t)
++corenet_tcp_connect_msnp_port(mozilla_plugin_t)
+corenet_tcp_connect_pulseaudio_port(mozilla_plugin_t)
corenet_tcp_connect_speech_port(mozilla_plugin_t)
+corenet_tcp_connect_squid_port(mozilla_plugin_t)
+corenet_tcp_connect_streaming_port(mozilla_plugin_t)
+corenet_tcp_connect_soundd_port(mozilla_plugin_t)
++corenet_tcp_connect_tor_socks_port(mozilla_plugin_t)
+corenet_tcp_connect_vnc_port(mozilla_plugin_t)
++corenet_tcp_connect_commplex_port(mozilla_plugin_t)
+corenet_tcp_connect_couchdb_port(mozilla_plugin_t)
+corenet_tcp_connect_monopd_port(mozilla_plugin_t)
+corenet_tcp_connect_all_ephemeral_ports(mozilla_plugin_t)
@@ -32095,8 +34821,10 @@ index d4fcb75..b1d28b7 100644
+dev_read_generic_usb_dev(mozilla_plugin_t)
dev_read_video_dev(mozilla_plugin_t)
dev_write_video_dev(mozilla_plugin_t)
++dev_read_realtime_clock(mozilla_plugin_t)
dev_read_sysfs(mozilla_plugin_t)
-@@ -356,6 +397,7 @@ dev_write_sound(mozilla_plugin_t)
+ dev_read_sound(mozilla_plugin_t)
+ dev_write_sound(mozilla_plugin_t)
# for nvidia driver
dev_rw_xserver_misc(mozilla_plugin_t)
dev_dontaudit_rw_dri(mozilla_plugin_t)
@@ -32104,16 +34832,18 @@ index d4fcb75..b1d28b7 100644
domain_use_interactive_fds(mozilla_plugin_t)
domain_dontaudit_read_all_domains_state(mozilla_plugin_t)
-@@ -363,15 +405,23 @@ domain_dontaudit_read_all_domains_state(mozilla_plugin_t)
+@@ -363,55 +418,59 @@ domain_dontaudit_read_all_domains_state(mozilla_plugin_t)
files_read_config_files(mozilla_plugin_t)
files_read_usr_files(mozilla_plugin_t)
files_list_mnt(mozilla_plugin_t)
+files_exec_usr_files(mozilla_plugin_t)
-+fs_dontaudit_read_tmpfs_files(mozilla_plugin_t)
++fs_rw_inherited_tmpfs_files(mozilla_plugin_t)
fs_getattr_all_fs(mozilla_plugin_t)
fs_list_dos(mozilla_plugin_t)
- fs_read_dos_files(mozilla_plugin_t)
+-fs_read_dos_files(mozilla_plugin_t)
++fs_read_noxattr_fs_files(mozilla_plugin_t)
++fs_read_hugetlbfs_files(mozilla_plugin_t)
+application_exec(mozilla_plugin_t)
application_dontaudit_signull(mozilla_plugin_t)
@@ -32121,14 +34851,16 @@ index d4fcb75..b1d28b7 100644
auth_use_nsswitch(mozilla_plugin_t)
+init_dontaudit_getattr_initctl(mozilla_plugin_t)
++init_read_all_script_files(mozilla_plugin_t)
+
+libs_exec_ld_so(mozilla_plugin_t)
+libs_exec_lib_files(mozilla_plugin_t)
+
logging_send_syslog_msg(mozilla_plugin_t)
- miscfiles_read_localization(mozilla_plugin_t)
-@@ -380,39 +430,29 @@ miscfiles_read_generic_certs(mozilla_plugin_t)
+-miscfiles_read_localization(mozilla_plugin_t)
+ miscfiles_read_fonts(mozilla_plugin_t)
+ miscfiles_read_generic_certs(mozilla_plugin_t)
miscfiles_dontaudit_setattr_fonts_dirs(mozilla_plugin_t)
miscfiles_dontaudit_setattr_fonts_cache_dirs(mozilla_plugin_t)
@@ -32138,6 +34870,7 @@ index d4fcb75..b1d28b7 100644
term_getattr_all_ptys(mozilla_plugin_t)
+term_getattr_ptmx(mozilla_plugin_t)
++userdom_dontaudit_setattr_user_tmpfs(mozilla_plugin_t)
userdom_rw_user_tmpfs_files(mozilla_plugin_t)
+userdom_delete_user_tmpfs_files(mozilla_plugin_t)
userdom_dontaudit_use_user_terminals(mozilla_plugin_t)
@@ -32170,17 +34903,18 @@ index d4fcb75..b1d28b7 100644
- fs_manage_nfs_files(mozilla_plugin_t)
- fs_manage_nfs_symlinks(mozilla_plugin_t)
-')
--
++userdom_home_manager(mozilla_plugin_t)
+
-tunable_policy(`use_samba_home_dirs',`
- fs_manage_cifs_dirs(mozilla_plugin_t)
- fs_manage_cifs_files(mozilla_plugin_t)
- fs_manage_cifs_symlinks(mozilla_plugin_t)
--')
-+userdom_home_manager(mozilla_plugin_t)
++tunable_policy(`mozilla_plugin_can_network_connect',`
++ corenet_tcp_connect_all_ports(mozilla_plugin_t)
+ ')
optional_policy(`
- alsa_read_rw_config(mozilla_plugin_t)
-@@ -422,24 +462,37 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -422,24 +481,39 @@ optional_policy(`
optional_policy(`
dbus_system_bus_client(mozilla_plugin_t)
dbus_session_bus_client(mozilla_plugin_t)
@@ -32218,26 +34952,28 @@ index d4fcb75..b1d28b7 100644
optional_policy(`
- pcscd_stream_connect(mozilla_plugin_t)
+ mplayer_exec(mozilla_plugin_t)
-+ mplayer_read_user_home_files(mozilla_plugin_t)
++ mplayer_filetrans_home_content(mozilla_plugin_t)
++ mplayer_manage_user_home_dirs(mozilla_plugin_t)
++ mplayer_manage_user_home_files(mozilla_plugin_t)
')
optional_policy(`
-@@ -447,10 +500,104 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -447,10 +521,115 @@ optional_policy(`
pulseaudio_stream_connect(mozilla_plugin_t)
pulseaudio_setattr_home_dir(mozilla_plugin_t)
pulseaudio_manage_home_files(mozilla_plugin_t)
+ pulseaudio_manage_home_symlinks(mozilla_plugin_t)
- ')
-
- optional_policy(`
-+ pcscd_stream_connect(mozilla_plugin_t)
+')
+
+optional_policy(`
-+ rtkit_scheduled(mozilla_plugin_t)
++ pcscd_stream_connect(mozilla_plugin_t)
+')
+
+optional_policy(`
++ rtkit_scheduled(mozilla_plugin_t)
+ ')
+
+ optional_policy(`
+ udev_read_db(mozilla_plugin_t)
+')
+
@@ -32264,6 +35000,8 @@ index d4fcb75..b1d28b7 100644
+allow mozilla_plugin_config_t self:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
+allow mozilla_plugin_config_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
+
++ps_process_pattern(mozilla_plugin_config_t,mozilla_plugin_t)
++
+dev_search_sysfs(mozilla_plugin_config_t)
+dev_read_urand(mozilla_plugin_config_t)
+dev_dontaudit_read_rand(mozilla_plugin_config_t)
@@ -32293,9 +35031,10 @@ index d4fcb75..b1d28b7 100644
+files_dontaudit_search_home(mozilla_plugin_config_t)
+files_list_tmp(mozilla_plugin_config_t)
+
++fs_getattr_all_fs(mozilla_plugin_config_t)
++
+auth_use_nsswitch(mozilla_plugin_config_t)
+
-+miscfiles_read_localization(mozilla_plugin_config_t)
+miscfiles_read_fonts(mozilla_plugin_config_t)
+
+userdom_search_user_home_content(mozilla_plugin_config_t)
@@ -32304,12 +35043,20 @@ index d4fcb75..b1d28b7 100644
+userdom_dontaudit_search_admin_dir(mozilla_plugin_config_t)
+userdom_use_inherited_user_ptys(mozilla_plugin_config_t)
+userdom_dontaudit_use_user_terminals(mozilla_plugin_config_t)
++userdom_dontaudit_rw_user_tmp_pipes(mozilla_plugin_config_t)
++userdom_dontaudit_write_all_user_home_content_files(mozilla_plugin_config_t)
++userdom_dontaudit_write_all_user_tmp_content_files(mozilla_plugin_config_t)
+
+domtrans_pattern(mozilla_plugin_config_t, mozilla_plugin_exec_t, mozilla_plugin_t)
+
+optional_policy(`
++ gnome_dontaudit_rw_inherited_config(mozilla_plugin_config_t)
++')
++
++optional_policy(`
+ xserver_use_user_fonts(mozilla_plugin_config_t)
+')
++
+ifdef(`distro_redhat',`
+ typealias mozilla_plugin_t alias nsplugin_t;
+ typealias mozilla_plugin_exec_t alias nsplugin_exec_t;
@@ -32355,7 +35102,7 @@ index d72276f..cb8c563 100644
mpd_initrc_domtrans($1)
domain_system_change_exemption($1)
diff --git a/mpd.te b/mpd.te
-index 7f68872..42b966b 100644
+index 7f68872..d92aaa8 100644
--- a/mpd.te
+++ b/mpd.te
@@ -44,6 +44,9 @@ allow mpd_t self:unix_stream_socket { connectto create_stream_socket_perms };
@@ -32387,21 +35134,35 @@ index 7f68872..42b966b 100644
corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(mpd_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(mpd_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_node(mpd_t)
-@@ -103,6 +109,10 @@ logging_send_syslog_msg(mpd_t)
+@@ -87,6 +93,7 @@ corenet_sendrecv_http_cache_client_packets(mpd_t)
+ corenet_sendrecv_pulseaudio_client_packets(mpd_t)
+ corenet_sendrecv_soundd_client_packets(mpd_t)
- miscfiles_read_localization(mpd_t)
++dev_read_urand(mpd_t)
+ dev_read_sound(mpd_t)
+ dev_write_sound(mpd_t)
+ dev_read_sysfs(mpd_t)
+@@ -101,7 +108,9 @@ auth_use_nsswitch(mpd_t)
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(mpd_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(mpd_t)
+userdom_read_home_audio_files(mpd_t)
+userdom_read_user_tmpfs_files(mpd_t)
+userdom_home_reader(mpd_t)
-+
+
optional_policy(`
alsa_read_rw_config(mpd_t)
- ')
-@@ -122,5 +132,14 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -122,5 +131,20 @@ optional_policy(`
')
optional_policy(`
++ #needed by pulseaudio
++ systemd_read_logind_sessions_files(mpd_t)
++ systemd_login_read_pid_files(mpd_t)
++')
++
++optional_policy(`
+ rtkit_daemon_dontaudit_dbus_chat(mpd_t)
+')
+
@@ -32414,16 +35175,73 @@ index 7f68872..42b966b 100644
+ xserver_dontaudit_read_xdm_pid(mpd_t)
+')
diff --git a/mplayer.if b/mplayer.if
-index d8ea41d..8bdc526 100644
+index d8ea41d..87c7046 100644
--- a/mplayer.if
+++ b/mplayer.if
-@@ -102,3 +102,39 @@ interface(`mplayer_read_user_home_files',`
+@@ -102,3 +102,96 @@ interface(`mplayer_read_user_home_files',`
read_files_pattern($1, mplayer_home_t, mplayer_home_t)
userdom_search_user_home_dirs($1)
')
+
+########################################
+## <summary>
++## Manage mplayer per user homedir
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`mplayer_manage_user_home_dirs',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type mplayer_home_t;
++ ')
++
++ manage_dirs_pattern($1, mplayer_home_t, mplayer_home_t)
++ userdom_search_user_home_dirs($1)
++')
++
++########################################
++## <summary>
++## Manage mplayer per user homedir
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`mplayer_manage_user_home_files',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type mplayer_home_t;
++ ')
++
++ manage_files_pattern($1, mplayer_home_t, mplayer_home_t)
++ manage_lnk_files_pattern($1, mplayer_home_t, mplayer_home_t)
++ userdom_search_user_home_dirs($1)
++')
++
++########################################
++## <summary>
++## Transition to mplayer named content
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`mplayer_filetrans_home_content',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type mplayer_home_t;
++ ')
++
++ userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans($1, mplayer_home_t, file, ".mplayer")
++')
++
++########################################
++## <summary>
+## Execute mplayer_exec_t
+## in the specified domain.
+## </summary>
@@ -32458,7 +35276,7 @@ index d8ea41d..8bdc526 100644
+ domtrans_pattern($1, mplayer_exec_t, $2)
+')
diff --git a/mplayer.te b/mplayer.te
-index 0cdea57..f84b0da 100644
+index 0cdea57..321a21a 100644
--- a/mplayer.te
+++ b/mplayer.te
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ policy_module(mplayer, 2.4.0)
@@ -32470,9 +35288,11 @@ index 0cdea57..f84b0da 100644
type mencoder_t;
type mencoder_exec_t;
-@@ -73,13 +73,14 @@ storage_raw_read_removable_device(mencoder_t)
+@@ -71,15 +71,15 @@ fs_search_auto_mountpoints(mencoder_t)
+ # Access to DVD/CD/V4L
+ storage_raw_read_removable_device(mencoder_t)
- miscfiles_read_localization(mencoder_t)
+-miscfiles_read_localization(mencoder_t)
-userdom_use_user_terminals(mencoder_t)
+userdom_use_inherited_user_terminals(mencoder_t)
@@ -32486,7 +35306,7 @@ index 0cdea57..f84b0da 100644
# Read content to encode
ifndef(`enable_mls',`
-@@ -88,58 +89,18 @@ ifndef(`enable_mls',`
+@@ -88,58 +88,18 @@ ifndef(`enable_mls',`
fs_read_removable_symlinks(mencoder_t)
')
@@ -32548,7 +35368,7 @@ index 0cdea57..f84b0da 100644
########################################
#
# mplayer local policy
-@@ -156,6 +117,7 @@ manage_dirs_pattern(mplayer_t, mplayer_home_t, mplayer_home_t)
+@@ -156,6 +116,7 @@ manage_dirs_pattern(mplayer_t, mplayer_home_t, mplayer_home_t)
manage_files_pattern(mplayer_t, mplayer_home_t, mplayer_home_t)
manage_lnk_files_pattern(mplayer_t, mplayer_home_t, mplayer_home_t)
userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans(mplayer_t, mplayer_home_t, dir)
@@ -32556,7 +35376,7 @@ index 0cdea57..f84b0da 100644
manage_files_pattern(mplayer_t, mplayer_tmpfs_t, mplayer_tmpfs_t)
manage_lnk_files_pattern(mplayer_t, mplayer_tmpfs_t, mplayer_tmpfs_t)
-@@ -177,7 +139,6 @@ kernel_read_system_state(mplayer_t)
+@@ -177,7 +138,6 @@ kernel_read_system_state(mplayer_t)
kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(mplayer_t)
corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(mplayer_t)
@@ -32564,7 +35384,7 @@ index 0cdea57..f84b0da 100644
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(mplayer_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_node(mplayer_t)
corenet_tcp_bind_generic_node(mplayer_t)
-@@ -206,7 +167,6 @@ domain_use_interactive_fds(mplayer_t)
+@@ -206,7 +166,6 @@ domain_use_interactive_fds(mplayer_t)
# Access to DVD/CD/V4L
storage_raw_read_removable_device(mplayer_t)
@@ -32572,15 +35392,15 @@ index 0cdea57..f84b0da 100644
files_dontaudit_list_non_security(mplayer_t)
files_dontaudit_getattr_non_security_files(mplayer_t)
files_read_non_security_files(mplayer_t)
-@@ -222,10 +182,14 @@ fs_dontaudit_getattr_all_fs(mplayer_t)
+@@ -222,10 +181,13 @@ fs_dontaudit_getattr_all_fs(mplayer_t)
fs_search_auto_mountpoints(mplayer_t)
fs_list_inotifyfs(mplayer_t)
+-miscfiles_read_localization(mplayer_t)
+auth_use_nsswitch(mplayer_t)
+
+logging_send_syslog_msg(mplayer_t)
+
- miscfiles_read_localization(mplayer_t)
miscfiles_read_fonts(mplayer_t)
-userdom_use_user_terminals(mplayer_t)
@@ -32588,7 +35408,7 @@ index 0cdea57..f84b0da 100644
# Read media files
userdom_list_user_tmp(mplayer_t)
userdom_read_user_tmp_files(mplayer_t)
-@@ -233,6 +197,7 @@ userdom_read_user_tmp_symlinks(mplayer_t)
+@@ -233,6 +195,7 @@ userdom_read_user_tmp_symlinks(mplayer_t)
userdom_read_user_home_content_files(mplayer_t)
userdom_read_user_home_content_symlinks(mplayer_t)
userdom_write_user_tmp_sockets(mplayer_t)
@@ -32596,7 +35416,7 @@ index 0cdea57..f84b0da 100644
xserver_user_x_domain_template(mplayer, mplayer_t, mplayer_tmpfs_t)
-@@ -243,62 +208,31 @@ ifdef(`enable_mls',`',`
+@@ -243,62 +206,31 @@ ifdef(`enable_mls',`',`
fs_read_removable_symlinks(mplayer_t)
')
@@ -32667,8 +35487,19 @@ index 0cdea57..f84b0da 100644
')
optional_policy(`
+diff --git a/mrtg.fc b/mrtg.fc
+index 37fb953..7e9773a 100644
+--- a/mrtg.fc
++++ b/mrtg.fc
+@@ -14,5 +14,6 @@
+ #
+ /var/lib/mrtg(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:mrtg_var_lib_t,s0)
+ /var/lock/mrtg(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:mrtg_lock_t,s0)
++/var/lock/mrtg-rrd(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:mrtg_lock_t,s0)
+ /var/log/mrtg(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:mrtg_log_t,s0)
+ /var/run/mrtg\.pid gen_context(system_u:object_r:mrtg_var_run_t,s0)
diff --git a/mrtg.te b/mrtg.te
-index 0e19d80..1a53995 100644
+index 0e19d80..c203717 100644
--- a/mrtg.te
+++ b/mrtg.te
@@ -43,9 +43,12 @@ read_lnk_files_pattern(mrtg_t, mrtg_etc_t, mrtg_etc_t)
@@ -32700,8 +35531,12 @@ index 0e19d80..1a53995 100644
fs_search_auto_mountpoints(mrtg_t)
fs_getattr_xattr_fs(mrtg_t)
-@@ -112,9 +113,10 @@ miscfiles_read_localization(mrtg_t)
+@@ -108,13 +109,12 @@ libs_read_lib_files(mrtg_t)
+
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(mrtg_t)
+-miscfiles_read_localization(mrtg_t)
+-
selinux_dontaudit_getattr_dir(mrtg_t)
-userdom_use_user_terminals(mrtg_t)
@@ -32713,10 +35548,10 @@ index 0e19d80..1a53995 100644
netutils_domtrans_ping(mrtg_t)
diff --git a/mta.fc b/mta.fc
-index afa18c8..f6e2bb8 100644
+index afa18c8..2f102b2 100644
--- a/mta.fc
+++ b/mta.fc
-@@ -1,4 +1,8 @@
+@@ -1,30 +1,41 @@
-HOME_DIR/\.forward -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:mail_forward_t,s0)
+HOME_DIR/\.esmtp_queue -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:mail_home_t,s0)
+HOME_DIR/\.forward[^/]* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:mail_home_t,s0)
@@ -32726,7 +35561,13 @@ index afa18c8..f6e2bb8 100644
/bin/mail(x)? -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:sendmail_exec_t,s0)
-@@ -11,20 +15,28 @@ ifdef(`distro_redhat',`
+ /etc/aliases -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:etc_aliases_t,s0)
+ /etc/aliases\.db -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:etc_aliases_t,s0)
+ /etc/mail(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:etc_mail_t,s0)
+-/etc/mail/aliases -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:etc_aliases_t,s0)
+-/etc/mail/aliases\.db -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:etc_aliases_t,s0)
++/etc/mail/aliases.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:etc_aliases_t,s0)
+ ifdef(`distro_redhat',`
/etc/postfix/aliases.* gen_context(system_u:object_r:etc_aliases_t,s0)
')
@@ -32763,7 +35604,7 @@ index afa18c8..f6e2bb8 100644
+/var/spool/mqueue\.in(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:mqueue_spool_t,s0)
/var/spool/mail(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:mail_spool_t,s0)
diff --git a/mta.if b/mta.if
-index 4e2a5ba..c3643f0 100644
+index 4e2a5ba..0005ac0 100644
--- a/mta.if
+++ b/mta.if
@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ interface(`mta_stub',`
@@ -32774,7 +35615,7 @@ index 4e2a5ba..c3643f0 100644
#
template(`mta_base_mail_template',`
-@@ -56,92 +57,15 @@ template(`mta_base_mail_template',`
+@@ -56,92 +57,19 @@ template(`mta_base_mail_template',`
type $1_mail_tmp_t;
files_tmp_file($1_mail_tmp_t)
@@ -32790,8 +35631,11 @@ index 4e2a5ba..c3643f0 100644
- # re-exec itself
- can_exec($1_mail_t, sendmail_exec_t)
- allow $1_mail_t sendmail_exec_t:lnk_file read_lnk_file_perms;
--
-- kernel_read_system_state($1_mail_t)
++ manage_dirs_pattern($1_mail_t, $1_mail_tmp_t, $1_mail_tmp_t)
++ manage_files_pattern($1_mail_t, $1_mail_tmp_t, $1_mail_tmp_t)
++ files_tmp_filetrans($1_mail_t, $1_mail_tmp_t, { file dir })
+
+ kernel_read_system_state($1_mail_t)
- kernel_read_kernel_sysctls($1_mail_t)
-
- corenet_all_recvfrom_unlabeled($1_mail_t)
@@ -32809,16 +35653,13 @@ index 4e2a5ba..c3643f0 100644
- files_search_spool($1_mail_t)
- # It wants to check for nscd
- files_dontaudit_search_pids($1_mail_t)
-+ manage_dirs_pattern($1_mail_t, $1_mail_tmp_t, $1_mail_tmp_t)
-+ manage_files_pattern($1_mail_t, $1_mail_tmp_t, $1_mail_tmp_t)
-+ files_tmp_filetrans($1_mail_t, $1_mail_tmp_t, { file dir })
auth_use_nsswitch($1_mail_t)
- init_dontaudit_rw_utmp($1_mail_t)
-
-- logging_send_syslog_msg($1_mail_t)
--
+ logging_send_syslog_msg($1_mail_t)
+
- miscfiles_read_localization($1_mail_t)
-
- optional_policy(`
@@ -32870,7 +35711,7 @@ index 4e2a5ba..c3643f0 100644
')
########################################
-@@ -169,11 +93,19 @@ interface(`mta_role',`
+@@ -169,11 +97,19 @@ interface(`mta_role',`
# Transition from the user domain to the derived domain.
domtrans_pattern($2, sendmail_exec_t, user_mail_t)
@@ -32879,7 +35720,8 @@ index 4e2a5ba..c3643f0 100644
allow mta_user_agent $2:fd use;
allow mta_user_agent $2:process sigchld;
- allow mta_user_agent $2:fifo_file { read write };
+- allow mta_user_agent $2:fifo_file { read write };
++ allow mta_user_agent $2:fifo_file rw_inherited_fifo_file_perms;
+
+ optional_policy(`
+ exim_run($2, $1)
@@ -32891,7 +35733,7 @@ index 4e2a5ba..c3643f0 100644
')
########################################
-@@ -220,6 +152,25 @@ interface(`mta_agent_executable',`
+@@ -220,6 +156,25 @@ interface(`mta_agent_executable',`
application_executable_file($1)
')
@@ -32917,7 +35759,7 @@ index 4e2a5ba..c3643f0 100644
########################################
## <summary>
## Make the specified type by a system MTA.
-@@ -306,10 +257,15 @@ interface(`mta_mailserver_sender',`
+@@ -306,10 +261,15 @@ interface(`mta_mailserver_sender',`
interface(`mta_mailserver_delivery',`
gen_require(`
attribute mailserver_delivery;
@@ -32934,7 +35776,17 @@ index 4e2a5ba..c3643f0 100644
')
#######################################
-@@ -393,12 +349,19 @@ interface(`mta_send_mail',`
+@@ -361,8 +321,7 @@ interface(`mta_send_mail',`
+
+ allow mta_user_agent $1:fd use;
+ allow mta_user_agent $1:process sigchld;
+- allow mta_user_agent $1:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms;
+-
++ allow mta_user_agent $1:fifo_file rw_inherited_fifo_file_perms;
+ dontaudit mta_user_agent $1:unix_stream_socket rw_socket_perms;
+ ')
+
+@@ -393,12 +352,19 @@ interface(`mta_send_mail',`
#
interface(`mta_sendmail_domtrans',`
gen_require(`
@@ -32952,11 +35804,11 @@ index 4e2a5ba..c3643f0 100644
+ domtrans_pattern($1, mta_exec_type, $2)
+ allow mta_user_agent $1:fd use;
+ allow mta_user_agent $1:process sigchld;
-+ allow mta_user_agent $1:fifo_file { read write };
++ allow mta_user_agent $1:fifo_file rw_inherited_fifo_file_perms;
')
########################################
-@@ -411,7 +374,6 @@ interface(`mta_sendmail_domtrans',`
+@@ -411,7 +377,6 @@ interface(`mta_sendmail_domtrans',`
## </summary>
## </param>
#
@@ -32964,7 +35816,7 @@ index 4e2a5ba..c3643f0 100644
interface(`mta_signal_system_mail',`
gen_require(`
type system_mail_t;
-@@ -422,6 +384,60 @@ interface(`mta_signal_system_mail',`
+@@ -422,6 +387,60 @@ interface(`mta_signal_system_mail',`
########################################
## <summary>
@@ -33025,7 +35877,7 @@ index 4e2a5ba..c3643f0 100644
## Execute sendmail in the caller domain.
## </summary>
## <param name="domain">
-@@ -440,6 +456,26 @@ interface(`mta_sendmail_exec',`
+@@ -440,6 +459,26 @@ interface(`mta_sendmail_exec',`
########################################
## <summary>
@@ -33052,7 +35904,33 @@ index 4e2a5ba..c3643f0 100644
## Read mail server configuration.
## </summary>
## <param name="domain">
-@@ -496,6 +532,7 @@ interface(`mta_read_aliases',`
+@@ -481,6 +520,25 @@ interface(`mta_write_config',`
+
+ ########################################
+ ## <summary>
++## Manage mail server configuration.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++## <rolecap/>
++#
++interface(`mta_manage_config',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type etc_mail_t;
++ ')
++
++ manage_files_pattern($1, etc_mail_t, etc_mail_t)
++')
++
++########################################
++## <summary>
+ ## Read mail address aliases.
+ ## </summary>
+ ## <param name="domain">
+@@ -496,6 +554,7 @@ interface(`mta_read_aliases',`
files_search_etc($1)
allow $1 etc_aliases_t:file read_file_perms;
@@ -33060,7 +35938,28 @@ index 4e2a5ba..c3643f0 100644
')
########################################
-@@ -534,7 +571,7 @@ interface(`mta_etc_filetrans_aliases',`
+@@ -516,6 +575,9 @@ interface(`mta_manage_aliases',`
+ files_search_etc($1)
+ manage_files_pattern($1, etc_aliases_t, etc_aliases_t)
+ manage_lnk_files_pattern($1, etc_aliases_t, etc_aliases_t)
++ mta_etc_filetrans_aliases($1, "aliases")
++ mta_etc_filetrans_aliases($1, "aliases.db")
++ mta_etc_filetrans_aliases($1, "aliasesdb-stamp")
+ ')
+
+ ########################################
+@@ -528,13 +590,18 @@ interface(`mta_manage_aliases',`
+ ## Domain allowed access.
+ ## </summary>
+ ## </param>
++## <param name="name" optional="true">
++## <summary>
++## The name of the object being created.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
+ #
+ interface(`mta_etc_filetrans_aliases',`
+ gen_require(`
type etc_aliases_t;
')
@@ -33069,7 +35968,7 @@ index 4e2a5ba..c3643f0 100644
')
########################################
-@@ -554,7 +591,7 @@ interface(`mta_rw_aliases',`
+@@ -554,7 +621,7 @@ interface(`mta_rw_aliases',`
')
files_search_etc($1)
@@ -33078,7 +35977,7 @@ index 4e2a5ba..c3643f0 100644
')
#######################################
-@@ -576,6 +613,25 @@ interface(`mta_dontaudit_rw_delivery_tcp_sockets',`
+@@ -576,6 +643,25 @@ interface(`mta_dontaudit_rw_delivery_tcp_sockets',`
dontaudit $1 mailserver_delivery:tcp_socket { read write };
')
@@ -33104,7 +36003,7 @@ index 4e2a5ba..c3643f0 100644
#######################################
## <summary>
## Connect to all mail servers over TCP. (Deprecated)
-@@ -648,8 +704,8 @@ interface(`mta_dontaudit_getattr_spool_files',`
+@@ -648,8 +734,8 @@ interface(`mta_dontaudit_getattr_spool_files',`
files_dontaudit_search_spool($1)
dontaudit $1 mail_spool_t:dir search_dir_perms;
@@ -33115,7 +36014,19 @@ index 4e2a5ba..c3643f0 100644
')
#######################################
-@@ -679,7 +735,26 @@ interface(`mta_spool_filetrans',`
+@@ -672,6 +758,11 @@ interface(`mta_dontaudit_getattr_spool_files',`
+ ## The object class of the object being created.
+ ## </summary>
+ ## </param>
++## <param name="name" optional="true">
++## <summary>
++## The name of the object being created.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
+ #
+ interface(`mta_spool_filetrans',`
+ gen_require(`
+@@ -679,7 +770,26 @@ interface(`mta_spool_filetrans',`
')
files_search_spool($1)
@@ -33143,7 +36054,7 @@ index 4e2a5ba..c3643f0 100644
')
########################################
-@@ -699,8 +774,8 @@ interface(`mta_rw_spool',`
+@@ -699,8 +809,8 @@ interface(`mta_rw_spool',`
files_search_spool($1)
allow $1 mail_spool_t:dir list_dir_perms;
@@ -33154,7 +36065,7 @@ index 4e2a5ba..c3643f0 100644
read_lnk_files_pattern($1, mail_spool_t, mail_spool_t)
')
-@@ -840,7 +915,7 @@ interface(`mta_dontaudit_rw_queue',`
+@@ -840,7 +950,7 @@ interface(`mta_dontaudit_rw_queue',`
')
dontaudit $1 mqueue_spool_t:dir search_dir_perms;
@@ -33163,7 +36074,7 @@ index 4e2a5ba..c3643f0 100644
')
########################################
-@@ -866,6 +941,36 @@ interface(`mta_manage_queue',`
+@@ -866,6 +976,41 @@ interface(`mta_manage_queue',`
#######################################
## <summary>
@@ -33185,6 +36096,11 @@ index 4e2a5ba..c3643f0 100644
+## The object class of the object being created.
+## </summary>
+## </param>
++## <param name="name" optional="true">
++## <summary>
++## The name of the object being created.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
+#
+interface(`mta_spool_filetrans_queue',`
+ gen_require(`
@@ -33200,7 +36116,7 @@ index 4e2a5ba..c3643f0 100644
## Read sendmail binary.
## </summary>
## <param name="domain">
-@@ -901,3 +1006,170 @@ interface(`mta_rw_user_mail_stream_sockets',`
+@@ -901,3 +1046,173 @@ interface(`mta_rw_user_mail_stream_sockets',`
allow $1 user_mail_domain:unix_stream_socket rw_socket_perms;
')
@@ -33269,6 +36185,7 @@ index 4e2a5ba..c3643f0 100644
+
+ userdom_search_user_home_dirs($1)
+ read_files_pattern($1, mail_home_rw_t, mail_home_rw_t)
++ read_lnk_files_pattern($1, mail_home_rw_t, mail_home_rw_t)
+
+ ifdef(`distro_redhat',`
+ userdom_search_admin_dir($1)
@@ -33291,9 +36208,10 @@ index 4e2a5ba..c3643f0 100644
+ ')
+
+ userdom_search_user_home_dirs($1)
++ userdom_search_admin_dir($1)
+ manage_files_pattern($1, mail_home_rw_t, mail_home_rw_t)
+ manage_dirs_pattern($1, mail_home_rw_t, mail_home_rw_t)
-+ read_lnk_files_pattern($1, mail_home_rw_t, mail_home_rw_t)
++ manage_lnk_files_pattern($1, mail_home_rw_t, mail_home_rw_t)
+ userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans($1, mail_home_rw_t, dir, "Maildir")
+
+ ifdef(`distro_redhat',`
@@ -33328,7 +36246,7 @@ index 4e2a5ba..c3643f0 100644
+
+########################################
+## <summary>
-+## Transition to mta named content
++## Transition to mta named home content
+## </summary>
+## <param name="domain">
+## <summary>
@@ -33351,7 +36269,7 @@ index 4e2a5ba..c3643f0 100644
+
+########################################
+## <summary>
-+## Transition to apache named content
++## Transition to mta named content
+## </summary>
+## <param name="domain">
+## <summary>
@@ -33368,11 +36286,12 @@ index 4e2a5ba..c3643f0 100644
+ filetrans_pattern($1, etc_mail_t, etc_aliases_t, { dir file })
+ mta_etc_filetrans_aliases($1, "aliases")
+ mta_etc_filetrans_aliases($1, "aliases.db")
++ mta_etc_filetrans_aliases($1, "aliasesdb-stamp")
+ mta_filetrans_home_content($1)
+ mta_filetrans_admin_home_content($1)
+')
diff --git a/mta.te b/mta.te
-index 84a7d66..f887c9e 100644
+index 84a7d66..c58f1e7 100644
--- a/mta.te
+++ b/mta.te
@@ -20,14 +20,19 @@ files_type(etc_aliases_t)
@@ -33421,7 +36340,12 @@ index 84a7d66..f887c9e 100644
dev_read_sysfs(system_mail_t)
dev_read_rand(system_mail_t)
-@@ -79,9 +75,22 @@ selinux_getattr_fs(system_mail_t)
+@@ -74,14 +70,25 @@ files_read_usr_files(system_mail_t)
+
+ fs_rw_anon_inodefs_files(system_mail_t)
+
+-selinux_getattr_fs(system_mail_t)
+-
term_dontaudit_use_unallocated_ttys(system_mail_t)
init_use_script_ptys(system_mail_t)
@@ -33445,7 +36369,7 @@ index 84a7d66..f887c9e 100644
optional_policy(`
apache_read_squirrelmail_data(system_mail_t)
-@@ -92,14 +101,26 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -92,25 +99,38 @@ optional_policy(`
apache_dontaudit_rw_stream_sockets(system_mail_t)
apache_dontaudit_rw_tcp_sockets(system_mail_t)
apache_dontaudit_rw_sys_script_stream_sockets(system_mail_t)
@@ -33467,22 +36391,20 @@ index 84a7d66..f887c9e 100644
+ arpwatch_dontaudit_rw_packet_sockets(system_mail_t)
+ ')
+
-+')
-+
-+optional_policy(`
-+ bugzilla_search_content(system_mail_t)
-+ bugzilla_dontaudit_rw_stream_sockets(system_mail_t)
- ')
-
- optional_policy(`
-@@ -108,9 +129,15 @@ optional_policy(`
')
optional_policy(`
-+ courier_stream_connect_authdaemon(system_mail_t)
+- clamav_stream_connect(system_mail_t)
+- clamav_append_log(system_mail_t)
++ bugzilla_search_content(system_mail_t)
++ bugzilla_dontaudit_rw_stream_sockets(system_mail_t)
+')
+
+optional_policy(`
++ courier_stream_connect_authdaemon(system_mail_t)
+ ')
+
+ optional_policy(`
cron_read_system_job_tmp_files(system_mail_t)
cron_dontaudit_write_pipes(system_mail_t)
cron_rw_system_job_stream_sockets(system_mail_t)
@@ -33491,7 +36413,7 @@ index 84a7d66..f887c9e 100644
')
optional_policy(`
-@@ -124,12 +151,9 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -124,12 +144,9 @@ optional_policy(`
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -33506,7 +36428,7 @@ index 84a7d66..f887c9e 100644
')
optional_policy(`
-@@ -146,6 +170,10 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -146,6 +163,10 @@ optional_policy(`
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -33517,7 +36439,7 @@ index 84a7d66..f887c9e 100644
nagios_read_tmp_files(system_mail_t)
')
-@@ -158,22 +186,13 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -158,22 +179,13 @@ optional_policy(`
files_etc_filetrans(system_mail_t, etc_aliases_t, { file lnk_file sock_file fifo_file })
domain_use_interactive_fds(system_mail_t)
@@ -33543,7 +36465,7 @@ index 84a7d66..f887c9e 100644
')
optional_policy(`
-@@ -189,6 +208,10 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -189,6 +201,10 @@ optional_policy(`
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -33554,7 +36476,7 @@ index 84a7d66..f887c9e 100644
smartmon_read_tmp_files(system_mail_t)
')
-@@ -199,20 +222,23 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -199,20 +215,23 @@ optional_policy(`
arpwatch_search_data(mailserver_delivery)
arpwatch_manage_tmp_files(mta_user_agent)
@@ -33582,7 +36504,7 @@ index 84a7d66..f887c9e 100644
allow mailserver_delivery mail_spool_t:dir list_dir_perms;
create_files_pattern(mailserver_delivery, mail_spool_t, mail_spool_t)
read_files_pattern(mailserver_delivery, mail_spool_t, mail_spool_t)
-@@ -220,21 +246,13 @@ append_files_pattern(mailserver_delivery, mail_spool_t, mail_spool_t)
+@@ -220,21 +239,14 @@ append_files_pattern(mailserver_delivery, mail_spool_t, mail_spool_t)
create_lnk_files_pattern(mailserver_delivery, mail_spool_t, mail_spool_t)
read_lnk_files_pattern(mailserver_delivery, mail_spool_t, mail_spool_t)
@@ -33591,15 +36513,16 @@ index 84a7d66..f887c9e 100644
+read_files_pattern(mailserver_delivery, mail_home_t, mail_home_t)
-read_files_pattern(mailserver_delivery, system_mail_tmp_t, system_mail_tmp_t)
-+manage_dirs_pattern(mailserver_delivery, mail_home_rw_t, mail_home_rw_t)
-+manage_files_pattern(mailserver_delivery, mail_home_rw_t, mail_home_rw_t)
-
+-
-tunable_policy(`use_samba_home_dirs',`
- fs_manage_cifs_dirs(mailserver_delivery)
- fs_manage_cifs_files(mailserver_delivery)
- fs_manage_cifs_symlinks(mailserver_delivery)
-')
--
++manage_dirs_pattern(mailserver_delivery, mail_home_rw_t, mail_home_rw_t)
++manage_files_pattern(mailserver_delivery, mail_home_rw_t, mail_home_rw_t)
++manage_lnk_files_pattern(mailserver_delivery, mail_home_rw_t, mail_home_rw_t)
+
-tunable_policy(`use_nfs_home_dirs',`
- fs_manage_nfs_dirs(mailserver_delivery)
- fs_manage_nfs_files(mailserver_delivery)
@@ -33609,7 +36532,7 @@ index 84a7d66..f887c9e 100644
optional_policy(`
dovecot_manage_spool(mailserver_delivery)
-@@ -242,6 +260,10 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -242,6 +254,10 @@ optional_policy(`
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -33620,7 +36543,7 @@ index 84a7d66..f887c9e 100644
# so MTA can access /var/lib/mailman/mail/wrapper
files_search_var_lib(mailserver_delivery)
-@@ -249,6 +271,14 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -249,6 +265,14 @@ optional_policy(`
mailman_read_data_symlinks(mailserver_delivery)
')
@@ -33635,7 +36558,7 @@ index 84a7d66..f887c9e 100644
########################################
#
# User send mail local policy
-@@ -256,9 +286,9 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -256,9 +280,9 @@ optional_policy(`
domain_use_interactive_fds(user_mail_t)
@@ -33647,7 +36570,7 @@ index 84a7d66..f887c9e 100644
# Create dead.letter in user home directories.
userdom_manage_user_home_content_files(user_mail_t)
userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans_user_home_content(user_mail_t, file)
-@@ -270,6 +300,8 @@ userdom_manage_user_home_content_symlinks(mailserver_delivery)
+@@ -270,6 +294,8 @@ userdom_manage_user_home_content_symlinks(mailserver_delivery)
userdom_manage_user_home_content_pipes(mailserver_delivery)
userdom_manage_user_home_content_sockets(mailserver_delivery)
userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans_user_home_content(mailserver_delivery, { dir file lnk_file fifo_file sock_file })
@@ -33656,7 +36579,7 @@ index 84a7d66..f887c9e 100644
# Read user temporary files.
userdom_read_user_tmp_files(user_mail_t)
userdom_dontaudit_append_user_tmp_files(user_mail_t)
-@@ -277,6 +309,8 @@ userdom_dontaudit_append_user_tmp_files(user_mail_t)
+@@ -277,6 +303,8 @@ userdom_dontaudit_append_user_tmp_files(user_mail_t)
# files in an appropriate place for mta_user_agent
userdom_read_user_tmp_files(mta_user_agent)
@@ -33665,7 +36588,7 @@ index 84a7d66..f887c9e 100644
tunable_policy(`use_samba_home_dirs',`
fs_manage_cifs_files(user_mail_t)
fs_manage_cifs_symlinks(user_mail_t)
-@@ -292,3 +326,122 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -292,3 +320,123 @@ optional_policy(`
postfix_read_config(user_mail_t)
postfix_list_spool(user_mail_t)
')
@@ -33695,7 +36618,6 @@ index 84a7d66..f887c9e 100644
+
+read_files_pattern(user_mail_domain, etc_mail_t, etc_mail_t)
+
-+kernel_read_system_state(user_mail_domain)
+kernel_read_network_state(user_mail_domain)
+kernel_request_load_module(user_mail_domain)
+
@@ -33713,10 +36635,8 @@ index 84a7d66..f887c9e 100644
+can_exec(user_mail_domain, sendmail_exec_t)
+allow user_mail_domain sendmail_exec_t:lnk_file read_lnk_file_perms;
+
-+kernel_read_system_state(user_mail_domain)
+kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(user_mail_domain)
+
-+corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(user_mail_domain)
+corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(user_mail_domain)
+corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_node(user_mail_domain)
+corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_ports(user_mail_domain)
@@ -33739,10 +36659,6 @@ index 84a7d66..f887c9e 100644
+
+init_dontaudit_rw_utmp(user_mail_domain)
+
-+logging_send_syslog_msg(user_mail_domain)
-+
-+miscfiles_read_localization(user_mail_domain)
-+
+optional_policy(`
+ courier_manage_spool_dirs(user_mail_domain)
+ courier_manage_spool_files(user_mail_domain)
@@ -33770,6 +36686,9 @@ index 84a7d66..f887c9e 100644
+ ')
+')
+
++optional_policy(`
++ openshift_rw_inherited_content(mta_user_agent)
++')
+
+optional_policy(`
+ procmail_exec(user_mail_domain)
@@ -33788,11 +36707,27 @@ index 84a7d66..f887c9e 100644
+optional_policy(`
+ uucp_manage_spool(user_mail_domain)
+')
++
++optional_policy(`
++ clamav_stream_connect(user_mail_domain)
++ clamav_stream_connect(mta_user_agent)
++')
diff --git a/munin.fc b/munin.fc
-index fd71d69..26597b2 100644
+index fd71d69..5b771ef 100644
--- a/munin.fc
+++ b/munin.fc
-@@ -41,6 +41,9 @@
+@@ -4,7 +4,9 @@
+ /usr/bin/munin-.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:munin_exec_t,s0)
+ /usr/sbin/munin-.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:munin_exec_t,s0)
+ /usr/share/munin/munin-.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:munin_exec_t,s0)
+-/usr/share/munin/plugins/.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:munin_exec_t,s0)
++
++# label all plugins as unconfined_munin_plugin_exec_t
++/usr/share/munin/plugins/.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:unconfined_munin_plugin_exec_t,s0)
+
+ # disk plugins
+ /usr/share/munin/plugins/diskstat.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:disk_munin_plugin_exec_t,s0)
+@@ -41,6 +43,9 @@
/usr/share/munin/plugins/tomcat_.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:services_munin_plugin_exec_t,s0)
/usr/share/munin/plugins/varnish_.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:services_munin_plugin_exec_t,s0)
@@ -33802,7 +36737,7 @@ index fd71d69..26597b2 100644
# system plugins
/usr/share/munin/plugins/acpi -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:system_munin_plugin_exec_t,s0)
/usr/share/munin/plugins/cpu.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:system_munin_plugin_exec_t,s0)
-@@ -51,6 +54,7 @@
+@@ -51,6 +56,7 @@
/usr/share/munin/plugins/irqstats -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:system_munin_plugin_exec_t,s0)
/usr/share/munin/plugins/load -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:system_munin_plugin_exec_t,s0)
/usr/share/munin/plugins/memory -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:system_munin_plugin_exec_t,s0)
@@ -33810,7 +36745,13 @@ index fd71d69..26597b2 100644
/usr/share/munin/plugins/netstat -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:system_munin_plugin_exec_t,s0)
/usr/share/munin/plugins/nfs.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:system_munin_plugin_exec_t,s0)
/usr/share/munin/plugins/open_files -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:system_munin_plugin_exec_t,s0)
-@@ -63,6 +67,7 @@
+@@ -58,11 +64,13 @@
+ /usr/share/munin/plugins/processes -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:system_munin_plugin_exec_t,s0)
+ /usr/share/munin/plugins/swap -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:system_munin_plugin_exec_t,s0)
+ /usr/share/munin/plugins/threads -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:system_munin_plugin_exec_t,s0)
++/usr/share/munin/plugins/unbound -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:system_munin_plugin_exec_t,s0)
+ /usr/share/munin/plugins/uptime -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:system_munin_plugin_exec_t,s0)
+ /usr/share/munin/plugins/users -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:system_munin_plugin_exec_t,s0)
/usr/share/munin/plugins/yum -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:system_munin_plugin_exec_t,s0)
/var/lib/munin(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:munin_var_lib_t,s0)
@@ -33819,7 +36760,7 @@ index fd71d69..26597b2 100644
/var/run/munin(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:munin_var_run_t,s0)
/var/www/html/munin(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_munin_content_t,s0)
diff --git a/munin.if b/munin.if
-index c358d8f..7c097ec 100644
+index c358d8f..1cc176c 100644
--- a/munin.if
+++ b/munin.if
@@ -13,10 +13,11 @@
@@ -33836,7 +36777,7 @@ index c358d8f..7c097ec 100644
type $1_munin_plugin_exec_t;
typealias $1_munin_plugin_t alias munin_$1_plugin_t;
typealias $1_munin_plugin_exec_t alias munin_$1_plugin_exec_t;
-@@ -36,17 +37,7 @@ template(`munin_plugin_template',`
+@@ -36,17 +37,9 @@ template(`munin_plugin_template',`
# automatic transition rules from munin domain
# to specific munin plugin domain
domtrans_pattern(munin_t, $1_munin_plugin_exec_t, $1_munin_plugin_t)
@@ -33845,17 +36786,17 @@ index c358d8f..7c097ec 100644
- allow $1_munin_plugin_t munin_t:tcp_socket rw_socket_perms;
-
- read_lnk_files_pattern($1_munin_plugin_t, munin_etc_t, munin_etc_t)
--
-- kernel_read_system_state($1_munin_plugin_t)
++ allow munin_t $1_munin_plugin_t:process signal_perms;
+
+ kernel_read_system_state($1_munin_plugin_t)
-
- corecmd_exec_bin($1_munin_plugin_t)
-
- miscfiles_read_localization($1_munin_plugin_t)
-+ allow munin_t $1_munin_plugin_t:process signal_perms;
')
########################################
-@@ -65,9 +56,8 @@ interface(`munin_stream_connect',`
+@@ -65,9 +58,8 @@ interface(`munin_stream_connect',`
type munin_var_run_t, munin_t;
')
@@ -33866,7 +36807,7 @@ index c358d8f..7c097ec 100644
')
#######################################
-@@ -88,10 +78,28 @@ interface(`munin_read_config',`
+@@ -88,12 +80,50 @@ interface(`munin_read_config',`
allow $1 munin_etc_t:dir list_dir_perms;
allow $1 munin_etc_t:file read_file_perms;
@@ -33875,6 +36816,26 @@ index c358d8f..7c097ec 100644
files_search_etc($1)
')
+ #######################################
+ ## <summary>
++## Read munin library files.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`munin_read_var_lib_files',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type munin_var_lib_t;
++ ')
++
++ files_search_var_lib($1)
++ read_files_pattern($1, munin_var_lib_t, munin_var_lib_t)
++
++')
++
+######################################
+## <summary>
+## dontaudit read and write an leaked file descriptors
@@ -33893,10 +36854,12 @@ index c358d8f..7c097ec 100644
+ dontaudit $1 munin_t:tcp_socket { read write };
+')
+
- #######################################
- ## <summary>
++#######################################
++## <summary>
## Append to the munin log.
-@@ -172,12 +180,14 @@ interface(`munin_admin',`
+ ## </summary>
+ ## <param name="domain">
+@@ -172,12 +202,14 @@ interface(`munin_admin',`
gen_require(`
type munin_t, munin_etc_t, munin_tmp_t;
type munin_log_t, munin_var_lib_t, munin_var_run_t;
@@ -33915,7 +36878,7 @@ index c358d8f..7c097ec 100644
init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, munin_initrc_exec_t)
domain_system_change_exemption($1)
diff --git a/munin.te b/munin.te
-index f17583b..a363924 100644
+index f17583b..de08ab6 100644
--- a/munin.te
+++ b/munin.te
@@ -5,6 +5,8 @@ policy_module(munin, 1.8.0)
@@ -33937,7 +36900,7 @@ index f17583b..a363924 100644
type munin_var_run_t alias lrrd_var_run_t;
files_pid_file(munin_var_run_t)
-@@ -31,6 +36,8 @@ munin_plugin_template(disk)
+@@ -31,16 +36,20 @@ munin_plugin_template(disk)
munin_plugin_template(mail)
@@ -33946,7 +36909,11 @@ index f17583b..a363924 100644
munin_plugin_template(services)
munin_plugin_template(system)
-@@ -40,7 +47,7 @@ munin_plugin_template(system)
+
++munin_plugin_template(unconfined)
++
+ ########################################
+ #
# Local policy
#
@@ -33955,7 +36922,7 @@ index f17583b..a363924 100644
dontaudit munin_t self:capability sys_tty_config;
allow munin_t self:process { getsched setsched signal_perms };
allow munin_t self:unix_stream_socket { create_stream_socket_perms connectto };
-@@ -71,9 +78,12 @@ manage_files_pattern(munin_t, munin_var_lib_t, munin_var_lib_t)
+@@ -71,9 +80,12 @@ manage_files_pattern(munin_t, munin_var_lib_t, munin_var_lib_t)
manage_lnk_files_pattern(munin_t, munin_var_lib_t, munin_var_lib_t)
files_search_var_lib(munin_t)
@@ -33965,11 +36932,11 @@ index f17583b..a363924 100644
-files_pid_filetrans(munin_t, munin_var_run_t, file)
+files_pid_filetrans(munin_t, munin_var_run_t, { file dir })
+
-+read_files_pattern(munin_t, munin_plugin_state_t, munin_plugin_state_t)
++rw_files_pattern(munin_t, munin_plugin_state_t, munin_plugin_state_t)
kernel_read_system_state(munin_t)
kernel_read_network_state(munin_t)
-@@ -82,7 +92,6 @@ kernel_read_all_sysctls(munin_t)
+@@ -82,7 +94,6 @@ kernel_read_all_sysctls(munin_t)
corecmd_exec_bin(munin_t)
corecmd_exec_shell(munin_t)
@@ -33977,7 +36944,7 @@ index f17583b..a363924 100644
corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(munin_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(munin_t)
corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if(munin_t)
-@@ -101,7 +110,6 @@ dev_read_urand(munin_t)
+@@ -101,7 +112,6 @@ dev_read_urand(munin_t)
domain_use_interactive_fds(munin_t)
domain_read_all_domains_state(munin_t)
@@ -33985,15 +36952,16 @@ index f17583b..a363924 100644
files_read_etc_runtime_files(munin_t)
files_read_usr_files(munin_t)
files_list_spool(munin_t)
-@@ -116,6 +124,7 @@ logging_read_all_logs(munin_t)
+@@ -115,7 +125,7 @@ logging_send_syslog_msg(munin_t)
+ logging_read_all_logs(munin_t)
miscfiles_read_fonts(munin_t)
- miscfiles_read_localization(munin_t)
+-miscfiles_read_localization(munin_t)
+miscfiles_setattr_fonts_cache_dirs(munin_t)
sysnet_exec_ifconfig(munin_t)
-@@ -145,6 +154,7 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -145,6 +155,7 @@ optional_policy(`
optional_policy(`
mta_read_config(munin_t)
mta_send_mail(munin_t)
@@ -34001,7 +36969,13 @@ index f17583b..a363924 100644
mta_read_queue(munin_t)
')
-@@ -159,6 +169,7 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -155,10 +166,13 @@ optional_policy(`
+
+ optional_policy(`
+ netutils_domtrans_ping(munin_t)
++ netutils_signal_ping(munin_t)
++ netutils_kill_ping(munin_t)
+ ')
optional_policy(`
postfix_list_spool(munin_t)
@@ -34009,7 +36983,7 @@ index f17583b..a363924 100644
')
optional_policy(`
-@@ -182,6 +193,7 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -182,6 +196,7 @@ optional_policy(`
# local policy for disk plugins
#
@@ -34017,7 +36991,7 @@ index f17583b..a363924 100644
allow disk_munin_plugin_t self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
rw_files_pattern(disk_munin_plugin_t, munin_var_lib_t, munin_var_lib_t)
-@@ -190,15 +202,14 @@ corecmd_exec_shell(disk_munin_plugin_t)
+@@ -190,15 +205,18 @@ corecmd_exec_shell(disk_munin_plugin_t)
corenet_tcp_connect_hddtemp_port(disk_munin_plugin_t)
@@ -34030,13 +37004,17 @@ index f17583b..a363924 100644
+dev_getattr_lvm_control(disk_munin_plugin_t)
dev_read_sysfs(disk_munin_plugin_t)
dev_read_urand(disk_munin_plugin_t)
++dev_read_all_blk_files(munin_disk_plugin_t)
++
++fs_getattr_all_fs(disk_munin_plugin_t)
++fs_getattr_all_dirs(disk_munin_plugin_t)
-storage_getattr_fixed_disk_dev(disk_munin_plugin_t)
+storage_raw_read_fixed_disk(disk_munin_plugin_t)
sysnet_read_config(disk_munin_plugin_t)
-@@ -221,30 +232,47 @@ rw_files_pattern(mail_munin_plugin_t, munin_var_lib_t, munin_var_lib_t)
+@@ -221,30 +239,47 @@ rw_files_pattern(mail_munin_plugin_t, munin_var_lib_t, munin_var_lib_t)
dev_read_urand(mail_munin_plugin_t)
@@ -34090,7 +37068,7 @@ index f17583b..a363924 100644
allow services_munin_plugin_t self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
allow services_munin_plugin_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms;
allow services_munin_plugin_t self:netlink_route_socket r_netlink_socket_perms;
-@@ -255,13 +283,10 @@ corenet_tcp_connect_http_port(services_munin_plugin_t)
+@@ -255,13 +290,10 @@ corenet_tcp_connect_http_port(services_munin_plugin_t)
dev_read_urand(services_munin_plugin_t)
dev_read_rand(services_munin_plugin_t)
@@ -34105,7 +37083,7 @@ index f17583b..a363924 100644
cups_stream_connect(services_munin_plugin_t)
')
-@@ -279,6 +304,10 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -279,6 +311,10 @@ optional_policy(`
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -34116,18 +37094,26 @@ index f17583b..a363924 100644
postgresql_stream_connect(services_munin_plugin_t)
')
-@@ -286,6 +315,10 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -286,6 +322,18 @@ optional_policy(`
snmp_read_snmp_var_lib_files(services_munin_plugin_t)
')
+optional_policy(`
++ sssd_stream_connect(services_munin_plugin_t)
++')
++
++optional_policy(`
+ varnishd_read_lib_files(services_munin_plugin_t)
+')
+
++optional_policy(`
++ bind_read_config(munin_services_plugin_t)
++')
++
##################################
#
# local policy for system plugins
-@@ -295,12 +328,10 @@ allow system_munin_plugin_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms;
+@@ -295,12 +343,10 @@ allow system_munin_plugin_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms;
rw_files_pattern(system_munin_plugin_t, munin_var_lib_t, munin_var_lib_t)
@@ -34136,25 +37122,40 @@ index f17583b..a363924 100644
-
-corecmd_exec_shell(system_munin_plugin_t)
+# needed by munin_* plugins
-+allow system_munin_plugin_t munin_log_t:file read_file_perms;
++read_files_pattern(system_munin_plugin_t, munin_log_t, munin_log_t)
-fs_getattr_all_fs(system_munin_plugin_t)
+kernel_read_network_state(system_munin_plugin_t)
dev_read_sysfs(system_munin_plugin_t)
dev_read_urand(system_munin_plugin_t)
-@@ -313,3 +344,36 @@ init_read_utmp(system_munin_plugin_t)
+@@ -313,3 +359,47 @@ init_read_utmp(system_munin_plugin_t)
sysnet_exec_ifconfig(system_munin_plugin_t)
term_getattr_unallocated_ttys(system_munin_plugin_t)
+term_getattr_all_ttys(system_munin_plugin_t)
+term_getattr_all_ptys(system_munin_plugin_t)
+
++optional_policy(`
++ bind_read_config(system_munin_plugin_t)
++')
++
++#######################################
++#
++# Unconfined plugin policy
++#
++
++optional_policy(`
++ unconfined_domain(unconfined_munin_plugin_t)
++')
++
+################################
+#
+# local policy for munin plugin domains
+#
+
++allow munin_plugin_domain self:process signal;
++
+allow munin_plugin_domain munin_exec_t:file read_file_perms;
+allow munin_plugin_domain munin_t:tcp_socket rw_socket_perms;
+
@@ -34163,8 +37164,6 @@ index f17583b..a363924 100644
+
+read_lnk_files_pattern(munin_plugin_domain, munin_etc_t, munin_etc_t)
+
-+kernel_read_system_state(munin_plugin_domain)
-+
+corecmd_exec_bin(munin_plugin_domain)
+corecmd_exec_shell(munin_plugin_domain)
+
@@ -34175,8 +37174,6 @@ index f17583b..a363924 100644
+
+auth_read_passwd(munin_plugin_domain)
+
-+miscfiles_read_localization(munin_plugin_domain)
-+
+optional_policy(`
+ nscd_socket_use(munin_plugin_domain)
+')
@@ -34448,7 +37445,7 @@ index e9c0982..404ed6d 100644
+ mysql_stream_connect($1)
')
diff --git a/mysql.te b/mysql.te
-index 1cf05a3..e4792ab 100644
+index 1cf05a3..8855ea2 100644
--- a/mysql.te
+++ b/mysql.te
@@ -29,6 +29,12 @@ files_type(mysqld_db_t)
@@ -34510,8 +37507,12 @@ index 1cf05a3..e4792ab 100644
files_read_usr_files(mysqld_t)
files_search_var_lib(mysqld_t)
-@@ -122,13 +135,8 @@ miscfiles_read_localization(mysqld_t)
+@@ -118,17 +131,10 @@ auth_use_nsswitch(mysqld_t)
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(mysqld_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(mysqld_t)
+-
sysnet_read_config(mysqld_t)
-userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fds(mysqld_t)
@@ -34525,7 +37526,7 @@ index 1cf05a3..e4792ab 100644
')
tunable_policy(`mysql_connect_any',`
-@@ -154,10 +162,11 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -154,10 +160,11 @@ optional_policy(`
#
allow mysqld_safe_t self:capability { chown dac_override fowner kill };
@@ -34538,7 +37539,7 @@ index 1cf05a3..e4792ab 100644
domtrans_pattern(mysqld_safe_t, mysqld_exec_t, mysqld_t)
-@@ -170,26 +179,35 @@ kernel_read_system_state(mysqld_safe_t)
+@@ -170,26 +177,33 @@ kernel_read_system_state(mysqld_safe_t)
kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(mysqld_safe_t)
corecmd_exec_bin(mysqld_safe_t)
@@ -34555,13 +37556,12 @@ index 1cf05a3..e4792ab 100644
logging_log_filetrans(mysqld_safe_t, mysqld_log_t, file)
+logging_send_syslog_msg(mysqld_safe_t)
-+
-+auth_read_passwd(mysqld_safe_t)
-hostname_exec(mysqld_safe_t)
-+domain_dontaudit_signull_all_domains(mysqld_safe_t)
++auth_read_passwd(mysqld_safe_t)
- miscfiles_read_localization(mysqld_safe_t)
+-miscfiles_read_localization(mysqld_safe_t)
++domain_dontaudit_signull_all_domains(mysqld_safe_t)
mysql_manage_db_files(mysqld_safe_t)
mysql_read_config(mysqld_safe_t)
@@ -34576,7 +37576,7 @@ index 1cf05a3..e4792ab 100644
########################################
#
# MySQL Manager Policy
-@@ -218,7 +236,6 @@ kernel_read_system_state(mysqlmanagerd_t)
+@@ -218,7 +232,6 @@ kernel_read_system_state(mysqlmanagerd_t)
corecmd_exec_shell(mysqlmanagerd_t)
@@ -34584,14 +37584,16 @@ index 1cf05a3..e4792ab 100644
corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(mysqlmanagerd_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(mysqlmanagerd_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_node(mysqlmanagerd_t)
-@@ -231,7 +248,6 @@ corenet_sendrecv_mysqlmanagerd_client_packets(mysqlmanagerd_t)
+@@ -231,9 +244,7 @@ corenet_sendrecv_mysqlmanagerd_client_packets(mysqlmanagerd_t)
dev_read_urand(mysqlmanagerd_t)
-files_read_etc_files(mysqlmanagerd_t)
files_read_usr_files(mysqlmanagerd_t)
- miscfiles_read_localization(mysqlmanagerd_t)
+-miscfiles_read_localization(mysqlmanagerd_t)
+
+ userdom_getattr_user_home_dirs(mysqlmanagerd_t)
diff --git a/nagios.fc b/nagios.fc
index 1238f2e..d80b4db 100644
--- a/nagios.fc
@@ -34708,10 +37710,10 @@ index 1238f2e..d80b4db 100644
+# eventhandlers
+/usr/lib/nagios/plugins/eventhandlers(/.*) gen_context(system_u:object_r:nagios_eventhandler_plugin_exec_t,s0)
diff --git a/nagios.if b/nagios.if
-index 8581040..7d8e93b 100644
+index 8581040..d7d9a79 100644
--- a/nagios.if
+++ b/nagios.if
-@@ -12,31 +12,22 @@
+@@ -12,31 +12,24 @@
## </param>
#
template(`nagios_plugin_template',`
@@ -34741,12 +37743,13 @@ index 8581040..7d8e93b 100644
- # cjp: leaked file descriptor
- dontaudit nagios_$1_plugin_t nrpe_t:tcp_socket { read write };
- dontaudit nagios_$1_plugin_t nagios_log_t:file { read write };
--
++ kernel_read_system_state(nagios_$1_plugin_t)
+
- miscfiles_read_localization(nagios_$1_plugin_t)
')
########################################
-@@ -49,7 +40,6 @@ template(`nagios_plugin_template',`
+@@ -49,7 +42,6 @@ template(`nagios_plugin_template',`
## Domain to not audit.
## </summary>
## </param>
@@ -34754,7 +37757,7 @@ index 8581040..7d8e93b 100644
#
interface(`nagios_dontaudit_rw_pipes',`
gen_require(`
-@@ -159,6 +149,26 @@ interface(`nagios_read_tmp_files',`
+@@ -159,6 +151,26 @@ interface(`nagios_read_tmp_files',`
########################################
## <summary>
@@ -34781,7 +37784,7 @@ index 8581040..7d8e93b 100644
## Execute the nagios NRPE with
## a domain transition.
## </summary>
-@@ -195,15 +205,16 @@ interface(`nagios_domtrans_nrpe',`
+@@ -195,15 +207,16 @@ interface(`nagios_domtrans_nrpe',`
#
interface(`nagios_admin',`
gen_require(`
@@ -34805,7 +37808,7 @@ index 8581040..7d8e93b 100644
init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, nagios_initrc_exec_t)
domain_system_change_exemption($1)
diff --git a/nagios.te b/nagios.te
-index c3e2a2d..f5afc60 100644
+index c3e2a2d..f4cbdff 100644
--- a/nagios.te
+++ b/nagios.te
@@ -5,6 +5,8 @@ policy_module(nagios, 1.12.0)
@@ -34859,7 +37862,7 @@ index c3e2a2d..f5afc60 100644
corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(nagios_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(nagios_t)
corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if(nagios_t)
-@@ -103,17 +116,14 @@ domain_use_interactive_fds(nagios_t)
+@@ -103,31 +116,27 @@ domain_use_interactive_fds(nagios_t)
# for ps
domain_read_all_domains_state(nagios_t)
@@ -34878,7 +37881,10 @@ index c3e2a2d..f5afc60 100644
auth_use_nsswitch(nagios_t)
logging_send_syslog_msg(nagios_t)
-@@ -124,10 +134,10 @@ userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fds(nagios_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(nagios_t)
+
+ userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fds(nagios_t)
userdom_dontaudit_search_user_home_dirs(nagios_t)
mta_send_mail(nagios_t)
@@ -34891,7 +37897,7 @@ index c3e2a2d..f5afc60 100644
netutils_kill_ping(nagios_t)
')
-@@ -143,6 +153,7 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -143,6 +152,7 @@ optional_policy(`
#
# Nagios CGI local policy
#
@@ -34899,7 +37905,7 @@ index c3e2a2d..f5afc60 100644
optional_policy(`
apache_content_template(nagios)
typealias httpd_nagios_script_t alias nagios_cgi_t;
-@@ -180,29 +191,30 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -180,29 +190,31 @@ optional_policy(`
#
allow nrpe_t self:capability { setuid setgid };
@@ -34920,10 +37926,10 @@ index c3e2a2d..f5afc60 100644
manage_files_pattern(nrpe_t, nrpe_var_run_t, nrpe_var_run_t)
files_pid_filetrans(nrpe_t, nrpe_var_run_t, file)
--kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(nrpe_t)
--kernel_read_software_raid_state(nrpe_t)
- kernel_read_system_state(nrpe_t)
-+kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(nrpe_t)
++kernel_read_system_state(nrpe_t)
+ kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(nrpe_t)
+ kernel_read_software_raid_state(nrpe_t)
+-kernel_read_system_state(nrpe_t)
corecmd_exec_bin(nrpe_t)
corecmd_exec_shell(nrpe_t)
@@ -34944,7 +37950,15 @@ index c3e2a2d..f5afc60 100644
fs_getattr_all_fs(nrpe_t)
fs_search_auto_mountpoints(nrpe_t)
-@@ -252,11 +264,9 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -220,7 +232,6 @@ auth_use_nsswitch(nrpe_t)
+
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(nrpe_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(nrpe_t)
+
+ userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fds(nrpe_t)
+
+@@ -252,11 +263,9 @@ optional_policy(`
corecmd_read_bin_files(nagios_admin_plugin_t)
corecmd_read_bin_symlinks(nagios_admin_plugin_t)
@@ -34956,7 +37970,7 @@ index c3e2a2d..f5afc60 100644
# for check_file_age plugin
files_getattr_all_dirs(nagios_admin_plugin_t)
files_getattr_all_files(nagios_admin_plugin_t)
-@@ -271,20 +281,15 @@ files_getattr_all_file_type_fs(nagios_admin_plugin_t)
+@@ -271,20 +280,15 @@ files_getattr_all_file_type_fs(nagios_admin_plugin_t)
#
allow nagios_mail_plugin_t self:capability { setuid setgid dac_override };
@@ -34977,7 +37991,7 @@ index c3e2a2d..f5afc60 100644
logging_send_syslog_msg(nagios_mail_plugin_t)
-@@ -300,7 +305,7 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -300,7 +304,7 @@ optional_policy(`
optional_policy(`
postfix_stream_connect_master(nagios_mail_plugin_t)
@@ -34986,7 +38000,7 @@ index c3e2a2d..f5afc60 100644
')
######################################
-@@ -311,7 +316,9 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -311,7 +315,9 @@ optional_policy(`
# needed by ioctl()
allow nagios_checkdisk_plugin_t self:capability { sys_admin sys_rawio };
@@ -34997,7 +38011,7 @@ index c3e2a2d..f5afc60 100644
files_read_etc_runtime_files(nagios_checkdisk_plugin_t)
fs_getattr_all_fs(nagios_checkdisk_plugin_t)
-@@ -323,11 +330,11 @@ storage_raw_read_fixed_disk(nagios_checkdisk_plugin_t)
+@@ -323,11 +329,11 @@ storage_raw_read_fixed_disk(nagios_checkdisk_plugin_t)
# local policy for service check plugins
#
@@ -35011,7 +38025,7 @@ index c3e2a2d..f5afc60 100644
corecmd_exec_bin(nagios_services_plugin_t)
-@@ -342,6 +349,8 @@ files_read_usr_files(nagios_services_plugin_t)
+@@ -342,6 +348,8 @@ files_read_usr_files(nagios_services_plugin_t)
optional_policy(`
netutils_domtrans_ping(nagios_services_plugin_t)
@@ -35020,7 +38034,7 @@ index c3e2a2d..f5afc60 100644
')
optional_policy(`
-@@ -365,6 +374,8 @@ manage_files_pattern(nagios_system_plugin_t, nagios_system_plugin_tmp_t, nagios_
+@@ -365,6 +373,8 @@ manage_files_pattern(nagios_system_plugin_t, nagios_system_plugin_tmp_t, nagios_
manage_dirs_pattern(nagios_system_plugin_t, nagios_system_plugin_tmp_t, nagios_system_plugin_tmp_t)
files_tmp_filetrans(nagios_system_plugin_t, nagios_system_plugin_tmp_t, { dir file })
@@ -35029,7 +38043,7 @@ index c3e2a2d..f5afc60 100644
kernel_read_system_state(nagios_system_plugin_t)
kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(nagios_system_plugin_t)
-@@ -372,11 +383,13 @@ corecmd_exec_bin(nagios_system_plugin_t)
+@@ -372,11 +382,13 @@ corecmd_exec_bin(nagios_system_plugin_t)
corecmd_exec_shell(nagios_system_plugin_t)
dev_read_sysfs(nagios_system_plugin_t)
@@ -35045,7 +38059,7 @@ index c3e2a2d..f5afc60 100644
# needed by check_users plugin
optional_policy(`
-@@ -391,3 +404,52 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -391,3 +403,48 @@ optional_policy(`
optional_policy(`
unconfined_domain(nagios_unconfined_plugin_t)
')
@@ -35087,15 +38101,11 @@ index c3e2a2d..f5afc60 100644
+dontaudit nagios_plugin_domain nrpe_t:tcp_socket { read write };
+dontaudit nagios_plugin_domain nagios_log_t:file { read write };
+
-+kernel_read_system_state(nagios_plugin_domain)
-+
+dev_read_urand(nagios_plugin_domain)
+dev_read_rand(nagios_plugin_domain)
+
+files_read_usr_files(nagios_plugin_domain)
+
-+miscfiles_read_localization(nagios_plugin_domain)
-+
+userdom_use_inherited_user_ptys(nagios_plugin_domain)
+userdom_use_inherited_user_ttys(nagios_plugin_domain)
diff --git a/namespace.fc b/namespace.fc
@@ -35163,10 +38173,10 @@ index 0000000..8d7c751
+')
diff --git a/namespace.te b/namespace.te
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..3857701
+index 0000000..ef7b846
--- /dev/null
+++ b/namespace.te
-@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+policy_module(namespace,1.0.0)
+
+########################################
@@ -35202,7 +38212,6 @@ index 0000000..3857701
+
+auth_use_nsswitch(namespace_init_t)
+
-+miscfiles_read_localization(namespace_init_t)
+
+term_use_console(namespace_init_t)
+
@@ -35239,7 +38248,7 @@ index a648982..59f096b 100644
')
+
diff --git a/ncftool.te b/ncftool.te
-index f19ca0b..dfc1ba2 100644
+index f19ca0b..3eadfbb 100644
--- a/ncftool.te
+++ b/ncftool.te
@@ -5,25 +5,29 @@ policy_module(ncftool, 1.1.0)
@@ -35276,7 +38285,7 @@ index f19ca0b..dfc1ba2 100644
allow ncftool_t self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
allow ncftool_t self:netlink_route_socket create_netlink_socket_perms;
-@@ -41,24 +45,34 @@ domain_read_all_domains_state(ncftool_t)
+@@ -41,24 +45,33 @@ domain_read_all_domains_state(ncftool_t)
dev_read_sysfs(ncftool_t)
@@ -35289,7 +38298,6 @@ index f19ca0b..dfc1ba2 100644
-miscfiles_read_localization(ncftool_t)
+term_use_all_inherited_terms(ncftool_t)
-+miscfiles_read_localization(ncftool_t)
sysnet_delete_dhcpc_pid(ncftool_t)
-sysnet_run_dhcpc(ncftool_t, ncftool_roles)
-sysnet_run_ifconfig(ncftool_t, ncftool_roles)
@@ -35315,7 +38323,7 @@ index f19ca0b..dfc1ba2 100644
optional_policy(`
consoletype_exec(ncftool_t)
')
-@@ -69,13 +83,18 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -69,13 +82,18 @@ optional_policy(`
optional_policy(`
iptables_initrc_domtrans(ncftool_t)
@@ -35337,7 +38345,7 @@ index f19ca0b..dfc1ba2 100644
+ #netutils_run(ncftool_t, ncftool_roles)
')
diff --git a/nessus.te b/nessus.te
-index abf25da..16322b7 100644
+index abf25da..bad6973 100644
--- a/nessus.te
+++ b/nessus.te
@@ -56,7 +56,6 @@ kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(nessusd_t)
@@ -35348,6 +38356,14 @@ index abf25da..16322b7 100644
corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(nessusd_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(nessusd_t)
corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if(nessusd_t)
+@@ -85,7 +84,6 @@ fs_search_auto_mountpoints(nessusd_t)
+
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(nessusd_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(nessusd_t)
+
+ sysnet_read_config(nessusd_t)
+
diff --git a/networkmanager.fc b/networkmanager.fc
index 386543b..8fe1d63 100644
--- a/networkmanager.fc
@@ -35395,7 +38411,7 @@ index 386543b..8fe1d63 100644
/var/run/wpa_supplicant(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:NetworkManager_var_run_t,s0)
/var/run/wpa_supplicant-global -s gen_context(system_u:object_r:NetworkManager_var_run_t,s0)
diff --git a/networkmanager.if b/networkmanager.if
-index 2324d9e..da61d01 100644
+index 2324d9e..96dbf6f 100644
--- a/networkmanager.if
+++ b/networkmanager.if
@@ -43,9 +43,9 @@ interface(`networkmanager_rw_packet_sockets',`
@@ -35470,7 +38486,33 @@ index 2324d9e..da61d01 100644
## Send a generic signal to NetworkManager
## </summary>
## <param name="domain">
-@@ -191,3 +236,90 @@ interface(`networkmanager_read_pid_files',`
+@@ -173,6 +218,25 @@ interface(`networkmanager_read_lib_files',`
+ read_files_pattern($1, NetworkManager_var_lib_t, NetworkManager_var_lib_t)
+ ')
+
++#######################################
++## <summary>
++## Read NetworkManager conf files.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`networkmanager_read_conf',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type NetworkManager_etc_t;
++ ')
++
++ allow $1 NetworkManager_etc_t:dir list_dir_perms;
++ read_files_pattern($1,NetworkManager_etc_t,NetworkManager_etc_t)
++')
++
+ ########################################
+ ## <summary>
+ ## Read NetworkManager PID files.
+@@ -191,3 +255,110 @@ interface(`networkmanager_read_pid_files',`
files_search_pids($1)
allow $1 NetworkManager_var_run_t:file read_file_perms;
')
@@ -35522,6 +38564,26 @@ index 2324d9e..da61d01 100644
+ append_files_pattern($1, NetworkManager_log_t, NetworkManager_log_t)
+')
+
++#######################################
++## <summary>
++## Allow the specified domain to manage
++## to Network Manager lib files.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`networkmanager_manage_lib',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type NetworkManager_var_lib_t;
++ ')
++
++ manage_files_pattern($1, NetworkManager_var_lib_t, NetworkManager_var_lib_t)
++')
++
++
+########################################
+## <summary>
+## Transition to networkmanager named content
@@ -35562,7 +38624,7 @@ index 2324d9e..da61d01 100644
+ files_etc_filetrans($1, NetworkManager_var_lib_t, file, "wireed-settings.conf")
+')
diff --git a/networkmanager.te b/networkmanager.te
-index 0619395..83f2ceb 100644
+index 0619395..3a77265 100644
--- a/networkmanager.te
+++ b/networkmanager.te
@@ -12,6 +12,15 @@ init_daemon_domain(NetworkManager_t, NetworkManager_exec_t)
@@ -35670,7 +38732,7 @@ index 0619395..83f2ceb 100644
files_read_usr_files(NetworkManager_t)
files_read_usr_src_files(NetworkManager_t)
-@@ -128,35 +160,44 @@ init_domtrans_script(NetworkManager_t)
+@@ -128,35 +160,51 @@ init_domtrans_script(NetworkManager_t)
auth_use_nsswitch(NetworkManager_t)
@@ -35678,7 +38740,7 @@ index 0619395..83f2ceb 100644
+
logging_send_syslog_msg(NetworkManager_t)
- miscfiles_read_localization(NetworkManager_t)
+-miscfiles_read_localization(NetworkManager_t)
miscfiles_read_generic_certs(NetworkManager_t)
-modutils_domtrans_insmod(NetworkManager_t)
@@ -35707,6 +38769,14 @@ index 0619395..83f2ceb 100644
+userdom_read_home_certs(NetworkManager_t)
userdom_read_user_home_content_files(NetworkManager_t)
+userdom_dgram_send(NetworkManager_t)
++
++tunable_policy(`use_nfs_home_dirs',`
++ fs_read_nfs_files(NetworkManager_t)
++')
++
++tunable_policy(`use_samba_home_dirs',`
++ fs_read_cifs_files(NetworkManager_t)
++')
optional_policy(`
avahi_domtrans(NetworkManager_t)
@@ -35717,7 +38787,7 @@ index 0619395..83f2ceb 100644
')
optional_policy(`
-@@ -176,10 +217,17 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -176,10 +224,17 @@ optional_policy(`
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -35735,7 +38805,7 @@ index 0619395..83f2ceb 100644
')
')
-@@ -191,6 +239,7 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -191,6 +246,7 @@ optional_policy(`
dnsmasq_kill(NetworkManager_t)
dnsmasq_signal(NetworkManager_t)
dnsmasq_signull(NetworkManager_t)
@@ -35743,7 +38813,7 @@ index 0619395..83f2ceb 100644
')
optional_policy(`
-@@ -202,23 +251,45 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -202,23 +258,45 @@ optional_policy(`
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -35789,7 +38859,7 @@ index 0619395..83f2ceb 100644
openvpn_domtrans(NetworkManager_t)
openvpn_kill(NetworkManager_t)
openvpn_signal(NetworkManager_t)
-@@ -234,6 +305,10 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -234,6 +312,10 @@ optional_policy(`
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -35800,7 +38870,7 @@ index 0619395..83f2ceb 100644
ppp_initrc_domtrans(NetworkManager_t)
ppp_domtrans(NetworkManager_t)
ppp_manage_pid_files(NetworkManager_t)
-@@ -241,6 +316,7 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -241,6 +323,7 @@ optional_policy(`
ppp_signal(NetworkManager_t)
ppp_signull(NetworkManager_t)
ppp_read_config(NetworkManager_t)
@@ -35808,18 +38878,19 @@ index 0619395..83f2ceb 100644
')
optional_policy(`
-@@ -254,6 +330,10 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -254,6 +337,11 @@ optional_policy(`
')
optional_policy(`
+ systemd_read_logind_sessions_files(NetworkManager_t)
++ systemd_dbus_chat_logind(NetworkManager_t)
+')
+
+optional_policy(`
udev_exec(NetworkManager_t)
udev_read_db(NetworkManager_t)
')
-@@ -263,6 +343,7 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -263,6 +351,7 @@ optional_policy(`
vpn_kill(NetworkManager_t)
vpn_signal(NetworkManager_t)
vpn_signull(NetworkManager_t)
@@ -35827,6 +38898,13 @@ index 0619395..83f2ceb 100644
')
########################################
+@@ -284,6 +373,5 @@ rw_sock_files_pattern(wpa_cli_t, NetworkManager_var_run_t, NetworkManager_var_ru
+ init_dontaudit_use_fds(wpa_cli_t)
+ init_use_script_ptys(wpa_cli_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(wpa_cli_t)
+
+ term_dontaudit_use_console(wpa_cli_t)
diff --git a/nis.fc b/nis.fc
index 632a565..cd0e015 100644
--- a/nis.fc
@@ -35851,10 +38929,10 @@ index 632a565..cd0e015 100644
+/usr/lib/systemd/system/yppasswdd.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nis_unit_file_t,s0)
+/usr/lib/systemd/system/ypxfrd.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nis_unit_file_t,s0)
diff --git a/nis.if b/nis.if
-index abe3f7f..6b31271 100644
+index abe3f7f..1112fae 100644
--- a/nis.if
+++ b/nis.if
-@@ -27,17 +27,21 @@ interface(`nis_use_ypbind_uncond',`
+@@ -27,18 +27,13 @@ interface(`nis_use_ypbind_uncond',`
gen_require(`
type var_yp_t;
')
@@ -35870,18 +38948,11 @@ index abe3f7f..6b31271 100644
allow $1 var_yp_t:file read_file_perms;
- corenet_all_recvfrom_unlabeled($1)
-+ #corenet_all_recvfrom_unlabeled($1)
-+ # we now use an attribute in corenet_all_recvfrom_unlabeled() calling
-+ kernel_dccp_recvfrom_unlabeled(corenet_unlabeled_type)
-+ kernel_tcp_recvfrom_unlabeled(corenet_unlabeled_type)
-+ kernel_udp_recvfrom_unlabeled(corenet_unlabeled_type)
-+ kernel_raw_recvfrom_unlabeled(corenet_unlabeled_type)
-+ kernel_recvfrom_unlabeled_peer(corenet_unlabeled_type)
-+
- corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel($1)
+- corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel($1)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if($1)
corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if($1)
-@@ -49,14 +53,13 @@ interface(`nis_use_ypbind_uncond',`
+ corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_node($1)
+@@ -49,14 +44,13 @@ interface(`nis_use_ypbind_uncond',`
corenet_udp_bind_generic_node($1)
corenet_tcp_bind_generic_port($1)
corenet_udp_bind_generic_port($1)
@@ -35899,7 +38970,7 @@ index abe3f7f..6b31271 100644
corenet_sendrecv_portmap_client_packets($1)
corenet_sendrecv_generic_client_packets($1)
corenet_sendrecv_generic_server_packets($1)
-@@ -88,7 +91,7 @@ interface(`nis_use_ypbind_uncond',`
+@@ -88,7 +82,7 @@ interface(`nis_use_ypbind_uncond',`
## <rolecap/>
#
interface(`nis_use_ypbind',`
@@ -35908,7 +38979,7 @@ index abe3f7f..6b31271 100644
nis_use_ypbind_uncond($1)
')
')
-@@ -105,7 +108,7 @@ interface(`nis_use_ypbind',`
+@@ -105,7 +99,7 @@ interface(`nis_use_ypbind',`
## <rolecap/>
#
interface(`nis_authenticate',`
@@ -35917,7 +38988,32 @@ index abe3f7f..6b31271 100644
nis_use_ypbind_uncond($1)
corenet_tcp_bind_all_rpc_ports($1)
corenet_udp_bind_all_rpc_ports($1)
-@@ -337,6 +340,55 @@ interface(`nis_initrc_domtrans_ypbind',`
+@@ -131,6 +125,24 @@ interface(`nis_domtrans_ypbind',`
+ domtrans_pattern($1, ypbind_exec_t, ypbind_t)
+ ')
+
++#######################################
++## <summary>
++## Execute ypbind in the caller domain.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed to transition.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`nis_exec_ypbind',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type ypbind_t, ypbind_exec_t;
++ ')
++
++ can_exec($1, ypbind_exec_t)
++')
++
+ ########################################
+ ## <summary>
+ ## Execute ypbind in the ypbind domain, and
+@@ -337,6 +349,55 @@ interface(`nis_initrc_domtrans_ypbind',`
########################################
## <summary>
@@ -35973,7 +39069,7 @@ index abe3f7f..6b31271 100644
## All of the rules required to administrate
## an nis environment
## </summary>
-@@ -354,22 +406,31 @@ interface(`nis_initrc_domtrans_ypbind',`
+@@ -354,22 +415,31 @@ interface(`nis_initrc_domtrans_ypbind',`
#
interface(`nis_admin',`
gen_require(`
@@ -36012,7 +39108,7 @@ index abe3f7f..6b31271 100644
ps_process_pattern($1, ypxfr_t)
nis_initrc_domtrans($1)
-@@ -379,18 +440,24 @@ interface(`nis_admin',`
+@@ -379,18 +449,22 @@ interface(`nis_admin',`
role_transition $2 ypbind_initrc_exec_t system_r;
allow $2 system_r;
@@ -36038,11 +39134,9 @@ index abe3f7f..6b31271 100644
+ nis_systemctl($1)
+ admin_pattern($1, nis_unit_file_t)
+ allow $1 nis_unit_file_t:service all_service_perms;
-+
-+
')
diff --git a/nis.te b/nis.te
-index f27899c..ba3f6a9 100644
+index f27899c..f1dd1fa 100644
--- a/nis.te
+++ b/nis.te
@@ -18,11 +18,14 @@ init_daemon_domain(ypbind_t, ypbind_exec_t)
@@ -36089,6 +39183,18 @@ index f27899c..ba3f6a9 100644
corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(ypbind_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(ypbind_t)
corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if(ypbind_t)
+@@ -108,9 +113,9 @@ domain_use_interactive_fds(ypbind_t)
+ files_read_etc_files(ypbind_t)
+ files_list_var(ypbind_t)
+
+-logging_send_syslog_msg(ypbind_t)
++init_search_pid_dirs(ypbind_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(ypbind_t)
++logging_send_syslog_msg(ypbind_t)
+
+ sysnet_read_config(ypbind_t)
+
@@ -156,12 +161,13 @@ files_pid_filetrans(yppasswdd_t, yppasswdd_var_run_t, file)
manage_files_pattern(yppasswdd_t, var_yp_t, var_yp_t)
manage_lnk_files_pattern(yppasswdd_t, var_yp_t, var_yp_t)
@@ -36112,7 +39218,15 @@ index f27899c..ba3f6a9 100644
auth_etc_filetrans_shadow(yppasswdd_t)
corecmd_exec_bin(yppasswdd_t)
-@@ -211,6 +218,10 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -199,7 +206,6 @@ files_relabel_etc_files(yppasswdd_t)
+
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(yppasswdd_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(yppasswdd_t)
+
+ sysnet_read_config(yppasswdd_t)
+
+@@ -211,6 +217,10 @@ optional_policy(`
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -36123,7 +39237,7 @@ index f27899c..ba3f6a9 100644
seutil_sigchld_newrole(yppasswdd_t)
')
-@@ -247,7 +258,6 @@ kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(ypserv_t)
+@@ -247,7 +257,6 @@ kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(ypserv_t)
kernel_list_proc(ypserv_t)
kernel_read_proc_symlinks(ypserv_t)
@@ -36131,7 +39245,15 @@ index f27899c..ba3f6a9 100644
corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(ypserv_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(ypserv_t)
corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if(ypserv_t)
-@@ -317,7 +327,6 @@ allow ypxfr_t ypserv_conf_t:file read_file_perms;
+@@ -279,7 +288,6 @@ files_read_etc_files(ypserv_t)
+
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(ypserv_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(ypserv_t)
+
+ nis_domtrans_ypxfr(ypserv_t)
+
+@@ -317,7 +325,6 @@ allow ypxfr_t ypserv_conf_t:file read_file_perms;
manage_files_pattern(ypxfr_t, ypxfr_var_run_t, ypxfr_var_run_t)
files_pid_filetrans(ypxfr_t, ypxfr_var_run_t, file)
@@ -36139,6 +39261,13 @@ index f27899c..ba3f6a9 100644
corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(ypxfr_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(ypxfr_t)
corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if(ypxfr_t)
+@@ -342,6 +349,5 @@ files_search_usr(ypxfr_t)
+
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(ypxfr_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(ypxfr_t)
+
+ sysnet_read_config(ypxfr_t)
diff --git a/nova.fc b/nova.fc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..02dc6dc
@@ -36179,10 +39308,10 @@ index 0000000..02dc6dc
+/var/run/nova(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:nova_var_run_t,s0)
diff --git a/nova.if b/nova.if
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..0d11800
+index 0000000..7d11148
--- /dev/null
+++ b/nova.if
-@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+## <summary>openstack-nova</summary>
+
+#######################################
@@ -36215,13 +39344,16 @@ index 0000000..0d11800
+ manage_files_pattern(nova_$1_t, nova_$1_tmp_t, nova_$1_tmp_t)
+ files_tmp_filetrans(nova_$1_t, nova_$1_tmp_t, { file dir })
+ can_exec(nova_$1_t, nova_$1_tmp_t)
++
++ kernel_read_system_state(nova_$1_t)
++
+')
diff --git a/nova.te b/nova.te
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..ac55887
+index 0000000..f0aaecf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/nova.te
-@@ -0,0 +1,327 @@
+@@ -0,0 +1,324 @@
+policy_module(nova, 1.0.0)
+
+########################################
@@ -36276,8 +39408,6 @@ index 0000000..ac55887
+manage_dirs_pattern(nova_domain, nova_var_run_t, nova_var_run_t)
+manage_files_pattern(nova_domain, nova_var_run_t, nova_var_run_t)
+
-+kernel_read_system_state(nova_domain)
-+
+corenet_tcp_connect_amqp_port(nova_domain)
+
+corecmd_exec_bin(nova_domain)
@@ -36293,7 +39423,6 @@ index 0000000..ac55887
+
+files_read_etc_files(nova_domain)
+
-+miscfiles_read_localization(nova_domain)
+
+optional_policy(`
+ sysnet_read_config(nova_domain)
@@ -36549,6 +39678,16 @@ index 0000000..ac55887
+ unconfined_domain(nova_volume_t)
+')
+
+diff --git a/nscd.fc b/nscd.fc
+index 623b731..429bd79 100644
+--- a/nscd.fc
++++ b/nscd.fc
+@@ -11,3 +11,5 @@
+ /var/run/\.nscd_socket -s gen_context(system_u:object_r:nscd_var_run_t,s0)
+
+ /var/run/nscd(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:nscd_var_run_t,s0)
++
++/usr/lib/systemd/system/nscd\.service -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nscd_unit_file_t,s0)
diff --git a/nscd.if b/nscd.if
index 85188dc..2b37836 100644
--- a/nscd.if
@@ -36672,7 +39811,7 @@ index 85188dc..2b37836 100644
+ allow $1 nscd_unit_file_t:service all_service_perms;
')
diff --git a/nscd.te b/nscd.te
-index 7936e09..48a40f0 100644
+index 7936e09..2814186 100644
--- a/nscd.te
+++ b/nscd.te
@@ -4,6 +4,13 @@ gen_require(`
@@ -36734,7 +39873,15 @@ index 7936e09..48a40f0 100644
files_read_generic_tmp_symlinks(nscd_t)
# Needed to read files created by firstboot "/etc/hesiod.conf"
files_read_etc_runtime_files(nscd_t)
-@@ -112,6 +123,10 @@ userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fds(nscd_t)
+@@ -99,7 +110,6 @@ files_read_etc_runtime_files(nscd_t)
+ logging_send_audit_msgs(nscd_t)
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(nscd_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(nscd_t)
+
+ seutil_read_config(nscd_t)
+ seutil_read_default_contexts(nscd_t)
+@@ -112,6 +122,10 @@ userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fds(nscd_t)
userdom_dontaudit_search_user_home_dirs(nscd_t)
optional_policy(`
@@ -36745,7 +39892,7 @@ index 7936e09..48a40f0 100644
cron_read_system_job_tmp_files(nscd_t)
')
-@@ -127,3 +142,17 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -127,3 +141,19 @@ optional_policy(`
xen_dontaudit_rw_unix_stream_sockets(nscd_t)
xen_append_log(nscd_t)
')
@@ -36755,7 +39902,9 @@ index 7936e09..48a40f0 100644
+ samba_append_log(nscd_t)
+ samba_dontaudit_use_fds(nscd_t)
+ ')
++')
+
++optional_policy(`
+ samba_read_config(nscd_t)
+ samba_read_var_files(nscd_t)
+')
@@ -36781,8 +39930,38 @@ index 53cc800..5348e92 100644
/var/lib/nsd(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:nsd_zone_t,s0)
-/var/lib/nsd/nsd\.db -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nsd_db_t,s0)
/var/run/nsd\.pid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nsd_var_run_t,s0)
+diff --git a/nsd.if b/nsd.if
+index a1371d5..ad4f14a 100644
+--- a/nsd.if
++++ b/nsd.if
+@@ -2,6 +2,25 @@
+
+ ########################################
+ ## <summary>
++## Read NSD pid file.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`nsd_read_pid',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type nsd_var_run_t;
++ ')
++
++ files_search_pids($1)
++ read_files_pattern($1, nsd_var_run_t, nsd_var_run_t)
++')
++
++########################################
++## <summary>
+ ## Send and receive datagrams from NSD. (Deprecated)
+ ## </summary>
+ ## <param name="domain">
diff --git a/nsd.te b/nsd.te
-index 4b15536..2446617 100644
+index 4b15536..82e97aa 100644
--- a/nsd.te
+++ b/nsd.te
@@ -18,15 +18,11 @@ domain_type(nsd_crond_t)
@@ -36842,7 +40021,7 @@ index 4b15536..2446617 100644
corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(nsd_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(nsd_t)
corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if(nsd_t)
-@@ -79,17 +73,19 @@ dev_read_sysfs(nsd_t)
+@@ -79,17 +73,17 @@ dev_read_sysfs(nsd_t)
domain_use_interactive_fds(nsd_t)
@@ -36853,18 +40032,18 @@ index 4b15536..2446617 100644
fs_getattr_all_fs(nsd_t)
fs_search_auto_mountpoints(nsd_t)
+-logging_send_syslog_msg(nsd_t)
+auth_use_nsswitch(nsd_t)
-+
- logging_send_syslog_msg(nsd_t)
- miscfiles_read_localization(nsd_t)
+-miscfiles_read_localization(nsd_t)
++logging_send_syslog_msg(nsd_t)
-sysnet_read_config(nsd_t)
+sysnet_dns_name_resolve(nsd_t)
userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fds(nsd_t)
userdom_dontaudit_search_user_home_dirs(nsd_t)
-@@ -121,8 +117,6 @@ allow nsd_crond_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms;
+@@ -121,8 +115,6 @@ allow nsd_crond_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms;
allow nsd_crond_t nsd_conf_t:file read_file_perms;
@@ -36873,7 +40052,7 @@ index 4b15536..2446617 100644
files_search_var_lib(nsd_crond_t)
allow nsd_crond_t nsd_t:process signal;
-@@ -139,7 +133,6 @@ kernel_read_system_state(nsd_crond_t)
+@@ -139,7 +131,6 @@ kernel_read_system_state(nsd_crond_t)
corecmd_exec_bin(nsd_crond_t)
corecmd_exec_shell(nsd_crond_t)
@@ -36881,7 +40060,7 @@ index 4b15536..2446617 100644
corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(nsd_crond_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(nsd_crond_t)
corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if(nsd_crond_t)
-@@ -155,10 +148,11 @@ dev_read_urand(nsd_crond_t)
+@@ -155,13 +146,13 @@ dev_read_urand(nsd_crond_t)
domain_dontaudit_read_all_domains_state(nsd_crond_t)
@@ -36893,7 +40072,10 @@ index 4b15536..2446617 100644
+
logging_send_syslog_msg(nsd_crond_t)
- miscfiles_read_localization(nsd_crond_t)
+-miscfiles_read_localization(nsd_crond_t)
+
+ sysnet_read_config(nsd_crond_t)
+
diff --git a/nslcd.if b/nslcd.if
index 23c769c..0398e70 100644
--- a/nslcd.if
@@ -36932,10 +40114,10 @@ index 23c769c..0398e70 100644
+ admin_pattern($1, nslcd_var_run_t, nslcd_var_run_t)
')
diff --git a/nslcd.te b/nslcd.te
-index 01594c8..fad9434 100644
+index 01594c8..bcc61b5 100644
--- a/nslcd.te
+++ b/nslcd.te
-@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ type nslcd_var_run_t;
+@@ -16,15 +16,15 @@ type nslcd_var_run_t;
files_pid_file(nslcd_var_run_t)
type nslcd_conf_t;
@@ -36944,16 +40126,17 @@ index 01594c8..fad9434 100644
########################################
#
-@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ files_type(nslcd_conf_t)
+ # nslcd local policy
#
- allow nslcd_t self:capability { setgid setuid dac_override };
+-allow nslcd_t self:capability { setgid setuid dac_override };
-allow nslcd_t self:process signal;
++allow nslcd_t self:capability { dac_override setgid setuid sys_nice };
+allow nslcd_t self:process { setsched signal };
allow nslcd_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
allow nslcd_t nslcd_conf_t:file read_file_perms;
-@@ -42,6 +42,8 @@ corenet_tcp_connect_ldap_port(nslcd_t)
+@@ -42,13 +42,21 @@ corenet_tcp_connect_ldap_port(nslcd_t)
corenet_sendrecv_ldap_client_packets(nslcd_t)
files_read_etc_files(nslcd_t)
@@ -36962,16 +40145,16 @@ index 01594c8..fad9434 100644
auth_use_nsswitch(nslcd_t)
-@@ -49,6 +51,13 @@ logging_send_syslog_msg(nslcd_t)
-
- miscfiles_read_localization(nslcd_t)
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(nslcd_t)
+-miscfiles_read_localization(nslcd_t)
++
+userdom_read_user_tmp_files(nslcd_t)
+
+optional_policy(`
+ dirsrv_stream_connect(nslcd_t)
+')
-+
+
optional_policy(`
ldap_stream_connect(nslcd_t)
')
@@ -37473,10 +40656,10 @@ index 0000000..fce899a
+')
diff --git a/nsplugin.te b/nsplugin.te
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..a217e56
+index 0000000..a333e40
--- /dev/null
+++ b/nsplugin.te
-@@ -0,0 +1,325 @@
+@@ -0,0 +1,323 @@
+policy_module(nsplugin, 1.0.0)
+
+########################################
@@ -37624,7 +40807,6 @@ index 0000000..a217e56
+
+libs_exec_ld_so(nsplugin_t)
+
-+miscfiles_read_localization(nsplugin_t)
+miscfiles_read_fonts(nsplugin_t)
+miscfiles_dontaudit_write_fonts(nsplugin_t)
+miscfiles_setattr_fonts_cache_dirs(nsplugin_t)
@@ -37747,7 +40929,6 @@ index 0000000..a217e56
+
+auth_use_nsswitch(nsplugin_config_t)
+
-+miscfiles_read_localization(nsplugin_config_t)
+miscfiles_read_fonts(nsplugin_config_t)
+
+userdom_search_user_home_content(nsplugin_config_t)
@@ -37803,7 +40984,7 @@ index 0000000..a217e56
+ pulseaudio_setattr_home_dir(nsplugin_t)
+')
diff --git a/ntop.te b/ntop.te
-index ded9fb6..e4beebd 100644
+index ded9fb6..6b11681 100644
--- a/ntop.te
+++ b/ntop.te
@@ -63,7 +63,6 @@ kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(ntop_t)
@@ -37822,11 +41003,19 @@ index ded9fb6..e4beebd 100644
files_read_usr_files(ntop_t)
fs_getattr_all_fs(ntop_t)
+@@ -95,7 +93,6 @@ auth_use_nsswitch(ntop_t)
+
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(ntop_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(ntop_t)
+ miscfiles_read_fonts(ntop_t)
+
+ userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fds(ntop_t)
diff --git a/ntp.fc b/ntp.fc
-index e79dccc..e8d3e38 100644
+index e79dccc..2a3c6af 100644
--- a/ntp.fc
+++ b/ntp.fc
-@@ -10,6 +10,8 @@
+@@ -10,10 +10,14 @@
/etc/rc\.d/init\.d/ntpd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:ntpd_initrc_exec_t,s0)
@@ -37834,7 +41023,13 @@ index e79dccc..e8d3e38 100644
+
/usr/sbin/ntpd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:ntpd_exec_t,s0)
/usr/sbin/ntpdate -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:ntpdate_exec_t,s0)
++/usr/sbin/sntp -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:ntpdate_exec_t,s0)
+ /var/lib/ntp(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:ntp_drift_t,s0)
++/var/lib/sntp-kod(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:ntp_drift_t,s0)
+
+ /var/log/ntp.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:ntpd_log_t,s0)
+ /var/log/ntpstats(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:ntpd_log_t,s0)
diff --git a/ntp.if b/ntp.if
index e80f8c0..0044e73 100644
--- a/ntp.if
@@ -37943,7 +41138,7 @@ index e80f8c0..0044e73 100644
+ allow $1 ntpd_unit_file_t:service all_service_perms;
')
diff --git a/ntp.te b/ntp.te
-index c61adc8..b374876 100644
+index c61adc8..cb20a9d 100644
--- a/ntp.te
+++ b/ntp.te
@@ -15,6 +15,9 @@ init_daemon_domain(ntpd_t, ntpd_exec_t)
@@ -37956,7 +41151,15 @@ index c61adc8..b374876 100644
type ntpd_key_t;
files_type(ntpd_key_t)
-@@ -78,7 +81,6 @@ kernel_read_system_state(ntpd_t)
+@@ -50,6 +53,7 @@ allow ntpd_t self:unix_stream_socket create_socket_perms;
+ allow ntpd_t self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
+ allow ntpd_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms;
+
++manage_dirs_pattern(ntpd_t, ntp_drift_t, ntp_drift_t)
+ manage_files_pattern(ntpd_t, ntp_drift_t, ntp_drift_t)
+
+ can_exec(ntpd_t, ntpd_exec_t)
+@@ -78,7 +82,6 @@ kernel_read_system_state(ntpd_t)
kernel_read_network_state(ntpd_t)
kernel_request_load_module(ntpd_t)
@@ -37964,7 +41167,7 @@ index c61adc8..b374876 100644
corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(ntpd_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(ntpd_t)
corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if(ntpd_t)
-@@ -96,11 +98,15 @@ corenet_sendrecv_ntp_client_packets(ntpd_t)
+@@ -96,11 +99,15 @@ corenet_sendrecv_ntp_client_packets(ntpd_t)
dev_read_sysfs(ntpd_t)
# for SSP
dev_read_urand(ntpd_t)
@@ -37980,7 +41183,7 @@ index c61adc8..b374876 100644
auth_use_nsswitch(ntpd_t)
-@@ -110,7 +116,6 @@ corecmd_exec_shell(ntpd_t)
+@@ -110,7 +117,6 @@ corecmd_exec_shell(ntpd_t)
domain_use_interactive_fds(ntpd_t)
domain_dontaudit_list_all_domains_state(ntpd_t)
@@ -37988,6 +41191,14 @@ index c61adc8..b374876 100644
files_read_etc_runtime_files(ntpd_t)
files_read_usr_files(ntpd_t)
files_list_var_lib(ntpd_t)
+@@ -119,7 +125,6 @@ init_exec_script_files(ntpd_t)
+
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(ntpd_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(ntpd_t)
+
+ userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fds(ntpd_t)
+ userdom_list_user_home_dirs(ntpd_t)
diff --git a/numad.fc b/numad.fc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1f97624
@@ -38081,10 +41292,10 @@ index 0000000..709dda1
+')
diff --git a/numad.te b/numad.te
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..e18b767
+index 0000000..c2d4196
--- /dev/null
+++ b/numad.te
-@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+policy_module(numad, 1.0.0)
+
+########################################
@@ -38113,6 +41324,7 @@ index 0000000..e18b767
+allow numad_t self:process { fork };
+allow numad_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms;
+allow numad_t self:msgq create_msgq_perms;
++allow numad_t self:msg { send receive };
+allow numad_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
+
+manage_files_pattern(numad_t, numad_var_log_t, numad_var_log_t)
@@ -38129,7 +41341,7 @@ index 0000000..e18b767
+
+files_read_etc_files(numad_t)
+
-+miscfiles_read_localization(numad_t)
++fs_search_cgroup_dirs(numad_t)
diff --git a/nut.fc b/nut.fc
index 0a929ef..371119d 100644
--- a/nut.fc
@@ -38143,7 +41355,7 @@ index 0a929ef..371119d 100644
/var/run/nut(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:nut_var_run_t,s0)
diff --git a/nut.te b/nut.te
-index ff962dd..34f9ac8 100644
+index ff962dd..7c6ea74 100644
--- a/nut.te
+++ b/nut.te
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ files_pid_file(nut_var_run_t)
@@ -38154,7 +41366,23 @@ index ff962dd..34f9ac8 100644
allow nut_upsd_t self:unix_dgram_socket { create_socket_perms sendto };
allow nut_upsd_t self:tcp_socket connected_stream_socket_perms;
-@@ -133,6 +134,7 @@ kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(nut_upsdrvctl_t)
+@@ -55,7 +56,6 @@ auth_use_nsswitch(nut_upsd_t)
+
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(nut_upsd_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(nut_upsd_t)
+
+ ########################################
+ #
+@@ -100,7 +100,6 @@ logging_send_syslog_msg(nut_upsmon_t)
+
+ auth_use_nsswitch(nut_upsmon_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(nut_upsmon_t)
+
+ mta_send_mail(nut_upsmon_t)
+
+@@ -133,6 +132,7 @@ kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(nut_upsdrvctl_t)
# /sbin/upsdrvctl executes other drivers
corecmd_exec_bin(nut_upsdrvctl_t)
@@ -38162,7 +41390,15 @@ index ff962dd..34f9ac8 100644
dev_read_urand(nut_upsdrvctl_t)
dev_rw_generic_usb_dev(nut_upsdrvctl_t)
-@@ -157,7 +159,6 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -144,7 +144,6 @@ init_sigchld(nut_upsdrvctl_t)
+
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(nut_upsdrvctl_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(nut_upsdrvctl_t)
+
+ #######################################
+ #
+@@ -157,7 +156,6 @@ optional_policy(`
read_files_pattern(httpd_nutups_cgi_script_t, nut_conf_t, nut_conf_t)
@@ -38219,7 +41455,7 @@ index 79a225c..d82b231 100644
+ filetrans_pattern($1, nx_server_var_lib_t, nx_server_home_ssh_t, dir, ".ssh")
+')
diff --git a/nx.te b/nx.te
-index 58e2972..842affd 100644
+index 58e2972..4633dd2 100644
--- a/nx.te
+++ b/nx.te
@@ -28,6 +28,9 @@ files_type(nx_server_var_lib_t)
@@ -38259,6 +41495,17 @@ index 58e2972..842affd 100644
corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(nx_server_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(nx_server_t)
corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if(nx_server_t)
+@@ -77,10 +82,6 @@ files_read_etc_runtime_files(nx_server_t)
+ # but users need to be able to also read the config
+ files_read_usr_files(nx_server_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(nx_server_t)
+-
+-seutil_dontaudit_search_config(nx_server_t)
+-
+ sysnet_read_config(nx_server_t)
+
+ ifdef(`TODO',`
diff --git a/oav.fc b/oav.fc
index 0a66474..cf90b6e 100644
--- a/oav.fc
@@ -38270,7 +41517,7 @@ index 0a66474..cf90b6e 100644
-/var/log/scannerdaemon\.log -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:scannerdaemon_log_t,s0)
+/var/log/scannerdaemon\.log.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:scannerdaemon_log_t,s0)
diff --git a/oav.te b/oav.te
-index b4c5f86..3611887 100644
+index b4c5f86..9ecd4a3 100644
--- a/oav.te
+++ b/oav.te
@@ -48,7 +48,6 @@ read_lnk_files_pattern(oav_update_t, oav_update_var_lib_t, oav_update_var_lib_t)
@@ -38298,6 +41545,14 @@ index b4c5f86..3611887 100644
corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(scannerdaemon_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(scannerdaemon_t)
corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if(scannerdaemon_t)
+@@ -130,7 +128,6 @@ libs_exec_lib_files(scannerdaemon_t)
+
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(scannerdaemon_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(scannerdaemon_t)
+
+ sysnet_read_config(scannerdaemon_t)
+
diff --git a/obex.fc b/obex.fc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7b31529
@@ -38392,10 +41647,10 @@ index 0000000..d3b9544
+')
diff --git a/obex.te b/obex.te
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..827b7ab
+index 0000000..e9f259e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/obex.te
-@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+policy_module(obex,1.0.0)
+
+########################################
@@ -38422,7 +41677,6 @@ index 0000000..827b7ab
+
+logging_send_syslog_msg(obex_t)
+
-+miscfiles_read_localization(obex_t)
+
+userdom_search_user_home_content(obex_t)
+
@@ -38435,20 +41689,21 @@ index 0000000..827b7ab
+ dbus_system_bus_client(obex_t)
+')
diff --git a/oddjob.fc b/oddjob.fc
-index 9c272c2..0132b08 100644
+index 9c272c2..7e2287c 100644
--- a/oddjob.fc
+++ b/oddjob.fc
-@@ -1,7 +1,6 @@
+@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
/usr/lib/oddjob/mkhomedir -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:oddjob_mkhomedir_exec_t,s0)
+/usr/libexec/oddjob/mkhomedir -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:oddjob_mkhomedir_exec_t,s0)
++/usr/sbin/mkhomedir_helper -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:oddjob_mkhomedir_exec_t,s0)
/usr/sbin/oddjobd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:oddjob_exec_t,s0)
-/sbin/mkhomedir_helper -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:oddjob_mkhomedir_exec_t,s0)
-
/var/run/oddjobd\.pid gen_context(system_u:object_r:oddjob_var_run_t,s0)
diff --git a/oddjob.if b/oddjob.if
-index bd76ec2..28c4f00 100644
+index bd76ec2..dec6bc7 100644
--- a/oddjob.if
+++ b/oddjob.if
@@ -22,6 +22,25 @@ interface(`oddjob_domtrans',`
@@ -38510,29 +41765,79 @@ index bd76ec2..28c4f00 100644
########################################
## <summary>
## Execute a domain transition to run oddjob_mkhomedir.
+@@ -109,3 +147,41 @@ interface(`oddjob_run_mkhomedir',`
+ oddjob_domtrans_mkhomedir($1)
+ role $2 types oddjob_mkhomedir_t;
+ ')
++
++########################################
++## <summary>
++## Create a domain which can be started by init,
++## with a range transition.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Type to be used as a domain.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++## <param name="entry_point">
++## <summary>
++## Type of the program to be used as an entry point to this domain.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++## <param name="range">
++## <summary>
++## Range for the domain.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`oddjob_ranged_domain',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type oddjob_t;
++ ')
++
++ oddjob_system_entry($1, $2)
++
++ ifdef(`enable_mcs',`
++ range_transition oddjob_t $2:process $3;
++ ')
++
++ ifdef(`enable_mls',`
++ range_transition oddjob_t $2:process $3;
++ mls_rangetrans_target($1)
++ ')
++')
diff --git a/oddjob.te b/oddjob.te
-index a17ba31..9500f31 100644
+index a17ba31..467700e 100644
--- a/oddjob.te
+++ b/oddjob.te
-@@ -51,7 +51,8 @@ mcs_process_set_categories(oddjob_t)
+@@ -51,9 +51,9 @@ mcs_process_set_categories(oddjob_t)
selinux_compute_create_context(oddjob_t)
-files_read_etc_files(oddjob_t)
-+
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(oddjob_t)
+auth_use_nsswitch(oddjob_t)
++
- miscfiles_read_localization(oddjob_t)
+ locallogin_dontaudit_use_fds(oddjob_t)
-@@ -78,7 +79,6 @@ allow oddjob_mkhomedir_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
+@@ -78,13 +78,10 @@ allow oddjob_mkhomedir_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
kernel_read_system_state(oddjob_mkhomedir_t)
-files_read_etc_files(oddjob_mkhomedir_t)
-
+-
auth_use_nsswitch(oddjob_mkhomedir_t)
-@@ -99,8 +99,7 @@ seutil_read_default_contexts(oddjob_mkhomedir_t)
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(oddjob_mkhomedir_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(oddjob_mkhomedir_t)
+
+ selinux_get_fs_mount(oddjob_mkhomedir_t)
+ selinux_validate_context(oddjob_mkhomedir_t)
+@@ -99,8 +96,9 @@ seutil_read_default_contexts(oddjob_mkhomedir_t)
# Add/remove user home directories
userdom_home_filetrans_user_home_dir(oddjob_mkhomedir_t)
@@ -38542,6 +41847,8 @@ index a17ba31..9500f31 100644
-userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans_user_home_content(oddjob_mkhomedir_t, notdevfile_class_set)
+userdom_manage_user_home_content_dirs(oddjob_mkhomedir_t)
+userdom_manage_user_home_content(oddjob_mkhomedir_t)
++userdom_home_manager(oddjob_mkhomedir_t)
++userdom_stream_connect(oddjob_mkhomedir_t)
diff --git a/oident.if b/oident.if
index bb4fae5..4dfed8a 100644
@@ -38589,7 +41896,7 @@ index bb4fae5..4dfed8a 100644
+ admin_pattern($1, oidentd_config_t)
+')
diff --git a/oident.te b/oident.te
-index 8845174..9a1de6b 100644
+index 8845174..f7b073f 100644
--- a/oident.te
+++ b/oident.te
@@ -26,15 +26,14 @@ files_config_file(oidentd_config_t)
@@ -38612,7 +41919,12 @@ index 8845174..9a1de6b 100644
corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(oidentd_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(oidentd_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_node(oidentd_t)
-@@ -59,17 +58,4 @@ miscfiles_read_localization(oidentd_t)
+@@ -54,22 +53,7 @@ kernel_request_load_module(oidentd_t)
+
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(oidentd_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(oidentd_t)
+-
sysnet_read_config(oidentd_t)
oident_read_user_content(oidentd_t)
@@ -38632,7 +41944,7 @@ index 8845174..9a1de6b 100644
-')
+userdom_home_reader(oidentd_t)
diff --git a/openct.te b/openct.te
-index 7f8fdc2..1d2aea8 100644
+index 7f8fdc2..bc14bc4 100644
--- a/openct.te
+++ b/openct.te
@@ -29,6 +29,8 @@ kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(openct_t)
@@ -38644,7 +41956,12 @@ index 7f8fdc2..1d2aea8 100644
dev_read_sysfs(openct_t)
# openct asks for this
dev_rw_usbfs(openct_t)
-@@ -50,7 +52,9 @@ miscfiles_read_localization(openct_t)
+@@ -45,12 +47,12 @@ fs_search_auto_mountpoints(openct_t)
+
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(openct_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(openct_t)
+-
userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fds(openct_t)
userdom_dontaudit_search_user_home_dirs(openct_t)
@@ -38836,10 +42153,10 @@ index 0000000..598789a
+
diff --git a/openhpid.te b/openhpid.te
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..faa9b16
+index 0000000..c4ecca7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openhpid.te
-@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+policy_module(openhpid, 1.0.0)
+
+########################################
@@ -38891,202 +42208,294 @@ index 0000000..faa9b16
+files_read_etc_files(openhpid_t)
+
+logging_send_syslog_msg(openhpid_t)
+diff --git a/openshift-origin.fc b/openshift-origin.fc
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..30ca148
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/openshift-origin.fc
+@@ -0,0 +1 @@
++# Left Blank
+diff --git a/openshift-origin.if b/openshift-origin.if
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..3eb6a30
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/openshift-origin.if
+@@ -0,0 +1 @@
++## <summary></summary>
+diff --git a/openshift-origin.te b/openshift-origin.te
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..a437f80
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/openshift-origin.te
+@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
++policy_module(openshift-origin,1.0.0)
++gen_require(`
++ attribute openshift_domain;
++')
+
-+miscfiles_read_localization(openhpid_t)
-diff --git a/openvpn.if b/openvpn.if
-index d883214..d6afa87 100644
---- a/openvpn.if
-+++ b/openvpn.if
-@@ -144,8 +144,11 @@ interface(`openvpn_admin',`
- type openvpn_var_run_t, openvpn_initrc_exec_t;
- ')
-
-- allow $1 openvpn_t:process { ptrace signal_perms };
-+ allow $1 openvpn_t:process signal_perms;
- ps_process_pattern($1, openvpn_t)
-+ tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',`
-+ allow $1 openvpn_t:process ptrace;
++########################################
++#
++# openshift origin standard local policy
++#
++allow openshift_domain self:socket_class_set create_socket_perms;
++corenet_tcp_connect_all_ports(openshift_domain)
++corenet_tcp_bind_all_ports(openshift_domain)
++files_read_config_files(openshift_domain)
+diff --git a/openshift.fc b/openshift.fc
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..c9a5f74
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/openshift.fc
+@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
++/etc/rc\.d/init\.d/libra gen_context(system_u:object_r:openshift_initrc_exec_t,s0)
++/etc/rc\.d/init\.d/mcollective gen_context(system_u:object_r:openshift_initrc_exec_t,s0)
++
++/var/lib/stickshift(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:openshift_var_lib_t,s0)
++/var/lib/stickshift/.*/data(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:openshift_rw_file_t,s0)
++/var/lib/openshift(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:openshift_var_lib_t,s0)
++/var/lib/openshift/.*/data(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:openshift_rw_file_t,s0)
++
++/var/lib/stickshift/.*/\.tmp(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:openshift_tmp_t,s0)
++/var/lib/stickshift/.*/\.sandbox(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:openshift_tmp_t,s0)
++/var/lib/openshift/.*/\.tmp(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:openshift_tmp_t,s0)
++/var/lib/openshift/.*/\.sandbox(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:openshift_tmp_t,s0)
++
++/var/log/mcollective\.log -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:openshift_log_t,s0)
++
++/usr/s?bin/(oo|rhc)-cgroup-read -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:openshift_cgroup_read_exec_t,s0)
++
++/usr/s?bin/(oo|rhc)-restorer -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:openshift_initrc_exec_t,s0)
++/usr/s?bin/(oo|rhc)-restorer-wrapper.sh -- gen_context(unconfined_u:object_r:httpd_openshift_script_exec_t,s0)
++/usr/s?bin/oo-admin-ctl-gears -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:openshift_initrc_exec_t,s0)
++/usr/s?bin/mcollectived -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:openshift_initrc_exec_t,s0)
++
++/var/run/stickshift(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:openshift_var_run_t,s0)
++/var/run/openshift(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:openshift_var_run_t,s0)
+diff --git a/openshift.if b/openshift.if
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..6e20e72
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/openshift.if
+@@ -0,0 +1,644 @@
++
++## <summary> policy for openshift </summary>
++
++########################################
++## <summary>
++## Execute openshift server in the openshift domain.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## The type of the process performing this action.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`openshift_initrc_domtrans',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type openshift_initrc_t;
++ type openshift_initrc_exec_t;
+ ')
-
- init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, openvpn_initrc_exec_t)
- domain_system_change_exemption($1)
-diff --git a/openvpn.te b/openvpn.te
-index 66a52ee..4ca43aa 100644
---- a/openvpn.te
-+++ b/openvpn.te
-@@ -24,6 +24,9 @@ files_config_file(openvpn_etc_t)
- type openvpn_etc_rw_t;
- files_config_file(openvpn_etc_rw_t)
-
-+type openvpn_tmp_t;
-+files_tmp_file(openvpn_tmp_t)
+
- type openvpn_initrc_exec_t;
- init_script_file(openvpn_initrc_exec_t)
-
-@@ -40,15 +43,15 @@ files_pid_file(openvpn_var_run_t)
- # openvpn local policy
- #
-
--allow openvpn_t self:capability { dac_read_search dac_override ipc_lock net_bind_service net_admin setgid setuid sys_chroot sys_tty_config };
--allow openvpn_t self:process { signal getsched };
-+allow openvpn_t self:capability { dac_read_search dac_override ipc_lock net_bind_service net_admin setgid setuid sys_chroot sys_tty_config sys_nice };
-+allow openvpn_t self:process { signal getsched setsched };
- allow openvpn_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms;
-
- allow openvpn_t self:unix_dgram_socket { create_socket_perms sendto };
- allow openvpn_t self:unix_stream_socket { create_stream_socket_perms connectto };
- allow openvpn_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms;
- allow openvpn_t self:tcp_socket server_stream_socket_perms;
--allow openvpn_t self:tun_socket create;
-+allow openvpn_t self:tun_socket { create_socket_perms relabelfrom };
- allow openvpn_t self:netlink_route_socket rw_netlink_socket_perms;
-
- can_exec(openvpn_t, openvpn_etc_t)
-@@ -58,9 +61,15 @@ read_lnk_files_pattern(openvpn_t, openvpn_etc_t, openvpn_etc_t)
- manage_files_pattern(openvpn_t, openvpn_etc_t, openvpn_etc_rw_t)
- filetrans_pattern(openvpn_t, openvpn_etc_t, openvpn_etc_rw_t, file)
-
--allow openvpn_t openvpn_var_log_t:file manage_file_perms;
--logging_log_filetrans(openvpn_t, openvpn_var_log_t, file)
-+manage_files_pattern(openvpn_t, openvpn_tmp_t, openvpn_tmp_t)
-+files_tmp_filetrans(openvpn_t, openvpn_tmp_t, file)
++ domtrans_pattern($1, openshift_initrc_exec_t, openshift_initrc_t)
++')
+
++########################################
++## <summary>
++## Send a null signal to openshift init scripts.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`openshift_initrc_signull',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type openshift_initrc_t;
++ ')
+
-+manage_dirs_pattern(openvpn_t, openvpn_var_log_t, openvpn_var_log_t)
-+manage_files_pattern(openvpn_t, openvpn_var_log_t, openvpn_var_log_t)
-+logging_log_filetrans(openvpn_t, openvpn_var_log_t, { dir file })
-
-+manage_dirs_pattern(openvpn_t, openvpn_var_run_t, openvpn_var_run_t)
- manage_files_pattern(openvpn_t, openvpn_var_run_t, openvpn_var_run_t)
- files_pid_filetrans(openvpn_t, openvpn_var_run_t, { file dir })
-
-@@ -68,11 +77,11 @@ kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(openvpn_t)
- kernel_read_net_sysctls(openvpn_t)
- kernel_read_network_state(openvpn_t)
- kernel_read_system_state(openvpn_t)
-+kernel_request_load_module(openvpn_t)
-
- corecmd_exec_bin(openvpn_t)
- corecmd_exec_shell(openvpn_t)
-
--corenet_all_recvfrom_unlabeled(openvpn_t)
- corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(openvpn_t)
- corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(openvpn_t)
- corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if(openvpn_t)
-@@ -87,6 +96,7 @@ corenet_udp_bind_openvpn_port(openvpn_t)
- corenet_tcp_bind_http_port(openvpn_t)
- corenet_tcp_connect_openvpn_port(openvpn_t)
- corenet_tcp_connect_http_port(openvpn_t)
-+corenet_tcp_connect_tor_socks_port(openvpn_t)
- corenet_tcp_connect_http_cache_port(openvpn_t)
- corenet_rw_tun_tap_dev(openvpn_t)
- corenet_sendrecv_openvpn_server_packets(openvpn_t)
-@@ -100,33 +110,40 @@ dev_read_urand(openvpn_t)
- files_read_etc_files(openvpn_t)
- files_read_etc_runtime_files(openvpn_t)
-
-+fs_getattr_xattr_fs(openvpn_t)
++ allow $1 openshift_initrc_t:process signull;
++')
+
- auth_use_pam(openvpn_t)
-
-+init_read_utmp(openvpn_t)
++#######################################
++## <summary>
++## Send a signal to openshift init scripts.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`openshift_initrc_signal',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type openshift_initrc_t;
++ ')
+
- logging_send_syslog_msg(openvpn_t)
-
- miscfiles_read_localization(openvpn_t)
- miscfiles_read_all_certs(openvpn_t)
-
- sysnet_dns_name_resolve(openvpn_t)
-+sysnet_use_ldap(openvpn_t)
- sysnet_exec_ifconfig(openvpn_t)
- sysnet_manage_config(openvpn_t)
- sysnet_etc_filetrans_config(openvpn_t)
-
--userdom_use_user_terminals(openvpn_t)
-+userdom_use_inherited_user_terminals(openvpn_t)
-+userdom_read_home_certs(openvpn_t)
-+userdom_attach_admin_tun_iface(openvpn_t)
-+userdom_read_inherited_user_tmp_files(openvpn_t)
-+userdom_read_inherited_user_home_content_files(openvpn_t)
-
- tunable_policy(`openvpn_enable_homedirs',`
-- userdom_read_user_home_content_files(openvpn_t)
-+ userdom_search_user_home_dirs(openvpn_t)
- ')
-
- tunable_policy(`openvpn_enable_homedirs && use_nfs_home_dirs',`
-- fs_read_nfs_files(openvpn_t)
-- fs_read_nfs_symlinks(openvpn_t)
--')
-+ fs_read_nfs_files(openvpn_t)
++ allow $1 openshift_initrc_t:process signal;
+')
-
- tunable_policy(`openvpn_enable_homedirs && use_samba_home_dirs',`
-- fs_read_cifs_files(openvpn_t)
-- fs_read_cifs_symlinks(openvpn_t)
--')
-+ fs_read_cifs_files(openvpn_t)
++
++########################################
++## <summary>
++## Send a signal to openshift init scripts.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`openshift_initrc_signl',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type openshift_initrc_t;
++ ')
++
++ allow $1 openshift_initrc_t:process signal;
+')
-
- optional_policy(`
- daemontools_service_domain(openvpn_t, openvpn_exec_t)
-@@ -138,3 +155,7 @@ optional_policy(`
-
- networkmanager_dbus_chat(openvpn_t)
- ')
+
-+optional_policy(`
-+ unconfined_attach_tun_iface(openvpn_t)
++########################################
++## <summary>
++## Search openshift cache directories.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`openshift_search_cache',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type openshift_cache_t;
++ ')
++
++ allow $1 openshift_cache_t:dir search_dir_perms;
++ files_search_var($1)
+')
-diff --git a/pacemaker.fc b/pacemaker.fc
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..4e915ab
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/pacemaker.fc
-@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
-+/etc/rc\.d/init\.d/pacemaker -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:pacemaker_initrc_exec_t,s0)
+
-+/usr/lib/systemd/system/pacemaker.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:pacemaker_unit_file_t,s0)
++########################################
++## <summary>
++## Read openshift cache files.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`openshift_read_cache_files',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type openshift_cache_t;
++ ')
+
-+/usr/sbin/pacemakerd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:pacemaker_exec_t,s0)
++ files_search_var($1)
++ read_files_pattern($1, openshift_cache_t, openshift_cache_t)
++')
+
-+/var/lib/heartbeat/crm(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:pacemaker_var_lib_t,s0)
++########################################
++## <summary>
++## Create, read, write, and delete
++## openshift cache files.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`openshift_manage_cache_files',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type openshift_cache_t;
++ ')
+
-+/var/lib/pengine(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:pacemaker_var_lib_t,s0)
++ files_search_var($1)
++ manage_files_pattern($1, openshift_cache_t, openshift_cache_t)
++')
+
-+/var/run/crm(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:pacemaker_var_run_t,s0)
-diff --git a/pacemaker.if b/pacemaker.if
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..e05c78f
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/pacemaker.if
-@@ -0,0 +1,209 @@
++########################################
++## <summary>
++## Create, read, write, and delete
++## openshift cache dirs.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`openshift_manage_cache_dirs',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type openshift_cache_t;
++ ')
++
++ files_search_var($1)
++ manage_dirs_pattern($1, openshift_cache_t, openshift_cache_t)
++')
+
-+## <summary>policy for pacemaker</summary>
+
+########################################
+## <summary>
-+## Transition to pacemaker.
++## Allow the specified domain to read openshift's log files.
+## </summary>
+## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++## <rolecap/>
++#
++interface(`openshift_read_log',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type openshift_log_t;
++ ')
++
++ logging_search_logs($1)
++ read_files_pattern($1, openshift_log_t, openshift_log_t)
++')
++
++########################################
+## <summary>
++## Allow the specified domain to append
++## openshift log files.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
+## Domain allowed to transition.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`openshift_append_log',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type openshift_log_t;
++ ')
++
++ logging_search_logs($1)
++ append_files_pattern($1, openshift_log_t, openshift_log_t)
++')
++
++########################################
++## <summary>
++## Allow domain to manage openshift log files
+## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain to not audit.
++## </summary>
+## </param>
+#
-+interface(`pacemaker_domtrans',`
++interface(`openshift_manage_log',`
+ gen_require(`
-+ type pacemaker_t, pacemaker_exec_t;
++ type openshift_log_t;
+ ')
+
-+ corecmd_search_bin($1)
-+ domtrans_pattern($1, pacemaker_exec_t, pacemaker_t)
++ logging_search_logs($1)
++ manage_dirs_pattern($1, openshift_log_t, openshift_log_t)
++ manage_files_pattern($1, openshift_log_t, openshift_log_t)
++ manage_lnk_files_pattern($1, openshift_log_t, openshift_log_t)
+')
+
+########################################
+## <summary>
-+## Execute pacemaker server in the pacemaker domain.
++## Search openshift lib directories.
+## </summary>
+## <param name="domain">
+## <summary>
@@ -39094,17 +42503,18 @@ index 0000000..e05c78f
+## </summary>
+## </param>
+#
-+interface(`pacemaker_initrc_domtrans',`
++interface(`openshift_search_lib',`
+ gen_require(`
-+ type pacemaker_initrc_exec_t;
++ type openshift_var_lib_t;
+ ')
+
-+ init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, pacemaker_initrc_exec_t)
++ allow $1 openshift_var_lib_t:dir search_dir_perms;
++ files_search_var_lib($1)
+')
+
+########################################
+## <summary>
-+## Search pacemaker lib directories.
++## Read openshift lib files.
+## </summary>
+## <param name="domain">
+## <summary>
@@ -39112,18 +42522,18 @@ index 0000000..e05c78f
+## </summary>
+## </param>
+#
-+interface(`pacemaker_search_lib',`
++interface(`openshift_read_lib_files',`
+ gen_require(`
-+ type pacemaker_var_lib_t;
++ type openshift_var_lib_t;
+ ')
+
-+ allow $1 pacemaker_var_lib_t:dir search_dir_perms;
+ files_search_var_lib($1)
++ read_files_pattern($1, openshift_var_lib_t, openshift_var_lib_t)
+')
+
+########################################
+## <summary>
-+## Read pacemaker lib files.
++## Read openshift lib files.
+## </summary>
+## <param name="domain">
+## <summary>
@@ -39131,18 +42541,19 @@ index 0000000..e05c78f
+## </summary>
+## </param>
+#
-+interface(`pacemaker_read_lib_files',`
++interface(`openshift_append_lib_files',`
+ gen_require(`
-+ type pacemaker_var_lib_t;
++ type openshift_var_lib_t;
+ ')
+
+ files_search_var_lib($1)
-+ read_files_pattern($1, pacemaker_var_lib_t, pacemaker_var_lib_t)
++ append_files_pattern($1, openshift_var_lib_t, openshift_var_lib_t)
+')
+
+########################################
+## <summary>
-+## Manage pacemaker lib files.
++## Create, read, write, and delete
++## openshift lib files.
+## </summary>
+## <param name="domain">
+## <summary>
@@ -39150,18 +42561,18 @@ index 0000000..e05c78f
+## </summary>
+## </param>
+#
-+interface(`pacemaker_manage_lib_files',`
++interface(`openshift_manage_lib_files',`
+ gen_require(`
-+ type pacemaker_var_lib_t;
++ type openshift_var_lib_t;
+ ')
+
+ files_search_var_lib($1)
-+ manage_files_pattern($1, pacemaker_var_lib_t, pacemaker_var_lib_t)
++ manage_files_pattern($1, openshift_var_lib_t, openshift_var_lib_t)
+')
+
+########################################
+## <summary>
-+## Manage pacemaker lib directories.
++## Manage openshift lib dirs files.
+## </summary>
+## <param name="domain">
+## <summary>
@@ -39169,63 +42580,74 @@ index 0000000..e05c78f
+## </summary>
+## </param>
+#
-+interface(`pacemaker_manage_lib_dirs',`
++interface(`openshift_manage_lib_dirs',`
+ gen_require(`
-+ type pacemaker_var_lib_t;
++ type openshift_var_lib_t;
+ ')
+
+ files_search_var_lib($1)
-+ manage_dirs_pattern($1, pacemaker_var_lib_t, pacemaker_var_lib_t)
++ manage_dirs_pattern($1, openshift_var_lib_t, openshift_var_lib_t)
+')
+
-+########################################
++#######################################
+## <summary>
-+## Read pacemaker PID files.
++## Create private objects in the
++## mail lib directory.
+## </summary>
+## <param name="domain">
+## <summary>
+## Domain allowed access.
+## </summary>
+## </param>
++## <param name="private type">
++## <summary>
++## The type of the object to be created.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++## <param name="object">
++## <summary>
++## The object class of the object being created.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++## <param name="name" optional="true">
++## <summary>
++## The name of the object being created.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
+#
-+interface(`pacemaker_read_pid_files',`
++interface(`openshift_lib_filetrans',`
+ gen_require(`
-+ type pacemaker_var_run_t;
++ type openshift_var_lib_t;
+ ')
+
-+ files_search_pids($1)
-+ allow $1 pacemaker_var_run_t:file read_file_perms;
++ files_search_var_lib($1)
++ filetrans_pattern($1, openshift_var_lib_t, $2, $3, $4)
+')
+
+########################################
+## <summary>
-+## Execute pacemaker server in the pacemaker domain.
++## Read openshift PID files.
+## </summary>
+## <param name="domain">
+## <summary>
-+## Domain allowed to transition.
++## Domain allowed access.
+## </summary>
+## </param>
+#
-+interface(`pacemaker_systemctl',`
++interface(`openshift_read_pid_files',`
+ gen_require(`
-+ type pacemaker_t;
-+ type pacemaker_unit_file_t;
++ type openshift_var_run_t;
+ ')
+
-+ systemd_exec_systemctl($1)
-+ systemd_read_fifo_file_passwd_run($1)
-+ allow $1 pacemaker_unit_file_t:file read_file_perms;
-+ allow $1 pacemaker_unit_file_t:service manage_service_perms;
-+
-+ ps_process_pattern($1, pacemaker_t)
++ files_search_pids($1)
++ allow $1 openshift_var_run_t:file read_file_perms;
+')
+
+
+########################################
+## <summary>
+## All of the rules required to administrate
-+## an pacemaker environment
++## an openshift environment
+## </summary>
+## <param name="domain">
+## <summary>
@@ -39239,285 +42661,890 @@ index 0000000..e05c78f
+## </param>
+## <rolecap/>
+#
-+interface(`pacemaker_admin',`
++interface(`openshift_admin',`
+ gen_require(`
-+ type pacemaker_t;
-+ type pacemaker_initrc_exec_t;
-+ type pacemaker_var_lib_t;
-+ type pacemaker_var_run_t;
-+ type pacemaker_unit_file_t;
++ type openshift_t;
++ type openshift_initrc_exec_t;
++ type openshift_cache_t;
++ type openshift_log_t;
++ type openshift_var_lib_t;
++ type openshift_var_run_t;
+ ')
+
-+ allow $1 pacemaker_t:process { ptrace signal_perms };
-+ ps_process_pattern($1, pacemaker_t)
++ allow $1 openshift_t:process { ptrace signal_perms };
++ ps_process_pattern($1, openshift_t)
+
-+ pacemaker_initrc_domtrans($1)
++ openshift_initrc_domtrans($1)
+ domain_system_change_exemption($1)
-+ role_transition $2 pacemaker_initrc_exec_t system_r;
++ role_transition $2 openshift_initrc_exec_t system_r;
+ allow $2 system_r;
+
++ files_search_var($1)
++ admin_pattern($1, openshift_cache_t)
++
++ logging_search_logs($1)
++ admin_pattern($1, openshift_log_t)
++
+ files_search_var_lib($1)
-+ admin_pattern($1, pacemaker_var_lib_t)
++ admin_pattern($1, openshift_var_lib_t)
+
+ files_search_pids($1)
-+ admin_pattern($1, pacemaker_var_run_t)
++ admin_pattern($1, openshift_var_run_t)
+
-+ pacemaker_systemctl($1)
-+ admin_pattern($1, pacemaker_unit_file_t)
-+ allow $1 pacemaker_unit_file_t:service all_service_perms;
-+
-+ optional_policy(`
-+ systemd_passwd_agent_exec($1)
-+ systemd_read_fifo_file_passwd_run($1)
-+ ')
+')
-diff --git a/pacemaker.te b/pacemaker.te
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..0fcbb7f
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/pacemaker.te
-@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
-+policy_module(pacemaker, 1.0.0)
+
+########################################
++## <summary>
++## Make the specified type usable as a openshift domain.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="openshiftdomain_prefix">
++## <summary>
++## The prefix of the domain (e.g., openshift
++## is the prefix for openshift_t).
++## </summary>
++## </param>
+#
-+# Declarations
-+#
++template(`openshift_service_domain_template',`
++ gen_require(`
++ attribute openshift_domain;
++ attribute openshift_user_domain;
++ ')
+
-+type pacemaker_t;
-+type pacemaker_exec_t;
-+init_daemon_domain(pacemaker_t, pacemaker_exec_t)
++ type $1_t;
++ typeattribute $1_t openshift_domain, openshift_user_domain;
++ domain_type($1_t)
++ role system_r types $1_t;
++ mcs_untrusted_proc($1_t)
++ domain_user_exemption_target($1_t)
++ auth_use_nsswitch($1_t)
++ domain_subj_id_change_exemption($1_t)
++ domain_obj_id_change_exemption($1_t)
++ domain_dyntrans_type($1_t)
+
-+type pacemaker_initrc_exec_t;
-+init_script_file(pacemaker_initrc_exec_t)
++ kernel_read_system_state($1_t)
+
-+type pacemaker_var_lib_t;
-+files_type(pacemaker_var_lib_t)
++ logging_send_syslog_msg($1_t)
+
-+type pacemaker_var_run_t;
-+files_pid_file(pacemaker_var_run_t)
++ type $1_app_t;
++ typeattribute $1_app_t openshift_domain;
++ domain_type($1_app_t)
++ role system_r types $1_app_t;
++ mcs_untrusted_proc($1_app_t)
++ domain_user_exemption_target($1_app_t)
++ domain_obj_id_change_exemption($1_app_t)
++ domain_dyntrans_type($1_app_t)
+
-+type pacemaker_unit_file_t;
-+systemd_unit_file(pacemaker_unit_file_t)
++ kernel_read_system_state($1_app_t)
++
++ logging_send_syslog_msg($1_app_t)
++')
+
+########################################
++## <summary>
++## Make the specified type usable as a openshift domain.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="type">
++## <summary>
++## Type to be used as a openshift domain type.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
+#
-+# pacemaker local policy
++template(`openshift_net_type',`
++ gen_require(`
++ attribute openshift_net_domain;
++ ')
++
++ typeattribute $1 openshift_net_domain;
++')
++
++########################################
++## <summary>
++## Read and write inherited openshift files.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
+#
-+allow pacemaker_t self:capability { chown dac_override setuid };
-+allow pacemaker_t self:process { fork setrlimit signal };
-+allow pacemaker_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms;
-+allow pacemaker_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
++interface(`openshift_rw_inherited_content',`
++ gen_require(`
++ attribute openshift_file_type;
++ ')
+
-+manage_dirs_pattern(pacemaker_t, pacemaker_var_lib_t, pacemaker_var_lib_t)
-+manage_files_pattern(pacemaker_t, pacemaker_var_lib_t, pacemaker_var_lib_t)
-+files_var_lib_filetrans(pacemaker_t, pacemaker_var_lib_t, { dir file })
++ allow $1 openshift_file_type:file rw_inherited_file_perms;
++')
+
-+manage_dirs_pattern(pacemaker_t, pacemaker_var_run_t, pacemaker_var_run_t)
-+manage_files_pattern(pacemaker_t, pacemaker_var_run_t, pacemaker_var_run_t)
-+files_pid_filetrans(pacemaker_t, pacemaker_var_run_t, { dir file })
++########################################
++## <summary>
++## Manage openshift tmp files.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`openshift_manage_tmp_files',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type openshift_tmp_t;
++ ')
+
-+domain_use_interactive_fds(pacemaker_t)
++ manage_files_pattern($1, openshift_tmp_t, openshift_tmp_t)
++')
++
++########################################
++## <summary>
++## Manage openshift tmp sockets.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`openshift_manage_tmp_sockets',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type openshift_tmp_t;
++ ')
+
++ manage_sock_files_pattern($1, openshift_tmp_t, openshift_tmp_t)
++')
+
-+auth_use_nsswitch(pacemaker_t)
++########################################
++## <summary>
++## Mounton openshift tmp directory.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`openshift_mounton_tmp',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type openshift_tmp_t;
++ ')
+
-+logging_send_syslog_msg(pacemaker_t)
++ allow $1 openshift_tmp_t:dir mounton;
++')
++
++########################################
++## <summary>
++## Dontaudit Read and write inherited script fifo files.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`openshift_dontaudit_rw_inherited_fifo_files',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type openshift_initrc_t;
++ ')
++
++ dontaudit $1 openshift_initrc_t:fifo_file rw_inherited_fifo_file_perms;
++')
++
++########################################
++## <summary>
++## Allow calling app to transition to an openshift domain
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++## <rolecap/>
++#
++interface(`openshift_transition',`
++ gen_require(`
++ attribute openshift_user_domain;
++ ')
++
++ allow $1 openshift_user_domain:process transition;
++ dontaudit $1 openshift_user_domain:process { noatsecure siginh rlimitinh };
++ allow openshift_user_domain $1:fd use;
++ allow openshift_user_domain $1:fifo_file rw_inherited_fifo_file_perms;
++ allow openshift_user_domain $1:process sigchld;
++ dontaudit $1 openshift_user_domain:socket_class_set { read write };
++')
++
++########################################
++## <summary>
++## Allow calling app to transition to an openshift domain
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++## <rolecap/>
++#
++interface(`openshift_dyntransition',`
++ gen_require(`
++ attribute openshift_domain;
++ attribute openshift_user_domain;
++ ')
++
++ allow $1 openshift_user_domain:process dyntransition;
++ dontaudit openshift_user_domain $1:key view;
++ allow openshift_user_domain $1:unix_stream_socket { connectto rw_socket_perms };
++ allow openshift_user_domain $1:unix_dgram_socket rw_socket_perms;
++ allow $1 openshift_user_domain:process { rlimitinh signal };
++ dontaudit openshift_domain $1:tcp_socket { read write getattr setopt getopt shutdown };
++')
++
++########################################
++## <summary>
++## Execute openshift in the openshift domain, and
++## allow the specified role the openshift domain.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed to transition.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++## <param name="role">
++## <summary>
++## Role allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`openshift_run',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type openshift_initrc_exec_t;
++ ')
++
++ openshift_initrc_domtrans($1)
++ role_transition $2 openshift_initrc_exec_t system_r;
++ openshift_transition($1)
++')
+diff --git a/openshift.te b/openshift.te
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..d97b009
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/openshift.te
+@@ -0,0 +1,383 @@
++policy_module(openshift,1.0.0)
++
++gen_require(`
++ role system_r;
++')
++
++########################################
++#
++# Declarations
++#
+
-+miscfiles_read_localization(pacemaker_t)
++# openshift applications that can use the network.
++attribute openshift_net_domain;
++# Attribute representing all openshift user processes (excludes apache processes)
++attribute openshift_user_domain;
++# Attribute representing all openshift processes
++attribute openshift_domain;
+
++# Attribute for all openshift content
++attribute openshift_file_type;
++
++# Type of openshift init script
++type openshift_initrc_t;
++type openshift_initrc_exec_t;
++init_daemon_domain(openshift_initrc_t, openshift_initrc_exec_t)
++init_ranged_daemon_domain(openshift_initrc_t, openshift_initrc_exec_t, s0 - mcs_systemhigh)
++domain_obj_id_change_exemption(openshift_initrc_t)
+optional_policy(`
-+ corosync_stream_connect(pacemaker_t)
++ oddjob_ranged_domain(openshift_initrc_t, openshift_initrc_exec_t, s0 - mcs_systemhigh)
+')
+
-diff --git a/pads.fc b/pads.fc
-index 0870c56..6d5fb1d 100644
---- a/pads.fc
-+++ b/pads.fc
-@@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
- /etc/pads-ether-codes -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:pads_config_t, s0)
- /etc/pads-signature-list -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:pads_config_t, s0)
--/etc/pads.conf -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:pads_config_t, s0)
-+/etc/pads\.conf -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:pads_config_t, s0)
- /etc/pads-assets.csv -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:pads_config_t, s0)
-
- /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/pads -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:pads_initrc_exec_t, s0)
-
- /usr/bin/pads -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:pads_exec_t, s0)
-
--/var/run/pads.pid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:pads_var_run_t, s0)
-+/var/run/pads\.pid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:pads_var_run_t, s0)
-diff --git a/pads.if b/pads.if
-index 8ac407e..45673ad 100644
---- a/pads.if
-+++ b/pads.if
-@@ -25,20 +25,26 @@
- ## </param>
- ## <rolecap/>
- #
--interface(`pads_admin', `
-+interface(`pads_admin',`
- gen_require(`
-- type pads_t, pads_config_t;
-- type pads_var_run_t, pads_initrc_exec_t;
-+ type pads_t, pads_config_t, pads_initrc_exec_t;
-+ type pads_var_run_t;
++
++type openshift_initrc_tmp_t;
++files_tmp_file(openshift_initrc_tmp_t)
++
++type openshift_tmpfs_t;
++files_tmpfs_file(openshift_tmpfs_t)
++
++type openshift_tmp_t, openshift_file_type;
++files_tmp_file(openshift_tmp_t)
++files_mountpoint(openshift_tmp_t)
++files_poly(openshift_tmp_t)
++files_poly_parent(openshift_tmp_t)
++
++type openshift_var_run_t;
++files_pid_file(openshift_var_run_t)
++
++type openshift_var_lib_t, openshift_file_type;
++files_poly(openshift_var_lib_t)
++files_poly_parent(openshift_var_lib_t)
++files_mountpoint(openshift_var_lib_t)
++
++type openshift_rw_file_t, openshift_file_type;
++files_poly(openshift_rw_file_t)
++files_poly_parent(openshift_rw_file_t)
++
++type openshift_log_t;
++logging_log_file(openshift_log_t)
++
++type openshift_port_t;
++corenet_port(openshift_port_t)
++corenet_reserved_port(openshift_port_t)
++
++type openshift_cgroup_read_t;
++type openshift_cgroup_read_exec_t;
++application_domain(openshift_cgroup_read_t, openshift_cgroup_read_exec_t)
++
++########################################
++#
++# Template to create openshift_t and openshift_app_t
++#
++
++openshift_service_domain_template(openshift)
++
++########################################
++#
++# openshift initrc local policy
++#
++unconfined_domain_noaudit(openshift_initrc_t)
++mcs_process_set_categories(openshift_initrc_t)
++
++systemd_dbus_chat_logind(openshift_initrc_t)
++
++manage_dirs_pattern(openshift_initrc_t, openshift_initrc_tmp_t, openshift_initrc_tmp_t)
++manage_files_pattern(openshift_initrc_t, openshift_initrc_tmp_t, openshift_initrc_tmp_t)
++manage_lnk_files_pattern(openshift_initrc_t, openshift_initrc_tmp_t, openshift_initrc_tmp_t)
++files_tmp_filetrans(openshift_initrc_t, openshift_initrc_tmp_t, { file dir })
++
++manage_dirs_pattern(openshift_initrc_t, openshift_var_run_t, openshift_var_run_t)
++manage_files_pattern(openshift_initrc_t, openshift_var_run_t, openshift_var_run_t)
++manage_lnk_files_pattern(openshift_initrc_t, openshift_var_run_t, openshift_var_run_t)
++files_pid_filetrans(openshift_initrc_t, openshift_var_run_t, { file dir })
++
++manage_dirs_pattern(openshift_initrc_t, openshift_log_t, openshift_log_t)
++manage_files_pattern(openshift_initrc_t, openshift_log_t, openshift_log_t)
++logging_log_filetrans(openshift_initrc_t, openshift_log_t, { file dir })
++
++allow openshift_initrc_t openshift_domain:process { getattr getsched setsched transition signal signull sigkill };
++allow openshift_domain openshift_initrc_t:fd use;
++allow openshift_domain openshift_initrc_t:fifo_file rw_inherited_fifo_file_perms;
++allow openshift_domain openshift_initrc_t:process sigchld;
++dontaudit openshift_domain openshift_initrc_t:key view;
++dontaudit openshift_domain openshift_initrc_t:process signull;
++dontaudit openshift_domain openshift_initrc_t:socket_class_set { read write };
++
++#######################################################
++#
++# Policy for all openshift domains
++#
++allow openshift_domain self:process all_process_perms;
++allow openshift_domain self:msg all_msg_perms;
++allow openshift_domain self:msgq create_msgq_perms;
++allow openshift_domain self:shm create_shm_perms;
++allow openshift_domain self:sem create_sem_perms;
++dontaudit openshift_domain self:dir write;
++
++dontaudit openshift_domain self:netlink_tcpdiag_socket create;
++allow openshift_domain self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
++allow openshift_domain self:fifo_file manage_fifo_file_perms;
++allow openshift_domain self:unix_stream_socket { create_stream_socket_perms connectto };
++allow openshift_domain self:unix_dgram_socket { create_socket_perms sendto };
++dontaudit openshift_domain self:netlink_audit_socket { create_socket_perms nlmsg_relay };
++
++manage_dirs_pattern(openshift_domain, openshift_rw_file_t, openshift_rw_file_t)
++manage_files_pattern(openshift_domain, openshift_rw_file_t, openshift_rw_file_t)
++manage_fifo_files_pattern(openshift_domain, openshift_rw_file_t, openshift_rw_file_t)
++manage_sock_files_pattern(openshift_domain, openshift_rw_file_t, openshift_rw_file_t)
++manage_lnk_files_pattern(openshift_domain, openshift_rw_file_t, openshift_rw_file_t)
++allow openshift_domain openshift_rw_file_t:dir_file_class_set { relabelfrom relabelto };
++
++list_dirs_pattern(openshift_domain, openshift_file_type, openshift_file_type)
++read_files_pattern(openshift_domain, openshift_file_type, openshift_file_type)
++rw_fifo_files_pattern(openshift_domain, openshift_file_type, openshift_file_type)
++rw_sock_files_pattern(openshift_domain, openshift_file_type, openshift_file_type)
++read_lnk_files_pattern(openshift_domain, openshift_file_type, openshift_file_type)
++allow openshift_domain openshift_file_type:file execmod;
++can_exec(openshift_domain, openshift_file_type)
++allow openshift_domain openshift_file_type:file entrypoint;
++# Allow users to execute files in their home dir
++allow openshift_domain openshift_file_type:file { execute execute_no_trans };
++
++# Dontaudit openshift domains trying to search other openshift domains directories,
++# this happens just when users are probing the system
++dontaudit openshift_domain openshift_file_type:dir search_dir_perms
++;
++
++manage_dirs_pattern(openshift_domain, openshift_tmpfs_t, openshift_tmpfs_t)
++manage_files_pattern(openshift_domain, openshift_tmpfs_t, openshift_tmpfs_t)
++fs_tmpfs_filetrans(openshift_domain, openshift_tmpfs_t, { dir file })
++can_exec(openshift_domain, openshift_tmpfs_t)
++
++manage_dirs_pattern(openshift_domain, openshift_tmp_t, openshift_tmp_t)
++manage_fifo_files_pattern(openshift_domain, openshift_tmp_t, openshift_tmp_t)
++manage_files_pattern(openshift_domain, openshift_tmp_t, openshift_tmp_t)
++manage_lnk_files_pattern(openshift_domain, openshift_tmp_t, openshift_tmp_t)
++manage_sock_files_pattern(openshift_domain, openshift_tmp_t, openshift_tmp_t)
++files_tmp_filetrans(openshift_domain, openshift_tmp_t, { lnk_file file dir sock_file fifo_file })
++allow openshift_domain openshift_tmp_t:dir_file_class_set { relabelfrom relabelto };
++
++allow openshift_domain openshift_log_t:file { getattr append lock ioctl };
++
++#lsof
++allow openshift_domain openshift_initrc_t:tcp_socket getattr;
++
++dontaudit openshift_domain openshift_initrc_tmp_t:file append;
++dontaudit openshift_domain openshift_var_run_t:file append;
++dontaudit openshift_domain openshift_file_type:sock_file execute;
++
++kernel_read_network_state(openshift_domain)
++kernel_dontaudit_list_all_proc(openshift_domain)
++kernel_dontaudit_list_all_sysctls(openshift_domain)
++kernel_dontaudit_request_load_module(openshift_domain)
++kernel_get_sysvipc_info(openshift_domain)
++
++corecmd_shell_entry_type(openshift_domain)
++corecmd_bin_entry_type(openshift_domain)
++corecmd_exec_all_executables(openshift_domain)
++
++dev_read_sysfs(openshift_domain)
++dev_read_rand(openshift_domain)
++dev_read_urand(openshift_domain)
++dev_dontaudit_append_rand(openshift_domain)
++dev_dontaudit_write_urand(openshift_domain)
++dev_dontaudit_getattr_all_blk_files(openshift_domain)
++dev_dontaudit_getattr_all_chr_files(openshift_domain)
++
++domain_use_interactive_fds(openshift_domain)
++domain_dontaudit_read_all_domains_state(openshift_domain)
++
++files_read_var_lib_symlinks(openshift_domain)
++
++fs_rw_hugetlbfs_files(openshift_domain)
++fs_rw_anon_inodefs_files(openshift_domain)
++fs_search_tmpfs(openshift_domain)
++fs_getattr_all_fs(openshift_domain)
++fs_dontaudit_getattr_all_fs(openshift_domain)
++fs_list_inotifyfs(openshift_domain)
++fs_dontaudit_list_auto_mountpoints(openshift_domain)
++fs_dontaudit_list_tmpfs(openshift_domain)
++storage_dontaudit_getattr_fixed_disk_dev(openshift_domain)
++storage_getattr_fixed_disk_dev(openshift_domain)
++fs_get_xattr_fs_quotas(openshift_domain)
++fs_rw_inherited_tmpfs_files(openshift_domain)
++fs_dontaudit_rw_anon_inodefs_files(openshift_domain)
++
++dontaudit openshift_domain file_type:dir read;
++files_dontaudit_list_home(openshift_domain)
++files_dontaudit_search_all_pids(openshift_domain)
++files_dontaudit_getattr_all_dirs(openshift_domain)
++files_dontaudit_getattr_all_files(openshift_domain)
++files_dontaudit_list_mnt(openshift_domain)
++files_dontaudit_list_var(openshift_domain)
++files_dontaudit_getattr_lost_found_dirs(openshift_domain)
++files_dontaudit_search_all_mountpoints(openshift_domain)
++files_dontaudit_search_spool(openshift_domain)
++files_dontaudit_search_all_dirs(openshift_domain)
++files_dontaudit_list_var(openshift_domain)
++files_read_etc_files(openshift_domain)
++files_exec_etc_files(openshift_domain)
++files_read_usr_files(openshift_domain)
++files_exec_usr_files(openshift_domain)
++files_dontaudit_getattr_non_security_sockets(openshift_domain)
++files_dontaudit_setattr_non_security_dirs(openshift_domain)
++files_dontaudit_setattr_non_security_files(openshift_domain)
++
++libs_exec_lib_files(openshift_domain)
++libs_exec_ld_so(openshift_domain)
++
++term_use_ptmx(openshift_domain)
++term_use_generic_ptys(openshift_domain)
++
++selinux_validate_context(openshift_domain)
++
++logging_inherit_append_all_logs(openshift_domain)
++
++init_dontaudit_read_utmp(openshift_domain)
++
++miscfiles_read_fonts(openshift_domain)
++miscfiles_dontaudit_setattr_fonts_cache_dirs(openshift_domain)
++
++mta_dontaudit_read_spool_symlinks(openshift_domain)
++
++term_dontaudit_search_ptys(openshift_domain)
++term_use_ptmx(openshift_domain)
++
++userdom_use_inherited_user_ptys(openshift_domain)
++userdom_dontaudit_search_admin_dir(openshift_domain)
++
++application_exec(openshift_domain)
++
++optional_policy(`
++ apache_exec_modules(openshift_domain)
++ apache_list_modules(openshift_domain)
++ apache_read_config(openshift_domain)
++ apache_search_config(openshift_domain)
++ apache_read_sys_content(openshift_domain)
++ apache_exec_sys_script(openshift_domain)
++ apache_entrypoint(openshift_domain)
++ apache_dontaudit_read_log(openshift_domain)
++')
++
++optional_policy(`
++ #############################################
++ #
++ # openshift cgi script policy
++ #
++ apache_content_template(openshift)
++ domtrans_pattern(httpd_openshift_script_t, openshift_initrc_exec_t, openshift_initrc_t)
++
++ optional_policy(`
++ dbus_system_bus_client(httpd_openshift_script_t)
++
++ optional_policy(`
++ oddjob_dbus_chat(httpd_openshift_script_t)
++ oddjob_dontaudit_rw_fifo_file(openshift_domain)
++ ')
++ ')
++')
++
++optional_policy(`
++ cron_role(system_r, openshift_domain)
++')
++
++optional_policy(`
++ gpg_entry_type(openshift_domain)
++')
++
++optional_policy(`
++ mysql_search_db(openshift_domain)
++')
++
++optional_policy(`
++ screen_exec(openshift_domain)
++')
++
++optional_policy(`
++ ssh_use_ptys(openshift_domain)
++ ssh_getattr_user_home_dir(openshift_domain)
++ ssh_dontaudit_search_user_home_dir(openshift_domain)
++')
++
++#######################################################
++#
++# Policy for openshift user domain process
++#
++manage_dirs_pattern(openshift_user_domain, openshift_file_type, openshift_file_type)
++manage_files_pattern(openshift_user_domain, openshift_file_type, openshift_file_type)
++manage_fifo_files_pattern(openshift_user_domain, openshift_file_type, openshift_file_type)
++manage_sock_files_pattern(openshift_user_domain, openshift_file_type, openshift_file_type)
++manage_lnk_files_pattern(openshift_user_domain, openshift_file_type, openshift_file_type)
++allow openshift_user_domain openshift_file_type:dir_file_class_set { relabelfrom relabelto };
++
++allow openshift_user_domain openshift_domain:process transition;
++allow openshift_domain openshift_user_domain:fd use;
++allow openshift_domain openshift_user_domain:fifo_file rw_inherited_fifo_file_perms;
++allow openshift_domain openshift_user_domain:process sigchld;
++dontaudit openshift_domain openshift_user_domain:key view;
++dontaudit openshift_domain openshift_user_domain:process signull;
++dontaudit openshift_domain openshift_user_domain:socket_class_set { read write };
++
++allow openshift_user_domain openshift_domain:process ptrace;
++
++optional_policy(`
++ ssh_rw_tcp_sockets(openshift_user_domain)
++')
++
++############################################################################
++#
++# Rules specific to openshift and openshift_app_t
++#
++kernel_read_vm_sysctls(openshift_t)
++kernel_read_vm_sysctls(openshift_app_t)
++kernel_search_vm_sysctl(openshift_t)
++kernel_search_vm_sysctl(openshift_app_t)
++netutils_domtrans_ping(openshift_t)
++netutils_kill_ping(openshift_t)
++netutils_signal_ping(openshift_t)
++
++openshift_net_type(openshift_app_t)
++openshift_net_type(openshift_t)
++
++optional_policy(`
++ postfix_rw_public_pipes(openshift_t)
++ postfix_manage_spool_maildrop_files(openshift_t)
++')
++
++########################################
++#
++# openshift_cgroup_read local policy
++#
++
++allow openshift_cgroup_read_t self:process { getattr signal_perms };
++allow openshift_cgroup_read_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms;
++allow openshift_cgroup_read_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
++allow openshift_cgroup_read_t openshift_initrc_t:fifo_file rw_inherited_fifo_file_perms;
++
++optional_policy(`
++ ssh_use_ptys(openshift_cgroup_read_t)
++')
++
++corecmd_exec_bin(openshift_cgroup_read_t)
++
++dev_read_urand(openshift_cgroup_read_t)
++
++domain_use_interactive_fds(openshift_cgroup_read_t)
++
++files_read_etc_files(openshift_cgroup_read_t)
++
++fs_dontaudit_rw_anon_inodefs_files(openshift_cgroup_read_t)
++
++userdom_use_inherited_user_ptys(openshift_cgroup_read_t)
++
++miscfiles_read_generic_certs(openshift_cgroup_read_t)
++
++domtrans_pattern(openshift_domain, openshift_cgroup_read_exec_t, openshift_cgroup_read_t)
++role system_r types openshift_cgroup_read_t;
++
++allow openshift_domain openshift_cgroup_read_t:process { getattr signal signull sigkill };
++
++fs_read_cgroup_files(openshift_cgroup_read_t)
++
++allow openshift_cgroup_read_t openshift_var_lib_t:dir list_dir_perms;
++read_files_pattern(openshift_cgroup_read_t, openshift_var_lib_t, openshift_var_lib_t)
+diff --git a/openvpn.if b/openvpn.if
+index d883214..d6afa87 100644
+--- a/openvpn.if
++++ b/openvpn.if
+@@ -144,8 +144,11 @@ interface(`openvpn_admin',`
+ type openvpn_var_run_t, openvpn_initrc_exec_t;
')
-- allow $1 pads_t:process { ptrace signal_perms };
-+ allow $1 pads_t:process signal_perms;
- ps_process_pattern($1, pads_t)
+- allow $1 openvpn_t:process { ptrace signal_perms };
++ allow $1 openvpn_t:process signal_perms;
+ ps_process_pattern($1, openvpn_t)
+ tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',`
-+ allow $1 pads_t:process ptrace;
++ allow $1 openvpn_t:process ptrace;
+ ')
- init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, pads_initrc_exec_t)
+ init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, openvpn_initrc_exec_t)
domain_system_change_exemption($1)
- role_transition $2 pads_initrc_exec_t system_r;
- allow $2 system_r;
+diff --git a/openvpn.te b/openvpn.te
+index 66a52ee..6db0311 100644
+--- a/openvpn.te
++++ b/openvpn.te
+@@ -24,6 +24,9 @@ files_config_file(openvpn_etc_t)
+ type openvpn_etc_rw_t;
+ files_config_file(openvpn_etc_rw_t)
-+ files_list_pids($1)
- admin_pattern($1, pads_var_run_t)
++type openvpn_tmp_t;
++files_tmp_file(openvpn_tmp_t)
+
-+ files_list_etc($1)
- admin_pattern($1, pads_config_t)
- ')
-diff --git a/pads.te b/pads.te
-index b246bdd..99f27c0 100644
---- a/pads.te
-+++ b/pads.te
-@@ -25,10 +25,11 @@ files_pid_file(pads_var_run_t)
+ type openvpn_initrc_exec_t;
+ init_script_file(openvpn_initrc_exec_t)
+
+@@ -40,15 +43,15 @@ files_pid_file(openvpn_var_run_t)
+ # openvpn local policy
#
- allow pads_t self:capability { dac_override net_raw };
--allow pads_t self:netlink_route_socket { write getattr read bind create nlmsg_read };
--allow pads_t self:packet_socket { ioctl setopt getopt read bind create };
--allow pads_t self:udp_socket { create ioctl };
--allow pads_t self:unix_dgram_socket { write create connect };
-+allow pads_t self:netlink_route_socket create_netlink_socket_perms;
-+allow pads_t self:packet_socket create_socket_perms;
-+allow pads_t self:socket create_socket_perms;
-+allow pads_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms;
-+allow pads_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms;
+-allow openvpn_t self:capability { dac_read_search dac_override ipc_lock net_bind_service net_admin setgid setuid sys_chroot sys_tty_config };
+-allow openvpn_t self:process { signal getsched };
++allow openvpn_t self:capability { dac_read_search dac_override ipc_lock net_bind_service net_admin setgid setuid sys_chroot sys_tty_config sys_nice };
++allow openvpn_t self:process { signal getsched setsched };
+ allow openvpn_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms;
- allow pads_t pads_config_t:file manage_file_perms;
- files_etc_filetrans(pads_t, pads_config_t, file)
-@@ -37,10 +38,10 @@ allow pads_t pads_var_run_t:file manage_file_perms;
- files_pid_filetrans(pads_t, pads_var_run_t, file)
+ allow openvpn_t self:unix_dgram_socket { create_socket_perms sendto };
+ allow openvpn_t self:unix_stream_socket { create_stream_socket_perms connectto };
+ allow openvpn_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms;
+ allow openvpn_t self:tcp_socket server_stream_socket_perms;
+-allow openvpn_t self:tun_socket create;
++allow openvpn_t self:tun_socket { create_socket_perms relabelfrom };
+ allow openvpn_t self:netlink_route_socket rw_netlink_socket_perms;
- kernel_read_sysctl(pads_t)
-+kernel_read_network_state(pads_t)
+ can_exec(openvpn_t, openvpn_etc_t)
+@@ -58,9 +61,14 @@ read_lnk_files_pattern(openvpn_t, openvpn_etc_t, openvpn_etc_t)
+ manage_files_pattern(openvpn_t, openvpn_etc_t, openvpn_etc_rw_t)
+ filetrans_pattern(openvpn_t, openvpn_etc_t, openvpn_etc_rw_t, file)
- corecmd_search_bin(pads_t)
+-allow openvpn_t openvpn_var_log_t:file manage_file_perms;
+-logging_log_filetrans(openvpn_t, openvpn_var_log_t, file)
++manage_files_pattern(openvpn_t, openvpn_tmp_t, openvpn_tmp_t)
++files_tmp_filetrans(openvpn_t, openvpn_tmp_t, file)
++
++manage_dirs_pattern(openvpn_t, openvpn_var_log_t, openvpn_var_log_t)
++manage_files_pattern(openvpn_t, openvpn_var_log_t, openvpn_var_log_t)
++logging_log_filetrans(openvpn_t, openvpn_var_log_t, { dir file })
--corenet_all_recvfrom_unlabeled(pads_t)
- corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(pads_t)
- corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(pads_t)
- corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_node(pads_t)
-@@ -48,6 +49,7 @@ corenet_tcp_connect_prelude_port(pads_t)
++manage_dirs_pattern(openvpn_t, openvpn_var_run_t, openvpn_var_run_t)
+ manage_files_pattern(openvpn_t, openvpn_var_run_t, openvpn_var_run_t)
+ files_pid_filetrans(openvpn_t, openvpn_var_run_t, { file dir })
- dev_read_rand(pads_t)
- dev_read_urand(pads_t)
-+dev_read_sysfs(pads_t)
+@@ -68,11 +76,11 @@ kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(openvpn_t)
+ kernel_read_net_sysctls(openvpn_t)
+ kernel_read_network_state(openvpn_t)
+ kernel_read_system_state(openvpn_t)
++kernel_request_load_module(openvpn_t)
- files_read_etc_files(pads_t)
- files_search_spool(pads_t)
-diff --git a/passenger.fc b/passenger.fc
-index 545518d..7d5bf4c 100644
---- a/passenger.fc
-+++ b/passenger.fc
-@@ -3,6 +3,11 @@
- /usr/lib/ruby/gems/.*/passenger-.*/agents/PassengerLoggingAgent -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:passenger_exec_t,s0)
- /usr/lib/ruby/gems/.*/passenger-.*/agents/apache2/PassengerHelperAgent -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:passenger_exec_t,s0)
+ corecmd_exec_bin(openvpn_t)
+ corecmd_exec_shell(openvpn_t)
+
+-corenet_all_recvfrom_unlabeled(openvpn_t)
+ corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(openvpn_t)
+ corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(openvpn_t)
+ corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if(openvpn_t)
+@@ -87,6 +95,7 @@ corenet_udp_bind_openvpn_port(openvpn_t)
+ corenet_tcp_bind_http_port(openvpn_t)
+ corenet_tcp_connect_openvpn_port(openvpn_t)
+ corenet_tcp_connect_http_port(openvpn_t)
++corenet_tcp_connect_tor_socks_port(openvpn_t)
+ corenet_tcp_connect_http_cache_port(openvpn_t)
+ corenet_rw_tun_tap_dev(openvpn_t)
+ corenet_sendrecv_openvpn_server_packets(openvpn_t)
+@@ -100,33 +109,39 @@ dev_read_urand(openvpn_t)
+ files_read_etc_files(openvpn_t)
+ files_read_etc_runtime_files(openvpn_t)
+
++fs_getattr_xattr_fs(openvpn_t)
++
+ auth_use_pam(openvpn_t)
-+/usr/share/gems/.*/passenger-.*/ext/apache2/ApplicationPoolServerExecutable -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:passenger_exec_t,s0)
-+/usr/share/gems/.*/passenger-.*/agents/PassengerWatchdog -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:passenger_exec_t,s0)
-+/usr/gems/.*/passenger-.*/agents/PassengerLoggingAgent -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:passenger_exec_t,s0)
-+/usr/gems/.*/passenger-.*/agents/apache2/PassengerHelperAgent -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:passenger_exec_t,s0)
++init_read_utmp(openvpn_t)
+
- /var/lib/passenger(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:passenger_var_lib_t,s0)
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(openvpn_t)
- /var/log/passenger(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:passenger_log_t,s0)
-diff --git a/passenger.if b/passenger.if
-index f68b573..95efca0 100644
---- a/passenger.if
-+++ b/passenger.if
-@@ -18,6 +18,24 @@ interface(`passenger_domtrans',`
- domtrans_pattern($1, passenger_exec_t, passenger_t)
+-miscfiles_read_localization(openvpn_t)
+ miscfiles_read_all_certs(openvpn_t)
+
+ sysnet_dns_name_resolve(openvpn_t)
++sysnet_use_ldap(openvpn_t)
+ sysnet_exec_ifconfig(openvpn_t)
+ sysnet_manage_config(openvpn_t)
+ sysnet_etc_filetrans_config(openvpn_t)
+
+-userdom_use_user_terminals(openvpn_t)
++userdom_use_inherited_user_terminals(openvpn_t)
++userdom_read_home_certs(openvpn_t)
++userdom_attach_admin_tun_iface(openvpn_t)
++userdom_read_inherited_user_tmp_files(openvpn_t)
++userdom_read_inherited_user_home_content_files(openvpn_t)
+
+ tunable_policy(`openvpn_enable_homedirs',`
+- userdom_read_user_home_content_files(openvpn_t)
++ userdom_search_user_home_dirs(openvpn_t)
')
-+######################################
+ tunable_policy(`openvpn_enable_homedirs && use_nfs_home_dirs',`
+- fs_read_nfs_files(openvpn_t)
+- fs_read_nfs_symlinks(openvpn_t)
+-')
++ fs_read_nfs_files(openvpn_t)
++')
+
+ tunable_policy(`openvpn_enable_homedirs && use_samba_home_dirs',`
+- fs_read_cifs_files(openvpn_t)
+- fs_read_cifs_symlinks(openvpn_t)
+-')
++ fs_read_cifs_files(openvpn_t)
++')
+
+ optional_policy(`
+ daemontools_service_domain(openvpn_t, openvpn_exec_t)
+@@ -138,3 +153,7 @@ optional_policy(`
+
+ networkmanager_dbus_chat(openvpn_t)
+ ')
++
++optional_policy(`
++ unconfined_attach_tun_iface(openvpn_t)
++')
+diff --git a/openvswitch.fc b/openvswitch.fc
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..baf8d21
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/openvswitch.fc
+@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
++/usr/lib/systemd/system/openvswitch.service -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:openvswitch_unit_file_t,s0)
++
++/usr/share/openvswitch/scripts/ovs-ctl -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:openvswitch_exec_t,s0)
++/usr/bin/ovs-vsctl -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:openvswitch_exec_t,s0)
++/usr/sbin/ovsdb-ctl -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:openvswitch_exec_t,s0)
++/usr/sbin/ovsdb-server -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:openvswitch_exec_t,s0)
++/usr/sbin/ovs-vswitchd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:openvswitch_exec_t,s0)
++
++/var/lib/openvswitch(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:openvswitch_var_lib_t,s0)
++
++/var/log/openvswitch(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:openvswitch_log_t,s0)
++
++/var/run/openvswitch(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:openvswitch_var_run_t,s0)
++
++/etc/openvswitch(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:openvswitch_rw_t,s0)
+diff --git a/openvswitch.if b/openvswitch.if
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..14f29e4
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/openvswitch.if
+@@ -0,0 +1,242 @@
++
++## <summary>policy for openvswitch</summary>
++
++########################################
+## <summary>
-+## Execute passenger in the current domain.
++## Execute TEMPLATE in the openvswitch domin.
+## </summary>
+## <param name="domain">
-+## <summary>
++## <summary>
+## Domain allowed to transition.
-+## </summary>
++## </summary>
+## </param>
+#
-+interface(`passenger_exec',`
++interface(`openvswitch_domtrans',`
+ gen_require(`
-+ type passenger_exec_t;
++ type openvswitch_t, openvswitch_exec_t;
+ ')
+
-+ can_exec($1, passenger_exec_t)
++ corecmd_search_bin($1)
++ domtrans_pattern($1, openvswitch_exec_t, openvswitch_t)
+')
-+
- ########################################
- ## <summary>
- ## Read passenger lib files
-@@ -37,3 +55,64 @@ interface(`passenger_read_lib_files',`
- read_lnk_files_pattern($1, passenger_var_lib_t, passenger_var_lib_t)
- files_search_var_lib($1)
- ')
-+
+########################################
+## <summary>
-+## Manage passenger lib files
++## Read openvswitch's log files.
+## </summary>
+## <param name="domain">
+## <summary>
+## Domain allowed access.
+## </summary>
+## </param>
++## <rolecap/>
+#
-+interface(`passenger_manage_lib_files',`
++interface(`openvswitch_read_log',`
+ gen_require(`
-+ type passenger_var_lib_t;
++ type openvswitch_log_t;
+ ')
+
-+ manage_dirs_pattern($1, passenger_var_lib_t, passenger_var_lib_t)
-+ manage_files_pattern($1, passenger_var_lib_t, passenger_var_lib_t)
-+ manage_lnk_files_pattern($1, passenger_var_lib_t, passenger_var_lib_t)
-+ files_search_var_lib($1)
++ logging_search_logs($1)
++ read_files_pattern($1, openvswitch_log_t, openvswitch_log_t)
+')
+
-+#####################################
++########################################
+## <summary>
-+## Manage passenger var_run content.
++## Append to openvswitch log files.
+## </summary>
+## <param name="domain">
-+## <summary>
-+## Domain allowed access.
-+## </summary>
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
+## </param>
+#
-+interface(`passenger_manage_pid_content',`
-+ gen_require(`
-+ type passenger_var_run_t;
-+ ')
++interface(`openvswitch_append_log',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type openvswitch_log_t;
++ ')
+
-+ files_search_pids($1)
-+ manage_dirs_pattern($1, passenger_var_run_t, passenger_var_run_t)
-+ manage_files_pattern($1, passenger_var_run_t, passenger_var_run_t)
-+ manage_fifo_files_pattern($1, passenger_var_run_t, passenger_var_run_t)
-+ manage_sock_files_pattern($1, passenger_var_run_t, passenger_var_run_t)
++ logging_search_logs($1)
++ append_files_pattern($1, openvswitch_log_t, openvswitch_log_t)
+')
+
+########################################
+## <summary>
-+## Connect to passenger unix stream socket.
++## Manage openvswitch log files
+## </summary>
+## <param name="domain">
+## <summary>
@@ -39525,309 +43552,2065 @@ index f68b573..95efca0 100644
+## </summary>
+## </param>
+#
-+interface(`passenger_stream_connect',`
++interface(`openvswitch_manage_log',`
+ gen_require(`
-+ type passenger_t;
++ type openvswitch_log_t;
+ ')
+
-+ allow $1 passenger_t:unix_stream_socket connectto;
++ logging_search_logs($1)
++ manage_dirs_pattern($1, openvswitch_log_t, openvswitch_log_t)
++ manage_files_pattern($1, openvswitch_log_t, openvswitch_log_t)
++ manage_lnk_files_pattern($1, openvswitch_log_t, openvswitch_log_t)
+')
-diff --git a/passenger.te b/passenger.te
-index 3470036..ef09491 100644
---- a/passenger.te
-+++ b/passenger.te
-@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ files_pid_file(passenger_var_run_t)
- # passanger local policy
++
++########################################
++## <summary>
++## Search openvswitch lib directories.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`openvswitch_search_lib',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type openvswitch_var_lib_t;
++ ')
++
++ allow $1 openvswitch_var_lib_t:dir search_dir_perms;
++ files_search_var_lib($1)
++')
++
++########################################
++## <summary>
++## Read openvswitch lib files.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`openvswitch_read_lib_files',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type openvswitch_var_lib_t;
++ ')
++
++ files_search_var_lib($1)
++ read_files_pattern($1, openvswitch_var_lib_t, openvswitch_var_lib_t)
++')
++
++########################################
++## <summary>
++## Manage openvswitch lib files.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`openvswitch_manage_lib_files',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type openvswitch_var_lib_t;
++ ')
++
++ files_search_var_lib($1)
++ manage_files_pattern($1, openvswitch_var_lib_t, openvswitch_var_lib_t)
++')
++
++########################################
++## <summary>
++## Manage openvswitch lib directories.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`openvswitch_manage_lib_dirs',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type openvswitch_var_lib_t;
++ ')
++
++ files_search_var_lib($1)
++ manage_dirs_pattern($1, openvswitch_var_lib_t, openvswitch_var_lib_t)
++')
++
++########################################
++## <summary>
++## Read openvswitch PID files.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`openvswitch_read_pid_files',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type openvswitch_var_run_t;
++ ')
++
++ files_search_pids($1)
++ read_files_pattern($1, openvswitch_var_run_t, openvswitch_var_run_t)
++')
++
++########################################
++## <summary>
++## Execute openvswitch server in the openvswitch domain.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed to transition.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`openvswitch_systemctl',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type openvswitch_t;
++ type openvswitch_unit_file_t;
++ ')
++
++ systemd_exec_systemctl($1)
++ systemd_read_fifo_file_password_run($1)
++ allow $1 openvswitch_unit_file_t:file read_file_perms;
++ allow $1 openvswitch_unit_file_t:service manage_service_perms;
++
++ ps_process_pattern($1, openvswitch_t)
++')
++
++
++########################################
++## <summary>
++## All of the rules required to administrate
++## an openvswitch environment
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++## <rolecap/>
++#
++interface(`openvswitch_admin',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type openvswitch_t, openvswitch_log_t, openvswitch_var_lib_t;
++ type openvswitch_rw_t, openvswitch_var_run_t, openvswitch_unit_file_t;
++ ')
++
++ allow $1 openvswitch_t:process { ptrace signal_perms };
++ ps_process_pattern($1, openvswitch_t)
++
++ logging_search_logs($1)
++ admin_pattern($1, openvswitch_rw_t)
++
++ logging_search_logs($1)
++ admin_pattern($1, openvswitch_log_t)
++
++ files_search_var_lib($1)
++ admin_pattern($1, openvswitch_var_lib_t)
++
++ files_search_pids($1)
++ admin_pattern($1, openvswitch_var_run_t)
++
++ openvswitch_systemctl($1)
++ admin_pattern($1, openvswitch_unit_file_t)
++ allow $1 openvswitch_unit_file_t:service all_service_perms;
++ optional_policy(`
++ systemd_passwd_agent_exec($1)
++ systemd_read_fifo_file_passwd_run($1)
++ ')
++')
+diff --git a/openvswitch.te b/openvswitch.te
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..31370ed
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/openvswitch.te
+@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
++policy_module(openvswitch, 1.0.0)
++
++########################################
++#
++# Declarations
++#
++
++type openvswitch_t;
++type openvswitch_exec_t;
++init_daemon_domain(openvswitch_t, openvswitch_exec_t)
++
++type openvswitch_rw_t;
++files_config_file(openvswitch_rw_t)
++
++type openvswitch_var_lib_t;
++files_type(openvswitch_var_lib_t)
++
++type openvswitch_log_t;
++logging_log_file(openvswitch_log_t)
++
++type openvswitch_var_run_t;
++files_pid_file(openvswitch_var_run_t)
++
++type openvswitch_unit_file_t;
++systemd_unit_file(openvswitch_unit_file_t)
++
++########################################
++#
++# openvswitch local policy
++#
++
++allow openvswitch_t self:capability { net_admin ipc_lock sys_nice sys_resource };
++allow openvswitch_t self:process { fork setsched setrlimit signal };
++allow openvswitch_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms;
++allow openvswitch_t self:unix_stream_socket { create_stream_socket_perms connectto };
++allow openvswitch_t self:netlink_socket create_socket_perms;
++
++can_exec(openvswitch_t, openvswitch_exec_t)
++
++manage_dirs_pattern(openvswitch_t, openvswitch_rw_t, openvswitch_rw_t)
++manage_files_pattern(openvswitch_t, openvswitch_rw_t, openvswitch_rw_t)
++manage_lnk_files_pattern(openvswitch_t, openvswitch_rw_t, openvswitch_rw_t)
++
++manage_dirs_pattern(openvswitch_t, openvswitch_var_lib_t, openvswitch_var_lib_t)
++manage_files_pattern(openvswitch_t, openvswitch_var_lib_t, openvswitch_var_lib_t)
++manage_lnk_files_pattern(openvswitch_t, openvswitch_var_lib_t, openvswitch_var_lib_t)
++files_var_lib_filetrans(openvswitch_t, openvswitch_var_lib_t, { dir file lnk_file })
++
++manage_dirs_pattern(openvswitch_t, openvswitch_log_t, openvswitch_log_t)
++manage_files_pattern(openvswitch_t, openvswitch_log_t, openvswitch_log_t)
++manage_lnk_files_pattern(openvswitch_t, openvswitch_log_t, openvswitch_log_t)
++logging_log_filetrans(openvswitch_t, openvswitch_log_t, { dir file lnk_file })
++
++manage_dirs_pattern(openvswitch_t, openvswitch_var_run_t, openvswitch_var_run_t)
++manage_files_pattern(openvswitch_t, openvswitch_var_run_t, openvswitch_var_run_t)
++manage_sock_files_pattern(openvswitch_t, openvswitch_var_run_t, openvswitch_var_run_t)
++manage_lnk_files_pattern(openvswitch_t, openvswitch_var_run_t, openvswitch_var_run_t)
++files_pid_filetrans(openvswitch_t, openvswitch_var_run_t, { dir file lnk_file })
++
++kernel_read_network_state(openvswitch_t)
++kernel_read_system_state(openvswitch_t)
++
++corecmd_exec_bin(openvswitch_t)
++
++dev_read_urand(openvswitch_t)
++
++domain_use_interactive_fds(openvswitch_t)
++
++files_read_etc_files(openvswitch_t)
++
++fs_getattr_all_fs(openvswitch_t)
++fs_search_cgroup_dirs(openvswitch_t)
++
++auth_read_passwd(openvswitch_t)
++
++logging_send_syslog_msg(openvswitch_t)
++
++sysnet_dns_name_resolve(openvswitch_t)
++
++optional_policy(`
++ iptables_domtrans(openvswitch_t)
++')
++
+diff --git a/pacemaker.fc b/pacemaker.fc
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..3793461
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/pacemaker.fc
+@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
++/etc/rc\.d/init\.d/pacemaker -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:pacemaker_initrc_exec_t,s0)
++
++/usr/lib/systemd/system/pacemaker.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:pacemaker_unit_file_t,s0)
++
++/usr/sbin/pacemakerd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:pacemaker_exec_t,s0)
++
++/var/lib/heartbeat/crm(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:pacemaker_var_lib_t,s0)
++
++/var/lib/pacemaker(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:pacemaker_var_lib_t,s0)
++/var/lib/pengine(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:pacemaker_var_lib_t,s0)
++
++/var/run/crm(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:pacemaker_var_run_t,s0)
+diff --git a/pacemaker.if b/pacemaker.if
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..e05c78f
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/pacemaker.if
+@@ -0,0 +1,209 @@
++
++## <summary>policy for pacemaker</summary>
++
++########################################
++## <summary>
++## Transition to pacemaker.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed to transition.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`pacemaker_domtrans',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type pacemaker_t, pacemaker_exec_t;
++ ')
++
++ corecmd_search_bin($1)
++ domtrans_pattern($1, pacemaker_exec_t, pacemaker_t)
++')
++
++########################################
++## <summary>
++## Execute pacemaker server in the pacemaker domain.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`pacemaker_initrc_domtrans',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type pacemaker_initrc_exec_t;
++ ')
++
++ init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, pacemaker_initrc_exec_t)
++')
++
++########################################
++## <summary>
++## Search pacemaker lib directories.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`pacemaker_search_lib',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type pacemaker_var_lib_t;
++ ')
++
++ allow $1 pacemaker_var_lib_t:dir search_dir_perms;
++ files_search_var_lib($1)
++')
++
++########################################
++## <summary>
++## Read pacemaker lib files.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`pacemaker_read_lib_files',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type pacemaker_var_lib_t;
++ ')
++
++ files_search_var_lib($1)
++ read_files_pattern($1, pacemaker_var_lib_t, pacemaker_var_lib_t)
++')
++
++########################################
++## <summary>
++## Manage pacemaker lib files.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`pacemaker_manage_lib_files',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type pacemaker_var_lib_t;
++ ')
++
++ files_search_var_lib($1)
++ manage_files_pattern($1, pacemaker_var_lib_t, pacemaker_var_lib_t)
++')
++
++########################################
++## <summary>
++## Manage pacemaker lib directories.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`pacemaker_manage_lib_dirs',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type pacemaker_var_lib_t;
++ ')
++
++ files_search_var_lib($1)
++ manage_dirs_pattern($1, pacemaker_var_lib_t, pacemaker_var_lib_t)
++')
++
++########################################
++## <summary>
++## Read pacemaker PID files.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`pacemaker_read_pid_files',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type pacemaker_var_run_t;
++ ')
++
++ files_search_pids($1)
++ allow $1 pacemaker_var_run_t:file read_file_perms;
++')
++
++########################################
++## <summary>
++## Execute pacemaker server in the pacemaker domain.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed to transition.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`pacemaker_systemctl',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type pacemaker_t;
++ type pacemaker_unit_file_t;
++ ')
++
++ systemd_exec_systemctl($1)
++ systemd_read_fifo_file_passwd_run($1)
++ allow $1 pacemaker_unit_file_t:file read_file_perms;
++ allow $1 pacemaker_unit_file_t:service manage_service_perms;
++
++ ps_process_pattern($1, pacemaker_t)
++')
++
++
++########################################
++## <summary>
++## All of the rules required to administrate
++## an pacemaker environment
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++## <param name="role">
++## <summary>
++## Role allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++## <rolecap/>
++#
++interface(`pacemaker_admin',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type pacemaker_t;
++ type pacemaker_initrc_exec_t;
++ type pacemaker_var_lib_t;
++ type pacemaker_var_run_t;
++ type pacemaker_unit_file_t;
++ ')
++
++ allow $1 pacemaker_t:process { ptrace signal_perms };
++ ps_process_pattern($1, pacemaker_t)
++
++ pacemaker_initrc_domtrans($1)
++ domain_system_change_exemption($1)
++ role_transition $2 pacemaker_initrc_exec_t system_r;
++ allow $2 system_r;
++
++ files_search_var_lib($1)
++ admin_pattern($1, pacemaker_var_lib_t)
++
++ files_search_pids($1)
++ admin_pattern($1, pacemaker_var_run_t)
++
++ pacemaker_systemctl($1)
++ admin_pattern($1, pacemaker_unit_file_t)
++ allow $1 pacemaker_unit_file_t:service all_service_perms;
++
++ optional_policy(`
++ systemd_passwd_agent_exec($1)
++ systemd_read_fifo_file_passwd_run($1)
++ ')
++')
+diff --git a/pacemaker.te b/pacemaker.te
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..3a97ac3
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/pacemaker.te
+@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
++policy_module(pacemaker, 1.0.0)
++
++########################################
++#
++# Declarations
++#
++
++type pacemaker_t;
++type pacemaker_exec_t;
++init_daemon_domain(pacemaker_t, pacemaker_exec_t)
++
++type pacemaker_initrc_exec_t;
++init_script_file(pacemaker_initrc_exec_t)
++
++type pacemaker_var_lib_t;
++files_type(pacemaker_var_lib_t)
++
++type pacemaker_var_run_t;
++files_pid_file(pacemaker_var_run_t)
++
++type pacemaker_tmp_t;
++files_tmp_file(pacemaker_tmp_t)
++
++type pacemaker_tmpfs_t;
++files_tmpfs_file(pacemaker_tmpfs_t)
++
++type pacemaker_unit_file_t;
++systemd_unit_file(pacemaker_unit_file_t)
++
++########################################
++#
++# pacemaker local policy
++#
++
++allow pacemaker_t self:capability { fowner fsetid kill chown dac_override setuid };
++allow pacemaker_t self:process { fork setrlimit signal setpgid };
++allow pacemaker_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms;
++allow pacemaker_t self:unix_stream_socket { connectto create_stream_socket_perms };
++
++manage_dirs_pattern(pacemaker_t, pacemaker_var_lib_t, pacemaker_var_lib_t)
++manage_files_pattern(pacemaker_t, pacemaker_var_lib_t, pacemaker_var_lib_t)
++files_var_lib_filetrans(pacemaker_t, pacemaker_var_lib_t, { dir file })
++
++manage_dirs_pattern(pacemaker_t, pacemaker_var_run_t, pacemaker_var_run_t)
++manage_files_pattern(pacemaker_t, pacemaker_var_run_t, pacemaker_var_run_t)
++files_pid_filetrans(pacemaker_t, pacemaker_var_run_t, { dir file })
++
++manage_dirs_pattern(pacemaker_t, pacemaker_tmp_t, pacemaker_tmp_t)
++manage_files_pattern(pacemaker_t, pacemaker_tmp_t, pacemaker_tmp_t)
++files_tmp_filetrans(pacemaker_t, pacemaker_tmp_t, { file dir })
++
++manage_dirs_pattern(pacemaker_t, pacemaker_tmpfs_t, pacemaker_tmpfs_t)
++manage_files_pattern(pacemaker_t, pacemaker_tmpfs_t, pacemaker_tmpfs_t)
++fs_tmpfs_filetrans(pacemaker_t, pacemaker_tmpfs_t, { dir file })
++
++kernel_read_system_state(pacemaker_t)
++kernel_read_network_state(pacemaker_t)
++kernel_read_all_sysctls(pacemaker_t)
++kernel_read_messages(pacemaker_t)
++kernel_getattr_core_if(pacemaker_t)
++kernel_read_software_raid_state(pacemaker_t)
++
++corecmd_exec_bin(pacemaker_t)
++corecmd_exec_shell(pacemaker_t)
++
++domain_use_interactive_fds(pacemaker_t)
++domain_read_all_domains_state(pacemaker_t)
++
++dev_getattr_mtrr_dev(pacemaker_t)
++dev_read_rand(pacemaker_t)
++dev_read_urand(pacemaker_t)
++
++files_read_kernel_symbol_table(pacemaker_t)
++
++fs_getattr_all_fs(pacemaker_t)
++
++auth_use_nsswitch(pacemaker_t)
++
++logging_send_syslog_msg(pacemaker_t)
++
++optional_policy(`
++ corosync_read_log(pacemaker_t)
++ corosync_stream_connect(pacemaker_t)
++ corosync_rw_tmpfs(pacemaker_t)
++')
++
+diff --git a/pads.fc b/pads.fc
+index 0870c56..6d5fb1d 100644
+--- a/pads.fc
++++ b/pads.fc
+@@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
+ /etc/pads-ether-codes -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:pads_config_t, s0)
+ /etc/pads-signature-list -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:pads_config_t, s0)
+-/etc/pads.conf -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:pads_config_t, s0)
++/etc/pads\.conf -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:pads_config_t, s0)
+ /etc/pads-assets.csv -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:pads_config_t, s0)
+
+ /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/pads -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:pads_initrc_exec_t, s0)
+
+ /usr/bin/pads -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:pads_exec_t, s0)
+
+-/var/run/pads.pid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:pads_var_run_t, s0)
++/var/run/pads\.pid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:pads_var_run_t, s0)
+diff --git a/pads.if b/pads.if
+index 8ac407e..45673ad 100644
+--- a/pads.if
++++ b/pads.if
+@@ -25,20 +25,26 @@
+ ## </param>
+ ## <rolecap/>
#
+-interface(`pads_admin', `
++interface(`pads_admin',`
+ gen_require(`
+- type pads_t, pads_config_t;
+- type pads_var_run_t, pads_initrc_exec_t;
++ type pads_t, pads_config_t, pads_initrc_exec_t;
++ type pads_var_run_t;
+ ')
--allow passenger_t self:capability { chown dac_override fsetid fowner kill setuid setgid sys_nice };
-+allow passenger_t self:capability { chown dac_override fsetid fowner kill setuid setgid sys_nice sys_ptrace sys_resource };
- allow passenger_t self:process { setpgid setsched sigkill signal };
- allow passenger_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms;
- allow passenger_t self:unix_stream_socket { create_stream_socket_perms connectto };
-@@ -49,11 +49,15 @@ manage_fifo_files_pattern(passenger_t, passenger_var_run_t, passenger_var_run_t)
- manage_sock_files_pattern(passenger_t, passenger_var_run_t, passenger_var_run_t)
- files_pid_filetrans(passenger_t, passenger_var_run_t, { file dir sock_file })
+- allow $1 pads_t:process { ptrace signal_perms };
++ allow $1 pads_t:process signal_perms;
+ ps_process_pattern($1, pads_t)
++ tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',`
++ allow $1 pads_t:process ptrace;
++ ')
-+#needed by puppet
-+manage_dirs_pattern(passenger_t, passenger_tmp_t, passenger_tmp_t)
-+manage_files_pattern(passenger_t, passenger_tmp_t, passenger_tmp_t)
-+files_tmp_filetrans(passenger_t, passenger_tmp_t, { file dir })
+ init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, pads_initrc_exec_t)
+ domain_system_change_exemption($1)
+ role_transition $2 pads_initrc_exec_t system_r;
+ allow $2 system_r;
+
++ files_list_pids($1)
+ admin_pattern($1, pads_var_run_t)
++
++ files_list_etc($1)
+ admin_pattern($1, pads_config_t)
+ ')
+diff --git a/pads.te b/pads.te
+index b246bdd..3cbcc49 100644
+--- a/pads.te
++++ b/pads.te
+@@ -25,10 +25,11 @@ files_pid_file(pads_var_run_t)
+ #
+
+ allow pads_t self:capability { dac_override net_raw };
+-allow pads_t self:netlink_route_socket { write getattr read bind create nlmsg_read };
+-allow pads_t self:packet_socket { ioctl setopt getopt read bind create };
+-allow pads_t self:udp_socket { create ioctl };
+-allow pads_t self:unix_dgram_socket { write create connect };
++allow pads_t self:netlink_route_socket create_netlink_socket_perms;
++allow pads_t self:packet_socket create_socket_perms;
++allow pads_t self:socket create_socket_perms;
++allow pads_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms;
++allow pads_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms;
+
+ allow pads_t pads_config_t:file manage_file_perms;
+ files_etc_filetrans(pads_t, pads_config_t, file)
+@@ -37,10 +38,10 @@ allow pads_t pads_var_run_t:file manage_file_perms;
+ files_pid_filetrans(pads_t, pads_var_run_t, file)
+
+ kernel_read_sysctl(pads_t)
++kernel_read_network_state(pads_t)
+
+ corecmd_search_bin(pads_t)
+
+-corenet_all_recvfrom_unlabeled(pads_t)
+ corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(pads_t)
+ corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(pads_t)
+ corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_node(pads_t)
+@@ -48,12 +49,11 @@ corenet_tcp_connect_prelude_port(pads_t)
+
+ dev_read_rand(pads_t)
+ dev_read_urand(pads_t)
++dev_read_sysfs(pads_t)
+
+ files_read_etc_files(pads_t)
+ files_search_spool(pads_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(pads_t)
+-
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(pads_t)
+
+ sysnet_dns_name_resolve(pads_t)
+diff --git a/passenger.fc b/passenger.fc
+index 545518d..677ac68 100644
+--- a/passenger.fc
++++ b/passenger.fc
+@@ -1,11 +1,10 @@
+-/usr/lib/ruby/gems/.*/passenger-.*/ext/apache2/ApplicationPoolServerExecutable -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:passenger_exec_t,s0)
+-/usr/lib/ruby/gems/.*/passenger-.*/agents/PassengerWatchdog -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:passenger_exec_t,s0)
+-/usr/lib/ruby/gems/.*/passenger-.*/agents/PassengerLoggingAgent -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:passenger_exec_t,s0)
+-/usr/lib/ruby/gems/.*/passenger-.*/agents/apache2/PassengerHelperAgent -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:passenger_exec_t,s0)
++/usr/share/gems/.*/Passenger.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:passenger_exec_t,s0)
++/usr/share/gems/.*/ApplicationPoolServerExecutable -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:passenger_exec_t,s0)
++/usr/lib/gems/.*/Passenger.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:passenger_exec_t,s0)
++/usr/lib/gems/.*/ApplicationPoolServerExecutable -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:passenger_exec_t,s0)
+
+ /var/lib/passenger(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:passenger_var_lib_t,s0)
+
+-/var/log/passenger(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:passenger_log_t,s0)
+-/var/log/passenger.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:passenger_log_t,s0)
++/var/log/passenger.* gen_context(system_u:object_r:passenger_log_t,s0)
+
+ /var/run/passenger(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:passenger_var_run_t,s0)
+diff --git a/passenger.if b/passenger.if
+index f68b573..c050b37 100644
+--- a/passenger.if
++++ b/passenger.if
+@@ -18,6 +18,42 @@ interface(`passenger_domtrans',`
+ domtrans_pattern($1, passenger_exec_t, passenger_t)
+ ')
+
++######################################
++## <summary>
++## Execute passenger in the current domain.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed to transition.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`passenger_exec',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type passenger_exec_t;
++ ')
++
++ can_exec($1, passenger_exec_t)
++')
++
++#######################################
++## <summary>
++## Getattr passenger log files
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`passenger_getattr_log_files',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type passenger_log_t;
++ ')
++
++ getattr_files_pattern($1, passenger_log_t, passenger_log_t)
++')
++
+ ########################################
+ ## <summary>
+ ## Read passenger lib files
+@@ -37,3 +73,84 @@ interface(`passenger_read_lib_files',`
+ read_lnk_files_pattern($1, passenger_var_lib_t, passenger_var_lib_t)
+ files_search_var_lib($1)
+ ')
++
++########################################
++## <summary>
++## Manage passenger lib files
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`passenger_manage_lib_files',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type passenger_var_lib_t;
++ ')
++
++ manage_dirs_pattern($1, passenger_var_lib_t, passenger_var_lib_t)
++ manage_files_pattern($1, passenger_var_lib_t, passenger_var_lib_t)
++ manage_lnk_files_pattern($1, passenger_var_lib_t, passenger_var_lib_t)
++ files_search_var_lib($1)
++')
++
++#####################################
++## <summary>
++## Manage passenger var_run content.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`passenger_manage_pid_content',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type passenger_var_run_t;
++ ')
++
++ files_search_pids($1)
++ manage_dirs_pattern($1, passenger_var_run_t, passenger_var_run_t)
++ manage_files_pattern($1, passenger_var_run_t, passenger_var_run_t)
++ manage_fifo_files_pattern($1, passenger_var_run_t, passenger_var_run_t)
++ manage_sock_files_pattern($1, passenger_var_run_t, passenger_var_run_t)
++')
++
++########################################
++## <summary>
++## Connect to passenger unix stream socket.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`passenger_stream_connect',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type passenger_t;
++ ')
++
++ allow $1 passenger_t:unix_stream_socket connectto;
++')
++
++#######################################
++## <summary>
++## Allow to manage passenger tmp files/dirs.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`passenger_manage_tmp_files',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type passenger_tmp_t;
++ ')
++
++ files_search_tmp($1)
++ manage_files_pattern($1, passenger_tmp_t, passenger_tmp_t)
++ manage_dirs_pattern($1, passenger_tmp_t, passenger_tmp_t)
++')
+diff --git a/passenger.te b/passenger.te
+index 3470036..7811795 100644
+--- a/passenger.te
++++ b/passenger.te
+@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ files_pid_file(passenger_var_run_t)
+ # passanger local policy
+ #
+
+-allow passenger_t self:capability { chown dac_override fsetid fowner kill setuid setgid sys_nice };
++allow passenger_t self:capability { chown dac_override fsetid fowner kill setuid setgid sys_nice sys_ptrace sys_resource };
+ allow passenger_t self:process { setpgid setsched sigkill signal };
+ allow passenger_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms;
+ allow passenger_t self:unix_stream_socket { create_stream_socket_perms connectto };
+@@ -49,11 +49,16 @@ manage_fifo_files_pattern(passenger_t, passenger_var_run_t, passenger_var_run_t)
+ manage_sock_files_pattern(passenger_t, passenger_var_run_t, passenger_var_run_t)
+ files_pid_filetrans(passenger_t, passenger_var_run_t, { file dir sock_file })
+
++#needed by puppet
++manage_dirs_pattern(passenger_t, passenger_tmp_t, passenger_tmp_t)
++manage_files_pattern(passenger_t, passenger_tmp_t, passenger_tmp_t)
++manage_sock_files_pattern(passenger_t, passenger_tmp_t, passenger_tmp_t)
++files_tmp_filetrans(passenger_t, passenger_tmp_t, { file dir sock_file })
++
+ kernel_read_system_state(passenger_t)
+ kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(passenger_t)
+
+ corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(passenger_t)
+-corenet_all_recvfrom_unlabeled(passenger_t)
+ corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(passenger_t)
+ corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_node(passenger_t)
+ corenet_tcp_connect_http_port(passenger_t)
+@@ -63,11 +68,13 @@ corecmd_exec_shell(passenger_t)
+
+ dev_read_urand(passenger_t)
+
+-files_read_etc_files(passenger_t)
++domain_read_all_domains_state(passenger_t)
++
++files_read_usr_files(passenger_t)
+
+ auth_use_nsswitch(passenger_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(passenger_t)
++logging_send_syslog_msg(passenger_t)
+
+ userdom_dontaudit_use_user_terminals(passenger_t)
+
+@@ -75,3 +82,25 @@ optional_policy(`
+ apache_append_log(passenger_t)
+ apache_read_sys_content(passenger_t)
+ ')
++
++optional_policy(`
++ hostname_exec(passenger_t)
++')
++
++optional_policy(`
++ mta_send_mail(passenger_t)
++')
++
++optional_policy(`
++ puppet_manage_lib(passenger_t)
++ puppet_read_config(passenger_t)
++ puppet_append_log(passenger_t)
++ puppet_create_log(passenger_t)
++ puppet_read_log(passenger_t)
++ puppet_search_pid(passenger_t)
++')
++
++optional_policy(`
++ rpm_exec(passenger_t)
++ rpm_read_db(passenger_t)
++')
+diff --git a/pcmcia.fc b/pcmcia.fc
+index 9cf0e56..2b5260a 100644
+--- a/pcmcia.fc
++++ b/pcmcia.fc
+@@ -4,6 +4,9 @@
+ /sbin/cardctl -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:cardctl_exec_t,s0)
+ /sbin/cardmgr -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:cardmgr_exec_t,s0)
+
++/usr/sbin/cardctl -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:cardctl_exec_t,s0)
++/usr/sbin/cardmgr -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:cardmgr_exec_t,s0)
++
+ /var/lib/pcmcia(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:cardmgr_var_run_t,s0)
+
+ /var/run/cardmgr\.pid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:cardmgr_var_run_t,s0)
+diff --git a/pcmcia.te b/pcmcia.te
+index 4d06ae3..e1a4943 100644
+--- a/pcmcia.te
++++ b/pcmcia.te
+@@ -62,9 +62,7 @@ dev_read_urand(cardmgr_t)
+
+ domain_use_interactive_fds(cardmgr_t)
+ # Read /proc/PID directories for all domains (for fuser).
+-domain_read_confined_domains_state(cardmgr_t)
+-domain_getattr_confined_domains(cardmgr_t)
+-domain_dontaudit_ptrace_confined_domains(cardmgr_t)
++domain_read_all_domains_state(cardmgr_t)
+ # cjp: these look excessive:
+ domain_dontaudit_getattr_all_pipes(cardmgr_t)
+ domain_dontaudit_getattr_all_sockets(cardmgr_t)
+@@ -96,8 +94,6 @@ libs_exec_lib_files(cardmgr_t)
+
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(cardmgr_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(cardmgr_t)
+-
+ modutils_domtrans_insmod(cardmgr_t)
+
+ sysnet_domtrans_ifconfig(cardmgr_t)
+@@ -105,12 +101,11 @@ sysnet_domtrans_ifconfig(cardmgr_t)
+ sysnet_etc_filetrans_config(cardmgr_t)
+ sysnet_manage_config(cardmgr_t)
+
+-userdom_use_user_terminals(cardmgr_t)
++userdom_use_inherited_user_terminals(cardmgr_t)
+ userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fds(cardmgr_t)
+ userdom_dontaudit_search_user_home_dirs(cardmgr_t)
+
+ optional_policy(`
+- seutil_dontaudit_read_config(cardmgr_t)
+ seutil_sigchld_newrole(cardmgr_t)
+ ')
+
+diff --git a/pcscd.fc b/pcscd.fc
+index 87f17e8..63ee18a 100644
+--- a/pcscd.fc
++++ b/pcscd.fc
+@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
+ /var/run/pcscd\.comm -s gen_context(system_u:object_r:pcscd_var_run_t,s0)
++/var/run/pcscd(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:pcscd_var_run_t,s0)
+ /var/run/pcscd\.pid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:pcscd_var_run_t,s0)
+ /var/run/pcscd\.pub -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:pcscd_var_run_t,s0)
+ /var/run/pcscd\.events(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:pcscd_var_run_t,s0)
+diff --git a/pcscd.if b/pcscd.if
+index 1c2a091..3ead3cc 100644
+--- a/pcscd.if
++++ b/pcscd.if
+@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ interface(`pcscd_read_pub_files',`
+ ')
+
+ files_search_pids($1)
+- allow $1 pcscd_var_run_t:file read_file_perms;
++ read_files_pattern($1, pcscd_var_run_t, pcscd_var_run_t)
+ ')
+
+ ########################################
+diff --git a/pcscd.te b/pcscd.te
+index ceafba6..47b690d 100644
+--- a/pcscd.te
++++ b/pcscd.te
+@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ allow pcscd_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms;
+ allow pcscd_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
+ allow pcscd_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms;
+ allow pcscd_t self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
++allow pcscd_t self:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket create_socket_perms;
+
+ manage_dirs_pattern(pcscd_t, pcscd_var_run_t, pcscd_var_run_t)
+ manage_files_pattern(pcscd_t, pcscd_var_run_t, pcscd_var_run_t)
+@@ -34,7 +35,6 @@ files_pid_filetrans(pcscd_t, pcscd_var_run_t, { file sock_file dir })
+
+ kernel_read_system_state(pcscd_t)
+
+-corenet_all_recvfrom_unlabeled(pcscd_t)
+ corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(pcscd_t)
+ corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(pcscd_t)
+ corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_node(pcscd_t)
+@@ -56,8 +56,6 @@ locallogin_use_fds(pcscd_t)
+
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(pcscd_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(pcscd_t)
+-
+ sysnet_dns_name_resolve(pcscd_t)
+
+ optional_policy(`
+@@ -77,3 +75,7 @@ optional_policy(`
+ optional_policy(`
+ rpm_use_script_fds(pcscd_t)
+ ')
++
++optional_policy(`
++ udev_read_db(pcscd_t)
++')
+diff --git a/pegasus.te b/pegasus.te
+index 3185114..d459c82 100644
+--- a/pegasus.te
++++ b/pegasus.te
+@@ -9,6 +9,9 @@ type pegasus_t;
+ type pegasus_exec_t;
+ init_daemon_domain(pegasus_t, pegasus_exec_t)
+
++type pegasus_cache_t;
++files_type(pegasus_cache_t)
++
+ type pegasus_data_t;
+ files_type(pegasus_data_t)
+
+@@ -16,7 +19,7 @@ type pegasus_tmp_t;
+ files_tmp_file(pegasus_tmp_t)
+
+ type pegasus_conf_t;
+-files_type(pegasus_conf_t)
++files_config_file(pegasus_conf_t)
+
+ type pegasus_mof_t;
+ files_type(pegasus_mof_t)
+@@ -29,18 +32,23 @@ files_pid_file(pegasus_var_run_t)
+ # Local policy
+ #
+
+-allow pegasus_t self:capability { chown sys_nice setuid setgid dac_override net_bind_service };
++allow pegasus_t self:capability { chown kill ipc_lock sys_nice setuid setgid dac_override net_admin net_bind_service };
+ dontaudit pegasus_t self:capability sys_tty_config;
+ allow pegasus_t self:process signal;
+ allow pegasus_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms;
+ allow pegasus_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms;
+-allow pegasus_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
++allow pegasus_t self:unix_stream_socket { connectto create_stream_socket_perms };
+ allow pegasus_t self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
+
+ allow pegasus_t pegasus_conf_t:dir rw_dir_perms;
+-allow pegasus_t pegasus_conf_t:file { read_file_perms link unlink };
++allow pegasus_t pegasus_conf_t:file { read_file_perms link delete_file_perms rename_file_perms };
+ allow pegasus_t pegasus_conf_t:lnk_file read_lnk_file_perms;
+
++manage_dirs_pattern(pegasus_t, pegasus_cache_t, pegasus_cache_t)
++manage_files_pattern(pegasus_t, pegasus_cache_t, pegasus_cache_t)
++manage_lnk_files_pattern(pegasus_t, pegasus_cache_t, pegasus_cache_t)
++files_var_filetrans(pegasus_t, pegasus_cache_t, { dir file lnk_file })
++
+ manage_dirs_pattern(pegasus_t, pegasus_data_t, pegasus_data_t)
+ manage_files_pattern(pegasus_t, pegasus_data_t, pegasus_data_t)
+ manage_lnk_files_pattern(pegasus_t, pegasus_data_t, pegasus_data_t)
+@@ -56,17 +64,20 @@ manage_dirs_pattern(pegasus_t, pegasus_tmp_t, pegasus_tmp_t)
+ manage_files_pattern(pegasus_t, pegasus_tmp_t, pegasus_tmp_t)
+ files_tmp_filetrans(pegasus_t, pegasus_tmp_t, { file dir })
+
+-allow pegasus_t pegasus_var_run_t:sock_file { create setattr unlink };
++manage_sock_files_pattern(pegasus_t, pegasus_var_run_t, pegasus_var_run_t)
++manage_dirs_pattern(pegasus_t, pegasus_var_run_t, pegasus_var_run_t)
+ manage_files_pattern(pegasus_t, pegasus_var_run_t, pegasus_var_run_t)
+-files_pid_filetrans(pegasus_t, pegasus_var_run_t, file)
++files_pid_filetrans(pegasus_t, pegasus_var_run_t, { file dir })
+
++kernel_read_network_state(pegasus_t)
+ kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(pegasus_t)
+ kernel_read_fs_sysctls(pegasus_t)
+ kernel_read_system_state(pegasus_t)
+ kernel_search_vm_sysctl(pegasus_t)
+ kernel_read_net_sysctls(pegasus_t)
++kernel_read_xen_state(pegasus_t)
++kernel_write_xen_state(pegasus_t)
+
+-corenet_all_recvfrom_unlabeled(pegasus_t)
+ corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(pegasus_t)
+ corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(pegasus_t)
+ corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_node(pegasus_t)
+@@ -86,7 +97,7 @@ corenet_sendrecv_pegasus_https_server_packets(pegasus_t)
+ corecmd_exec_bin(pegasus_t)
+ corecmd_exec_shell(pegasus_t)
+
+-dev_read_sysfs(pegasus_t)
++dev_rw_sysfs(pegasus_t)
+ dev_read_urand(pegasus_t)
+
+ fs_getattr_all_fs(pegasus_t)
+@@ -95,11 +106,11 @@ files_getattr_all_dirs(pegasus_t)
+
+ auth_use_nsswitch(pegasus_t)
+ auth_domtrans_chk_passwd(pegasus_t)
++auth_read_shadow(pegasus_t)
+
+ domain_use_interactive_fds(pegasus_t)
+ domain_read_all_domains_state(pegasus_t)
+
+-files_read_etc_files(pegasus_t)
+ files_list_var_lib(pegasus_t)
+ files_read_var_lib_files(pegasus_t)
+ files_read_var_lib_symlinks(pegasus_t)
+@@ -112,8 +123,6 @@ init_stream_connect_script(pegasus_t)
+ logging_send_audit_msgs(pegasus_t)
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(pegasus_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(pegasus_t)
+-
+ sysnet_read_config(pegasus_t)
+ sysnet_domtrans_ifconfig(pegasus_t)
+
+@@ -121,12 +130,48 @@ userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fds(pegasus_t)
+ userdom_dontaudit_search_user_home_dirs(pegasus_t)
+
+ optional_policy(`
++ dbus_system_bus_client(pegasus_t)
++ dbus_connect_system_bus(pegasus_t)
++
++ optional_policy(`
++ networkmanager_dbus_chat(pegasus_t)
++ ')
++')
++
++optional_policy(`
++ corosync_stream_connect(pegasus_t)
++')
++
++optional_policy(`
++ hostname_exec(pegasus_t)
++')
++
++optional_policy(`
++ lldpad_dgram_send(pegasus_t)
++')
++
++optional_policy(`
++ ricci_stream_connect_modclusterd(pegasus_t)
++')
++
++optional_policy(`
+ rpm_exec(pegasus_t)
+ ')
+
+ optional_policy(`
++ samba_manage_config(pegasus_t)
++')
++
++optional_policy(`
++ sysnet_domtrans_ifconfig(pegasus_t)
++')
++
++optional_policy(`
++ ssh_exec(pegasus_t)
++')
++
++optional_policy(`
+ seutil_sigchld_newrole(pegasus_t)
+- seutil_dontaudit_read_config(pegasus_t)
+ ')
+
+ optional_policy(`
+@@ -136,3 +181,14 @@ optional_policy(`
+ optional_policy(`
+ unconfined_signull(pegasus_t)
+ ')
++
++optional_policy(`
++ virt_domtrans(pegasus_t)
++ virt_stream_connect(pegasus_t)
++ virt_manage_config(pegasus_t)
++')
++
++optional_policy(`
++ xen_stream_connect(pegasus_t)
++ xen_stream_connect_xenstore(pegasus_t)
++')
+diff --git a/perdition.te b/perdition.te
+index 3636277..05e65ad 100644
+--- a/perdition.te
++++ b/perdition.te
+@@ -36,7 +36,6 @@ kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(perdition_t)
+ kernel_list_proc(perdition_t)
+ kernel_read_proc_symlinks(perdition_t)
+
+-corenet_all_recvfrom_unlabeled(perdition_t)
+ corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(perdition_t)
+ corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(perdition_t)
+ corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if(perdition_t)
+@@ -59,8 +58,6 @@ files_read_etc_files(perdition_t)
+
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(perdition_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(perdition_t)
+-
+ sysnet_read_config(perdition_t)
+
+ userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fds(perdition_t)
+diff --git a/phpfpm.fc b/phpfpm.fc
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..4c64b13
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/phpfpm.fc
+@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
++/usr/lib/systemd/system/php-fpm.service -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:phpfpm_unit_file_t,s0)
++
++/usr/sbin/php-fpm -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:phpfpm_exec_t,s0)
++
++/var/log/php-fpm(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:phpfpm_log_t,s0)
++
++/var/run/php-fpm(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:phpfpm_var_run_t,s0)
+diff --git a/phpfpm.if b/phpfpm.if
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..18f0425
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/phpfpm.if
+@@ -0,0 +1,162 @@
++
++## <summary> PHP-FPM (FastCGI Process Manager) is an alternative PHP FastCGI implementation with some additional features useful for sites of any size, especially busier sites. </summary>
++
++########################################
++## <summary>
++## Execute php-fpm in the phpfpm domain.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed to transition.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`phpfpm_domtrans',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type phpfpm_t, phpfpm_exec_t;
++ ')
++
++ corecmd_search_bin($1)
++ domtrans_pattern($1, phpfpm_exec_t, phpfpm_t)
++')
++
++########################################
++## <summary>
++## Read phpfpm's log files.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++## <rolecap/>
++#
++interface(`phpfpm_read_log',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type phpfpm_log_t;
++ ')
++
++ logging_search_logs($1)
++ read_files_pattern($1, phpfpm_log_t, phpfpm_log_t)
++')
++
++########################################
++## <summary>
++## Append to phpfpm log files.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`phpfpm_append_log',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type phpfpm_log_t;
++ ')
++
++ logging_search_logs($1)
++ append_files_pattern($1, phpfpm_log_t, phpfpm_log_t)
++')
++
++########################################
++## <summary>
++## Manage phpfpm log files
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`phpfpm_manage_log',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type phpfpm_log_t;
++ ')
++
++ logging_search_logs($1)
++ manage_dirs_pattern($1, phpfpm_log_t, phpfpm_log_t)
++ manage_files_pattern($1, phpfpm_log_t, phpfpm_log_t)
++ manage_lnk_files_pattern($1, phpfpm_log_t, phpfpm_log_t)
++')
++
++########################################
++## <summary>
++## Read phpfpm PID files.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`phpfpm_read_pid_files',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type phpfpm_var_run_t;
++ ')
++
++ files_search_pids($1)
++ allow $1 phpfpm_var_run_t:file read_file_perms;
++')
++
++########################################
++## <summary>
++## Execute phpfpm server in the phpfpm domain.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed to transition.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`phpfpm_systemctl',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type phpfpm_t;
++ type phpfpm_unit_file_t;
++ ')
++
++ systemd_exec_systemctl($1)
++ allow $1 phpfpm_unit_file_t:file read_file_perms;
++ allow $1 phpfpm_unit_file_t:service manage_service_perms;
++
++ ps_process_pattern($1, phpfpm_t)
++')
++
++
++########################################
++## <summary>
++## All of the rules required to administrate
++## an phpfpm environment
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`phpfpm_admin',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type phpfpm_t;
++ type phpfpm_log_t;
++ type phpfpm_var_run_t;
++ type phpfpm_unit_file_t;
++ ')
++
++ allow $1 phpfpm_t:process { ptrace signal_perms };
++ ps_process_pattern($1, phpfpm_t)
++
++ logging_search_logs($1)
++ admin_pattern($1, phpfpm_log_t)
++
++ files_search_pids($1)
++ admin_pattern($1, phpfpm_var_run_t)
++
++ phpfpm_systemctl($1)
++ admin_pattern($1, phpfpm_unit_file_t)
++ allow $1 phpfpm_unit_file_t:service all_service_perms;
++
++ optional_policy(`
++ systemd_passwd_agent_exec($1)
++ systemd_read_fifo_file_passwd_run($1)
++ ')
++')
+diff --git a/phpfpm.te b/phpfpm.te
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..78af4d7
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/phpfpm.te
+@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
++policy_module(phpfpm, 1.0.0)
++
++########################################
++#
++# Declarations
++#
++
++type phpfpm_t;
++type phpfpm_exec_t;
++init_daemon_domain(phpfpm_t, phpfpm_exec_t)
++
++type phpfpm_log_t;
++logging_log_file(phpfpm_log_t)
++
++type phpfpm_var_run_t;
++files_pid_file(phpfpm_var_run_t)
++
++type phpfpm_unit_file_t;
++systemd_unit_file(phpfpm_unit_file_t)
++
++########################################
++#
++# phpfpm local policy
++#
++
++allow phpfpm_t self:capability { chown kill setgid setuid sys_chroot sys_nice };
++allow phpfpm_t self:process { setsched setrlimit signal sigkill };
++
++allow phpfpm_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms;
++allow phpfpm_t self:tcp_socket { accept listen };
++allow phpfpm_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
++
++manage_dirs_pattern(phpfpm_t, phpfpm_log_t, phpfpm_log_t)
++manage_files_pattern(phpfpm_t, phpfpm_log_t, phpfpm_log_t)
++
++manage_dirs_pattern(phpfpm_t, phpfpm_var_run_t, phpfpm_var_run_t)
++manage_files_pattern(phpfpm_t, phpfpm_var_run_t, phpfpm_var_run_t)
++files_pid_filetrans(phpfpm_t, phpfpm_var_run_t, dir )
++
++kernel_read_system_state(phpfpm_t)
++kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(phpfpm_t)
++
++corenet_tcp_bind_generic_port(phpfpm_t)
++
++domain_use_interactive_fds(phpfpm_t)
++
++files_read_etc_files(phpfpm_t)
++
++auth_use_nsswitch(phpfpm_t)
++
++dev_read_rand(phpfpm_t)
++dev_read_urand(phpfpm_t)
++
++logging_send_syslog_msg(phpfpm_t)
++
++sysnet_dns_name_resolve(phpfpm_t)
++
++optional_policy(`
++ mysql_stream_connect(phpfpm_t)
++ mysql_tcp_connect(phpfpm_t)
++')
+diff --git a/pingd.if b/pingd.if
+index 8688aae..cf34fc1 100644
+--- a/pingd.if
++++ b/pingd.if
+@@ -55,7 +55,6 @@ interface(`pingd_manage_config',`
+ files_search_etc($1)
+ manage_dirs_pattern($1, pingd_etc_t, pingd_etc_t)
+ manage_files_pattern($1, pingd_etc_t, pingd_etc_t)
+-
+ ')
+
+ #######################################
+@@ -77,12 +76,15 @@ interface(`pingd_manage_config',`
+ #
+ interface(`pingd_admin',`
+ gen_require(`
+- type pingd_t, pingd_etc_t;
+- type pingd_initrc_exec_t, pingd_modules_t;
++ type pingd_t, pingd_etc_t, pingd_modules_t;
++ type pingd_initrc_exec_t;
+ ')
+
+- allow $1 pingd_t:process { ptrace signal_perms };
++ allow $1 pingd_t:process signal_perms;
+ ps_process_pattern($1, pingd_t)
++ tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',`
++ allow $1 pingd_t:process ptrace;
++ ')
+
+ init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, pingd_initrc_exec_t)
+ domain_system_change_exemption($1)
+diff --git a/pingd.te b/pingd.te
+index e9cf8a4..c476cf4 100644
+--- a/pingd.te
++++ b/pingd.te
+@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ init_daemon_domain(pingd_t, pingd_exec_t)
+
+ # type for config
+ type pingd_etc_t;
+-files_type(pingd_etc_t)
++files_config_file(pingd_etc_t)
+
+ type pingd_initrc_exec_t;
+ init_script_file(pingd_initrc_exec_t)
+@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ files_type(pingd_modules_t)
+
+ allow pingd_t self:capability net_raw;
+ allow pingd_t self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
+-allow pingd_t self:rawip_socket { write read create bind };
++allow pingd_t self:rawip_socket create_socket_perms;
+
+ read_files_pattern(pingd_t, pingd_etc_t, pingd_etc_t)
+
+@@ -43,5 +43,3 @@ auth_use_nsswitch(pingd_t)
+ files_search_usr(pingd_t)
+
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(pingd_t)
+-
+-miscfiles_read_localization(pingd_t)
+diff --git a/piranha.fc b/piranha.fc
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..20ea9f5
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/piranha.fc
+@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
++
++/etc/rc\.d/init\.d/pulse -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:piranha_pulse_initrc_exec_t,s0)
++
++# RHEL6
++#/etc/sysconfig/ha/lvs\.cf -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:piranha_etc_rw_t,s0)
++
++/etc/piranha/lvs\.cf -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:piranha_etc_rw_t,s0)
++
++/usr/sbin/fos -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:piranha_fos_exec_t,s0)
++/usr/sbin/lvsd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:piranha_lvs_exec_t,s0)
++/usr/sbin/piranha_gui -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:piranha_web_exec_t,s0)
++/usr/sbin/pulse -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:piranha_pulse_exec_t,s0)
++
++/var/lib/luci(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:piranha_web_data_t,s0)
++/var/lib/luci/cert(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:piranha_web_conf_t,s0)
++/var/lib/luci/etc(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:piranha_web_conf_t,s0)
++
++/var/log/piranha(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:piranha_log_t,s0)
++
++/var/run/fos\.pid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:piranha_fos_var_run_t,s0)
++/var/run/lvs\.pid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:piranha_lvs_var_run_t,s0)
++/var/run/piranha-httpd\.pid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:piranha_web_var_run_t,s0)
++/var/run/pulse\.pid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:piranha_pulse_var_run_t,s0)
++
+diff --git a/piranha.if b/piranha.if
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..8d681d1
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/piranha.if
+@@ -0,0 +1,179 @@
++## <summary>policy for piranha</summary>
++
++#######################################
++## <summary>
++## Creates types and rules for a basic
++## cluster init daemon domain.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="prefix">
++## <summary>
++## Prefix for the domain.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++template(`piranha_domain_template',`
++ gen_require(`
++ attribute piranha_domain;
++ ')
++
++ ##############################
++ #
++ # piranha_$1_t declarations
++ #
++
++ type piranha_$1_t, piranha_domain;
++ type piranha_$1_exec_t;
++ init_daemon_domain(piranha_$1_t, piranha_$1_exec_t)
++
++ # pid files
++ type piranha_$1_var_run_t;
++ files_pid_file(piranha_$1_var_run_t)
++
++ ##############################
++ #
++ # piranha_$1_t local policy
++ #
++
++ manage_files_pattern(piranha_$1_t, piranha_$1_var_run_t, piranha_$1_var_run_t)
++ manage_dirs_pattern(piranha_$1_t, piranha_$1_var_run_t, piranha_$1_var_run_t)
++ files_pid_filetrans(piranha_$1_t, piranha_$1_var_run_t, { dir file })
++
++ kernel_read_system_state(piranha_$1_t)
++
++ auth_use_nsswitch(piranha_$1_t)
++
++ logging_send_syslog_msg(piranha_$1_t)
++')
++
++########################################
++## <summary>
++## Execute a domain transition to run fos.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed to transition.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`piranha_domtrans_fos',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type piranha_fos_t, piranha_fos_exec_t;
++ ')
++
++ domtrans_pattern($1, piranha_fos_exec_t, piranha_fos_t)
++')
++
++#######################################
++## <summary>
++## Execute a domain transition to run lvsd.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed to transition.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`piranha_domtrans_lvs',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type piranha_lvs_t, piranha_lvs_exec_t;
++ ')
++
++ domtrans_pattern($1, piranha_lvs_exec_t, piranha_lvs_t)
++')
++
++#######################################
++## <summary>
++## Execute a domain transition to run pulse.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed to transition.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`piranha_domtrans_pulse',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type piranha_pulse_t, piranha_pulse_exec_t;
++ ')
++
++ domtrans_pattern($1, piranha_pulse_exec_t, piranha_pulse_t)
++')
++
++#######################################
++## <summary>
++## Execute pulse server in the pulse domain.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed to transition.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`piranha_pulse_initrc_domtrans',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type piranha_pulse_initrc_exec_t;
++ ')
++
++ init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, piranha_pulse_initrc_exec_t)
++')
++
++########################################
++## <summary>
++## Allow the specified domain to read piranha's log files.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++## <rolecap/>
++#
++interface(`piranha_read_log',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type piranha_log_t;
++ ')
++
++ logging_search_logs($1)
++ read_files_pattern($1, piranha_log_t, piranha_log_t)
++')
++
++########################################
++## <summary>
++## Allow the specified domain to append
++## piranha log files.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`piranha_append_log',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type piranha_log_t;
++ ')
++
++ logging_search_logs($1)
++ append_files_pattern($1, piranha_log_t, piranha_log_t)
++')
++
++########################################
++## <summary>
++## Allow domain to manage piranha log files
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`piranha_manage_log',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type piranha_log_t;
++ ')
++
++ logging_search_logs($1)
++ manage_dirs_pattern($1, piranha_log_t, piranha_log_t)
++ manage_files_pattern($1, piranha_log_t, piranha_log_t)
++ manage_lnk_files_pattern($1, piranha_log_t, piranha_log_t)
++')
+diff --git a/piranha.te b/piranha.te
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..b1d27d7
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/piranha.te
+@@ -0,0 +1,295 @@
++policy_module(piranha, 1.0.0)
++
++########################################
++#
++# Declarations
++#
++
++## <desc>
++## <p>
++## Allow piranha-lvs domain to connect to the network using TCP.
++## </p>
++## </desc>
++gen_tunable(piranha_lvs_can_network_connect, false)
++
++attribute piranha_domain;
++
++piranha_domain_template(fos)
++
++piranha_domain_template(lvs)
++
++piranha_domain_template(pulse)
++
++type piranha_pulse_initrc_exec_t;
++init_script_file(piranha_pulse_initrc_exec_t)
++
++piranha_domain_template(web)
++
++type piranha_web_tmpfs_t;
++files_tmpfs_file(piranha_web_tmpfs_t)
++
++type piranha_web_conf_t;
++files_config_file(piranha_web_conf_t)
++
++type piranha_web_data_t;
++files_type(piranha_web_data_t)
++
++type piranha_web_tmp_t;
++files_tmp_file(piranha_web_tmp_t)
++
++type piranha_etc_rw_t;
++files_config_file(piranha_etc_rw_t)
++
++type piranha_log_t;
++logging_log_file(piranha_log_t)
++
++#######################################
++#
++# piranha-fos local policy
++#
++
++kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(piranha_fos_t)
++
++domain_read_all_domains_state(piranha_fos_t)
++
++optional_policy(`
++ consoletype_exec(piranha_fos_t)
++')
++
++# start and stop services
++init_domtrans_script(piranha_fos_t)
++
++########################################
++#
++# piranha-gui local policy
++#
++
++allow piranha_web_t self:capability { setuid sys_nice kill setgid };
++allow piranha_web_t self:process { getsched setsched signal signull };
++
++allow piranha_web_t self:rawip_socket create_socket_perms;
++allow piranha_web_t self:netlink_route_socket r_netlink_socket_perms;
++allow piranha_web_t self:sem create_sem_perms;
++allow piranha_web_t self:shm create_shm_perms;
++
++manage_files_pattern(piranha_web_t, piranha_web_data_t, piranha_web_data_t)
++manage_dirs_pattern(piranha_web_t, piranha_web_data_t, piranha_web_data_t)
++files_var_lib_filetrans(piranha_web_t, piranha_web_data_t, file)
++
++read_files_pattern(piranha_web_t, piranha_web_conf_t, piranha_web_conf_t)
++
++rw_files_pattern(piranha_web_t, piranha_etc_rw_t, piranha_etc_rw_t)
++
++manage_dirs_pattern(piranha_web_t, piranha_log_t, piranha_log_t)
++manage_files_pattern(piranha_web_t, piranha_log_t, piranha_log_t)
++logging_log_filetrans(piranha_web_t, piranha_log_t, { dir file })
++
++can_exec(piranha_web_t, piranha_web_tmp_t)
++manage_dirs_pattern(piranha_web_t, piranha_web_tmp_t, piranha_web_tmp_t)
++manage_files_pattern(piranha_web_t, piranha_web_tmp_t, piranha_web_tmp_t)
++files_tmp_filetrans(piranha_web_t, piranha_web_tmp_t, { file dir })
++
++manage_dirs_pattern(piranha_web_t, piranha_web_tmpfs_t, piranha_web_tmpfs_t)
++manage_files_pattern(piranha_web_t, piranha_web_tmpfs_t, piranha_web_tmpfs_t)
++fs_tmpfs_filetrans(piranha_web_t, piranha_web_tmpfs_t, { dir file })
++
++piranha_pulse_initrc_domtrans(piranha_web_t)
++
++kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(piranha_web_t)
++
++corenet_tcp_bind_http_cache_port(piranha_web_t)
++corenet_tcp_bind_luci_port(piranha_web_t)
++corenet_tcp_bind_piranha_port(piranha_web_t)
++corenet_tcp_connect_ricci_port(piranha_web_t)
++
++dev_read_rand(piranha_web_t)
++dev_read_urand(piranha_web_t)
++
++domain_read_all_domains_state(piranha_web_t)
++
++files_read_usr_files(piranha_web_t)
++
++optional_policy(`
++ consoletype_exec(piranha_web_t)
++')
++
++optional_policy(`
++ apache_read_config(piranha_web_t)
++ apache_exec_modules(piranha_web_t)
++ apache_exec(piranha_web_t)
++')
++
++optional_policy(`
++ gnome_dontaudit_search_config(piranha_web_t)
++')
++
++optional_policy(`
++ sasl_connect(piranha_web_t)
++')
++
++optional_policy(`
++ snmp_dontaudit_read_snmp_var_lib_files(piranha_web_t)
++ snmp_dontaudit_write_snmp_var_lib_files(piranha_web_t)
++')
++
++######################################
++#
++# piranha-lvs local policy
++#
++
++# neede by nanny
++allow piranha_lvs_t self:capability { net_raw sys_nice };
++allow piranha_lvs_t self:process signal;
++allow piranha_lvs_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms;
++allow piranha_lvs_t self:rawip_socket create_socket_perms;
++
++kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(piranha_lvs_t)
++
++# needed by nanny
++corenet_tcp_connect_ftp_port(piranha_lvs_t)
++corenet_tcp_connect_http_port(piranha_lvs_t)
++corenet_tcp_connect_smtp_port(piranha_lvs_t)
++
++sysnet_dns_name_resolve(piranha_lvs_t)
++
++# needed by nanny
++tunable_policy(`piranha_lvs_can_network_connect',`
++ corenet_tcp_connect_all_ports(piranha_lvs_t)
++')
++
++# needed by ipvsadm
++optional_policy(`
++ iptables_domtrans(piranha_lvs_t)
++')
++
++#######################################
++#
++# piranha-pulse local policy
++#
++
++allow piranha_pulse_t self:capability net_admin;
++
++allow piranha_pulse_t self:packet_socket create_socket_perms;
++
++# pulse starts fos and lvs daemon
++domtrans_pattern(piranha_pulse_t, piranha_fos_exec_t, piranha_fos_t)
++allow piranha_pulse_t piranha_fos_t:process signal;
++
++domtrans_pattern(piranha_pulse_t, piranha_lvs_exec_t, piranha_lvs_t)
++allow piranha_pulse_t piranha_lvs_t:process signal;
++
++kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(piranha_pulse_t)
++kernel_read_rpc_sysctls(piranha_pulse_t)
++kernel_rw_rpc_sysctls(piranha_pulse_t)
++kernel_search_debugfs(piranha_pulse_t)
++kernel_search_network_state(piranha_pulse_t)
++
++corecmd_exec_bin(piranha_pulse_t)
++corecmd_exec_shell(piranha_pulse_t)
++optional_policy(`
++ consoletype_exec(piranha_pulse_t)
++')
++
++corenet_udp_bind_apertus_ldp_port(piranha_pulse_t)
++corenet_udp_bind_cma_port(piranha_pulse_t)
++
++domain_read_all_domains_state(piranha_pulse_t)
++domain_getattr_all_domains(piranha_pulse_t)
+
- kernel_read_system_state(passenger_t)
- kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(passenger_t)
-
- corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(passenger_t)
--corenet_all_recvfrom_unlabeled(passenger_t)
- corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(passenger_t)
- corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_node(passenger_t)
- corenet_tcp_connect_http_port(passenger_t)
-@@ -63,10 +67,14 @@ corecmd_exec_shell(passenger_t)
-
- dev_read_urand(passenger_t)
-
--files_read_etc_files(passenger_t)
-+domain_read_all_domains_state(passenger_t)
++fs_getattr_all_fs(piranha_pulse_t)
+
-+files_read_usr_files(passenger_t)
-
- auth_use_nsswitch(passenger_t)
-
-+logging_send_syslog_msg(passenger_t)
++init_initrc_domain(piranha_pulse_t)
+
- miscfiles_read_localization(passenger_t)
-
- userdom_dontaudit_use_user_terminals(passenger_t)
-@@ -75,3 +83,9 @@ optional_policy(`
- apache_append_log(passenger_t)
- apache_read_sys_content(passenger_t)
- ')
++logging_send_syslog_msg(piranha_pulse_t)
++
++# various services to failover
+
+optional_policy(`
-+ puppet_manage_lib(passenger_t)
-+ puppet_search_log(passenger_t)
-+ puppet_search_pid(passenger_t)
++ apache_domtrans(piranha_pulse_t)
++ apache_signal(piranha_pulse_t)
+')
-diff --git a/pcmcia.fc b/pcmcia.fc
-index 9cf0e56..2b5260a 100644
---- a/pcmcia.fc
-+++ b/pcmcia.fc
-@@ -4,6 +4,9 @@
- /sbin/cardctl -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:cardctl_exec_t,s0)
- /sbin/cardmgr -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:cardmgr_exec_t,s0)
-
-+/usr/sbin/cardctl -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:cardctl_exec_t,s0)
-+/usr/sbin/cardmgr -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:cardmgr_exec_t,s0)
+
- /var/lib/pcmcia(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:cardmgr_var_run_t,s0)
-
- /var/run/cardmgr\.pid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:cardmgr_var_run_t,s0)
-diff --git a/pcmcia.te b/pcmcia.te
-index 4d06ae3..d94ff3b 100644
---- a/pcmcia.te
-+++ b/pcmcia.te
-@@ -62,9 +62,7 @@ dev_read_urand(cardmgr_t)
-
- domain_use_interactive_fds(cardmgr_t)
- # Read /proc/PID directories for all domains (for fuser).
--domain_read_confined_domains_state(cardmgr_t)
--domain_getattr_confined_domains(cardmgr_t)
--domain_dontaudit_ptrace_confined_domains(cardmgr_t)
-+domain_read_all_domains_state(cardmgr_t)
- # cjp: these look excessive:
- domain_dontaudit_getattr_all_pipes(cardmgr_t)
- domain_dontaudit_getattr_all_sockets(cardmgr_t)
-@@ -105,7 +103,7 @@ sysnet_domtrans_ifconfig(cardmgr_t)
- sysnet_etc_filetrans_config(cardmgr_t)
- sysnet_manage_config(cardmgr_t)
-
--userdom_use_user_terminals(cardmgr_t)
-+userdom_use_inherited_user_terminals(cardmgr_t)
- userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fds(cardmgr_t)
- userdom_dontaudit_search_user_home_dirs(cardmgr_t)
-
-diff --git a/pcscd.fc b/pcscd.fc
-index 87f17e8..63ee18a 100644
---- a/pcscd.fc
-+++ b/pcscd.fc
-@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
- /var/run/pcscd\.comm -s gen_context(system_u:object_r:pcscd_var_run_t,s0)
-+/var/run/pcscd(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:pcscd_var_run_t,s0)
- /var/run/pcscd\.pid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:pcscd_var_run_t,s0)
- /var/run/pcscd\.pub -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:pcscd_var_run_t,s0)
- /var/run/pcscd\.events(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:pcscd_var_run_t,s0)
-diff --git a/pcscd.if b/pcscd.if
-index 1c2a091..3ead3cc 100644
---- a/pcscd.if
-+++ b/pcscd.if
-@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ interface(`pcscd_read_pub_files',`
- ')
-
- files_search_pids($1)
-- allow $1 pcscd_var_run_t:file read_file_perms;
-+ read_files_pattern($1, pcscd_var_run_t, pcscd_var_run_t)
- ')
-
- ########################################
-diff --git a/pcscd.te b/pcscd.te
-index ceafba6..dbf1b71 100644
---- a/pcscd.te
-+++ b/pcscd.te
-@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ allow pcscd_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms;
- allow pcscd_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
- allow pcscd_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms;
- allow pcscd_t self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
-+allow pcscd_t self:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket create_socket_perms;
-
- manage_dirs_pattern(pcscd_t, pcscd_var_run_t, pcscd_var_run_t)
- manage_files_pattern(pcscd_t, pcscd_var_run_t, pcscd_var_run_t)
-@@ -34,7 +35,6 @@ files_pid_filetrans(pcscd_t, pcscd_var_run_t, { file sock_file dir })
-
- kernel_read_system_state(pcscd_t)
-
--corenet_all_recvfrom_unlabeled(pcscd_t)
- corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(pcscd_t)
- corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(pcscd_t)
- corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_node(pcscd_t)
-@@ -77,3 +77,7 @@ optional_policy(`
- optional_policy(`
- rpm_use_script_fds(pcscd_t)
- ')
++optional_policy(`
++ ftp_domtrans(piranha_pulse_t)
++ ftp_initrc_domtrans(piranha_pulse_t)
++ ftp_systemctl(piranha_pulse_t)
++')
+
+optional_policy(`
-+ udev_read_db(pcscd_t)
++ hostname_exec(piranha_pulse_t)
+')
-diff --git a/pegasus.te b/pegasus.te
-index 3185114..e196595 100644
---- a/pegasus.te
-+++ b/pegasus.te
-@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ type pegasus_tmp_t;
- files_tmp_file(pegasus_tmp_t)
-
- type pegasus_conf_t;
--files_type(pegasus_conf_t)
-+files_config_file(pegasus_conf_t)
-
- type pegasus_mof_t;
- files_type(pegasus_mof_t)
-@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ files_pid_file(pegasus_var_run_t)
- # Local policy
- #
-
--allow pegasus_t self:capability { chown sys_nice setuid setgid dac_override net_bind_service };
-+allow pegasus_t self:capability { chown kill ipc_lock sys_nice setuid setgid dac_override net_bind_service };
- dontaudit pegasus_t self:capability sys_tty_config;
- allow pegasus_t self:process signal;
- allow pegasus_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms;
-@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ allow pegasus_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
- allow pegasus_t self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
-
- allow pegasus_t pegasus_conf_t:dir rw_dir_perms;
--allow pegasus_t pegasus_conf_t:file { read_file_perms link unlink };
-+allow pegasus_t pegasus_conf_t:file { read_file_perms link delete_file_perms rename_file_perms };
- allow pegasus_t pegasus_conf_t:lnk_file read_lnk_file_perms;
-
- manage_dirs_pattern(pegasus_t, pegasus_data_t, pegasus_data_t)
-@@ -56,17 +56,20 @@ manage_dirs_pattern(pegasus_t, pegasus_tmp_t, pegasus_tmp_t)
- manage_files_pattern(pegasus_t, pegasus_tmp_t, pegasus_tmp_t)
- files_tmp_filetrans(pegasus_t, pegasus_tmp_t, { file dir })
-
--allow pegasus_t pegasus_var_run_t:sock_file { create setattr unlink };
-+allow pegasus_t pegasus_var_run_t:sock_file { create_sock_file_perms setattr_sock_file_perms delete_sock_file_perms };
-+manage_dirs_pattern(pegasus_t, pegasus_var_run_t, pegasus_var_run_t)
- manage_files_pattern(pegasus_t, pegasus_var_run_t, pegasus_var_run_t)
--files_pid_filetrans(pegasus_t, pegasus_var_run_t, file)
-+files_pid_filetrans(pegasus_t, pegasus_var_run_t, { file dir })
-
-+kernel_read_network_state(pegasus_t)
- kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(pegasus_t)
- kernel_read_fs_sysctls(pegasus_t)
- kernel_read_system_state(pegasus_t)
- kernel_search_vm_sysctl(pegasus_t)
- kernel_read_net_sysctls(pegasus_t)
-+kernel_read_xen_state(pegasus_t)
-+kernel_write_xen_state(pegasus_t)
-
--corenet_all_recvfrom_unlabeled(pegasus_t)
- corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(pegasus_t)
- corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(pegasus_t)
- corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_node(pegasus_t)
-@@ -95,11 +98,11 @@ files_getattr_all_dirs(pegasus_t)
-
- auth_use_nsswitch(pegasus_t)
- auth_domtrans_chk_passwd(pegasus_t)
-+auth_read_shadow(pegasus_t)
-
- domain_use_interactive_fds(pegasus_t)
- domain_read_all_domains_state(pegasus_t)
-
--files_read_etc_files(pegasus_t)
- files_list_var_lib(pegasus_t)
- files_read_var_lib_files(pegasus_t)
- files_read_var_lib_symlinks(pegasus_t)
-@@ -121,10 +124,30 @@ userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fds(pegasus_t)
- userdom_dontaudit_search_user_home_dirs(pegasus_t)
-
- optional_policy(`
-+ hostname_exec(pegasus_t)
++
++optional_policy(`
++ iptables_domtrans(piranha_pulse_t)
+')
+
+optional_policy(`
-+ lldpad_dgram_send(pegasus_t)
++ ldap_systemctl(piranha_pulse_t)
++ ldap_initrc_domtrans(piranha_pulse_t)
++ ldap_domtrans(piranha_pulse_t)
+')
+
+optional_policy(`
- rpm_exec(pegasus_t)
- ')
-
- optional_policy(`
-+ samba_manage_config(pegasus_t)
++ mysql_domtrans_mysql_safe(piranha_pulse_t)
++ mysql_stream_connect(piranha_pulse_t)
+')
+
+optional_policy(`
-+ sysnet_domtrans_ifconfig(pegasus_t)
++ netutils_domtrans(piranha_pulse_t)
++ netutils_domtrans_ping(piranha_pulse_t)
+')
+
+optional_policy(`
-+ ssh_exec(pegasus_t)
++ postgresql_domtrans(piranha_pulse_t)
++ postgresql_signal(piranha_pulse_t)
+')
+
+optional_policy(`
- seutil_sigchld_newrole(pegasus_t)
- seutil_dontaudit_read_config(pegasus_t)
- ')
-@@ -136,3 +159,14 @@ optional_policy(`
- optional_policy(`
- unconfined_signull(pegasus_t)
- ')
++ samba_initrc_domtrans(piranha_pulse_t)
++ samba_systemctl(piranha_pulse_t)
++ samba_domtrans_smbd(piranha_pulse_t)
++ samba_domtrans_nmbd(piranha_pulse_t)
++ samba_manage_var_files(piranha_pulse_t)
++ samba_rw_config(piranha_pulse_t)
++ samba_signal_smbd(piranha_pulse_t)
++ samba_signal_nmbd(piranha_pulse_t)
++')
+
+optional_policy(`
-+ virt_domtrans(pegasus_t)
-+ virt_stream_connect(pegasus_t)
-+ virt_manage_config(pegasus_t)
++ sysnet_domtrans_ifconfig(piranha_pulse_t)
+')
+
+optional_policy(`
-+ xen_stream_connect(pegasus_t)
-+ xen_stream_connect_xenstore(pegasus_t)
++ udev_read_db(piranha_pulse_t)
+')
-diff --git a/perdition.te b/perdition.te
-index 3636277..9432a3c 100644
---- a/perdition.te
-+++ b/perdition.te
-@@ -36,7 +36,6 @@ kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(perdition_t)
- kernel_list_proc(perdition_t)
- kernel_read_proc_symlinks(perdition_t)
-
--corenet_all_recvfrom_unlabeled(perdition_t)
- corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(perdition_t)
- corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(perdition_t)
- corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if(perdition_t)
-diff --git a/phpfpm.fc b/phpfpm.fc
++
++####################################
++#
++# piranha domains common policy
++#
++
++allow piranha_domain self:process signal_perms;
++allow piranha_domain self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms;
++allow piranha_domain self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
++allow piranha_domain self:udp_socket create_socket_perms;
++allow piranha_domain self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
++
++read_files_pattern(piranha_domain, piranha_etc_rw_t, piranha_etc_rw_t)
++
++kernel_read_network_state(piranha_domain)
++
++corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(piranha_domain)
++corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if(piranha_domain)
++corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_node(piranha_domain)
++corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_node(piranha_domain)
++corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_ports(piranha_domain)
++corenet_udp_sendrecv_all_ports(piranha_domain)
++corenet_tcp_bind_generic_node(piranha_domain)
++corenet_udp_bind_generic_node(piranha_domain)
++
++files_read_etc_files(piranha_domain)
++
++corecmd_exec_bin(piranha_domain)
++corecmd_exec_shell(piranha_domain)
++
++sysnet_read_config(piranha_domain)
+diff --git a/pkcsslotd.fc b/pkcsslotd.fc
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..4c64b13
+index 0000000..dd1b8f2
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/phpfpm.fc
-@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
-+/usr/lib/systemd/system/php-fpm.service -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:phpfpm_unit_file_t,s0)
-+
-+/usr/sbin/php-fpm -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:phpfpm_exec_t,s0)
++++ b/pkcsslotd.fc
+@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
++/usr/lib/systemd/system/pkcsslotd.service -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:pkcsslotd_unit_file_t,s0)
+
-+/var/log/php-fpm(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:phpfpm_log_t,s0)
++/usr/sbin/pkcsslotd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:pkcsslotd_exec_t,s0)
+
-+/var/run/php-fpm(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:phpfpm_var_run_t,s0)
-diff --git a/phpfpm.if b/phpfpm.if
++/var/lib/opencryptoki(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:pkcsslotd_var_lib_t,s0)
+diff --git a/pkcsslotd.if b/pkcsslotd.if
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..9dcdaa8
+index 0000000..848ddc9
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/phpfpm.if
-@@ -0,0 +1,168 @@
++++ b/pkcsslotd.if
+@@ -0,0 +1,155 @@
+
-+## <summary> PHP-FPM (FastCGI Process Manager) is an alternative PHP FastCGI implementation with some additional features useful for sites of any size, especially busier sites. </summary>
++## <summary>policy for pkcsslotd</summary>
+
+########################################
+## <summary>
-+## Execute php-fpm in the phpfpm domain.
++## Transition to pkcsslotd.
+## </summary>
+## <param name="domain">
+## <summary>
@@ -39835,38 +45618,37 @@ index 0000000..9dcdaa8
+## </summary>
+## </param>
+#
-+interface(`phpfpm_domtrans',`
++interface(`pkcsslotd_domtrans',`
+ gen_require(`
-+ type phpfpm_t, phpfpm_exec_t;
++ type pkcsslotd_t, pkcsslotd_exec_t;
+ ')
+
+ corecmd_search_bin($1)
-+ domtrans_pattern($1, phpfpm_exec_t, phpfpm_t)
++ domtrans_pattern($1, pkcsslotd_exec_t, pkcsslotd_t)
+')
+
+########################################
+## <summary>
-+## Read phpfpm's log files.
++## Search pkcsslotd lib directories.
+## </summary>
+## <param name="domain">
+## <summary>
+## Domain allowed access.
+## </summary>
+## </param>
-+## <rolecap/>
+#
-+interface(`phpfpm_read_log',`
++interface(`pkcsslotd_search_lib',`
+ gen_require(`
-+ type phpfpm_log_t;
++ type pkcsslotd_var_lib_t;
+ ')
+
-+ logging_search_logs($1)
-+ read_files_pattern($1, phpfpm_log_t, phpfpm_log_t)
++ allow $1 pkcsslotd_var_lib_t:dir search_dir_perms;
++ files_search_var_lib($1)
+')
+
+########################################
+## <summary>
-+## Append to phpfpm log files.
++## Read pkcsslotd lib files.
+## </summary>
+## <param name="domain">
+## <summary>
@@ -39874,18 +45656,18 @@ index 0000000..9dcdaa8
+## </summary>
+## </param>
+#
-+interface(`phpfpm_append_log',`
++interface(`pkcsslotd_read_lib_files',`
+ gen_require(`
-+ type phpfpm_log_t;
++ type pkcsslotd_var_lib_t;
+ ')
+
-+ logging_search_logs($1)
-+ append_files_pattern($1, phpfpm_log_t, phpfpm_log_t)
++ files_search_var_lib($1)
++ read_files_pattern($1, pkcsslotd_var_lib_t, pkcsslotd_var_lib_t)
+')
+
+########################################
+## <summary>
-+## Manage phpfpm log files
++## Manage pkcsslotd lib files.
+## </summary>
+## <param name="domain">
+## <summary>
@@ -39893,20 +45675,18 @@ index 0000000..9dcdaa8
+## </summary>
+## </param>
+#
-+interface(`phpfpm_manage_log',`
++interface(`pkcsslotd_manage_lib_files',`
+ gen_require(`
-+ type phpfpm_log_t;
++ type pkcsslotd_var_lib_t;
+ ')
+
-+ logging_search_logs($1)
-+ manage_dirs_pattern($1, phpfpm_log_t, phpfpm_log_t)
-+ manage_files_pattern($1, phpfpm_log_t, phpfpm_log_t)
-+ manage_lnk_files_pattern($1, phpfpm_log_t, phpfpm_log_t)
++ files_search_var_lib($1)
++ manage_files_pattern($1, pkcsslotd_var_lib_t, pkcsslotd_var_lib_t)
+')
+
+########################################
+## <summary>
-+## Read phpfpm PID files.
++## Manage pkcsslotd lib directories.
+## </summary>
+## <param name="domain">
+## <summary>
@@ -39914,18 +45694,18 @@ index 0000000..9dcdaa8
+## </summary>
+## </param>
+#
-+interface(`phpfpm_read_pid_files',`
++interface(`pkcsslotd_manage_lib_dirs',`
+ gen_require(`
-+ type phpfpm_var_run_t;
++ type pkcsslotd_var_lib_t;
+ ')
+
-+ files_search_pids($1)
-+ allow $1 phpfpm_var_run_t:file read_file_perms;
++ files_search_var_lib($1)
++ manage_dirs_pattern($1, pkcsslotd_var_lib_t, pkcsslotd_var_lib_t)
+')
+
+########################################
+## <summary>
-+## Execute phpfpm server in the phpfpm domain.
++## Execute pkcsslotd server in the pkcsslotd domain.
+## </summary>
+## <param name="domain">
+## <summary>
@@ -39933,706 +45713,749 @@ index 0000000..9dcdaa8
+## </summary>
+## </param>
+#
-+interface(`phpfpm_systemctl',`
++interface(`pkcsslotd_systemctl',`
+ gen_require(`
-+ type phpfpm_t;
-+ type phpfpm_unit_file_t;
++ type pkcsslotd_t;
++ type pkcsslotd_unit_file_t;
+ ')
+
+ systemd_exec_systemctl($1)
-+ allow $1 phpfpm_unit_file_t:file read_file_perms;
-+ allow $1 phpfpm_unit_file_t:service manage_service_perms;
++ allow $1 pkcsslotd_unit_file_t:file read_file_perms;
++ allow $1 pkcsslotd_unit_file_t:service manage_service_perms;
+
-+ ps_process_pattern($1, phpfpm_t)
++ ps_process_pattern($1, pkcsslotd_t)
+')
+
+
+########################################
+## <summary>
+## All of the rules required to administrate
-+## an phpfpm environment
++## an pkcsslotd environment
+## </summary>
+## <param name="domain">
+## <summary>
+## Domain allowed access.
+## </summary>
+## </param>
-+## <param name="role">
-+## <summary>
-+## Role allowed access.
-+## </summary>
-+## </param>
-+## <rolecap/>
+#
-+interface(`phpfpm_admin',`
++interface(`pkcsslotd_admin',`
+ gen_require(`
-+ type phpfpm_t;
-+ type phpfpm_log_t;
-+ type phpfpm_var_run_t;
-+ type phpfpm_unit_file_t;
++ type pkcsslotd_t;
++ type pkcsslotd_var_lib_t;
++ type pkcsslotd_unit_file_t;
+ ')
+
-+ allow $1 phpfpm_t:process { ptrace signal_perms };
-+ ps_process_pattern($1, phpfpm_t)
-+
-+ logging_search_logs($1)
-+ admin_pattern($1, phpfpm_log_t)
++ allow $1 pkcsslotd_t:process { ptrace signal_perms };
++ ps_process_pattern($1, pkcsslotd_t)
+
-+ files_search_pids($1)
-+ admin_pattern($1, phpfpm_var_run_t)
++ files_search_var_lib($1)
++ admin_pattern($1, pkcsslotd_var_lib_t)
+
-+ phpfpm_systemctl($1)
-+ admin_pattern($1, phpfpm_unit_file_t)
-+ allow $1 phpfpm_unit_file_t:service all_service_perms;
++ pkcsslotd_systemctl($1)
++ admin_pattern($1, pkcsslotd_unit_file_t)
++ allow $1 pkcsslotd_unit_file_t:service all_service_perms;
+
+ optional_policy(`
+ systemd_passwd_agent_exec($1)
+ systemd_read_fifo_file_passwd_run($1)
+ ')
+')
-diff --git a/phpfpm.te b/phpfpm.te
+diff --git a/pkcsslotd.te b/pkcsslotd.te
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..ae5bdb2
+index 0000000..9ab2c4d
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/phpfpm.te
-@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
-+policy_module(phpfpm, 1.0.0)
++++ b/pkcsslotd.te
+@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
++policy_module(pkcsslotd, 1.0.0)
+
+########################################
+#
+# Declarations
+#
+
-+type phpfpm_t;
-+type phpfpm_exec_t;
-+init_daemon_domain(phpfpm_t, phpfpm_exec_t)
++type pkcsslotd_t;
++type pkcsslotd_exec_t;
++init_daemon_domain(pkcsslotd_t, pkcsslotd_exec_t)
+
-+type phpfpm_log_t;
-+logging_log_file(phpfpm_log_t)
++type pkcsslotd_var_lib_t;
++files_type(pkcsslotd_var_lib_t)
+
-+type phpfpm_var_run_t;
-+files_pid_file(phpfpm_var_run_t)
++type pkcsslotd_unit_file_t;
++systemd_unit_file(pkcsslotd_unit_file_t)
+
-+type phpfpm_unit_file_t;
-+systemd_unit_file(phpfpm_unit_file_t)
++type pkcsslotd_tmp_t;
++files_tmp_file(pkcsslotd_tmp_t)
++
++type pkcsslotd_tmpfs_t;
++files_tmpfs_file(pkcsslotd_tmpfs_t)
++
++type pkcsslotd_var_run_t;
++files_pid_file(pkcsslotd_var_run_t)
+
+########################################
+#
-+# phpfpm local policy
++# pkcsslotd local policy
+#
+
-+allow phpfpm_t self:capability { chown kill setgid setuid sys_chroot sys_nice };
-+allow phpfpm_t self:process { setsched setrlimit signal sigkill };
-+
-+allow phpfpm_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms;
-+allow phpfpm_t self:tcp_socket { accept listen };
-+allow phpfpm_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
-+
-+manage_dirs_pattern(phpfpm_t, phpfpm_log_t, phpfpm_log_t)
-+manage_files_pattern(phpfpm_t, phpfpm_log_t, phpfpm_log_t)
-+
-+manage_dirs_pattern(phpfpm_t, phpfpm_var_run_t, phpfpm_var_run_t)
-+manage_files_pattern(phpfpm_t, phpfpm_var_run_t, phpfpm_var_run_t)
-+files_pid_filetrans(phpfpm_t, phpfpm_var_run_t, dir )
++allow pkcsslotd_t self:capability { kill };
++allow pkcsslotd_t self:process { fork };
+
-+kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(phpfpm_t)
++allow pkcsslotd_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms;
++allow pkcsslotd_t self:sem create_sem_perms;
++allow pkcsslotd_t self:shm create_shm_perms;
++allow pkcsslotd_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
+
-+corenet_tcp_bind_generic_port(phpfpm_t)
++manage_dirs_pattern(pkcsslotd_t, pkcsslotd_tmp_t, pkcsslotd_tmp_t)
++manage_files_pattern(pkcsslotd_t, pkcsslotd_tmp_t, pkcsslotd_tmp_t)
++files_tmp_filetrans(pkcsslotd_t, pkcsslotd_tmp_t, { file dir })
+
-+domain_use_interactive_fds(phpfpm_t)
++manage_dirs_pattern(pkcsslotd_t, pkcsslotd_tmpfs_t, pkcsslotd_tmpfs_t)
++manage_files_pattern(pkcsslotd_t, pkcsslotd_tmpfs_t, pkcsslotd_tmpfs_t)
++fs_tmpfs_filetrans(pkcsslotd_t, pkcsslotd_tmpfs_t, { dir file })
+
-+files_read_etc_files(phpfpm_t)
++manage_dirs_pattern(pkcsslotd_t, pkcsslotd_var_lib_t, pkcsslotd_var_lib_t)
++manage_files_pattern(pkcsslotd_t, pkcsslotd_var_lib_t, pkcsslotd_var_lib_t)
++manage_lnk_files_pattern(pkcsslotd_t, pkcsslotd_var_lib_t, pkcsslotd_var_lib_t)
++files_var_lib_filetrans(pkcsslotd_t, pkcsslotd_var_lib_t, { dir file lnk_file })
+
-+auth_use_nsswitch(phpfpm_t)
++manage_files_pattern(pkcsslotd_t, pkcsslotd_var_run_t, pkcsslotd_var_run_t)
++manage_dirs_pattern(pkcsslotd_t, pkcsslotd_var_run_t,pkcsslotd_var_run_t)
++files_pid_filetrans(pkcsslotd_t, pkcsslotd_var_run_t, { file dir })
+
-+logging_send_syslog_msg(phpfpm_t)
++domain_use_interactive_fds(pkcsslotd_t)
+
-+miscfiles_read_localization(phpfpm_t)
++files_read_etc_files(pkcsslotd_t)
+
-+sysnet_dns_name_resolve(phpfpm_t)
-diff --git a/pingd.if b/pingd.if
-index 8688aae..cf34fc1 100644
---- a/pingd.if
-+++ b/pingd.if
-@@ -55,7 +55,6 @@ interface(`pingd_manage_config',`
- files_search_etc($1)
- manage_dirs_pattern($1, pingd_etc_t, pingd_etc_t)
- manage_files_pattern($1, pingd_etc_t, pingd_etc_t)
--
- ')
-
- #######################################
-@@ -77,12 +76,15 @@ interface(`pingd_manage_config',`
- #
- interface(`pingd_admin',`
- gen_require(`
-- type pingd_t, pingd_etc_t;
-- type pingd_initrc_exec_t, pingd_modules_t;
-+ type pingd_t, pingd_etc_t, pingd_modules_t;
-+ type pingd_initrc_exec_t;
- ')
-
-- allow $1 pingd_t:process { ptrace signal_perms };
-+ allow $1 pingd_t:process signal_perms;
- ps_process_pattern($1, pingd_t)
-+ tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',`
-+ allow $1 pingd_t:process ptrace;
-+ ')
-
- init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, pingd_initrc_exec_t)
- domain_system_change_exemption($1)
-diff --git a/pingd.te b/pingd.te
-index e9cf8a4..9a7e5dc 100644
---- a/pingd.te
-+++ b/pingd.te
-@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ init_daemon_domain(pingd_t, pingd_exec_t)
-
- # type for config
- type pingd_etc_t;
--files_type(pingd_etc_t)
-+files_config_file(pingd_etc_t)
-
- type pingd_initrc_exec_t;
- init_script_file(pingd_initrc_exec_t)
-@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ files_type(pingd_modules_t)
-
- allow pingd_t self:capability net_raw;
- allow pingd_t self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
--allow pingd_t self:rawip_socket { write read create bind };
-+allow pingd_t self:rawip_socket create_socket_perms;
-
- read_files_pattern(pingd_t, pingd_etc_t, pingd_etc_t)
-
-diff --git a/piranha.fc b/piranha.fc
++logging_send_syslog_msg(pkcsslotd_t)
+diff --git a/pki.fc b/pki.fc
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..20ea9f5
+index 0000000..0c167b7
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/piranha.fc
-@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
-+
-+/etc/rc\.d/init\.d/pulse -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:piranha_pulse_initrc_exec_t,s0)
-+
-+# RHEL6
-+#/etc/sysconfig/ha/lvs\.cf -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:piranha_etc_rw_t,s0)
-+
-+/etc/piranha/lvs\.cf -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:piranha_etc_rw_t,s0)
-+
-+/usr/sbin/fos -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:piranha_fos_exec_t,s0)
-+/usr/sbin/lvsd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:piranha_lvs_exec_t,s0)
-+/usr/sbin/piranha_gui -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:piranha_web_exec_t,s0)
-+/usr/sbin/pulse -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:piranha_pulse_exec_t,s0)
-+
-+/var/lib/luci(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:piranha_web_data_t,s0)
-+/var/lib/luci/cert(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:piranha_web_conf_t,s0)
-+/var/lib/luci/etc(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:piranha_web_conf_t,s0)
-+
-+/var/log/piranha(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:piranha_log_t,s0)
-+
-+/var/run/fos\.pid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:piranha_fos_var_run_t,s0)
-+/var/run/lvs\.pid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:piranha_lvs_var_run_t,s0)
-+/var/run/piranha-httpd\.pid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:piranha_web_var_run_t,s0)
-+/var/run/pulse\.pid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:piranha_pulse_var_run_t,s0)
-+
-diff --git a/piranha.if b/piranha.if
++++ b/pki.fc
+@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
++/etc/pki/pki-tomcat(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:pki_tomcat_etc_rw_t,s0)
++/var/lib/pki/pki-tomcat(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:pki_tomcat_var_lib_t,s0)
++/var/run/pki/tomcat(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:pki_tomcat_var_run_t,s0)
++/var/log/pki/pki-tomcat(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:pki_tomcat_log_t,s0)
++/etc/sysconfig/pki/tomcat(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:pki_tomcat_etc_rw_t,s0)
++/var/log/pki gen_context(system_u:object_r:pki_log_t,s0)
++/usr/bin/pkidaemon gen_context(system_u:object_r:pki_tomcat_exec_t,s0)
++/etc/pki/pki-tomcat/alias(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:pki_tomcat_cert_t,s0)
++
++/etc/pki-ra(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:pki_ra_etc_rw_t,s0)
++/var/lib/pki-ra(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:pki_ra_var_lib_t,s0)
++/var/log/pki-ra(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:pki_ra_log_t,s0)
++/var/run/pki/ra(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:pki_ra_var_run_t,s0)
++/etc/sysconfig/pki/ra(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:pki_ra_etc_rw_t,s0)
++/var/lib/pki-ra/pki-ra gen_context(system_u:object_r:pki_ra_exec_t,s0)
++
++/etc/pki-tps(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:pki_tps_etc_rw_t,s0)
++/var/lib/pki-tps(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:pki_tps_var_lib_t,s0)
++/var/log/pki-tps(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:pki_tps_log_t,s0)
++/var/run/pki/tps(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:pki_tps_var_run_t,s0)
++/etc/sysconfig/pki/tps(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:pki_tps_etc_rw_t,s0)
++/var/lib/pki-tps/pki-tps gen_context(system_u:object_r:pki_tps_exec_t,s0)
++
++# default labeling for nCipher
++/opt/nfast/scripts/init.d/(.*) gen_context(system_u:object_r:initrc_exec_t, s0)
++/opt/nfast/sbin/init.d-ncipher gen_context(system_u:object_r:initrc_exec_t, s0)
++/opt/nfast(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:pki_common_t, s0)
++/dev/nfast(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:pki_common_dev_t, s0)
++
++# old paths (for migration)
++/etc/pki-ca(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:pki_tomcat_etc_rw_t,s0)
++/var/lib/pki-ca(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:pki_tomcat_var_lib_t,s0)
++/var/run/pki-ca.pid gen_context(system_u:object_r:pki_tomcat_var_run_t,s0)
++/var/log/pki-ca(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:pki_tomcat_log_t,s0)
++/var/lib/pki-ca/alias(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:pki_tomcat_cert_t,s0)
++/etc/pki-kra(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:pki_tomcat_etc_rw_t,s0)
++/var/lib/pki-kra(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:pki_tomcat_var_lib_t,s0)
++/var/run/pki-kra.pid gen_context(system_u:object_r:pki_tomcat_var_run_t,s0)
++/var/log/pki-kra(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:pki_tomcat_log_t,s0)
++/var/lib/pki-kra/alias(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:pki_tomcat_cert_t,s0)
++/etc/pki-ocsp(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:pki_tomcat_etc_rw_t,s0)
++/var/lib/pki-ocsp(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:pki_tomcat_var_lib_t,s0)
++/var/run/pki-ocsp.pid gen_context(system_u:object_r:pki_tomcat_var_run_t,s0)
++/var/log/pki-ocsp(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:pki_tomcat_log_t,s0)
++/var/lib/pki-ocsp/alias(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:pki_tomcat_cert_t,s0)
++/etc/pki-tks(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:pki_tomcat_etc_rw_t,s0)
++/var/lib/pki-tks(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:pki_tomcat_var_lib_t,s0)
++/var/run/pki-tks.pid gen_context(system_u:object_r:pki_tomcat_var_run_t,s0)
++/var/log/pki-tks(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:pki_tomcat_log_t,s0)
++/var/lib/pki-tks/alias(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:pki_tomcat_cert_t,s0)
++
++/var/lock/subsys/pkidaemon -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:pki_tomcat_lock_t,s0)
++
++#/etc/systemd/system/pki-tomcatd\.target\.wants(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:pki_tomcat_unit_file_t,s0)
++/usr/lib/systemd/system/pki-tomcat.* gen_context(system_u:object_r:pki_tomcat_unit_file_t,s0)
+diff --git a/pki.if b/pki.if
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..242567b
+index 0000000..83c13cf
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/piranha.if
-@@ -0,0 +1,175 @@
-+## <summary>policy for piranha</summary>
++++ b/pki.if
+@@ -0,0 +1,248 @@
+
-+#######################################
++## <summary>policy for pki</summary>
++########################################
+## <summary>
-+## Creates types and rules for a basic
-+## cluster init daemon domain.
++## Allow read and write pki cert files.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`pki_rw_tomcat_cert',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type pki_tomcat_cert_t;
++ type pki_tomcat_etc_rw_t;
++ ')
++
++ allow $1 pki_tomcat_etc_rw_t:dir search_dir_perms;
++ rw_files_pattern($1, pki_tomcat_cert_t, pki_tomcat_cert_t)
++')
++
++########################################
++## <summary>
++## Create a set of derived types for apache
++## web content.
+## </summary>
+## <param name="prefix">
+## <summary>
-+## Prefix for the domain.
++## The prefix to be used for deriving type names.
+## </summary>
+## </param>
+#
-+template(`piranha_domain_template',`
++template(`pki_apache_template',`
+ gen_require(`
-+ attribute piranha_domain;
++ attribute pki_apache_domain;
++ attribute pki_apache_config, pki_apache_var_lib, pki_apache_var_run;
++ attribute pki_apache_executable, pki_apache_script, pki_apache_var_log;
+ ')
+
-+ ##############################
++ ########################################
+ #
-+ # piranha_$1_t declarations
++ # Declarations
+ #
+
-+ type piranha_$1_t, piranha_domain;
-+ type piranha_$1_exec_t;
-+ init_daemon_domain(piranha_$1_t, piranha_$1_exec_t)
++ type $1_t, pki_apache_domain;
++ type $1_exec_t, pki_apache_executable;
++ domain_type($1_t)
++ init_daemon_domain($1_t, $1_exec_t)
+
-+ # pid files
-+ type piranha_$1_var_run_t;
-+ files_pid_file(piranha_$1_var_run_t)
++ type $1_script_exec_t, pki_apache_script;
++ init_script_file($1_script_exec_t)
+
-+ ##############################
++ type $1_etc_rw_t, pki_apache_config;
++ files_type($1_etc_rw_t)
++
++ type $1_var_run_t, pki_apache_var_run;
++ files_pid_file($1_var_run_t)
++
++ type $1_var_lib_t, pki_apache_var_lib;
++ files_type($1_var_lib_t)
++
++ type $1_log_t, pki_apache_var_log;
++ logging_log_file($1_log_t)
++
++ type $1_lock_t;
++ files_lock_file($1_lock_t)
++
++ ########################################
+ #
-+ # piranha_$1_t local policy
++ # $1 local policy
+ #
+
-+ manage_files_pattern(piranha_$1_t, piranha_$1_var_run_t, piranha_$1_var_run_t)
-+ manage_dirs_pattern(piranha_$1_t, piranha_$1_var_run_t, piranha_$1_var_run_t)
-+ files_pid_filetrans(piranha_$1_t, piranha_$1_var_run_t, { dir file })
++ files_read_etc_files($1_t)
++ allow $1_t $1_etc_rw_t:lnk_file read;
++
++ manage_dirs_pattern($1_t, $1_etc_rw_t, $1_etc_rw_t)
++ manage_files_pattern($1_t, $1_etc_rw_t, $1_etc_rw_t)
++ files_etc_filetrans($1_t,$1_etc_rw_t, { file dir })
++
++ manage_dirs_pattern($1_t, $1_var_run_t, $1_var_run_t)
++ manage_files_pattern($1_t, $1_var_run_t, $1_var_run_t)
++ files_pid_filetrans($1_t,$1_var_run_t, { file dir })
++
++ manage_dirs_pattern($1_t, $1_var_lib_t, $1_var_lib_t)
++ manage_files_pattern($1_t, $1_var_lib_t, $1_var_lib_t)
++ read_lnk_files_pattern($1_t, $1_var_lib_t, $1_var_lib_t)
++ files_var_lib_filetrans($1_t, $1_var_lib_t, { file dir } )
++
++ manage_dirs_pattern($1_t, $1_log_t, $1_log_t)
++ manage_files_pattern($1_t, $1_log_t, $1_log_t)
++ logging_log_filetrans($1_t, $1_log_t, { file dir } )
++
++ manage_dirs_pattern($1_t, $1_lock_t, $1_lock_t)
++ manage_files_pattern($1_t, $1_lock_t, $1_lock_t)
++ manage_lnk_files_pattern($1_t, $1_lock_t, $1_lock_t)
++ files_lock_filetrans($1_t, $1_lock_t, { dir file lnk_file })
++
++ #talk to lunasa hsm
++ logging_send_syslog_msg($1_t)
++
++ kernel_read_kernel_sysctls($1_t)
++ kernel_read_system_state($1_t)
+
-+ auth_use_nsswitch(piranha_$1_t)
++ corenet_all_recvfrom_unlabeled($1_t)
++
++ # need to resolve addresses?
++ auth_use_nsswitch($1_t)
++
++ #pki_apache_domain_signal(httpd_t)
++ #pki_apache_domain_signal(httpd_t)
++ #pki_manage_apache_run(httpd_t)
++ #pki_manage_apache_config_files(httpd_t)
++ #pki_manage_apache_log_files(httpd_t)
++ #pki_manage_apache_lib(httpd_t)
+')
+
-+########################################
++#######################################
+## <summary>
-+## Execute a domain transition to run fos.
++## Send a null signal to pki apache domains.
+## </summary>
+## <param name="domain">
-+## <summary>
-+## Domain allowed to transition.
-+## </summary>
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
+## </param>
+#
-+interface(`piranha_domtrans_fos',`
-+ gen_require(`
-+ type piranha_fos_t, piranha_fos_exec_t;
-+ ')
++interface(`pki_apache_domain_signal',`
++ gen_require(`
++ attribute pki_apache_domain;
++ ')
+
-+ domtrans_pattern($1, piranha_fos_exec_t, piranha_fos_t)
++ allow $1 pki_apache_domain:process signal;
+')
+
+#######################################
+## <summary>
-+## Execute a domain transition to run lvsd.
++## Send a null signal to pki apache domains.
+## </summary>
+## <param name="domain">
-+## <summary>
-+## Domain allowed to transition.
-+## </summary>
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
+## </param>
+#
-+interface(`piranha_domtrans_lvs',`
-+ gen_require(`
-+ type piranha_lvs_t, piranha_lvs_exec_t;
-+ ')
++interface(`pki_apache_domain_signull',`
++ gen_require(`
++ attribute pki_apache_domain;
++ ')
+
-+ domtrans_pattern($1, piranha_lvs_exec_t, piranha_lvs_t)
++ allow $1 pki_apache_domain:process signull;
+')
+
-+#######################################
++###################################
+## <summary>
-+## Execute a domain transition to run pulse.
++## Allow domain to read pki apache subsystem pid files
+## </summary>
+## <param name="domain">
-+## <summary>
-+## Domain allowed to transition.
-+## </summary>
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
+## </param>
+#
-+interface(`piranha_domtrans_pulse',`
-+ gen_require(`
-+ type piranha_pulse_t, piranha_pulse_exec_t;
-+ ')
++interface(`pki_manage_apache_run',`
++ gen_require(`
++ attribute pki_apache_var_run;
++ ')
+
-+ domtrans_pattern($1, piranha_pulse_exec_t, piranha_pulse_t)
++ files_search_var_lib($1)
++ read_files_pattern($1, pki_apache_var_run, pki_apache_var_run)
+')
+
-+#######################################
++####################################
+## <summary>
-+## Execute pulse server in the pulse domain.
++## Allow domain to manage pki apache subsystem lib files
+## </summary>
+## <param name="domain">
-+## <summary>
-+## Domain allowed to transition.
-+## </summary>
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
+## </param>
+#
-+interface(`piranha_pulse_initrc_domtrans',`
-+ gen_require(`
-+ type piranha_pulse_initrc_exec_t;
-+ ')
++interface(`pki_manage_apache_lib',`
++ gen_require(`
++ attribute pki_apache_var_lib;
++ ')
+
-+ init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, piranha_pulse_initrc_exec_t)
++ files_search_var_lib($1)
++ manage_files_pattern($1, pki_apache_var_lib, pki_apache_var_lib)
++ manage_lnk_files_pattern($1, pki_apache_var_lib, pki_apache_var_lib)
+')
+
-+########################################
++##################################
+## <summary>
-+## Allow the specified domain to read piranha's log files.
++## Dontaudit domain to write pki log files
+## </summary>
+## <param name="domain">
-+## <summary>
-+## Domain allowed access.
-+## </summary>
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
+## </param>
-+## <rolecap/>
+#
-+interface(`piranha_read_log',`
-+ gen_require(`
-+ type piranha_log_t;
-+ ')
++interface(`pki_dontaudit_write_log',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type pki_log_t;
++ ')
+
-+ logging_search_logs($1)
-+ read_files_pattern($1, piranha_log_t, piranha_log_t)
++ dontaudit $1 pki_log_t:file write;
+')
+
-+########################################
++###################################
+## <summary>
-+## Allow the specified domain to append
-+## piranha log files.
++## Allow domain to manage pki apache subsystem log files
+## </summary>
+## <param name="domain">
-+## <summary>
-+## Domain allowed access.
-+## </summary>
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
+## </param>
+#
-+interface(`piranha_append_log',`
-+ gen_require(`
-+ type piranha_log_t;
-+ ')
++interface(`pki_manage_apache_log_files',`
++ gen_require(`
++ attribute pki_apache_var_log;
++ ')
+
-+ logging_search_logs($1)
-+ append_files_pattern($1, piranha_log_t, piranha_log_t)
++ files_search_var_lib($1)
++ manage_files_pattern($1, pki_apache_var_log, pki_apache_var_log)
+')
+
-+########################################
++##################################
+## <summary>
-+## Allow domain to manage piranha log files
++## Allow domain to manage pki apache subsystem config files
+## </summary>
+## <param name="domain">
-+## <summary>
-+## Domain allowed access.
-+## </summary>
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
+## </param>
+#
-+interface(`piranha_manage_log',`
-+ gen_require(`
-+ type piranha_log_t;
-+ ')
++interface(`pki_manage_apache_config_files',`
++ gen_require(`
++ attribute pki_apache_config;
++ ')
+
-+ logging_search_logs($1)
-+ manage_dirs_pattern($1, piranha_log_t, piranha_log_t)
-+ manage_files_pattern($1, piranha_log_t, piranha_log_t)
-+ manage_lnk_files_pattern($1, piranha_log_t, piranha_log_t)
++ files_search_var_lib($1)
++ manage_files_pattern($1, pki_apache_config, pki_apache_config)
+')
-diff --git a/piranha.te b/piranha.te
++
+diff --git a/pki.te b/pki.te
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..f29bf1d
+index 0000000..dfebbd9
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/piranha.te
-@@ -0,0 +1,298 @@
-+policy_module(piranha, 1.0.0)
++++ b/pki.te
+@@ -0,0 +1,289 @@
++policy_module(pki,10.0.11)
+
+########################################
+#
+# Declarations
+#
+
-+## <desc>
-+## <p>
-+## Allow piranha-lvs domain to connect to the network using TCP.
-+## </p>
-+## </desc>
-+gen_tunable(piranha_lvs_can_network_connect, false)
++attribute pki_apache_domain;
++attribute pki_apache_config;
++attribute pki_apache_executable;
++attribute pki_apache_var_lib;
++attribute pki_apache_var_log;
++attribute pki_apache_var_run;
++attribute pki_apache_pidfiles;
++attribute pki_apache_script;
+
-+attribute piranha_domain;
++type pki_log_t;
++files_type(pki_log_t)
+
-+piranha_domain_template(fos)
++type pki_common_t;
++files_type(pki_common_t)
+
-+piranha_domain_template(lvs)
++type pki_common_dev_t;
++files_type(pki_common_dev_t)
+
-+piranha_domain_template(pulse)
++type pki_tomcat_etc_rw_t;
++files_type(pki_tomcat_etc_rw_t)
+
-+type piranha_pulse_initrc_exec_t;
-+init_script_file(piranha_pulse_initrc_exec_t)
++type pki_tomcat_cert_t;
++files_type(pki_tomcat_cert_t)
+
-+piranha_domain_template(web)
++tomcat_domain_template(pki_tomcat)
+
-+type piranha_web_tmpfs_t;
-+files_tmpfs_file(piranha_web_tmpfs_t)
++type pki_tomcat_unit_file_t;
++systemd_unit_file(pki_tomcat_unit_file_t)
+
-+type piranha_web_conf_t;
-+files_config_file(piranha_web_conf_t)
++type pki_tomcat_lock_t;
++files_lock_file(pki_tomcat_lock_t)
+
-+type piranha_web_data_t;
-+files_type(piranha_web_data_t)
++# old type aliases for migration
++typealias pki_tomcat_t alias { pki_ca_t pki_kra_t pki_ocsp_t pki_tks_t };
++typealias pki_tomcat_etc_rw_t alias { pki_ca_etc_rw_t pki_kra_etc_rw_t pki_ocsp_etc_rw_t pki_tks_etc_rw_t };
++typealias pki_tomcat_var_lib_t alias { pki_ca_var_lib_t pki_kra_var_lib_t pki_ocsp_var_lib_t pki_tks_var_lib_t };
++typealias pki_tomcat_var_run_t alias { pki_ca_var_run_t pki_kra_var_run_t pki_ocsp_var_run_t pki_tks_var_run_t };
++typealias pki_tomcat_log_t alias { pki_ca_log_t pki_kra_log_t pki_ocsp_log_t pki_tks_log_t };
++# typealias http_port_t alias { pki_ca_port_t pki_kra_port_t pki_ocsp_port_t pki_tks_port_t };
+
-+type piranha_web_tmp_t;
-+files_tmp_file(piranha_web_tmp_t)
+
-+type piranha_etc_rw_t;
-+files_config_file(piranha_etc_rw_t)
++# pki policy types
++type pki_tps_tomcat_exec_t;
++files_type(pki_tps_tomcat_exec_t)
+
-+type piranha_log_t;
-+logging_log_file(piranha_log_t)
++pki_apache_template(pki_tps)
+
-+#######################################
-+#
-+# piranha-fos local policy
-+#
++# ra policy types
++type pki_ra_tomcat_exec_t;
++files_type(pki_ra_tomcat_exec_t)
+
-+kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(piranha_fos_t)
++pki_apache_template(pki_ra)
+
-+domain_read_all_domains_state(piranha_fos_t)
++# needed for dogtag 9 style instances
++type pki_tomcat_script_t;
++domain_type(pki_tomcat_script_t)
++role system_r types pki_tomcat_script_t;
+
+optional_policy(`
-+ consoletype_exec(piranha_fos_t)
++ unconfined_domain(pki_tomcat_script_t)
+')
+
-+# start and stop services
-+init_domtrans_script(piranha_fos_t)
-+
+########################################
+#
-+# piranha-gui local policy
++# pki-tomcat local policy
+#
+
-+allow piranha_web_t self:capability { setuid sys_nice kill setgid };
-+allow piranha_web_t self:process { getsched setsched signal signull };
++allow pki_tomcat_t self:capability { setuid chown setgid fowner audit_write dac_override sys_nice fsetid};
++allow pki_tomcat_t self:process { signal setsched signull execmem };
+
-+allow piranha_web_t self:rawip_socket create_socket_perms;
-+allow piranha_web_t self:netlink_route_socket r_netlink_socket_perms;
-+allow piranha_web_t self:sem create_sem_perms;
-+allow piranha_web_t self:shm create_shm_perms;
++allow pki_tomcat_t self:netlink_audit_socket { nlmsg_relay create };
++allow pki_tomcat_t self:tcp_socket { accept listen };
+
-+manage_files_pattern(piranha_web_t, piranha_web_data_t, piranha_web_data_t)
-+manage_dirs_pattern(piranha_web_t, piranha_web_data_t, piranha_web_data_t)
-+files_var_lib_filetrans(piranha_web_t, piranha_web_data_t, file)
++# allow writing to the kernel keyring
++allow pki_tomcat_t self:key { write read };
+
-+read_files_pattern(piranha_web_t, piranha_web_conf_t, piranha_web_conf_t)
++manage_dirs_pattern(pki_tomcat_t, pki_tomcat_etc_rw_t, pki_tomcat_etc_rw_t)
++manage_files_pattern(pki_tomcat_t, pki_tomcat_etc_rw_t, pki_tomcat_etc_rw_t)
+
-+rw_files_pattern(piranha_web_t, piranha_etc_rw_t, piranha_etc_rw_t)
++manage_dirs_pattern(pki_tomcat_t, pki_tomcat_cert_t, pki_tomcat_cert_t)
++manage_files_pattern(pki_tomcat_t, pki_tomcat_cert_t, pki_tomcat_cert_t)
+
-+manage_dirs_pattern(piranha_web_t, piranha_log_t, piranha_log_t)
-+manage_files_pattern(piranha_web_t, piranha_log_t, piranha_log_t)
-+logging_log_filetrans(piranha_web_t, piranha_log_t, { dir file })
++manage_dirs_pattern(pki_tomcat_t, pki_tomcat_lock_t, pki_tomcat_lock_t)
++manage_files_pattern(pki_tomcat_t, pki_tomcat_lock_t, pki_tomcat_lock_t)
++manage_lnk_files_pattern(pki_tomcat_t, pki_tomcat_lock_t, pki_tomcat_lock_t)
++files_lock_filetrans(pki_tomcat_t, pki_tomcat_lock_t, { dir file lnk_file })
+
-+can_exec(piranha_web_t, piranha_web_tmp_t)
-+manage_dirs_pattern(piranha_web_t, piranha_web_tmp_t, piranha_web_tmp_t)
-+manage_files_pattern(piranha_web_t, piranha_web_tmp_t, piranha_web_tmp_t)
-+files_tmp_filetrans(piranha_web_t, piranha_web_tmp_t, { file dir })
++read_files_pattern(pki_tomcat_t, pki_tomcat_unit_file_t,pki_tomcat_unit_file_t)
++read_lnk_files_pattern(pki_tomcat_t, pki_tomcat_unit_file_t, pki_tomcat_unit_file_t)
++allow pki_tomcat_t pki_tomcat_unit_file_t:file setattr;
++allow pki_tomcat_t pki_tomcat_unit_file_t:lnk_file setattr;
++systemd_search_unit_dirs(pki_tomcat_t)
+
-+manage_dirs_pattern(piranha_web_t, piranha_web_tmpfs_t, piranha_web_tmpfs_t)
-+manage_files_pattern(piranha_web_t, piranha_web_tmpfs_t, piranha_web_tmpfs_t)
-+fs_tmpfs_filetrans(piranha_web_t, piranha_web_tmpfs_t, { dir file })
++# allow java subsystems to talk to the ncipher hsm
++allow pki_tomcat_t pki_common_dev_t:sock_file write;
++allow pki_tomcat_t pki_common_dev_t:dir search;
++allow pki_tomcat_t pki_common_t:dir create_dir_perms;
++manage_files_pattern(pki_tomcat_t, pki_common_t, pki_common_t)
++can_exec(pki_tomcat_t, pki_common_t)
++init_stream_connect_script(pki_tomcat_t)
+
-+piranha_pulse_initrc_domtrans(piranha_web_t)
++search_dirs_pattern(pki_tomcat_t, pki_log_t, pki_log_t)
+
-+kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(piranha_web_t)
++kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(pki_tomcat_t)
+
-+corenet_tcp_bind_http_cache_port(piranha_web_t)
-+corenet_tcp_bind_luci_port(piranha_web_t)
-+corenet_tcp_bind_piranha_port(piranha_web_t)
-+corenet_tcp_connect_ricci_port(piranha_web_t)
++corenet_tcp_connect_http_cache_port(pki_tomcat_t)
++corenet_tcp_connect_ldap_port(pki_tomcat_t)
++corenet_tcp_connect_smtp_port(pki_tomcat_t)
++corenet_tcp_connect_pki_ca_port(pki_tomcat_t)
++corenet_tcp_connect_ldap_port(pki_tomcat_t)
+
-+dev_read_rand(piranha_web_t)
-+dev_read_urand(piranha_web_t)
++selinux_get_enforce_mode(pki_tomcat_t)
+
-+domain_read_all_domains_state(piranha_web_t)
++logging_send_audit_msgs(pki_tomcat_t)
+
-+files_read_usr_files(piranha_web_t)
++miscfiles_read_hwdata(pki_tomcat_t)
+
-+optional_policy(`
-+ consoletype_exec(piranha_web_t)
-+')
++# is this really needed?
++userdom_manage_user_tmp_dirs(pki_tomcat_t)
++userdom_manage_user_tmp_files(pki_tomcat_t)
+
-+optional_policy(`
-+ apache_read_config(piranha_web_t)
-+ apache_exec_modules(piranha_web_t)
-+ apache_exec(piranha_web_t)
-+')
++# forward proxy
++# need to define ports to fix this
++#corenet_tcp_connect_pki_tomcat_port(httpd_t)
++
++# for crl publishing
++allow pki_tomcat_t pki_tomcat_var_lib_t:lnk_file { rename create unlink };
++
++# for ECC
++auth_getattr_shadow(pki_tomcat_t)
+
+optional_policy(`
-+ gnome_dontaudit_search_config(piranha_web_t)
++ consoletype_exec(pki_tomcat_t)
+')
+
+optional_policy(`
-+ sasl_connect(piranha_web_t)
++ dirsrv_manage_var_lib(pki_tomcat_t)
+')
+
+optional_policy(`
-+ snmp_dontaudit_read_snmp_var_lib_files(piranha_web_t)
-+ snmp_dontaudit_write_snmp_var_lib_files(piranha_web_t)
++ hostname_exec(pki_tomcat_t)
+')
+
-+######################################
++# install/ uninstall instance
++# WHY? leak?
++#allow load_policy_t pki_log_t:file write;
++#allow setfiles_t pki_log_t:file write;
++
++#######################################
+#
-+# piranha-lvs local policy
++# tps local policy
+#
+
-+# neede by nanny
-+allow piranha_lvs_t self:capability { net_raw sys_nice };
-+allow piranha_lvs_t self:process signal;
-+allow piranha_lvs_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms;
-+allow piranha_lvs_t self:rawip_socket create_socket_perms;
++# used to serve cgi web pages under /var/lib/pki-tps, formatting, enrollment
++allow pki_tps_t pki_tps_var_lib_t:file {execute execute_no_trans};
+
-+kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(piranha_lvs_t)
++corenet_tcp_bind_pki_tps_port(pki_tps_t)
++# customer may run an ldap server on 389
++corenet_tcp_connect_ldap_port(pki_tps_t)
++# connect to other subsystems
++corenet_tcp_connect_pki_ca_port(pki_tps_t)
++corenet_tcp_connect_pki_kra_port(pki_tps_t)
++corenet_tcp_connect_pki_tks_port(pki_tps_t)
+
-+# needed by nanny
-+corenet_tcp_connect_ftp_port(piranha_lvs_t)
-+corenet_tcp_connect_http_port(piranha_lvs_t)
-+corenet_tcp_connect_smtp_port(piranha_lvs_t)
++files_exec_usr_files(pki_tps_t)
++files_read_usr_files(pki_tps_t)
+
-+sysnet_dns_name_resolve(piranha_lvs_t)
++# why do I need to add this?
++#allow httpd_t httpd_config_t:file execute;
+
-+# needed by nanny
-+tunable_policy(`piranha_lvs_can_network_connect',`
-+ corenet_tcp_connect_all_ports(piranha_lvs_t)
-+')
++######################################
++#
++# ra local policy
++#
++
++# RA specific? talking to mysql?
++allow pki_ra_t self:udp_socket { write read create connect };
++allow pki_ra_t self:unix_dgram_socket { write create connect };
++
++corenet_tcp_bind_pki_ra_port(pki_ra_t)
++# talk to other subsystems
++corenet_tcp_connect_pki_ca_port(pki_ra_t)
++corenet_tcp_connect_smtp_port(pki_ra_t)
++
++fs_getattr_xattr_fs(pki_ra_t)
++
++files_search_spool(pki_ra_t)
++files_exec_usr_files(pki_ra_t)
+
-+# needed by ipvsadm
+optional_policy(`
-+ iptables_domtrans(piranha_lvs_t)
++ mta_send_mail(pki_ra_t)
++ mta_manage_spool(pki_ra_t)
++ mta_manage_queue(pki_ra_t)
++ mta_read_config(pki_ra_t)
+')
+
-+#######################################
++#####################################
+#
-+# piranha-pulse local policy
++# pki_apache_domain local policy
+#
+
-+allow piranha_pulse_t self:capability net_admin;
-+
-+allow piranha_pulse_t self:packet_socket create_socket_perms;
-+
-+# pulse starts fos and lvs daemon
-+domtrans_pattern(piranha_pulse_t, piranha_fos_exec_t, piranha_fos_t)
-+allow piranha_pulse_t piranha_fos_t:process signal;
+
-+domtrans_pattern(piranha_pulse_t, piranha_lvs_exec_t, piranha_lvs_t)
-+allow piranha_pulse_t piranha_lvs_t:process signal;
++allow pki_apache_domain self:capability { setuid sys_nice setgid dac_override fowner fsetid kill chown};
++allow pki_apache_domain self:process { setsched signal getsched signull execstack execmem sigkill};
+
-+kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(piranha_pulse_t)
-+kernel_read_rpc_sysctls(piranha_pulse_t)
-+kernel_read_system_state(piranha_pulse_t)
-+kernel_rw_rpc_sysctls(piranha_pulse_t)
-+kernel_search_debugfs(piranha_pulse_t)
-+kernel_search_network_state(piranha_pulse_t)
++allow pki_apache_domain self:sem all_sem_perms;
++allow pki_apache_domain self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
++allow pki_apache_domain self:netlink_route_socket { write getattr read bind create nlmsg_read };
+
-+corecmd_exec_bin(piranha_pulse_t)
-+corecmd_exec_shell(piranha_pulse_t)
-+optional_policy(`
-+ consoletype_exec(piranha_pulse_t)
-+')
++# allow writing to the kernel keyring
++allow pki_apache_domain self:key { write read };
+
-+corenet_udp_bind_apertus_ldp_port(piranha_pulse_t)
-+corenet_udp_bind_cma_port(piranha_pulse_t)
++## internal communication is often done using fifo and unix sockets.
++allow pki_apache_domain self:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
++allow pki_apache_domain self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
+
-+domain_read_all_domains_state(piranha_pulse_t)
-+domain_getattr_all_domains(piranha_pulse_t)
++# talk to the hsm
++allow pki_apache_domain pki_common_dev_t:sock_file write;
++allow pki_apache_domain pki_common_dev_t:dir search;
++allow pki_apache_domain pki_common_t:dir create_dir_perms;
++manage_files_pattern(pki_apache_domain, pki_common_t, pki_common_t)
++can_exec(pki_apache_domain, pki_common_t)
++init_stream_connect_script(pki_apache_domain)
+
-+fs_getattr_all_fs(piranha_pulse_t)
++corenet_sendrecv_unlabeled_packets(pki_apache_domain)
++corenet_tcp_bind_all_nodes(pki_apache_domain)
++corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_if(pki_apache_domain)
++corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_nodes(pki_apache_domain)
++corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_ports(pki_apache_domain)
++#corenet_all_recvfrom_unlabeled(pki_apache_domain)
++corenet_tcp_connect_generic_port(pki_apache_domain)
+
-+logging_send_syslog_msg(piranha_pulse_t)
++# Init script handling
++domain_use_interactive_fds(pki_apache_domain)
+
-+miscfiles_read_localization(piranha_pulse_t)
++seutil_exec_setfiles(pki_apache_domain)
+
-+# various services to failover
++init_dontaudit_write_utmp(pki_apache_domain)
+
-+optional_policy(`
-+ apache_domtrans(piranha_pulse_t)
-+ apache_signal(piranha_pulse_t)
-+')
++libs_use_ld_so(pki_apache_domain)
++libs_use_shared_libs(pki_apache_domain)
++libs_exec_ld_so(pki_apache_domain)
++libs_exec_lib_files(pki_apache_domain)
+
-+optional_policy(`
-+ ftp_domtrans(piranha_pulse_t)
-+ ftp_initrc_domtrans(piranha_pulse_t)
-+ ftp_systemctl(piranha_pulse_t)
-+')
++fs_search_cgroup_dirs(pki_apache_domain)
+
-+optional_policy(`
-+ hostname_exec(piranha_pulse_t)
-+')
++corecmd_exec_bin(pki_apache_domain)
++corecmd_exec_shell(pki_apache_domain)
+
-+optional_policy(`
-+ ldap_systemctl(piranha_pulse_t)
-+ ldap_initrc_domtrans(piranha_pulse_t)
-+ ldap_domtrans(piranha_pulse_t)
-+')
++dev_read_urand(pki_apache_domain)
++dev_read_rand(pki_apache_domain)
+
-+optional_policy(`
-+ mysql_domtrans_mysql_safe(piranha_pulse_t)
-+ mysql_stream_connect(piranha_pulse_t)
-+')
++# shutdown script uses ps
++domain_dontaudit_read_all_domains_state(pki_apache_domain)
++ps_process_pattern(pki_apache_domain, pki_apache_domain)
+
-+optional_policy(`
-+ netutils_domtrans(piranha_pulse_t)
-+ netutils_domtrans_ping(piranha_pulse_t)
-+')
++sysnet_read_config(pki_apache_domain)
+
-+optional_policy(`
-+ postgresql_domtrans(piranha_pulse_t)
-+ postgresql_signal(piranha_pulse_t)
++ifdef(`targeted_policy',`
++ term_dontaudit_use_unallocated_ttys(pki_apache_domain)
++ term_dontaudit_use_generic_ptys(pki_apache_domain)
+')
+
+optional_policy(`
-+ samba_initrc_domtrans(piranha_pulse_t)
-+ samba_systemctl(piranha_pulse_t)
-+ samba_domtrans_smbd(piranha_pulse_t)
-+ samba_domtrans_nmbd(piranha_pulse_t)
-+ samba_manage_var_files(piranha_pulse_t)
-+ samba_rw_config(piranha_pulse_t)
-+ samba_signal_smbd(piranha_pulse_t)
-+ samba_signal_nmbd(piranha_pulse_t)
-+')
++ # apache permissions
++ apache_exec_modules(pki_apache_domain)
++ apache_list_modules(pki_apache_domain)
++ apache_read_config(pki_apache_domain)
++ apache_exec(pki_apache_domain)
++ apache_entrypoint(pki_apache_domain)
+
-+optional_policy(`
-+ sysnet_domtrans_ifconfig(piranha_pulse_t)
++ # should be started using a script which will execute httpd
++ # start up httpd in pki_apache_domain mode
++ #can_exec(pki_apache_domain, httpd_config_t)
++ #can_exec(pki_apache_domain, httpd_suexec_exec_t)
+')
+
++# allow rpm -q in init scripts
+optional_policy(`
-+ udev_read_db(piranha_pulse_t)
++ rpm_exec(pki_apache_domain)
+')
+
-+####################################
-+#
-+# piranha domains common policy
-+#
-+
-+allow piranha_domain self:process signal_perms;
-+allow piranha_domain self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms;
-+allow piranha_domain self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
-+allow piranha_domain self:udp_socket create_socket_perms;
-+allow piranha_domain self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
-+
-+read_files_pattern(piranha_domain, piranha_etc_rw_t, piranha_etc_rw_t)
-+
-+kernel_read_system_state(piranha_domain)
-+kernel_read_network_state(piranha_domain)
-+
-+corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(piranha_domain)
-+corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(piranha_domain)
-+corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if(piranha_domain)
-+corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_node(piranha_domain)
-+corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_node(piranha_domain)
-+corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_ports(piranha_domain)
-+corenet_udp_sendrecv_all_ports(piranha_domain)
-+corenet_tcp_bind_generic_node(piranha_domain)
-+corenet_udp_bind_generic_node(piranha_domain)
-+
-+files_read_etc_files(piranha_domain)
-+
-+corecmd_exec_bin(piranha_domain)
-+corecmd_exec_shell(piranha_domain)
-+
-+logging_send_syslog_msg(piranha_domain)
-+
-+miscfiles_read_localization(piranha_domain)
-+
-+sysnet_read_config(piranha_domain)
diff --git a/plymouthd.fc b/plymouthd.fc
-index 5702ca4..498d856 100644
+index 5702ca4..ef1dd7a 100644
--- a/plymouthd.fc
+++ b/plymouthd.fc
-@@ -2,6 +2,10 @@
+@@ -2,6 +2,14 @@
/sbin/plymouthd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:plymouthd_exec_t,s0)
+/usr/bin/plymouth -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:plymouth_exec_t,s0)
+
-+/usr/sbin/plymouthd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:plymouthd_exec_t,s0)
-+
/var/lib/plymouth(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:plymouthd_var_lib_t,s0)
++
/var/run/plymouth(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:plymouthd_var_run_t,s0)
++/var/log/boot\.log gen_context(system_u:object_r:plymouthd_var_log_t,mls_systemhigh)
++
++/usr/sbin/plymouthd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:plymouthd_exec_t,s0)
++
/var/spool/plymouth(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:plymouthd_spool_t,s0)
++
diff --git a/plymouthd.if b/plymouthd.if
index 9759ed8..17c097d 100644
--- a/plymouthd.if
@@ -40729,7 +46552,7 @@ index 9759ed8..17c097d 100644
admin_pattern($1, plymouthd_var_run_t)
')
diff --git a/plymouthd.te b/plymouthd.te
-index 86700ed..1600742 100644
+index 86700ed..5772ef0 100644
--- a/plymouthd.te
+++ b/plymouthd.te
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
@@ -40761,7 +46584,15 @@ index 86700ed..1600742 100644
type plymouthd_var_run_t;
files_pid_file(plymouthd_var_run_t)
-@@ -42,6 +46,10 @@ manage_dirs_pattern(plymouthd_t, plymouthd_var_lib_t, plymouthd_var_lib_t)
+@@ -28,6 +32,7 @@ files_pid_file(plymouthd_var_run_t)
+ #
+
+ allow plymouthd_t self:capability { sys_admin sys_tty_config };
++allow plymouthd_t self:capability2 block_suspend;
+ dontaudit plymouthd_t self:capability dac_override;
+ allow plymouthd_t self:process { signal getsched };
+ allow plymouthd_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms;
+@@ -42,6 +47,10 @@ manage_dirs_pattern(plymouthd_t, plymouthd_var_lib_t, plymouthd_var_lib_t)
manage_files_pattern(plymouthd_t, plymouthd_var_lib_t, plymouthd_var_lib_t)
files_var_lib_filetrans(plymouthd_t, plymouthd_var_lib_t, { file dir })
@@ -40772,10 +46603,16 @@ index 86700ed..1600742 100644
manage_dirs_pattern(plymouthd_t, plymouthd_var_run_t, plymouthd_var_run_t)
manage_files_pattern(plymouthd_t, plymouthd_var_run_t, plymouthd_var_run_t)
files_pid_filetrans(plymouthd_t, plymouthd_var_run_t, { file dir })
-@@ -60,10 +68,34 @@ domain_use_interactive_fds(plymouthd_t)
+@@ -57,13 +66,42 @@ dev_write_framebuffer(plymouthd_t)
+
+ domain_use_interactive_fds(plymouthd_t)
+
++fs_getattr_all_fs(plymouthd_t)
++
files_read_etc_files(plymouthd_t)
files_read_usr_files(plymouthd_t)
+-miscfiles_read_localization(plymouthd_t)
+term_getattr_pty_fs(plymouthd_t)
+term_use_all_terms(plymouthd_t)
+term_use_ptmx(plymouthd_t)
@@ -40787,12 +46624,17 @@ index 86700ed..1600742 100644
+
+auth_read_passwd(plymouthd_t)
+
- miscfiles_read_localization(plymouthd_t)
miscfiles_read_fonts(plymouthd_t)
miscfiles_manage_fonts_cache(plymouthd_t)
+userdom_read_admin_home_files(plymouthd_t)
+
++term_use_unallocated_ttys(plymouthd_t)
++
++optional_policy(`
++ gnome_read_config(plymouthd_t)
++')
++
+optional_policy(`
+ sssd_stream_connect(plymouthd_t)
+')
@@ -40802,12 +46644,10 @@ index 86700ed..1600742 100644
+ xserver_read_state_xdm(plymouthd_t)
+')
+
-+term_use_unallocated_ttys(plymouthd_t)
-+
########################################
#
# Plymouth private policy
-@@ -74,6 +106,7 @@ allow plymouth_t self:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
+@@ -74,6 +112,7 @@ allow plymouth_t self:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
allow plymouth_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
kernel_read_system_state(plymouth_t)
@@ -40815,8 +46655,16 @@ index 86700ed..1600742 100644
domain_use_interactive_fds(plymouth_t)
+@@ -81,7 +120,6 @@ files_read_etc_files(plymouth_t)
+
+ term_use_ptmx(plymouth_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(plymouth_t)
+
+ sysnet_read_config(plymouth_t)
+
diff --git a/podsleuth.te b/podsleuth.te
-index 4cffb07..3436696 100644
+index 4cffb07..4170218 100644
--- a/podsleuth.te
+++ b/podsleuth.te
@@ -25,7 +25,8 @@ userdom_user_tmpfs_file(podsleuth_tmpfs_t)
@@ -40829,6 +46677,14 @@ index 4cffb07..3436696 100644
allow podsleuth_t self:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
allow podsleuth_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
allow podsleuth_t self:sem create_sem_perms;
+@@ -66,7 +67,6 @@ fs_getattr_tmpfs(podsleuth_t)
+ fs_list_tmpfs(podsleuth_t)
+ fs_rw_removable_blk_files(podsleuth_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(podsleuth_t)
+
+ sysnet_dns_name_resolve(podsleuth_t)
+
diff --git a/policykit.fc b/policykit.fc
index 63d0061..4718a93 100644
--- a/policykit.fc
@@ -41001,10 +46857,10 @@ index 48ff1e8..be00a65 100644
+ allow $1 policykit_auth_t:process signal;
')
diff --git a/policykit.te b/policykit.te
-index 44db896..5bf2bf0 100644
+index 44db896..946bfb5 100644
--- a/policykit.te
+++ b/policykit.te
-@@ -1,51 +1,73 @@
+@@ -1,51 +1,67 @@
-policy_module(policykit, 1.2.0)
+policy_module(policykit, 1.1.0)
@@ -41061,12 +46917,6 @@ index 44db896..5bf2bf0 100644
+
+dev_read_sysfs(policykit_domain)
+
-+#auth_use_nsswitch(policykit_domain)
-+
-+logging_send_syslog_msg(policykit_domain)
-+
-+miscfiles_read_localization(policykit_domain)
-+
########################################
#
# policykit local policy
@@ -41091,7 +46941,7 @@ index 44db896..5bf2bf0 100644
rw_files_pattern(policykit_t, policykit_reload_t, policykit_reload_t)
policykit_domtrans_resolve(policykit_t)
-@@ -56,56 +78,110 @@ manage_dirs_pattern(policykit_t, policykit_var_run_t, policykit_var_run_t)
+@@ -56,56 +72,115 @@ manage_dirs_pattern(policykit_t, policykit_var_run_t, policykit_var_run_t)
manage_files_pattern(policykit_t, policykit_var_run_t, policykit_var_run_t)
files_pid_filetrans(policykit_t, policykit_var_run_t, { file dir })
@@ -41108,16 +46958,17 @@ index 44db896..5bf2bf0 100644
auth_use_nsswitch(policykit_t)
--logging_send_syslog_msg(policykit_t)
-+userdom_getattr_all_users(policykit_t)
-+userdom_read_all_users_state(policykit_t)
-+userdom_dontaudit_search_admin_dir(policykit_t)
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(policykit_t)
-miscfiles_read_localization(policykit_t)
+-
++userdom_getattr_all_users(policykit_t)
+ userdom_read_all_users_state(policykit_t)
++userdom_dontaudit_search_admin_dir(policykit_t)
++
+optional_policy(`
+ dbus_system_domain(policykit_t, policykit_exec_t)
-
--userdom_read_all_users_state(policykit_t)
++
+ init_dbus_chat(policykit_t)
+
+ optional_policy(`
@@ -41157,9 +47008,9 @@ index 44db896..5bf2bf0 100644
-allow policykit_auth_t self:capability setgid;
-allow policykit_auth_t self:process getattr;
-allow policykit_auth_t self:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
-+allow policykit_auth_t self:capability { ipc_lock setgid setuid };
++allow policykit_auth_t self:capability { sys_nice ipc_lock setgid setuid };
+dontaudit policykit_auth_t self:capability sys_tty_config;
-+allow policykit_auth_t self:process { getsched signal };
++allow policykit_auth_t self:process { setsched getsched signal };
+
allow policykit_auth_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms;
allow policykit_auth_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
@@ -41186,22 +47037,23 @@ index 44db896..5bf2bf0 100644
-kernel_read_system_state(policykit_auth_t)
+kernel_dontaudit_search_kernel_sysctl(policykit_auth_t)
-+
-+dev_read_video_dev(policykit_auth_t)
-files_read_etc_files(policykit_auth_t)
++dev_read_video_dev(policykit_auth_t)
++
++files_read_etc_runtime_files(policykit_auth_t)
files_read_usr_files(policykit_auth_t)
+files_search_home(policykit_auth_t)
-
--auth_use_nsswitch(policykit_auth_t)
++
+fs_getattr_all_fs(policykit_auth_t)
+fs_search_tmpfs(policykit_auth_t)
--logging_send_syslog_msg(policykit_auth_t)
+auth_rw_var_auth(policykit_auth_t)
-+auth_use_nsswitch(policykit_auth_t)
+ auth_use_nsswitch(policykit_auth_t)
+auth_domtrans_chk_passwd(policykit_auth_t)
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(policykit_auth_t)
+
-miscfiles_read_localization(policykit_auth_t)
+miscfiles_read_fonts(policykit_auth_t)
+miscfiles_setattr_fonts_cache_dirs(policykit_auth_t)
@@ -41216,7 +47068,7 @@ index 44db896..5bf2bf0 100644
dbus_session_bus_client(policykit_auth_t)
optional_policy(`
-@@ -118,14 +194,26 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -118,14 +193,26 @@ optional_policy(`
hal_read_state(policykit_auth_t)
')
@@ -41245,7 +47097,7 @@ index 44db896..5bf2bf0 100644
allow policykit_grant_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms;
allow policykit_grant_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
-@@ -142,22 +230,20 @@ manage_files_pattern(policykit_grant_t, policykit_var_run_t, policykit_var_run_t
+@@ -142,22 +229,22 @@ manage_files_pattern(policykit_grant_t, policykit_var_run_t, policykit_var_run_t
manage_files_pattern(policykit_grant_t, policykit_var_lib_t, policykit_var_lib_t)
@@ -41254,12 +47106,12 @@ index 44db896..5bf2bf0 100644
-auth_use_nsswitch(policykit_grant_t)
auth_domtrans_chk_passwd(policykit_grant_t)
--
--logging_send_syslog_msg(policykit_grant_t)
--
--miscfiles_read_localization(policykit_grant_t)
+auth_use_nsswitch(policykit_grant_t)
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(policykit_grant_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(policykit_grant_t)
+-
userdom_read_all_users_state(policykit_grant_t)
optional_policy(`
@@ -41273,7 +47125,7 @@ index 44db896..5bf2bf0 100644
consolekit_dbus_chat(policykit_grant_t)
')
')
-@@ -167,9 +253,8 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -167,9 +254,8 @@ optional_policy(`
# polkit_resolve local policy
#
@@ -41285,7 +47137,7 @@ index 44db896..5bf2bf0 100644
allow policykit_resolve_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms;
allow policykit_resolve_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
-@@ -182,17 +267,10 @@ read_files_pattern(policykit_resolve_t, policykit_var_lib_t, policykit_var_lib_t
+@@ -182,17 +268,12 @@ read_files_pattern(policykit_resolve_t, policykit_var_lib_t, policykit_var_lib_t
can_exec(policykit_resolve_t, policykit_resolve_exec_t)
corecmd_search_bin(policykit_resolve_t)
@@ -41296,18 +47148,13 @@ index 44db896..5bf2bf0 100644
-
auth_use_nsswitch(policykit_resolve_t)
--logging_send_syslog_msg(policykit_resolve_t)
--
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(policykit_resolve_t)
+
-miscfiles_read_localization(policykit_resolve_t)
-
userdom_read_all_users_state(policykit_resolve_t)
optional_policy(`
-@@ -207,4 +285,3 @@ optional_policy(`
- kernel_search_proc(policykit_resolve_t)
- hal_read_state(policykit_resolve_t)
- ')
--
diff --git a/polipo.fc b/polipo.fc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..11f77ee
@@ -41557,10 +47404,10 @@ index 0000000..d00f6ba
+')
diff --git a/polipo.te b/polipo.te
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..00b432b
+index 0000000..a0b37ad
--- /dev/null
+++ b/polipo.te
-@@ -0,0 +1,171 @@
+@@ -0,0 +1,159 @@
+policy_module(polipo, 1.0.0)
+
+########################################
@@ -41602,14 +47449,6 @@ index 0000000..00b432b
+gen_tunable(polipo_session_users, false)
+
+## <desc>
-+## <p>
-+## Determine whether Polipo session daemon
-+## can send syslog messages.
-+## </p>
-+## </desc>
-+gen_tunable(polipo_session_send_syslog_msg, false)
-+
-+## <desc>
+## <p>
+## Allow polipo to connect to all ports > 1023
+## </p>
@@ -41658,7 +47497,6 @@ index 0000000..00b432b
+allow polipo_daemon self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms;
+allow polipo_daemon self:tcp_socket { listen accept };
+
-+corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(polipo_daemon)
+corenet_tcp_bind_generic_node(polipo_daemon)
+corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(polipo_daemon)
+corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_node(polipo_daemon)
@@ -41671,7 +47509,6 @@ index 0000000..00b432b
+
+fs_search_auto_mountpoints(polipo_daemon)
+
-+miscfiles_read_localization(polipo_daemon)
+
+########################################
+#
@@ -41727,9 +47564,7 @@ index 0000000..00b432b
+ corenet_tcp_bind_all_unreserved_ports(polipo_session_t)
+')
+
-+tunable_policy(`polipo_session_send_syslog_msg',`
-+ logging_send_syslog_msg(polipo_session_t)
-+')
++logging_send_syslog_msg(polipo_session_t)
+
+userdom_home_manager(polipo_session_t)
diff --git a/portage.fc b/portage.fc
@@ -41777,7 +47612,7 @@ index 08ac5af..9c4aa3c 100644
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if($1)
corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if($1)
diff --git a/portage.te b/portage.te
-index 630f16f..c49cdd9 100644
+index 630f16f..64fb1f5 100644
--- a/portage.te
+++ b/portage.te
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ policy_module(portage, 1.13.0)
@@ -41828,7 +47663,7 @@ index 630f16f..c49cdd9 100644
type portage_cache_t;
files_type(portage_cache_t)
-@@ -115,7 +118,8 @@ files_list_all(gcc_config_t)
+@@ -115,18 +118,19 @@ files_list_all(gcc_config_t)
init_dontaudit_read_script_status_files(gcc_config_t)
libs_read_lib_files(gcc_config_t)
@@ -41838,13 +47673,14 @@ index 630f16f..c49cdd9 100644
libs_manage_shared_libs(gcc_config_t)
# gcc-config creates a temp dir for the libs
libs_manage_lib_dirs(gcc_config_t)
-@@ -124,9 +128,11 @@ logging_send_syslog_msg(gcc_config_t)
- miscfiles_read_localization(gcc_config_t)
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(gcc_config_t)
--userdom_use_user_terminals(gcc_config_t)
+-miscfiles_read_localization(gcc_config_t)
+userdom_use_inherited_user_terminals(gcc_config_t)
+-userdom_use_user_terminals(gcc_config_t)
+-
-consoletype_exec(gcc_config_t)
+optional_policy(`
+ consoletype_exec(gcc_config_t)
@@ -41852,7 +47688,7 @@ index 630f16f..c49cdd9 100644
ifdef(`distro_gentoo',`
init_exec_rc(gcc_config_t)
-@@ -198,33 +204,41 @@ auth_manage_shadow(portage_t)
+@@ -198,33 +202,41 @@ auth_manage_shadow(portage_t)
init_exec(portage_t)
# run setfiles -r
@@ -41907,7 +47743,7 @@ index 630f16f..c49cdd9 100644
ifdef(`TODO',`
# seems to work ok without these
-@@ -271,7 +285,6 @@ kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(portage_fetch_t)
+@@ -271,7 +283,6 @@ kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(portage_fetch_t)
corecmd_exec_bin(portage_fetch_t)
corecmd_exec_shell(portage_fetch_t)
@@ -41915,7 +47751,12 @@ index 630f16f..c49cdd9 100644
corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(portage_fetch_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(portage_fetch_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_node(portage_fetch_t)
-@@ -308,11 +321,9 @@ miscfiles_read_localization(portage_fetch_t)
+@@ -303,16 +314,13 @@ logging_dontaudit_search_logs(portage_fetch_t)
+
+ term_search_ptys(portage_fetch_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(portage_fetch_t)
+
sysnet_read_config(portage_fetch_t)
sysnet_dns_name_resolve(portage_fetch_t)
@@ -41928,7 +47769,7 @@ index 630f16f..c49cdd9 100644
ifdef(`hide_broken_symptoms',`
dontaudit portage_fetch_t portage_cache_t:file read;
')
-@@ -328,6 +339,10 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -328,6 +336,10 @@ optional_policy(`
gpg_exec(portage_fetch_t)
')
@@ -41953,7 +47794,7 @@ index 3cdcd9f..2061efe 100644
/sbin/pmap_dump -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:portmap_helper_exec_t,s0)
/sbin/pmap_set -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:portmap_helper_exec_t,s0)
diff --git a/portmap.te b/portmap.te
-index c1db652..068c887 100644
+index c1db652..66590bd 100644
--- a/portmap.te
+++ b/portmap.te
@@ -43,7 +43,6 @@ files_pid_filetrans(portmap_t, portmap_var_run_t, file)
@@ -41964,17 +47805,21 @@ index c1db652..068c887 100644
corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(portmap_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(portmap_t)
corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if(portmap_t)
-@@ -73,7 +72,8 @@ fs_search_auto_mountpoints(portmap_t)
+@@ -73,12 +72,10 @@ fs_search_auto_mountpoints(portmap_t)
domain_use_interactive_fds(portmap_t)
-files_read_etc_files(portmap_t)
-+
+auth_use_nsswitch(portmap_t)
logging_send_syslog_msg(portmap_t)
-@@ -113,7 +113,6 @@ allow portmap_helper_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms;
+-miscfiles_read_localization(portmap_t)
+-
+ sysnet_read_config(portmap_t)
+
+ userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fds(portmap_t)
+@@ -113,7 +110,6 @@ allow portmap_helper_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms;
allow portmap_helper_t portmap_var_run_t:file manage_file_perms;
files_pid_filetrans(portmap_helper_t, portmap_var_run_t, file)
@@ -41982,7 +47827,7 @@ index c1db652..068c887 100644
corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(portmap_helper_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(portmap_helper_t)
corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if(portmap_helper_t)
-@@ -133,7 +132,6 @@ corenet_tcp_connect_all_ports(portmap_helper_t)
+@@ -133,7 +129,6 @@ corenet_tcp_connect_all_ports(portmap_helper_t)
domain_dontaudit_use_interactive_fds(portmap_helper_t)
@@ -41990,7 +47835,7 @@ index c1db652..068c887 100644
files_rw_generic_pids(portmap_helper_t)
init_rw_utmp(portmap_helper_t)
-@@ -142,7 +140,7 @@ logging_send_syslog_msg(portmap_helper_t)
+@@ -142,7 +137,7 @@ logging_send_syslog_msg(portmap_helper_t)
sysnet_read_config(portmap_helper_t)
@@ -42121,10 +47966,10 @@ index 1ddfa16..c0e0959 100644
/var/spool/postfix/pid/.* gen_context(system_u:object_r:postfix_var_run_t,s0)
/var/spool/postfix/private(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:postfix_private_t,s0)
diff --git a/postfix.if b/postfix.if
-index 46bee12..61cc81a 100644
+index 46bee12..8ef270f 100644
--- a/postfix.if
+++ b/postfix.if
-@@ -28,75 +28,19 @@ interface(`postfix_stub',`
+@@ -28,75 +28,23 @@ interface(`postfix_stub',`
## </param>
#
template(`postfix_domain_template',`
@@ -42164,7 +48009,7 @@ index 46bee12..61cc81a 100644
- allow postfix_$1_t postfix_var_run_t:file manage_file_perms;
- files_pid_filetrans(postfix_$1_t, postfix_var_run_t, file)
-
-- kernel_read_system_state(postfix_$1_t)
+ kernel_read_system_state(postfix_$1_t)
- kernel_read_network_state(postfix_$1_t)
- kernel_read_all_sysctls(postfix_$1_t)
-
@@ -42189,11 +48034,11 @@ index 46bee12..61cc81a 100644
-
- init_dontaudit_use_fds(postfix_$1_t)
- init_sigchld(postfix_$1_t)
--
+
auth_use_nsswitch(postfix_$1_t)
-- logging_send_syslog_msg(postfix_$1_t)
--
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(postfix_$1_t)
+
- miscfiles_read_localization(postfix_$1_t)
- miscfiles_read_generic_certs(postfix_$1_t)
-
@@ -42206,7 +48051,7 @@ index 46bee12..61cc81a 100644
')
########################################
-@@ -115,7 +59,7 @@ template(`postfix_server_domain_template',`
+@@ -115,7 +63,7 @@ template(`postfix_server_domain_template',`
type postfix_$1_tmp_t;
files_tmp_file(postfix_$1_tmp_t)
@@ -42215,7 +48060,7 @@ index 46bee12..61cc81a 100644
allow postfix_$1_t postfix_master_t:unix_stream_socket { connectto rw_stream_socket_perms };
allow postfix_$1_t self:tcp_socket create_socket_perms;
allow postfix_$1_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms;
-@@ -126,7 +70,6 @@ template(`postfix_server_domain_template',`
+@@ -126,7 +74,6 @@ template(`postfix_server_domain_template',`
domtrans_pattern(postfix_master_t, postfix_$1_exec_t, postfix_$1_t)
@@ -42223,7 +48068,7 @@ index 46bee12..61cc81a 100644
corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(postfix_$1_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(postfix_$1_t)
corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if(postfix_$1_t)
-@@ -165,6 +108,8 @@ template(`postfix_user_domain_template',`
+@@ -165,6 +112,8 @@ template(`postfix_user_domain_template',`
domtrans_pattern(postfix_user_domtrans, postfix_$1_exec_t, postfix_$1_t)
domain_use_interactive_fds(postfix_$1_t)
@@ -42232,7 +48077,19 @@ index 46bee12..61cc81a 100644
')
########################################
-@@ -215,7 +160,7 @@ interface(`postfix_config_filetrans',`
+@@ -208,6 +157,11 @@ interface(`postfix_read_config',`
+ ## The object class of the object being created.
+ ## </summary>
+ ## </param>
++## <param name="name" optional="true">
++## <summary>
++## The name of the object being created.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
+ #
+ interface(`postfix_config_filetrans',`
+ gen_require(`
+@@ -215,7 +169,7 @@ interface(`postfix_config_filetrans',`
')
files_search_etc($1)
@@ -42241,7 +48098,33 @@ index 46bee12..61cc81a 100644
')
########################################
-@@ -272,7 +217,8 @@ interface(`postfix_read_local_state',`
+@@ -257,6 +211,25 @@ interface(`postfix_rw_local_pipes',`
+ allow $1 postfix_local_t:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms;
+ ')
+
++#######################################
++## <summary>
++## Allow read/write postfix public pipes
++## TCP sockets.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`postfix_rw_public_pipes',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type postfix_public_t;
++ ')
++
++ allow $1 postfix_public_t:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms;
++')
++
+ ########################################
+ ## <summary>
+ ## Allow domain to read postfix local process state
+@@ -272,7 +245,8 @@ interface(`postfix_read_local_state',`
type postfix_local_t;
')
@@ -42251,7 +48134,7 @@ index 46bee12..61cc81a 100644
')
########################################
-@@ -290,7 +236,27 @@ interface(`postfix_read_master_state',`
+@@ -290,7 +264,27 @@ interface(`postfix_read_master_state',`
type postfix_master_t;
')
@@ -42280,7 +48163,7 @@ index 46bee12..61cc81a 100644
')
########################################
-@@ -376,6 +342,25 @@ interface(`postfix_domtrans_master',`
+@@ -376,6 +370,25 @@ interface(`postfix_domtrans_master',`
domtrans_pattern($1, postfix_master_exec_t, postfix_master_t)
')
@@ -42306,7 +48189,7 @@ index 46bee12..61cc81a 100644
########################################
## <summary>
## Execute the master postfix program in the
-@@ -404,7 +389,6 @@ interface(`postfix_exec_master',`
+@@ -404,7 +417,6 @@ interface(`postfix_exec_master',`
## Domain allowed access.
## </summary>
## </param>
@@ -42314,7 +48197,7 @@ index 46bee12..61cc81a 100644
#
interface(`postfix_stream_connect_master',`
gen_require(`
-@@ -416,6 +400,24 @@ interface(`postfix_stream_connect_master',`
+@@ -416,6 +428,24 @@ interface(`postfix_stream_connect_master',`
########################################
## <summary>
@@ -42339,7 +48222,7 @@ index 46bee12..61cc81a 100644
## Execute the master postdrop in the
## postfix_postdrop domain.
## </summary>
-@@ -462,7 +464,7 @@ interface(`postfix_domtrans_postqueue',`
+@@ -462,7 +492,7 @@ interface(`postfix_domtrans_postqueue',`
## </summary>
## </param>
#
@@ -42348,7 +48231,7 @@ index 46bee12..61cc81a 100644
gen_require(`
type postfix_postqueue_exec_t;
')
-@@ -529,6 +531,25 @@ interface(`postfix_domtrans_smtp',`
+@@ -529,6 +559,25 @@ interface(`postfix_domtrans_smtp',`
########################################
## <summary>
@@ -42374,7 +48257,7 @@ index 46bee12..61cc81a 100644
## Search postfix mail spool directories.
## </summary>
## <param name="domain">
-@@ -539,10 +560,10 @@ interface(`postfix_domtrans_smtp',`
+@@ -539,10 +588,10 @@ interface(`postfix_domtrans_smtp',`
#
interface(`postfix_search_spool',`
gen_require(`
@@ -42387,7 +48270,7 @@ index 46bee12..61cc81a 100644
files_search_spool($1)
')
-@@ -558,10 +579,10 @@ interface(`postfix_search_spool',`
+@@ -558,10 +607,10 @@ interface(`postfix_search_spool',`
#
interface(`postfix_list_spool',`
gen_require(`
@@ -42400,7 +48283,7 @@ index 46bee12..61cc81a 100644
files_search_spool($1)
')
-@@ -577,11 +598,11 @@ interface(`postfix_list_spool',`
+@@ -577,11 +626,11 @@ interface(`postfix_list_spool',`
#
interface(`postfix_read_spool_files',`
gen_require(`
@@ -42414,7 +48297,7 @@ index 46bee12..61cc81a 100644
')
########################################
-@@ -596,11 +617,11 @@ interface(`postfix_read_spool_files',`
+@@ -596,11 +645,31 @@ interface(`postfix_read_spool_files',`
#
interface(`postfix_manage_spool_files',`
gen_require(`
@@ -42425,10 +48308,30 @@ index 46bee12..61cc81a 100644
files_search_spool($1)
- manage_files_pattern($1, postfix_spool_t, postfix_spool_t)
+ manage_files_pattern($1, postfix_spool_type, postfix_spool_type)
++')
++
++#######################################
++## <summary>
++## Create, read, write, and delete postfix maildrop spool files.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`postfix_manage_spool_maildrop_files',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type postfix_spool_maildrop_t;
++ ')
++
++ files_search_spool($1)
++ manage_dirs_pattern($1, postfix_spool_maildrop_t, postfix_spool_maildrop_t)
++ manage_files_pattern($1, postfix_spool_maildrop_t, postfix_spool_maildrop_t)
')
########################################
-@@ -621,3 +642,155 @@ interface(`postfix_domtrans_user_mail_handler',`
+@@ -621,3 +690,155 @@ interface(`postfix_domtrans_user_mail_handler',`
typeattribute $1 postfix_user_domtrans;
')
@@ -42585,7 +48488,7 @@ index 46bee12..61cc81a 100644
+ postfix_config_filetrans($1, postfix_prng_t, file, "prng_exch")
+')
diff --git a/postfix.te b/postfix.te
-index a1e0f60..ec5fc31 100644
+index a1e0f60..85b12af 100644
--- a/postfix.te
+++ b/postfix.te
@@ -5,6 +5,15 @@ policy_module(postfix, 1.14.0)
@@ -42593,9 +48496,9 @@ index a1e0f60..ec5fc31 100644
#
+## <desc>
-+## <p>
-+## Allow postfix_local domain full write access to mail_spool directories
-+## </p>
++## <p>
++## Allow postfix_local domain full write access to mail_spool directories
++## </p>
+## </desc>
+gen_tunable(postfix_local_write_mail_spool, true)
+
@@ -42654,11 +48557,13 @@ index a1e0f60..ec5fc31 100644
type postfix_public_t;
files_type(postfix_public_t)
-@@ -94,23 +107,24 @@ mta_mailserver_delivery(postfix_virtual_t)
+@@ -94,23 +107,26 @@ mta_mailserver_delivery(postfix_virtual_t)
# chown is to set the correct ownership of queue dirs
allow postfix_master_t self:capability { chown dac_override kill setgid setuid net_bind_service sys_tty_config };
-allow postfix_master_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms;
++allow postfix_master_t self:capability2 block_suspend;
++
+allow postfix_master_t self:process setrlimit;
allow postfix_master_t self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
allow postfix_master_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms;
@@ -42684,7 +48589,7 @@ index a1e0f60..ec5fc31 100644
manage_fifo_files_pattern(postfix_master_t, postfix_private_t, postfix_private_t)
manage_sock_files_pattern(postfix_master_t, postfix_private_t, postfix_private_t)
-@@ -130,7 +144,7 @@ manage_files_pattern(postfix_master_t, postfix_spool_t, postfix_spool_t)
+@@ -130,7 +146,7 @@ manage_files_pattern(postfix_master_t, postfix_spool_t, postfix_spool_t)
files_spool_filetrans(postfix_master_t, postfix_spool_t, dir)
allow postfix_master_t postfix_spool_bounce_t:dir manage_dir_perms;
@@ -42693,7 +48598,7 @@ index a1e0f60..ec5fc31 100644
manage_dirs_pattern(postfix_master_t, postfix_spool_flush_t, postfix_spool_flush_t)
manage_files_pattern(postfix_master_t, postfix_spool_flush_t, postfix_spool_flush_t)
-@@ -138,11 +152,11 @@ manage_lnk_files_pattern(postfix_master_t, postfix_spool_flush_t, postfix_spool_
+@@ -138,11 +154,11 @@ manage_lnk_files_pattern(postfix_master_t, postfix_spool_flush_t, postfix_spool_
delete_files_pattern(postfix_master_t, postfix_spool_maildrop_t, postfix_spool_maildrop_t)
rename_files_pattern(postfix_master_t, postfix_spool_maildrop_t, postfix_spool_maildrop_t)
@@ -42706,7 +48611,7 @@ index a1e0f60..ec5fc31 100644
corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(postfix_master_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(postfix_master_t)
corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if(postfix_master_t)
-@@ -150,6 +164,9 @@ corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_node(postfix_master_t)
+@@ -150,6 +166,9 @@ corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_node(postfix_master_t)
corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_node(postfix_master_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_ports(postfix_master_t)
corenet_udp_sendrecv_all_ports(postfix_master_t)
@@ -42716,7 +48621,7 @@ index a1e0f60..ec5fc31 100644
corenet_tcp_bind_generic_node(postfix_master_t)
corenet_tcp_bind_amavisd_send_port(postfix_master_t)
corenet_tcp_bind_smtp_port(postfix_master_t)
-@@ -157,6 +174,8 @@ corenet_tcp_connect_all_ports(postfix_master_t)
+@@ -157,6 +176,8 @@ corenet_tcp_connect_all_ports(postfix_master_t)
corenet_sendrecv_amavisd_send_server_packets(postfix_master_t)
corenet_sendrecv_smtp_server_packets(postfix_master_t)
corenet_sendrecv_all_client_packets(postfix_master_t)
@@ -42725,18 +48630,35 @@ index a1e0f60..ec5fc31 100644
# for a find command
selinux_dontaudit_search_fs(postfix_master_t)
-@@ -167,6 +186,10 @@ corecmd_exec_bin(postfix_master_t)
+@@ -167,14 +188,14 @@ corecmd_exec_bin(postfix_master_t)
domain_use_interactive_fds(postfix_master_t)
files_read_usr_files(postfix_master_t)
+files_search_var_lib(postfix_master_t)
+files_search_tmp(postfix_master_t)
-+
+
+-term_dontaudit_search_ptys(postfix_master_t)
+mcs_file_read_all(postfix_master_t)
- term_dontaudit_search_ptys(postfix_master_t)
+-miscfiles_read_man_pages(postfix_master_t)
++term_dontaudit_search_ptys(postfix_master_t)
+
+ seutil_sigchld_newrole(postfix_master_t)
+-# postfix does a "find" on startup for some reason - keep it quiet
+-seutil_dontaudit_search_config(postfix_master_t)
+
+ mta_rw_aliases(postfix_master_t)
+ mta_read_sendmail_bin(postfix_master_t)
+@@ -195,7 +216,7 @@ optional_policy(`
+ ')
+
+ optional_policy(`
+-# for postalias
++# for postalias
+ mailman_manage_data_files(postfix_master_t)
+ ')
-@@ -220,13 +243,17 @@ allow postfix_bounce_t self:capability dac_read_search;
+@@ -220,13 +241,17 @@ allow postfix_bounce_t self:capability dac_read_search;
allow postfix_bounce_t self:tcp_socket create_socket_perms;
allow postfix_bounce_t postfix_public_t:sock_file write;
@@ -42755,7 +48677,7 @@ index a1e0f60..ec5fc31 100644
manage_dirs_pattern(postfix_bounce_t, postfix_spool_bounce_t, postfix_spool_bounce_t)
manage_files_pattern(postfix_bounce_t, postfix_spool_bounce_t, postfix_spool_bounce_t)
manage_lnk_files_pattern(postfix_bounce_t, postfix_spool_bounce_t, postfix_spool_bounce_t)
-@@ -237,22 +264,31 @@ manage_lnk_files_pattern(postfix_bounce_t, postfix_spool_bounce_t, postfix_spool
+@@ -237,22 +262,31 @@ manage_lnk_files_pattern(postfix_bounce_t, postfix_spool_bounce_t, postfix_spool
#
allow postfix_cleanup_t self:process setrlimit;
@@ -42787,7 +48709,7 @@ index a1e0f60..ec5fc31 100644
mta_read_aliases(postfix_cleanup_t)
optional_policy(`
-@@ -264,7 +300,6 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -264,7 +298,6 @@ optional_policy(`
# Postfix local local policy
#
@@ -42795,22 +48717,24 @@ index a1e0f60..ec5fc31 100644
allow postfix_local_t self:process { setsched setrlimit };
# connect to master process
-@@ -273,12 +308,13 @@ stream_connect_pattern(postfix_local_t, postfix_public_t, postfix_public_t, post
+@@ -272,28 +305,51 @@ stream_connect_pattern(postfix_local_t, postfix_public_t, postfix_public_t, post
+
# for .forward - maybe we need a new type for it?
rw_sock_files_pattern(postfix_local_t, postfix_private_t, postfix_private_t)
-
-+domtrans_pattern(postfix_local_t, postfix_postdrop_exec_t, postfix_postdrop_t)
++rw_files_pattern(postfix_local_t, postfix_spool_maildrop_t, postfix_spool_maildrop_t)
+
++domtrans_pattern(postfix_local_t, postfix_postdrop_exec_t, postfix_postdrop_t)
+
allow postfix_local_t postfix_spool_t:file rw_file_perms;
corecmd_exec_shell(postfix_local_t)
corecmd_exec_bin(postfix_local_t)
-files_read_etc_files(postfix_local_t)
-
+-
logging_dontaudit_search_logs(postfix_local_t)
-@@ -286,10 +322,15 @@ mta_read_aliases(postfix_local_t)
+ mta_read_aliases(postfix_local_t)
mta_delete_spool(postfix_local_t)
# For reading spamassasin
mta_read_config(postfix_local_t)
@@ -42823,28 +48747,34 @@ index a1e0f60..ec5fc31 100644
+userdom_read_user_home_content_files(postfix_local_t)
+userdom_exec_user_bin_files(postfix_local_t)
+
++tunable_policy(`use_nfs_home_dirs',`
++ fs_exec_nfs_files(postfix_local_t)
++')
++
++tunable_policy(`use_samba_home_dirs',`
++ fs_exec_cifs_files(postfix_local_t)
++')
++
+tunable_policy(`postfix_local_write_mail_spool',`
+ mta_manage_spool(postfix_local_t)
+')
optional_policy(`
clamav_search_lib(postfix_local_t)
-@@ -297,6 +338,14 @@ optional_policy(`
- ')
-
- optional_policy(`
-+ dovecot_domtrans_deliver(postfix_local_t)
+ clamav_exec_clamscan(postfix_local_t)
++ clamav_stream_connect(postfix_domain)
+')
+
+optional_policy(`
-+ dspam_domtrans(postfix_local_t)
++ dovecot_domtrans_deliver(postfix_local_t)
+')
+
+optional_policy(`
- # for postalias
- mailman_manage_data_files(postfix_local_t)
- mailman_append_log(postfix_local_t)
-@@ -304,9 +353,22 @@ optional_policy(`
++ dspam_domtrans(postfix_local_t)
+ ')
+
+ optional_policy(`
+@@ -304,9 +360,26 @@ optional_policy(`
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -42852,6 +48782,10 @@ index a1e0f60..ec5fc31 100644
+')
+
+optional_policy(`
++ openshift_search_lib(postfix_local_t)
++')
++
++optional_policy(`
procmail_domtrans(postfix_local_t)
')
@@ -42867,7 +48801,7 @@ index a1e0f60..ec5fc31 100644
########################################
#
# Postfix map local policy
-@@ -329,7 +391,6 @@ kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(postfix_map_t)
+@@ -329,7 +402,6 @@ kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(postfix_map_t)
kernel_dontaudit_list_proc(postfix_map_t)
kernel_dontaudit_read_system_state(postfix_map_t)
@@ -42875,7 +48809,7 @@ index a1e0f60..ec5fc31 100644
corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(postfix_map_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(postfix_map_t)
corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if(postfix_map_t)
-@@ -348,7 +409,6 @@ corecmd_read_bin_sockets(postfix_map_t)
+@@ -348,7 +420,6 @@ corecmd_read_bin_sockets(postfix_map_t)
files_list_home(postfix_map_t)
files_read_usr_files(postfix_map_t)
@@ -42883,7 +48817,16 @@ index a1e0f60..ec5fc31 100644
files_read_etc_runtime_files(postfix_map_t)
files_dontaudit_search_var(postfix_map_t)
-@@ -379,18 +439,24 @@ stream_connect_pattern(postfix_pickup_t, postfix_private_t, postfix_private_t, p
+@@ -356,8 +427,6 @@ auth_use_nsswitch(postfix_map_t)
+
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(postfix_map_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(postfix_map_t)
+-
+ optional_policy(`
+ locallogin_dontaudit_use_fds(postfix_map_t)
+ ')
+@@ -379,18 +448,24 @@ stream_connect_pattern(postfix_pickup_t, postfix_private_t, postfix_private_t, p
rw_fifo_files_pattern(postfix_pickup_t, postfix_public_t, postfix_public_t)
rw_sock_files_pattern(postfix_pickup_t, postfix_public_t, postfix_public_t)
@@ -42909,7 +48852,7 @@ index a1e0f60..ec5fc31 100644
allow postfix_pipe_t self:process setrlimit;
write_sock_files_pattern(postfix_pipe_t, postfix_private_t, postfix_private_t)
-@@ -401,6 +467,8 @@ rw_files_pattern(postfix_pipe_t, postfix_spool_t, postfix_spool_t)
+@@ -401,6 +476,8 @@ rw_files_pattern(postfix_pipe_t, postfix_spool_t, postfix_spool_t)
domtrans_pattern(postfix_pipe_t, postfix_postdrop_exec_t, postfix_postdrop_t)
@@ -42918,7 +48861,7 @@ index a1e0f60..ec5fc31 100644
optional_policy(`
dovecot_domtrans_deliver(postfix_pipe_t)
')
-@@ -420,6 +488,7 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -420,6 +497,7 @@ optional_policy(`
optional_policy(`
spamassassin_domtrans_client(postfix_pipe_t)
@@ -42926,7 +48869,7 @@ index a1e0f60..ec5fc31 100644
')
optional_policy(`
-@@ -436,11 +505,17 @@ allow postfix_postdrop_t self:capability sys_resource;
+@@ -436,11 +514,17 @@ allow postfix_postdrop_t self:capability sys_resource;
allow postfix_postdrop_t self:tcp_socket create;
allow postfix_postdrop_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms;
@@ -42944,7 +48887,7 @@ index a1e0f60..ec5fc31 100644
corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if(postfix_postdrop_t)
corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_node(postfix_postdrop_t)
-@@ -487,8 +562,8 @@ write_fifo_files_pattern(postfix_postqueue_t, postfix_public_t, postfix_public_t
+@@ -487,8 +571,8 @@ write_fifo_files_pattern(postfix_postqueue_t, postfix_public_t, postfix_public_t
domtrans_pattern(postfix_postqueue_t, postfix_showq_exec_t, postfix_showq_t)
# to write the mailq output, it really should not need read access!
@@ -42955,7 +48898,7 @@ index a1e0f60..ec5fc31 100644
init_sigchld_script(postfix_postqueue_t)
init_use_script_fds(postfix_postqueue_t)
-@@ -519,7 +594,11 @@ files_spool_filetrans(postfix_qmgr_t, postfix_spool_t, dir)
+@@ -519,7 +603,11 @@ files_spool_filetrans(postfix_qmgr_t, postfix_spool_t, dir)
allow postfix_qmgr_t postfix_spool_bounce_t:dir list_dir_perms;
allow postfix_qmgr_t postfix_spool_bounce_t:file read_file_perms;
@@ -42968,7 +48911,7 @@ index a1e0f60..ec5fc31 100644
corecmd_exec_bin(postfix_qmgr_t)
-@@ -539,7 +618,9 @@ postfix_list_spool(postfix_showq_t)
+@@ -539,7 +627,9 @@ postfix_list_spool(postfix_showq_t)
allow postfix_showq_t postfix_spool_maildrop_t:dir list_dir_perms;
allow postfix_showq_t postfix_spool_maildrop_t:file read_file_perms;
@@ -42979,7 +48922,7 @@ index a1e0f60..ec5fc31 100644
# to write the mailq output, it really should not need read access!
term_use_all_ptys(postfix_showq_t)
-@@ -558,6 +639,11 @@ allow postfix_smtp_t postfix_prng_t:file rw_file_perms;
+@@ -558,6 +648,12 @@ allow postfix_smtp_t postfix_prng_t:file rw_file_perms;
allow postfix_smtp_t postfix_spool_t:file rw_file_perms;
@@ -42987,15 +48930,16 @@ index a1e0f60..ec5fc31 100644
+
+# for spampd
+corenet_tcp_connect_spamd_port(postfix_master_t)
++corenet_tcp_bind_spamd_port(postfix_master_t)
+
files_search_all_mountpoints(postfix_smtp_t)
optional_policy(`
-@@ -565,6 +651,14 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -565,6 +661,14 @@ optional_policy(`
')
optional_policy(`
-+ dovecot_stream_connect(postfix_smtp_t)
++ dovecot_stream_connect(postfix_smtp_t)
+')
+
+optional_policy(`
@@ -43006,7 +48950,7 @@ index a1e0f60..ec5fc31 100644
milter_stream_connect_all(postfix_smtp_t)
')
-@@ -581,17 +675,25 @@ stream_connect_pattern(postfix_smtpd_t, { postfix_private_t postfix_public_t },
+@@ -581,17 +685,25 @@ stream_connect_pattern(postfix_smtpd_t, { postfix_private_t postfix_public_t },
corenet_tcp_connect_postfix_policyd_port(postfix_smtpd_t)
# for prng_exch
@@ -43033,20 +48977,19 @@ index a1e0f60..ec5fc31 100644
')
optional_policy(`
-@@ -599,6 +701,12 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -599,6 +711,11 @@ optional_policy(`
')
optional_policy(`
+ milter_stream_connect_all(postfix_smtpd_t)
+ spamassassin_read_pid_files(postfix_smtpd_t)
-+ spamd_stream_connect(postfix_smtpd_t)
+')
+
+optional_policy(`
postgrey_stream_connect(postfix_smtpd_t)
')
-@@ -611,7 +719,6 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -611,7 +728,6 @@ optional_policy(`
# Postfix virtual local policy
#
@@ -43054,7 +48997,7 @@ index a1e0f60..ec5fc31 100644
allow postfix_virtual_t self:process { setsched setrlimit };
allow postfix_virtual_t postfix_spool_t:file rw_file_perms;
-@@ -622,7 +729,6 @@ stream_connect_pattern(postfix_virtual_t, { postfix_private_t postfix_public_t }
+@@ -622,7 +738,6 @@ stream_connect_pattern(postfix_virtual_t, { postfix_private_t postfix_public_t }
corecmd_exec_shell(postfix_virtual_t)
corecmd_exec_bin(postfix_virtual_t)
@@ -43062,7 +49005,7 @@ index a1e0f60..ec5fc31 100644
files_read_usr_files(postfix_virtual_t)
mta_read_aliases(postfix_virtual_t)
-@@ -630,3 +736,75 @@ mta_delete_spool(postfix_virtual_t)
+@@ -630,3 +745,76 @@ mta_delete_spool(postfix_virtual_t)
# For reading spamassasin
mta_read_config(postfix_virtual_t)
mta_manage_spool(postfix_virtual_t)
@@ -43101,7 +49044,6 @@ index a1e0f60..ec5fc31 100644
+allow postfix_domain postfix_var_run_t:file manage_file_perms;
+files_pid_filetrans(postfix_domain, postfix_var_run_t, file)
+
-+kernel_read_system_state(postfix_domain)
+kernel_read_network_state(postfix_domain)
+kernel_read_all_sysctls(postfix_domain)
+
@@ -43128,14 +49070,16 @@ index a1e0f60..ec5fc31 100644
+init_sigchld(postfix_domain)
+init_dontaudit_rw_stream_socket(postfix_domain)
+
-+logging_send_syslog_msg(postfix_domain)
-+
-+miscfiles_read_localization(postfix_domain)
+miscfiles_read_generic_certs(postfix_domain)
+
+userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fds(postfix_domain)
+
+optional_policy(`
++ spamd_stream_connect(postfix_domain)
++ spamassassin_domtrans_client(postfix_domain)
++')
++
++optional_policy(`
+ udev_read_db(postfix_domain)
+')
diff --git a/postfixpolicyd.if b/postfixpolicyd.if
@@ -43161,7 +49105,7 @@ index feae93b..b2af729 100644
init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, postfix_policyd_initrc_exec_t)
domain_system_change_exemption($1)
diff --git a/postfixpolicyd.te b/postfixpolicyd.te
-index 7257526..e7bd755 100644
+index 7257526..e69e0d4 100644
--- a/postfixpolicyd.te
+++ b/postfixpolicyd.te
@@ -23,19 +23,18 @@ files_pid_file(postfix_policyd_var_run_t)
@@ -43187,6 +49131,13 @@ index 7257526..e7bd755 100644
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(postfix_policyd_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_node(postfix_policyd_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_ports(postfix_policyd_t)
+@@ -48,6 +47,4 @@ files_read_usr_files(postfix_policyd_t)
+
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(postfix_policyd_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(postfix_policyd_t)
+-
+ sysnet_dns_name_resolve(postfix_policyd_t)
diff --git a/postgrey.if b/postgrey.if
index ad15fde..12202e1 100644
--- a/postgrey.if
@@ -43231,7 +49182,7 @@ index ad15fde..12202e1 100644
init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, postgrey_initrc_exec_t)
domain_system_change_exemption($1)
diff --git a/postgrey.te b/postgrey.te
-index db843e2..f7b64e3 100644
+index db843e2..570cf36 100644
--- a/postgrey.te
+++ b/postgrey.te
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ type postgrey_initrc_exec_t;
@@ -43251,15 +49202,18 @@ index db843e2..f7b64e3 100644
corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(postgrey_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(postgrey_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_node(postgrey_t)
-@@ -80,6 +79,8 @@ files_getattr_tmp_dirs(postgrey_t)
+@@ -80,9 +79,9 @@ files_getattr_tmp_dirs(postgrey_t)
fs_getattr_all_fs(postgrey_t)
fs_search_auto_mountpoints(postgrey_t)
+-logging_send_syslog_msg(postgrey_t)
+auth_read_passwd(postgrey_t)
-+
- logging_send_syslog_msg(postgrey_t)
- miscfiles_read_localization(postgrey_t)
+-miscfiles_read_localization(postgrey_t)
++logging_send_syslog_msg(postgrey_t)
+
+ sysnet_read_config(postgrey_t)
+
diff --git a/ppp.fc b/ppp.fc
index 2d82c6d..ff2c96a 100644
--- a/ppp.fc
@@ -43443,7 +49397,7 @@ index de4bdb7..a4cad0b 100644
+ allow $1 pppd_unit_file_t:service all_service_perms;
')
diff --git a/ppp.te b/ppp.te
-index bcbf9ac..83abaca 100644
+index bcbf9ac..5a550bb 100644
--- a/ppp.te
+++ b/ppp.te
@@ -19,14 +19,15 @@ gen_tunable(pppd_can_insmod, false)
@@ -43489,7 +49443,7 @@ index bcbf9ac..83abaca 100644
#
-allow pppd_t self:capability { kill net_admin setuid setgid fsetid fowner net_raw dac_override };
-+allow pppd_t self:capability { kill net_admin setuid setgid sys_admin fsetid fowner net_raw dac_override };
++allow pppd_t self:capability { kill net_admin setuid setgid sys_admin fsetid fowner net_raw dac_override sys_nice };
dontaudit pppd_t self:capability sys_tty_config;
-allow pppd_t self:process { getsched signal };
+allow pppd_t self:process { getsched setsched signal };
@@ -43553,8 +49507,11 @@ index bcbf9ac..83abaca 100644
# allow running ip-up and ip-down scripts and running chat.
corecmd_exec_bin(pppd_t)
-@@ -163,13 +170,15 @@ files_manage_etc_runtime_files(pppd_t)
+@@ -161,43 +168,54 @@ domain_use_interactive_fds(pppd_t)
+ files_exec_etc_files(pppd_t)
+ files_manage_etc_runtime_files(pppd_t)
files_dontaudit_write_etc_files(pppd_t)
++files_read_usr_files(pppd_t)
# for scripts
-files_read_etc_files(pppd_t)
@@ -43570,7 +49527,10 @@ index bcbf9ac..83abaca 100644
logging_send_syslog_msg(pppd_t)
logging_send_audit_msgs(pppd_t)
-@@ -180,24 +189,34 @@ sysnet_exec_ifconfig(pppd_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(pppd_t)
+-
+ sysnet_exec_ifconfig(pppd_t)
sysnet_manage_config(pppd_t)
sysnet_etc_filetrans_config(pppd_t)
@@ -43608,7 +49568,7 @@ index bcbf9ac..83abaca 100644
')
optional_policy(`
-@@ -247,21 +266,24 @@ allow pptp_t pppd_log_t:file append_file_perms;
+@@ -247,21 +265,24 @@ allow pptp_t pppd_log_t:file append_file_perms;
allow pptp_t pptp_log_t:file manage_file_perms;
logging_log_filetrans(pptp_t, pptp_log_t, file)
@@ -43635,14 +49595,25 @@ index bcbf9ac..83abaca 100644
corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(pptp_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(pptp_t)
corenet_raw_sendrecv_generic_if(pptp_t)
-@@ -273,7 +295,6 @@ corenet_tcp_connect_generic_port(pptp_t)
+@@ -272,8 +293,7 @@ corenet_tcp_bind_generic_node(pptp_t)
+ corenet_tcp_connect_generic_port(pptp_t)
corenet_tcp_connect_all_reserved_ports(pptp_t)
corenet_sendrecv_generic_client_packets(pptp_t)
-
+-
-files_read_etc_files(pptp_t)
++corenet_tcp_connect_pptp_port(pptp_t)
fs_getattr_all_fs(pptp_t)
fs_search_auto_mountpoints(pptp_t)
+@@ -288,8 +308,6 @@ auth_use_nsswitch(pptp_t)
+
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(pptp_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(pptp_t)
+-
+ sysnet_exec_ifconfig(pptp_t)
+
+ userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fds(pptp_t)
diff --git a/prelink.fc b/prelink.fc
index ec0e76a..62af9a4 100644
--- a/prelink.fc
@@ -43656,11 +49627,45 @@ index ec0e76a..62af9a4 100644
/var/log/prelink(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:prelink_log_t,s0)
/var/lib/misc/prelink.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:prelink_var_lib_t,s0)
+diff --git a/prelink.if b/prelink.if
+index 93ec175..e6605c1 100644
+--- a/prelink.if
++++ b/prelink.if
+@@ -202,3 +202,21 @@ interface(`prelink_relabel_lib',`
+ files_search_var_lib($1)
+ relabel_files_pattern($1, prelink_var_lib_t, prelink_var_lib_t)
+ ')
++
++########################################
++## <summary>
++## Transition to prelink named content
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`prelink_filetrans_named_content',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type prelink_cache_t;
++ ')
++
++ files_etc_filetrans($1, prelink_cache_t, file, "prelink.cache")
++')
diff --git a/prelink.te b/prelink.te
-index af55369..f292637 100644
+index af55369..9f1d1b5 100644
--- a/prelink.te
+++ b/prelink.te
-@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ files_type(prelink_var_lib_t)
+@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ type prelink_cron_system_t;
+ type prelink_cron_system_exec_t;
+ domain_type(prelink_cron_system_t)
+ domain_entry_file(prelink_cron_system_t, prelink_cron_system_exec_t)
++domain_obj_id_change_exemption(prelink_cron_system_t)
+
+ type prelink_log_t;
+ logging_log_file(prelink_log_t)
+@@ -36,7 +37,7 @@ files_type(prelink_var_lib_t)
# Local policy
#
@@ -43669,7 +49674,7 @@ index af55369..f292637 100644
allow prelink_t self:process { execheap execmem execstack signal };
allow prelink_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms;
-@@ -59,10 +59,11 @@ manage_dirs_pattern(prelink_t, prelink_var_lib_t, prelink_var_lib_t)
+@@ -59,10 +60,11 @@ manage_dirs_pattern(prelink_t, prelink_var_lib_t, prelink_var_lib_t)
manage_files_pattern(prelink_t, prelink_var_lib_t, prelink_var_lib_t)
relabel_files_pattern(prelink_t, prelink_var_lib_t, prelink_var_lib_t)
files_var_lib_filetrans(prelink_t, prelink_var_lib_t, { dir file })
@@ -43682,7 +49687,7 @@ index af55369..f292637 100644
kernel_read_system_state(prelink_t)
kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(prelink_t)
-@@ -73,6 +74,7 @@ corecmd_mmap_all_executables(prelink_t)
+@@ -73,6 +75,7 @@ corecmd_mmap_all_executables(prelink_t)
corecmd_read_bin_symlinks(prelink_t)
dev_read_urand(prelink_t)
@@ -43690,7 +49695,7 @@ index af55369..f292637 100644
files_list_all(prelink_t)
files_getattr_all_files(prelink_t)
-@@ -86,6 +88,8 @@ files_relabelfrom_usr_files(prelink_t)
+@@ -86,6 +89,8 @@ files_relabelfrom_usr_files(prelink_t)
fs_getattr_xattr_fs(prelink_t)
@@ -43699,9 +49704,11 @@ index af55369..f292637 100644
selinux_get_enforce_mode(prelink_t)
libs_exec_ld_so(prelink_t)
-@@ -98,7 +102,15 @@ libs_delete_lib_symlinks(prelink_t)
+@@ -96,9 +101,16 @@ libs_manage_shared_libs(prelink_t)
+ libs_relabel_shared_libs(prelink_t)
+ libs_delete_lib_symlinks(prelink_t)
- miscfiles_read_localization(prelink_t)
+-miscfiles_read_localization(prelink_t)
-userdom_use_user_terminals(prelink_t)
+userdom_use_inherited_user_terminals(prelink_t)
@@ -43740,7 +49747,7 @@ index af55369..f292637 100644
domtrans_pattern(prelink_cron_system_t, prelink_exec_t, prelink_t)
allow prelink_cron_system_t prelink_t:process noatsecure;
-@@ -144,21 +166,40 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -144,21 +166,38 @@ optional_policy(`
corecmd_exec_bin(prelink_cron_system_t)
corecmd_exec_shell(prelink_cron_system_t)
@@ -43762,9 +49769,9 @@ index af55369..f292637 100644
logging_search_logs(prelink_cron_system_t)
+- miscfiles_read_localization(prelink_cron_system_t)
+ init_stream_connect(prelink_cron_system_t)
+
- miscfiles_read_localization(prelink_cron_system_t)
cron_system_entry(prelink_cron_system_t, prelink_cron_system_exec_t)
@@ -43779,7 +49786,6 @@ index af55369..f292637 100644
+ optional_policy(`
+ dbus_read_config(prelink_t)
+ ')
-+ miscfiles_read_man_pages(prelink_t)
+')
diff --git a/prelude.fc b/prelude.fc
index 3bd847a..a52b025 100644
@@ -43852,7 +49858,7 @@ index 2316653..f41a4f7 100644
+ admin_pattern($1, prelude_lml_tmp_t)
')
diff --git a/prelude.te b/prelude.te
-index b1bc02c..0c57041 100644
+index b1bc02c..a06f448 100644
--- a/prelude.te
+++ b/prelude.te
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ type prelude_initrc_exec_t;
@@ -43880,7 +49886,16 @@ index b1bc02c..0c57041 100644
files_read_etc_runtime_files(prelude_t)
files_read_usr_files(prelude_t)
files_search_tmp(prelude_t)
-@@ -143,7 +141,6 @@ kernel_read_system_state(prelude_audisp_t)
+@@ -107,8 +105,6 @@ auth_use_nsswitch(prelude_t)
+ logging_send_audit_msgs(prelude_t)
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(prelude_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(prelude_t)
+-
+ optional_policy(`
+ mysql_search_db(prelude_t)
+ mysql_stream_connect(prelude_t)
+@@ -143,7 +139,6 @@ kernel_read_system_state(prelude_audisp_t)
corecmd_search_bin(prelude_audisp_t)
@@ -43888,7 +49903,7 @@ index b1bc02c..0c57041 100644
corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(prelude_audisp_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(prelude_audisp_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_node(prelude_audisp_t)
-@@ -156,7 +153,6 @@ dev_read_urand(prelude_audisp_t)
+@@ -156,14 +151,11 @@ dev_read_urand(prelude_audisp_t)
# Init script handling
domain_use_interactive_fds(prelude_audisp_t)
@@ -43896,7 +49911,14 @@ index b1bc02c..0c57041 100644
files_read_etc_runtime_files(prelude_audisp_t)
files_search_tmp(prelude_audisp_t)
-@@ -183,7 +179,6 @@ kernel_read_sysctl(prelude_correlator_t)
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(prelude_audisp_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(prelude_audisp_t)
+-
+ sysnet_dns_name_resolve(prelude_audisp_t)
+
+ ########################################
+@@ -183,7 +175,6 @@ kernel_read_sysctl(prelude_correlator_t)
corecmd_search_bin(prelude_correlator_t)
@@ -43904,7 +49926,7 @@ index b1bc02c..0c57041 100644
corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(prelude_correlator_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(prelude_correlator_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_node(prelude_correlator_t)
-@@ -192,7 +187,6 @@ corenet_tcp_connect_prelude_port(prelude_correlator_t)
+@@ -192,14 +183,11 @@ corenet_tcp_connect_prelude_port(prelude_correlator_t)
dev_read_rand(prelude_correlator_t)
dev_read_urand(prelude_correlator_t)
@@ -43912,7 +49934,14 @@ index b1bc02c..0c57041 100644
files_read_usr_files(prelude_correlator_t)
files_search_spool(prelude_correlator_t)
-@@ -210,8 +204,8 @@ prelude_manage_spool(prelude_correlator_t)
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(prelude_correlator_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(prelude_correlator_t)
+-
+ sysnet_dns_name_resolve(prelude_correlator_t)
+
+ prelude_manage_spool(prelude_correlator_t)
+@@ -210,8 +198,8 @@ prelude_manage_spool(prelude_correlator_t)
#
allow prelude_lml_t self:capability dac_override;
@@ -43923,7 +49952,7 @@ index b1bc02c..0c57041 100644
allow prelude_lml_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms;
allow prelude_lml_t self:unix_stream_socket connectto;
-@@ -236,10 +230,10 @@ kernel_read_sysctl(prelude_lml_t)
+@@ -236,10 +224,10 @@ kernel_read_sysctl(prelude_lml_t)
corecmd_exec_bin(prelude_lml_t)
@@ -43935,7 +49964,7 @@ index b1bc02c..0c57041 100644
corenet_sendrecv_unlabeled_packets(prelude_lml_t)
corenet_tcp_connect_prelude_port(prelude_lml_t)
-@@ -247,7 +241,6 @@ dev_read_rand(prelude_lml_t)
+@@ -247,7 +235,6 @@ dev_read_rand(prelude_lml_t)
dev_read_urand(prelude_lml_t)
files_list_etc(prelude_lml_t)
@@ -43943,7 +49972,16 @@ index b1bc02c..0c57041 100644
files_read_etc_runtime_files(prelude_lml_t)
fs_getattr_all_fs(prelude_lml_t)
-@@ -283,7 +276,6 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -262,8 +249,6 @@ libs_read_lib_files(prelude_lml_t)
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(prelude_lml_t)
+ logging_read_generic_logs(prelude_lml_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(prelude_lml_t)
+-
+ sysnet_dns_name_resolve(prelude_lml_t)
+
+ userdom_read_all_users_state(prelude_lml_t)
+@@ -283,7 +268,6 @@ optional_policy(`
can_exec(httpd_prewikka_script_t, httpd_prewikka_script_exec_t)
@@ -43969,7 +50007,7 @@ index afd1751..5aff531 100644
init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, privoxy_initrc_exec_t)
domain_system_change_exemption($1)
diff --git a/privoxy.te b/privoxy.te
-index 2dbf4d4..06da119 100644
+index 2dbf4d4..daa7c93 100644
--- a/privoxy.te
+++ b/privoxy.te
@@ -46,10 +46,10 @@ logging_log_filetrans(privoxy_t, privoxy_log_t, file)
@@ -43993,7 +50031,7 @@ index 2dbf4d4..06da119 100644
corenet_sendrecv_http_cache_client_packets(privoxy_t)
corenet_sendrecv_squid_client_packets(privoxy_t)
corenet_sendrecv_http_cache_server_packets(privoxy_t)
-@@ -76,7 +77,6 @@ fs_search_auto_mountpoints(privoxy_t)
+@@ -76,18 +77,15 @@ fs_search_auto_mountpoints(privoxy_t)
domain_use_interactive_fds(privoxy_t)
@@ -44001,7 +50039,10 @@ index 2dbf4d4..06da119 100644
auth_use_nsswitch(privoxy_t)
-@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ miscfiles_read_localization(privoxy_t)
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(privoxy_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(privoxy_t)
+-
userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fds(privoxy_t)
userdom_dontaudit_search_user_home_dirs(privoxy_t)
# cjp: this should really not be needed
@@ -44048,7 +50089,7 @@ index b64b02f..166e9c3 100644
+ read_files_pattern($1, procmail_home_t, procmail_home_t)
+')
diff --git a/procmail.te b/procmail.te
-index 29b9295..c2ffb07 100644
+index 29b9295..23625fc 100644
--- a/procmail.te
+++ b/procmail.te
@@ -10,6 +10,9 @@ type procmail_exec_t;
@@ -44078,7 +50119,7 @@ index 29b9295..c2ffb07 100644
corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(procmail_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(procmail_t)
corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if(procmail_t)
-@@ -67,18 +69,26 @@ auth_use_nsswitch(procmail_t)
+@@ -67,17 +69,23 @@ auth_use_nsswitch(procmail_t)
corecmd_exec_bin(procmail_t)
corecmd_exec_shell(procmail_t)
@@ -44097,17 +50138,15 @@ index 29b9295..c2ffb07 100644
logging_send_syslog_msg(procmail_t)
+logging_append_all_logs(procmail_t)
- miscfiles_read_localization(procmail_t)
-
+-miscfiles_read_localization(procmail_t)
+list_dirs_pattern(procmail_t, procmail_home_t, procmail_home_t)
+read_files_pattern(procmail_t, procmail_home_t, procmail_home_t)
+userdom_search_user_home_dirs(procmail_t)
+userdom_search_admin_dir(procmail_t)
-+
+
# only works until we define a different type for maildir
userdom_manage_user_home_content_dirs(procmail_t)
- userdom_manage_user_home_content_files(procmail_t)
-@@ -87,8 +97,8 @@ userdom_manage_user_home_content_pipes(procmail_t)
+@@ -87,8 +95,8 @@ userdom_manage_user_home_content_pipes(procmail_t)
userdom_manage_user_home_content_sockets(procmail_t)
userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans_user_home_content(procmail_t, { dir file lnk_file fifo_file sock_file })
@@ -44118,7 +50157,7 @@ index 29b9295..c2ffb07 100644
mta_manage_spool(procmail_t)
mta_read_queue(procmail_t)
-@@ -97,21 +107,19 @@ ifdef(`hide_broken_symptoms',`
+@@ -97,21 +105,19 @@ ifdef(`hide_broken_symptoms',`
mta_dontaudit_rw_queue(procmail_t)
')
@@ -44148,7 +50187,7 @@ index 29b9295..c2ffb07 100644
')
optional_policy(`
-@@ -125,6 +133,11 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -125,6 +131,11 @@ optional_policy(`
postfix_read_spool_files(procmail_t)
postfix_read_local_state(procmail_t)
postfix_read_master_state(procmail_t)
@@ -44160,7 +50199,7 @@ index 29b9295..c2ffb07 100644
')
optional_policy(`
-@@ -134,6 +147,7 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -134,6 +145,7 @@ optional_policy(`
optional_policy(`
mta_read_config(procmail_t)
@@ -44313,7 +50352,7 @@ index bc329d1..20bb463 100644
admin_pattern($1, psad_tmp_t)
')
diff --git a/psad.te b/psad.te
-index d4000e0..0e04801 100644
+index d4000e0..7fbcae1 100644
--- a/psad.te
+++ b/psad.te
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ init_daemon_domain(psad_t, psad_exec_t)
@@ -44354,7 +50393,7 @@ index d4000e0..0e04801 100644
corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(psad_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(psad_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_node(psad_t)
-@@ -85,13 +85,12 @@ corenet_sendrecv_whois_client_packets(psad_t)
+@@ -85,22 +85,23 @@ corenet_sendrecv_whois_client_packets(psad_t)
dev_read_urand(psad_t)
files_read_etc_runtime_files(psad_t)
@@ -44369,7 +50408,9 @@ index d4000e0..0e04801 100644
logging_read_generic_logs(psad_t)
logging_read_syslog_config(psad_t)
logging_send_syslog_msg(psad_t)
-@@ -101,6 +100,10 @@ miscfiles_read_localization(psad_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(psad_t)
+-
sysnet_exec_ifconfig(psad_t)
optional_policy(`
@@ -44409,6 +50450,16 @@ index 96cc023..5919bbd 100644
########################################
## <summary>
## Execute ptchown in the ptchown domain, and
+diff --git a/ptchown.te b/ptchown.te
+index d90245a..546474f 100644
+--- a/ptchown.te
++++ b/ptchown.te
+@@ -28,4 +28,4 @@ term_setattr_all_ptys(ptchown_t)
+ term_use_generic_ptys(ptchown_t)
+ term_use_ptmx(ptchown_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(ptchown_t)
++auth_read_passwd(ptchown_t)
diff --git a/pulseaudio.fc b/pulseaudio.fc
index 84f23dc..5be2738 100644
--- a/pulseaudio.fc
@@ -44427,7 +50478,7 @@ index 84f23dc..5be2738 100644
/var/lib/pulse(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:pulseaudio_var_lib_t,s0)
diff --git a/pulseaudio.if b/pulseaudio.if
-index f40c64d..a3352d3 100644
+index f40c64d..d676e96 100644
--- a/pulseaudio.if
+++ b/pulseaudio.if
@@ -35,6 +35,9 @@ interface(`pulseaudio_role',`
@@ -44455,7 +50506,7 @@ index f40c64d..a3352d3 100644
')
########################################
-@@ -257,4 +262,68 @@ interface(`pulseaudio_manage_home_files',`
+@@ -257,4 +262,87 @@ interface(`pulseaudio_manage_home_files',`
userdom_search_user_home_dirs($1)
manage_files_pattern($1, pulseaudio_home_t, pulseaudio_home_t)
read_lnk_files_pattern($1, pulseaudio_home_t, pulseaudio_home_t)
@@ -44523,9 +50574,28 @@ index f40c64d..a3352d3 100644
+ userdom_admin_home_dir_filetrans($1, pulseaudio_home_t, dir, ".pulse")
+ userdom_admin_home_dir_filetrans($1, pulseaudio_home_t, file, ".pulse-cookie")
+ userdom_admin_home_dir_filetrans($1, pulseaudio_home_t, file, ".esd_auth")
++')
++
++########################################
++## <summary>
++## Allow the domain to read pulseaudio state files in /proc.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`pulseaudio_read_state',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type pulseaudio_t;
++ ')
++
++ kernel_search_proc($1)
++ ps_process_pattern($1, pulseaudio_t)
')
diff --git a/pulseaudio.te b/pulseaudio.te
-index 901ac9b..10dbb29 100644
+index 901ac9b..bef43f7 100644
--- a/pulseaudio.te
+++ b/pulseaudio.te
@@ -41,7 +41,13 @@ allow pulseaudio_t self:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket create_socket_perms;
@@ -44536,7 +50606,7 @@ index 901ac9b..10dbb29 100644
userdom_search_user_home_dirs(pulseaudio_t)
+pulseaudio_filetrans_home_content(pulseaudio_t)
+
-+# ~/.esd_auth - maybe we should label this pulseaudit_home_t?
++# ~/.esd_auth - maybe we should label this pulseaudio_home_t?
+userdom_read_user_home_content_files(pulseaudio_t)
+userdom_search_admin_dir(pulseaudio_t)
@@ -44559,7 +50629,14 @@ index 901ac9b..10dbb29 100644
corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(pulseaudio_t)
corenet_tcp_bind_pulseaudio_port(pulseaudio_t)
corenet_tcp_bind_soundd_port(pulseaudio_t)
-@@ -76,15 +81,14 @@ dev_write_sound(pulseaudio_t)
+@@ -70,32 +75,49 @@ corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_node(pulseaudio_t)
+ corenet_udp_bind_sap_port(pulseaudio_t)
+ corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if(pulseaudio_t)
+ corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_node(pulseaudio_t)
++corenet_dontaudit_tcp_connect_xserver_port(pulseaudio_t)
+
+ dev_read_sound(pulseaudio_t)
+ dev_write_sound(pulseaudio_t)
dev_read_sysfs(pulseaudio_t)
dev_read_urand(pulseaudio_t)
@@ -44577,14 +50654,9 @@ index 901ac9b..10dbb29 100644
auth_use_nsswitch(pulseaudio_t)
-@@ -92,10 +96,29 @@ logging_send_syslog_msg(pulseaudio_t)
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(pulseaudio_t)
- miscfiles_read_localization(pulseaudio_t)
-
--# cjp: this seems excessive. need to confirm
--userdom_manage_user_home_content_files(pulseaudio_t)
--userdom_manage_user_tmp_files(pulseaudio_t)
--userdom_manage_user_tmpfs_files(pulseaudio_t)
+-miscfiles_read_localization(pulseaudio_t)
+tunable_policy(`use_nfs_home_dirs',`
+ fs_mount_nfs(pulseaudio_t)
+ fs_mounton_nfs(pulseaudio_t)
@@ -44604,14 +50676,18 @@ index 901ac9b..10dbb29 100644
+ fs_manage_cifs_named_sockets(pulseaudio_t)
+ fs_manage_cifs_named_pipes(pulseaudio_t)
+')
-+
+
+-# cjp: this seems excessive. need to confirm
+-userdom_manage_user_home_content_files(pulseaudio_t)
+-userdom_manage_user_tmp_files(pulseaudio_t)
+-userdom_manage_user_tmpfs_files(pulseaudio_t)
+optional_policy(`
+ alsa_read_rw_config(pulseaudio_t)
+')
optional_policy(`
bluetooth_stream_connect(pulseaudio_t)
-@@ -125,16 +148,37 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -125,16 +147,37 @@ optional_policy(`
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -44649,7 +50725,7 @@ index 901ac9b..10dbb29 100644
udev_read_state(pulseaudio_t)
udev_read_db(pulseaudio_t)
')
-@@ -146,3 +190,7 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -146,3 +189,7 @@ optional_policy(`
xserver_read_xdm_pid(pulseaudio_t)
xserver_user_x_domain_template(pulseaudio, pulseaudio_t, pulseaudio_tmpfs_t)
')
@@ -44670,7 +50746,7 @@ index 2f1e529..8c0b242 100644
/usr/sbin/puppetmasterd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:puppetmaster_exec_t,s0)
diff --git a/puppet.if b/puppet.if
-index 2855a44..2f72e9a 100644
+index 2855a44..b7b5ee7 100644
--- a/puppet.if
+++ b/puppet.if
@@ -8,6 +8,53 @@
@@ -44727,7 +50803,7 @@ index 2855a44..2f72e9a 100644
################################################
## <summary>
## Read / Write to Puppet temp files. Puppet uses
-@@ -26,6 +73,82 @@ interface(`puppet_rw_tmp', `
+@@ -26,6 +73,178 @@ interface(`puppet_rw_tmp', `
type puppet_tmp_t;
')
@@ -44795,6 +50871,102 @@ index 2855a44..2f72e9a 100644
+
+#####################################
+## <summary>
++## Allow the specified domain to read puppet's log files.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`puppet_read_log',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type puppet_log_t;
++ ')
++
++ logging_search_logs($1)
++ read_files_pattern($1, puppet_log_t, puppet_log_t)
++')
++
++#####################################
++## <summary>
++## Allow the specified domain to create puppet's log files.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`puppet_create_log',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type puppet_log_t;
++ ')
++
++ logging_search_logs($1)
++ create_files_pattern($1, puppet_log_t, puppet_log_t)
++')
++
++####################################
++## <summary>
++## Allow the specified domain to append puppet's log files.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`puppet_append_log',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type puppet_log_t;
++ ')
++
++ logging_search_logs($1)
++ append_files_pattern($1, puppet_log_t, puppet_log_t)
++')
++
++####################################
++## <summary>
++## Allow the specified domain to manage puppet's log files.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`puppet_manage_log',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type puppet_log_t;
++ ')
++
++ logging_search_logs($1)
++ manage_files_pattern($1, puppet_log_t, puppet_log_t)
++')
++
++####################################
++## <summary>
++## Allow the specified domain to read puppet's config files.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`puppet_read_config',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type puppet_etc_t;
++ ')
++
++ logging_search_logs($1)
++ list_dirs_pattern($1, puppet_etc_t, puppet_etc_t)
++ read_files_pattern($1, puppet_etc_t, puppet_etc_t)
++')
++
++#####################################
++## <summary>
+## Allow the specified domain to search puppet's pid files.
+## </summary>
+## <param name="domain">
@@ -44812,7 +50984,7 @@ index 2855a44..2f72e9a 100644
+ allow $1 puppet_var_run_t:dir search_dir_perms;
+')
diff --git a/puppet.te b/puppet.te
-index baa88f6..f683a84 100644
+index baa88f6..050d953 100644
--- a/puppet.te
+++ b/puppet.te
@@ -13,6 +13,13 @@ policy_module(puppet, 1.3.0)
@@ -44875,7 +51047,7 @@ index baa88f6..f683a84 100644
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(puppet_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_node(puppet_t)
corenet_tcp_bind_generic_node(puppet_t)
-@@ -103,6 +117,7 @@ files_manage_config_files(puppet_t)
+@@ -103,11 +117,11 @@ files_manage_config_files(puppet_t)
files_manage_config_dirs(puppet_t)
files_manage_etc_dirs(puppet_t)
files_manage_etc_files(puppet_t)
@@ -44883,7 +51055,12 @@ index baa88f6..f683a84 100644
files_read_usr_symlinks(puppet_t)
files_relabel_config_dirs(puppet_t)
files_relabel_config_files(puppet_t)
-@@ -115,6 +130,8 @@ selinux_validate_context(puppet_t)
+
+-selinux_search_fs(puppet_t)
+ selinux_set_all_booleans(puppet_t)
+ selinux_set_generic_booleans(puppet_t)
+ selinux_validate_context(puppet_t)
+@@ -115,6 +129,8 @@ selinux_validate_context(puppet_t)
term_dontaudit_getattr_unallocated_ttys(puppet_t)
term_dontaudit_getattr_all_ttys(puppet_t)
@@ -44892,12 +51069,14 @@ index baa88f6..f683a84 100644
init_all_labeled_script_domtrans(puppet_t)
init_domtrans_script(puppet_t)
init_read_utmp(puppet_t)
-@@ -125,20 +142,22 @@ logging_send_syslog_msg(puppet_t)
- miscfiles_read_hwdata(puppet_t)
- miscfiles_read_localization(puppet_t)
+@@ -123,22 +139,23 @@ init_signull_script(puppet_t)
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(puppet_t)
--mount_domtrans(puppet_t)
+ miscfiles_read_hwdata(puppet_t)
+-miscfiles_read_localization(puppet_t)
-
+-mount_domtrans(puppet_t)
+
seutil_domtrans_setfiles(puppet_t)
seutil_domtrans_semanage(puppet_t)
+seutil_read_file_contexts(puppet_t)
@@ -44920,7 +51099,7 @@ index baa88f6..f683a84 100644
')
optional_policy(`
-@@ -146,6 +165,14 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -146,6 +163,14 @@ optional_policy(`
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -44935,7 +51114,7 @@ index baa88f6..f683a84 100644
portage_domtrans(puppet_t)
portage_domtrans_fetch(puppet_t)
portage_domtrans_gcc_config(puppet_t)
-@@ -164,8 +191,131 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -164,8 +189,134 @@ optional_policy(`
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -44999,6 +51178,10 @@ index baa88f6..f683a84 100644
+')
+
+optional_policy(`
++ openshift_initrc_domtrans(puppet_t)
++')
++
++optional_policy(`
+ quota_filetrans_named_content(puppet_t)
+')
+
@@ -45049,7 +51232,6 @@ index baa88f6..f683a84 100644
+
+logging_search_logs(puppetca_t)
+
-+miscfiles_read_localization(puppetca_t)
+miscfiles_read_generic_certs(puppetca_t)
+
+seutil_read_file_contexts(puppetca_t)
@@ -45069,7 +51251,7 @@ index baa88f6..f683a84 100644
')
########################################
-@@ -184,51 +334,84 @@ allow puppetmaster_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms;
+@@ -184,51 +335,83 @@ allow puppetmaster_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms;
list_dirs_pattern(puppetmaster_t, puppet_etc_t, puppet_etc_t)
read_files_pattern(puppetmaster_t, puppet_etc_t, puppet_etc_t)
@@ -45135,7 +51317,7 @@ index baa88f6..f683a84 100644
logging_send_syslog_msg(puppetmaster_t)
- miscfiles_read_localization(puppetmaster_t)
+-miscfiles_read_localization(puppetmaster_t)
+miscfiles_read_generic_certs(puppetmaster_t)
+
+seutil_read_file_contexts(puppetmaster_t)
@@ -45261,10 +51443,10 @@ index 0000000..86d25ea
+')
diff --git a/pwauth.te b/pwauth.te
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..8d2c891
+index 0000000..8f357cc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/pwauth.te
-@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+policy_module(pwauth, 1.0.0)
+
+########################################
@@ -45304,8 +51486,6 @@ index 0000000..8d2c891
+
+logging_send_syslog_msg(pwauth_t)
+logging_send_audit_msgs(pwauth_t)
-+
-+miscfiles_read_localization(pwauth_t)
diff --git a/pxe.fc b/pxe.fc
index 44b3a0c..5d247cb 100644
--- a/pxe.fc
@@ -45318,8 +51498,21 @@ index 44b3a0c..5d247cb 100644
+/var/log/pxe\.log.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:pxe_log_t,s0)
/var/run/pxe\.pid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:pxe_var_run_t,s0)
+diff --git a/pxe.te b/pxe.te
+index fec69eb..848c311 100644
+--- a/pxe.te
++++ b/pxe.te
+@@ -49,8 +49,6 @@ fs_search_auto_mountpoints(pxe_t)
+
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(pxe_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(pxe_t)
+-
+ userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fds(pxe_t)
+ userdom_dontaudit_search_user_home_dirs(pxe_t)
+
diff --git a/pyicqt.te b/pyicqt.te
-index a841221..fa2f1b7 100644
+index a841221..c653e4a 100644
--- a/pyicqt.te
+++ b/pyicqt.te
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ type pyicqt_conf_t;
@@ -45339,6 +51532,13 @@ index a841221..fa2f1b7 100644
corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(pyicqt_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(pyicqt_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_node(pyicqt_t)
+@@ -54,6 +53,5 @@ files_read_usr_files(pyicqt_t)
+
+ libs_read_lib_files(pyicqt_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(pyicqt_t)
+
+ sysnet_read_config(pyicqt_t)
diff --git a/pyzor.fc b/pyzor.fc
index d4a7750..a927c5a 100644
--- a/pyzor.fc
@@ -45434,7 +51634,7 @@ index 494f7e2..2c411af 100644
+ admin_pattern($1, pyzor_var_lib_t)
+')
diff --git a/pyzor.te b/pyzor.te
-index c8fb70b..84801f0 100644
+index c8fb70b..f7bf36e 100644
--- a/pyzor.te
+++ b/pyzor.te
@@ -1,42 +1,66 @@
@@ -45537,7 +51737,7 @@ index c8fb70b..84801f0 100644
########################################
#
-@@ -74,12 +98,15 @@ corenet_tcp_connect_http_port(pyzor_t)
+@@ -74,11 +98,13 @@ corenet_tcp_connect_http_port(pyzor_t)
dev_read_urand(pyzor_t)
@@ -45547,14 +51747,13 @@ index c8fb70b..84801f0 100644
auth_use_nsswitch(pyzor_t)
- miscfiles_read_localization(pyzor_t)
-
-+mta_read_queue(pyzor_t)
+-miscfiles_read_localization(pyzor_t)
+
++mta_read_queue(pyzor_t)
+
userdom_dontaudit_search_user_home_dirs(pyzor_t)
- optional_policy(`
-@@ -109,8 +136,8 @@ allow pyzord_t pyzor_etc_t:dir list_dir_perms;
+@@ -109,8 +135,8 @@ allow pyzord_t pyzor_etc_t:dir list_dir_perms;
can_exec(pyzord_t, pyzor_exec_t)
manage_files_pattern(pyzord_t, pyzord_log_t, pyzord_log_t)
@@ -45565,7 +51764,7 @@ index c8fb70b..84801f0 100644
kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(pyzord_t)
kernel_read_system_state(pyzord_t)
-@@ -119,7 +146,6 @@ dev_read_urand(pyzord_t)
+@@ -119,7 +145,6 @@ dev_read_urand(pyzord_t)
corecmd_exec_bin(pyzord_t)
@@ -45573,7 +51772,7 @@ index c8fb70b..84801f0 100644
corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(pyzord_t)
corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if(pyzord_t)
corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_node(pyzord_t)
-@@ -128,7 +154,6 @@ corenet_udp_bind_generic_node(pyzord_t)
+@@ -128,13 +153,11 @@ corenet_udp_bind_generic_node(pyzord_t)
corenet_udp_bind_pyzor_port(pyzord_t)
corenet_sendrecv_pyzor_server_packets(pyzord_t)
@@ -45581,8 +51780,14 @@ index c8fb70b..84801f0 100644
auth_use_nsswitch(pyzord_t)
+ locallogin_dontaudit_use_fds(pyzord_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(pyzord_t)
+
+ # Do not audit attempts to access /root.
+ userdom_dontaudit_search_user_home_dirs(pyzord_t)
diff --git a/qemu.if b/qemu.if
-index 268d691..8b40924 100644
+index 268d691..580f9ee 100644
--- a/qemu.if
+++ b/qemu.if
@@ -43,7 +43,6 @@ template(`qemu_domain_template',`
@@ -45593,7 +51798,11 @@ index 268d691..8b40924 100644
corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel($1_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if($1_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_node($1_t)
-@@ -76,7 +75,7 @@ template(`qemu_domain_template',`
+@@ -72,11 +71,10 @@ template(`qemu_domain_template',`
+ term_getattr_pty_fs($1_t)
+ term_use_generic_ptys($1_t)
+
+- miscfiles_read_localization($1_t)
sysnet_read_config($1_t)
@@ -45602,7 +51811,7 @@ index 268d691..8b40924 100644
userdom_attach_admin_tun_iface($1_t)
optional_policy(`
-@@ -98,61 +97,40 @@ template(`qemu_domain_template',`
+@@ -98,61 +96,40 @@ template(`qemu_domain_template',`
')
')
@@ -45677,7 +51886,7 @@ index 268d691..8b40924 100644
')
########################################
-@@ -256,20 +234,63 @@ interface(`qemu_kill',`
+@@ -256,20 +233,63 @@ interface(`qemu_kill',`
########################################
## <summary>
@@ -45747,7 +51956,7 @@ index 268d691..8b40924 100644
')
########################################
-@@ -307,3 +328,22 @@ interface(`qemu_manage_tmp_files',`
+@@ -307,3 +327,22 @@ interface(`qemu_manage_tmp_files',`
manage_files_pattern($1, qemu_tmp_t, qemu_tmp_t)
')
@@ -45858,10 +52067,18 @@ index 0055e54..edee505 100644
/usr/sbin/qmail-clean -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:qmail_clean_exec_t,s0)
/usr/sbin/qmail-getpw -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:qmail_exec_t,s0)
diff --git a/qmail.if b/qmail.if
-index a55bf44..c6dee66 100644
+index a55bf44..05e219e 100644
--- a/qmail.if
+++ b/qmail.if
-@@ -62,14 +62,13 @@ interface(`qmail_domtrans_inject',`
+@@ -44,7 +44,6 @@ template(`qmail_child_domain_template',`
+
+ fs_getattr_xattr_fs($1_t)
+
+- miscfiles_read_localization($1_t)
+ ')
+
+ ########################################
+@@ -62,14 +61,13 @@ interface(`qmail_domtrans_inject',`
type qmail_inject_t, qmail_inject_exec_t;
')
@@ -45877,7 +52094,7 @@ index a55bf44..c6dee66 100644
')
')
-@@ -88,14 +87,13 @@ interface(`qmail_domtrans_queue',`
+@@ -88,14 +86,13 @@ interface(`qmail_domtrans_queue',`
type qmail_queue_t, qmail_queue_exec_t;
')
@@ -45893,7 +52110,7 @@ index a55bf44..c6dee66 100644
')
')
-@@ -149,3 +147,59 @@ interface(`qmail_smtpd_service_domain',`
+@@ -149,3 +146,59 @@ interface(`qmail_smtpd_service_domain',`
domtrans_pattern(qmail_smtpd_t, $2, $1)
')
@@ -45954,7 +52171,7 @@ index a55bf44..c6dee66 100644
+ allow $1 qmail_spool_t:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms;
+')
diff --git a/qmail.te b/qmail.te
-index 355b2a2..c5cb56e 100644
+index 355b2a2..af2850e 100644
--- a/qmail.te
+++ b/qmail.te
@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ qmail_child_domain_template(qmail_smtpd, qmail_tcp_env_t)
@@ -45989,7 +52206,14 @@ index 355b2a2..c5cb56e 100644
allow qmail_inject_t qmail_queue_exec_t:file read_file_perms;
-@@ -88,11 +88,11 @@ qmail_read_config(qmail_inject_t)
+@@ -81,18 +81,17 @@ corecmd_search_bin(qmail_inject_t)
+
+ files_search_var(qmail_inject_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(qmail_inject_t)
+
+ qmail_read_config(qmail_inject_t)
+
########################################
#
# qmail-local local policy
@@ -46003,7 +52227,7 @@ index 355b2a2..c5cb56e 100644
allow qmail_local_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
manage_dirs_pattern(qmail_local_t, qmail_alias_home_t, qmail_alias_home_t)
-@@ -109,7 +109,6 @@ kernel_read_system_state(qmail_local_t)
+@@ -109,7 +108,6 @@ kernel_read_system_state(qmail_local_t)
corecmd_exec_bin(qmail_local_t)
corecmd_exec_shell(qmail_local_t)
@@ -46011,7 +52235,7 @@ index 355b2a2..c5cb56e 100644
files_read_etc_runtime_files(qmail_local_t)
auth_use_nsswitch(qmail_local_t)
-@@ -121,13 +120,17 @@ mta_append_spool(qmail_local_t)
+@@ -121,13 +119,17 @@ mta_append_spool(qmail_local_t)
qmail_domtrans_queue(qmail_local_t)
optional_policy(`
@@ -46030,7 +52254,7 @@ index 355b2a2..c5cb56e 100644
#
allow qmail_lspawn_t self:capability { setuid setgid };
-@@ -143,22 +146,21 @@ read_files_pattern(qmail_lspawn_t, qmail_spool_t, qmail_spool_t)
+@@ -143,22 +145,21 @@ read_files_pattern(qmail_lspawn_t, qmail_spool_t, qmail_spool_t)
corecmd_search_bin(qmail_lspawn_t)
@@ -46055,7 +52279,7 @@ index 355b2a2..c5cb56e 100644
manage_dirs_pattern(qmail_queue_t, qmail_spool_t, qmail_spool_t)
manage_files_pattern(qmail_queue_t, qmail_spool_t, qmail_spool_t)
-@@ -175,7 +177,7 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -175,7 +176,7 @@ optional_policy(`
########################################
#
# qmail-remote local policy
@@ -46064,7 +52288,7 @@ index 355b2a2..c5cb56e 100644
#
allow qmail_remote_t self:tcp_socket create_socket_perms;
-@@ -183,7 +185,6 @@ allow qmail_remote_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms;
+@@ -183,7 +184,6 @@ allow qmail_remote_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms;
rw_files_pattern(qmail_remote_t, qmail_spool_t, qmail_spool_t)
@@ -46072,7 +52296,7 @@ index 355b2a2..c5cb56e 100644
corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(qmail_remote_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(qmail_remote_t)
corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if(qmail_remote_t)
-@@ -202,7 +203,7 @@ sysnet_read_config(qmail_remote_t)
+@@ -202,7 +202,7 @@ sysnet_read_config(qmail_remote_t)
########################################
#
# qmail-rspawn local policy
@@ -46081,7 +52305,7 @@ index 355b2a2..c5cb56e 100644
#
allow qmail_rspawn_t self:process signal_perms;
-@@ -217,7 +218,7 @@ corecmd_search_bin(qmail_rspawn_t)
+@@ -217,7 +217,7 @@ corecmd_search_bin(qmail_rspawn_t)
########################################
#
# qmail-send local policy
@@ -46090,7 +52314,7 @@ index 355b2a2..c5cb56e 100644
#
allow qmail_send_t self:process signal_perms;
-@@ -236,7 +237,7 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -236,7 +236,7 @@ optional_policy(`
########################################
#
# qmail-smtpd local policy
@@ -46099,7 +52323,7 @@ index 355b2a2..c5cb56e 100644
#
allow qmail_smtpd_t self:process signal_perms;
-@@ -265,12 +266,11 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -265,27 +265,25 @@ optional_policy(`
########################################
#
# splogger local policy
@@ -46113,7 +52337,8 @@ index 355b2a2..c5cb56e 100644
init_dontaudit_use_script_fds(qmail_splogger_t)
-@@ -279,13 +279,13 @@ miscfiles_read_localization(qmail_splogger_t)
+-miscfiles_read_localization(qmail_splogger_t)
+
########################################
#
# qmail-start local policy
@@ -46129,7 +52354,7 @@ index 355b2a2..c5cb56e 100644
can_exec(qmail_start_t, qmail_start_exec_t)
-@@ -303,7 +303,7 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -303,7 +301,7 @@ optional_policy(`
########################################
#
# tcp-env local policy
@@ -46394,7 +52619,7 @@ index 5a9630c..bedca3a 100644
+ manage_files_pattern($1, qpidd_tmpfs_t, qpidd_tmpfs_t)
')
diff --git a/qpid.te b/qpid.te
-index cb7ecb5..172dc37 100644
+index cb7ecb5..68f26ad 100644
--- a/qpid.te
+++ b/qpid.te
@@ -12,12 +12,15 @@ init_daemon_domain(qpidd_t, qpidd_exec_t)
@@ -46415,7 +52640,7 @@ index cb7ecb5..172dc37 100644
########################################
#
# qpidd local policy
-@@ -30,27 +33,35 @@ allow qpidd_t self:shm create_shm_perms;
+@@ -30,34 +33,41 @@ allow qpidd_t self:shm create_shm_perms;
allow qpidd_t self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
allow qpidd_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
@@ -46457,15 +52682,14 @@ index cb7ecb5..172dc37 100644
logging_send_syslog_msg(qpidd_t)
-@@ -61,3 +72,8 @@ sysnet_dns_name_resolve(qpidd_t)
+-miscfiles_read_localization(qpidd_t)
+-
+ sysnet_dns_name_resolve(qpidd_t)
+
optional_policy(`
corosync_stream_connect(qpidd_t)
')
+
-+optional_policy(`
-+ matahari_manage_lib_files(qpidd_t)
-+ matahari_manage_pid_files(qpidd_t)
-+')
diff --git a/quantum.fc b/quantum.fc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9108437
@@ -46708,10 +52932,10 @@ index 0000000..010b2be
+')
diff --git a/quantum.te b/quantum.te
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..a5fa6b6
+index 0000000..6e15504
--- /dev/null
+++ b/quantum.te
-@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+policy_module(quantum, 1.0.0)
+
+########################################
@@ -46783,8 +53007,6 @@ index 0000000..a5fa6b6
+logging_send_audit_msgs(quantum_t)
+logging_send_syslog_msg(quantum_t)
+
-+miscfiles_read_localization(quantum_t)
-+
+sysnet_domtrans_ifconfig(quantum_t)
+
+optional_policy(`
@@ -46795,7 +53017,7 @@ index 0000000..a5fa6b6
+ sudo_exec(quantum_t)
+')
diff --git a/quota.fc b/quota.fc
-index f387230..e63f9c6 100644
+index f387230..0ee2489 100644
--- a/quota.fc
+++ b/quota.fc
@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
@@ -46804,7 +53026,7 @@ index f387230..e63f9c6 100644
/a?quota\.(user|group) -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:quota_db_t,s0)
-@@ -8,12 +9,18 @@ HOME_ROOT/a?quota\.(user|group) -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:quota_db_t,s0)
+@@ -8,12 +9,21 @@ HOME_ROOT/a?quota\.(user|group) -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:quota_db_t,s0)
/sbin/quota(check|on) -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:quota_exec_t,s0)
@@ -46823,6 +53045,9 @@ index f387230..e63f9c6 100644
+
+/usr/sbin/quota_nld -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:quota_nld_exec_t,s0)
+
++/var/lib/stickshift/a?quota\.(user|group) -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:quota_db_t,s0)
++/var/lib/openshift/a?quota\.(user|group) -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:quota_db_t,s0)
++
+/var/run/quota_nld\.pid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:quota_nld_var_run_t,s0)
diff --git a/quota.if b/quota.if
index bf75d99..3fb8575 100644
@@ -46940,7 +53165,7 @@ index bf75d99..3fb8575 100644
+ domtrans_pattern($1, quota_nld_exec_t, quota_nld_t)
+')
diff --git a/quota.te b/quota.te
-index 5dd42f5..634182b 100644
+index 5dd42f5..0df6e21 100644
--- a/quota.te
+++ b/quota.te
@@ -7,7 +7,8 @@ policy_module(quota, 1.5.0)
@@ -46967,7 +53192,7 @@ index 5dd42f5..634182b 100644
########################################
#
# Local policy
-@@ -34,6 +42,13 @@ files_home_filetrans(quota_t, quota_db_t, file)
+@@ -34,6 +42,17 @@ files_home_filetrans(quota_t, quota_db_t, file)
files_usr_filetrans(quota_t, quota_db_t, file)
files_var_filetrans(quota_t, quota_db_t, file)
files_spool_filetrans(quota_t, quota_db_t, file)
@@ -46978,10 +53203,14 @@ index 5dd42f5..634182b 100644
+ mta_spool_filetrans(quota_t, quota_db_t, file)
+ mta_spool_filetrans_queue(quota_t, quota_db_t, file)
+')
++
++optional_policy(`
++ openshift_lib_filetrans(quota_t, quota_db_t, file)
++')
kernel_list_proc(quota_t)
kernel_read_proc_symlinks(quota_t)
-@@ -72,7 +87,7 @@ init_use_script_ptys(quota_t)
+@@ -72,7 +91,7 @@ init_use_script_ptys(quota_t)
logging_send_syslog_msg(quota_t)
@@ -46990,7 +53219,7 @@ index 5dd42f5..634182b 100644
userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fds(quota_t)
optional_policy(`
-@@ -82,3 +97,33 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -82,3 +101,30 @@ optional_policy(`
optional_policy(`
udev_read_db(quota_t)
')
@@ -47009,15 +53238,12 @@ index 5dd42f5..634182b 100644
+
+kernel_read_network_state(quota_nld_t)
+
-+
+auth_use_nsswitch(quota_nld_t)
+
+init_read_utmp(quota_nld_t)
+
+logging_send_syslog_msg(quota_nld_t)
+
-+miscfiles_read_localization(quota_nld_t)
-+
+userdom_use_user_terminals(quota_nld_t)
+
+optional_policy(`
@@ -47066,10 +53292,10 @@ index 0000000..491bd1f
+')
diff --git a/rabbitmq.te b/rabbitmq.te
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..591ca32
+index 0000000..4cb2ad8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/rabbitmq.te
-@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
+@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+policy_module(rabbitmq, 1.0.0)
+
+########################################
@@ -47124,7 +53350,6 @@ index 0000000..591ca32
+
+files_read_etc_files(rabbitmq_beam_t)
+
-+miscfiles_read_localization(rabbitmq_beam_t)
+
+optional_policy(`
+ sysnet_dns_name_resolve(rabbitmq_beam_t)
@@ -47153,15 +53378,68 @@ index 0000000..591ca32
+files_read_etc_files(rabbitmq_epmd_t)
+
+logging_send_syslog_msg(rabbitmq_epmd_t)
-+
-+miscfiles_read_localization(rabbitmq_epmd_t)
-+
+diff --git a/radius.fc b/radius.fc
+index 09f7b50..61c6d34 100644
+--- a/radius.fc
++++ b/radius.fc
+@@ -9,6 +9,8 @@
+ /usr/sbin/radiusd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:radiusd_exec_t,s0)
+ /usr/sbin/freeradius -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:radiusd_exec_t,s0)
+
++/usr/lib/systemd/system/radiusd.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:radiusd_unit_file_t,s0)
++
+ /var/lib/radiousd(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:radiusd_var_lib_t,s0)
+
+ /var/log/freeradius(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:radiusd_log_t,s0)
+@@ -16,7 +18,7 @@
+ /var/log/radius(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:radiusd_log_t,s0)
+ /var/log/radius\.log.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:radiusd_log_t,s0)
+ /var/log/radiusd-freeradius(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:radiusd_log_t,s0)
+-/var/log/radutmp -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:radiusd_log_t,s0)
++/var/log/radutmp.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:radiusd_log_t,s0)
+ /var/log/radwtmp.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:radiusd_log_t,s0)
+
+ /var/run/radiusd(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:radiusd_var_run_t,s0)
diff --git a/radius.if b/radius.if
-index 75e5dc4..87d75fe 100644
+index 75e5dc4..a366f85 100644
--- a/radius.if
+++ b/radius.if
-@@ -38,8 +38,11 @@ interface(`radius_admin',`
- type radiusd_initrc_exec_t;
+@@ -14,6 +14,29 @@ interface(`radius_use',`
+ refpolicywarn(`$0($*) has been deprecated.')
+ ')
+
++#######################################
++## <summary>
++## Execute radiusd server in the radiusd domain.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed to transition.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`radiusd_systemctl',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type radiusd_unit_file_t;
++ type radiusd_t;
++ ')
++
++ systemd_exec_systemctl($1)
++ allow $1 radiusd_unit_file_t:file read_file_perms;
++ allow $1 radiusd_unit_file_t:service manage_service_perms;
++
++ ps_process_pattern($1, radiusd_t)
++')
++
+ ########################################
+ ## <summary>
+ ## All of the rules required to administrate
+@@ -35,11 +58,14 @@ interface(`radius_admin',`
+ gen_require(`
+ type radiusd_t, radiusd_etc_t, radiusd_log_t;
+ type radiusd_etc_rw_t, radiusd_var_lib_t, radiusd_var_run_t;
+- type radiusd_initrc_exec_t;
++ type radiusd_initrc_exec_t, radiusd_unit_file_t;
')
- allow $1 radiusd_t:process { ptrace signal_perms };
@@ -47173,11 +53451,31 @@ index 75e5dc4..87d75fe 100644
init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, radiusd_initrc_exec_t)
domain_system_change_exemption($1)
+@@ -59,4 +85,9 @@ interface(`radius_admin',`
+
+ files_list_pids($1)
+ admin_pattern($1, radiusd_var_run_t)
++
++ admin_pattern($1, radiusd_unit_file_t)
++ bind_systemctl($1)
++ allow $1 radiusd_unit_file_t:service all_service_perms;
++
+ ')
diff --git a/radius.te b/radius.te
-index b1ed1bf..fe6a9c7 100644
+index b1ed1bf..8b3f408 100644
--- a/radius.te
+++ b/radius.te
-@@ -62,11 +62,11 @@ manage_sock_files_pattern(radiusd_t, radiusd_var_run_t, radiusd_var_run_t)
+@@ -27,6 +27,9 @@ files_type(radiusd_var_lib_t)
+ type radiusd_var_run_t;
+ files_pid_file(radiusd_var_run_t)
+
++type radiusd_unit_file_t;
++systemd_unit_file(radiusd_unit_file_t)
++
+ ########################################
+ #
+ # Local policy
+@@ -62,11 +65,11 @@ manage_sock_files_pattern(radiusd_t, radiusd_var_run_t, radiusd_var_run_t)
manage_dirs_pattern(radiusd_t, radiusd_var_run_t, radiusd_var_run_t)
manage_files_pattern(radiusd_t, radiusd_var_run_t, radiusd_var_run_t)
files_pid_filetrans(radiusd_t, radiusd_var_run_t, { file sock_file dir })
@@ -47190,7 +53488,7 @@ index b1ed1bf..fe6a9c7 100644
corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(radiusd_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(radiusd_t)
corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if(radiusd_t)
-@@ -77,6 +77,7 @@ corenet_udp_sendrecv_all_ports(radiusd_t)
+@@ -77,6 +80,7 @@ corenet_udp_sendrecv_all_ports(radiusd_t)
corenet_udp_bind_generic_node(radiusd_t)
corenet_udp_bind_radacct_port(radiusd_t)
corenet_udp_bind_radius_port(radiusd_t)
@@ -47198,7 +53496,7 @@ index b1ed1bf..fe6a9c7 100644
corenet_tcp_connect_mysqld_port(radiusd_t)
corenet_tcp_connect_snmp_port(radiusd_t)
corenet_sendrecv_radius_server_packets(radiusd_t)
-@@ -99,7 +100,6 @@ corecmd_exec_shell(radiusd_t)
+@@ -99,7 +103,6 @@ corecmd_exec_shell(radiusd_t)
domain_use_interactive_fds(radiusd_t)
files_read_usr_files(radiusd_t)
@@ -47206,8 +53504,11 @@ index b1ed1bf..fe6a9c7 100644
files_read_etc_runtime_files(radiusd_t)
auth_use_nsswitch(radiusd_t)
-@@ -113,6 +113,8 @@ logging_send_syslog_msg(radiusd_t)
- miscfiles_read_localization(radiusd_t)
+@@ -110,9 +113,10 @@ libs_exec_lib_files(radiusd_t)
+
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(radiusd_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(radiusd_t)
miscfiles_read_generic_certs(radiusd_t)
+sysnet_use_ldap(radiusd_t)
@@ -47216,10 +53517,35 @@ index b1ed1bf..fe6a9c7 100644
userdom_dontaudit_search_user_home_dirs(radiusd_t)
diff --git a/radvd.if b/radvd.if
-index be05bff..7b00e1e 100644
+index be05bff..924fc0c 100644
--- a/radvd.if
+++ b/radvd.if
-@@ -19,12 +19,15 @@
+@@ -1,5 +1,24 @@
+ ## <summary>IPv6 router advertisement daemon</summary>
+
++######################################
++## <summary>
++## Read radvd PID files.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`radvd_read_pid_files',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type radvd_var_run_t;
++ ')
++
++ files_search_pids($1)
++ read_files_pattern($1, radvd_var_run_t, radvd_var_run_t)
++')
++
+ ########################################
+ ## <summary>
+ ## All of the rules required to administrate
+@@ -19,12 +38,15 @@
#
interface(`radvd_admin',`
gen_require(`
@@ -47239,7 +53565,7 @@ index be05bff..7b00e1e 100644
init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, radvd_initrc_exec_t)
domain_system_change_exemption($1)
diff --git a/radvd.te b/radvd.te
-index f9a2162..38354b2 100644
+index f9a2162..903be76 100644
--- a/radvd.te
+++ b/radvd.te
@@ -43,7 +43,6 @@ kernel_read_network_state(radvd_t)
@@ -47250,7 +53576,7 @@ index f9a2162..38354b2 100644
corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(radvd_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(radvd_t)
corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if(radvd_t)
-@@ -61,7 +60,6 @@ fs_search_auto_mountpoints(radvd_t)
+@@ -61,15 +60,12 @@ fs_search_auto_mountpoints(radvd_t)
domain_use_interactive_fds(radvd_t)
@@ -47258,6 +53584,14 @@ index f9a2162..38354b2 100644
files_list_usr(radvd_t)
auth_use_nsswitch(radvd_t)
+
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(radvd_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(radvd_t)
+-
+ userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fds(radvd_t)
+ userdom_dontaudit_search_user_home_dirs(radvd_t)
+
diff --git a/raid.fc b/raid.fc
index ed9c70d..c298507 100644
--- a/raid.fc
@@ -47308,7 +53642,7 @@ index b1a85b5..db0d815 100644
## </summary>
## <desc>
diff --git a/raid.te b/raid.te
-index a8a12b7..8543ebf 100644
+index a8a12b7..a6cbba3 100644
--- a/raid.te
+++ b/raid.te
@@ -10,11 +10,9 @@ type mdadm_exec_t;
@@ -47352,7 +53686,7 @@ index a8a12b7..8543ebf 100644
kernel_rw_software_raid_state(mdadm_t)
kernel_getattr_core_if(mdadm_t)
-@@ -52,14 +52,16 @@ dev_dontaudit_getattr_generic_blk_files(mdadm_t)
+@@ -52,15 +52,18 @@ dev_dontaudit_getattr_generic_blk_files(mdadm_t)
dev_read_realtime_clock(mdadm_t)
# unfortunately needed for DMI decoding:
dev_read_raw_memory(mdadm_t)
@@ -47370,9 +53704,11 @@ index a8a12b7..8543ebf 100644
+fs_list_hugetlbfs(mdadm_t)
+fs_list_auto_mountpoints(mdadm_t)
fs_dontaudit_list_tmpfs(mdadm_t)
++fs_manage_cgroup_files(mdadm_t)
mls_file_read_all_levels(mdadm_t)
-@@ -69,10 +71,13 @@ mls_file_write_all_levels(mdadm_t)
+ mls_file_write_all_levels(mdadm_t)
+@@ -69,16 +72,17 @@ mls_file_write_all_levels(mdadm_t)
storage_manage_fixed_disk(mdadm_t)
storage_dev_filetrans_fixed_disk(mdadm_t)
storage_read_scsi_generic(mdadm_t)
@@ -47386,7 +53722,13 @@ index a8a12b7..8543ebf 100644
init_dontaudit_getattr_initctl(mdadm_t)
logging_send_syslog_msg(mdadm_t)
-@@ -86,6 +91,10 @@ userdom_dontaudit_use_user_terminals(mdadm_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(mdadm_t)
+-
+ userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fds(mdadm_t)
+ userdom_dontaudit_search_user_home_content(mdadm_t)
+ userdom_dontaudit_use_user_terminals(mdadm_t)
+@@ -86,6 +90,10 @@ userdom_dontaudit_use_user_terminals(mdadm_t)
mta_send_mail(mdadm_t)
optional_policy(`
@@ -47417,7 +53759,7 @@ index 1efba0c..6e26673 100644
+#/var/lib/razor(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:razor_var_lib_t,s0)
+#/var/log/razor-agent\.log.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:razor_log_t,s0)
diff --git a/razor.if b/razor.if
-index f04a595..d6a6e1a 100644
+index f04a595..fee3b7c 100644
--- a/razor.if
+++ b/razor.if
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ template(`razor_common_domain_template',`
@@ -47437,7 +53779,15 @@ index f04a595..d6a6e1a 100644
manage_dirs_pattern($1_t, razor_log_t, razor_log_t)
manage_files_pattern($1_t, razor_log_t, razor_log_t)
-@@ -117,6 +118,7 @@ template(`razor_common_domain_template',`
+@@ -93,7 +94,6 @@ template(`razor_common_domain_template',`
+
+ libs_read_lib_files($1_t)
+
+- miscfiles_read_localization($1_t)
+
+ sysnet_read_config($1_t)
+ sysnet_dns_name_resolve($1_t)
+@@ -117,6 +117,7 @@ template(`razor_common_domain_template',`
## User domain for the role
## </summary>
## </param>
@@ -47445,7 +53795,7 @@ index f04a595..d6a6e1a 100644
#
interface(`razor_role',`
gen_require(`
-@@ -130,7 +132,10 @@ interface(`razor_role',`
+@@ -130,7 +131,10 @@ interface(`razor_role',`
# allow ps to show razor and allow the user to kill it
ps_process_pattern($2, razor_t)
@@ -47457,7 +53807,7 @@ index f04a595..d6a6e1a 100644
manage_dirs_pattern($2, razor_home_t, razor_home_t)
manage_files_pattern($2, razor_home_t, razor_home_t)
-@@ -157,3 +162,43 @@ interface(`razor_domtrans',`
+@@ -157,3 +161,43 @@ interface(`razor_domtrans',`
domtrans_pattern($1, razor_exec_t, razor_t)
')
@@ -47749,7 +54099,7 @@ index dee4adc..a7e4bc7 100644
+
+/usr/sbin/rdisc -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:rdisc_exec_t,s0)
diff --git a/rdisc.te b/rdisc.te
-index 0f07685..2e3ce6c 100644
+index 0f07685..1b75760 100644
--- a/rdisc.te
+++ b/rdisc.te
@@ -25,7 +25,6 @@ kernel_list_proc(rdisc_t)
@@ -47760,6 +54110,15 @@ index 0f07685..2e3ce6c 100644
corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(rdisc_t)
corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if(rdisc_t)
corenet_raw_sendrecv_generic_if(rdisc_t)
+@@ -43,8 +42,6 @@ files_read_etc_files(rdisc_t)
+
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(rdisc_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(rdisc_t)
+-
+ sysnet_read_config(rdisc_t)
+
+ userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fds(rdisc_t)
diff --git a/readahead.fc b/readahead.fc
index 7077413..0428aee 100644
--- a/readahead.fc
@@ -47826,7 +54185,7 @@ index 47c4723..64c8889 100644
+')
+
diff --git a/readahead.te b/readahead.te
-index b4ac57e..ef944a4 100644
+index b4ac57e..e384d8e 100644
--- a/readahead.te
+++ b/readahead.te
@@ -16,13 +16,14 @@ typealias readahead_var_lib_t alias readahead_etc_rw_t;
@@ -47845,7 +54204,7 @@ index b4ac57e..ef944a4 100644
dontaudit readahead_t self:capability { net_admin sys_tty_config };
allow readahead_t self:process { setsched signal_perms };
-@@ -31,13 +32,18 @@ manage_files_pattern(readahead_t, readahead_var_lib_t, readahead_var_lib_t)
+@@ -31,13 +32,19 @@ manage_files_pattern(readahead_t, readahead_var_lib_t, readahead_var_lib_t)
files_search_var_lib(readahead_t)
manage_files_pattern(readahead_t, readahead_var_run_t, readahead_var_run_t)
@@ -47858,19 +54217,22 @@ index b4ac57e..ef944a4 100644
kernel_read_all_sysctls(readahead_t)
kernel_read_system_state(readahead_t)
kernel_dontaudit_getattr_core_if(readahead_t)
++kernel_list_all_proc(readahead_t)
- dev_read_sysfs(readahead_t)
+-dev_read_sysfs(readahead_t)
++dev_rw_sysfs(readahead_t)
+dev_read_kmsg(readahead_t)
+dev_write_kmsg(readahead_t)
dev_getattr_generic_chr_files(readahead_t)
dev_getattr_generic_blk_files(readahead_t)
dev_getattr_all_chr_files(readahead_t)
-@@ -53,10 +59,18 @@ domain_read_all_domains_state(readahead_t)
+@@ -53,10 +60,19 @@ domain_read_all_domains_state(readahead_t)
files_list_non_security(readahead_t)
files_read_non_security_files(readahead_t)
+files_dontaudit_read_security_files(readahead_t)
files_create_boot_flag(readahead_t)
++files_delete_root_files(readahead_t)
files_getattr_all_pipes(readahead_t)
files_dontaudit_getattr_all_sockets(readahead_t)
files_dontaudit_getattr_non_security_blk_files(readahead_t)
@@ -47884,7 +54246,7 @@ index b4ac57e..ef944a4 100644
fs_getattr_all_fs(readahead_t)
fs_search_auto_mountpoints(readahead_t)
-@@ -66,12 +80,14 @@ fs_read_cgroup_files(readahead_t)
+@@ -66,12 +82,14 @@ fs_read_cgroup_files(readahead_t)
fs_read_tmpfs_files(readahead_t)
fs_read_tmpfs_symlinks(readahead_t)
fs_list_inotifyfs(readahead_t)
@@ -47899,7 +54261,7 @@ index b4ac57e..ef944a4 100644
storage_raw_read_fixed_disk(readahead_t)
-@@ -82,6 +98,8 @@ auth_dontaudit_read_shadow(readahead_t)
+@@ -82,13 +100,13 @@ auth_dontaudit_read_shadow(readahead_t)
init_use_fds(readahead_t)
init_use_script_ptys(readahead_t)
init_getattr_initctl(readahead_t)
@@ -47908,6 +54270,13 @@ index b4ac57e..ef944a4 100644
logging_send_syslog_msg(readahead_t)
logging_set_audit_parameters(readahead_t)
+ logging_dontaudit_search_audit_config(readahead_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(readahead_t)
+-
+ userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fds(readahead_t)
+ userdom_dontaudit_search_user_home_dirs(readahead_t)
+
diff --git a/realmd.fc b/realmd.fc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3c24ce4
@@ -47917,10 +54286,10 @@ index 0000000..3c24ce4
+/usr/lib/realmd/realmd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:realmd_exec_t,s0)
diff --git a/realmd.if b/realmd.if
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..48ea717
+index 0000000..e38693b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/realmd.if
-@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+
+## <summary>dbus system service which manages discovery and enrollment in realms and domains like Active Directory or IPA</summary>
+
@@ -47942,12 +54311,33 @@ index 0000000..48ea717
+ corecmd_search_bin($1)
+ domtrans_pattern($1, realmd_exec_t, realmd_t)
+')
++
++########################################
++## <summary>
++## Send and receive messages from
++## realmd over dbus.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`realmd_dbus_chat',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type realmd_t;
++ class dbus send_msg;
++ ')
++
++ allow $1 realmd_t:dbus send_msg;
++ allow realmd_t $1:dbus send_msg;
++')
diff --git a/realmd.te b/realmd.te
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..314e17e
+index 0000000..c994751
--- /dev/null
+++ b/realmd.te
-@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
+policy_module(realmd, 1.0.0)
+
+########################################
@@ -47958,42 +54348,101 @@ index 0000000..314e17e
+type realmd_t;
+type realmd_exec_t;
+application_domain(realmd_t, realmd_exec_t)
++role system_r types realmd_t;
+
+########################################
+#
+# realmd local policy
+#
+
-+allow realmd_t self:capability { kill };
++allow realmd_t self:capability sys_nice;
++allow realmd_t self:process setsched;
++
++kernel_read_system_state(realmd_t)
++
++corecmd_exec_bin(realmd_t)
++corecmd_exec_shell(realmd_t)
++
++corenet_tcp_connect_http_port(realmd_t)
+
+domain_use_interactive_fds(realmd_t)
+
++dev_read_rand(realmd_t)
++dev_read_urand(realmd_t)
++
+files_read_etc_files(realmd_t)
++files_read_usr_files(realmd_t)
++
++fs_getattr_all_fs(realmd_t)
++
++auth_use_nsswitch(realmd_t)
+
+logging_send_syslog_msg(realmd_t)
+
-+miscfiles_read_localization(realmd_t)
++sysnet_dns_name_resolve(realmd_t)
++systemd_exec_systemctl(realmd_t)
++
++#userdom_admin_home_dir_filetrans(realmd_t, cache_home_t, dir, ".cache")
++#userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans(realmd_t, cache_home_t, dir, ".cache")
++
++optional_policy(`
++ authconfig_domtrans(realmd_t)
++')
+
+optional_policy(`
+ dbus_system_domain(realmd_t, realmd_exec_t)
++
++ optional_policy(`
++ networkmanager_dbus_chat(realmd_t)
++ ')
++
++ optional_policy(`
++ policykit_dbus_chat(realmd_t)
++ ')
++')
++
++optional_policy(`
++ hostname_exec(realmd_t)
+')
+
+optional_policy(`
+ kerberos_use(realmd_t)
++ kerberos_rw_keytab(realmd_t)
++')
++
++optional_policy(`
++ nis_exec_ypbind(realmd_t)
++ nis_systemctl_ypbind(realmd_t)
++')
++
++optional_policy(`
++ gnome_read_config(realmd_t)
++ gnome_read_generic_cache_files(realmd_t)
++ gnome_write_generic_cache_files(realmd_t)
++ gnome_manage_cache_home_dir(realmd_t)
++
+')
+
+optional_policy(`
+ samba_domtrans_net(realmd_t)
-+ samba_read_config(realmd_t)
++ samba_manage_config(realmd_t)
++ samba_getattr_winbind(realmd_t)
+')
+
+optional_policy(`
-+ sssd_read_config(realmd_t)
-+ sssd_write_config(realmd_t)
-+ sssd_create_config(realmd_t)
++ sssd_getattr_exec(realmd_t)
++ sssd_manage_config(realmd_t)
++ sssd_manage_lib_files(realmd_t)
++ sssd_manage_public_files(realmd_t)
++ sssd_read_pid_files(realmd_t)
++ sssd_systemctl(realmd_t)
++')
++
++optional_policy(`
++ xserver_read_state_xdm(realmd_t)
+')
diff --git a/remotelogin.te b/remotelogin.te
-index 0a76027..a3bc03a 100644
+index 0a76027..18f59a7 100644
--- a/remotelogin.te
+++ b/remotelogin.te
@@ -10,9 +10,6 @@ domain_interactive_fd(remote_login_t)
@@ -48034,16 +54483,18 @@ index 0a76027..a3bc03a 100644
files_read_etc_runtime_files(remote_login_t)
files_list_home(remote_login_t)
files_read_usr_files(remote_login_t)
-@@ -77,7 +71,7 @@ files_list_mnt(remote_login_t)
+@@ -77,9 +71,8 @@ files_list_mnt(remote_login_t)
# for when /var/mail is a sym-link
files_read_var_symlinks(remote_login_t)
-sysnet_dns_name_resolve(remote_login_t)
+auth_use_nsswitch(remote_login_t)
- miscfiles_read_localization(remote_login_t)
+-miscfiles_read_localization(remote_login_t)
-@@ -87,34 +81,28 @@ userdom_search_user_home_content(remote_login_t)
+ userdom_use_unpriv_users_fds(remote_login_t)
+ userdom_search_user_home_content(remote_login_t)
+@@ -87,34 +80,28 @@ userdom_search_user_home_content(remote_login_t)
# since very weak authentication is used.
userdom_signal_unpriv_users(remote_login_t)
userdom_spec_domtrans_unpriv_users(remote_login_t)
@@ -48111,22 +54562,49 @@ index d457736..eabdd78 100644
files_search_pids($1)
+ stream_connect_pattern($1, resmgrd_var_run_t, resmgrd_var_run_t, resmgrd_t)
')
+diff --git a/resmgr.te b/resmgr.te
+index bf5efbf..b38b22d 100644
+--- a/resmgr.te
++++ b/resmgr.te
+@@ -53,8 +53,6 @@ storage_raw_write_removable_device(resmgrd_t)
+
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(resmgrd_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(resmgrd_t)
+-
+ userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fds(resmgrd_t)
+
+ optional_policy(`
diff --git a/rgmanager.fc b/rgmanager.fc
-index 3c97ef0..d3de440 100644
+index 3c97ef0..91e69b8 100644
--- a/rgmanager.fc
+++ b/rgmanager.fc
-@@ -1,6 +1,8 @@
+@@ -1,7 +1,22 @@
++/etc/rc\.d/init\.d/cpglockd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:rgmanager_initrc_exec_t,s0)
+/etc/rc\.d/init\.d/rgmanager -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:rgmanager_initrc_exec_t,s0)
++/etc/rc\.d/init\.d/heartbeat -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:rgmanager_initrc_exec_t,s0)
+
++/usr/sbin/cpglockd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:rgmanager_exec_t,s0)
/usr/sbin/rgmanager -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:rgmanager_exec_t,s0)
-/var/log/cluster/rgmanager\.log -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:rgmanager_var_log_t,s0)
++/usr/sbin/ccs_tool -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:rgmanager_exec_t,s0)
++/usr/sbin/cman_tool -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:rgmanager_exec_t,s0)
++
++/usr/lib/heartbeat(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:rgmanager_var_lib_t,s0)
++/usr/lib/heartbeat/heartbeat -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:rgmanager_exec_t,s0)
++/var/lib/heartbeat(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:rgmanager_var_lib_t,s0)
++
++/var/log/cluster/cpglockd\.log.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:rgmanager_var_log_t,s0)
+/var/log/cluster/rgmanager\.log.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:rgmanager_var_log_t,s0)
/var/run/cluster/rgmanager\.sk -s gen_context(system_u:object_r:rgmanager_var_run_t,s0)
++/var/run/cpglockd\.pid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:rgmanager_var_run_t,s0)
++/var/run/heartbeat(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:rgmanager_var_run_t,s0)
+ /var/run/rgmanager\.pid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:rgmanager_var_run_t,s0)
diff --git a/rgmanager.if b/rgmanager.if
-index 7dc38d1..808f9c6 100644
+index 7dc38d1..5bd6fdb 100644
--- a/rgmanager.if
+++ b/rgmanager.if
@@ -5,9 +5,9 @@
@@ -48150,7 +54628,7 @@ index 7dc38d1..808f9c6 100644
## </summary>
## <param name="domain">
## <summary>
-@@ -75,3 +75,67 @@ interface(`rgmanager_manage_tmpfs_files',`
+@@ -75,3 +75,91 @@ interface(`rgmanager_manage_tmpfs_files',`
fs_search_tmpfs($1)
manage_files_pattern($1, rgmanager_tmpfs_t, rgmanager_tmpfs_t)
')
@@ -48218,11 +54696,35 @@ index 7dc38d1..808f9c6 100644
+ files_list_pids($1)
+ admin_pattern($1, rgmanager_var_run_t)
+')
++
++
++######################################
++## <summary>
++## Allow the specified domain to manage rgmanager's lib/run files.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`rgmanager_manage_files',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type rgmanager_var_lib_t;
++ type rgmanager_var_run_t;
++ ')
++
++ files_list_var_lib($1)
++ admin_pattern($1, rgmanager_var_lib_t)
++
++ files_list_pids($1)
++ admin_pattern($1, rgmanager_var_run_t)
++')
diff --git a/rgmanager.te b/rgmanager.te
-index 3786c45..70bc902 100644
+index 3786c45..1ad9c12 100644
--- a/rgmanager.te
+++ b/rgmanager.te
-@@ -14,9 +14,11 @@ gen_tunable(rgmanager_can_network_connect, false)
+@@ -14,15 +14,20 @@ gen_tunable(rgmanager_can_network_connect, false)
type rgmanager_t;
type rgmanager_exec_t;
@@ -48235,7 +54737,16 @@ index 3786c45..70bc902 100644
type rgmanager_tmp_t;
files_tmp_file(rgmanager_tmp_t)
-@@ -35,9 +37,7 @@ files_pid_file(rgmanager_var_run_t)
+ type rgmanager_tmpfs_t;
+ files_tmpfs_file(rgmanager_tmpfs_t)
+
++type rgmanager_var_lib_t;
++files_type(rgmanager_var_lib_t)
++
+ type rgmanager_var_log_t;
+ logging_log_file(rgmanager_var_log_t)
+
+@@ -35,9 +40,7 @@ files_pid_file(rgmanager_var_run_t)
#
allow rgmanager_t self:capability { dac_override net_raw sys_resource sys_admin sys_nice ipc_lock };
@@ -48245,7 +54756,20 @@ index 3786c45..70bc902 100644
allow rgmanager_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms;
allow rgmanager_t self:unix_stream_socket { create_stream_socket_perms };
-@@ -55,11 +55,14 @@ fs_tmpfs_filetrans(rgmanager_t, rgmanager_tmpfs_t, { dir file })
+@@ -52,14 +55,27 @@ manage_dirs_pattern(rgmanager_t, rgmanager_tmpfs_t, rgmanager_tmpfs_t)
+ manage_files_pattern(rgmanager_t, rgmanager_tmpfs_t, rgmanager_tmpfs_t)
+ fs_tmpfs_filetrans(rgmanager_t, rgmanager_tmpfs_t, { dir file })
+
++# var/lib files
++# # needed by hearbeat
++can_exec(rgmanager_t, rgmanager_var_lib_t)
++manage_files_pattern(rgmanager_t, rgmanager_var_lib_t,rgmanager_var_lib_t)
++manage_dirs_pattern(rgmanager_t, rgmanager_var_lib_t,rgmanager_var_lib_t)
++manage_sock_files_pattern(rgmanager_t, rgmanager_var_lib_t,rgmanager_var_lib_t)
++manage_fifo_files_pattern(rgmanager_t, rgmanager_var_lib_t,rgmanager_var_lib_t)
++files_var_lib_filetrans(rgmanager_t,rgmanager_var_lib_t, { file dir fifo_file sock_file })
++
++
manage_files_pattern(rgmanager_t, rgmanager_var_log_t, rgmanager_var_log_t)
logging_log_filetrans(rgmanager_t, rgmanager_var_log_t, { file })
@@ -48261,7 +54785,7 @@ index 3786c45..70bc902 100644
kernel_read_system_state(rgmanager_t)
kernel_rw_rpc_sysctls(rgmanager_t)
kernel_search_debugfs(rgmanager_t)
-@@ -67,7 +70,6 @@ kernel_search_network_state(rgmanager_t)
+@@ -67,7 +83,6 @@ kernel_search_network_state(rgmanager_t)
corecmd_exec_bin(rgmanager_t)
corecmd_exec_shell(rgmanager_t)
@@ -48269,7 +54793,7 @@ index 3786c45..70bc902 100644
# need to write to /dev/misc/dlm-control
dev_rw_dlm_control(rgmanager_t)
-@@ -76,31 +78,37 @@ dev_search_sysfs(rgmanager_t)
+@@ -76,31 +91,35 @@ dev_search_sysfs(rgmanager_t)
domain_read_all_domains_state(rgmanager_t)
domain_getattr_all_domains(rgmanager_t)
@@ -48300,19 +54824,19 @@ index 3786c45..70bc902 100644
auth_dontaudit_getattr_shadow(rgmanager_t)
auth_use_nsswitch(rgmanager_t)
+-logging_send_syslog_msg(rgmanager_t)
+init_domtrans_script(rgmanager_t)
+init_initrc_domain(rgmanager_t)
-+
- logging_send_syslog_msg(rgmanager_t)
- miscfiles_read_localization(rgmanager_t)
+-miscfiles_read_localization(rgmanager_t)
++logging_send_syslog_msg(rgmanager_t)
-mount_domtrans(rgmanager_t)
+userdom_kill_all_users(rgmanager_t)
tunable_policy(`rgmanager_can_network_connect',`
corenet_tcp_connect_all_ports(rgmanager_t)
-@@ -118,6 +126,14 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -118,6 +137,14 @@ optional_policy(`
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -48327,7 +54851,7 @@ index 3786c45..70bc902 100644
fstools_domtrans(rgmanager_t)
')
-@@ -140,6 +156,16 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -140,6 +167,16 @@ optional_policy(`
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -48344,7 +54868,7 @@ index 3786c45..70bc902 100644
mysql_domtrans_mysql_safe(rgmanager_t)
mysql_stream_connect(rgmanager_t)
')
-@@ -165,6 +191,8 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -165,6 +202,8 @@ optional_policy(`
optional_policy(`
rpc_initrc_domtrans_nfsd(rgmanager_t)
rpc_initrc_domtrans_rpcd(rgmanager_t)
@@ -48354,14 +54878,15 @@ index 3786c45..70bc902 100644
rpc_domtrans_nfsd(rgmanager_t)
rpc_domtrans_rpcd(rgmanager_t)
diff --git a/rhcs.fc b/rhcs.fc
-index c2ba53b..1f935bf 100644
+index c2ba53b..977f2eb 100644
--- a/rhcs.fc
+++ b/rhcs.fc
-@@ -1,20 +1,25 @@
+@@ -1,22 +1,30 @@
/usr/sbin/dlm_controld -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:dlm_controld_exec_t,s0)
/usr/sbin/fenced -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:fenced_exec_t,s0)
/usr/sbin/fence_node -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:fenced_exec_t,s0)
+/usr/sbin/fence_tool -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:fenced_exec_t,s0)
++/usr/sbin/fence_virtd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:fenced_exec_t,s0)
/usr/sbin/gfs_controld -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:gfs_controld_exec_t,s0)
+/usr/sbin/foghorn -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:foghorn_exec_t,s0)
/usr/sbin/groupd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:groupd_exec_t,s0)
@@ -48377,14 +54902,19 @@ index c2ba53b..1f935bf 100644
/var/log/cluster/fenced\.log.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:fenced_var_log_t,s0)
/var/log/cluster/gfs_controld\.log.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:gfs_controld_var_log_t,s0)
/var/log/cluster/qdiskd\.log.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:qdiskd_var_log_t,s0)
++/var/log/dlm_controld(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:dlm_controld_var_log_t,s0)
/var/run/cluster/fenced_override -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:fenced_var_run_t,s0)
+/var/run/cluster/fence_scsi.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:fenced_var_run_t,s0)
/var/run/dlm_controld\.pid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:dlm_controld_var_run_t,s0)
- /var/run/fenced\.pid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:fenced_var_run_t,s0)
+-/var/run/fenced\.pid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:fenced_var_run_t,s0)
++/var/run/dlm_controld(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:dlm_controld_var_run_t,s0)
++/var/run/fence.* gen_context(system_u:object_r:fenced_var_run_t,s0)
/var/run/gfs_controld\.pid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:gfs_controld_var_run_t,s0)
+ /var/run/groupd\.pid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:groupd_var_run_t,s0)
+ /var/run/qdiskd\.pid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:qdiskd_var_run_t,s0)
diff --git a/rhcs.if b/rhcs.if
-index de37806..3e870b7 100644
+index de37806..aee7ba7 100644
--- a/rhcs.if
+++ b/rhcs.if
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@
@@ -48412,15 +54942,30 @@ index de37806..3e870b7 100644
files_pid_file($1_var_run_t)
##############################
-@@ -51,7 +51,6 @@ template(`rhcs_domain_template',`
+@@ -43,15 +43,20 @@ template(`rhcs_domain_template',`
+ manage_files_pattern($1_t, $1_tmpfs_t, $1_tmpfs_t)
+ fs_tmpfs_filetrans($1_t, $1_tmpfs_t, { dir file })
+
++ manage_dirs_pattern($1_t, $1_var_log_t, $1_var_log_t)
+ manage_files_pattern($1_t, $1_var_log_t, $1_var_log_t)
+ manage_sock_files_pattern($1_t, $1_var_log_t, $1_var_log_t)
+- logging_log_filetrans($1_t, $1_var_log_t, { file sock_file })
++ logging_log_filetrans($1_t, $1_var_log_t, { dir file sock_file })
+
++ manage_dirs_pattern($1_t, $1_var_run_t, $1_var_run_t)
+ manage_files_pattern($1_t, $1_var_run_t, $1_var_run_t)
manage_fifo_files_pattern($1_t, $1_var_run_t, $1_var_run_t)
manage_sock_files_pattern($1_t, $1_var_run_t, $1_var_run_t)
- files_pid_filetrans($1_t, $1_var_run_t, { file fifo_file })
--
+- files_pid_filetrans($1_t, $1_var_run_t, { file fifo_file })
++ files_pid_filetrans($1_t, $1_var_run_t, { dir file fifo_file })
++
++ auth_use_nsswitch($1_t)
+
++ logging_send_syslog_msg($1_t)
')
######################################
-@@ -59,9 +58,9 @@ template(`rhcs_domain_template',`
+@@ -59,9 +64,9 @@ template(`rhcs_domain_template',`
## Execute a domain transition to run dlm_controld.
## </summary>
## <param name="domain">
@@ -48432,7 +54977,7 @@ index de37806..3e870b7 100644
## </param>
#
interface(`rhcs_domtrans_dlm_controld',`
-@@ -133,6 +132,24 @@ interface(`rhcs_domtrans_fenced',`
+@@ -133,6 +138,24 @@ interface(`rhcs_domtrans_fenced',`
domtrans_pattern($1, fenced_exec_t, fenced_t)
')
@@ -48457,16 +55002,35 @@ index de37806..3e870b7 100644
######################################
## <summary>
## Allow read and write access to fenced semaphores.
-@@ -156,7 +173,7 @@ interface(`rhcs_rw_fenced_semaphores',`
+@@ -156,7 +179,26 @@ interface(`rhcs_rw_fenced_semaphores',`
######################################
## <summary>
-## Connect to fenced over an unix domain stream socket.
++## Read fenced PID files.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`rhcs_read_fenced_pid_files',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type fenced_var_run_t;
++ ')
++
++ files_search_pids($1)
++ read_files_pattern($1, fenced_var_run_t, fenced_var_run_t)
++')
++
++######################################
++## <summary>
+## Connect to fenced over a unix domain stream socket.
## </summary>
## <param name="domain">
## <summary>
-@@ -169,9 +186,8 @@ interface(`rhcs_stream_connect_fenced',`
+@@ -169,9 +211,8 @@ interface(`rhcs_stream_connect_fenced',`
type fenced_var_run_t, fenced_t;
')
@@ -48477,7 +55041,7 @@ index de37806..3e870b7 100644
')
#####################################
-@@ -237,7 +253,7 @@ interface(`rhcs_rw_gfs_controld_shm',`
+@@ -237,7 +278,7 @@ interface(`rhcs_rw_gfs_controld_shm',`
#####################################
## <summary>
@@ -48486,7 +55050,7 @@ index de37806..3e870b7 100644
## </summary>
## <param name="domain">
## <summary>
-@@ -335,6 +351,65 @@ interface(`rhcs_rw_groupd_shm',`
+@@ -335,6 +376,65 @@ interface(`rhcs_rw_groupd_shm',`
manage_files_pattern($1, groupd_tmpfs_t, groupd_tmpfs_t)
')
@@ -48552,7 +55116,7 @@ index de37806..3e870b7 100644
######################################
## <summary>
## Execute a domain transition to run qdiskd.
-@@ -353,3 +428,80 @@ interface(`rhcs_domtrans_qdiskd',`
+@@ -353,3 +453,80 @@ interface(`rhcs_domtrans_qdiskd',`
corecmd_search_bin($1)
domtrans_pattern($1, qdiskd_exec_t, qdiskd_t)
')
@@ -48634,7 +55198,7 @@ index de37806..3e870b7 100644
+ relabelfrom_files_pattern($1, cluster_var_lib_t, cluster_var_lib_t)
+')
diff --git a/rhcs.te b/rhcs.te
-index 93c896a..708da10 100644
+index 93c896a..8aa7362 100644
--- a/rhcs.te
+++ b/rhcs.te
@@ -12,7 +12,16 @@ policy_module(rhcs, 1.1.0)
@@ -48674,25 +55238,26 @@ index 93c896a..708da10 100644
#####################################
#
# dlm_controld local policy
-@@ -46,6 +61,7 @@ stream_connect_pattern(dlm_controld_t, fenced_var_run_t, fenced_var_run_t, fence
+@@ -46,6 +61,9 @@ stream_connect_pattern(dlm_controld_t, fenced_var_run_t, fenced_var_run_t, fence
stream_connect_pattern(dlm_controld_t, groupd_var_run_t, groupd_var_run_t, groupd_t)
kernel_read_system_state(dlm_controld_t)
+kernel_rw_net_sysctls(dlm_controld_t)
++
++corecmd_exec_bin(dlm_controld_t)
dev_rw_dlm_control(dlm_controld_t)
dev_rw_sysfs(dlm_controld_t)
-@@ -55,20 +71,17 @@ fs_manage_configfs_dirs(dlm_controld_t)
-
+@@ -56,7 +74,7 @@ fs_manage_configfs_dirs(dlm_controld_t)
init_rw_script_tmp_files(dlm_controld_t)
--optional_policy(`
+ optional_policy(`
- ccs_stream_connect(dlm_controld_t)
--')
--
++ corosync_rw_tmpfs(dlm_controld_t)
+ ')
+
#######################################
- #
- # fenced local policy
+@@ -65,10 +83,11 @@ optional_policy(`
#
allow fenced_t self:capability { sys_rawio sys_resource };
@@ -48705,35 +55270,40 @@ index 93c896a..708da10 100644
can_exec(fenced_t, fenced_exec_t)
-@@ -82,13 +95,19 @@ files_tmp_filetrans(fenced_t, fenced_tmp_t, { file fifo_file dir })
+@@ -82,13 +101,23 @@ files_tmp_filetrans(fenced_t, fenced_tmp_t, { file fifo_file dir })
stream_connect_pattern(fenced_t, groupd_var_run_t, groupd_var_run_t, groupd_t)
+kernel_read_system_state(fenced_t)
++kernel_read_network_state(fenced_t)
+
corecmd_exec_bin(fenced_t)
+corecmd_exec_shell(fenced_t)
+corenet_udp_bind_ionixnetmon_port(fenced_t)
+corenet_tcp_bind_zented_port(fenced_t)
++corenet_udp_bind_zented_port(fenced_t)
corenet_tcp_connect_http_port(fenced_t)
++corenet_tcp_connect_zented_port(fenced_t)
dev_read_sysfs(fenced_t)
dev_read_urand(fenced_t)
++dev_read_rand(fenced_t)
+files_read_usr_files(fenced_t)
files_read_usr_symlinks(fenced_t)
storage_raw_read_fixed_disk(fenced_t)
-@@ -97,6 +116,7 @@ storage_raw_read_removable_device(fenced_t)
+@@ -97,16 +126,37 @@ storage_raw_read_removable_device(fenced_t)
term_getattr_pty_fs(fenced_t)
term_use_ptmx(fenced_t)
+-
+-auth_use_nsswitch(fenced_t)
+term_use_generic_ptys(fenced_t)
- auth_use_nsswitch(fenced_t)
-
-@@ -105,8 +125,28 @@ tunable_policy(`fenced_can_network_connect',`
+ tunable_policy(`fenced_can_network_connect',`
+ corenet_tcp_connect_all_ports(fenced_t)
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -48742,11 +55312,13 @@ index 93c896a..708da10 100644
+ allow fenced_t self:capability { setuid setgid };
+
+ corenet_tcp_connect_ssh_port(fenced_t)
++ ')
++')
+
++optional_policy(`
+ ssh_exec(fenced_t)
+ ssh_read_user_home_files(fenced_t)
+ ')
-+')
+
+# needed by fence_scsi
+optional_policy(`
@@ -48763,7 +55335,7 @@ index 93c896a..708da10 100644
')
optional_policy(`
-@@ -114,13 +154,42 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -114,13 +164,52 @@ optional_policy(`
lvm_read_config(fenced_t)
')
@@ -48772,6 +55344,12 @@ index 93c896a..708da10 100644
+ snmp_manage_var_lib_dirs(fenced_t)
+')
+
++optional_policy(`
++ virt_domtrans(fenced_t)
++ virt_read_config(fenced_t)
++ virt_read_pid_files(fenced_t)
++ virt_stream_connect(fenced_t)
++')
+
+#######################################
+#
@@ -48786,14 +55364,18 @@ index 93c896a..708da10 100644
+
+dev_read_urand(foghorn_t)
+
++files_read_etc_files(foghorn_t)
+files_read_usr_files(foghorn_t)
+
++sysnet_dns_name_resolve(foghorn_t)
++
+optional_policy(`
+ dbus_connect_system_bus(foghorn_t)
+')
+
+optional_policy(`
+ snmp_read_snmp_var_lib_files(foghorn_t)
++ snmp_dontaudit_write_snmp_var_lib_files(foghorn_t)
+ snmp_stream_connect(foghorn_t)
+')
+
@@ -48807,7 +55389,7 @@ index 93c896a..708da10 100644
allow gfs_controld_t self:shm create_shm_perms;
allow gfs_controld_t self:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket create_socket_perms;
-@@ -139,10 +208,6 @@ storage_getattr_removable_dev(gfs_controld_t)
+@@ -139,10 +228,6 @@ storage_getattr_removable_dev(gfs_controld_t)
init_rw_script_tmp_files(gfs_controld_t)
optional_policy(`
@@ -48818,7 +55400,7 @@ index 93c896a..708da10 100644
lvm_exec(gfs_controld_t)
dev_rw_lvm_control(gfs_controld_t)
')
-@@ -154,12 +219,12 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -154,12 +239,12 @@ optional_policy(`
allow groupd_t self:capability { sys_nice sys_resource };
allow groupd_t self:process setsched;
@@ -48833,7 +55415,7 @@ index 93c896a..708da10 100644
init_rw_script_tmp_files(groupd_t)
-@@ -168,8 +233,7 @@ init_rw_script_tmp_files(groupd_t)
+@@ -168,8 +253,7 @@ init_rw_script_tmp_files(groupd_t)
# qdiskd local policy
#
@@ -48843,7 +55425,7 @@ index 93c896a..708da10 100644
allow qdiskd_t self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
allow qdiskd_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms;
-@@ -182,7 +246,7 @@ kernel_read_system_state(qdiskd_t)
+@@ -182,7 +266,7 @@ kernel_read_system_state(qdiskd_t)
kernel_read_software_raid_state(qdiskd_t)
kernel_getattr_core_if(qdiskd_t)
@@ -48852,28 +55434,31 @@ index 93c896a..708da10 100644
corecmd_exec_shell(qdiskd_t)
dev_read_sysfs(qdiskd_t)
-@@ -197,7 +261,8 @@ domain_dontaudit_getattr_all_sockets(qdiskd_t)
+@@ -197,19 +281,16 @@ domain_dontaudit_getattr_all_sockets(qdiskd_t)
files_dontaudit_getattr_all_sockets(qdiskd_t)
files_dontaudit_getattr_all_pipes(qdiskd_t)
-files_read_etc_files(qdiskd_t)
+
++files_read_usr_files(qdiskd_t)
++
+fs_list_hugetlbfs(qdiskd_t)
storage_raw_read_removable_device(qdiskd_t)
storage_raw_write_removable_device(qdiskd_t)
-@@ -207,10 +272,6 @@ storage_raw_write_fixed_disk(qdiskd_t)
- auth_use_nsswitch(qdiskd_t)
+ storage_raw_read_fixed_disk(qdiskd_t)
+ storage_raw_write_fixed_disk(qdiskd_t)
- optional_policy(`
+-auth_use_nsswitch(qdiskd_t)
+-
+-optional_policy(`
- ccs_stream_connect(qdiskd_t)
-')
-
--optional_policy(`
+ optional_policy(`
netutils_domtrans_ping(qdiskd_t)
')
-
-@@ -223,18 +284,28 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -223,18 +304,24 @@ optional_policy(`
# rhcs domains common policy
#
@@ -48886,18 +55471,16 @@ index 93c896a..708da10 100644
allow cluster_domain self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
allow cluster_domain self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms;
+-logging_send_syslog_msg(cluster_domain)
+manage_files_pattern(cluster_domain, cluster_var_lib_t, cluster_var_lib_t)
+manage_dirs_pattern(cluster_domain, cluster_var_lib_t, cluster_var_lib_t)
-+
- logging_send_syslog_msg(cluster_domain)
- miscfiles_read_localization(cluster_domain)
-
- optional_policy(`
+-miscfiles_read_localization(cluster_domain)
++optional_policy(`
+ ccs_stream_connect(cluster_domain)
+')
-+
-+optional_policy(`
+
+ optional_policy(`
corosync_stream_connect(cluster_domain)
')
+
@@ -48906,18 +55489,23 @@ index 93c896a..708da10 100644
+')
diff --git a/rhev.fc b/rhev.fc
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..48beae9
+index 0000000..4b66adf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/rhev.fc
-@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+/usr/share/rhev-agent/rhev-agentd\.py -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:rhev_agentd_exec_t,s0)
+/usr/share/ovirt-guest-agent -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:rhev_agentd_exec_t,s0)
+
++/usr/share/rhev-agent/LockActiveSession\.py -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:rhev_agentd_exec_t,s0)
++/usr/share/ovirt-guest-agent/LockActiveSession\.py -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:rhev_agentd_exec_t,s0)
++
+/usr/lib/systemd/system/ovirt-guest-agent.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:rhev_agentd_unit_file_t,s0)
+
+/var/run/rhev-agentd\.pid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:rhev_agentd_var_run_t,s0)
++/var/run/ovirt-guest-agent\.pid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:rhev_agentd_var_run_t,s0)
+
+/var/log/rhev-agent(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:rhev_agentd_log_t,s0)
++/var/log/ovirt-guest-agent(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:rhev_agentd_log_t,s0)
diff --git a/rhev.if b/rhev.if
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bf11e25
@@ -49002,10 +55590,10 @@ index 0000000..bf11e25
+')
diff --git a/rhev.te b/rhev.te
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..5a48fce
+index 0000000..51b00c0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/rhev.te
-@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
+@@ -0,0 +1,117 @@
+policy_module(rhev,1.0)
+
+########################################
@@ -49034,7 +55622,7 @@ index 0000000..5a48fce
+# rhev_agentd_t local policy
+#
+
-+allow rhev_agentd_t self:capability sys_nice;
++allow rhev_agentd_t self:capability { setuid setgid sys_nice };
+allow rhev_agentd_t self:process setsched;
+
+allow rhev_agentd_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms;
@@ -49046,6 +55634,8 @@ index 0000000..5a48fce
+files_pid_filetrans(rhev_agentd_t, rhev_agentd_var_run_t, { dir file sock_file })
+
+manage_files_pattern(rhev_agentd_t, rhev_agentd_log_t, rhev_agentd_log_t)
++manage_dirs_pattern(rhev_agentd_t, rhev_agentd_log_t, rhev_agentd_log_t)
++logging_log_filetrans(rhev_agentd_t, rhev_agentd_log_t, { dir file })
+
+manage_dirs_pattern(rhev_agentd_t, rhev_agentd_tmp_t, rhev_agentd_tmp_t)
+manage_files_pattern(rhev_agentd_t, rhev_agentd_tmp_t, rhev_agentd_tmp_t)
@@ -49062,7 +55652,10 @@ index 0000000..5a48fce
+
+term_use_virtio_console(rhev_agentd_t)
+
++fs_getattr_all_fs(rhev_agentd_t)
++
+files_getattr_all_mountpoints(rhev_agentd_t)
++files_search_all_mountpoints(rhev_agentd_t)
+files_read_usr_files(rhev_agentd_t)
+
+auth_use_nsswitch(rhev_agentd_t)
@@ -49072,8 +55665,6 @@ index 0000000..5a48fce
+libs_exec_ldconfig(rhev_agentd_t)
+logging_send_syslog_msg(rhev_agentd_t)
+
-+miscfiles_read_localization(rhev_agentd_t)
-+
+optional_policy(`
+ rpm_read_db(rhev_agentd_t)
+ rpm_dontaudit_manage_db(rhev_agentd_t)
@@ -49086,10 +55677,12 @@ index 0000000..5a48fce
+optional_policy(`
+ dbus_system_bus_client(rhev_agentd_t)
+ dbus_connect_system_bus(rhev_agentd_t)
++ dbus_session_bus_client(rhev_agentd_t)
+')
+
+optional_policy(`
+ xserver_dbus_chat_xdm(rhev_agentd_t)
++ xserver_stream_connect(rhev_agentd_t)
+')
+
+######################################
@@ -49100,13 +55693,16 @@ index 0000000..5a48fce
+optional_policy(`
+ userhelper_console_role_template(rhev_agentd, system_r, rhev_agentd_t)
+
-+ allow rhev_agentd_consolehelper_t rhev_agentd_log_t:file append;
++ allow rhev_agentd_consolehelper_t rhev_agentd_log_t:file rw_inherited_file_perms;
++ allow rhev_agentd_consolehelper_t rhev_agentd_tmp_t:file rw_inherited_file_perms;
+
+ can_exec(rhev_agentd_consolehelper_t, rhev_agentd_exec_t)
+ kernel_read_system_state(rhev_agentd_consolehelper_t)
+
+ term_use_virtio_console(rhev_agentd_consolehelper_t)
+
++ corenet_tcp_connect_xserver_port(rhev_agentd_consolehelper_t)
++
+ optional_policy(`
+ dbus_session_bus_client(rhev_agentd_consolehelper_t)
+ ')
@@ -49127,7 +55723,7 @@ index 96efae7..793a29f 100644
allow $1 rhgb_tmpfs_t:file rw_file_perms;
')
diff --git a/rhgb.te b/rhgb.te
-index 0f262a7..8f326ba 100644
+index 0f262a7..08c49bc 100644
--- a/rhgb.te
+++ b/rhgb.te
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ allow rhgb_t self:tcp_socket create_socket_perms;
@@ -49147,8 +55743,155 @@ index 0f262a7..8f326ba 100644
corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(rhgb_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(rhgb_t)
corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if(rhgb_t)
+@@ -97,7 +96,6 @@ libs_read_lib_files(rhgb_t)
+
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(rhgb_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(rhgb_t)
+ miscfiles_read_fonts(rhgb_t)
+ miscfiles_dontaudit_write_fonts(rhgb_t)
+
+diff --git a/rhnsd.fc b/rhnsd.fc
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..1936028
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/rhnsd.fc
+@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
++/etc/rc\.d/init\.d/rhnsd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:rhnsd_initrc_exec_t,s0)
++
++/usr/sbin/rhnsd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:rhnsd_exec_t,s0)
++
++/var/run/rhnsd\.pid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:rhnsd_var_run_t,s0)
+diff --git a/rhnsd.if b/rhnsd.if
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..d2a58c1
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/rhnsd.if
+@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
++
++## <summary>policy for rhnsd</summary>
++
++########################################
++## <summary>
++## Transition to rhnsd.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed to transition.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`rhnsd_domtrans',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type rhnsd_t, rhnsd_exec_t;
++ ')
++
++ corecmd_search_bin($1)
++ domtrans_pattern($1, rhnsd_exec_t, rhnsd_t)
++')
++
++########################################
++## <summary>
++## Execute rhnsd server in the rhnsd domain.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`rhnsd_initrc_domtrans',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type rhnsd_initrc_exec_t;
++ ')
++
++ init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, rhnsd_initrc_exec_t)
++')
++
++########################################
++## <summary>
++## All of the rules required to administrate
++## an rhnsd environment
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++## <param name="role">
++## <summary>
++## Role allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++## <rolecap/>
++#
++interface(`rhnsd_admin',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type rhnsd_t;
++ type rhnsd_initrc_exec_t;
++ ')
++
++ allow $1 rhnsd_t:process { ptrace signal_perms };
++ ps_process_pattern($1, rhnsd_t)
++
++ rhnsd_initrc_domtrans($1)
++ domain_system_change_exemption($1)
++ role_transition $2 rhnsd_initrc_exec_t system_r;
++ allow $2 system_r;
++ optional_policy(`
++ systemd_passwd_agent_exec($1)
++ systemd_read_fifo_file_passwd_run($1)
++ ')
++')
+diff --git a/rhnsd.te b/rhnsd.te
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..5b2757d
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/rhnsd.te
+@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
++policy_module(rhnsd, 1.0.0)
++
++########################################
++#
++# Declarations
++#
++
++type rhnsd_t;
++type rhnsd_exec_t;
++init_daemon_domain(rhnsd_t, rhnsd_exec_t)
++
++type rhnsd_var_run_t;
++files_pid_file(rhnsd_var_run_t)
++
++type rhnsd_initrc_exec_t;
++init_script_file(rhnsd_initrc_exec_t)
++
++########################################
++#
++# rhnsd local policy
++#
++
++allow rhnsd_t self:capability { kill };
++allow rhnsd_t self:process { fork signal };
++allow rhnsd_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms;
++allow rhnsd_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
++
++manage_dirs_pattern(rhnsd_t, rhnsd_var_run_t, rhnsd_var_run_t)
++manage_files_pattern(rhnsd_t, rhnsd_var_run_t, rhnsd_var_run_t)
++files_pid_filetrans(rhnsd_t, rhnsd_var_run_t, { dir file })
++
++corecmd_exec_bin(rhnsd_t)
++
++files_read_etc_files(rhnsd_t)
++
++logging_send_syslog_msg(rhnsd_t)
++
++optional_policy(`
++ # execute rhn_check
++ rpm_domtrans(rhnsd_t)
++')
diff --git a/rhsmcertd.if b/rhsmcertd.if
-index 137605a..7624759 100644
+index 137605a..fd40b90 100644
--- a/rhsmcertd.if
+++ b/rhsmcertd.if
@@ -194,13 +194,13 @@ interface(`rhsmcertd_read_pid_files',`
@@ -49205,7 +55948,20 @@ index 137605a..7624759 100644
')
########################################
-@@ -279,18 +279,7 @@ interface(`rhsmcertd_admin',`
+@@ -264,12 +264,6 @@ interface(`rhsmcertd_dontaudit_dbus_chat',`
+ ## Domain allowed access.
+ ## </summary>
+ ## </param>
+-## <param name="role">
+-## <summary>
+-## Role allowed access.
+-## </summary>
+-## </param>
+-## <rolecap/>
+ #
+ interface(`rhsmcertd_admin',`
+ gen_require(`
+@@ -279,18 +273,7 @@ interface(`rhsmcertd_admin',`
allow $1 rhsmcertd_t:process signal_perms;
ps_process_pattern($1, rhsmcertd_t)
@@ -49228,7 +55984,7 @@ index 137605a..7624759 100644
+ ')
')
diff --git a/rhsmcertd.te b/rhsmcertd.te
-index 783f678..f82fdec 100644
+index 783f678..14193ca 100644
--- a/rhsmcertd.te
+++ b/rhsmcertd.te
@@ -29,6 +29,9 @@ files_pid_file(rhsmcertd_var_run_t)
@@ -49236,12 +55992,12 @@ index 783f678..f82fdec 100644
#
+allow rhsmcertd_t self:capability sys_nice;
-+allow rhsmcertd_t self:process setsched;
++allow rhsmcertd_t self:process { signal setsched };
+
allow rhsmcertd_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms;
allow rhsmcertd_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
-@@ -43,17 +46,26 @@ manage_files_pattern(rhsmcertd_t, rhsmcertd_var_lib_t, rhsmcertd_var_lib_t)
+@@ -43,17 +46,36 @@ manage_files_pattern(rhsmcertd_t, rhsmcertd_var_lib_t, rhsmcertd_var_lib_t)
manage_dirs_pattern(rhsmcertd_t, rhsmcertd_var_run_t, rhsmcertd_var_run_t)
manage_files_pattern(rhsmcertd_t, rhsmcertd_var_run_t, rhsmcertd_var_run_t)
@@ -49254,21 +56010,32 @@ index 783f678..f82fdec 100644
+
corecmd_exec_bin(rhsmcertd_t)
++dev_read_rand(rhsmcertd_t)
dev_read_urand(rhsmcertd_t)
++dev_read_sysfs(rhsmcertd_t)
files_read_etc_files(rhsmcertd_t)
files_read_usr_files(rhsmcertd_t)
+files_manage_generic_locks(rhsmcertd_t)
+
+auth_read_passwd(rhsmcertd_t)
++
++logging_send_syslog_msg(rhsmcertd_t)
- miscfiles_read_localization(rhsmcertd_t)
+-miscfiles_read_localization(rhsmcertd_t)
-miscfiles_read_generic_certs(rhsmcertd_t)
+miscfiles_read_certs(rhsmcertd_t)
sysnet_dns_name_resolve(rhsmcertd_t)
+
-+rpm_read_db(rhsmcertd_t)
++
++optional_policy(`
++ dmidecode_domtrans(rhsmcertd_t)
++')
++
++optional_policy(`
++ gnome_dontaudit_search_config(rhsmcertd_t)
++')
diff --git a/ricci.fc b/ricci.fc
index 5b08327..4d5819e 100644
--- a/ricci.fc
@@ -49504,7 +56271,7 @@ index f7826f9..23d579c 100644
+ admin_pattern($1, ricci_var_run_t)
+')
diff --git a/ricci.te b/ricci.te
-index 33e72e8..c0a8abe 100644
+index 33e72e8..6b0ec3e 100644
--- a/ricci.te
+++ b/ricci.te
@@ -7,9 +7,11 @@ policy_module(ricci, 1.7.0)
@@ -49562,7 +56329,16 @@ index 33e72e8..c0a8abe 100644
files_read_etc_runtime_files(ricci_t)
files_create_boot_flag(ricci_t)
-@@ -170,6 +173,10 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -136,8 +139,6 @@ locallogin_dontaudit_use_fds(ricci_t)
+
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(ricci_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(ricci_t)
+-
+ sysnet_dns_name_resolve(ricci_t)
+
+ optional_policy(`
+@@ -170,6 +171,10 @@ optional_policy(`
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -49573,7 +56349,7 @@ index 33e72e8..c0a8abe 100644
unconfined_use_fds(ricci_t)
')
-@@ -193,15 +200,17 @@ corecmd_exec_shell(ricci_modcluster_t)
+@@ -193,29 +198,25 @@ corecmd_exec_shell(ricci_modcluster_t)
corecmd_exec_bin(ricci_modcluster_t)
corenet_tcp_bind_cluster_port(ricci_modclusterd_t)
@@ -49593,10 +56369,10 @@ index 33e72e8..c0a8abe 100644
init_exec(ricci_modcluster_t)
init_domtrans_script(ricci_modcluster_t)
-@@ -209,13 +218,9 @@ logging_send_syslog_msg(ricci_modcluster_t)
-
- miscfiles_read_localization(ricci_modcluster_t)
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(ricci_modcluster_t)
+-miscfiles_read_localization(ricci_modcluster_t)
+-
-modutils_domtrans_insmod(ricci_modcluster_t)
-
-mount_domtrans(ricci_modcluster_t)
@@ -49610,7 +56386,7 @@ index 33e72e8..c0a8abe 100644
optional_policy(`
aisexec_stream_connect(ricci_modcluster_t)
-@@ -233,7 +238,15 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -233,7 +234,15 @@ optional_policy(`
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -49627,7 +56403,7 @@ index 33e72e8..c0a8abe 100644
')
optional_policy(`
-@@ -241,8 +254,7 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -241,8 +250,7 @@ optional_policy(`
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -49637,7 +56413,7 @@ index 33e72e8..c0a8abe 100644
')
########################################
-@@ -261,6 +273,10 @@ allow ricci_modclusterd_t self:socket create_socket_perms;
+@@ -261,6 +269,10 @@ allow ricci_modclusterd_t self:socket create_socket_perms;
allow ricci_modclusterd_t ricci_modcluster_t:unix_stream_socket connectto;
allow ricci_modclusterd_t ricci_modcluster_t:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
@@ -49648,7 +56424,7 @@ index 33e72e8..c0a8abe 100644
allow ricci_modclusterd_t ricci_modcluster_var_log_t:dir setattr;
manage_files_pattern(ricci_modclusterd_t, ricci_modcluster_var_log_t, ricci_modcluster_var_log_t)
manage_sock_files_pattern(ricci_modclusterd_t, ricci_modcluster_var_log_t, ricci_modcluster_var_log_t)
-@@ -272,6 +288,7 @@ files_pid_filetrans(ricci_modclusterd_t, ricci_modcluster_var_run_t, { file sock
+@@ -272,6 +284,7 @@ files_pid_filetrans(ricci_modclusterd_t, ricci_modcluster_var_run_t, { file sock
kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(ricci_modclusterd_t)
kernel_read_system_state(ricci_modclusterd_t)
@@ -49656,7 +56432,7 @@ index 33e72e8..c0a8abe 100644
corecmd_exec_bin(ricci_modclusterd_t)
-@@ -283,7 +300,6 @@ corenet_tcp_connect_ricci_modcluster_port(ricci_modclusterd_t)
+@@ -283,7 +296,6 @@ corenet_tcp_connect_ricci_modcluster_port(ricci_modclusterd_t)
domain_read_all_domains_state(ricci_modclusterd_t)
@@ -49664,7 +56440,16 @@ index 33e72e8..c0a8abe 100644
files_read_etc_runtime_files(ricci_modclusterd_t)
fs_getattr_xattr_fs(ricci_modclusterd_t)
-@@ -334,7 +350,6 @@ corecmd_exec_bin(ricci_modlog_t)
+@@ -296,8 +308,6 @@ locallogin_dontaudit_use_fds(ricci_modclusterd_t)
+
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(ricci_modclusterd_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(ricci_modclusterd_t)
+-
+ sysnet_domtrans_ifconfig(ricci_modclusterd_t)
+
+ optional_policy(`
+@@ -334,12 +344,10 @@ corecmd_exec_bin(ricci_modlog_t)
domain_read_all_domains_state(ricci_modlog_t)
@@ -49672,17 +56457,23 @@ index 33e72e8..c0a8abe 100644
files_search_usr(ricci_modlog_t)
logging_read_generic_logs(ricci_modlog_t)
-@@ -361,7 +376,8 @@ kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(ricci_modrpm_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(ricci_modlog_t)
+
+ optional_policy(`
+ nscd_dontaudit_search_pid(ricci_modlog_t)
+@@ -361,9 +369,8 @@ kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(ricci_modrpm_t)
corecmd_exec_bin(ricci_modrpm_t)
files_search_usr(ricci_modrpm_t)
-files_read_etc_files(ricci_modrpm_t)
-+
-+logging_send_syslog_msg(ricci_modrpm_t)
- miscfiles_read_localization(ricci_modrpm_t)
+-miscfiles_read_localization(ricci_modrpm_t)
++logging_send_syslog_msg(ricci_modrpm_t)
-@@ -388,16 +404,15 @@ kernel_read_system_state(ricci_modservice_t)
+ optional_policy(`
+ oddjob_system_entry(ricci_modrpm_t, ricci_modrpm_exec_t)
+@@ -388,23 +395,24 @@ kernel_read_system_state(ricci_modservice_t)
corecmd_exec_bin(ricci_modservice_t)
corecmd_exec_shell(ricci_modservice_t)
@@ -49696,12 +56487,11 @@ index 33e72e8..c0a8abe 100644
-
init_domtrans_script(ricci_modservice_t)
+-miscfiles_read_localization(ricci_modservice_t)
+logging_send_syslog_msg(ricci_modservice_t)
-+
- miscfiles_read_localization(ricci_modservice_t)
optional_policy(`
-@@ -405,6 +420,10 @@ optional_policy(`
+ ccs_read_config(ricci_modservice_t)
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -49712,7 +56502,7 @@ index 33e72e8..c0a8abe 100644
nscd_dontaudit_search_pid(ricci_modservice_t)
')
-@@ -418,7 +437,6 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -418,7 +426,6 @@ optional_policy(`
#
allow ricci_modstorage_t self:process { setsched signal };
@@ -49720,7 +56510,7 @@ index 33e72e8..c0a8abe 100644
allow ricci_modstorage_t self:capability { mknod sys_nice };
allow ricci_modstorage_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms;
allow ricci_modstorage_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms;
-@@ -444,22 +462,22 @@ files_read_etc_runtime_files(ricci_modstorage_t)
+@@ -444,22 +451,20 @@ files_read_etc_runtime_files(ricci_modstorage_t)
files_read_usr_files(ricci_modstorage_t)
files_read_kernel_modules(ricci_modstorage_t)
@@ -49739,8 +56529,8 @@ index 33e72e8..c0a8abe 100644
logging_send_syslog_msg(ricci_modstorage_t)
- miscfiles_read_localization(ricci_modstorage_t)
-
+-miscfiles_read_localization(ricci_modstorage_t)
+-
-modutils_read_module_deps(ricci_modstorage_t)
-
-consoletype_exec(ricci_modstorage_t)
@@ -49750,7 +56540,7 @@ index 33e72e8..c0a8abe 100644
optional_policy(`
aisexec_stream_connect(ricci_modstorage_t)
corosync_stream_connect(ricci_modstorage_t)
-@@ -471,12 +489,24 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -471,12 +476,24 @@ optional_policy(`
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -49823,7 +56613,7 @@ index 63e78c6..fdd8228 100644
type rlogind_home_t;
')
diff --git a/rlogin.te b/rlogin.te
-index 16304ec..864f4b4 100644
+index 16304ec..3293b25 100644
--- a/rlogin.te
+++ b/rlogin.te
@@ -27,15 +27,14 @@ files_pid_file(rlogind_var_run_t)
@@ -49873,7 +56663,14 @@ index 16304ec..864f4b4 100644
files_read_etc_runtime_files(rlogind_t)
files_search_home(rlogind_t)
files_search_default(rlogind_t)
-@@ -88,27 +86,24 @@ seutil_read_config(rlogind_t)
+@@ -81,34 +79,29 @@ init_rw_utmp(rlogind_t)
+
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(rlogind_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(rlogind_t)
+-
+ seutil_read_config(rlogind_t)
+
userdom_setattr_user_ptys(rlogind_t)
# cjp: this is egregious
userdom_read_user_home_content_files(rlogind_t)
@@ -49913,6 +56710,129 @@ index 16304ec..864f4b4 100644
')
optional_policy(`
+diff --git a/rngd.fc b/rngd.fc
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..f6be09d
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/rngd.fc
+@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
++
++/etc/rc\.d/init\.d/rngd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:rngd_initrc_exec_t,s0)
++
++/usr/lib/systemd/system/rngd.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:rngd_unit_file_t,s0)
++
++/usr/sbin/rngd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:rngd_exec_t,s0)
+diff --git a/rngd.if b/rngd.if
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..8b505d5
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/rngd.if
+@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
++## <summary>Check and feed random data from hardware device to kernel random device.</summary>
++
++########################################
++## <summary>
++## Execute rngd in the rngd domain.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed to transition.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`rng_systemctl_rngd',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type rngd_t, rngd_unit_file_t;
++ ')
++
++ systemd_exec_systemctl($1)
++ allow $1 rngd_unit_file_t:file read_file_perms;
++ allow $1 rngd_unit_file_t:service manage_service_perms;
++
++ ps_process_pattern($1, rngd_t)
++')
++
++########################################
++## <summary>
++## All of the rules required to
++## administrate an rng environment.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++## <param name="role">
++## <summary>
++## Role allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++## <rolecap/>
++#
++interface(`rng_admin',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type rngd_t, rngd_initrc_exec_t, rngd_unit_file_t;
++ ')
++
++ allow $1 rngd_t:process signal_perms;
++ ps_process_pattern($1, rngd_t)
++
++ tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',`
++ allow $1 rngd_t:process ptrace;
++ ')
++
++ init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, rngd_initrc_exec_t)
++ domain_system_change_exemption($1)
++ role_transition $2 rngd_initrc_exec_t system_r;
++ allow $2 system_r;
++
++ rng_systemctl($1)
++ admin_pattern($1, rngd_unit_file_t)
++ allow $1 rngd_unit_file_t:service all_service_perms;
++')
+diff --git a/rngd.te b/rngd.te
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..50b6196
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/rngd.te
+@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
++policy_module(rngd, 1.0.0)
++
++########################################
++#
++# Declarations
++#
++
++type rngd_t;
++type rngd_exec_t;
++init_daemon_domain(rngd_t, rngd_exec_t)
++
++type rngd_initrc_exec_t;
++init_script_file(rngd_initrc_exec_t)
++
++type rngd_unit_file_t;
++systemd_unit_file(rngd_unit_file_t)
++
++########################################
++#
++# Local policy
++#
++
++allow rngd_t self:capability sys_admin;
++allow rngd_t self:process { signal };
++allow rngd_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms;
++allow rngd_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
++
++kernel_rw_kernel_sysctl(rngd_t)
++
++dev_read_rand(rngd_t)
++dev_read_urand(rngd_t)
++dev_rw_tpm(rngd_t)
++dev_write_rand(rngd_t)
++
++files_read_etc_files(rngd_t)
++
++logging_send_syslog_msg(rngd_t)
diff --git a/roundup.if b/roundup.if
index 30c4b75..e07c2ff 100644
--- a/roundup.if
@@ -49931,7 +56851,7 @@ index 30c4b75..e07c2ff 100644
init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, roundup_initrc_exec_t)
domain_system_change_exemption($1)
diff --git a/roundup.te b/roundup.te
-index 57f839f..c002c99 100644
+index 57f839f..090dd29 100644
--- a/roundup.te
+++ b/roundup.te
@@ -45,7 +45,6 @@ dev_read_sysfs(roundup_t)
@@ -49942,6 +56862,15 @@ index 57f839f..c002c99 100644
corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(roundup_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(roundup_t)
corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if(roundup_t)
+@@ -75,8 +74,6 @@ fs_search_auto_mountpoints(roundup_t)
+
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(roundup_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(roundup_t)
+-
+ sysnet_read_config(roundup_t)
+
+ userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fds(roundup_t)
diff --git a/rpc.fc b/rpc.fc
index 5c70c0c..b0c22f7 100644
--- a/rpc.fc
@@ -49977,7 +56906,7 @@ index 5c70c0c..b0c22f7 100644
/var/run/rpc\.statd\.pid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:rpcd_var_run_t,s0)
+
diff --git a/rpc.if b/rpc.if
-index dddabcf..90b3b52 100644
+index dddabcf..a61764b 100644
--- a/rpc.if
+++ b/rpc.if
@@ -32,7 +32,11 @@ interface(`rpc_stub',`
@@ -50001,7 +56930,15 @@ index dddabcf..90b3b52 100644
corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel($1_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if($1_t)
corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if($1_t)
-@@ -152,7 +155,7 @@ interface(`rpc_dontaudit_getattr_exports',`
+@@ -105,7 +108,6 @@ template(`rpc_domain_template', `
+
+ logging_send_syslog_msg($1_t)
+
+- miscfiles_read_localization($1_t)
+
+ userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fds($1_t)
+
+@@ -152,7 +154,7 @@ interface(`rpc_dontaudit_getattr_exports',`
type exports_t;
')
@@ -50010,7 +56947,7 @@ index dddabcf..90b3b52 100644
')
########################################
-@@ -188,7 +191,7 @@ interface(`rpc_write_exports',`
+@@ -188,7 +190,7 @@ interface(`rpc_write_exports',`
type exports_t;
')
@@ -50019,7 +56956,7 @@ index dddabcf..90b3b52 100644
')
########################################
-@@ -229,6 +232,29 @@ interface(`rpc_initrc_domtrans_nfsd',`
+@@ -229,6 +231,29 @@ interface(`rpc_initrc_domtrans_nfsd',`
########################################
## <summary>
@@ -50049,7 +56986,7 @@ index dddabcf..90b3b52 100644
## Execute domain in rpcd domain.
## </summary>
## <param name="domain">
-@@ -246,6 +272,32 @@ interface(`rpc_domtrans_rpcd',`
+@@ -246,6 +271,32 @@ interface(`rpc_domtrans_rpcd',`
allow rpcd_t $1:process signal;
')
@@ -50082,7 +57019,7 @@ index dddabcf..90b3b52 100644
#######################################
## <summary>
## Execute domain in rpcd domain.
-@@ -266,6 +318,29 @@ interface(`rpc_initrc_domtrans_rpcd',`
+@@ -266,6 +317,29 @@ interface(`rpc_initrc_domtrans_rpcd',`
########################################
## <summary>
@@ -50112,7 +57049,7 @@ index dddabcf..90b3b52 100644
## Read NFS exported content.
## </summary>
## <param name="domain">
-@@ -282,7 +357,7 @@ interface(`rpc_read_nfs_content',`
+@@ -282,7 +356,7 @@ interface(`rpc_read_nfs_content',`
allow $1 { nfsd_ro_t nfsd_rw_t }:dir list_dir_perms;
allow $1 { nfsd_ro_t nfsd_rw_t }:file read_file_perms;
@@ -50121,7 +57058,7 @@ index dddabcf..90b3b52 100644
')
########################################
-@@ -329,7 +404,7 @@ interface(`rpc_manage_nfs_ro_content',`
+@@ -329,7 +403,7 @@ interface(`rpc_manage_nfs_ro_content',`
########################################
## <summary>
@@ -50130,7 +57067,7 @@ index dddabcf..90b3b52 100644
## </summary>
## <param name="domain">
## <summary>
-@@ -337,17 +412,17 @@ interface(`rpc_manage_nfs_ro_content',`
+@@ -337,17 +411,17 @@ interface(`rpc_manage_nfs_ro_content',`
## </summary>
## </param>
#
@@ -50151,7 +57088,7 @@ index dddabcf..90b3b52 100644
## </summary>
## <param name="domain">
## <summary>
-@@ -355,17 +430,13 @@ interface(`rpc_tcp_rw_nfs_sockets',`
+@@ -355,17 +429,13 @@ interface(`rpc_tcp_rw_nfs_sockets',`
## </summary>
## </param>
#
@@ -50172,7 +57109,7 @@ index dddabcf..90b3b52 100644
## </summary>
## <param name="domain">
## <summary>
-@@ -373,13 +444,18 @@ interface(`rpc_udp_rw_nfs_sockets',`
+@@ -373,13 +443,18 @@ interface(`rpc_udp_rw_nfs_sockets',`
## </summary>
## </param>
#
@@ -50194,7 +57131,7 @@ index dddabcf..90b3b52 100644
## </summary>
## <param name="domain">
## <summary>
-@@ -387,13 +463,13 @@ interface(`rpc_udp_send_nfs',`
+@@ -387,13 +462,13 @@ interface(`rpc_udp_send_nfs',`
## </summary>
## </param>
#
@@ -50210,14 +57147,14 @@ index dddabcf..90b3b52 100644
')
########################################
-@@ -432,4 +508,5 @@ interface(`rpc_manage_nfs_state_data',`
+@@ -432,4 +507,5 @@ interface(`rpc_manage_nfs_state_data',`
files_search_var_lib($1)
manage_files_pattern($1, var_lib_nfs_t, var_lib_nfs_t)
+ allow $1 var_lib_nfs_t:file relabel_file_perms;
')
diff --git a/rpc.te b/rpc.te
-index 330d01f..b80dad2 100644
+index 330d01f..fd96b3c 100644
--- a/rpc.te
+++ b/rpc.te
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ policy_module(rpc, 1.14.0)
@@ -50256,12 +57193,14 @@ index 330d01f..b80dad2 100644
type nfsd_rw_t;
files_type(nfsd_rw_t)
-@@ -58,13 +64,14 @@ files_mountpoint(var_lib_nfs_t)
+@@ -58,13 +64,16 @@ files_mountpoint(var_lib_nfs_t)
# RPC local policy
#
-allow rpcd_t self:capability { sys_admin chown dac_override setgid setuid };
+allow rpcd_t self:capability { setpcap sys_admin chown dac_override setgid setuid };
++allow rpcd_t self:capability2 block_suspend;
++
allow rpcd_t self:process { getcap setcap };
allow rpcd_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms;
@@ -50274,7 +57213,7 @@ index 330d01f..b80dad2 100644
# rpc.statd executes sm-notify
can_exec(rpcd_t, rpcd_exec_t)
-@@ -81,12 +88,14 @@ corecmd_exec_bin(rpcd_t)
+@@ -81,21 +90,26 @@ corecmd_exec_bin(rpcd_t)
files_manage_mounttab(rpcd_t)
files_getattr_all_dirs(rpcd_t)
@@ -50289,16 +57228,20 @@ index 330d01f..b80dad2 100644
fs_getattr_all_fs(rpcd_t)
storage_getattr_fixed_disk_dev(rpcd_t)
-@@ -97,21 +106,41 @@ miscfiles_read_generic_certs(rpcd_t)
- seutil_dontaudit_search_config(rpcd_t)
++init_read_utmp(rpcd_t)
++
+ selinux_dontaudit_read_fs(rpcd_t)
+
+ miscfiles_read_generic_certs(rpcd_t)
+-seutil_dontaudit_search_config(rpcd_t)
+userdom_signal_unpriv_users(rpcd_t)
+userdom_read_user_home_content_files(rpcd_t)
-+
+
optional_policy(`
automount_signal(rpcd_t)
- automount_dontaudit_write_pipes(rpcd_t)
+@@ -103,15 +117,32 @@ optional_policy(`
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -50331,7 +57274,7 @@ index 330d01f..b80dad2 100644
allow nfsd_t exports_t:file read_file_perms;
allow nfsd_t { nfsd_rw_t nfsd_ro_t }:dir list_dir_perms;
-@@ -120,9 +149,16 @@ allow nfsd_t { nfsd_rw_t nfsd_ro_t }:dir list_dir_perms;
+@@ -120,9 +151,16 @@ allow nfsd_t { nfsd_rw_t nfsd_ro_t }:dir list_dir_perms;
kernel_read_system_state(nfsd_t)
kernel_read_network_state(nfsd_t)
kernel_dontaudit_getattr_core_if(nfsd_t)
@@ -50348,7 +57291,7 @@ index 330d01f..b80dad2 100644
dev_dontaudit_getattr_all_blk_files(nfsd_t)
dev_dontaudit_getattr_all_chr_files(nfsd_t)
-@@ -135,12 +171,12 @@ files_getattr_tmp_dirs(nfsd_t)
+@@ -135,12 +173,12 @@ files_getattr_tmp_dirs(nfsd_t)
# cjp: this should really have its own type
files_manage_mounttab(nfsd_t)
files_read_etc_runtime_files(nfsd_t)
@@ -50363,7 +57306,7 @@ index 330d01f..b80dad2 100644
storage_dontaudit_read_fixed_disk(nfsd_t)
storage_raw_read_removable_device(nfsd_t)
-@@ -148,8 +184,11 @@ storage_raw_read_removable_device(nfsd_t)
+@@ -148,8 +186,11 @@ storage_raw_read_removable_device(nfsd_t)
# Read access to public_content_t and public_content_rw_t
miscfiles_read_public_files(nfsd_t)
@@ -50376,7 +57319,7 @@ index 330d01f..b80dad2 100644
miscfiles_manage_public_files(nfsd_t)
')
-@@ -158,7 +197,6 @@ tunable_policy(`nfs_export_all_rw',`
+@@ -158,7 +199,6 @@ tunable_policy(`nfs_export_all_rw',`
dev_getattr_all_chr_files(nfsd_t)
fs_read_noxattr_fs_files(nfsd_t)
@@ -50384,7 +57327,7 @@ index 330d01f..b80dad2 100644
')
tunable_policy(`nfs_export_all_ro',`
-@@ -170,8 +208,11 @@ tunable_policy(`nfs_export_all_ro',`
+@@ -170,8 +210,12 @@ tunable_policy(`nfs_export_all_ro',`
fs_read_noxattr_fs_files(nfsd_t)
@@ -50395,10 +57338,11 @@ index 330d01f..b80dad2 100644
+
+optional_policy(`
+ mount_exec(nfsd_t)
++ mount_manage_pid_files(nfsd_t)
')
########################################
-@@ -181,7 +222,7 @@ tunable_policy(`nfs_export_all_ro',`
+@@ -181,7 +225,7 @@ tunable_policy(`nfs_export_all_ro',`
allow gssd_t self:capability { dac_override dac_read_search setuid sys_nice };
allow gssd_t self:process { getsched setsched };
@@ -50407,7 +57351,7 @@ index 330d01f..b80dad2 100644
manage_dirs_pattern(gssd_t, gssd_tmp_t, gssd_tmp_t)
manage_files_pattern(gssd_t, gssd_tmp_t, gssd_tmp_t)
-@@ -199,6 +240,7 @@ corecmd_exec_bin(gssd_t)
+@@ -199,6 +243,7 @@ corecmd_exec_bin(gssd_t)
fs_list_rpc(gssd_t)
fs_rw_rpc_sockets(gssd_t)
fs_read_rpc_files(gssd_t)
@@ -50415,7 +57359,7 @@ index 330d01f..b80dad2 100644
fs_list_inotifyfs(gssd_t)
files_list_tmp(gssd_t)
-@@ -210,14 +252,14 @@ auth_manage_cache(gssd_t)
+@@ -210,14 +255,14 @@ auth_manage_cache(gssd_t)
miscfiles_read_generic_certs(gssd_t)
@@ -50433,7 +57377,7 @@ index 330d01f..b80dad2 100644
')
optional_policy(`
-@@ -226,6 +268,11 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -226,6 +271,11 @@ optional_policy(`
optional_policy(`
kerberos_keytab_template(gssd, gssd_t)
@@ -50446,10 +57390,10 @@ index 330d01f..b80dad2 100644
optional_policy(`
diff --git a/rpcbind.fc b/rpcbind.fc
-index f5c47d6..482b584 100644
+index f5c47d6..164ce1f 100644
--- a/rpcbind.fc
+++ b/rpcbind.fc
-@@ -2,6 +2,9 @@
+@@ -2,8 +2,10 @@
/sbin/rpcbind -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:rpcbind_exec_t,s0)
@@ -50459,8 +57403,11 @@ index f5c47d6..482b584 100644
/var/lib/rpcbind(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:rpcbind_var_lib_t,s0)
/var/run/rpc.statd\.pid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:rpcbind_var_run_t,s0)
+-/var/run/rpcbind\.lock -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:rpcbind_var_run_t,s0)
+-/var/run/rpcbind\.sock -s gen_context(system_u:object_r:rpcbind_var_run_t,s0)
++/var/run/rpcbind.* gen_context(system_u:object_r:rpcbind_var_run_t,s0)
diff --git a/rpcbind.if b/rpcbind.if
-index a96249c..5f38427 100644
+index a96249c..ff1163f 100644
--- a/rpcbind.if
+++ b/rpcbind.if
@@ -34,8 +34,7 @@ interface(`rpcbind_stream_connect',`
@@ -50473,7 +57420,7 @@ index a96249c..5f38427 100644
')
########################################
-@@ -117,6 +116,24 @@ interface(`rpcbind_manage_lib_files',`
+@@ -117,6 +116,60 @@ interface(`rpcbind_manage_lib_files',`
########################################
## <summary>
@@ -50495,10 +57442,46 @@ index a96249c..5f38427 100644
+
+########################################
+## <summary>
++## Transition to rpcbind named content
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`rpcbind_filetrans_named_content',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type rpcbind_var_run_t;
++ ')
++
++ files_pid_filetrans($1, rpcbind_var_run_t, sock_file, "rpcbind.sock")
++')
++
++########################################
++## <summary>
++## Relabel from rpcbind sock file.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`rpcbind_relabel_sock_file',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type rpcbind_var_run_t;
++ ')
++
++ allow $1 rpcbind_var_run_t:sock_file relabel_sock_file_perms;
++')
++
++########################################
++## <summary>
## All of the rules required to administrate
## an rpcbind environment
## </summary>
-@@ -138,11 +155,20 @@ interface(`rpcbind_admin',`
+@@ -138,11 +191,20 @@ interface(`rpcbind_admin',`
type rpcbind_initrc_exec_t;
')
@@ -50522,7 +57505,7 @@ index a96249c..5f38427 100644
+ admin_pattern($1, rpcbind_var_run_t)
')
diff --git a/rpcbind.te b/rpcbind.te
-index a63e9ee..b4e1f32 100644
+index a63e9ee..e4a0c9b 100644
--- a/rpcbind.te
+++ b/rpcbind.te
@@ -43,7 +43,8 @@ kernel_read_system_state(rpcbind_t)
@@ -50535,8 +57518,15 @@ index a63e9ee..b4e1f32 100644
corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(rpcbind_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(rpcbind_t)
corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if(rpcbind_t)
-@@ -67,3 +68,11 @@ logging_send_syslog_msg(rpcbind_t)
- miscfiles_read_localization(rpcbind_t)
+@@ -62,8 +63,16 @@ domain_use_interactive_fds(rpcbind_t)
+ files_read_etc_files(rpcbind_t)
+ files_read_etc_runtime_files(rpcbind_t)
+
+-logging_send_syslog_msg(rpcbind_t)
++auth_read_passwd(rpcbind_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(rpcbind_t)
++logging_send_syslog_msg(rpcbind_t)
sysnet_dns_name_resolve(rpcbind_t)
+
@@ -50548,10 +57538,15 @@ index a63e9ee..b4e1f32 100644
+ nis_use_ypbind(rpcbind_t)
+')
diff --git a/rpm.fc b/rpm.fc
-index b2a0b6a..6167fe8 100644
+index b2a0b6a..ee55335 100644
--- a/rpm.fc
+++ b/rpm.fc
-@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@
+@@ -2,10 +2,12 @@
+ /bin/rpm -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:rpm_exec_t,s0)
+
+ /usr/bin/debuginfo-install -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:debuginfo_exec_t,s0)
++/usr/bin/dnf -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:rpm_exec_t,s0)
+ /usr/bin/rpm -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:rpm_exec_t,s0)
/usr/bin/smart -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:rpm_exec_t,s0)
/usr/bin/yum -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:rpm_exec_t,s0)
@@ -50559,7 +57554,7 @@ index b2a0b6a..6167fe8 100644
/usr/libexec/packagekitd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:rpm_exec_t,s0)
/usr/libexec/yumDBUSBackend.py -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:rpm_exec_t,s0)
-@@ -20,12 +21,18 @@
+@@ -20,12 +22,18 @@
/usr/share/yumex/yum_childtask\.py -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:rpm_exec_t,s0)
ifdef(`distro_redhat', `
@@ -50578,7 +57573,7 @@ index b2a0b6a..6167fe8 100644
')
/var/cache/PackageKit(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:rpm_var_cache_t,s0)
-@@ -36,9 +43,10 @@ ifdef(`distro_redhat', `
+@@ -36,9 +44,10 @@ ifdef(`distro_redhat', `
/var/lib/rpm(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:rpm_var_lib_t,s0)
/var/lib/yum(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:rpm_var_lib_t,s0)
@@ -50591,7 +57586,7 @@ index b2a0b6a..6167fe8 100644
/var/run/PackageKit(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:rpm_var_run_t,s0)
diff --git a/rpm.if b/rpm.if
-index 951d8f6..8ba0f86 100644
+index 951d8f6..bedc8ae 100644
--- a/rpm.if
+++ b/rpm.if
@@ -13,10 +13,13 @@
@@ -50630,7 +57625,7 @@ index 951d8f6..8ba0f86 100644
')
########################################
-@@ -178,6 +189,41 @@ interface(`rpm_rw_pipes',`
+@@ -178,6 +189,42 @@ interface(`rpm_rw_pipes',`
########################################
## <summary>
@@ -50663,6 +57658,7 @@ index 951d8f6..8ba0f86 100644
+ dontaudit $1 rpm_tmpfs_t:dir rw_dir_perms;
+ dontaudit $1 rpm_tmpfs_t:file rw_inherited_file_perms;
+ dontaudit $1 rpm_script_tmp_t:file rw_inherited_file_perms;
++ dontaudit $1 rpm_var_lib_t:dir getattr;
+ dontaudit $1 rpm_var_lib_t:file rw_inherited_file_perms;
+ dontaudit $1 rpm_var_cache_t:file rw_inherited_file_perms;
+')
@@ -50672,7 +57668,7 @@ index 951d8f6..8ba0f86 100644
## Send and receive messages from
## rpm over dbus.
## </summary>
-@@ -274,8 +320,7 @@ interface(`rpm_append_log',`
+@@ -274,8 +321,7 @@ interface(`rpm_append_log',`
type rpm_log_t;
')
@@ -50682,7 +57678,7 @@ index 951d8f6..8ba0f86 100644
')
########################################
-@@ -332,7 +377,9 @@ interface(`rpm_manage_script_tmp_files',`
+@@ -332,7 +378,9 @@ interface(`rpm_manage_script_tmp_files',`
')
files_search_tmp($1)
@@ -50692,7 +57688,7 @@ index 951d8f6..8ba0f86 100644
')
#####################################
-@@ -351,8 +398,7 @@ interface(`rpm_append_tmp_files',`
+@@ -351,8 +399,7 @@ interface(`rpm_append_tmp_files',`
type rpm_tmp_t;
')
@@ -50702,7 +57698,7 @@ index 951d8f6..8ba0f86 100644
')
########################################
-@@ -372,7 +418,9 @@ interface(`rpm_manage_tmp_files',`
+@@ -372,7 +419,9 @@ interface(`rpm_manage_tmp_files',`
')
files_search_tmp($1)
@@ -50712,7 +57708,7 @@ index 951d8f6..8ba0f86 100644
')
########################################
-@@ -456,6 +504,7 @@ interface(`rpm_read_db',`
+@@ -456,6 +505,7 @@ interface(`rpm_read_db',`
allow $1 rpm_var_lib_t:dir list_dir_perms;
read_files_pattern($1, rpm_var_lib_t, rpm_var_lib_t)
read_lnk_files_pattern($1, rpm_var_lib_t, rpm_var_lib_t)
@@ -50720,7 +57716,7 @@ index 951d8f6..8ba0f86 100644
')
########################################
-@@ -513,7 +562,7 @@ interface(`rpm_dontaudit_manage_db',`
+@@ -513,7 +563,7 @@ interface(`rpm_dontaudit_manage_db',`
type rpm_var_lib_t;
')
@@ -50729,7 +57725,7 @@ index 951d8f6..8ba0f86 100644
dontaudit $1 rpm_var_lib_t:file manage_file_perms;
dontaudit $1 rpm_var_lib_t:lnk_file manage_lnk_file_perms;
')
-@@ -573,3 +622,66 @@ interface(`rpm_pid_filetrans',`
+@@ -573,3 +623,66 @@ interface(`rpm_pid_filetrans',`
files_pid_filetrans($1, rpm_var_run_t, file)
')
@@ -50797,10 +57793,10 @@ index 951d8f6..8ba0f86 100644
+ allow rpm_script_t $1:process sigchld;
+')
diff --git a/rpm.te b/rpm.te
-index 60149a5..aa590f5 100644
+index 60149a5..b33a77d 100644
--- a/rpm.te
+++ b/rpm.te
-@@ -1,12 +1,11 @@
+@@ -1,15 +1,11 @@
policy_module(rpm, 1.15.0)
+attribute rpm_transition_domain;
@@ -50812,18 +57808,25 @@ index 60149a5..aa590f5 100644
-
-attribute_role rpm_roles;
-
- type debuginfo_exec_t;
- domain_entry_file(rpm_t, debuginfo_exec_t)
-
-@@ -17,7 +16,6 @@ domain_obj_id_change_exemption(rpm_t)
+-type debuginfo_exec_t;
+-domain_entry_file(rpm_t, debuginfo_exec_t)
+-
+ type rpm_t;
+ type rpm_exec_t;
+ init_system_domain(rpm_t, rpm_exec_t)
+@@ -17,7 +13,10 @@ domain_obj_id_change_exemption(rpm_t)
domain_role_change_exemption(rpm_t)
domain_system_change_exemption(rpm_t)
domain_interactive_fd(rpm_t)
-role rpm_roles types rpm_t;
++role system_r types rpm_t;
++
++type debuginfo_exec_t;
++domain_entry_file(rpm_t, debuginfo_exec_t)
type rpm_file_t;
files_type(rpm_file_t)
-@@ -50,7 +48,6 @@ corecmd_bin_entry_type(rpm_script_t)
+@@ -50,7 +49,6 @@ corecmd_bin_entry_type(rpm_script_t)
domain_type(rpm_script_t)
domain_entry_file(rpm_t, rpm_script_exec_t)
domain_interactive_fd(rpm_script_t)
@@ -50831,7 +57834,7 @@ index 60149a5..aa590f5 100644
role system_r types rpm_script_t;
type rpm_script_tmp_t;
-@@ -80,6 +77,9 @@ allow rpm_t self:shm create_shm_perms;
+@@ -80,6 +78,9 @@ allow rpm_t self:shm create_shm_perms;
allow rpm_t self:sem create_sem_perms;
allow rpm_t self:msgq create_msgq_perms;
allow rpm_t self:msg { send receive };
@@ -50841,7 +57844,7 @@ index 60149a5..aa590f5 100644
allow rpm_t rpm_log_t:file manage_file_perms;
logging_log_filetrans(rpm_t, rpm_log_t, file)
-@@ -105,17 +105,19 @@ files_var_filetrans(rpm_t, rpm_var_cache_t, dir)
+@@ -105,17 +106,19 @@ files_var_filetrans(rpm_t, rpm_var_cache_t, dir)
manage_files_pattern(rpm_t, rpm_var_lib_t, rpm_var_lib_t)
files_var_lib_filetrans(rpm_t, rpm_var_lib_t, dir)
@@ -50863,7 +57866,7 @@ index 60149a5..aa590f5 100644
corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(rpm_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(rpm_t)
corenet_raw_sendrecv_generic_if(rpm_t)
-@@ -131,6 +133,19 @@ corenet_sendrecv_all_client_packets(rpm_t)
+@@ -131,6 +134,19 @@ corenet_sendrecv_all_client_packets(rpm_t)
dev_list_sysfs(rpm_t)
dev_list_usbfs(rpm_t)
dev_read_urand(rpm_t)
@@ -50883,7 +57886,7 @@ index 60149a5..aa590f5 100644
fs_getattr_all_dirs(rpm_t)
fs_list_inotifyfs(rpm_t)
-@@ -158,8 +173,8 @@ storage_raw_read_fixed_disk(rpm_t)
+@@ -158,8 +174,8 @@ storage_raw_read_fixed_disk(rpm_t)
term_list_ptys(rpm_t)
@@ -50894,7 +57897,7 @@ index 60149a5..aa590f5 100644
auth_dontaudit_read_shadow(rpm_t)
auth_use_nsswitch(rpm_t)
-@@ -168,7 +183,6 @@ rpm_domtrans_script(rpm_t)
+@@ -168,7 +184,6 @@ rpm_domtrans_script(rpm_t)
domain_read_all_domains_state(rpm_t)
domain_getattr_all_domains(rpm_t)
@@ -50902,7 +57905,7 @@ index 60149a5..aa590f5 100644
domain_use_interactive_fds(rpm_t)
domain_dontaudit_getattr_all_pipes(rpm_t)
domain_dontaudit_getattr_all_tcp_sockets(rpm_t)
-@@ -177,23 +191,26 @@ domain_dontaudit_getattr_all_packet_sockets(rpm_t)
+@@ -177,23 +192,26 @@ domain_dontaudit_getattr_all_packet_sockets(rpm_t)
domain_dontaudit_getattr_all_raw_sockets(rpm_t)
domain_dontaudit_getattr_all_stream_sockets(rpm_t)
domain_dontaudit_getattr_all_dgram_sockets(rpm_t)
@@ -50931,7 +57934,7 @@ index 60149a5..aa590f5 100644
userdom_use_unpriv_users_fds(rpm_t)
optional_policy(`
-@@ -211,14 +228,15 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -211,14 +229,15 @@ optional_policy(`
optional_policy(`
networkmanager_dbus_chat(rpm_t)
')
@@ -50949,7 +57952,7 @@ index 60149a5..aa590f5 100644
# yum-updatesd requires this
unconfined_dbus_chat(rpm_t)
unconfined_dbus_chat(rpm_script_t)
-@@ -229,7 +247,8 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -229,7 +248,8 @@ optional_policy(`
# rpm-script Local policy
#
@@ -50959,7 +57962,7 @@ index 60149a5..aa590f5 100644
allow rpm_script_t self:process ~{ ptrace setcurrent setexec setfscreate setrlimit execheap };
allow rpm_script_t self:fd use;
allow rpm_script_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms;
-@@ -261,12 +280,18 @@ manage_sock_files_pattern(rpm_script_t, rpm_script_tmpfs_t, rpm_script_tmpfs_t)
+@@ -261,12 +281,18 @@ manage_sock_files_pattern(rpm_script_t, rpm_script_tmpfs_t, rpm_script_tmpfs_t)
fs_tmpfs_filetrans(rpm_script_t, rpm_script_tmpfs_t, { dir file lnk_file sock_file fifo_file })
can_exec(rpm_script_t, rpm_script_tmpfs_t)
@@ -50978,7 +57981,7 @@ index 60149a5..aa590f5 100644
dev_list_sysfs(rpm_script_t)
# ideally we would not need this
-@@ -286,7 +311,6 @@ fs_unmount_xattr_fs(rpm_script_t)
+@@ -286,7 +312,6 @@ fs_unmount_xattr_fs(rpm_script_t)
fs_search_auto_mountpoints(rpm_script_t)
mcs_killall(rpm_script_t)
@@ -50986,7 +57989,7 @@ index 60149a5..aa590f5 100644
mls_file_read_all_levels(rpm_script_t)
mls_file_write_all_levels(rpm_script_t)
-@@ -303,19 +327,20 @@ storage_raw_write_fixed_disk(rpm_script_t)
+@@ -303,19 +328,20 @@ storage_raw_write_fixed_disk(rpm_script_t)
term_getattr_unallocated_ttys(rpm_script_t)
term_list_ptys(rpm_script_t)
@@ -51011,15 +58014,20 @@ index 60149a5..aa590f5 100644
domain_use_interactive_fds(rpm_script_t)
domain_signal_all_domains(rpm_script_t)
domain_signull_all_domains(rpm_script_t)
-@@ -330,33 +355,37 @@ init_telinit(rpm_script_t)
+@@ -328,35 +354,41 @@ files_relabel_all_files(rpm_script_t)
+ init_domtrans_script(rpm_script_t)
+ init_telinit(rpm_script_t)
++systemd_config_all_services(rpm_script_t)
++
libs_exec_ld_so(rpm_script_t)
libs_exec_lib_files(rpm_script_t)
-libs_run_ldconfig(rpm_script_t, rpm_roles)
++libs_ldconfig_exec_entry_type(rpm_script_t)
logging_send_syslog_msg(rpm_script_t)
- miscfiles_read_localization(rpm_script_t)
+-miscfiles_read_localization(rpm_script_t)
+miscfiles_filetrans_named_content(rpm_script_t)
-modutils_run_depmod(rpm_script_t, rpm_roles)
@@ -51058,7 +58066,7 @@ index 60149a5..aa590f5 100644
')
optional_policy(`
-@@ -364,7 +393,7 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -364,7 +396,7 @@ optional_policy(`
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -51067,7 +58075,7 @@ index 60149a5..aa590f5 100644
')
optional_policy(`
-@@ -372,8 +401,13 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -372,8 +404,17 @@ optional_policy(`
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -51078,12 +58086,16 @@ index 60149a5..aa590f5 100644
+')
+
+optional_policy(`
++ openshift_initrc_domtrans(rpm_script_t)
++')
++
++optional_policy(`
+ tzdata_domtrans(rpm_t)
+ tzdata_domtrans(rpm_script_t)
')
optional_policy(`
-@@ -381,7 +415,7 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -381,7 +422,7 @@ optional_policy(`
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -51092,7 +58104,7 @@ index 60149a5..aa590f5 100644
unconfined_domtrans(rpm_script_t)
optional_policy(`
-@@ -394,6 +428,6 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -394,6 +435,6 @@ optional_policy(`
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -51102,7 +58114,7 @@ index 60149a5..aa590f5 100644
+ usermanage_domtrans_useradd(rpm_script_t)
')
diff --git a/rshd.te b/rshd.te
-index 0b405d1..df2ecae 100644
+index 0b405d1..23c58c2 100644
--- a/rshd.te
+++ b/rshd.te
@@ -22,7 +22,6 @@ allow rshd_t self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
@@ -51122,7 +58134,13 @@ index 0b405d1..df2ecae 100644
selinux_get_fs_mount(rshd_t)
selinux_validate_context(rshd_t)
selinux_compute_access_vector(rshd_t)
-@@ -66,20 +67,12 @@ seutil_read_config(rshd_t)
+@@ -60,26 +61,16 @@ init_rw_utmp(rshd_t)
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(rshd_t)
+ logging_search_logs(rshd_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(rshd_t)
+-
+ seutil_read_config(rshd_t)
seutil_read_default_contexts(rshd_t)
userdom_search_user_home_content(rshd_t)
@@ -51154,7 +58172,7 @@ index 4c091ca..a58f123 100644
+
+/usr/libexec/rssh_chroot_helper -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:rssh_chroot_helper_exec_t,s0)
diff --git a/rssh.te b/rssh.te
-index ffb9605..11dbdb2 100644
+index ffb9605..4bb7119 100644
--- a/rssh.te
+++ b/rssh.te
@@ -63,7 +63,6 @@ manage_files_pattern(rssh_t, rssh_rw_t, rssh_rw_t)
@@ -51165,14 +58183,26 @@ index ffb9605..11dbdb2 100644
files_read_etc_runtime_files(rssh_t)
files_list_home(rssh_t)
files_read_usr_files(rssh_t)
-@@ -95,7 +94,6 @@ allow rssh_chroot_helper_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
+@@ -73,8 +72,6 @@ fs_search_auto_mountpoints(rssh_t)
+
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(rssh_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(rssh_t)
+-
+ rssh_domtrans_chroot_helper(rssh_t)
+
+ ssh_rw_tcp_sockets(rssh_t)
+@@ -95,10 +92,6 @@ allow rssh_chroot_helper_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
domain_use_interactive_fds(rssh_chroot_helper_t)
-files_read_etc_files(rssh_chroot_helper_t)
-
+-
auth_use_nsswitch(rssh_chroot_helper_t)
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(rssh_chroot_helper_t)
+-
+-miscfiles_read_localization(rssh_chroot_helper_t)
diff --git a/rsync.fc b/rsync.fc
index 479615b..2d77839 100644
--- a/rsync.fc
@@ -51262,7 +58292,7 @@ index 3386f29..8d8f6c5 100644
+ files_etc_filetrans($1, rsync_etc_t, $2)
+')
diff --git a/rsync.te b/rsync.te
-index 2834d86..d01aa87 100644
+index 2834d86..8fdd060 100644
--- a/rsync.te
+++ b/rsync.te
@@ -7,6 +7,27 @@ policy_module(rsync, 1.12.0)
@@ -51319,39 +58349,32 @@ index 2834d86..d01aa87 100644
corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(rsync_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(rsync_t)
corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if(rsync_t)
-@@ -95,7 +115,6 @@ dev_read_urand(rsync_t)
+@@ -94,18 +114,19 @@ corenet_sendrecv_rsync_server_packets(rsync_t)
+ dev_read_urand(rsync_t)
fs_getattr_xattr_fs(rsync_t)
++fs_search_auto_mountpoints(rsync_t)
-files_read_etc_files(rsync_t)
files_search_home(rsync_t)
auth_use_nsswitch(rsync_t)
-@@ -105,7 +124,7 @@ logging_send_syslog_msg(rsync_t)
- miscfiles_read_localization(rsync_t)
+
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(rsync_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(rsync_t)
miscfiles_read_public_files(rsync_t)
-tunable_policy(`allow_rsync_anon_write',`
++userdom_home_manager(rsync_t)
++
+tunable_policy(`rsync_anon_write',`
miscfiles_manage_public_files(rsync_t)
')
-@@ -121,13 +140,39 @@ optional_policy(`
- inetd_service_domain(rsync_t, rsync_exec_t)
+@@ -122,12 +143,26 @@ optional_policy(`
')
-+tunable_policy(`rsync_use_cifs',`
-+ fs_list_cifs(rsync_t)
-+ fs_read_cifs_files(rsync_t)
-+ fs_read_cifs_symlinks(rsync_t)
-+')
-+
-+tunable_policy(`rsync_use_nfs',`
-+ fs_list_nfs(rsync_t)
-+ fs_read_nfs_files(rsync_t)
-+ fs_read_nfs_symlinks(rsync_t)
-+')
-+
tunable_policy(`rsync_export_all_ro',`
- fs_read_noxattr_fs_files(rsync_t)
+ files_getattr_all_pipes(rsync_t)
@@ -51422,7 +58445,7 @@ index 46dad1f..051addd 100644
allow rtkit_daemon_t $1:process { getsched setsched };
rtkit_daemon_dbus_chat($1)
diff --git a/rtkit.te b/rtkit.te
-index 6f8e268..a50b694 100644
+index 6f8e268..eaad2c5 100644
--- a/rtkit.te
+++ b/rtkit.te
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ policy_module(rtkit, 1.1.0)
@@ -51434,13 +58457,16 @@ index 6f8e268..a50b694 100644
########################################
#
-@@ -31,5 +31,8 @@ logging_send_syslog_msg(rtkit_daemon_t)
- miscfiles_read_localization(rtkit_daemon_t)
+@@ -28,8 +28,9 @@ auth_use_nsswitch(rtkit_daemon_t)
- optional_policy(`
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(rtkit_daemon_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(rtkit_daemon_t)
+-
++optional_policy(`
+ dbus_system_domain(rtkit_daemon_t, rtkit_daemon_exec_t)
+')
-+optional_policy(`
+ optional_policy(`
policykit_dbus_chat(rtkit_daemon_t)
')
diff --git a/rwho.if b/rwho.if
@@ -51461,7 +58487,7 @@ index 71ea0ea..886a45e 100644
init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, rwho_initrc_exec_t)
domain_system_change_exemption($1)
diff --git a/rwho.te b/rwho.te
-index a07b2f4..807a1cf 100644
+index a07b2f4..22e0db0 100644
--- a/rwho.te
+++ b/rwho.te
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ type rwho_log_t;
@@ -51489,19 +58515,18 @@ index a07b2f4..807a1cf 100644
corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(rwho_t)
corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if(rwho_t)
corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_node(rwho_t)
-@@ -55,6 +55,10 @@ files_read_etc_files(rwho_t)
+@@ -55,6 +55,8 @@ files_read_etc_files(rwho_t)
init_read_utmp(rwho_t)
init_dontaudit_write_utmp(rwho_t)
+-miscfiles_read_localization(rwho_t)
+logging_send_syslog_msg(rwho_t)
-+
- miscfiles_read_localization(rwho_t)
sysnet_dns_name_resolve(rwho_t)
+
+userdom_getattr_user_terminals(rwho_t)
diff --git a/samba.fc b/samba.fc
-index 69a6074..c9dbc93 100644
+index 69a6074..2ccac49 100644
--- a/samba.fc
+++ b/samba.fc
@@ -14,6 +14,9 @@
@@ -51514,7 +58539,14 @@ index 69a6074..c9dbc93 100644
/usr/bin/net -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:samba_net_exec_t,s0)
/usr/bin/ntlm_auth -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:winbind_helper_exec_t,s0)
/usr/bin/smbcontrol -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:smbcontrol_exec_t,s0)
-@@ -36,6 +39,10 @@
+@@ -31,11 +34,17 @@
+ /var/cache/samba(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:samba_var_t,s0)
+ /var/cache/samba/winbindd_privileged(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:winbind_var_run_t,s0)
+
++/var/nmbd(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:samba_var_t,s0)
++
+ /var/lib/samba(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:samba_var_t,s0)
+ /var/lib/samba/winbindd_privileged(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:winbind_var_run_t,s0)
/var/log/samba(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:samba_log_t,s0)
@@ -51525,7 +58557,7 @@ index 69a6074..c9dbc93 100644
/var/run/samba/brlock\.tdb -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:smbd_var_run_t,s0)
/var/run/samba/connections\.tdb -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:smbd_var_run_t,s0)
/var/run/samba/gencache\.tdb -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:smbd_var_run_t,s0)
-@@ -48,6 +55,11 @@
+@@ -48,6 +57,11 @@
/var/run/samba/smbd\.pid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:smbd_var_run_t,s0)
/var/run/samba/unexpected\.tdb -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nmbd_var_run_t,s0)
@@ -51538,7 +58570,7 @@ index 69a6074..c9dbc93 100644
+/var/lib/samba/scripts(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:samba_unconfined_script_exec_t,s0)
+')
diff --git a/samba.if b/samba.if
-index 82cb169..987239e 100644
+index 82cb169..a6bab06 100644
--- a/samba.if
+++ b/samba.if
@@ -42,6 +42,44 @@ interface(`samba_signal_nmbd',`
@@ -51694,7 +58726,15 @@ index 82cb169..987239e 100644
########################################
## <summary>
## Execute smbmount in the smbmount domain.
-@@ -409,9 +534,10 @@ interface(`samba_manage_var_files',`
+@@ -166,6 +291,7 @@ interface(`samba_read_config',`
+ ')
+
+ files_search_etc($1)
++ list_dirs_pattern($1, samba_etc_t, samba_etc_t)
+ read_files_pattern($1, samba_etc_t, samba_etc_t)
+ ')
+
+@@ -409,9 +535,10 @@ interface(`samba_manage_var_files',`
type samba_var_t;
')
@@ -51706,7 +58746,32 @@ index 82cb169..987239e 100644
')
########################################
-@@ -564,6 +690,7 @@ interface(`samba_domtrans_winbind_helper',`
+@@ -548,6 +675,24 @@ interface(`samba_rw_smbmount_tcp_sockets',`
+ allow $1 smbmount_t:tcp_socket { read write };
+ ')
+
++#######################################
++## <summary>
++## Allow to getattr on winbind binary.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed to transition.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`samba_getattr_winbind',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type winbind_exec_t;
++ ')
++
++ allow $1 winbind_exec_t:file getattr;
++')
++
+ ########################################
+ ## <summary>
+ ## Execute winbind_helper in the winbind_helper domain.
+@@ -564,6 +709,7 @@ interface(`samba_domtrans_winbind_helper',`
')
domtrans_pattern($1, winbind_helper_exec_t, winbind_helper_t)
@@ -51714,7 +58779,7 @@ index 82cb169..987239e 100644
')
########################################
-@@ -607,7 +734,7 @@ interface(`samba_read_winbind_pid',`
+@@ -607,7 +753,7 @@ interface(`samba_read_winbind_pid',`
type winbind_var_run_t;
')
@@ -51723,7 +58788,7 @@ index 82cb169..987239e 100644
allow $1 winbind_var_run_t:file read_file_perms;
')
-@@ -626,9 +753,10 @@ interface(`samba_stream_connect_winbind',`
+@@ -626,9 +772,10 @@ interface(`samba_stream_connect_winbind',`
type samba_var_t, winbind_t, winbind_var_run_t;
')
@@ -51735,7 +58800,7 @@ index 82cb169..987239e 100644
ifndef(`distro_redhat',`
gen_require(`
-@@ -644,6 +772,37 @@ interface(`samba_stream_connect_winbind',`
+@@ -644,6 +791,37 @@ interface(`samba_stream_connect_winbind',`
########################################
## <summary>
@@ -51773,7 +58838,7 @@ index 82cb169..987239e 100644
## All of the rules required to administrate
## an samba environment
## </summary>
-@@ -661,33 +820,33 @@ interface(`samba_stream_connect_winbind',`
+@@ -661,33 +839,33 @@ interface(`samba_stream_connect_winbind',`
#
interface(`samba_admin',`
gen_require(`
@@ -51828,7 +58893,7 @@ index 82cb169..987239e 100644
init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, samba_initrc_exec_t)
domain_system_change_exemption($1)
-@@ -709,9 +868,6 @@ interface(`samba_admin',`
+@@ -709,9 +887,6 @@ interface(`samba_admin',`
admin_pattern($1, samba_var_t)
files_list_var($1)
@@ -51838,7 +58903,7 @@ index 82cb169..987239e 100644
admin_pattern($1, smbd_var_run_t)
files_list_pids($1)
-@@ -727,4 +883,9 @@ interface(`samba_admin',`
+@@ -727,4 +902,9 @@ interface(`samba_admin',`
admin_pattern($1, winbind_tmp_t)
admin_pattern($1, winbind_var_run_t)
@@ -51849,7 +58914,7 @@ index 82cb169..987239e 100644
+ allow $1 samba_unit_file_t:service all_service_perms;
')
diff --git a/samba.te b/samba.te
-index 905883f..564240d 100644
+index 905883f..7e70344 100644
--- a/samba.te
+++ b/samba.te
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ policy_module(samba, 1.15.0)
@@ -51896,7 +58961,11 @@ index 905883f..564240d 100644
type winbind_var_run_t;
files_pid_file(winbind_var_run_t)
-@@ -184,8 +192,8 @@ manage_lnk_files_pattern(samba_net_t, samba_var_t, samba_var_t)
+@@ -181,11 +189,12 @@ files_tmp_filetrans(samba_net_t, samba_net_tmp_t, { file dir })
+ manage_dirs_pattern(samba_net_t, samba_var_t, samba_var_t)
+ manage_files_pattern(samba_net_t, samba_var_t, samba_var_t)
+ manage_lnk_files_pattern(samba_net_t, samba_var_t, samba_var_t)
++files_var_filetrans(samba_net_t, samba_var_t, dir, "samba")
kernel_read_proc_symlinks(samba_net_t)
kernel_read_system_state(samba_net_t)
@@ -51906,7 +58975,7 @@ index 905883f..564240d 100644
corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(samba_net_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(samba_net_t)
corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if(samba_net_t)
-@@ -203,7 +211,6 @@ dev_read_urand(samba_net_t)
+@@ -203,7 +212,6 @@ dev_read_urand(samba_net_t)
domain_use_interactive_fds(samba_net_t)
@@ -51914,13 +58983,12 @@ index 905883f..564240d 100644
files_read_usr_symlinks(samba_net_t)
auth_use_nsswitch(samba_net_t)
-@@ -211,15 +218,18 @@ auth_manage_cache(samba_net_t)
+@@ -211,15 +219,16 @@ auth_manage_cache(samba_net_t)
logging_send_syslog_msg(samba_net_t)
-miscfiles_read_localization(samba_net_t)
-+miscfiles_read_localization(samba_net_t)
-
+-
samba_read_var_files(samba_net_t)
-userdom_use_user_terminals(samba_net_t)
@@ -51936,7 +59004,7 @@ index 905883f..564240d 100644
')
optional_policy(`
-@@ -228,13 +238,15 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -228,13 +237,15 @@ optional_policy(`
optional_policy(`
kerberos_use(samba_net_t)
@@ -51953,6 +59021,14 @@ index 905883f..564240d 100644
dontaudit smbd_t self:capability sys_tty_config;
allow smbd_t self:process ~{ ptrace setcurrent setexec setfscreate setrlimit execmem execstack execheap };
allow smbd_t self:process setrlimit;
+@@ -244,6 +255,7 @@ allow smbd_t self:msg { send receive };
+ allow smbd_t self:msgq create_msgq_perms;
+ allow smbd_t self:sem create_sem_perms;
+ allow smbd_t self:shm create_shm_perms;
++allow smbd_t self:key manage_key_perms;
+ allow smbd_t self:sock_file read_sock_file_perms;
+ allow smbd_t self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
+ allow smbd_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms;
@@ -253,6 +265,7 @@ allow smbd_t self:unix_stream_socket { create_stream_socket_perms connectto };
allow smbd_t nmbd_t:process { signal signull };
@@ -51972,7 +59048,7 @@ index 905883f..564240d 100644
manage_files_pattern(smbd_t, samba_var_t, samba_var_t)
manage_lnk_files_pattern(smbd_t, samba_var_t, samba_var_t)
manage_sock_files_pattern(smbd_t, samba_var_t, samba_var_t)
-+files_var_filetrans(smbd_t, samba_var_t, dir)
++files_var_filetrans(smbd_t, samba_var_t, dir, "samba")
allow smbd_t smbcontrol_t:process { signal signull };
@@ -52032,8 +59108,11 @@ index 905883f..564240d 100644
# Allow samba to list mnt_t for potential mounted dirs
files_list_mnt(smbd_t)
-@@ -358,6 +375,8 @@ logging_send_syslog_msg(smbd_t)
- miscfiles_read_localization(smbd_t)
+@@ -355,9 +372,10 @@ init_rw_utmp(smbd_t)
+ logging_search_logs(smbd_t)
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(smbd_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(smbd_t)
miscfiles_read_public_files(smbd_t)
+sysnet_use_ldap(smbd_t)
@@ -52041,7 +59120,7 @@ index 905883f..564240d 100644
userdom_use_unpriv_users_fds(smbd_t)
userdom_search_user_home_content(smbd_t)
userdom_signal_all_users(smbd_t)
-@@ -372,8 +391,13 @@ ifdef(`hide_broken_symptoms', `
+@@ -372,8 +390,13 @@ ifdef(`hide_broken_symptoms', `
fs_dontaudit_getattr_tmpfs_dirs(smbd_t)
')
@@ -52056,7 +59135,7 @@ index 905883f..564240d 100644
')
tunable_policy(`samba_domain_controller',`
-@@ -389,12 +413,7 @@ tunable_policy(`samba_domain_controller',`
+@@ -389,12 +412,7 @@ tunable_policy(`samba_domain_controller',`
')
tunable_policy(`samba_enable_home_dirs',`
@@ -52070,7 +59149,7 @@ index 905883f..564240d 100644
')
# Support Samba sharing of NFS mount points
-@@ -415,6 +434,15 @@ tunable_policy(`samba_share_fusefs',`
+@@ -415,6 +433,15 @@ tunable_policy(`samba_share_fusefs',`
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -52086,7 +59165,7 @@ index 905883f..564240d 100644
cups_read_rw_config(smbd_t)
cups_stream_connect(smbd_t)
')
-@@ -426,6 +454,7 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -426,6 +453,7 @@ optional_policy(`
optional_policy(`
ldap_stream_connect(smbd_t)
@@ -52094,7 +59173,7 @@ index 905883f..564240d 100644
')
optional_policy(`
-@@ -452,26 +481,26 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -452,26 +480,26 @@ optional_policy(`
tunable_policy(`samba_create_home_dirs',`
allow smbd_t self:capability chown;
userdom_create_user_home_dirs(smbd_t)
@@ -52133,7 +59212,7 @@ index 905883f..564240d 100644
########################################
#
# nmbd Local policy
-@@ -491,8 +520,11 @@ allow nmbd_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms;
+@@ -491,8 +519,11 @@ allow nmbd_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms;
allow nmbd_t self:unix_dgram_socket { create_socket_perms sendto };
allow nmbd_t self:unix_stream_socket { create_stream_socket_perms connectto };
@@ -52146,7 +59225,14 @@ index 905883f..564240d 100644
read_files_pattern(nmbd_t, samba_etc_t, samba_etc_t)
read_lnk_files_pattern(nmbd_t, samba_etc_t, samba_etc_t)
-@@ -504,8 +536,6 @@ manage_files_pattern(nmbd_t, samba_var_t, samba_var_t)
+@@ -501,11 +532,13 @@ manage_dirs_pattern(nmbd_t, samba_log_t, samba_log_t)
+ manage_files_pattern(nmbd_t, samba_log_t, samba_log_t)
+
+ manage_files_pattern(nmbd_t, samba_var_t, samba_var_t)
++manage_files_pattern(nmbd_t, samba_var_t, samba_var_t)
++manage_lnk_files_pattern(nmbd_t, samba_var_t, samba_var_t)
++manage_sock_files_pattern(nmbd_t, samba_var_t, samba_var_t)
++files_var_filetrans(nmbd_t, samba_var_t, dir, "samba")
allow nmbd_t smbcontrol_t:process signal;
@@ -52155,7 +59241,7 @@ index 905883f..564240d 100644
kernel_getattr_core_if(nmbd_t)
kernel_getattr_message_if(nmbd_t)
kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(nmbd_t)
-@@ -513,7 +543,6 @@ kernel_read_network_state(nmbd_t)
+@@ -513,7 +546,6 @@ kernel_read_network_state(nmbd_t)
kernel_read_software_raid_state(nmbd_t)
kernel_read_system_state(nmbd_t)
@@ -52163,7 +59249,7 @@ index 905883f..564240d 100644
corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(nmbd_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(nmbd_t)
corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if(nmbd_t)
-@@ -536,7 +565,6 @@ fs_search_auto_mountpoints(nmbd_t)
+@@ -536,7 +568,6 @@ fs_search_auto_mountpoints(nmbd_t)
domain_use_interactive_fds(nmbd_t)
files_read_usr_files(nmbd_t)
@@ -52171,7 +59257,24 @@ index 905883f..564240d 100644
files_list_var_lib(nmbd_t)
auth_use_nsswitch(nmbd_t)
-@@ -562,18 +590,21 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -544,12 +575,14 @@ auth_use_nsswitch(nmbd_t)
+ logging_search_logs(nmbd_t)
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(nmbd_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(nmbd_t)
+-
+ userdom_use_unpriv_users_fds(nmbd_t)
+ userdom_dontaudit_search_user_home_dirs(nmbd_t)
+
+ optional_policy(`
++ ctdbd_stream_connect(nmbd_t)
++')
++
++optional_policy(`
+ seutil_sigchld_newrole(nmbd_t)
+ ')
+
+@@ -562,18 +595,21 @@ optional_policy(`
# smbcontrol local policy
#
@@ -52197,30 +59300,30 @@ index 905883f..564240d 100644
samba_read_config(smbcontrol_t)
samba_rw_var_files(smbcontrol_t)
samba_search_var(smbcontrol_t)
-@@ -581,11 +612,20 @@ samba_read_winbind_pid(smbcontrol_t)
+@@ -581,11 +617,19 @@ samba_read_winbind_pid(smbcontrol_t)
domain_use_interactive_fds(smbcontrol_t)
-files_read_etc_files(smbcontrol_t)
+dev_read_urand(smbcontrol_t)
+
++files_read_usr_files(smbcontrol_t)
++
+term_use_console(smbcontrol_t)
+
++sysnet_use_ldap(smbcontrol_t)
- miscfiles_read_localization(smbcontrol_t)
+-miscfiles_read_localization(smbcontrol_t)
++userdom_use_inherited_user_terminals(smbcontrol_t)
-userdom_use_user_terminals(smbcontrol_t)
-+sysnet_use_ldap(smbcontrol_t)
-+
-+userdom_use_inherited_user_terminals(smbcontrol_t)
-+
+optional_policy(`
+ ctdbd_stream_connect(smbcontrol_t)
+')
########################################
#
-@@ -604,7 +644,7 @@ allow smbmount_t samba_etc_t:file read_file_perms;
+@@ -604,18 +648,20 @@ allow smbmount_t samba_etc_t:file read_file_perms;
can_exec(smbmount_t, smbmount_exec_t)
@@ -52229,7 +59332,13 @@ index 905883f..564240d 100644
allow smbmount_t samba_log_t:file manage_file_perms;
allow smbmount_t samba_secrets_t:file manage_file_perms;
-@@ -615,7 +655,6 @@ files_list_var_lib(smbmount_t)
+
++manage_dirs_pattern(smbmount_t, samba_var_t, samba_var_t)
+ manage_files_pattern(smbmount_t, samba_var_t, samba_var_t)
+ manage_lnk_files_pattern(smbmount_t, samba_var_t, samba_var_t)
++files_var_filetrans(smbmount_t, samba_var_t, dir, "samba")
++
+ files_list_var_lib(smbmount_t)
kernel_read_system_state(smbmount_t)
@@ -52237,7 +59346,7 @@ index 905883f..564240d 100644
corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(smbmount_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(smbmount_t)
corenet_raw_sendrecv_generic_if(smbmount_t)
-@@ -645,25 +684,26 @@ files_list_mnt(smbmount_t)
+@@ -645,31 +691,32 @@ files_list_mnt(smbmount_t)
files_mounton_mnt(smbmount_t)
files_manage_etc_runtime_files(smbmount_t)
files_etc_filetrans_etc_runtime(smbmount_t, file)
@@ -52245,10 +59354,10 @@ index 905883f..564240d 100644
auth_use_nsswitch(smbmount_t)
- miscfiles_read_localization(smbmount_t)
-
--mount_use_fds(smbmount_t)
+-miscfiles_read_localization(smbmount_t)
-
+-mount_use_fds(smbmount_t)
+
locallogin_use_fds(smbmount_t)
logging_search_logs(smbmount_t)
@@ -52268,7 +59377,14 @@ index 905883f..564240d 100644
########################################
#
# SWAT Local policy
-@@ -684,7 +724,8 @@ samba_domtrans_nmbd(swat_t)
+ #
+
+ allow swat_t self:capability { dac_override setuid setgid sys_resource };
++allow swat_t self:capability2 block_suspend;
+ allow swat_t self:process { setrlimit signal_perms };
+ allow swat_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms;
+ allow swat_t self:netlink_tcpdiag_socket r_netlink_socket_perms;
+@@ -684,7 +731,8 @@ samba_domtrans_nmbd(swat_t)
allow swat_t nmbd_t:process { signal signull };
allow nmbd_t swat_t:process signal;
@@ -52278,10 +59394,13 @@ index 905883f..564240d 100644
allow swat_t smbd_port_t:tcp_socket name_bind;
-@@ -699,12 +740,14 @@ manage_files_pattern(swat_t, samba_log_t, samba_log_t)
+@@ -698,13 +746,17 @@ manage_files_pattern(swat_t, samba_log_t, samba_log_t)
+
manage_files_pattern(swat_t, samba_etc_t, samba_secrets_t)
++manage_dirs_pattern(swat_t, samba_var_t, samba_var_t)
manage_files_pattern(swat_t, samba_var_t, samba_var_t)
++files_var_filetrans(swat_t, samba_var_t, dir, "samba")
+files_list_var_lib(swat_t)
allow swat_t smbd_exec_t:file mmap_file_perms ;
@@ -52293,7 +59412,7 @@ index 905883f..564240d 100644
manage_dirs_pattern(swat_t, swat_tmp_t, swat_tmp_t)
manage_files_pattern(swat_t, swat_tmp_t, swat_tmp_t)
-@@ -717,6 +760,7 @@ allow swat_t winbind_exec_t:file mmap_file_perms;
+@@ -717,6 +769,7 @@ allow swat_t winbind_exec_t:file mmap_file_perms;
domtrans_pattern(swat_t, winbind_exec_t, winbind_t)
allow swat_t winbind_t:process { signal signull };
@@ -52301,7 +59420,7 @@ index 905883f..564240d 100644
allow swat_t winbind_var_run_t:dir { write add_name remove_name };
allow swat_t winbind_var_run_t:sock_file { create unlink };
-@@ -726,7 +770,6 @@ kernel_read_network_state(swat_t)
+@@ -726,7 +779,6 @@ kernel_read_network_state(swat_t)
corecmd_search_bin(swat_t)
@@ -52309,7 +59428,7 @@ index 905883f..564240d 100644
corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(swat_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(swat_t)
corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if(swat_t)
-@@ -744,7 +787,6 @@ corenet_sendrecv_ipp_client_packets(swat_t)
+@@ -744,7 +796,6 @@ corenet_sendrecv_ipp_client_packets(swat_t)
dev_read_urand(swat_t)
files_list_var_lib(swat_t)
@@ -52317,20 +59436,19 @@ index 905883f..564240d 100644
files_search_home(swat_t)
files_read_usr_files(swat_t)
fs_getattr_xattr_fs(swat_t)
-@@ -759,8 +801,12 @@ logging_send_syslog_msg(swat_t)
+@@ -759,7 +810,10 @@ logging_send_syslog_msg(swat_t)
logging_send_audit_msgs(swat_t)
logging_search_logs(swat_t)
+-miscfiles_read_localization(swat_t)
+sysnet_use_ldap(swat_t)
+
- miscfiles_read_localization(swat_t)
-
-+userdom_dontaudit_search_admin_dir(swat_t)
+
++userdom_dontaudit_search_admin_dir(swat_t)
+
optional_policy(`
cups_read_rw_config(swat_t)
- cups_stream_connect(swat_t)
-@@ -790,7 +836,8 @@ allow winbind_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms;
+@@ -790,7 +844,8 @@ allow winbind_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms;
allow winbind_t nmbd_t:process { signal signull };
@@ -52340,7 +59458,16 @@ index 905883f..564240d 100644
allow winbind_t samba_etc_t:dir list_dir_perms;
read_files_pattern(winbind_t, samba_etc_t, samba_etc_t)
-@@ -813,21 +860,24 @@ rw_files_pattern(winbind_t, smbd_tmp_t, smbd_tmp_t)
+@@ -806,6 +861,8 @@ manage_lnk_files_pattern(winbind_t, samba_log_t, samba_log_t)
+ manage_dirs_pattern(winbind_t, samba_var_t, samba_var_t)
+ manage_files_pattern(winbind_t, samba_var_t, samba_var_t)
+ manage_lnk_files_pattern(winbind_t, samba_var_t, samba_var_t)
++manage_sock_files_pattern(winbind_t, samba_var_t, samba_var_t)
++files_var_filetrans(winbind_t, samba_var_t, dir, "samba")
+ files_list_var_lib(winbind_t)
+
+ rw_files_pattern(winbind_t, smbd_tmp_t, smbd_tmp_t)
+@@ -813,21 +870,26 @@ rw_files_pattern(winbind_t, smbd_tmp_t, smbd_tmp_t)
allow winbind_t winbind_log_t:file manage_file_perms;
logging_log_filetrans(winbind_t, winbind_log_t, file)
@@ -52356,11 +59483,14 @@ index 905883f..564240d 100644
manage_files_pattern(winbind_t, winbind_var_run_t, winbind_var_run_t)
manage_sock_files_pattern(winbind_t, winbind_var_run_t, winbind_var_run_t)
-files_pid_filetrans(winbind_t, winbind_var_run_t, file)
+-
+files_pid_filetrans(winbind_t, winbind_var_run_t, { sock_file file dir })
+filetrans_pattern(winbind_t, smbd_var_run_t, winbind_var_run_t, dir)
+# /run/samba/krb5cc_samba
+manage_files_pattern(winbind_t, smbd_var_run_t, smbd_var_run_t)
-
++manage_dirs_pattern(winbind_t, smbd_var_run_t, smbd_var_run_t)
++manage_sock_files_pattern(winbind_t, smbd_var_run_t, smbd_var_run_t)
++
+kernel_read_network_state(winbind_t)
kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(winbind_t)
kernel_read_system_state(winbind_t)
@@ -52371,7 +59501,7 @@ index 905883f..564240d 100644
corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(winbind_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(winbind_t)
corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if(winbind_t)
-@@ -840,6 +890,7 @@ corenet_udp_sendrecv_all_ports(winbind_t)
+@@ -840,12 +902,15 @@ corenet_udp_sendrecv_all_ports(winbind_t)
corenet_tcp_bind_generic_node(winbind_t)
corenet_udp_bind_generic_node(winbind_t)
corenet_tcp_connect_smbd_port(winbind_t)
@@ -52379,7 +59509,15 @@ index 905883f..564240d 100644
corenet_tcp_connect_epmap_port(winbind_t)
corenet_tcp_connect_all_unreserved_ports(winbind_t)
-@@ -855,12 +906,15 @@ auth_manage_cache(winbind_t)
+ dev_read_sysfs(winbind_t)
+ dev_read_urand(winbind_t)
+
++files_read_usr_files(winbind_t)
++
+ fs_getattr_all_fs(winbind_t)
+ fs_search_auto_mountpoints(winbind_t)
+
+@@ -855,12 +920,14 @@ auth_manage_cache(winbind_t)
domain_use_interactive_fds(winbind_t)
@@ -52389,14 +59527,14 @@ index 905883f..564240d 100644
logging_send_syslog_msg(winbind_t)
- miscfiles_read_localization(winbind_t)
+-miscfiles_read_localization(winbind_t)
+miscfiles_read_generic_certs(winbind_t)
+
+sysnet_use_ldap(winbind_t)
userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fds(winbind_t)
userdom_manage_user_home_content_dirs(winbind_t)
-@@ -871,6 +925,11 @@ userdom_manage_user_home_content_sockets(winbind_t)
+@@ -871,6 +938,15 @@ userdom_manage_user_home_content_sockets(winbind_t)
userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans_user_home_content(winbind_t, { dir file lnk_file fifo_file sock_file })
optional_policy(`
@@ -52405,23 +59543,25 @@ index 905883f..564240d 100644
+')
+
+optional_policy(`
++ dirsrv_stream_connect(winbind_t)
++')
++
++optional_policy(`
kerberos_use(winbind_t)
')
-@@ -909,9 +968,10 @@ auth_use_nsswitch(winbind_helper_t)
+@@ -909,9 +985,7 @@ auth_use_nsswitch(winbind_helper_t)
logging_send_syslog_msg(winbind_helper_t)
-miscfiles_read_localization(winbind_helper_t)
-+miscfiles_read_localization(winbind_helper_t)
-+
-+userdom_use_inherited_user_terminals(winbind_helper_t)
-
+-
-userdom_use_user_terminals(winbind_helper_t)
++userdom_use_inherited_user_terminals(winbind_helper_t)
optional_policy(`
apache_append_log(winbind_helper_t)
-@@ -929,19 +989,34 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -929,19 +1003,34 @@ optional_policy(`
#
optional_policy(`
@@ -52435,16 +59575,16 @@ index 905883f..564240d 100644
+ domain_type(samba_unconfined_net_t)
+ domain_entry_file(samba_unconfined_net_t, samba_net_exec_t)
+ role system_r types samba_unconfined_net_t;
-+
-+ unconfined_domain(samba_unconfined_net_t)
- allow smbd_t samba_unconfined_script_exec_t:dir search_dir_perms;
- allow smbd_t samba_unconfined_script_exec_t:file ioctl;
++ unconfined_domain(samba_unconfined_net_t)
+
+ manage_files_pattern(samba_unconfined_net_t, samba_etc_t, samba_secrets_t)
+ filetrans_pattern(samba_unconfined_net_t, samba_etc_t, samba_secrets_t, file)
+ userdom_use_inherited_user_terminals(samba_unconfined_net_t)
+')
-
++
+type samba_unconfined_script_t;
+type samba_unconfined_script_exec_t;
+domain_type(samba_unconfined_script_t)
@@ -52467,19 +59607,20 @@ index 905883f..564240d 100644
+ can_exec(smbd_t, samba_unconfined_script_exec_t)
')
diff --git a/sambagui.te b/sambagui.te
-index 1898dbd..43fcb73 100644
+index 1898dbd..1d5e802 100644
--- a/sambagui.te
+++ b/sambagui.te
-@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ policy_module(sambagui, 1.1.0)
+@@ -7,7 +7,8 @@ policy_module(sambagui, 1.1.0)
type sambagui_t;
type sambagui_exec_t;
-dbus_system_domain(sambagui_t, sambagui_exec_t)
+application_domain(sambagui_t, sambagui_exec_t)
++role system_r types sambagui_t;
########################################
#
-@@ -27,21 +27,30 @@ corecmd_exec_bin(sambagui_t)
+@@ -27,21 +28,28 @@ corecmd_exec_bin(sambagui_t)
dev_dontaudit_read_urand(sambagui_t)
@@ -52495,10 +59636,9 @@ index 1898dbd..43fcb73 100644
logging_send_syslog_msg(sambagui_t)
- miscfiles_read_localization(sambagui_t)
-
+-miscfiles_read_localization(sambagui_t)
+sysnet_use_ldap(sambagui_t)
-+
+
optional_policy(`
consoletype_exec(sambagui_t)
')
@@ -52511,7 +59651,7 @@ index 1898dbd..43fcb73 100644
nscd_dontaudit_search_pid(sambagui_t)
')
-@@ -56,6 +65,7 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -56,6 +64,7 @@ optional_policy(`
samba_manage_var_files(sambagui_t)
samba_read_secrets(sambagui_t)
samba_initrc_domtrans(sambagui_t)
@@ -52555,18 +59695,17 @@ index acd1700..778d18b 100644
#
diff --git a/sandbox.fc b/sandbox.fc
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..6caef63
+index 0000000..b7db254
--- /dev/null
+++ b/sandbox.fc
-@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
-+
-+/usr/share/sandbox/start -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:sandbox_exec_t,s0)
+@@ -0,0 +1 @@
++# Empty
diff --git a/sandbox.if b/sandbox.if
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..7a474f6
+index 0000000..7addd77
--- /dev/null
+++ b/sandbox.if
-@@ -0,0 +1,363 @@
+@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+
+## <summary>policy for sandbox</summary>
+
@@ -52588,11 +59727,7 @@ index 0000000..7a474f6
+#
+interface(`sandbox_transition',`
+ gen_require(`
-+ type sandbox_xserver_t;
-+ type sandbox_file_t;
+ attribute sandbox_domain;
-+ attribute sandbox_x_domain;
-+ attribute sandbox_tmpfs_type;
+ ')
+
+ allow $1 sandbox_domain:process transition;
@@ -52600,12 +59735,149 @@ index 0000000..7a474f6
+ role $2 types sandbox_domain;
+ allow sandbox_domain $1:process { sigchld signull };
+ allow sandbox_domain $1:fifo_file rw_inherited_fifo_file_perms;
++ dontaudit sandbox_domain $1:process signal;
++')
++
++########################################
++## <summary>
++## Creates types and rules for a basic
++## sandbox process domain.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="prefix">
++## <summary>
++## Prefix for the domain.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++template(`sandbox_domain_template',`
++
++ gen_require(`
++ attribute sandbox_domain;
++ ')
++ type $1_t, sandbox_domain;
++
++ application_type($1_t)
++
++ mls_rangetrans_target($1_t)
++ mcs_untrusted_proc($1_t)
++')
+diff --git a/sandbox.te b/sandbox.te
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..db440d4
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/sandbox.te
+@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
++policy_module(sandbox,1.0.0)
++
++attribute sandbox_domain;
++
++########################################
++#
++# Declarations
++#
++sandbox_domain_template(sandbox)
++
++########################################
++#
++# sandbox local policy
++#
++allow sandbox_domain self:process { getattr signal_perms getsched setsched setpgid execstack };
++tunable_policy(`deny_execmem',`',`
++ allow sandbox_domain self:process execmem;
++')
++
++allow sandbox_domain self:fifo_file manage_file_perms;
++allow sandbox_domain self:sem create_sem_perms;
++allow sandbox_domain self:shm create_shm_perms;
++allow sandbox_domain self:msgq create_msgq_perms;
++allow sandbox_domain self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
++allow sandbox_domain self:unix_dgram_socket { sendto create_socket_perms };
++dontaudit sandbox_domain self:netlink_audit_socket { create_netlink_socket_perms nlmsg_relay };
++
++dev_rw_all_inherited_chr_files(sandbox_domain)
++dev_rw_all_inherited_blk_files(sandbox_domain)
++
++# sandbox_file_t was moved to sandboxX.te
++optional_policy(`
++ sandbox_exec_file(sandbox_domain)
++ sandbox_manage_content(sandbox_domain)
++ sandbox_dontaudit_mounton(sandbox_domain)
++ sandbox_manage_tmpfs_files(sandbox_domain)
++')
++
++gen_require(`
++ type usr_t, lib_t, locale_t, device_t;
++ type var_t, var_run_t, rpm_log_t, locale_t;
++ attribute exec_type, configfile;
++')
++
++kernel_dontaudit_read_system_state(sandbox_domain)
++
++corecmd_exec_all_executables(sandbox_domain)
++
++dev_dontaudit_getattr_all(sandbox_domain)
++
++files_rw_all_inherited_files(sandbox_domain, -exec_type -configfile -usr_t -lib_t -locale_t -var_t -var_run_t -device_t -rpm_log_t )
++files_entrypoint_all_files(sandbox_domain)
++
++files_read_config_files(sandbox_domain)
++files_read_usr_files(sandbox_domain)
++files_read_var_files(sandbox_domain)
++files_dontaudit_search_all_dirs(sandbox_domain)
++
++fs_dontaudit_getattr_all_fs(sandbox_domain)
++
++
++userdom_dontaudit_use_user_terminals(sandbox_domain)
++
++mta_dontaudit_read_spool_symlinks(sandbox_domain)
++
++
+diff --git a/sandboxX.fc b/sandboxX.fc
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..6caef63
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/sandboxX.fc
+@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
++
++/usr/share/sandbox/start -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:sandbox_exec_t,s0)
+diff --git a/sandboxX.if b/sandboxX.if
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..f00e5c5
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/sandboxX.if
+@@ -0,0 +1,391 @@
++
++## <summary>policy for sandboxX </summary>
++
++########################################
++## <summary>
++## Execute sandbox in the sandbox domain, and
++## allow the specified role the sandbox domain.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++## <param name="role">
++## <summary>
++## The role to be allowed the sandbox domain.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`sandbox_x_transition',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type sandbox_xserver_t;
++ type sandbox_file_t;
++ attribute sandbox_x_domain;
++ attribute sandbox_tmpfs_type;
++ ')
+
+ allow $1 sandbox_x_domain:process { signal_perms transition };
+ dontaudit $1 sandbox_x_domain:process { noatsecure siginh rlimitinh };
+ allow sandbox_x_domain $1:process { sigchld signull };
+ allow { sandbox_x_domain sandbox_xserver_t } $1:fd use;
-+ dontaudit sandbox_domain $1:process signal;
+ role $2 types sandbox_x_domain;
+ role $2 types sandbox_xserver_t;
+ allow $1 sandbox_xserver_t:process signal_perms;
@@ -52649,37 +59921,12 @@ index 0000000..7a474f6
+## </summary>
+## </param>
+#
-+template(`sandbox_domain_template',`
-+
-+ gen_require(`
-+ attribute sandbox_domain;
-+ attribute sandbox_type;
-+ ')
-+ type $1_t, sandbox_domain, sandbox_type;
-+
-+ application_type($1_t)
-+
-+ mls_rangetrans_target($1_t)
-+ mcs_untrusted_proc($1_t)
-+')
-+
-+########################################
-+## <summary>
-+## Creates types and rules for a basic
-+## sandbox process domain.
-+## </summary>
-+## <param name="prefix">
-+## <summary>
-+## Prefix for the domain.
-+## </summary>
-+## </param>
-+#
+template(`sandbox_x_domain_template',`
+ gen_require(`
+ type xserver_exec_t, sandbox_devpts_t;
+ type sandbox_xserver_t;
+ type sandbox_exec_t;
-+ attribute sandbox_domain, sandbox_x_domain;
++ attribute sandbox_x_domain;
+ attribute sandbox_tmpfs_type;
+ attribute sandbox_type;
+ ')
@@ -52688,14 +59935,21 @@ index 0000000..7a474f6
+ application_type($1_t)
+ mcs_untrusted_proc($1_t)
+
++ kernel_read_system_state($1_t)
++ selinux_get_fs_mount($1_t)
++
+ auth_use_nsswitch($1_t)
+
++ logging_send_syslog_msg($1_t)
++
+ # window manager
+ miscfiles_setattr_fonts_cache_dirs($1_t)
+ allow $1_t self:capability setuid;
+
+ type $1_client_t, sandbox_x_domain;
+ application_type($1_client_t)
++ kernel_read_system_state($1_client_t)
++
+ mcs_untrusted_proc($1_t)
+
+ type $1_client_tmpfs_t, sandbox_tmpfs_type;
@@ -52716,17 +59970,12 @@ index 0000000..7a474f6
+ domtrans_pattern($1_t, sandbox_exec_t, $1_client_t)
+ domain_entry_file($1_client_t, sandbox_exec_t)
+
-+ # Random tmpfs_t that gets created when you run X.
-+ fs_rw_tmpfs_files($1_t)
-+
+ ps_process_pattern(sandbox_xserver_t, $1_client_t)
+ ps_process_pattern(sandbox_xserver_t, $1_t)
+ allow sandbox_xserver_t $1_client_t:shm rw_shm_perms;
+ allow sandbox_xserver_t $1_t:shm rw_shm_perms;
+ allow $1_client_t $1_t:unix_stream_socket connectto;
+ allow $1_t $1_client_t:unix_stream_socket connectto;
-+
-+ fs_get_xattr_fs_quotas($1_client_t)
+')
+
+########################################
@@ -52806,6 +60055,29 @@ index 0000000..7a474f6
+
+########################################
+## <summary>
++## Manage sandbox content
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`sandbox_manage_content',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type sandbox_file_t;
++ ')
++
++ allow $1 sandbox_file_t:filesystem getattr;
++ manage_files_pattern($1, sandbox_file_t, sandbox_file_t);
++ manage_dirs_pattern($1, sandbox_file_t, sandbox_file_t);
++ manage_sock_files_pattern($1, sandbox_file_t, sandbox_file_t);
++ manage_fifo_files_pattern($1, sandbox_file_t, sandbox_file_t);
++ manage_lnk_files_pattern($1, sandbox_file_t, sandbox_file_t);
++')
++
++########################################
++## <summary>
+## Delete sandbox symbolic links
+## </summary>
+## <param name="domain">
@@ -52930,16 +60202,51 @@ index 0000000..7a474f6
+
+ allow $1 sandbox_devpts_t:chr_file rw_inherited_term_perms;
+')
-diff --git a/sandbox.te b/sandbox.te
++
++#######################################
++## <summary>
++## Allow domain to execute sandbox_file_t in the caller domain.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`sandbox_exec_file',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type sandbox_file_t;
++ ')
++
++ can_exec($1, sandbox_file_t)
++')
++
++######################################
++## <summary>
++## Allow domain to execute sandbox_file_t in the caller domain.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`sandbox_dontaudit_mounton',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type sandbox_file_t;
++ ')
++
++ dontaudit $1 sandbox_file_t:dir mounton;
++')
+diff --git a/sandboxX.te b/sandboxX.te
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..964fd55
+index 0000000..479ece4
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/sandbox.te
-@@ -0,0 +1,506 @@
-+policy_module(sandbox,1.0.0)
++++ b/sandboxX.te
+@@ -0,0 +1,463 @@
++policy_module(sandboxX,1.0.0)
+
+dbus_stub()
-+attribute sandbox_domain;
+attribute sandbox_x_domain;
+attribute sandbox_web_type;
+attribute sandbox_file_type;
@@ -52957,8 +60264,6 @@ index 0000000..964fd55
+#
+# Declarations
+#
-+
-+sandbox_domain_template(sandbox)
+sandbox_x_domain_template(sandbox_min)
+sandbox_x_domain_template(sandbox_x)
+sandbox_x_domain_template(sandbox_web)
@@ -53033,7 +60338,6 @@ index 0000000..964fd55
+fs_search_auto_mountpoints(sandbox_xserver_t)
+
+miscfiles_read_fonts(sandbox_xserver_t)
-+miscfiles_read_localization(sandbox_xserver_t)
+
+selinux_validate_context(sandbox_xserver_t)
+selinux_compute_access_vector(sandbox_xserver_t)
@@ -53060,60 +60364,6 @@ index 0000000..964fd55
+
+########################################
+#
-+# sandbox local policy
-+#
-+
-+allow sandbox_domain self:process { getattr signal_perms getsched setsched setpgid execstack };
-+tunable_policy(`deny_execmem',`',`
-+ allow sandbox_domain self:process execmem;
-+')
-+
-+allow sandbox_domain self:fifo_file manage_file_perms;
-+allow sandbox_domain self:sem create_sem_perms;
-+allow sandbox_domain self:shm create_shm_perms;
-+allow sandbox_domain self:msgq create_msgq_perms;
-+allow sandbox_domain self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
-+allow sandbox_domain self:unix_dgram_socket { sendto create_socket_perms };
-+dontaudit sandbox_domain self:netlink_audit_socket { create_netlink_socket_perms nlmsg_relay };
-+
-+dev_rw_all_inherited_chr_files(sandbox_domain)
-+dev_rw_all_inherited_blk_files(sandbox_domain)
-+
-+can_exec(sandbox_domain, sandbox_file_t)
-+allow sandbox_domain sandbox_file_t:filesystem getattr;
-+manage_files_pattern(sandbox_domain, sandbox_file_t, sandbox_file_t);
-+manage_dirs_pattern(sandbox_domain, sandbox_file_t, sandbox_file_t);
-+manage_sock_files_pattern(sandbox_domain, sandbox_file_t, sandbox_file_t);
-+manage_fifo_files_pattern(sandbox_domain, sandbox_file_t, sandbox_file_t);
-+manage_lnk_files_pattern(sandbox_domain, sandbox_file_t, sandbox_file_t);
-+dontaudit sandbox_domain sandbox_file_t:dir mounton;
-+
-+gen_require(`
-+ type usr_t, lib_t, locale_t;
-+ type var_t, var_run_t, rpm_log_t, locale_t;
-+ attribute exec_type, configfile;
-+')
-+
-+kernel_dontaudit_read_system_state(sandbox_domain)
-+
-+corecmd_exec_all_executables(sandbox_domain)
-+
-+files_rw_all_inherited_files(sandbox_domain, -exec_type -configfile -usr_t -lib_t -locale_t -var_t -var_run_t -device_t -rpm_log_t )
-+files_entrypoint_all_files(sandbox_domain)
-+
-+files_read_config_files(sandbox_domain)
-+files_read_usr_files(sandbox_domain)
-+files_read_var_files(sandbox_domain)
-+files_dontaudit_search_all_dirs(sandbox_domain)
-+
-+miscfiles_read_localization(sandbox_domain)
-+
-+userdom_dontaudit_use_user_terminals(sandbox_domain)
-+
-+mta_dontaudit_read_spool_symlinks(sandbox_domain)
-+
-+########################################
-+#
+# sandbox_x_domain local policy
+#
+allow sandbox_x_domain self:process { getattr signal_perms getsched setsched setpgid execstack };
@@ -53149,7 +60399,6 @@ index 0000000..964fd55
+
+kernel_getattr_proc(sandbox_x_domain)
+kernel_read_network_state(sandbox_x_domain)
-+kernel_read_system_state(sandbox_x_domain)
+kernel_dontaudit_search_kernel_sysctl(sandbox_x_domain)
+
+domain_dontaudit_read_all_domains_state(sandbox_x_domain)
@@ -53172,6 +60421,9 @@ index 0000000..964fd55
+fs_getattr_xattr_fs(sandbox_x_domain)
+fs_list_inotifyfs(sandbox_x_domain)
+fs_dontaudit_getattr_xattr_fs(sandbox_x_domain)
++# Random tmpfs_t that gets created when you run X.
++fs_rw_tmpfs_files(sandbox_x_domain)
++fs_get_xattr_fs_quotas(sandbox_x_domain)
+
+auth_dontaudit_read_login_records(sandbox_x_domain)
+auth_dontaudit_write_login_records(sandbox_x_domain)
@@ -53182,12 +60434,10 @@ index 0000000..964fd55
+
+libs_dontaudit_setattr_lib_files(sandbox_x_domain)
+
-+miscfiles_read_localization(sandbox_x_domain)
+miscfiles_dontaudit_setattr_fonts_cache_dirs(sandbox_x_domain)
+
+mta_dontaudit_read_spool_symlinks(sandbox_x_domain)
+
-+selinux_get_fs_mount(sandbox_x_domain)
+selinux_validate_context(sandbox_x_domain)
+selinux_compute_access_vector(sandbox_x_domain)
+selinux_compute_create_context(sandbox_x_domain)
@@ -53202,7 +60452,6 @@ index 0000000..964fd55
+application_dontaudit_signal(sandbox_x_domain)
+application_dontaudit_sigkill(sandbox_x_domain)
+
-+logging_send_syslog_msg(sandbox_x_domain)
+logging_dontaudit_search_logs(sandbox_x_domain)
+
+miscfiles_read_fonts(sandbox_x_domain)
@@ -53248,6 +60497,7 @@ index 0000000..964fd55
+userdom_dontaudit_rw_user_tmp_pipes(sandbox_x_domain)
+
+fs_search_auto_mountpoints(sandbox_x_domain)
++fs_read_hugetlbfs_files(sandbox_x_domain)
+
+tunable_policy(`use_nfs_home_dirs',`
+ fs_search_auto_mountpoints(sandbox_x_domain)
@@ -53288,9 +60538,12 @@ index 0000000..964fd55
+dev_read_rand(sandbox_x_client_t)
+
+corenet_tcp_connect_ipp_port(sandbox_x_client_t)
++corenet_dontaudit_tcp_connect_xserver_port(sandbox_x_client_t)
+
+auth_use_nsswitch(sandbox_x_client_t)
+
++logging_send_syslog_msg(sandbox_x_client_t)
++
+optional_policy(`
+ colord_dbus_chat(sandbox_x_client_t)
+')
@@ -53309,8 +60562,12 @@ index 0000000..964fd55
+#
+typeattribute sandbox_web_client_t sandbox_web_type;
+
++selinux_get_fs_mount(sandbox_web_client_t)
++
+auth_use_nsswitch(sandbox_web_client_t)
+
++logging_send_syslog_msg(sandbox_web_client_t)
++
+allow sandbox_web_type self:capability { setuid setgid };
+allow sandbox_web_type self:netlink_audit_socket nlmsg_relay;
+dontaudit sandbox_web_type self:process setrlimit;
@@ -53326,7 +60583,6 @@ index 0000000..964fd55
+dev_write_sound(sandbox_web_type)
+dev_read_sound(sandbox_web_type)
+
-+corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(sandbox_web_type)
+corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(sandbox_web_type)
+corenet_raw_sendrecv_generic_if(sandbox_web_type)
+corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_node(sandbox_web_type)
@@ -53345,6 +60601,7 @@ index 0000000..964fd55
+corenet_tcp_connect_ipp_port(sandbox_web_type)
+corenet_tcp_connect_streaming_port(sandbox_web_type)
+corenet_tcp_connect_pulseaudio_port(sandbox_web_type)
++corenet_tcp_connect_tor_socks_port(sandbox_web_type)
+corenet_tcp_connect_speech_port(sandbox_web_type)
+corenet_tcp_connect_generic_port(sandbox_web_type)
+corenet_tcp_connect_soundd_port(sandbox_web_type)
@@ -53368,7 +60625,6 @@ index 0000000..964fd55
+
+dbus_system_bus_client(sandbox_web_type)
+dbus_read_config(sandbox_web_type)
-+selinux_get_fs_mount(sandbox_web_type)
+selinux_validate_context(sandbox_web_type)
+selinux_compute_access_vector(sandbox_web_type)
+selinux_compute_create_context(sandbox_web_type)
@@ -53411,6 +60667,12 @@ index 0000000..964fd55
+')
+
+optional_policy(`
++ # needed by pulseaudio
++ systemd_read_logind_sessions_files(sandbox_web_type)
++ systemd_login_read_pid_files(sandbox_web_type)
++')
++
++optional_policy(`
+ networkmanager_dontaudit_dbus_chat(sandbox_web_type)
+')
+
@@ -53424,7 +60686,6 @@ index 0000000..964fd55
+#
+typeattribute sandbox_net_client_t sandbox_web_type;
+
-+corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(sandbox_net_client_t)
+corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(sandbox_net_client_t)
+corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if(sandbox_net_client_t)
+corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_node(sandbox_net_client_t)
@@ -53434,8 +60695,12 @@ index 0000000..964fd55
+corenet_tcp_connect_all_ports(sandbox_net_client_t)
+corenet_sendrecv_all_client_packets(sandbox_net_client_t)
+
++selinux_get_fs_mount(sandbox_net_client_t)
++
+auth_use_nsswitch(sandbox_net_client_t)
+
++logging_send_syslog_msg(sandbox_net_client_t)
++
+optional_policy(`
+ mozilla_dontaudit_rw_user_home_files(sandbox_x_t)
+ mozilla_dontaudit_rw_user_home_files(sandbox_xserver_t)
@@ -53443,10 +60708,10 @@ index 0000000..964fd55
+ mozilla_plugin_dontaudit_leaks(sandbox_x_domain)
+')
diff --git a/sanlock.fc b/sanlock.fc
-index 5d1826c..9656f79 100644
+index 5d1826c..9059165 100644
--- a/sanlock.fc
+++ b/sanlock.fc
-@@ -1,7 +1,8 @@
+@@ -1,7 +1,10 @@
+
/etc/rc\.d/init\.d/sanlock -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:sanlock_initrc_exec_t,s0)
@@ -53456,8 +60721,10 @@ index 5d1826c..9656f79 100644
+/var/log/sanlock\.log.* gen_context(system_u:object_r:sanlock_log_t,s0)
/usr/sbin/sanlock -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:sanlock_exec_t,s0)
++
++/usr/lib/systemd/system/sanlock\.service -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:sanlock_unit_file_t,s0)
diff --git a/sanlock.if b/sanlock.if
-index cfe3172..3eb745d 100644
+index cfe3172..34b861a 100644
--- a/sanlock.if
+++ b/sanlock.if
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
@@ -53473,38 +60740,63 @@ index cfe3172..3eb745d 100644
########################################
## <summary>
## Execute sanlock server in the sanlock domain.
-@@ -57,21 +59,21 @@ interface(`sanlock_manage_pid_files',`
+@@ -57,21 +59,44 @@ interface(`sanlock_manage_pid_files',`
########################################
## <summary>
-## Connect to sanlock over an unix stream socket.
+## Connect to sanlock over a unix stream socket.
- ## </summary>
- ## <param name="domain">
--## <summary>
--## Domain allowed access.
--## </summary>
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
+## <summary>
+## Domain allowed access.
+## </summary>
- ## </param>
- #
- interface(`sanlock_stream_connect',`
-- gen_require(`
-- type sanlock_t, sanlock_var_run_t;
-- ')
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`sanlock_stream_connect',`
+ gen_require(`
+ type sanlock_t, sanlock_var_run_t;
+ ')
++
++ files_search_pids($1)
++ stream_connect_pattern($1, sanlock_var_run_t, sanlock_var_run_t, sanlock_t)
++')
++
++########################################
++## <summary>
++## Execute virt server in the virt domain.
+ ## </summary>
+ ## <param name="domain">
+ ## <summary>
+-## Domain allowed access.
++## Domain allowed to transition.
+ ## </summary>
+ ## </param>
+ #
+-interface(`sanlock_stream_connect',`
++interface(`sanlock_systemctl',`
+ gen_require(`
+- type sanlock_t, sanlock_var_run_t;
++ type sanlock_unit_file_t;
++ type sanlock_t;
+ ')
- files_search_pids($1)
- stream_connect_pattern($1, sanlock_var_run_t, sanlock_var_run_t, sanlock_t)
-+ files_search_pids($1)
-+ stream_connect_pattern($1, sanlock_var_run_t, sanlock_var_run_t, sanlock_t)
++ systemd_exec_systemctl($1)
++ allow $1 sanlock_unit_file_t:file read_file_perms;
++ allow $1 sanlock_unit_file_t:service manage_service_perms;
++
++ ps_process_pattern($1, sanlock_t)
')
########################################
-@@ -99,9 +101,13 @@ interface(`sanlock_admin',`
+@@ -95,13 +120,21 @@ interface(`sanlock_admin',`
+ gen_require(`
+ type sanlock_t;
+ type sanlock_initrc_exec_t;
++ type sanlock_unit_file_t;
+ ')
allow $1 sanlock_t:process signal_perms;
ps_process_pattern($1, sanlock_t)
@@ -53517,9 +60809,12 @@ index cfe3172..3eb745d 100644
role_transition $2 sanlock_initrc_exec_t system_r;
allow $2 system_r;
+
++ virt_systemctl($1)
++ admin_pattern($1, sanlock_unit_file_t)
++ allow $1 sanlock_unit_file_t:service all_service_perms;
')
diff --git a/sanlock.te b/sanlock.te
-index e02eb6c..8e19451 100644
+index e02eb6c..4f4eaf4 100644
--- a/sanlock.te
+++ b/sanlock.te
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
@@ -53528,7 +60823,7 @@ index e02eb6c..8e19451 100644
########################################
#
-@@ -6,16 +6,16 @@ policy_module(sanlock, 1.0.0)
+@@ -6,18 +6,25 @@ policy_module(sanlock, 1.0.0)
#
## <desc>
@@ -53542,16 +60837,34 @@ index e02eb6c..8e19451 100644
gen_tunable(sanlock_use_nfs, false)
## <desc>
--## <p>
--## Allow confined virtual guests to manage cifs files
--## </p>
+## <p>
+## Allow sanlock to manage cifs files
+## </p>
++## </desc>
++gen_tunable(sanlock_use_samba, false)
++
++## <desc>
+ ## <p>
+-## Allow confined virtual guests to manage cifs files
++## Allow sanlock to read/write fuse files
+ ## </p>
## </desc>
- gen_tunable(sanlock_use_samba, false)
+-gen_tunable(sanlock_use_samba, false)
++gen_tunable(sanlock_use_fusefs, false)
+
+ type sanlock_t;
+ type sanlock_exec_t;
+@@ -32,6 +39,9 @@ logging_log_file(sanlock_log_t)
+ type sanlock_initrc_exec_t;
+ init_script_file(sanlock_initrc_exec_t)
-@@ -44,8 +44,9 @@ ifdef(`enable_mls',`
++type sanlock_unit_file_t;
++systemd_unit_file(sanlock_unit_file_t)
++
+ ifdef(`enable_mcs',`
+ init_ranged_daemon_domain(sanlock_t, sanlock_exec_t, s0 - mcs_systemhigh)
+ ')
+@@ -44,8 +54,9 @@ ifdef(`enable_mls',`
#
# sanlock local policy
#
@@ -53563,7 +60876,7 @@ index e02eb6c..8e19451 100644
allow sanlock_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms;
allow sanlock_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
-@@ -58,15 +59,17 @@ manage_sock_files_pattern(sanlock_t, sanlock_var_run_t, sanlock_var_run_t)
+@@ -58,36 +69,51 @@ manage_sock_files_pattern(sanlock_t, sanlock_var_run_t, sanlock_var_run_t)
files_pid_filetrans(sanlock_t, sanlock_var_run_t, { file dir sock_file })
kernel_read_system_state(sanlock_t)
@@ -53572,9 +60885,11 @@ index e02eb6c..8e19451 100644
domain_use_interactive_fds(sanlock_t)
-files_read_etc_files(sanlock_t)
++files_read_mnt_symlinks(sanlock_t)
storage_raw_rw_fixed_disk(sanlock_t)
++dev_read_rand(sanlock_t)
dev_read_urand(sanlock_t)
+auth_use_nsswitch(sanlock_t)
@@ -53582,8 +60897,15 @@ index e02eb6c..8e19451 100644
init_read_utmp(sanlock_t)
init_dontaudit_write_utmp(sanlock_t)
-@@ -75,19 +78,25 @@ logging_send_syslog_msg(sanlock_t)
- miscfiles_read_localization(sanlock_t)
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(sanlock_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(sanlock_t)
++tunable_policy(`sanlock_use_fusefs',`
++ fs_manage_fusefs_dirs(sanlock_t)
++ fs_manage_fusefs_files(sanlock_t)
++ fs_read_fusefs_symlinks(sanlock_t)
++ fs_getattr_fusefs(sanlock_t)
++')
tunable_policy(`sanlock_use_nfs',`
- fs_manage_nfs_dirs(sanlock_t)
@@ -53648,7 +60970,7 @@ index f1aea88..3e6a93f 100644
admin_pattern($1, saslauthd_var_run_t)
')
diff --git a/sasl.te b/sasl.te
-index 9d9f8ce..4ad9ef7 100644
+index 9d9f8ce..88a01c0 100644
--- a/sasl.te
+++ b/sasl.te
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ policy_module(sasl, 1.14.0)
@@ -53711,7 +61033,17 @@ index 9d9f8ce..4ad9ef7 100644
corenet_sendrecv_pop_client_packets(saslauthd_t)
dev_read_urand(saslauthd_t)
-@@ -88,11 +86,13 @@ userdom_dontaudit_search_user_home_dirs(saslauthd_t)
+@@ -78,21 +76,20 @@ init_dontaudit_stream_connect_script(saslauthd_t)
+
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(saslauthd_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(saslauthd_t)
+ miscfiles_read_generic_certs(saslauthd_t)
+
+-seutil_dontaudit_read_config(saslauthd_t)
+-
+ userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fds(saslauthd_t)
+ userdom_dontaudit_search_user_home_dirs(saslauthd_t)
# cjp: typeattribute doesnt work in conditionals
auth_can_read_shadow_passwords(saslauthd_t)
@@ -53727,10 +61059,39 @@ index 9d9f8ce..4ad9ef7 100644
')
diff --git a/sblim.if b/sblim.if
-index fa24879..fdb665a 100644
+index fa24879..3abfdf2 100644
--- a/sblim.if
+++ b/sblim.if
-@@ -48,11 +48,6 @@ interface(`sblim_read_pid_files',`
+@@ -1,5 +1,28 @@
+ ## <summary> policy for SBLIM Gatherer </summary>
+
++######################################
++## <summary>
++## Creates types and rules for a basic
++## sblim daemon domain.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="prefix">
++## <summary>
++## Prefix for the domain.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++template(`sblim_domain_template',`
++ gen_require(`
++ attribute sblim_domain;
++ ')
++
++ type sblim_$1_t, sblim_domain;
++ type sblim_$1_exec_t;
++ init_daemon_domain(sblim_$1_t, sblim_$1_exec_t)
++
++ kernel_read_system_state(sblim_$1_t)
++')
++
+ ########################################
+ ## <summary>
+ ## Transition to gatherd.
+@@ -48,11 +71,6 @@ interface(`sblim_read_pid_files',`
## Domain allowed access.
## </summary>
## </param>
@@ -53742,7 +61103,7 @@ index fa24879..fdb665a 100644
## <rolecap/>
#
interface(`sblim_admin',`
-@@ -65,6 +60,11 @@ interface(`sblim_admin',`
+@@ -65,6 +83,11 @@ interface(`sblim_admin',`
allow $1 sblim_gatherd_t:process signal_perms;
ps_process_pattern($1, sblim_gatherd_t)
@@ -53755,17 +61116,74 @@ index fa24879..fdb665a 100644
ps_process_pattern($1, sblim_reposd_t)
diff --git a/sblim.te b/sblim.te
-index 869f976..d23d1c8 100644
+index 869f976..5171bda 100644
--- a/sblim.te
+++ b/sblim.te
-@@ -64,6 +64,7 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -7,13 +7,9 @@ policy_module(sblim, 1.0.0)
+
+ attribute sblim_domain;
+
+-type sblim_gatherd_t, sblim_domain;
+-type sblim_gatherd_exec_t;
+-init_daemon_domain(sblim_gatherd_t, sblim_gatherd_exec_t)
++sblim_domain_template(gatherd)
+
+-type sblim_reposd_t, sblim_domain;
+-type sblim_reposd_exec_t;
+-init_daemon_domain(sblim_reposd_t, sblim_reposd_exec_t)
++sblim_domain_template(reposd)
+
+ type sblim_var_run_t;
+ files_pid_file(sblim_var_run_t)
+@@ -41,6 +37,12 @@ dev_read_urand(sblim_gatherd_t)
+ domain_read_all_domains_state(sblim_gatherd_t)
+
+ fs_getattr_all_fs(sblim_gatherd_t)
++fs_search_cgroup_dirs(sblim_gatherd_t)
++
++storage_raw_read_fixed_disk(sblim_gatherd_t)
++storage_raw_read_removable_device(sblim_gatherd_t)
++
++logging_send_syslog_msg(sblim_gatherd_t)
+
+ sysnet_dns_name_resolve(sblim_gatherd_t)
+
+@@ -63,7 +65,9 @@ optional_policy(`
+ ')
optional_policy(`
++ virt_read_config(sblim_gatherd_t)
virt_stream_connect(sblim_gatherd_t)
+ virt_getattr_exec(sblim_gatherd_t)
')
optional_policy(`
+@@ -81,6 +85,8 @@ domtrans_pattern(sblim_gatherd_t, sblim_reposd_exec_t, sblim_reposd_t)
+ corenet_tcp_bind_all_nodes(sblim_reposd_t)
+ corenet_tcp_bind_repository_port(sblim_reposd_t)
+
++logging_send_syslog_msg(sblim_reposd_t)
++
+ ######################################
+ #
+ # sblim_domain local policy
+@@ -91,14 +97,13 @@ allow sblim_domain self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
+ manage_dirs_pattern(sblim_domain, sblim_var_run_t, sblim_var_run_t)
+ manage_files_pattern(sblim_domain, sblim_var_run_t, sblim_var_run_t)
+ manage_sock_files_pattern(sblim_domain, sblim_var_run_t, sblim_var_run_t)
++files_pid_filetrans(sblim_domain, sblim_var_run_t, { dir file sock_file })
+
+ kernel_read_network_state(sblim_domain)
+-kernel_read_system_state(sblim_domain)
+
+ dev_read_sysfs(sblim_domain)
+
+-logging_send_syslog_msg(sblim_domain)
++auth_read_passwd(sblim_domain)
+
+ files_read_etc_files(sblim_domain)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(sblim_domain)
diff --git a/screen.fc b/screen.fc
index c8254dd..b73334e 100644
--- a/screen.fc
@@ -53792,7 +61210,7 @@ index c8254dd..b73334e 100644
/var/run/screen(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:screen_var_run_t,s0)
+/var/run/tmux(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:screen_var_run_t,s0)
diff --git a/screen.if b/screen.if
-index c50a444..3ef87b4 100644
+index c50a444..caef1cd 100644
--- a/screen.if
+++ b/screen.if
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ template(`screen_role_template',`
@@ -53860,7 +61278,7 @@ index c50a444..3ef87b4 100644
manage_fifo_files_pattern($3, screen_home_t, screen_home_t)
manage_dirs_pattern($3, screen_home_t, screen_home_t)
-@@ -86,77 +57,41 @@ template(`screen_role_template',`
+@@ -86,77 +57,46 @@ template(`screen_role_template',`
relabel_lnk_files_pattern($3, screen_home_t, screen_home_t)
manage_dirs_pattern($3, screen_var_run_t, screen_var_run_t)
@@ -53868,9 +61286,9 @@ index c50a444..3ef87b4 100644
- manage_lnk_files_pattern($3, screen_var_run_t, screen_var_run_t)
manage_fifo_files_pattern($3, screen_var_run_t, screen_var_run_t)
-- kernel_read_system_state($1_screen_t)
+ kernel_read_system_state($1_screen_t)
- kernel_read_kernel_sysctls($1_screen_t)
--
+
- corecmd_list_bin($1_screen_t)
- corecmd_read_bin_files($1_screen_t)
- corecmd_read_bin_symlinks($1_screen_t)
@@ -53913,11 +61331,11 @@ index c50a444..3ef87b4 100644
-
- # Write to utmp.
- init_rw_utmp($1_screen_t)
--
-- logging_send_syslog_msg($1_screen_t)
--
-- miscfiles_read_localization($1_screen_t)
+ logging_send_syslog_msg($1_screen_t)
+
+- miscfiles_read_localization($1_screen_t)
+-
- seutil_read_config($1_screen_t)
-
- userdom_use_user_terminals($1_screen_t)
@@ -53925,6 +61343,7 @@ index c50a444..3ef87b4 100644
userdom_user_home_domtrans($1_screen_t, $3)
- userdom_setattr_user_ptys($1_screen_t)
- userdom_setattr_user_ttys($1_screen_t)
++ userdom_manage_tmp_role($2, $1_screen_t)
tunable_policy(`use_samba_home_dirs',`
fs_cifs_domtrans($1_screen_t, $3)
@@ -53958,7 +61377,7 @@ index c50a444..3ef87b4 100644
+ can_exec($1, screen_exec_t)
+')
diff --git a/screen.te b/screen.te
-index 2583626..3fe988d 100644
+index 2583626..86af6f6 100644
--- a/screen.te
+++ b/screen.te
@@ -5,6 +5,8 @@ policy_module(screen, 2.5.0)
@@ -53970,7 +61389,17 @@ index 2583626..3fe988d 100644
type screen_exec_t;
application_executable_file(screen_exec_t)
-@@ -23,3 +25,91 @@ typealias screen_var_run_t alias { user_screen_var_run_t staff_screen_var_run_t
+@@ -13,13 +15,84 @@ typealias screen_home_t alias { user_screen_home_t staff_screen_home_t sysadm_sc
+ typealias screen_home_t alias { auditadm_screen_home_t secadm_screen_home_t };
+ userdom_user_home_content(screen_home_t)
+
+-type screen_tmp_t;
+-typealias screen_tmp_t alias { user_screen_tmp_t staff_screen_tmp_t sysadm_screen_tmp_t };
+-typealias screen_tmp_t alias { auditadm_screen_tmp_t secadm_screen_tmp_t };
+-userdom_user_tmp_file(screen_tmp_t)
+-
+ type screen_var_run_t;
+ typealias screen_var_run_t alias { user_screen_var_run_t staff_screen_var_run_t sysadm_screen_var_run_t };
typealias screen_var_run_t alias { auditadm_screen_var_run_t secadm_screen_var_run_t screen_dir_t };
files_pid_file(screen_var_run_t)
ubac_constrained(screen_var_run_t)
@@ -53990,11 +61419,6 @@ index 2583626..3fe988d 100644
+allow screen_domain self:unix_stream_socket { create_socket_perms connectto };
+allow screen_domain self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms;
+
-+manage_dirs_pattern(screen_domain, screen_tmp_t, screen_tmp_t)
-+manage_files_pattern(screen_domain, screen_tmp_t, screen_tmp_t)
-+manage_fifo_files_pattern(screen_domain, screen_tmp_t, screen_tmp_t)
-+files_tmp_filetrans(screen_domain, screen_tmp_t, { file dir })
-+
+# Create fifo
+manage_fifo_files_pattern(screen_domain, screen_var_run_t, screen_var_run_t)
+manage_dirs_pattern(screen_domain, screen_var_run_t, screen_var_run_t)
@@ -54009,7 +61433,6 @@ index 2583626..3fe988d 100644
+read_files_pattern(screen_domain, screen_home_t, screen_home_t)
+read_lnk_files_pattern(screen_domain, screen_home_t, screen_home_t)
+
-+kernel_read_system_state(screen_domain)
+kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(screen_domain)
+
+corecmd_list_bin(screen_domain)
@@ -54018,7 +61441,6 @@ index 2583626..3fe988d 100644
+corecmd_read_bin_pipes(screen_domain)
+corecmd_read_bin_sockets(screen_domain)
+
-+corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(screen_domain)
+corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(screen_domain)
+corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if(screen_domain)
+corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_node(screen_domain)
@@ -54051,17 +61473,12 @@ index 2583626..3fe988d 100644
+# Write to utmp.
+init_rw_utmp(screen_domain)
+
-+logging_send_syslog_msg(screen_domain)
-+
-+miscfiles_read_localization(screen_domain)
-+
+seutil_read_config(screen_domain)
+
+userdom_use_user_terminals(screen_domain)
+userdom_create_user_pty(screen_domain)
+userdom_setattr_user_ptys(screen_domain)
+userdom_setattr_user_ttys(screen_domain)
-+
diff --git a/sectoolm.fc b/sectoolm.fc
index 1ed6870..3f1dac5 100644
--- a/sectoolm.fc
@@ -54130,16 +61547,18 @@ index c8ef84b..ffa81dd 100644
optional_policy(`
mount_exec(sectoolm_t)
diff --git a/sendmail.fc b/sendmail.fc
-index a86ec50..ef4199b 100644
+index a86ec50..da5d41d 100644
--- a/sendmail.fc
+++ b/sendmail.fc
-@@ -1,4 +1,6 @@
+@@ -1,5 +1,7 @@
+-/var/log/sendmail\.st -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:sendmail_log_t,s0)
+/etc/rc\.d/init\.d/sendmail -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:sendmail_initrc_exec_t,s0)
+
- /var/log/sendmail\.st -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:sendmail_log_t,s0)
++/var/log/sendmail\.st.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:sendmail_log_t,s0)
/var/log/mail(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:sendmail_log_t,s0)
+ /var/run/sendmail\.pid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:sendmail_var_run_t,s0)
diff --git a/sendmail.if b/sendmail.if
index 7e94c7c..ca74cd9 100644
--- a/sendmail.if
@@ -54265,7 +61684,7 @@ index 7e94c7c..ca74cd9 100644
+ admin_pattern($1, mail_spool_t)
+')
diff --git a/sendmail.te b/sendmail.te
-index 22dac1f..94f85f6 100644
+index 22dac1f..a536819 100644
--- a/sendmail.te
+++ b/sendmail.te
@@ -19,9 +19,8 @@ mta_sendmail_mailserver(sendmail_t)
@@ -54308,12 +61727,16 @@ index 22dac1f..94f85f6 100644
auth_use_nsswitch(sendmail_t)
-@@ -103,7 +102,7 @@ miscfiles_read_generic_certs(sendmail_t)
- miscfiles_read_localization(sendmail_t)
+@@ -100,10 +99,10 @@ logging_send_syslog_msg(sendmail_t)
+ logging_dontaudit_write_generic_logs(sendmail_t)
+
+ miscfiles_read_generic_certs(sendmail_t)
+-miscfiles_read_localization(sendmail_t)
userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fds(sendmail_t)
-userdom_dontaudit_search_user_home_dirs(sendmail_t)
+userdom_read_user_home_content_files(sendmail_t)
++userdom_dontaudit_list_user_home_dirs(sendmail_t)
mta_read_config(sendmail_t)
mta_etc_filetrans_aliases(sendmail_t)
@@ -54343,17 +61766,22 @@ index 22dac1f..94f85f6 100644
')
optional_policy(`
-@@ -149,7 +159,9 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -149,7 +159,14 @@ optional_policy(`
')
optional_policy(`
++ openshift_dontaudit_rw_inherited_fifo_files(sendmail_t)
++ openshift_rw_inherited_content(sendmail_t)
++')
++
++optional_policy(`
+ postfix_domtrans_postdrop(sendmail_t)
postfix_domtrans_master(sendmail_t)
+ postfix_domtrans_postqueue(sendmail_t)
postfix_read_config(sendmail_t)
postfix_search_spool(sendmail_t)
')
-@@ -168,20 +180,13 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -168,20 +185,13 @@ optional_policy(`
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -54377,6 +61805,139 @@ index 22dac1f..94f85f6 100644
- unconfined_domain(unconfined_sendmail_t)
+ uucp_domtrans_uux(sendmail_t)
')
+diff --git a/sensord.fc b/sensord.fc
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..e1ef619
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/sensord.fc
+@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
++/lib/systemd/system/sensord.service -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:sensord_unit_file_t,s0)
++
++/usr/sbin/sensord -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:sensord_exec_t,s0)
++
++/var/run/sensord\.pid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:sensord_var_run_t,s0)
+diff --git a/sensord.if b/sensord.if
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..5eba5fd
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/sensord.if
+@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
++
++## <summary>Sensor information logging daemon</summary>
++
++########################################
++## <summary>
++## Execute sensord in the sensord domain.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed to transition.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`sensord_domtrans',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type sensord_t, sensord_exec_t;
++ ')
++
++ corecmd_search_bin($1)
++ domtrans_pattern($1, sensord_exec_t, sensord_t)
++')
++########################################
++## <summary>
++## Execute sensord server in the sensord domain.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed to transition.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`sensord_systemctl',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type sensord_t;
++ type sensord_unit_file_t;
++ ')
++
++ systemd_exec_systemctl($1)
++ allow $1 sensord_unit_file_t:file read_file_perms;
++ allow $1 sensord_unit_file_t:service manage_service_perms;
++
++ ps_process_pattern($1, sensord_t)
++')
++
++
++########################################
++## <summary>
++## All of the rules required to administrate
++## an sensord environment
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++## <rolecap/>
++#
++interface(`sensord_admin',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type sensord_t;
++ type sensord_unit_file_t;
++ ')
++
++ allow $1 sensord_t:process { ptrace signal_perms };
++ ps_process_pattern($1, sensord_t)
++
++ sensord_systemctl($1)
++ admin_pattern($1, sensord_unit_file_t)
++ allow $1 sensord_unit_file_t:service all_service_perms;
++
++ optional_policy(`
++ systemd_passwd_agent_exec($1)
++ systemd_read_fifo_file_passwd_run($1)
++ ')
++')
+diff --git a/sensord.te b/sensord.te
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..5e92ac9
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/sensord.te
+@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
++policy_module(sensord, 1.0.0)
++
++########################################
++#
++# Declarations
++#
++
++type sensord_t;
++type sensord_exec_t;
++init_daemon_domain(sensord_t, sensord_exec_t)
++
++type sensord_unit_file_t;
++systemd_unit_file(sensord_unit_file_t)
++
++type sensord_var_run_t;
++files_pid_file(sensord_var_run_t)
++
++########################################
++#
++# sensord local policy
++#
++
++allow sensord_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms;
++allow sensord_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
++
++manage_files_pattern(sensord_t, sensord_var_run_t, sensord_var_run_t)
++files_pid_filetrans(sensord_t, sensord_var_run_t, { file })
++
++domain_use_interactive_fds(sensord_t)
++
++dev_read_sysfs(sensord_t)
++
++files_read_etc_files(sensord_t)
++
++logging_send_syslog_msg(sensord_t)
diff --git a/setroubleshoot.if b/setroubleshoot.if
index bcdd16c..039b0c8 100644
--- a/setroubleshoot.if
@@ -54449,7 +62010,7 @@ index bcdd16c..039b0c8 100644
files_list_var_lib($1)
admin_pattern($1, setroubleshoot_var_lib_t)
diff --git a/setroubleshoot.te b/setroubleshoot.te
-index 086cd5f..ffb516b 100644
+index 086cd5f..08ef0c7 100644
--- a/setroubleshoot.te
+++ b/setroubleshoot.te
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ init_daemon_domain(setroubleshootd_t, setroubleshootd_exec_t)
@@ -54527,28 +62088,33 @@ index 086cd5f..ffb516b 100644
term_dontaudit_use_all_ptys(setroubleshootd_t)
term_dontaudit_use_all_ttys(setroubleshootd_t)
-@@ -104,6 +112,8 @@ auth_use_nsswitch(setroubleshootd_t)
+@@ -104,15 +112,15 @@ auth_use_nsswitch(setroubleshootd_t)
init_read_utmp(setroubleshootd_t)
init_dontaudit_write_utmp(setroubleshootd_t)
+-miscfiles_read_localization(setroubleshootd_t)
+libs_exec_ld_so(setroubleshootd_t)
+
- miscfiles_read_localization(setroubleshootd_t)
locallogin_dontaudit_use_fds(setroubleshootd_t)
-@@ -112,8 +122,6 @@ logging_send_audit_msgs(setroubleshootd_t)
+
+ logging_send_audit_msgs(setroubleshootd_t)
logging_send_syslog_msg(setroubleshootd_t)
logging_stream_connect_dispatcher(setroubleshootd_t)
-
--modutils_read_module_config(setroubleshootd_t)
-
+-modutils_read_module_config(setroubleshootd_t)
++logging_stream_connect_syslog(setroubleshootd_t)
+
seutil_read_config(setroubleshootd_t)
seutil_read_file_contexts(setroubleshootd_t)
- seutil_read_bin_policy(setroubleshootd_t)
-@@ -121,10 +129,23 @@ seutil_read_bin_policy(setroubleshootd_t)
+@@ -121,10 +129,27 @@ seutil_read_bin_policy(setroubleshootd_t)
userdom_dontaudit_read_user_home_content_files(setroubleshootd_t)
optional_policy(`
++ abrt_dbus_chat(setroubleshootd_t)
++')
++
++optional_policy(`
+ locate_read_lib_files(setroubleshootd_t)
+')
+
@@ -54569,13 +62135,15 @@ index 086cd5f..ffb516b 100644
rpm_signull(setroubleshootd_t)
rpm_read_db(setroubleshootd_t)
rpm_dontaudit_manage_db(setroubleshootd_t)
-@@ -151,10 +172,14 @@ kernel_read_system_state(setroubleshoot_fixit_t)
+@@ -150,11 +175,16 @@ kernel_read_system_state(setroubleshoot_fixit_t)
+
corecmd_exec_bin(setroubleshoot_fixit_t)
corecmd_exec_shell(setroubleshoot_fixit_t)
-
++corecmd_getattr_all_executables(setroubleshoot_fixit_t)
++
+dev_read_sysfs(setroubleshoot_fixit_t)
+dev_read_urand(setroubleshoot_fixit_t)
-+
+
seutil_domtrans_setfiles(setroubleshoot_fixit_t)
+seutil_domtrans_setsebool(setroubleshoot_fixit_t)
+seutil_read_module_store(setroubleshoot_fixit_t)
@@ -54585,10 +62153,11 @@ index 086cd5f..ffb516b 100644
files_list_tmp(setroubleshoot_fixit_t)
auth_use_nsswitch(setroubleshoot_fixit_t)
-@@ -164,6 +189,17 @@ logging_send_syslog_msg(setroubleshoot_fixit_t)
-
- miscfiles_read_localization(setroubleshoot_fixit_t)
+@@ -162,7 +192,16 @@ auth_use_nsswitch(setroubleshoot_fixit_t)
+ logging_send_audit_msgs(setroubleshoot_fixit_t)
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(setroubleshoot_fixit_t)
+-miscfiles_read_localization(setroubleshoot_fixit_t)
+userdom_dontaudit_search_admin_dir(setroubleshoot_fixit_t)
+userdom_signull_unpriv_users(setroubleshoot_fixit_t)
+
@@ -54599,10 +62168,9 @@ index 086cd5f..ffb516b 100644
+optional_policy(`
+ gnome_dontaudit_search_config(setroubleshoot_fixit_t)
+')
-+
+
optional_policy(`
rpm_signull(setroubleshoot_fixit_t)
- rpm_read_db(setroubleshoot_fixit_t)
diff --git a/sge.fc b/sge.fc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..160ddc2
@@ -54617,18 +62185,40 @@ index 0000000..160ddc2
+
diff --git a/sge.if b/sge.if
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..839f1b3
+index 0000000..c9d2d9c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/sge.if
-@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+## <summary>Policy for gridengine MPI jobs</summary>
+
++######################################
++## <summary>
++## Creates types and rules for a basic
++## sge domain.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="prefix">
++## <summary>
++## Prefix for the domain.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++template(`sge_basic_types_template',`
++ gen_require(`
++ attribute sge_domain;
++ ')
++
++ type $1_t, sge_domain;
++ type $1_exec_t;
++
++ kernel_read_system_state($1_t)
++')
++
diff --git a/sge.te b/sge.te
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..803c998
+index 0000000..d43336f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/sge.te
-@@ -0,0 +1,195 @@
+@@ -0,0 +1,193 @@
+policy_module(sge, 1.0.0)
+
+########################################
@@ -54652,8 +62242,7 @@ index 0000000..803c998
+
+attribute sge_domain;
+
-+type sge_execd_t, sge_domain;
-+type sge_execd_exec_t;
++sge_basic_types_template(sge_execd)
+init_daemon_domain(sge_execd_t, sge_execd_exec_t)
+
+type sge_spool_t;
@@ -54662,13 +62251,11 @@ index 0000000..803c998
+type sge_tmp_t;
+files_tmp_file(sge_tmp_t)
+
-+type sge_shepherd_t, sge_domain;
-+type sge_shepherd_exec_t;
++sge_basic_types_template(sge_shepherd)
+application_domain(sge_shepherd_t, sge_shepherd_exec_t)
+role system_r types sge_shepherd_t;
+
-+type sge_job_t, sge_domain;
-+type sge_job_exec_t;
++sge_basic_types_template(sge_job)
+application_domain(sge_job_t, sge_job_exec_t)
+corecmd_shell_entry_type(sge_job_t)
+role system_r types sge_job_t;
@@ -54694,6 +62281,8 @@ index 0000000..803c998
+
+auth_use_nsswitch(sge_execd_t)
+
++logging_send_syslog_msg(sge_execd_t)
++
+init_read_utmp(sge_execd_t)
+
+optional_policy(`
@@ -54718,6 +62307,8 @@ index 0000000..803c998
+
+fs_getattr_all_fs(sge_shepherd_t)
+
++logging_send_syslog_msg(sge_shepherd_t)
++
+optional_policy(`
+ mta_send_mail(sge_shepherd_t)
+')
@@ -54743,6 +62334,8 @@ index 0000000..803c998
+
+term_use_all_terms(sge_job_t)
+
++logging_send_syslog_msg(sge_job_t)
++
+optional_policy(`
+ ssh_basic_client_template(sge_job, sge_job_t, system_r)
+ ssh_domtrans(sge_job_t)
@@ -54785,7 +62378,6 @@ index 0000000..803c998
+files_tmp_filetrans(sge_domain, sge_tmp_t, { file dir })
+
+kernel_read_network_state(sge_domain)
-+kernel_read_system_state(sge_domain)
+
+corecmd_exec_bin(sge_domain)
+corecmd_exec_shell(sge_domain)
@@ -54797,10 +62389,6 @@ index 0000000..803c998
+
+dev_read_urand(sge_domain)
+
-+logging_send_syslog_msg(sge_domain)
-+
-+miscfiles_read_localization(sge_domain)
-+
+tunable_policy(`sge_domain_can_network_connect',`
+ corenet_tcp_connect_all_ports(sge_domain)
+')
@@ -54917,10 +62505,10 @@ index 781ad7e..d5ce40a 100644
init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, shorewall_initrc_exec_t)
domain_system_change_exemption($1)
diff --git a/shorewall.te b/shorewall.te
-index 4723c6b..b0c2be4 100644
+index 4723c6b..c55fcaa 100644
--- a/shorewall.te
+++ b/shorewall.te
-@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ logging_log_file(shorewall_log_t)
+@@ -37,9 +37,10 @@ logging_log_file(shorewall_log_t)
# shorewall local policy
#
@@ -54928,8 +62516,11 @@ index 4723c6b..b0c2be4 100644
+allow shorewall_t self:capability { dac_override net_admin net_raw setuid setgid sys_nice };
dontaudit shorewall_t self:capability sys_tty_config;
allow shorewall_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms;
++allow shorewall_t self:netlink_socket create_socket_perms;
-@@ -59,6 +59,9 @@ exec_files_pattern(shorewall_t, shorewall_var_lib_t, shorewall_var_lib_t)
+ read_files_pattern(shorewall_t, shorewall_etc_t, shorewall_etc_t)
+ list_dirs_pattern(shorewall_t, shorewall_etc_t, shorewall_etc_t)
+@@ -59,6 +60,9 @@ exec_files_pattern(shorewall_t, shorewall_var_lib_t, shorewall_var_lib_t)
manage_dirs_pattern(shorewall_t, shorewall_var_lib_t, shorewall_var_lib_t)
manage_files_pattern(shorewall_t, shorewall_var_lib_t, shorewall_var_lib_t)
files_var_lib_filetrans(shorewall_t, shorewall_var_lib_t, { dir file })
@@ -54939,7 +62530,13 @@ index 4723c6b..b0c2be4 100644
allow shorewall_t shorewall_initrc_exec_t:file read_file_perms;
-@@ -75,7 +78,6 @@ dev_read_urand(shorewall_t)
+@@ -70,12 +74,12 @@ kernel_rw_net_sysctls(shorewall_t)
+ corecmd_exec_bin(shorewall_t)
+ corecmd_exec_shell(shorewall_t)
+
++dev_read_sysfs(shorewall_t)
+ dev_read_urand(shorewall_t)
+
domain_read_all_domains_state(shorewall_t)
files_getattr_kernel_modules(shorewall_t)
@@ -54947,16 +62544,15 @@ index 4723c6b..b0c2be4 100644
files_read_usr_files(shorewall_t)
files_search_kernel_modules(shorewall_t)
-@@ -83,13 +85,22 @@ fs_getattr_all_fs(shorewall_t)
+@@ -83,13 +87,20 @@ fs_getattr_all_fs(shorewall_t)
init_rw_utmp(shorewall_t)
+logging_read_generic_logs(shorewall_t)
logging_send_syslog_msg(shorewall_t)
+-miscfiles_read_localization(shorewall_t)
+auth_use_nsswitch(shorewall_t)
-+
- miscfiles_read_localization(shorewall_t)
sysnet_domtrans_ifconfig(shorewall_t)
@@ -55088,7 +62684,7 @@ index d0604cf..b66057c 100644
## </summary>
## <param name="domain">
diff --git a/shutdown.te b/shutdown.te
-index 8966ec9..7b4a2d4 100644
+index 8966ec9..2a52a13 100644
--- a/shutdown.te
+++ b/shutdown.te
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ policy_module(shutdown, 1.1.0)
@@ -55110,7 +62706,7 @@ index 8966ec9..7b4a2d4 100644
allow shutdown_t self:fifo_file manage_fifo_file_perms;
allow shutdown_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
-@@ -33,18 +34,21 @@ files_etc_filetrans(shutdown_t, shutdown_etc_t, file)
+@@ -33,25 +34,31 @@ files_etc_filetrans(shutdown_t, shutdown_etc_t, file)
manage_files_pattern(shutdown_t, shutdown_var_run_t, shutdown_var_run_t)
files_pid_filetrans(shutdown_t, shutdown_var_run_t, file)
@@ -55136,16 +62732,18 @@ index 8966ec9..7b4a2d4 100644
init_stream_connect(shutdown_t)
init_telinit(shutdown_t)
-@@ -54,10 +58,24 @@ logging_send_audit_msgs(shutdown_t)
- miscfiles_read_localization(shutdown_t)
+ logging_search_logs(shutdown_t)
+ logging_send_audit_msgs(shutdown_t)
- optional_policy(`
-+ cron_system_entry(shutdown_t, shutdown_exec_t)
-+')
+-miscfiles_read_localization(shutdown_t)
+
+optional_policy(`
++ cron_system_entry(shutdown_t, shutdown_exec_t)
++')
+
+ optional_policy(`
dbus_system_bus_client(shutdown_t)
- dbus_connect_system_bus(shutdown_t)
+@@ -59,5 +66,15 @@ optional_policy(`
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -55162,7 +62760,7 @@ index 8966ec9..7b4a2d4 100644
+ xserver_xdm_append_log(shutdown_t)
')
diff --git a/slocate.te b/slocate.te
-index a225c02..b53997a 100644
+index a225c02..b76ed92 100644
--- a/slocate.te
+++ b/slocate.te
@@ -43,7 +43,6 @@ files_getattr_all_files(locate_t)
@@ -55173,8 +62771,168 @@ index a225c02..b53997a 100644
fs_getattr_all_fs(locate_t)
fs_getattr_all_files(locate_t)
+@@ -58,7 +57,6 @@ fs_read_noxattr_fs_symlinks(locate_t)
+ # getpwnam
+ auth_use_nsswitch(locate_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(locate_t)
+
+ ifdef(`enable_mls',`
+ # On MLS machines will not be allowed to getattr Anything but SystemLow
+diff --git a/slpd.fc b/slpd.fc
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..5064a4a
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/slpd.fc
+@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
++/etc/rc\.d/init\.d/slpd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:slpd_initrc_exec_t,s0)
++
++/usr/sbin/slpd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:slpd_exec_t,s0)
++
++/var/log/slpd\.log -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:slpd_var_log_t,s0)
++
++/var/run/slpd\.pid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:slpd_var_run_t,s0)
+diff --git a/slpd.if b/slpd.if
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..75931f8
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/slpd.if
+@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
++
++## <summary>OpenSLP server daemon to dynamically register services.</summary>
++
++########################################
++## <summary>
++## Transition to slpd.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed to transition.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`slpd_domtrans',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type slpd_t, slpd_exec_t;
++ ')
++
++ corecmd_search_bin($1)
++ domtrans_pattern($1, slpd_exec_t, slpd_t)
++')
++
++########################################
++## <summary>
++## Execute slpd server in the slpd domain.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`slpd_initrc_domtrans',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type slpd_initrc_exec_t;
++ ')
++
++ init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, slpd_initrc_exec_t)
++')
++
++########################################
++## <summary>
++## All of the rules required to administrate
++## an slpd environment
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++## <param name="role">
++## <summary>
++## Role allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++## <rolecap/>
++#
++interface(`slpd_admin',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type slpd_t;
++ type slpd_initrc_exec_t;
++ ')
++
++ allow $1 slpd_t:process { ptrace signal_perms };
++ ps_process_pattern($1, slpd_t)
++
++ slpd_initrc_domtrans($1)
++ domain_system_change_exemption($1)
++ role_transition $2 slpd_initrc_exec_t system_r;
++ allow $2 system_r;
++ optional_policy(`
++ systemd_passwd_agent_exec($1)
++ systemd_read_fifo_file_passwd_run($1)
++ ')
++')
+diff --git a/slpd.te b/slpd.te
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..cd475d6
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/slpd.te
+@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
++policy_module(slpd, 1.0.0)
++
++########################################
++#
++# Declarations
++#
++
++type slpd_t;
++type slpd_exec_t;
++init_daemon_domain(slpd_t, slpd_exec_t)
++
++type slpd_initrc_exec_t;
++init_script_file(slpd_initrc_exec_t)
++
++type slpd_var_log_t;
++logging_log_file(slpd_var_log_t)
++
++type slpd_var_run_t;
++files_pid_file(slpd_var_run_t)
++
++########################################
++#
++# slpd local policy
++#
++
++allow slpd_t self:capability { kill setgid setuid };
++allow slpd_t self:process { fork signal };
++allow slpd_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms;
++allow slpd_t self:tcp_socket { create_socket_perms listen };
++allow slpd_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
++
++manage_files_pattern(slpd_t, slpd_var_log_t, slpd_var_log_t)
++logging_log_filetrans(slpd_t, slpd_var_log_t, { file })
++
++manage_files_pattern(slpd_t, slpd_var_run_t, slpd_var_run_t)
++files_pid_filetrans(slpd_t, slpd_var_run_t, { file })
++
++corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(slpd_t)
++corenet_tcp_bind_generic_node(slpd_t)
++corenet_udp_bind_generic_node(slpd_t)
++corenet_tcp_bind_all_ports(slpd_t)
++corenet_udp_bind_all_ports(slpd_t)
++
++dev_read_urand(slpd_t)
++
++domain_use_interactive_fds(slpd_t)
++
++files_read_etc_files(slpd_t)
++
++auth_use_nsswitch(slpd_t)
++
++sysnet_dns_name_resolve(slpd_t)
diff --git a/slrnpull.te b/slrnpull.te
-index e5e72fd..92eecec 100644
+index e5e72fd..84936ca 100644
--- a/slrnpull.te
+++ b/slrnpull.te
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ type slrnpull_var_run_t;
@@ -55186,8 +62944,17 @@ index e5e72fd..92eecec 100644
type slrnpull_log_t;
logging_log_file(slrnpull_log_t)
+@@ -52,8 +52,6 @@ fs_search_auto_mountpoints(slrnpull_t)
+
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(slrnpull_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(slrnpull_t)
+-
+ userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fds(slrnpull_t)
+ userdom_dontaudit_search_user_home_dirs(slrnpull_t)
+
diff --git a/smartmon.if b/smartmon.if
-index adea9f9..145adbd 100644
+index adea9f9..f5dd0fe 100644
--- a/smartmon.if
+++ b/smartmon.if
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ interface(`smartmon_read_tmp_files',`
@@ -55206,13 +62973,13 @@ index adea9f9..145adbd 100644
+ allow $1 fsdaemon_t:process signal_perms;
ps_process_pattern($1, fsdaemon_t)
+ tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',`
-+ allow $1 smartmon_t:process ptrace;
++ allow $1 fsdaemon_t:process ptrace;
+ ')
init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, fsdaemon_initrc_exec_t)
domain_system_change_exemption($1)
diff --git a/smartmon.te b/smartmon.te
-index 6b3322b..9a6149d 100644
+index 6b3322b..c955ccc 100644
--- a/smartmon.te
+++ b/smartmon.te
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
@@ -55244,7 +63011,7 @@ index 6b3322b..9a6149d 100644
corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(fsdaemon_t)
corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if(fsdaemon_t)
corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_node(fsdaemon_t)
-@@ -73,19 +73,31 @@ files_read_etc_runtime_files(fsdaemon_t)
+@@ -73,26 +73,36 @@ files_read_etc_runtime_files(fsdaemon_t)
files_read_usr_files(fsdaemon_t)
# for config
files_read_etc_files(fsdaemon_t)
@@ -55276,6 +63043,13 @@ index 6b3322b..9a6149d 100644
libs_exec_ld_so(fsdaemon_t)
libs_exec_lib_files(fsdaemon_t)
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(fsdaemon_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(fsdaemon_t)
+-
+ seutil_sigchld_newrole(fsdaemon_t)
+
+ sysnet_dns_name_resolve(fsdaemon_t)
diff --git a/smokeping.if b/smokeping.if
index 8265278..017b923 100644
--- a/smokeping.if
@@ -55294,10 +63068,15 @@ index 8265278..017b923 100644
smokeping_initrc_domtrans($1)
domain_system_change_exemption($1)
diff --git a/smokeping.te b/smokeping.te
-index 740994a..55643cb 100644
+index 740994a..4bfc780 100644
--- a/smokeping.te
+++ b/smokeping.te
-@@ -40,7 +40,6 @@ corecmd_read_bin_symlinks(smokeping_t)
+@@ -36,11 +36,10 @@ manage_dirs_pattern(smokeping_t, smokeping_var_lib_t, smokeping_var_lib_t)
+ manage_files_pattern(smokeping_t, smokeping_var_lib_t, smokeping_var_lib_t)
+ files_var_lib_filetrans(smokeping_t, smokeping_var_lib_t, { file dir } )
+
+-corecmd_read_bin_symlinks(smokeping_t)
++corecmd_exec_bin(smokeping_t)
dev_read_urand(smokeping_t)
@@ -55305,16 +63084,27 @@ index 740994a..55643cb 100644
files_read_usr_files(smokeping_t)
files_search_tmp(smokeping_t)
-@@ -73,5 +72,7 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -49,8 +48,6 @@ auth_dontaudit_read_shadow(smokeping_t)
+
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(smokeping_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(smokeping_t)
+-
+ mta_send_mail(smokeping_t)
+
+ netutils_domtrans_ping(smokeping_t)
+@@ -73,5 +70,9 @@ optional_policy(`
files_search_tmp(httpd_smokeping_cgi_script_t)
files_search_var_lib(httpd_smokeping_cgi_script_t)
+ auth_read_passwd(httpd_smokeping_cgi_script_t)
+
sysnet_dns_name_resolve(httpd_smokeping_cgi_script_t)
++
++ netutils_domtrans_ping(httpd_smokeping_cgi_script_t)
')
diff --git a/smoltclient.te b/smoltclient.te
-index bc00875..7c8590e 100644
+index bc00875..7dd4e53 100644
--- a/smoltclient.te
+++ b/smoltclient.te
@@ -8,7 +8,6 @@ policy_module(smoltclient, 1.1.0)
@@ -55325,7 +63115,7 @@ index bc00875..7c8590e 100644
type smoltclient_tmp_t;
files_tmp_file(smoltclient_tmp_t)
-@@ -39,22 +38,32 @@ corecmd_exec_shell(smoltclient_t)
+@@ -39,20 +38,29 @@ corecmd_exec_shell(smoltclient_t)
corenet_tcp_connect_http_port(smoltclient_t)
dev_read_sysfs(smoltclient_t)
@@ -55344,21 +63134,363 @@ index bc00875..7c8590e 100644
logging_send_syslog_msg(smoltclient_t)
+-miscfiles_read_localization(smoltclient_t)
+miscfiles_read_hwdata(smoltclient_t)
- miscfiles_read_localization(smoltclient_t)
-
- optional_policy(`
++
++optional_policy(`
+ abrt_stream_connect(smoltclient_t)
+')
+
+optional_policy(`
+ cron_system_entry(smoltclient_t, smoltclient_exec_t)
+')
-+
-+optional_policy(`
- dbus_system_bus_client(smoltclient_t)
- ')
+ optional_policy(`
+ dbus_system_bus_client(smoltclient_t)
+diff --git a/smsd.fc b/smsd.fc
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..4c3fcec
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/smsd.fc
+@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
++/etc/rc\.d/init\.d/smsd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:smsd_initrc_exec_t,s0)
++
++/usr/sbin/smsd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:smsd_exec_t,s0)
++
++/var/lib/smstools(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:smsd_var_lib_t,s0)
++
++/var/log/smsd(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:smsd_log_t,s0)
++
++/var/run/smsd(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:smsd_var_run_t,s0)
++
++/var/spool/sms(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:smsd_spool_t,s0)
+diff --git a/smsd.if b/smsd.if
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..6db3f07
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/smsd.if
+@@ -0,0 +1,241 @@
++
++## <summary>The SMS Server Tools are made to send and receive short messages through GSM modems. It supports easy file interfaces and it can run external programs for automatic actions.</summary>
++
++########################################
++## <summary>
++## Execute smsd in the smsd domin.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed to transition.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`smsd_domtrans',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type smsd_t, smsd_exec_t;
++ ')
++
++ corecmd_search_bin($1)
++ domtrans_pattern($1, smsd_exec_t, smsd_t)
++')
++
++########################################
++## <summary>
++## Execute smsd server in the smsd domain.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`smsd_initrc_domtrans',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type smsd_initrc_exec_t;
++ ')
++
++ init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, smsd_initrc_exec_t)
++')
++
++########################################
++## <summary>
++## Read smsd's log files.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`smsd_read_log',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type smsd_log_t;
++ ')
++
++ logging_search_logs($1)
++ read_files_pattern($1, smsd_log_t, smsd_log_t)
++')
++
++########################################
++## <summary>
++## Append to smsd log files.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`smsd_append_log',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type smsd_log_t;
++ ')
++
++ logging_search_logs($1)
++ append_files_pattern($1, smsd_log_t, smsd_log_t)
++')
++
++########################################
++## <summary>
++## Manage smsd log files
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`smsd_manage_log',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type smsd_log_t;
++ ')
++
++ logging_search_logs($1)
++ manage_dirs_pattern($1, smsd_log_t, smsd_log_t)
++ manage_files_pattern($1, smsd_log_t, smsd_log_t)
++ manage_lnk_files_pattern($1, smsd_log_t, smsd_log_t)
++')
++########################################
++## <summary>
++## Read smsd PID files.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`smsd_read_pid_files',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type smsd_var_run_t;
++ ')
++
++ files_search_pids($1)
++ read_files_pattern($1, smsd_var_run_t, smsd_var_run_t)
++')
++
++########################################
++## <summary>
++## Search smsd spool directories.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`smsd_search_spool',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type smsd_spool_t;
++ ')
++
++ allow $1 smsd_spool_t:dir search_dir_perms;
++ files_search_spool($1)
++')
++
++########################################
++## <summary>
++## Read smsd spool files.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`smsd_read_spool_files',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type smsd_spool_t;
++ ')
++
++ files_search_spool($1)
++ read_files_pattern($1, smsd_spool_t, smsd_spool_t)
++')
++
++########################################
++## <summary>
++## Manage smsd spool files.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`smsd_manage_spool_files',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type smsd_spool_t;
++ ')
++
++ files_search_spool($1)
++ manage_files_pattern($1, smsd_spool_t, smsd_spool_t)
++')
++
++########################################
++## <summary>
++## Manage smsd spool dirs.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`smsd_manage_spool_dirs',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type smsd_spool_t;
++ ')
++
++ files_search_spool($1)
++ manage_dirs_pattern($1, smsd_spool_t, smsd_spool_t)
++')
++
++########################################
++## <summary>
++## All of the rules required to administrate
++## an smsd environment
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++## <param name="role">
++## <summary>
++## Role allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++## <rolecap/>
++#
++interface(`smsd_admin',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type smsd_t;
++ type smsd_initrc_exec_t;
++ type smsd_log_t;
++ type smsd_var_run_t;
++ type smsd_spool_t;
++ ')
++
++ allow $1 smsd_t:process { ptrace signal_perms };
++ ps_process_pattern($1, smsd_t)
++
++ smsd_initrc_domtrans($1)
++ domain_system_change_exemption($1)
++ role_transition $2 smsd_initrc_exec_t system_r;
++ allow $2 system_r;
++
++ logging_search_logs($1)
++ admin_pattern($1, smsd_log_t)
++
++ files_search_pids($1)
++ admin_pattern($1, smsd_var_run_t)
++
++ files_search_spool($1)
++ admin_pattern($1, smsd_spool_t)
++
++ optional_policy(`
++ systemd_passwd_agent_exec($1)
++ systemd_read_fifo_file_passwd_run($1)
++ ')
++')
+diff --git a/smsd.te b/smsd.te
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..4e822e5
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/smsd.te
+@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
++policy_module(smsd, 1.0.0)
++
++########################################
++#
++# Declarations
++#
++
++type smsd_t;
++type smsd_exec_t;
++init_daemon_domain(smsd_t, smsd_exec_t)
++
++type smsd_initrc_exec_t;
++init_script_file(smsd_initrc_exec_t)
++
++type smsd_log_t;
++logging_log_file(smsd_log_t)
++
++type smsd_var_lib_t;
++files_type(smsd_var_lib_t)
++
++type smsd_var_run_t;
++files_pid_file(smsd_var_run_t)
++
++type smsd_spool_t;
++files_type(smsd_spool_t)
++
++type smsd_tmp_t;
++files_tmp_file(smsd_tmp_t)
++
++########################################
++#
++# smsd local policy
++#
++
++allow smsd_t self:capability { kill setgid setuid };
++allow smsd_t self:process { fork signal };
++allow smsd_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms;
++allow smsd_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
++
++manage_dirs_pattern(smsd_t, smsd_log_t, smsd_log_t)
++manage_files_pattern(smsd_t, smsd_log_t, smsd_log_t)
++manage_lnk_files_pattern(smsd_t, smsd_log_t, smsd_log_t)
++logging_log_filetrans(smsd_t, smsd_log_t, { dir })
++
++manage_dirs_pattern(smsd_t, smsd_var_lib_t, smsd_var_lib_t)
++manage_files_pattern(smsd_t, smsd_var_lib_t, smsd_var_lib_t)
++manage_lnk_files_pattern(smsd_t, smsd_var_lib_t, smsd_var_lib_t)
++
++manage_dirs_pattern(smsd_t, smsd_var_run_t, smsd_var_run_t)
++manage_files_pattern(smsd_t, smsd_var_run_t, smsd_var_run_t)
++manage_lnk_files_pattern(smsd_t, smsd_var_run_t, smsd_var_run_t)
++files_pid_filetrans(smsd_t, smsd_var_run_t, { dir })
++
++manage_dirs_pattern(smsd_t, smsd_spool_t, smsd_spool_t)
++manage_files_pattern(smsd_t, smsd_spool_t, smsd_spool_t)
++manage_lnk_files_pattern(smsd_t, smsd_spool_t, smsd_spool_t)
++files_spool_filetrans(smsd_t, smsd_spool_t, { dir })
++
++manage_dirs_pattern(smsd_t, smsd_tmp_t, smsd_tmp_t)
++manage_files_pattern(smsd_t, smsd_tmp_t, smsd_tmp_t)
++files_tmp_filetrans(smsd_t, smsd_tmp_t, { file dir })
++
++kernel_read_system_state(smsd_t)
++kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(smsd_t)
++
++corecmd_exec_shell(smsd_t)
++
++files_read_etc_files(smsd_t)
++
++auth_use_nsswitch(smsd_t)
++
++logging_send_syslog_msg(smsd_t)
++
++sysnet_dns_name_resolve(smsd_t)
diff --git a/snmp.fc b/snmp.fc
index 623c8fa..1ef62d0 100644
--- a/snmp.fc
@@ -55500,7 +63632,7 @@ index 275f9fb..f1343b7 100644
init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, snmpd_initrc_exec_t)
domain_system_change_exemption($1)
diff --git a/snmp.te b/snmp.te
-index 56f074c..e86e037 100644
+index 56f074c..4909ce8 100644
--- a/snmp.te
+++ b/snmp.te
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ policy_module(snmp, 1.13.0)
@@ -55557,7 +63689,15 @@ index 56f074c..e86e037 100644
corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(snmpd_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(snmpd_t)
corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if(snmpd_t)
-@@ -83,10 +86,8 @@ dev_getattr_usbfs_dirs(snmpd_t)
+@@ -73,6 +76,7 @@ corenet_sendrecv_snmp_server_packets(snmpd_t)
+ corenet_tcp_connect_agentx_port(snmpd_t)
+ corenet_tcp_bind_agentx_port(snmpd_t)
+ corenet_udp_bind_agentx_port(snmpd_t)
++corenet_tcp_connect_snmp_port(snmpd_t)
+
+ dev_list_sysfs(snmpd_t)
+ dev_read_sysfs(snmpd_t)
+@@ -83,10 +87,8 @@ dev_getattr_usbfs_dirs(snmpd_t)
domain_use_interactive_fds(snmpd_t)
domain_signull_all_domains(snmpd_t)
domain_read_all_domains_state(snmpd_t)
@@ -55568,7 +63708,7 @@ index 56f074c..e86e037 100644
files_read_usr_files(snmpd_t)
files_read_etc_runtime_files(snmpd_t)
files_search_home(snmpd_t)
-@@ -94,15 +95,19 @@ files_search_home(snmpd_t)
+@@ -94,28 +96,28 @@ files_search_home(snmpd_t)
fs_getattr_all_dirs(snmpd_t)
fs_getattr_all_fs(snmpd_t)
fs_search_auto_mountpoints(snmpd_t)
@@ -55589,7 +63729,12 @@ index 56f074c..e86e037 100644
logging_send_syslog_msg(snmpd_t)
-@@ -115,7 +120,7 @@ sysnet_read_config(snmpd_t)
+-miscfiles_read_localization(snmpd_t)
+-
+-seutil_dontaudit_search_config(snmpd_t)
+-
+ sysnet_read_config(snmpd_t)
+
userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fds(snmpd_t)
userdom_dontaudit_search_user_home_dirs(snmpd_t)
@@ -55598,7 +63743,18 @@ index 56f074c..e86e037 100644
optional_policy(`
rpm_read_db(snmpd_t)
rpm_dontaudit_manage_db(snmpd_t)
-@@ -140,6 +145,10 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -131,6 +133,10 @@ optional_policy(`
+ ')
+
+ optional_policy(`
++ corosync_stream_connect(snmpd_t)
++')
++
++optional_policy(`
+ cups_read_rw_config(snmpd_t)
+ ')
+
+@@ -140,6 +146,10 @@ optional_policy(`
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -55642,7 +63798,7 @@ index c117e8b..0eb909b 100644
+ files_list_pids($1)
')
diff --git a/snort.te b/snort.te
-index 179bc1b..84e5390 100644
+index 179bc1b..3dbbcc0 100644
--- a/snort.te
+++ b/snort.te
@@ -32,17 +32,18 @@ files_pid_file(snort_var_run_t)
@@ -55675,6 +63831,15 @@ index 179bc1b..84e5390 100644
corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(snort_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(snort_t)
corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if(snort_t)
+@@ -95,8 +95,6 @@ init_read_utmp(snort_t)
+
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(snort_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(snort_t)
+-
+ sysnet_read_config(snort_t)
+ # snorts must be able to resolve dns in case it wants to relay to a remote prelude-manager
+ sysnet_dns_name_resolve(snort_t)
diff --git a/sosreport.fc b/sosreport.fc
index a40478e..050f521 100644
--- a/sosreport.fc
@@ -55697,7 +63862,7 @@ index 94c01b5..f64bd93 100644
########################################
diff --git a/sosreport.te b/sosreport.te
-index c6079a5..6c7b30a 100644
+index c6079a5..cb59eff 100644
--- a/sosreport.te
+++ b/sosreport.te
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ files_tmpfs_file(sosreport_tmpfs_t)
@@ -55736,10 +63901,12 @@ index c6079a5..6c7b30a 100644
auth_use_nsswitch(sosreport_t)
init_domtrans_script(sosreport_t)
-@@ -92,13 +95,11 @@ logging_send_syslog_msg(sosreport_t)
-
- miscfiles_read_localization(sosreport_t)
+@@ -90,15 +93,11 @@ libs_domtrans_ldconfig(sosreport_t)
+ logging_read_all_logs(sosreport_t)
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(sosreport_t)
+-miscfiles_read_localization(sosreport_t)
+-
-# needed by modinfo
-modutils_read_module_deps(sosreport_t)
-
@@ -55751,7 +63918,7 @@ index c6079a5..6c7b30a 100644
')
optional_policy(`
-@@ -110,6 +111,11 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -110,6 +109,11 @@ optional_policy(`
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -55787,7 +63954,7 @@ index 93fe7bf..1b07ed4 100644
init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, soundd_initrc_exec_t)
domain_system_change_exemption($1)
diff --git a/soundserver.te b/soundserver.te
-index 3217605..14718f2 100644
+index 3217605..e9a4381 100644
--- a/soundserver.te
+++ b/soundserver.te
@@ -68,7 +68,6 @@ kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(soundd_t)
@@ -55798,8 +63965,17 @@ index 3217605..14718f2 100644
corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(soundd_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(soundd_t)
corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if(soundd_t)
+@@ -94,8 +93,6 @@ fs_search_auto_mountpoints(soundd_t)
+
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(soundd_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(soundd_t)
+-
+ sysnet_read_config(soundd_t)
+
+ userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fds(soundd_t)
diff --git a/spamassassin.fc b/spamassassin.fc
-index 6b3abf9..3dfa27b 100644
+index 6b3abf9..80c9e56 100644
--- a/spamassassin.fc
+++ b/spamassassin.fc
@@ -1,15 +1,53 @@
@@ -55831,7 +64007,7 @@ index 6b3abf9..3dfa27b 100644
+/var/lib/spamassassin/compiled(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:spamd_compiled_t,s0)
+
+/var/log/spamd\.log.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:spamd_log_t,s0)
-+/var/log/mimedefang -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:spamd_log_t,s0)
++/var/log/mimedefang.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:spamd_log_t,s0)
/var/run/spamassassin(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:spamd_var_run_t,s0)
@@ -56075,10 +64251,10 @@ index c954f31..82fc7f6 100644
+ admin_pattern($1, spamd_var_run_t)
')
diff --git a/spamassassin.te b/spamassassin.te
-index 1bbf73b..eb40028 100644
+index 1bbf73b..dd3e5e1 100644
--- a/spamassassin.te
+++ b/spamassassin.te
-@@ -6,52 +6,41 @@ policy_module(spamassassin, 2.5.0)
+@@ -6,52 +6,40 @@ policy_module(spamassassin, 2.5.0)
#
## <desc>
@@ -56131,7 +64307,6 @@ index 1bbf73b..eb40028 100644
+type spamd_update_t;
+type spamd_update_exec_t;
+application_domain(spamd_update_t, spamd_update_exec_t)
-+cron_system_entry(spamd_update_t, spamd_update_exec_t)
+role system_r types spamd_update_t;
type spamd_t;
@@ -56153,7 +64328,7 @@ index 1bbf73b..eb40028 100644
type spamd_tmp_t;
files_tmp_file(spamd_tmp_t)
-@@ -63,6 +52,89 @@ files_type(spamd_var_lib_t)
+@@ -63,6 +51,89 @@ files_type(spamd_var_lib_t)
type spamd_var_run_t;
files_pid_file(spamd_var_run_t)
@@ -56243,7 +64418,7 @@ index 1bbf73b..eb40028 100644
##############################
#
# Standalone program local policy
-@@ -98,12 +170,14 @@ manage_lnk_files_pattern(spamd_t, spamassassin_home_t, spamassassin_home_t)
+@@ -98,12 +169,14 @@ manage_lnk_files_pattern(spamd_t, spamassassin_home_t, spamassassin_home_t)
manage_fifo_files_pattern(spamd_t, spamassassin_home_t, spamassassin_home_t)
manage_sock_files_pattern(spamd_t, spamassassin_home_t, spamassassin_home_t)
userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans(spamd_t, spamassassin_home_t, { dir file lnk_file sock_file fifo_file })
@@ -56258,7 +64433,7 @@ index 1bbf73b..eb40028 100644
# this should probably be removed
corecmd_list_bin(spamassassin_t)
-@@ -114,7 +188,6 @@ corecmd_read_bin_sockets(spamassassin_t)
+@@ -114,7 +187,6 @@ corecmd_read_bin_sockets(spamassassin_t)
domain_use_interactive_fds(spamassassin_t)
@@ -56266,15 +64441,25 @@ index 1bbf73b..eb40028 100644
files_read_etc_runtime_files(spamassassin_t)
files_list_home(spamassassin_t)
files_read_usr_files(spamassassin_t)
-@@ -134,7 +207,6 @@ tunable_policy(`spamassassin_can_network',`
+@@ -122,8 +194,6 @@ files_dontaudit_search_var(spamassassin_t)
+
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(spamassassin_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(spamassassin_t)
+-
+ # cjp: this could probably be removed
+ seutil_read_config(spamassassin_t)
+
+@@ -134,8 +204,6 @@ tunable_policy(`spamassassin_can_network',`
allow spamassassin_t self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
allow spamassassin_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms;
- corenet_all_recvfrom_unlabeled(spamassassin_t)
- corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(spamassassin_t)
+- corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(spamassassin_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(spamassassin_t)
corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if(spamassassin_t)
-@@ -144,6 +216,9 @@ tunable_policy(`spamassassin_can_network',`
+ corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_node(spamassassin_t)
+@@ -144,6 +212,9 @@ tunable_policy(`spamassassin_can_network',`
corenet_udp_sendrecv_all_ports(spamassassin_t)
corenet_tcp_connect_all_ports(spamassassin_t)
corenet_sendrecv_all_client_packets(spamassassin_t)
@@ -56284,7 +64469,7 @@ index 1bbf73b..eb40028 100644
sysnet_read_config(spamassassin_t)
')
-@@ -154,25 +229,13 @@ tunable_policy(`spamd_enable_home_dirs',`
+@@ -154,25 +225,13 @@ tunable_policy(`spamd_enable_home_dirs',`
userdom_manage_user_home_content_symlinks(spamd_t)
')
@@ -56311,7 +64496,7 @@ index 1bbf73b..eb40028 100644
nis_use_ypbind_uncond(spamassassin_t)
')
')
-@@ -180,6 +243,8 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -180,6 +239,8 @@ optional_policy(`
optional_policy(`
mta_read_config(spamassassin_t)
sendmail_stub(spamassassin_t)
@@ -56320,7 +64505,7 @@ index 1bbf73b..eb40028 100644
')
########################################
-@@ -202,17 +267,37 @@ allow spamc_t self:unix_stream_socket connectto;
+@@ -202,17 +263,37 @@ allow spamc_t self:unix_stream_socket connectto;
allow spamc_t self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
allow spamc_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms;
@@ -56359,7 +64544,7 @@ index 1bbf73b..eb40028 100644
corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(spamc_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(spamc_t)
corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if(spamc_t)
-@@ -222,6 +307,7 @@ corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_ports(spamc_t)
+@@ -222,6 +303,7 @@ corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_ports(spamc_t)
corenet_udp_sendrecv_all_ports(spamc_t)
corenet_tcp_connect_all_ports(spamc_t)
corenet_sendrecv_all_client_packets(spamc_t)
@@ -56367,7 +64552,7 @@ index 1bbf73b..eb40028 100644
fs_search_auto_mountpoints(spamc_t)
-@@ -234,15 +320,19 @@ corecmd_read_bin_sockets(spamc_t)
+@@ -234,43 +316,52 @@ corecmd_read_bin_sockets(spamc_t)
domain_use_interactive_fds(spamc_t)
@@ -56383,21 +64568,22 @@ index 1bbf73b..eb40028 100644
logging_send_syslog_msg(spamc_t)
+-miscfiles_read_localization(spamc_t)
+auth_use_nsswitch(spamc_t)
-+
- miscfiles_read_localization(spamc_t)
- # cjp: this should probably be removed:
-@@ -250,27 +340,35 @@ seutil_read_config(spamc_t)
+-# cjp: this should probably be removed:
+-seutil_read_config(spamc_t)
++userdom_home_manager(spamc_t)
- sysnet_read_config(spamc_t)
+-sysnet_read_config(spamc_t)
++optional_policy(`
++ abrt_stream_connect(spamc_t)
++')
-+userdom_home_manager(spamc_t)
-+
optional_policy(`
- # Allow connection to spamd socket above
- evolution_stream_connect(spamc_t)
-+ abrt_stream_connect(spamc_t)
++ amavis_manage_spool_files(spamc_t)
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -56430,7 +64616,7 @@ index 1bbf73b..eb40028 100644
')
########################################
-@@ -282,7 +380,7 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -282,7 +373,7 @@ optional_policy(`
# setuids to the user running spamc. Comment this if you are not
# using this ability.
@@ -56439,12 +64625,15 @@ index 1bbf73b..eb40028 100644
dontaudit spamd_t self:capability sys_tty_config;
allow spamd_t self:process ~{ ptrace setcurrent setexec setfscreate setrlimit execmem execstack execheap };
allow spamd_t self:fd use;
-@@ -298,10 +396,17 @@ allow spamd_t self:unix_dgram_socket sendto;
+@@ -298,10 +389,20 @@ allow spamd_t self:unix_dgram_socket sendto;
allow spamd_t self:unix_stream_socket connectto;
allow spamd_t self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
allow spamd_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms;
-allow spamd_t self:netlink_route_socket r_netlink_socket_perms;
+
++# needed by razor
++rw_files_pattern(spamd_t, spamd_etc_t, spamd_etc_t)
++
+can_exec(spamd_t, spamd_compiled_t)
+manage_dirs_pattern(spamd_t, spamd_compiled_t, spamd_compiled_t)
+manage_files_pattern(spamd_t, spamd_compiled_t, spamd_compiled_t)
@@ -56458,7 +64647,7 @@ index 1bbf73b..eb40028 100644
files_spool_filetrans(spamd_t, spamd_spool_t, { file dir })
manage_dirs_pattern(spamd_t, spamd_tmp_t, spamd_tmp_t)
-@@ -310,16 +415,21 @@ files_tmp_filetrans(spamd_t, spamd_tmp_t, { file dir })
+@@ -310,16 +411,21 @@ files_tmp_filetrans(spamd_t, spamd_tmp_t, { file dir })
# var/lib files for spamd
allow spamd_t spamd_var_lib_t:dir list_dir_perms;
@@ -56483,7 +64672,7 @@ index 1bbf73b..eb40028 100644
corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(spamd_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(spamd_t)
corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if(spamd_t)
-@@ -356,30 +466,32 @@ corecmd_exec_bin(spamd_t)
+@@ -356,30 +462,30 @@ corecmd_exec_bin(spamd_t)
domain_use_interactive_fds(spamd_t)
files_read_usr_files(spamd_t)
@@ -56494,19 +64683,18 @@ index 1bbf73b..eb40028 100644
init_dontaudit_rw_utmp(spamd_t)
+-logging_send_syslog_msg(spamd_t)
+auth_use_nsswitch(spamd_t)
-+
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(spamd_t)
+libs_use_ld_so(spamd_t)
+libs_use_shared_libs(spamd_t)
-+
- logging_send_syslog_msg(spamd_t)
-
- miscfiles_read_localization(spamd_t)
-sysnet_read_config(spamd_t)
-sysnet_use_ldap(spamd_t)
-sysnet_dns_name_resolve(spamd_t)
--
++logging_send_syslog_msg(spamd_t)
+
userdom_use_unpriv_users_fds(spamd_t)
userdom_search_user_home_dirs(spamd_t)
+userdom_home_manager(spamd_t)
@@ -56525,7 +64713,7 @@ index 1bbf73b..eb40028 100644
')
optional_policy(`
-@@ -395,7 +507,9 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -395,7 +501,9 @@ optional_policy(`
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -56535,7 +64723,7 @@ index 1bbf73b..eb40028 100644
dcc_stream_connect_dccifd(spamd_t)
')
-@@ -404,25 +518,17 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -404,25 +512,17 @@ optional_policy(`
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -56563,18 +64751,21 @@ index 1bbf73b..eb40028 100644
postgresql_stream_connect(spamd_t)
')
-@@ -433,6 +539,10 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -433,6 +533,13 @@ optional_policy(`
optional_policy(`
razor_domtrans(spamd_t)
+ razor_read_lib_files(spamd_t)
++')
++
++optional_policy(`
+ tunable_policy(`spamd_enable_home_dirs',`
+ razor_manage_user_home_files(spamd_t)
+ ')
')
optional_policy(`
-@@ -440,6 +550,7 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -440,6 +547,7 @@ optional_policy(`
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -56582,7 +64773,7 @@ index 1bbf73b..eb40028 100644
sendmail_stub(spamd_t)
mta_read_config(spamd_t)
')
-@@ -447,3 +558,50 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -447,3 +555,54 @@ optional_policy(`
optional_policy(`
udev_read_db(spamd_t)
')
@@ -56594,6 +64785,7 @@ index 1bbf73b..eb40028 100644
+
+allow spamd_update_t self:fifo_file manage_fifo_file_perms;
+allow spamd_update_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
++allow spamd_update_t self:capability dac_read_search;
+dontaudit spamd_update_t self:capability dac_override;
+
+manage_dirs_pattern(spamd_update_t, spamd_tmp_t, spamd_tmp_t)
@@ -56601,6 +64793,7 @@ index 1bbf73b..eb40028 100644
+files_tmp_filetrans(spamd_update_t, spamd_tmp_t, { file dir })
+
+allow spamd_update_t spamd_var_lib_t:dir list_dir_perms;
++manage_dirs_pattern(spamd_update_t, spamd_var_lib_t, spamd_var_lib_t)
+manage_files_pattern(spamd_update_t, spamd_var_lib_t, spamd_var_lib_t)
+manage_lnk_files_pattern(spamd_update_t, spamd_var_lib_t, spamd_var_lib_t)
+
@@ -56623,16 +64816,52 @@ index 1bbf73b..eb40028 100644
+auth_use_nsswitch(spamd_update_t)
+auth_dontaudit_read_shadow(spamd_update_t)
+
-+miscfiles_read_localization(spamd_update_t)
-+
+mta_read_config(spamd_update_t)
+
+userdom_use_inherited_user_ptys(spamd_update_t)
+
+optional_policy(`
++ cron_system_entry(spamd_update_t, spamd_update_exec_t)
++')
++
++optional_policy(`
+ gpg_domtrans(spamd_update_t)
+')
+
+diff --git a/speedtouch.te b/speedtouch.te
+index ade10f5..bed16af 100644
+--- a/speedtouch.te
++++ b/speedtouch.te
+@@ -47,8 +47,6 @@ fs_search_auto_mountpoints(speedmgmt_t)
+
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(speedmgmt_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(speedmgmt_t)
+-
+ userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fds(speedmgmt_t)
+ userdom_dontaudit_search_user_home_dirs(speedmgmt_t)
+
+diff --git a/squid.fc b/squid.fc
+index 2015152..6664de3 100644
+--- a/squid.fc
++++ b/squid.fc
+@@ -1,8 +1,11 @@
+ /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/squid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:squid_initrc_exec_t,s0)
+ /etc/squid(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:squid_conf_t,s0)
++/etc/lightsquid(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:squid_conf_t,s0)
+
++/usr/share/lightsquid/cgi(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_squid_script_exec_t,s0)
+ /usr/lib/squid/cachemgr\.cgi -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_squid_script_exec_t,s0)
+ /usr/sbin/squid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:squid_exec_t,s0)
++/usr/sbin/lightparser.pl -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:squid_cron_exec_t,s0)
+ /usr/share/squid(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:squid_conf_t,s0)
+
+ /var/cache/squid(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:squid_cache_t,s0)
+@@ -11,3 +14,4 @@
+ /var/run/squid\.pid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:squid_var_run_t,s0)
+ /var/spool/squid(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:squid_cache_t,s0)
+ /var/squidGuard(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:squid_cache_t,s0)
++/var/lightsquid(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:squid_cache_t,s0)
diff --git a/squid.if b/squid.if
index d2496bd..c7614d7 100644
--- a/squid.if
@@ -56673,7 +64902,7 @@ index d2496bd..c7614d7 100644
init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, squid_initrc_exec_t)
domain_system_change_exemption($1)
diff --git a/squid.te b/squid.te
-index c38de7a..a4aef18 100644
+index c38de7a..413146c 100644
--- a/squid.te
+++ b/squid.te
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ type squid_cache_t;
@@ -56685,7 +64914,7 @@ index c38de7a..a4aef18 100644
type squid_initrc_exec_t;
init_script_file(squid_initrc_exec_t)
-@@ -40,6 +40,9 @@ logging_log_file(squid_log_t)
+@@ -40,9 +40,18 @@ logging_log_file(squid_log_t)
type squid_tmpfs_t;
files_tmpfs_file(squid_tmpfs_t)
@@ -56695,7 +64924,16 @@ index c38de7a..a4aef18 100644
type squid_var_run_t;
files_pid_file(squid_var_run_t)
-@@ -69,6 +72,7 @@ allow squid_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms;
++type squid_cron_t;
++type squid_cron_exec_t;
++init_daemon_domain(squid_cron_t, squid_cron_exec_t)
++application_domain(squid_cron_t, squid_cron_exec_t)
++role system_r types squid_cron_t;
++
+ ########################################
+ #
+ # Local policy
+@@ -69,6 +78,7 @@ allow squid_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms;
manage_dirs_pattern(squid_t, squid_cache_t, squid_cache_t)
manage_files_pattern(squid_t, squid_cache_t, squid_cache_t)
manage_lnk_files_pattern(squid_t, squid_cache_t, squid_cache_t)
@@ -56703,7 +64941,7 @@ index c38de7a..a4aef18 100644
allow squid_t squid_conf_t:dir list_dir_perms;
read_files_pattern(squid_t, squid_conf_t, squid_conf_t)
-@@ -85,15 +89,19 @@ logging_log_filetrans(squid_t, squid_log_t, { file dir })
+@@ -85,15 +95,19 @@ logging_log_filetrans(squid_t, squid_log_t, { file dir })
manage_files_pattern(squid_t, squid_tmpfs_t, squid_tmpfs_t)
fs_tmpfs_filetrans(squid_t, squid_tmpfs_t, file)
@@ -56724,7 +64962,7 @@ index c38de7a..a4aef18 100644
corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(squid_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(squid_t)
corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if(squid_t)
-@@ -145,7 +153,6 @@ corecmd_exec_shell(squid_t)
+@@ -145,7 +159,6 @@ corecmd_exec_shell(squid_t)
domain_use_interactive_fds(squid_t)
@@ -56732,7 +64970,15 @@ index c38de7a..a4aef18 100644
files_read_etc_runtime_files(squid_t)
files_read_usr_files(squid_t)
files_search_spool(squid_t)
-@@ -169,7 +176,8 @@ userdom_dontaudit_search_user_home_dirs(squid_t)
+@@ -161,7 +174,6 @@ libs_exec_lib_files(squid_t)
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(squid_t)
+
+ miscfiles_read_generic_certs(squid_t)
+-miscfiles_read_localization(squid_t)
+
+ userdom_use_unpriv_users_fds(squid_t)
+ userdom_dontaudit_search_user_home_dirs(squid_t)
+@@ -169,7 +181,8 @@ userdom_dontaudit_search_user_home_dirs(squid_t)
tunable_policy(`squid_connect_any',`
corenet_tcp_connect_all_ports(squid_t)
corenet_tcp_bind_all_ports(squid_t)
@@ -56742,7 +64988,7 @@ index c38de7a..a4aef18 100644
')
tunable_policy(`squid_use_tproxy',`
-@@ -182,9 +190,9 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -182,17 +195,19 @@ optional_policy(`
allow httpd_squid_script_t self:tcp_socket create_socket_perms;
@@ -56753,7 +64999,19 @@ index c38de7a..a4aef18 100644
sysnet_dns_name_resolve(httpd_squid_script_t)
-@@ -206,3 +214,7 @@ optional_policy(`
+- squid_read_config(httpd_squid_script_t)
++ optional_policy(`
++ squid_read_config(httpd_squid_script_t)
++ ')
+ ')
+
+ optional_policy(`
+- cron_system_entry(squid_t, squid_exec_t)
++ mysql_stream_connect(squid_t)
+ ')
+
+ optional_policy(`
+@@ -206,3 +221,32 @@ optional_policy(`
optional_policy(`
udev_read_db(squid_t)
')
@@ -56761,17 +65019,44 @@ index c38de7a..a4aef18 100644
+optional_policy(`
+ kerberos_tmp_filetrans_host_rcache(squid_t, "host_0")
+')
++
++########################################
++#
++# squid cron Local policy
++#
++manage_dirs_pattern(squid_cron_t, squid_cache_t, squid_cache_t)
++manage_files_pattern(squid_cron_t, squid_cache_t, squid_cache_t)
++manage_lnk_files_pattern(squid_cron_t, squid_cache_t, squid_cache_t)
++files_var_filetrans(squid_cron_t, squid_cache_t, dir, "squid")
++
++read_files_pattern(squid_cron_t, squid_conf_t, squid_conf_t)
++
++read_files_pattern(squid_cron_t, squid_log_t, squid_log_t)
++
++corecmd_exec_bin(squid_cron_t)
++
++dev_read_urand(squid_cron_t)
++
++files_read_etc_files(squid_cron_t)
++files_read_usr_files(squid_cron_t)
++
++
++optional_policy(`
++ cron_system_entry(squid_cron_t, squid_cron_exec_t)
++')
diff --git a/sssd.fc b/sssd.fc
-index 4271815..fb5520f 100644
+index 4271815..45291bb 100644
--- a/sssd.fc
+++ b/sssd.fc
-@@ -1,9 +1,13 @@
+@@ -1,9 +1,15 @@
/etc/rc\.d/init\.d/sssd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:sssd_initrc_exec_t,s0)
+/etc/sssd(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:sssd_conf_t,s0)
+
/usr/sbin/sssd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:sssd_exec_t,s0)
++/usr/lib/systemd/system/sssd.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:sssd_unit_file_t,s0)
++
/var/lib/sss(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:sssd_var_lib_t,s0)
+/var/lib/sss/mc(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:sssd_public_t,s0)
@@ -56780,10 +65065,32 @@ index 4271815..fb5520f 100644
/var/log/sssd(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:sssd_var_log_t,s0)
diff --git a/sssd.if b/sssd.if
-index 941380a..ff89df6 100644
+index 941380a..54c45f6 100644
--- a/sssd.if
+++ b/sssd.if
-@@ -5,9 +5,9 @@
+@@ -1,13 +1,31 @@
+ ## <summary>System Security Services Daemon</summary>
+
++#######################################
++## <summary>
++## Allow a domain to getattr on sssd binary.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed to transition.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`sssd_getattr_exec',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type sssd_t, sssd_exec_t;
++ ')
++
++ allow $1 sssd_exec_t:file getattr;
++')
++
+ ########################################
+ ## <summary>
## Execute a domain transition to run sssd.
## </summary>
## <param name="domain">
@@ -56795,10 +65102,31 @@ index 941380a..ff89df6 100644
## </param>
#
interface(`sssd_domtrans',`
-@@ -36,6 +36,63 @@ interface(`sssd_initrc_domtrans',`
- init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, sssd_initrc_exec_t)
- ')
+@@ -38,6 +56,106 @@ interface(`sssd_initrc_domtrans',`
+ ########################################
+ ## <summary>
++## Execute sssd server in the sssd domain.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed to transition.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`sssd_systemctl',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type sssd_t;
++ type sssd_unit_file_t;
++ ')
++
++ systemd_exec_systemctl($1)
++ allow $1 sssd_unit_file_t:file read_file_perms;
++ allow $1 sssd_unit_file_t:service manage_service_perms;
++
++ ps_process_pattern($1, sssd_t)
++')
++
+#######################################
+## <summary>
+## Read sssd configuration.
@@ -56815,6 +65143,7 @@ index 941380a..ff89df6 100644
+ ')
+
+ files_search_etc($1)
++ list_dirs_pattern($1, sssd_conf_t, sssd_conf_t)
+ read_files_pattern($1, sssd_conf_t, sssd_conf_t)
+')
+
@@ -56856,10 +65185,61 @@ index 941380a..ff89df6 100644
+ create_files_pattern($1, sssd_conf_t, sssd_conf_t)
+')
+
++####################################
++## <summary>
++## Manage sssd configuration.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`sssd_manage_config',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type sssd_conf_t;
++ ')
++
++ files_search_etc($1)
++ manage_files_pattern($1, sssd_conf_t, sssd_conf_t)
++')
++
++########################################
++## <summary>
+ ## Read sssd public files.
+ ## </summary>
+ ## <param name="domain">
+@@ -52,9 +170,29 @@ interface(`sssd_read_public_files',`
+ ')
+
+ sssd_search_lib($1)
++ list_dirs_pattern($1, sssd_public_t, sssd_public_t)
+ read_files_pattern($1, sssd_public_t, sssd_public_t)
+ ')
+
++#######################################
++## <summary>
++## Manage sssd public files.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`sssd_manage_public_files',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type sssd_public_t;
++ ')
++
++ sssd_search_lib($1)
++ manage_files_pattern($1, sssd_public_t, sssd_public_t)
++')
++
########################################
## <summary>
- ## Read sssd public files.
-@@ -89,6 +146,7 @@ interface(`sssd_manage_pids',`
+ ## Read sssd PID files.
+@@ -89,6 +227,7 @@ interface(`sssd_manage_pids',`
type sssd_var_run_t;
')
@@ -56867,7 +65247,7 @@ index 941380a..ff89df6 100644
manage_dirs_pattern($1, sssd_var_run_t, sssd_var_run_t)
manage_files_pattern($1, sssd_var_run_t, sssd_var_run_t)
')
-@@ -128,7 +186,6 @@ interface(`sssd_dontaudit_search_lib',`
+@@ -128,7 +267,6 @@ interface(`sssd_dontaudit_search_lib',`
')
dontaudit $1 sssd_var_lib_t:dir search_dir_perms;
@@ -56875,7 +65255,7 @@ index 941380a..ff89df6 100644
')
########################################
-@@ -148,6 +205,7 @@ interface(`sssd_read_lib_files',`
+@@ -148,6 +286,7 @@ interface(`sssd_read_lib_files',`
files_search_var_lib($1)
read_files_pattern($1, sssd_var_lib_t, sssd_var_lib_t)
@@ -56883,7 +65263,7 @@ index 941380a..ff89df6 100644
')
########################################
-@@ -168,6 +226,7 @@ interface(`sssd_manage_lib_files',`
+@@ -168,6 +307,7 @@ interface(`sssd_manage_lib_files',`
files_search_var_lib($1)
manage_files_pattern($1, sssd_var_lib_t, sssd_var_lib_t)
@@ -56891,7 +65271,7 @@ index 941380a..ff89df6 100644
')
########################################
-@@ -193,7 +252,7 @@ interface(`sssd_dbus_chat',`
+@@ -193,7 +333,7 @@ interface(`sssd_dbus_chat',`
########################################
## <summary>
@@ -56900,7 +65280,7 @@ index 941380a..ff89df6 100644
## </summary>
## <param name="domain">
## <summary>
-@@ -225,21 +284,18 @@ interface(`sssd_stream_connect',`
+@@ -225,21 +365,19 @@ interface(`sssd_stream_connect',`
## The role to be allowed to manage the sssd domain.
## </summary>
## </param>
@@ -56916,6 +65296,7 @@ index 941380a..ff89df6 100644
- type sssd_t, sssd_public_t;
- type sssd_initrc_exec_t;
+ type sssd_t, sssd_public_t, sssd_initrc_exec_t;
++ type sssd_unit_file_t;
')
- allow $1 sssd_t:process { ptrace signal_perms getattr };
@@ -56928,8 +65309,18 @@ index 941380a..ff89df6 100644
# Allow sssd_t to restart the apache service
sssd_initrc_domtrans($1)
+@@ -252,4 +390,9 @@ interface(`sssd_admin',`
+ sssd_manage_lib_files($1)
+
+ admin_pattern($1, sssd_public_t)
++
++ sssd_systemctl($1)
++ admin_pattern($1, sssd_unit_file_t)
++ allow $1 sssd_unit_file_t:service all_service_perms;
++
+ ')
diff --git a/sssd.te b/sssd.te
-index a1b61bc..8fc2d2d 100644
+index a1b61bc..3d2a591 100644
--- a/sssd.te
+++ b/sssd.te
@@ -12,11 +12,15 @@ init_daemon_domain(sssd_t, sssd_exec_t)
@@ -56948,7 +65339,14 @@ index a1b61bc..8fc2d2d 100644
type sssd_var_log_t;
logging_log_file(sssd_var_log_t)
-@@ -28,18 +32,23 @@ files_pid_file(sssd_var_run_t)
+@@ -24,22 +28,31 @@ logging_log_file(sssd_var_log_t)
+ type sssd_var_run_t;
+ files_pid_file(sssd_var_run_t)
+
++type sssd_unit_file_t;
++systemd_unit_file(sssd_unit_file_t)
++
+ ########################################
#
# sssd local policy
#
@@ -56957,6 +65355,7 @@ index a1b61bc..8fc2d2d 100644
-allow sssd_t self:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
+
+allow sssd_t self:capability { chown dac_read_search dac_override kill net_admin sys_nice setgid setuid sys_admin sys_resource };
++allow sssd_t self:capability2 block_suspend;
+allow sssd_t self:process { setfscreate setsched sigkill signal getsched setrlimit };
+allow sssd_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms;
+allow sssd_t self:key manage_key_perms;
@@ -56976,7 +65375,7 @@ index a1b61bc..8fc2d2d 100644
manage_files_pattern(sssd_t, sssd_var_log_t, sssd_var_log_t)
logging_log_filetrans(sssd_t, sssd_var_log_t, file)
-@@ -48,30 +57,44 @@ manage_dirs_pattern(sssd_t, sssd_var_run_t, sssd_var_run_t)
+@@ -48,37 +61,56 @@ manage_dirs_pattern(sssd_t, sssd_var_run_t, sssd_var_run_t)
manage_files_pattern(sssd_t, sssd_var_run_t, sssd_var_run_t)
files_pid_filetrans(sssd_t, sssd_var_run_t, { file dir })
@@ -57022,10 +65421,10 @@ index a1b61bc..8fc2d2d 100644
init_read_utmp(sssd_t)
-@@ -79,6 +102,12 @@ logging_send_syslog_msg(sssd_t)
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(sssd_t)
logging_send_audit_msgs(sssd_t)
- miscfiles_read_localization(sssd_t)
+-miscfiles_read_localization(sssd_t)
+miscfiles_read_generic_certs(sssd_t)
+
+sysnet_dns_name_resolve(sssd_t)
@@ -57035,7 +65434,7 @@ index a1b61bc..8fc2d2d 100644
optional_policy(`
dbus_system_bus_client(sssd_t)
-@@ -87,8 +116,17 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -87,8 +119,17 @@ optional_policy(`
optional_policy(`
kerberos_manage_host_rcache(sssd_t)
@@ -57068,10 +65467,10 @@ index 0000000..0ccce59
+/var/run/stap-server(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:stapserver_var_run_t,s0)
diff --git a/stapserver.if b/stapserver.if
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..89b20d3
+index 0000000..80c6480
--- /dev/null
+++ b/stapserver.if
-@@ -0,0 +1,156 @@
+@@ -0,0 +1,151 @@
+
+## <summary> Instrumentation System Server </summary>
+
@@ -57200,11 +65599,6 @@ index 0000000..89b20d3
+## Domain allowed access.
+## </summary>
+## </param>
-+## <param name="role">
-+## <summary>
-+## Role allowed access.
-+## </summary>
-+## </param>
+## <rolecap/>
+#
+interface(`stapserver_admin',`
@@ -57230,10 +65624,10 @@ index 0000000..89b20d3
+')
diff --git a/stapserver.te b/stapserver.te
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..fa12095
+index 0000000..b87c79c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/stapserver.te
-@@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
+@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
+policy_module(stapserver, 1.0.0)
+
+########################################
@@ -57300,6 +65694,8 @@ index 0000000..fa12095
+files_read_usr_files(stapserver_t)
+files_search_kernel_modules(stapserver_t)
+
++fs_search_cgroup_dirs(stapserver_t)
++
+auth_use_nsswitch(stapserver_t)
+
+init_read_utmp(stapserver_t)
@@ -57307,7 +65703,6 @@ index 0000000..fa12095
+logging_send_audit_msgs(stapserver_t)
+logging_send_syslog_msg(stapserver_t)
+
-+miscfiles_read_localization(stapserver_t)
+#lspci
+miscfiles_read_hwdata(stapserver_t)
+
@@ -57334,7 +65729,7 @@ index 0000000..fa12095
+')
+
diff --git a/stunnel.te b/stunnel.te
-index f646c66..8488d8f 100644
+index f646c66..a399168 100644
--- a/stunnel.te
+++ b/stunnel.te
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ allow stunnel_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms;
@@ -57354,7 +65749,16 @@ index f646c66..8488d8f 100644
corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(stunnel_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(stunnel_t)
corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if(stunnel_t)
-@@ -106,7 +105,6 @@ ifdef(`distro_gentoo', `
+@@ -73,8 +72,6 @@ auth_use_nsswitch(stunnel_t)
+
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(stunnel_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(stunnel_t)
+-
+ sysnet_read_config(stunnel_t)
+
+ ifdef(`distro_gentoo', `
+@@ -106,7 +103,6 @@ ifdef(`distro_gentoo', `
dev_read_urand(stunnel_t)
@@ -57362,7 +65766,7 @@ index f646c66..8488d8f 100644
files_read_etc_runtime_files(stunnel_t)
files_search_home(stunnel_t)
-@@ -120,4 +118,5 @@ ifdef(`distro_gentoo', `
+@@ -120,4 +116,5 @@ ifdef(`distro_gentoo', `
gen_require(`
type stunnel_port_t;
')
@@ -57512,10 +65916,10 @@ index 0000000..dd2ac36
+
diff --git a/svnserve.te b/svnserve.te
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..df04e25
+index 0000000..ba40a17
--- /dev/null
+++ b/svnserve.te
-@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+policy_module(svnserve, 1.0.0)
+
+########################################
@@ -57545,6 +65949,7 @@ index 0000000..df04e25
+#
+
+allow svnserve_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms;
++allow svnserve_t self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
+allow svnserve_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
+
+manage_dirs_pattern(svnserve_t, svnserve_content_t, svnserve_content_t)
@@ -57566,12 +65971,10 @@ index 0000000..df04e25
+
+logging_send_syslog_msg(svnserve_t)
+
-+miscfiles_read_localization(svnserve_t)
-+
+sysnet_dns_name_resolve(svnserve_t)
+
diff --git a/sxid.te b/sxid.te
-index 8296303..ae14531 100644
+index 8296303..50eddef 100644
--- a/sxid.te
+++ b/sxid.te
@@ -40,7 +40,6 @@ kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(sxid_t)
@@ -57591,10 +65994,12 @@ index 8296303..ae14531 100644
auth_dontaudit_getattr_shadow(sxid_t)
init_use_fds(sxid_t)
-@@ -76,13 +75,17 @@ logging_send_syslog_msg(sxid_t)
+@@ -74,15 +73,17 @@ init_use_script_ptys(sxid_t)
- miscfiles_read_localization(sxid_t)
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(sxid_t)
+-miscfiles_read_localization(sxid_t)
+-
-mount_exec(sxid_t)
-
sysnet_read_config(sxid_t)
@@ -57612,8 +66017,17 @@ index 8296303..ae14531 100644
optional_policy(`
mta_send_mail(sxid_t)
+diff --git a/sysstat.fc b/sysstat.fc
+index 5d0e77b..5a92938 100644
+--- a/sysstat.fc
++++ b/sysstat.fc
+@@ -6,3 +6,4 @@
+ /var/log/atsar(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:sysstat_log_t,s0)
+ /var/log/sa(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:sysstat_log_t,s0)
+ /var/log/sysstat(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:sysstat_log_t,s0)
++/opt/sartest(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:sysstat_log_t,s0)
diff --git a/sysstat.te b/sysstat.te
-index 0ecd8a7..58f7d76 100644
+index 0ecd8a7..b532568 100644
--- a/sysstat.te
+++ b/sysstat.te
@@ -18,8 +18,7 @@ logging_log_file(sysstat_log_t)
@@ -57634,7 +66048,7 @@ index 0ecd8a7..58f7d76 100644
corecmd_exec_bin(sysstat_t)
dev_read_urand(sysstat_t)
-@@ -45,18 +45,21 @@ files_search_var(sysstat_t)
+@@ -45,19 +45,20 @@ files_search_var(sysstat_t)
# for mtab
files_read_etc_runtime_files(sysstat_t)
#for fstab
@@ -57651,14 +66065,14 @@ index 0ecd8a7..58f7d76 100644
locallogin_use_fds(sysstat_t)
+-miscfiles_read_localization(sysstat_t)
+auth_use_nsswitch(sysstat_t)
+
+logging_send_syslog_msg(sysstat_t)
-+
- miscfiles_read_localization(sysstat_t)
userdom_dontaudit_list_user_home_dirs(sysstat_t)
-@@ -65,6 +68,3 @@ optional_policy(`
+
+@@ -65,6 +66,3 @@ optional_policy(`
cron_system_entry(sysstat_t, sysstat_exec_t)
')
@@ -57666,7 +66080,7 @@ index 0ecd8a7..58f7d76 100644
- logging_send_syslog_msg(sysstat_t)
-')
diff --git a/tcpd.te b/tcpd.te
-index 7038b55..7a6048c 100644
+index 7038b55..8961067 100644
--- a/tcpd.te
+++ b/tcpd.te
@@ -22,7 +22,6 @@ manage_dirs_pattern(tcpd_t, tcpd_tmp_t, tcpd_tmp_t)
@@ -57677,6 +66091,15 @@ index 7038b55..7a6048c 100644
corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(tcpd_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(tcpd_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_node(tcpd_t)
+@@ -39,8 +38,6 @@ files_dontaudit_search_var(tcpd_t)
+
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(tcpd_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(tcpd_t)
+-
+ sysnet_read_config(tcpd_t)
+
+ inetd_domtrans_child(tcpd_t)
diff --git a/tcsd.if b/tcsd.if
index 595f5a7..4e518cf 100644
--- a/tcsd.if
@@ -57695,7 +66118,7 @@ index 595f5a7..4e518cf 100644
tcsd_initrc_domtrans($1)
domain_system_change_exemption($1)
diff --git a/tcsd.te b/tcsd.te
-index ee9f3c6..6523b05 100644
+index ee9f3c6..ac97168 100644
--- a/tcsd.te
+++ b/tcsd.te
@@ -30,7 +30,6 @@ manage_files_pattern(tcsd_t, tcsd_var_lib_t, tcsd_var_lib_t)
@@ -57706,7 +66129,7 @@ index ee9f3c6..6523b05 100644
corenet_tcp_bind_generic_node(tcsd_t)
corenet_tcp_bind_tcs_port(tcsd_t)
-@@ -38,7 +37,6 @@ dev_read_urand(tcsd_t)
+@@ -38,13 +37,8 @@ dev_read_urand(tcsd_t)
# Access /dev/tpm0.
dev_rw_tpm(tcsd_t)
@@ -57714,10 +66137,10 @@ index ee9f3c6..6523b05 100644
files_read_usr_files(tcsd_t)
auth_use_nsswitch(tcsd_t)
-@@ -46,5 +44,3 @@ auth_use_nsswitch(tcsd_t)
- logging_send_syslog_msg(tcsd_t)
- miscfiles_read_localization(tcsd_t)
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(tcsd_t)
+-
+-miscfiles_read_localization(tcsd_t)
-
-sysnet_dns_name_resolve(tcsd_t)
diff --git a/telepathy.fc b/telepathy.fc
@@ -57738,7 +66161,7 @@ index b07ee19..a275bd6 100644
HOME_DIR/\.local/share/TpLogger(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:telepathy_logger_data_home_t,s0)
diff --git a/telepathy.if b/telepathy.if
-index f09171e..18952a8 100644
+index f09171e..95a9aa3 100644
--- a/telepathy.if
+++ b/telepathy.if
@@ -11,7 +11,6 @@
@@ -57749,7 +66172,7 @@ index f09171e..18952a8 100644
template(`telepathy_domain_template',`
gen_require(`
attribute telepathy_domain;
-@@ -20,19 +19,19 @@ template(`telepathy_domain_template',`
+@@ -20,19 +19,21 @@ template(`telepathy_domain_template',`
type telepathy_$1_t, telepathy_domain;
type telepathy_$1_exec_t, telepathy_executable;
@@ -57760,8 +66183,10 @@ index f09171e..18952a8 100644
type telepathy_$1_tmp_t;
userdom_user_tmp_file(telepathy_$1_tmp_t)
- auth_use_nsswitch(telepathy_$1_t)
--
+- auth_use_nsswitch(telepathy_$1_t)
++ kernel_read_system_state(telepathy_$1_t)
+
++ auth_use_nsswitch(telepathy_$1_t)
')
#######################################
@@ -57773,7 +66198,7 @@ index f09171e..18952a8 100644
## </summary>
## <param name="user_role">
## <summary>
-@@ -44,8 +43,13 @@ template(`telepathy_domain_template',`
+@@ -44,8 +45,13 @@ template(`telepathy_domain_template',`
## The type of the user domain.
## </summary>
## </param>
@@ -57788,7 +66213,7 @@ index f09171e..18952a8 100644
gen_require(`
attribute telepathy_domain;
type telepathy_gabble_t, telepathy_sofiasip_t, telepathy_idle_t;
-@@ -76,6 +80,8 @@ template(`telepathy_role', `
+@@ -76,6 +82,8 @@ template(`telepathy_role', `
dbus_session_domain($3, telepathy_sunshine_exec_t, telepathy_sunshine_t)
dbus_session_domain($3, telepathy_stream_engine_exec_t, telepathy_stream_engine_t)
dbus_session_domain($3, telepathy_msn_exec_t, telepathy_msn_t)
@@ -57797,7 +66222,7 @@ index f09171e..18952a8 100644
')
########################################
-@@ -122,11 +128,6 @@ interface(`telepathy_gabble_dbus_chat', `
+@@ -122,11 +130,6 @@ interface(`telepathy_gabble_dbus_chat', `
## <summary>
## Read telepathy mission control state.
## </summary>
@@ -57809,7 +66234,7 @@ index f09171e..18952a8 100644
## <param name="domain">
## <summary>
## Domain allowed access.
-@@ -166,7 +167,7 @@ interface(`telepathy_msn_stream_connect', `
+@@ -166,7 +169,7 @@ interface(`telepathy_msn_stream_connect', `
## Stream connect to Telepathy Salut
## </summary>
## <param name="domain">
@@ -57818,7 +66243,7 @@ index f09171e..18952a8 100644
## Domain allowed access.
## </summary>
## </param>
-@@ -179,3 +180,111 @@ interface(`telepathy_salut_stream_connect', `
+@@ -179,3 +182,130 @@ interface(`telepathy_salut_stream_connect', `
stream_connect_pattern($1, telepathy_salut_tmp_t, telepathy_salut_tmp_t, telepathy_salut_t)
files_search_tmp($1)
')
@@ -57930,8 +66355,27 @@ index f09171e..18952a8 100644
+ gnome_data_filetrans($1, telepathy_logger_data_home_t, dir, "TpLogger")
+ gnome_data_filetrans($1, telepathy_data_home_t, dir, "telepathy")
+')
++
++######################################
++## <summary>
++## Execute telepathy in the caller domain.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`telepathy_exec',`
++ gen_require(`
++ attribute telepathy_executable;
++ ')
++
++ corecmd_search_bin($1)
++ can_exec($1, telepathy_executable)
++')
diff --git a/telepathy.te b/telepathy.te
-index 964978b..b75b98c 100644
+index 964978b..6cc7ecd 100644
--- a/telepathy.te
+++ b/telepathy.te
@@ -7,16 +7,16 @@ policy_module(telepathy, 1.3.0)
@@ -58033,7 +66477,16 @@ index 964978b..b75b98c 100644
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(telepathy_idle_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_node(telepathy_idle_t)
corenet_tcp_connect_gatekeeper_port(telepathy_idle_t)
-@@ -147,10 +159,13 @@ tunable_policy(`telepathy_tcp_connect_generic_network_ports',`
+@@ -127,8 +139,6 @@ corenet_sendrecv_ircd_client_packets(telepathy_idle_t)
+
+ dev_read_rand(telepathy_idle_t)
+
+-files_read_etc_files(telepathy_idle_t)
+-
+ tunable_policy(`telepathy_connect_all_ports',`
+ corenet_tcp_connect_all_ports(telepathy_idle_t)
+ corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_ports(telepathy_idle_t)
+@@ -147,51 +157,74 @@ tunable_policy(`telepathy_tcp_connect_generic_network_ports',`
allow telepathy_logger_t self:unix_stream_socket create_socket_perms;
@@ -58043,11 +66496,14 @@ index 964978b..b75b98c 100644
manage_dirs_pattern(telepathy_logger_t, telepathy_logger_data_home_t, telepathy_logger_data_home_t)
manage_files_pattern(telepathy_logger_t, telepathy_logger_data_home_t, telepathy_logger_data_home_t)
-+gnome_data_filetrans(telepathy_logger_t, telepathy_logger_data_home_t, dir)
- files_read_etc_files(telepathy_logger_t)
- files_read_usr_files(telepathy_logger_t)
-@@ -158,40 +173,58 @@ files_search_pids(telepathy_logger_t)
+-files_read_etc_files(telepathy_logger_t)
+-files_read_usr_files(telepathy_logger_t)
++optional_policy(`
++ gnome_data_filetrans(telepathy_logger_t, telepathy_logger_data_home_t, dir)
++')
++
+ files_search_pids(telepathy_logger_t)
fs_getattr_all_fs(telepathy_logger_t)
@@ -58079,25 +66535,28 @@ index 964978b..b75b98c 100644
+manage_dirs_pattern(telepathy_mission_control_t, { telepathy_data_home_t telepathy_mission_control_data_home_t }, { telepathy_data_home_t telepathy_mission_control_data_home_t })
+manage_files_pattern(telepathy_mission_control_t, telepathy_mission_control_data_home_t, telepathy_mission_control_data_home_t)
+filetrans_pattern(telepathy_mission_control_t, telepathy_data_home_t, telepathy_mission_control_data_home_t, { dir file })
-+gnome_data_filetrans(telepathy_mission_control_t, telepathy_data_home_t, dir)
-+gnome_manage_home_config(telepathy_mission_control_t)
++
++optional_policy(`
++ gnome_data_filetrans(telepathy_mission_control_t, telepathy_data_home_t, dir)
++ gnome_manage_home_config(telepathy_mission_control_t)
++')
dev_read_rand(telepathy_mission_control_t)
fs_getattr_all_fs(telepathy_mission_control_t)
+-files_read_etc_files(telepathy_mission_control_t)
+-files_read_usr_files(telepathy_mission_control_t)
+files_list_tmp(telepathy_mission_control_t)
- files_read_etc_files(telepathy_mission_control_t)
- files_read_usr_files(telepathy_mission_control_t)
-
--tunable_policy(`use_nfs_home_dirs',`
-- fs_manage_nfs_dirs(telepathy_mission_control_t)
-- fs_manage_nfs_files(telepathy_mission_control_t)
++
+userdom_home_manager(telepathy_mission_control_t)
+
+optional_policy(`
+ dbus_system_bus_client(telepathy_mission_control_t)
-+
+
+-tunable_policy(`use_nfs_home_dirs',`
+- fs_manage_nfs_dirs(telepathy_mission_control_t)
+- fs_manage_nfs_files(telepathy_mission_control_t)
+ optional_policy(`
+ devicekit_dbus_chat_power(telepathy_mission_control_t)
+ ')
@@ -58134,16 +66593,17 @@ index 964978b..b75b98c 100644
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(telepathy_msn_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_node(telepathy_msn_t)
corenet_tcp_bind_generic_node(telepathy_msn_t)
-@@ -228,6 +263,8 @@ corecmd_read_bin_symlinks(telepathy_msn_t)
- files_read_etc_files(telepathy_msn_t)
- files_read_usr_files(telepathy_msn_t)
+@@ -225,8 +260,7 @@ corecmd_exec_bin(telepathy_msn_t)
+ corecmd_exec_shell(telepathy_msn_t)
+ corecmd_read_bin_symlinks(telepathy_msn_t)
+-files_read_etc_files(telepathy_msn_t)
+-files_read_usr_files(telepathy_msn_t)
+init_read_state(telepathy_msn_t)
-+
+
libs_exec_ldconfig(telepathy_msn_t)
- logging_send_syslog_msg(telepathy_msn_t)
-@@ -246,6 +283,10 @@ tunable_policy(`telepathy_tcp_connect_generic_network_ports',`
+@@ -246,6 +280,10 @@ tunable_policy(`telepathy_tcp_connect_generic_network_ports',`
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -58154,7 +66614,7 @@ index 964978b..b75b98c 100644
dbus_system_bus_client(telepathy_msn_t)
optional_policy(`
-@@ -264,7 +305,6 @@ manage_sock_files_pattern(telepathy_salut_t, telepathy_salut_tmp_t, telepathy_sa
+@@ -264,7 +302,6 @@ manage_sock_files_pattern(telepathy_salut_t, telepathy_salut_tmp_t, telepathy_sa
files_tmp_filetrans(telepathy_salut_t, telepathy_salut_tmp_t, sock_file)
corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(telepathy_salut_t)
@@ -58162,7 +66622,16 @@ index 964978b..b75b98c 100644
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(telepathy_salut_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_node(telepathy_salut_t)
corenet_tcp_bind_generic_node(telepathy_salut_t)
-@@ -302,7 +342,6 @@ allow telepathy_sofiasip_t self:rawip_socket { create_socket_perms listen };
+@@ -272,8 +309,6 @@ corenet_tcp_bind_presence_port(telepathy_salut_t)
+ corenet_tcp_connect_presence_port(telepathy_salut_t)
+ corenet_sendrecv_presence_server_packets(telepathy_salut_t)
+
+-files_read_etc_files(telepathy_salut_t)
+-
+ tunable_policy(`telepathy_connect_all_ports',`
+ corenet_tcp_connect_all_ports(telepathy_salut_t)
+ corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_ports(telepathy_salut_t)
+@@ -302,7 +337,6 @@ allow telepathy_sofiasip_t self:rawip_socket { create_socket_perms listen };
allow telepathy_sofiasip_t self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(telepathy_sofiasip_t)
@@ -58170,22 +66639,39 @@ index 964978b..b75b98c 100644
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(telepathy_sofiasip_t)
corenet_raw_sendrecv_generic_if(telepathy_sofiasip_t)
corenet_raw_sendrecv_generic_node(telepathy_sofiasip_t)
-@@ -361,10 +400,14 @@ allow telepathy_domain self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms;
+@@ -343,9 +377,6 @@ files_tmp_filetrans(telepathy_sunshine_t, telepathy_sunshine_tmp_t, file)
+
+ corecmd_exec_bin(telepathy_sunshine_t)
+
+-files_read_etc_files(telepathy_sunshine_t)
+-files_read_usr_files(telepathy_sunshine_t)
+-
+ optional_policy(`
+ xserver_read_xdm_pid(telepathy_sunshine_t)
+ xserver_stream_connect(telepathy_sunshine_t)
+@@ -361,18 +392,33 @@ allow telepathy_domain self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms;
allow telepathy_domain self:tcp_socket create_socket_perms;
allow telepathy_domain self:udp_socket create_socket_perms;
+manage_dirs_pattern(telepathy_domain, telepathy_cache_home_t, telepathy_cache_home_t)
-+gnome_cache_filetrans(telepathy_domain, telepathy_cache_home_t, dir, "telepathy")
++optional_policy(`
++ gnome_cache_filetrans(telepathy_domain, telepathy_cache_home_t, dir, "telepathy")
++')
+
dev_read_urand(telepathy_domain)
- kernel_read_system_state(telepathy_domain)
+-kernel_read_system_state(telepathy_domain)
++files_read_etc_files(telepathy_domain)
++files_read_usr_files(telepathy_domain)
+fs_getattr_all_fs(telepathy_domain)
fs_search_auto_mountpoints(telepathy_domain)
+-
+-miscfiles_read_localization(telepathy_domain)
++fs_rw_inherited_tmpfs_files(telepathy_domain)
- miscfiles_read_localization(telepathy_domain)
-@@ -374,5 +417,23 @@ optional_policy(`
+ optional_policy(`
+ automount_dontaudit_getattr_tmp_dirs(telepathy_domain)
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -58200,15 +66686,6 @@ index 964978b..b75b98c 100644
+optional_policy(`
xserver_rw_xdm_pipes(telepathy_domain)
')
-+
-+# Just for F15
-+optional_policy(`
-+ gen_require(`
-+ role unconfined_r;
-+ ')
-+
-+ role unconfined_r types telepathy_domain;
-+')
diff --git a/telnet.if b/telnet.if
index 58e7ec0..e4119f7 100644
--- a/telnet.if
@@ -58234,7 +66711,7 @@ index 58e7ec0..e4119f7 100644
+ allow $1 telnetd_devpts_t:chr_file rw_inherited_term_perms;
+')
diff --git a/telnet.te b/telnet.te
-index 3858d35..ec3bb78 100644
+index 3858d35..62dca46 100644
--- a/telnet.te
+++ b/telnet.te
@@ -24,21 +24,20 @@ files_pid_file(telnetd_var_run_t)
@@ -58278,8 +66755,12 @@ index 3858d35..ec3bb78 100644
files_read_etc_runtime_files(telnetd_t)
# for identd; cjp: this should probably only be inetd_child rules?
files_search_home(telnetd_t)
-@@ -81,10 +78,10 @@ miscfiles_read_localization(telnetd_t)
+@@ -77,14 +74,12 @@ init_rw_utmp(telnetd_t)
+
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(telnetd_t)
+-miscfiles_read_localization(telnetd_t)
+-
seutil_read_config(telnetd_t)
-remotelogin_domtrans(telnetd_t)
@@ -58291,7 +66772,7 @@ index 3858d35..ec3bb78 100644
tunable_policy(`use_nfs_home_dirs',`
fs_search_nfs(telnetd_t)
-@@ -96,5 +93,10 @@ tunable_policy(`use_samba_home_dirs',`
+@@ -96,5 +91,10 @@ tunable_policy(`use_samba_home_dirs',`
optional_policy(`
kerberos_keytab_template(telnetd, telnetd_t)
@@ -58312,16 +66793,17 @@ index 25eee43..621f343 100644
/usr/sbin/atftpd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:tftpd_exec_t,s0)
/usr/sbin/in\.tftpd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:tftpd_exec_t,s0)
diff --git a/tftp.if b/tftp.if
-index 38bb312..0a40bc5 100644
+index 38bb312..d9fe23c 100644
--- a/tftp.if
+++ b/tftp.if
-@@ -13,9 +13,33 @@
+@@ -13,9 +13,34 @@
interface(`tftp_read_content',`
gen_require(`
type tftpdir_t;
+ type tftpdir_rw_t;
')
++ list_dirs_pattern($1, tftpdir_t, tftpdir_t)
read_files_pattern($1, tftpdir_t, tftpdir_t)
+ read_lnk_files_pattern($1, tftpdir_t, tftpdir_t)
+
@@ -58349,7 +66831,7 @@ index 38bb312..0a40bc5 100644
')
########################################
-@@ -40,6 +64,91 @@ interface(`tftp_manage_rw_content',`
+@@ -40,6 +65,91 @@ interface(`tftp_manage_rw_content',`
########################################
## <summary>
@@ -58441,7 +66923,7 @@ index 38bb312..0a40bc5 100644
## All of the rules required to administrate
## an tftp environment
## </summary>
-@@ -55,8 +164,13 @@ interface(`tftp_admin',`
+@@ -55,8 +165,13 @@ interface(`tftp_admin',`
type tftpd_t, tftpdir_t, tftpdir_rw_t, tftpd_var_run_t;
')
@@ -58456,7 +66938,7 @@ index 38bb312..0a40bc5 100644
admin_pattern($1, tftpdir_rw_t)
-@@ -64,4 +178,6 @@ interface(`tftp_admin',`
+@@ -64,4 +179,6 @@ interface(`tftp_admin',`
files_list_pids($1)
admin_pattern($1, tftpd_var_run_t)
@@ -58464,10 +66946,24 @@ index 38bb312..0a40bc5 100644
+ tftp_manage_config($1)
')
diff --git a/tftp.te b/tftp.te
-index d50c10d..ef4647f 100644
+index d50c10d..d2778d3 100644
--- a/tftp.te
+++ b/tftp.te
-@@ -26,21 +26,26 @@ files_type(tftpdir_t)
+@@ -13,6 +13,13 @@ policy_module(tftp, 1.12.0)
+ ## </desc>
+ gen_tunable(tftp_anon_write, false)
+
++## <desc>
++## <p>
++## Allow tftp to read and write files in the user home directories
++## </p>
++## </desc>
++gen_tunable(tftp_home_dir, false)
++
+ type tftpd_t;
+ type tftpd_exec_t;
+ init_daemon_domain(tftpd_t, tftpd_exec_t)
+@@ -26,21 +33,26 @@ files_type(tftpdir_t)
type tftpdir_rw_t;
files_type(tftpdir_rw_t)
@@ -58496,7 +66992,7 @@ index d50c10d..ef4647f 100644
manage_dirs_pattern(tftpd_t, tftpdir_rw_t, tftpdir_rw_t)
manage_files_pattern(tftpd_t, tftpdir_rw_t, tftpdir_rw_t)
-@@ -52,7 +57,6 @@ files_pid_filetrans(tftpd_t, tftpd_var_run_t, file)
+@@ -52,7 +64,6 @@ files_pid_filetrans(tftpd_t, tftpd_var_run_t, file)
kernel_read_system_state(tftpd_t)
kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(tftpd_t)
@@ -58504,7 +67000,7 @@ index d50c10d..ef4647f 100644
corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(tftpd_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(tftpd_t)
corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if(tftpd_t)
-@@ -72,7 +76,6 @@ fs_search_auto_mountpoints(tftpd_t)
+@@ -72,7 +83,6 @@ fs_search_auto_mountpoints(tftpd_t)
domain_use_interactive_fds(tftpd_t)
@@ -58512,17 +67008,51 @@ index d50c10d..ef4647f 100644
files_read_etc_runtime_files(tftpd_t)
files_read_var_files(tftpd_t)
files_read_var_symlinks(tftpd_t)
-@@ -94,6 +97,10 @@ tunable_policy(`tftp_anon_write',`
+@@ -82,7 +92,6 @@ auth_use_nsswitch(tftpd_t)
+
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(tftpd_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(tftpd_t)
+ miscfiles_read_public_files(tftpd_t)
+
+ userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fds(tftpd_t)
+@@ -93,6 +102,36 @@ tunable_policy(`tftp_anon_write',`
+ miscfiles_manage_public_files(tftpd_t)
')
- optional_policy(`
-+ cobbler_read_lib_files(tftpd_t)
++tunable_policy(`tftp_home_dir',`
++ allow tftpd_t self:capability { dac_override dac_read_search };
++
++ # allow access to /home
++ files_list_home(tftpd_t)
++ userdom_read_user_home_content_files(tftpd_t)
++ userdom_manage_user_home_content(tftpd_t)
++
++ auth_read_all_dirs_except_shadow(tftpd_t)
++ auth_read_all_files_except_shadow(tftpd_t)
++ auth_read_all_symlinks_except_shadow(tftpd_t)
++',`
++ # Needed for permissive mode, to make sure everything gets labeled correctly
++ userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans_pattern(tftpd_t, { dir file lnk_file })
++')
++
++tunable_policy(`tftp_home_dir && use_nfs_home_dirs',`
++ fs_manage_nfs_files(tftpd_t)
++ fs_read_nfs_symlinks(tftpd_t)
++')
++
++tunable_policy(`tftp_home_dir && use_samba_home_dirs',`
++ fs_manage_cifs_files(tftpd_t)
++ fs_read_cifs_symlinks(tftpd_t)
+')
+
+optional_policy(`
++ cobbler_read_lib_files(tftpd_t)
++')
++
+ optional_policy(`
inetd_udp_service_domain(tftpd_t, tftpd_exec_t)
')
-
diff --git a/tgtd.fc b/tgtd.fc
index 8294f6f..4847b43 100644
--- a/tgtd.fc
@@ -58532,11 +67062,38 @@ index 8294f6f..4847b43 100644
/usr/sbin/tgtd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:tgtd_exec_t,s0)
/var/lib/tgtd(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:tgtd_var_lib_t,s0)
+/var/run/tgtd.* -s gen_context(system_u:object_r:tgtd_var_run_t,s0)
+diff --git a/tgtd.if b/tgtd.if
+index c2ed23a..d9e875d 100644
+--- a/tgtd.if
++++ b/tgtd.if
+@@ -44,3 +44,22 @@ interface(`tgtd_manage_semaphores',`
+
+ allow $1 tgtd_t:sem create_sem_perms;
+ ')
++
++######################################
++## <summary>
++## Connect to tgtd using a unix domain stream socket.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`tgtd_stream_connect',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type tgtd_t, tgtd_var_run_t;
++ ')
++
++ files_search_var_lib($1)
++ stream_connect_pattern($1, tgtd_var_run_t, tgtd_var_run_t, tgtd_t)
++')
diff --git a/tgtd.te b/tgtd.te
-index 80fe75c..9c3fc55 100644
+index 80fe75c..6e81911 100644
--- a/tgtd.te
+++ b/tgtd.te
-@@ -21,6 +21,9 @@ files_tmpfs_file(tgtd_tmpfs_t)
+@@ -21,15 +21,19 @@ files_tmpfs_file(tgtd_tmpfs_t)
type tgtd_var_lib_t;
files_type(tgtd_var_lib_t)
@@ -58546,8 +67103,10 @@ index 80fe75c..9c3fc55 100644
########################################
#
# TGTD personal policy.
-@@ -29,7 +32,7 @@ files_type(tgtd_var_lib_t)
+ #
+
allow tgtd_t self:capability sys_resource;
++allow tgtd_t self:capability2 block_suspend;
allow tgtd_t self:process { setrlimit signal };
allow tgtd_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms;
-allow tgtd_t self:netlink_route_socket { create_socket_perms nlmsg_read };
@@ -58555,7 +67114,7 @@ index 80fe75c..9c3fc55 100644
allow tgtd_t self:shm create_shm_perms;
allow tgtd_t self:sem create_sem_perms;
allow tgtd_t self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
-@@ -46,10 +49,15 @@ manage_dirs_pattern(tgtd_t, tgtd_var_lib_t, tgtd_var_lib_t)
+@@ -46,10 +50,15 @@ manage_dirs_pattern(tgtd_t, tgtd_var_lib_t, tgtd_var_lib_t)
manage_files_pattern(tgtd_t, tgtd_var_lib_t, tgtd_var_lib_t)
files_var_lib_filetrans(tgtd_t, tgtd_var_lib_t, { dir file })
@@ -58572,7 +67131,7 @@ index 80fe75c..9c3fc55 100644
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(tgtd_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_node(tgtd_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_iscsi_port(tgtd_t)
-@@ -57,10 +65,18 @@ corenet_tcp_bind_generic_node(tgtd_t)
+@@ -57,10 +66,16 @@ corenet_tcp_bind_generic_node(tgtd_t)
corenet_tcp_bind_iscsi_port(tgtd_t)
corenet_sendrecv_iscsi_server_packets(tgtd_t)
@@ -58586,8 +67145,7 @@ index 80fe75c..9c3fc55 100644
logging_send_syslog_msg(tgtd_t)
- miscfiles_read_localization(tgtd_t)
-+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(tgtd_t)
+optional_policy(`
+ iscsi_manage_semaphores(tgtd_t)
+')
@@ -58610,10 +67168,10 @@ index 0000000..7f4bce8
+/var/run/aeolus/thin\.pid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:thin_var_run_t,s0)
diff --git a/thin.if b/thin.if
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..6de86e5
+index 0000000..d000122
--- /dev/null
+++ b/thin.if
-@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+## <summary>thin policy</summary>
+
+#######################################
@@ -58637,6 +67195,8 @@ index 0000000..6de86e5
+ init_daemon_domain($1_t, $1_exec_t)
+
+ can_exec($1_t, $1_exec_t)
++
++ kernel_read_system_state($1_t)
+')
+
+######################################
@@ -58658,10 +67218,10 @@ index 0000000..6de86e5
+')
diff --git a/thin.te b/thin.te
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..1ed278e
+index 0000000..2b878d8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/thin.te
-@@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
+@@ -0,0 +1,110 @@
+policy_module(thin, 1.0)
+
+########################################
@@ -58695,6 +67255,8 @@ index 0000000..1ed278e
+# thin_domain local policy
+#
+
++allow thin_domain self:process signal;
++
+allow thin_domain self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms;
+allow thin_domain self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
+
@@ -58702,11 +67264,11 @@ index 0000000..1ed278e
+# # initrc_t at thin_test_exec_t->thin_test_t at thin_exec_t->thin_test_t
+can_exec(thin_domain, thin_exec_t)
+
-+kernel_read_system_state(thin_domain)
-+
+corecmd_exec_bin(thin_domain)
+corecmd_exec_shell(thin_domain)
+
++corenet_tcp_bind_generic_node(thin_domain)
++
+dev_read_rand(thin_domain)
+dev_read_urand(thin_domain)
+
@@ -58715,7 +67277,6 @@ index 0000000..1ed278e
+auth_read_passwd(thin_domain)
+
+miscfiles_read_certs(thin_domain)
-+miscfiles_read_localization(thin_domain)
+
+files_read_usr_files(thin_domain)
+
@@ -58747,7 +67308,6 @@ index 0000000..1ed278e
+manage_files_pattern(thin_t, thin_var_run_t, thin_var_run_t)
+files_pid_filetrans(thin_t, thin_var_run_t, { file })
+
-+corenet_tcp_bind_generic_node(thin_t)
+corenet_tcp_bind_ntop_port(thin_t)
+corenet_tcp_connect_postgresql_port(thin_t)
+
@@ -58757,6 +67317,10 @@ index 0000000..1ed278e
+# thin aeolus configserver local policy
+#
+
++allow thin_aeolus_configserver_t self:capability { setuid setgid };
++
++corenet_tcp_bind_tram_port(thin_aeolus_configserver_t)
++
+manage_files_pattern(thin_aeolus_configserver_t, thin_aeolus_configserver_lib_t, thin_aeolus_configserver_lib_t)
+manage_dirs_pattern(thin_aeolus_configserver_t, thin_aeolus_configserver_lib_t, thin_aeolus_configserver_lib_t)
+files_var_lib_filetrans(thin_aeolus_configserver_t, thin_aeolus_configserver_lib_t, { file dir })
@@ -58770,13 +67334,13 @@ index 0000000..1ed278e
+files_pid_filetrans(thin_aeolus_configserver_t, thin_aeolus_configserver_var_run_t, { dir file })
diff --git a/thumb.fc b/thumb.fc
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..17544ee
+index 0000000..059e12c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/thumb.fc
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
-+HOME_DIR/\.thumbnails(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:thumb_home_t,s0)
-+HOME_DIR/.cache/thumbnails(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:thumb_home_t,s0)
-+HOME_DIR/missfont\.log.* gen_context(system_u:object_r:thumb_home_t,s0)
++HOME_DIR/\.thumbnails(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:thumb_home_t,s0)
++HOME_DIR/\.cache/thumbnails(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:thumb_home_t,s0)
++HOME_DIR/missfont\.log.* gen_context(system_u:object_r:thumb_home_t,s0)
+
+/usr/bin/evince-thumbnailer -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:thumb_exec_t,s0)
+/usr/bin/gsf-office-thumbnailer -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:thumb_exec_t,s0)
@@ -58923,10 +67487,10 @@ index 0000000..9127cec
+')
diff --git a/thumb.te b/thumb.te
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..be861ba
+index 0000000..572ab5d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/thumb.te
-@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
+@@ -0,0 +1,126 @@
+policy_module(thumb, 1.0.0)
+
+########################################
@@ -58947,12 +67511,15 @@ index 0000000..be861ba
+type thumb_home_t;
+userdom_user_home_content(thumb_home_t)
+
++type thumb_tmpfs_t;
++files_tmpfs_file(thumb_tmpfs_t)
++
+########################################
+#
+# thumb local policy
+#
+
-+allow thumb_t self:process { setsched signal setrlimit };
++allow thumb_t self:process { setsched signal signull setrlimit };
+
+tunable_policy(`deny_execmem',`',`
+ allow thumb_t self:process execmem;
@@ -58963,6 +67530,8 @@ index 0000000..be861ba
+allow thumb_t self:netlink_route_socket r_netlink_socket_perms;
+allow thumb_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms;
+allow thumb_t self:tcp_socket create_socket_perms;
++allow thumb_t self:shm create_shm_perms;
++allow thumb_t self:sem create_sem_perms;
+
+manage_dirs_pattern(thumb_t, thumb_home_t, thumb_home_t)
+manage_files_pattern(thumb_t, thumb_home_t, thumb_home_t)
@@ -58977,6 +67546,10 @@ index 0000000..be861ba
+userdom_user_tmp_filetrans(thumb_t, thumb_tmp_t, { file dir sock_file })
+xserver_xdm_tmp_filetrans(thumb_t, thumb_tmp_t, sock_file)
+
++manage_dirs_pattern(thumb_t, thumb_tmpfs_t, thumb_tmpfs_t)
++manage_files_pattern(thumb_t, thumb_tmpfs_t, thumb_tmpfs_t)
++fs_tmpfs_filetrans(thumb_t, thumb_tmpfs_t, { dir file })
++
+can_exec(thumb_t, thumb_exec_t)
+
+kernel_read_system_state(thumb_t)
@@ -58998,18 +67571,21 @@ index 0000000..be861ba
+
+fs_getattr_all_fs(thumb_t)
+fs_read_dos_files(thumb_t)
++fs_rw_inherited_tmpfs_files(thumb_t)
+
-+auth_use_nsswitch(thumb_t)
++auth_read_passwd(thumb_t)
+
+tunable_policy(`selinuxuser_execmod',`
+ libs_legacy_use_shared_libs(thumb_t)
+')
+
+miscfiles_read_fonts(thumb_t)
-+miscfiles_read_localization(thumb_t)
++miscfiles_dontaudit_setattr_fonts_dirs(thumb_t)
++miscfiles_dontaudit_setattr_fonts_cache_dirs(thumb_t)
+
+sysnet_read_config(thumb_t)
+
++userdom_dontaudit_setattr_user_tmp(thumb_t)
+userdom_read_user_tmp_files(thumb_t)
+userdom_read_user_home_content_files(thumb_t)
+userdom_write_user_tmp_files(thumb_t)
@@ -59023,6 +67599,7 @@ index 0000000..be861ba
+xserver_dontaudit_read_xdm_pid(thumb_t)
+xserver_dontaudit_xdm_tmp_dirs(thumb_t)
+xserver_stream_connect(thumb_t)
++xserver_use_user_fonts(thumb_t)
+
+optional_policy(`
+ dbus_dontaudit_stream_connect_session_bus(thumb_t)
@@ -59032,14 +67609,16 @@ index 0000000..be861ba
+optional_policy(`
+ # .config
+ gnome_dontaudit_search_config(thumb_t)
++ gnome_append_generic_cache_files(thumb_t)
+ gnome_read_generic_data_home_files(thumb_t)
+ gnome_manage_gstreamer_home_files(thumb_t)
+ gnome_manage_gstreamer_home_dirs(thumb_t)
+ gnome_exec_gstreamer_home_files(thumb_t)
+ gnome_cache_filetrans(thumb_t, thumb_home_t, dir, "thumbnails")
++ gnome_cache_filetrans(thumb_t, thumb_home_t, file)
+')
diff --git a/thunderbird.te b/thunderbird.te
-index bf37d98..9456124 100644
+index bf37d98..0d863fc 100644
--- a/thunderbird.te
+++ b/thunderbird.te
@@ -54,7 +54,6 @@ kernel_read_system_state(thunderbird_t)
@@ -59058,7 +67637,15 @@ index bf37d98..9456124 100644
files_read_etc_runtime_files(thunderbird_t)
files_read_var_files(thunderbird_t)
files_read_var_symlinks(thunderbird_t)
-@@ -112,17 +110,7 @@ xserver_read_xdm_tmp_files(thunderbird_t)
+@@ -99,7 +97,6 @@ fs_search_auto_mountpoints(thunderbird_t)
+ auth_use_nsswitch(thunderbird_t)
+
+ miscfiles_read_fonts(thunderbird_t)
+-miscfiles_read_localization(thunderbird_t)
+
+ userdom_manage_user_tmp_dirs(thunderbird_t)
+ userdom_read_user_tmp_files(thunderbird_t)
+@@ -112,17 +109,7 @@ xserver_read_xdm_tmp_files(thunderbird_t)
xserver_dontaudit_getattr_xdm_tmp_sockets(thunderbird_t)
# Access ~/.thunderbird
@@ -59090,7 +67677,7 @@ index 67b5592..ccddff5 100644
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(timidity_t)
corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if(timidity_t)
diff --git a/tmpreaper.te b/tmpreaper.te
-index 0521d5a..1d41128 100644
+index 0521d5a..4ad0788 100644
--- a/tmpreaper.te
+++ b/tmpreaper.te
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ policy_module(tmpreaper, 1.6.0)
@@ -59101,7 +67688,7 @@ index 0521d5a..1d41128 100644
application_domain(tmpreaper_t, tmpreaper_exec_t)
role system_r types tmpreaper_t;
-@@ -18,33 +19,45 @@ role system_r types tmpreaper_t;
+@@ -18,33 +19,47 @@ role system_r types tmpreaper_t;
allow tmpreaper_t self:process { fork sigchld };
allow tmpreaper_t self:capability { dac_override dac_read_search fowner };
@@ -59121,6 +67708,8 @@ index 0521d5a..1d41128 100644
+files_setattr_usr_dirs(tmpreaper_t)
files_getattr_all_dirs(tmpreaper_t)
files_getattr_all_files(tmpreaper_t)
++kernel_list_unlabeled(tmpreaper_t)
++kernel_delete_unlabeled(tmpreaper_t)
+mcs_file_read_all(tmpreaper_t)
+mcs_file_write_all(tmpreaper_t)
@@ -59131,7 +67720,7 @@ index 0521d5a..1d41128 100644
+
logging_send_syslog_msg(tmpreaper_t)
- miscfiles_read_localization(tmpreaper_t)
+-miscfiles_read_localization(tmpreaper_t)
miscfiles_delete_man_pages(tmpreaper_t)
-cron_system_entry(tmpreaper_t, tmpreaper_exec_t)
@@ -59144,6 +67733,7 @@ index 0521d5a..1d41128 100644
- userdom_delete_user_home_content_dirs(tmpreaper_t)
- userdom_delete_user_home_content_files(tmpreaper_t)
- userdom_delete_user_home_content_symlinks(tmpreaper_t)
++ userdom_list_admin_dir(tmpreaper_t)
+ userdom_delete_all_user_home_content_dirs(tmpreaper_t)
+ userdom_delete_all_user_home_content_files(tmpreaper_t)
+ userdom_delete_all_user_home_content_sock_files(tmpreaper_t)
@@ -59152,7 +67742,7 @@ index 0521d5a..1d41128 100644
')
optional_policy(`
-@@ -52,7 +65,9 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -52,7 +67,9 @@ optional_policy(`
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -59162,20 +67752,24 @@ index 0521d5a..1d41128 100644
apache_delete_cache_files(tmpreaper_t)
apache_setattr_cache_dirs(tmpreaper_t)
')
-@@ -66,9 +81,13 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -66,9 +83,17 @@ optional_policy(`
')
optional_policy(`
- rpm_manage_cache(tmpreaper_t)
++ mandb_delete_cache(tmpreaper_t)
+ ')
+
+ optional_policy(`
+- unconfined_domain(tmpreaper_t)
+ sandbox_list(tmpreaper_t)
+ sandbox_delete_dirs(tmpreaper_t)
+ sandbox_delete_files(tmpreaper_t)
+ sandbox_delete_sock_files(tmpreaper_t)
+ sandbox_setattr_dirs(tmpreaper_t)
- ')
-
- optional_policy(`
-- unconfined_domain(tmpreaper_t)
++')
++
++optional_policy(`
+ rpm_manage_cache(tmpreaper_t)
')
diff --git a/tomcat.fc b/tomcat.fc
@@ -59197,10 +67791,10 @@ index 0000000..a8385bc
+/var/run/tomcat6?\.pid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:tomcat_var_run_t,s0)
diff --git a/tomcat.if b/tomcat.if
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..56f9936
+index 0000000..9abef48
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tomcat.if
-@@ -0,0 +1,352 @@
+@@ -0,0 +1,395 @@
+
+## <summary>policy for tomcat</summary>
+
@@ -59221,11 +67815,59 @@ index 0000000..56f9936
+ ')
+
+ type $1_t, tomcat_domain;
-+ type $1_exec_t;
-+ init_daemon_domain($1_t, $1_exec_t)
++ type $1_exec_t;
++ init_daemon_domain($1_t, $1_exec_t)
++
++ type $1_cache_t;
++ files_type($1_cache_t)
++
++ type $1_log_t;
++ logging_log_file($1_log_t)
++
++ type $1_var_lib_t;
++ files_type($1_var_lib_t)
++
++ type $1_var_run_t;
++ files_pid_file($1_var_run_t)
++
++ type $1_tmp_t;
++ files_tmp_file($1_tmp_t)
++
++ ##################################
++ #
++ # Local policy
++ #
++
++ manage_dirs_pattern($1_t, $1_cache_t, $1_cache_t)
++ manage_files_pattern($1_t, $1_cache_t, $1_cache_t)
++ manage_lnk_files_pattern($1_t, $1_cache_t, $1_cache_t)
++ files_var_filetrans($1_t, $1_cache_t, { dir file })
++
++ manage_dirs_pattern($1_t, $1_log_t, $1_log_t)
++ manage_files_pattern($1_t, $1_log_t, $1_log_t)
++ manage_lnk_files_pattern($1_t, $1_log_t, $1_log_t)
++ logging_log_filetrans($1_t, $1_log_t, { dir file })
++
++ manage_dirs_pattern($1_t, $1_var_lib_t, $1_var_lib_t)
++ manage_files_pattern($1_t, $1_var_lib_t, $1_var_lib_t)
++ manage_lnk_files_pattern($1_t, $1_var_lib_t, $1_var_lib_t)
++ files_var_lib_filetrans($1_t, $1_var_lib_t, { dir file lnk_file })
++
++ manage_dirs_pattern($1_t, $1_var_run_t, $1_var_run_t)
++ manage_files_pattern($1_t, $1_var_run_t, $1_var_run_t)
++ manage_lnk_files_pattern($1_t, $1_var_run_t, $1_var_run_t)
++ files_pid_filetrans($1_t, $1_var_run_t, { dir file lnk_file })
++
++ manage_dirs_pattern($1_t, $1_tmp_t, $1_tmp_t)
++ manage_files_pattern($1_t, $1_tmp_t, $1_tmp_t)
++ manage_fifo_files_pattern($1_t, $1_tmp_t, $1_tmp_t)
++ files_tmp_filetrans($1_t, $1_tmp_t, { file fifo_file dir })
+
+ can_exec($1_t, $1_exec_t)
+
++ kernel_read_system_state($1_t)
++
++ logging_send_syslog_msg($1_t)
+')
+
+########################################
@@ -59513,11 +68155,6 @@ index 0000000..56f9936
+## Domain allowed access.
+## </summary>
+## </param>
-+## <param name="role">
-+## <summary>
-+## Role allowed access.
-+## </summary>
-+## </param>
+## <rolecap/>
+#
+interface(`tomcat_admin',`
@@ -59555,10 +68192,10 @@ index 0000000..56f9936
+')
diff --git a/tomcat.te b/tomcat.te
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..a986de8
+index 0000000..0557ffc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tomcat.te
-@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
+@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+policy_module(tomcat, 1.0.0)
+
+########################################
@@ -59570,21 +68207,6 @@ index 0000000..a986de8
+
+tomcat_domain_template(tomcat)
+
-+type tomcat_cache_t;
-+files_type(tomcat_cache_t)
-+
-+type tomcat_log_t;
-+logging_log_file(tomcat_log_t)
-+
-+type tomcat_var_lib_t;
-+files_type(tomcat_var_lib_t)
-+
-+type tomcat_var_run_t;
-+files_pid_file(tomcat_var_run_t)
-+
-+type tomcat_tmp_t;
-+files_tmp_file(tomcat_tmp_t)
-+
+type tomcat_unit_file_t;
+systemd_unit_file(tomcat_unit_file_t)
+
@@ -59609,33 +68231,10 @@ index 0000000..a986de8
+allow tomcat_domain self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms;
+allow tomcat_domain self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
+
-+manage_dirs_pattern(tomcat_domain, tomcat_cache_t, tomcat_cache_t)
-+manage_files_pattern(tomcat_domain, tomcat_cache_t, tomcat_cache_t)
-+manage_lnk_files_pattern(tomcat_domain, tomcat_cache_t, tomcat_cache_t)
-+files_var_filetrans(tomcat_domain, tomcat_cache_t, { dir file })
-+
-+manage_dirs_pattern(tomcat_domain, tomcat_log_t, tomcat_log_t)
-+manage_files_pattern(tomcat_domain, tomcat_log_t, tomcat_log_t)
-+logging_log_filetrans(tomcat_domain, tomcat_log_t, { dir file })
-+
-+manage_dirs_pattern(tomcat_domain, tomcat_var_lib_t, tomcat_var_lib_t)
-+manage_files_pattern(tomcat_domain, tomcat_var_lib_t, tomcat_var_lib_t)
-+files_var_lib_filetrans(tomcat_domain, tomcat_var_lib_t, { dir file })
-+
-+manage_dirs_pattern(tomcat_domain, tomcat_var_run_t, tomcat_var_run_t)
-+manage_files_pattern(tomcat_domain, tomcat_var_run_t, tomcat_var_run_t)
-+files_pid_filetrans(tomcat_domain, tomcat_var_run_t, { dir file })
-+
-+manage_dirs_pattern(tomcat_t, tomcat_tmp_t, tomcat_tmp_t)
-+manage_files_pattern(tomcat_t, tomcat_tmp_t, tomcat_tmp_t)
-+manage_fifo_files_pattern(tomcat_t, tomcat_tmp_t, tomcat_tmp_t)
-+files_tmp_filetrans(tomcat_t, tomcat_tmp_t, { file fifo_file dir })
-+
+# we want to stay in a new tomcat domain if we call tomcat binary from a script
+# initrc_t at tomcat_test_exec_t->tomcat_test_t at tomcat_exec_t->tomcat_test_t
+can_exec(tomcat_domain, tomcat_exec_t)
+
-+kernel_read_system_state(tomcat_domain)
+kernel_read_network_state(tomcat_domain)
+
+corecmd_exec_bin(tomcat_domain)
@@ -59663,10 +68262,11 @@ index 0000000..a986de8
+
+auth_read_passwd(tomcat_domain)
+
-+miscfiles_read_localization(tomcat_domain)
-+
+sysnet_dns_name_resolve(tomcat_domain)
+
++optional_policy(`
++ tomcat_search_lib(tomcat_domain)
++')
diff --git a/tor.fc b/tor.fc
index e2e06b2..6752bc3 100644
--- a/tor.fc
@@ -59745,10 +68345,24 @@ index 904f13e..5801347 100644
+ ')
')
diff --git a/tor.te b/tor.te
-index c842cad..3c0dfe4 100644
+index c842cad..a655e4c 100644
--- a/tor.te
+++ b/tor.te
-@@ -36,12 +36,16 @@ logging_log_file(tor_var_log_t)
+@@ -13,6 +13,13 @@ policy_module(tor, 1.8.0)
+ ## </desc>
+ gen_tunable(tor_bind_all_unreserved_ports, false)
+
++## <desc>
++## <p>
++## Allow tor to act as a relay
++## </p>
++## </desc>
++gen_tunable(tor_can_network_relay, false)
++
+ type tor_t;
+ type tor_exec_t;
+ init_daemon_domain(tor_t, tor_exec_t)
+@@ -36,12 +43,16 @@ logging_log_file(tor_var_log_t)
type tor_var_run_t;
files_pid_file(tor_var_run_t)
@@ -59765,18 +68379,19 @@ index c842cad..3c0dfe4 100644
allow tor_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms;
allow tor_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
allow tor_t self:netlink_route_socket r_netlink_socket_perms;
-@@ -73,9 +77,9 @@ manage_sock_files_pattern(tor_t, tor_var_run_t, tor_var_run_t)
+@@ -73,9 +84,10 @@ manage_sock_files_pattern(tor_t, tor_var_run_t, tor_var_run_t)
files_pid_filetrans(tor_t, tor_var_run_t, { dir file sock_file })
kernel_read_system_state(tor_t)
+kernel_read_net_sysctls(tor_t)
++kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(tor_t)
# networking basics
-corenet_all_recvfrom_unlabeled(tor_t)
corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(tor_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(tor_t)
corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if(tor_t)
-@@ -87,6 +91,7 @@ corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_reserved_ports(tor_t)
+@@ -87,6 +99,7 @@ corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_reserved_ports(tor_t)
corenet_tcp_bind_generic_node(tor_t)
corenet_udp_bind_generic_node(tor_t)
corenet_tcp_bind_tor_port(tor_t)
@@ -59784,7 +68399,7 @@ index c842cad..3c0dfe4 100644
corenet_udp_bind_dns_port(tor_t)
corenet_sendrecv_tor_server_packets(tor_t)
corenet_sendrecv_dns_server_packets(tor_t)
-@@ -95,13 +100,14 @@ corenet_tcp_connect_all_ports(tor_t)
+@@ -95,13 +108,14 @@ corenet_tcp_connect_all_ports(tor_t)
corenet_sendrecv_all_client_packets(tor_t)
# ... especially including port 80 and other privileged ports
corenet_tcp_connect_all_reserved_ports(tor_t)
@@ -59800,8 +68415,27 @@ index c842cad..3c0dfe4 100644
files_read_etc_runtime_files(tor_t)
files_read_usr_files(tor_t)
+@@ -109,12 +123,16 @@ auth_use_nsswitch(tor_t)
+
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(tor_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(tor_t)
+-
+ tunable_policy(`tor_bind_all_unreserved_ports', `
+ corenet_tcp_bind_all_unreserved_ports(tor_t)
+ ')
+
++tunable_policy(`tor_can_network_relay',`
++ # allow httpd to work as a relay
++ corenet_tcp_connect_all_ephemeral_ports(tor_t)
++ corenet_tcp_bind_http_port(tor_t)
++')
++
+ optional_policy(`
+ seutil_sigchld_newrole(tor_t)
+ ')
diff --git a/transproxy.te b/transproxy.te
-index 95cf0c0..5ad358e 100644
+index 95cf0c0..f191f8a 100644
--- a/transproxy.te
+++ b/transproxy.te
@@ -29,7 +29,6 @@ kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(transproxy_t)
@@ -59812,8 +68446,17 @@ index 95cf0c0..5ad358e 100644
corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(transproxy_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(transproxy_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_node(transproxy_t)
+@@ -49,8 +48,6 @@ fs_search_auto_mountpoints(transproxy_t)
+
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(transproxy_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(transproxy_t)
+-
+ sysnet_read_config(transproxy_t)
+
+ userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fds(transproxy_t)
diff --git a/tripwire.te b/tripwire.te
-index 2ae8b62..a8e786b 100644
+index 2ae8b62..bfe64af 100644
--- a/tripwire.te
+++ b/tripwire.te
@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ files_getattr_all_sockets(tripwire_t)
@@ -59825,28 +68468,34 @@ index 2ae8b62..a8e786b 100644
optional_policy(`
cron_system_entry(tripwire_t, tripwire_exec_t)
-@@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ logging_send_syslog_msg(twadmin_t)
+@@ -99,9 +99,7 @@ domain_use_interactive_fds(twadmin_t)
- miscfiles_read_localization(twadmin_t)
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(twadmin_t)
+-miscfiles_read_localization(twadmin_t)
+-
-userdom_use_user_terminals(twadmin_t)
+userdom_use_inherited_user_terminals(twadmin_t)
########################################
#
-@@ -127,7 +127,7 @@ logging_send_syslog_msg(twprint_t)
+@@ -125,9 +123,7 @@ domain_use_interactive_fds(twprint_t)
- miscfiles_read_localization(twprint_t)
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(twprint_t)
+-miscfiles_read_localization(twprint_t)
+-
-userdom_use_user_terminals(twprint_t)
+userdom_use_inherited_user_terminals(twprint_t)
########################################
#
-@@ -143,4 +143,4 @@ logging_send_syslog_msg(siggen_t)
+@@ -141,6 +137,4 @@ files_read_all_files(siggen_t)
- miscfiles_read_localization(siggen_t)
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(siggen_t)
+-miscfiles_read_localization(siggen_t)
+-
-userdom_use_user_terminals(siggen_t)
+userdom_use_inherited_user_terminals(siggen_t)
diff --git a/tuned.fc b/tuned.fc
@@ -59909,7 +68558,7 @@ index 54b8605..a04f013 100644
admin_pattern($1, tuned_var_run_t)
')
diff --git a/tuned.te b/tuned.te
-index db9d2a5..288ada9 100644
+index db9d2a5..edfe6ba 100644
--- a/tuned.te
+++ b/tuned.te
@@ -12,6 +12,12 @@ init_daemon_domain(tuned_t, tuned_exec_t)
@@ -59925,20 +68574,22 @@ index db9d2a5..288ada9 100644
type tuned_log_t;
logging_log_file(tuned_log_t)
-@@ -22,31 +28,49 @@ files_pid_file(tuned_var_run_t)
+@@ -22,43 +28,85 @@ files_pid_file(tuned_var_run_t)
#
# tuned local policy
#
-
+allow tuned_t self:capability { sys_admin sys_nice };
dontaudit tuned_t self:capability { dac_override sys_tty_config };
-+allow tuned_t self:process signal;
++allow tuned_t self:process { setsched signal };
+allow tuned_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms;
+allow tuned_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms;
+
+read_files_pattern(tuned_t, tuned_etc_t, tuned_etc_t)
++exec_files_pattern(tuned_t, tuned_etc_t, tuned_etc_t)
+
+manage_files_pattern(tuned_t, tuned_etc_t, tuned_rw_etc_t)
++files_etc_filetrans(tuned_t, tuned_rw_etc_t, file, "active_profile")
manage_dirs_pattern(tuned_t, tuned_log_t, tuned_log_t)
manage_files_pattern(tuned_t, tuned_log_t, tuned_log_t)
@@ -59957,9 +68608,11 @@ index db9d2a5..288ada9 100644
kernel_read_network_state(tuned_t)
-
+kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(tuned_t)
++kernel_request_load_module(tuned_t)
+kernel_rw_kernel_sysctl(tuned_t)
+kernel_rw_hotplug_sysctls(tuned_t)
+kernel_rw_vm_sysctls(tuned_t)
++kernel_setsched(tuned_t)
+
+dev_getattr_all_blk_files(tuned_t)
+dev_getattr_all_chr_files(tuned_t)
@@ -59973,15 +68626,28 @@ index db9d2a5..288ada9 100644
-files_read_etc_files(tuned_t)
files_read_usr_files(tuned_t)
files_dontaudit_search_home(tuned_t)
-
-+fs_getattr_xattr_fs(tuned_t)
++files_list_tmp(tuned_t)
+
-+auth_use_nsswitch(tuned_t)
++fs_getattr_all_fs(tuned_t)
+
++auth_use_nsswitch(tuned_t)
+
logging_send_syslog_msg(tuned_t)
- miscfiles_read_localization(tuned_t)
-@@ -58,6 +82,14 @@ optional_policy(`
+-miscfiles_read_localization(tuned_t)
++mount_read_pid_files(tuned_t)
++
++udev_read_pid_files(tuned_t)
+
+ userdom_dontaudit_search_user_home_dirs(tuned_t)
+
++optional_policy(`
++ dbus_system_bus_client(tuned_t)
++ dbus_connect_system_bus(tuned_t)
++')
++
+ # to allow disk tuning
+ optional_policy(`
fstools_domtrans(tuned_t)
')
@@ -59996,12 +68662,20 @@ index db9d2a5..288ada9 100644
# to allow network interface tuning
optional_policy(`
sysnet_domtrans_ifconfig(tuned_t)
+ ')
++
++optional_policy(`
++ unconfined_dbus_send(tuned_t)
++')
diff --git a/tvtime.te b/tvtime.te
-index 531b1f1..951cee6 100644
+index 531b1f1..7455f78 100644
--- a/tvtime.te
+++ b/tvtime.te
-@@ -70,20 +70,11 @@ fs_search_auto_mountpoints(tvtime_t)
- miscfiles_read_localization(tvtime_t)
+@@ -67,23 +67,13 @@ files_read_etc_files(tvtime_t)
+ # X access, Home files
+ fs_search_auto_mountpoints(tvtime_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(tvtime_t)
miscfiles_read_fonts(tvtime_t)
-userdom_use_user_terminals(tvtime_t)
@@ -60024,7 +68698,7 @@ index 531b1f1..951cee6 100644
optional_policy(`
xserver_user_x_domain_template(tvtime, tvtime_t, tvtime_tmpfs_t)
diff --git a/tzdata.te b/tzdata.te
-index d0f2a64..834a56d 100644
+index d0f2a64..9896b57 100644
--- a/tzdata.te
+++ b/tzdata.te
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ application_domain(tzdata_t, tzdata_exec_t)
@@ -60036,7 +68710,11 @@ index d0f2a64..834a56d 100644
files_search_spool(tzdata_t)
fs_getattr_xattr_fs(tzdata_t)
-@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ miscfiles_read_localization(tzdata_t)
+@@ -24,11 +24,10 @@ term_dontaudit_list_ptys(tzdata_t)
+
+ locallogin_dontaudit_use_fds(tzdata_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(tzdata_t)
miscfiles_manage_localization(tzdata_t)
miscfiles_etc_filetrans_localization(tzdata_t)
@@ -60105,7 +68783,7 @@ index d23be5c..a05cd68 100644
init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, ulogd_initrc_exec_t)
domain_system_change_exemption($1)
diff --git a/ulogd.te b/ulogd.te
-index 3b953f5..70f687a 100644
+index 3b953f5..d35a323 100644
--- a/ulogd.te
+++ b/ulogd.te
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ init_daemon_domain(ulogd_t, ulogd_exec_t)
@@ -60132,6 +68810,14 @@ index 3b953f5..70f687a 100644
# config files
read_files_pattern(ulogd_t, ulogd_etc_t, ulogd_etc_t)
+@@ -46,7 +51,6 @@ logging_log_filetrans(ulogd_t, ulogd_var_log_t, file)
+ files_read_etc_files(ulogd_t)
+ files_read_usr_files(ulogd_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(ulogd_t)
+
+ optional_policy(`
+ allow ulogd_t self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
diff --git a/uml.if b/uml.if
index d2ab7cb..ddb34f1 100644
--- a/uml.if
@@ -60149,7 +68835,7 @@ index d2ab7cb..ddb34f1 100644
allow $2 uml_ro_t:dir list_dir_perms;
read_files_pattern($2, uml_ro_t, uml_ro_t)
diff --git a/uml.te b/uml.te
-index ff094e5..1b11396 100644
+index ff094e5..4ddeb30 100644
--- a/uml.te
+++ b/uml.te
@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ files_pid_file(uml_switch_var_run_t)
@@ -60178,11 +68864,29 @@ index ff094e5..1b11396 100644
userdom_attach_admin_tun_iface(uml_t)
optional_policy(`
+@@ -174,8 +173,6 @@ init_use_script_ptys(uml_switch_t)
+
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(uml_switch_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(uml_switch_t)
+-
+ userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fds(uml_switch_t)
+ userdom_dontaudit_search_user_home_dirs(uml_switch_t)
+
diff --git a/updfstab.te b/updfstab.te
-index ef12ed5..46c2a9a 100644
+index ef12ed5..4bd4cea 100644
--- a/updfstab.te
+++ b/updfstab.te
-@@ -78,9 +78,8 @@ seutil_read_file_contexts(updfstab_t)
+@@ -69,8 +69,6 @@ init_use_script_ptys(updfstab_t)
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(updfstab_t)
+ logging_search_logs(updfstab_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(updfstab_t)
+-
+ seutil_read_config(updfstab_t)
+ seutil_read_default_contexts(updfstab_t)
+ seutil_read_file_contexts(updfstab_t)
+@@ -78,9 +76,8 @@ seutil_read_file_contexts(updfstab_t)
userdom_dontaudit_search_user_home_content(updfstab_t)
userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fds(updfstab_t)
@@ -60195,7 +68899,7 @@ index ef12ed5..46c2a9a 100644
optional_policy(`
init_dbus_chat_script(updfstab_t)
diff --git a/uptime.te b/uptime.te
-index c2cf97e..1f8f768 100644
+index c2cf97e..d9105b0 100644
--- a/uptime.te
+++ b/uptime.te
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ type uptimed_etc_t alias etc_uptimed_t;
@@ -60216,6 +68920,15 @@ index c2cf97e..1f8f768 100644
allow uptimed_t uptimed_etc_t:file read_file_perms;
files_search_etc(uptimed_t)
+@@ -55,8 +55,6 @@ fs_search_auto_mountpoints(uptimed_t)
+
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(uptimed_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(uptimed_t)
+-
+ userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fds(uptimed_t)
+ userdom_dontaudit_search_user_home_dirs(uptimed_t)
+
diff --git a/usbmodules.te b/usbmodules.te
index 74354da..f04565f 100644
--- a/usbmodules.te
@@ -60239,22 +68952,120 @@ index 74354da..f04565f 100644
+optional_policy(`
+ modutils_read_module_deps(usbmodules_t)
+')
+diff --git a/usbmuxd.fc b/usbmuxd.fc
+index 40b8b8d..cd80b9b 100644
+--- a/usbmuxd.fc
++++ b/usbmuxd.fc
+@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+ /usr/sbin/usbmuxd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:usbmuxd_exec_t,s0)
+
+ /var/run/usbmuxd.* gen_context(system_u:object_r:usbmuxd_var_run_t,s0)
++/usr/lib/systemd/system/usbmuxd.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:usbmuxd_unit_file_t,s0)
+diff --git a/usbmuxd.if b/usbmuxd.if
+index 53792d3..823ac94 100644
+--- a/usbmuxd.if
++++ b/usbmuxd.if
+@@ -37,3 +37,65 @@ interface(`usbmuxd_stream_connect',`
+ files_search_pids($1)
+ stream_connect_pattern($1, usbmuxd_var_run_t, usbmuxd_var_run_t, usbmuxd_t)
+ ')
++
++########################################
++## <summary>
++## Execute usbmuxd server in the usbmuxd domain.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed to transition.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`usbmuxd_systemctl',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type usbmuxd_t;
++ type usbmuxd_unit_file_t;
++ ')
++
++ systemd_exec_systemctl($1)
++ allow $1 usbmuxd_unit_file_t:file read_file_perms;
++ allow $1 usbmuxd_unit_file_t:service manage_service_perms;
++
++ ps_process_pattern($1, usbmuxd_t)
++')
++
++#####################################
++## <summary>
++## All of the rules required to administrate
++## an usbmuxd environment
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++## <param name="role">
++## <summary>
++## The role to be allowed to manage the usbmuxd domain.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++## <rolecap/>
++#
++interface(`usbmuxd_admin',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type usbmuxd_t,usbmuxd_var_run_t;
++ type usbmuxd_unit_file_t;
++ ')
++
++ allow $1 usbmuxd_t:process { signal_perms };
++ ps_process_pattern($1, usbmuxd_t)
++
++ tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',`
++ allow $1 usbmuxd_t:process ptrace;
++ ')
++ allow $2 system_r;
++
++ files_list_pids($1)
++ admin_pattern($1, usbmuxd_var_run_t)
++
++ usbmuxd_systemctl($1)
++ admin_pattern($1, usbmuxd_unit_file_t)
++ allow $1 usbmuxd_unit_file_t:service all_service_perms;
++')
diff --git a/usbmuxd.te b/usbmuxd.te
-index 4440aa6..65b2c3a 100644
+index 4440aa6..8c94194 100644
--- a/usbmuxd.te
+++ b/usbmuxd.te
-@@ -33,10 +33,13 @@ kernel_read_system_state(usbmuxd_t)
+@@ -7,12 +7,15 @@ policy_module(usbmuxd, 1.1.0)
+
+ type usbmuxd_t;
+ type usbmuxd_exec_t;
+-application_domain(usbmuxd_t, usbmuxd_exec_t)
++init_system_domain(usbmuxd_t, usbmuxd_exec_t)
+ role system_r types usbmuxd_t;
+
+ type usbmuxd_var_run_t;
+ files_pid_file(usbmuxd_var_run_t)
+
++type usbmuxd_unit_file_t;
++systemd_unit_file(usbmuxd_unit_file_t)
++
+ ########################################
+ #
+ # usbmuxd local policy
+@@ -33,10 +36,12 @@ kernel_read_system_state(usbmuxd_t)
dev_read_sysfs(usbmuxd_t)
dev_rw_generic_usb_dev(usbmuxd_t)
-files_read_etc_files(usbmuxd_t)
-
- miscfiles_read_localization(usbmuxd_t)
-
+-
+-miscfiles_read_localization(usbmuxd_t)
+-
auth_use_nsswitch(usbmuxd_t)
logging_send_syslog_msg(usbmuxd_t)
+
++seutil_dontaudit_read_file_contexts(usbmuxd_t)
++
+optional_policy(`
+ virt_dontaudit_read_chr_dev(usbmuxd_t)
+')
@@ -60268,7 +69079,7 @@ index e70b0e8..cd83b89 100644
/usr/sbin/userhelper -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:userhelper_exec_t,s0)
+/usr/bin/consolehelper -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:consolehelper_exec_t,s0)
diff --git a/userhelper.if b/userhelper.if
-index 65baaac..821bcea 100644
+index 65baaac..3b93d32 100644
--- a/userhelper.if
+++ b/userhelper.if
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ template(`userhelper_role_template',`
@@ -60289,7 +69100,15 @@ index 65baaac..821bcea 100644
# Inherit descriptors from the current session.
init_use_fds($1_userhelper_t)
-@@ -145,18 +149,6 @@ template(`userhelper_role_template',`
+@@ -128,7 +132,6 @@ template(`userhelper_role_template',`
+ init_manage_utmp($1_userhelper_t)
+ init_pid_filetrans_utmp($1_userhelper_t)
+
+- miscfiles_read_localization($1_userhelper_t)
+
+ seutil_read_config($1_userhelper_t)
+ seutil_read_default_contexts($1_userhelper_t)
+@@ -145,18 +148,6 @@ template(`userhelper_role_template',`
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -60308,7 +69127,7 @@ index 65baaac..821bcea 100644
tunable_policy(`! secure_mode',`
#if we are not in secure mode then we can transition to sysadm_t
sysadm_bin_spec_domtrans($1_userhelper_t)
-@@ -255,3 +247,88 @@ interface(`userhelper_exec',`
+@@ -255,3 +246,91 @@ interface(`userhelper_exec',`
can_exec($1, userhelper_exec_t)
')
@@ -60356,6 +69175,9 @@ index 65baaac..821bcea 100644
+ allow $3 $1_consolehelper_t:process signal;
+ allow $3 $1_consolehelper_t:dbus send_msg;
+ allow $1_consolehelper_t $3:dbus send_msg;
++ allow $1_consolehelper_t $3:unix_stream_socket connectto;
++
++ kernel_read_system_state($1_consolehelper_t)
+
+ auth_use_pam($1_consolehelper_t)
+
@@ -60398,7 +69220,7 @@ index 65baaac..821bcea 100644
+ can_exec($1, consolehelper_exec_t)
+')
diff --git a/userhelper.te b/userhelper.te
-index f25ed61..390de9e 100644
+index f25ed61..1b381f0 100644
--- a/userhelper.te
+++ b/userhelper.te
@@ -6,9 +6,81 @@ policy_module(userhelper, 1.7.0)
@@ -60422,7 +69244,8 @@ index f25ed61..390de9e 100644
+#
+
+allow consolehelper_domain self:shm create_shm_perms;
-+allow consolehelper_domain self:capability { setgid setuid };
++allow consolehelper_domain self:capability { setgid setuid dac_override };
++allow consolehelper_domain self:process signal;
+
+allow consolehelper_domain userhelper_conf_t:file audit_access;
+dontaudit consolehelper_domain userhelper_conf_t:file write;
@@ -60435,7 +69258,6 @@ index f25ed61..390de9e 100644
+allow consolehelper_domain self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms;
+allow consolehelper_domain self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
+
-+kernel_read_system_state(consolehelper_domain)
+kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(consolehelper_domain)
+
+corecmd_exec_bin(consolehelper_domain)
@@ -60443,6 +69265,7 @@ index f25ed61..390de9e 100644
+dev_getattr_all_chr_files(consolehelper_domain)
+dev_dontaudit_list_all_dev_nodes(consolehelper_domain)
+dev_dontaudit_getattr_all(consolehelper_domain)
++fs_getattr_all_fs(consolehelper_domain)
+fs_getattr_all_dirs(consolehelper_domain)
+
+files_read_config_files(consolehelper_domain)
@@ -60456,7 +69279,6 @@ index f25ed61..390de9e 100644
+init_read_utmp(consolehelper_domain)
+init_telinit(consolehelper_domain)
+
-+miscfiles_read_localization(consolehelper_domain)
+miscfiles_read_fonts(consolehelper_domain)
+
+userhelper_exec(consolehelper_domain)
@@ -60518,7 +69340,7 @@ index d45c715..2d4f1ba 100644
+
')
diff --git a/usernetctl.te b/usernetctl.te
-index 19c70bb..1434b51 100644
+index 19c70bb..8a00ab0 100644
--- a/usernetctl.te
+++ b/usernetctl.te
@@ -5,13 +5,14 @@ policy_module(usernetctl, 1.6.0)
@@ -60546,7 +69368,12 @@ index 19c70bb..1434b51 100644
files_exec_etc_files(usernetctl_t)
files_read_etc_runtime_files(usernetctl_t)
files_list_pids(usernetctl_t)
-@@ -60,31 +60,33 @@ miscfiles_read_localization(usernetctl_t)
+@@ -55,36 +55,36 @@ auth_use_nsswitch(usernetctl_t)
+
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(usernetctl_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(usernetctl_t)
+-
seutil_read_config(usernetctl_t)
sysnet_read_config(usernetctl_t)
@@ -60611,7 +69438,7 @@ index ebc5414..8f8ac45 100644
logging_list_logs($1)
admin_pattern($1, uucpd_log_t)
diff --git a/uucp.te b/uucp.te
-index d4349e9..cd495f4 100644
+index d4349e9..e338438 100644
--- a/uucp.te
+++ b/uucp.te
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ type uucpd_ro_t;
@@ -60647,7 +69474,16 @@ index d4349e9..cd495f4 100644
files_search_home(uucpd_t)
files_search_spool(uucpd_t)
-@@ -125,15 +124,18 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -101,8 +100,6 @@ auth_use_nsswitch(uucpd_t)
+
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(uucpd_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(uucpd_t)
+-
+ mta_send_mail(uucpd_t)
+
+ optional_policy(`
+@@ -125,18 +122,19 @@ optional_policy(`
allow uux_t self:capability { setuid setgid };
allow uux_t self:fifo_file write_fifo_file_perms;
@@ -60662,12 +69498,15 @@ index d4349e9..cd495f4 100644
fs_rw_anon_inodefs_files(uux_t)
+-logging_send_syslog_msg(uux_t)
+auth_use_nsswitch(uux_t)
-+
- logging_send_syslog_msg(uux_t)
- miscfiles_read_localization(uux_t)
-@@ -145,5 +147,5 @@ optional_policy(`
+-miscfiles_read_localization(uux_t)
++logging_send_syslog_msg(uux_t)
+
+ optional_policy(`
+ mta_send_mail(uux_t)
+@@ -145,5 +143,5 @@ optional_policy(`
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -60699,8 +69538,17 @@ index 5d43bd5..879a5cb 100644
uuidd_initrc_domtrans($1)
domain_system_change_exemption($1)
+diff --git a/uuidd.te b/uuidd.te
+index 04589dc..33b02b5 100644
+--- a/uuidd.te
++++ b/uuidd.te
+@@ -41,4 +41,3 @@ domain_use_interactive_fds(uuidd_t)
+
+ files_read_etc_files(uuidd_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(uuidd_t)
diff --git a/uwimap.te b/uwimap.te
-index 46d9811..8be9765 100644
+index 46d9811..f109ba3 100644
--- a/uwimap.te
+++ b/uwimap.te
@@ -37,7 +37,6 @@ kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(imapd_t)
@@ -60711,6 +69559,15 @@ index 46d9811..8be9765 100644
corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(imapd_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(imapd_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_node(imapd_t)
+@@ -65,8 +64,6 @@ auth_domtrans_chk_passwd(imapd_t)
+
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(imapd_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(imapd_t)
+-
+ sysnet_read_config(imapd_t)
+
+ userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fds(imapd_t)
diff --git a/varnishd.if b/varnishd.if
index 93975d6..bd248ce 100644
--- a/varnishd.if
@@ -60747,7 +69604,7 @@ index 93975d6..bd248ce 100644
init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, varnishd_initrc_exec_t)
domain_system_change_exemption($1)
diff --git a/varnishd.te b/varnishd.te
-index f9310f3..e830a59 100644
+index f9310f3..b4dafb7 100644
--- a/varnishd.te
+++ b/varnishd.te
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ type varnishd_initrc_exec_t;
@@ -60768,7 +69625,16 @@ index f9310f3..e830a59 100644
########################################
#
-@@ -87,6 +87,8 @@ corenet_tcp_connect_http_port(varnishd_t)
+@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ files_type(varnishlog_log_t)
+
+ allow varnishd_t self:capability { kill dac_override ipc_lock setuid setgid };
+ dontaudit varnishd_t self:capability sys_tty_config;
+-allow varnishd_t self:process signal;
++allow varnishd_t self:process { execmem signal };
+ allow varnishd_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms;
+ allow varnishd_t self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
+ allow varnishd_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms;
+@@ -87,14 +87,14 @@ corenet_tcp_connect_http_port(varnishd_t)
dev_read_urand(varnishd_t)
@@ -60777,8 +69643,36 @@ index f9310f3..e830a59 100644
fs_getattr_all_fs(varnishd_t)
auth_use_nsswitch(varnishd_t)
+
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(varnishd_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(varnishd_t)
+-
+ sysnet_read_config(varnishd_t)
+
+ tunable_policy(`varnishd_connect_any',`
+diff --git a/vbetool.te b/vbetool.te
+index 001c93c..f918ed2 100644
+--- a/vbetool.te
++++ b/vbetool.te
+@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ init_system_domain(vbetool_t, vbetool_exec_t)
+ #
+
+ allow vbetool_t self:capability { dac_override sys_tty_config sys_admin };
++allow vbetool_t self:capability2 compromise_kernel;
+ allow vbetool_t self:process execmem;
+
+ dev_wx_raw_memory(vbetool_t)
+@@ -38,7 +39,6 @@ mls_file_write_all_levels(vbetool_t)
+
+ term_use_unallocated_ttys(vbetool_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(vbetool_t)
+
+ tunable_policy(`vbetool_mmap_zero_ignore',`
+ dontaudit vbetool_t self:memprotect mmap_zero;
diff --git a/vdagent.fc b/vdagent.fc
-index 21c5f41..5a2b836 100644
+index 21c5f41..3ae71ae 100644
--- a/vdagent.fc
+++ b/vdagent.fc
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
@@ -60789,7 +69683,8 @@ index 21c5f41..5a2b836 100644
+/var/log/spice-vdagentd\.log.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:vdagent_log_t,s0)
/var/run/spice-vdagentd(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:vdagent_var_run_t,s0)
- /var/run/spice-vdagentd.\pid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:vdagent_var_run_t,s0)
+-/var/run/spice-vdagentd.\pid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:vdagent_var_run_t,s0)
++/var/run/spice-vdagentd\.pid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:vdagent_var_run_t,s0)
diff --git a/vdagent.if b/vdagent.if
index e59a074..b708678 100644
--- a/vdagent.if
@@ -60907,7 +69802,7 @@ index e59a074..b708678 100644
files_search_pids($1)
admin_pattern($1, vdagent_var_run_t)
diff --git a/vdagent.te b/vdagent.te
-index 29e24e2..187ed62 100644
+index 29e24e2..b1ca03a 100644
--- a/vdagent.te
+++ b/vdagent.te
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ logging_log_file(vdagent_log_t)
@@ -60927,10 +69822,11 @@ index 29e24e2..187ed62 100644
dev_rw_input_dev(vdagent_t)
dev_read_sysfs(vdagent_t)
-@@ -40,6 +41,15 @@ dev_dontaudit_write_mtrr(vdagent_t)
+@@ -40,7 +41,16 @@ dev_dontaudit_write_mtrr(vdagent_t)
files_read_etc_files(vdagent_t)
+-miscfiles_read_localization(vdagent_t)
+init_read_state(vdagent_t)
+
+systemd_read_logind_sessions_files(vdagent_t)
@@ -60940,9 +69836,10 @@ index 29e24e2..187ed62 100644
+
+userdom_read_all_users_state(vdagent_t)
+
- miscfiles_read_localization(vdagent_t)
++logging_send_syslog_msg(vdagent_t)
optional_policy(`
+ consolekit_dbus_chat(vdagent_t)
diff --git a/vhostmd.if b/vhostmd.if
index 1f872b5..8af4bce 100644
--- a/vhostmd.if
@@ -61004,7 +69901,7 @@ index 1f872b5..8af4bce 100644
-
')
diff --git a/vhostmd.te b/vhostmd.te
-index 32a3c13..759f08c 100644
+index 32a3c13..0cbca75 100644
--- a/vhostmd.te
+++ b/vhostmd.te
@@ -24,8 +24,8 @@ files_pid_file(vhostmd_var_run_t)
@@ -61026,7 +69923,7 @@ index 32a3c13..759f08c 100644
kernel_read_system_state(vhostmd_t)
kernel_read_network_state(vhostmd_t)
kernel_write_xen_state(vhostmd_t)
-@@ -44,9 +45,15 @@ corecmd_exec_shell(vhostmd_t)
+@@ -44,17 +45,21 @@ corecmd_exec_shell(vhostmd_t)
corenet_tcp_connect_soundd_port(vhostmd_t)
@@ -61043,7 +69940,15 @@ index 32a3c13..759f08c 100644
dev_read_sysfs(vhostmd_t)
auth_use_nsswitch(vhostmd_t)
-@@ -66,6 +73,7 @@ optional_policy(`
+
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(vhostmd_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(vhostmd_t)
+-
+ optional_policy(`
+ hostname_exec(vhostmd_t)
+ ')
+@@ -66,6 +71,7 @@ optional_policy(`
optional_policy(`
virt_stream_connect(vhostmd_t)
@@ -61052,7 +69957,7 @@ index 32a3c13..759f08c 100644
optional_policy(`
diff --git a/virt.fc b/virt.fc
-index 2124b6a..b52dc56 100644
+index 2124b6a..e55e393 100644
--- a/virt.fc
+++ b/virt.fc
@@ -1,6 +1,14 @@
@@ -61072,7 +69977,7 @@ index 2124b6a..b52dc56 100644
/etc/libvirt -d gen_context(system_u:object_r:virt_etc_t,s0)
/etc/libvirt/[^/]* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:virt_etc_t,s0)
-@@ -12,18 +20,52 @@ HOME_DIR/VirtualMachines/isos(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:virt_content_t
+@@ -12,18 +20,59 @@ HOME_DIR/VirtualMachines/isos(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:virt_content_t
/etc/xen/[^/]* -d gen_context(system_u:object_r:virt_etc_rw_t,s0)
/etc/xen/.*/.* gen_context(system_u:object_r:virt_etc_rw_t,s0)
@@ -61098,13 +70003,12 @@ index 2124b6a..b52dc56 100644
+/var/log/log(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:virt_log_t,s0)
/var/log/libvirt(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:virt_log_t,s0)
+/var/log/vdsm(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:virt_log_t,s0)
-+/var/run/libguestfs(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:virt_var_run_t,s0)
++/var/run/libvirtd\.pid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:virt_var_run_t,s0)
/var/run/libvirt(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:virt_var_run_t,s0)
-/var/run/libvirt/qemu(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:svirt_var_run_t,s0)
+/var/run/libvirt/qemu(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:qemu_var_run_t,s0-mls_systemhigh)
+/var/run/libvirt/lxc(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:virt_lxc_var_run_t,s0)
+/var/run/libvirt-sandbox(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:virt_lxc_var_run_t,s0)
-+/var/run/user/[^/]*/libguestfs(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:virt_home_t,s0)
+/var/run/vdsm(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:virt_var_run_t,s0)
/var/vdsm(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:virt_var_run_t,s0)
@@ -61128,11 +70032,19 @@ index 2124b6a..b52dc56 100644
+/usr/bin/qemu-system-.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:qemu_exec_t,s0)
+/usr/bin/qemu-kvm -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:qemu_exec_t,s0)
+/usr/libexec/qemu.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:qemu_exec_t,s0)
++
++/usr/lib/systemd/system/virt.*\.service -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:virtd_unit_file_t,s0)
++/usr/lib/systemd/system/libvirt.*\.service -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:virtd_unit_file_t,s0)
++/usr/lib/systemd/system/.*xen.*\.service -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:virtd_unit_file_t,s0)
++
++/usr/bin/qemu-ga -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:virt_qemu_ga_exec_t,s0)
++/var/run/qemu-ga\.pid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:virt_qemu_ga_var_run_t,s0)
++/var/log/qemu-ga\.log -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:virt_qemu_ga_log_t,s0)
diff --git a/virt.if b/virt.if
-index 6f0736b..3e6749b 100644
+index 6f0736b..d91242a 100644
--- a/virt.if
+++ b/virt.if
-@@ -13,39 +13,45 @@
+@@ -13,67 +13,30 @@
#
template(`virt_domain_template',`
gen_require(`
@@ -61157,40 +70069,41 @@ index 6f0736b..3e6749b 100644
+ type $1_devpts_t, virt_ptynode;
term_pty($1_devpts_t)
- type $1_tmp_t;
- files_tmp_file($1_tmp_t)
+- type $1_tmp_t;
+- files_tmp_file($1_tmp_t)
++ kernel_read_system_state($1_t)
- type $1_tmpfs_t;
-+ type $1_tmpfs_t, virt_tmpfs_type;
- files_tmpfs_file($1_tmpfs_t)
+- files_tmpfs_file($1_tmpfs_t)
++ auth_read_passwd($1_t)
- type $1_image_t, virt_image_type;
- files_type($1_image_t)
- dev_node($1_image_t)
-+ dev_associate_sysfs($1_image_t)
+- type $1_image_t, virt_image_type;
+- files_type($1_image_t)
+- dev_node($1_image_t)
++ logging_send_syslog_msg($1_t)
- type $1_var_run_t;
- files_pid_file($1_var_run_t)
-+ auth_use_nsswitch($1_t)
-
+-
- allow $1_t $1_devpts_t:chr_file { rw_chr_file_perms setattr };
+ allow $1_t $1_devpts_t:chr_file { rw_chr_file_perms setattr_chr_file_perms };
term_create_pty($1_t, $1_devpts_t)
-
- manage_dirs_pattern($1_t, $1_image_t, $1_image_t)
- manage_files_pattern($1_t, $1_image_t, $1_image_t)
-+ manage_fifo_files_pattern($1_t, $1_image_t, $1_image_t)
- read_lnk_files_pattern($1_t, $1_image_t, $1_image_t)
-+ rw_chr_files_pattern($1_t, $1_image_t, $1_image_t)
- rw_blk_files_pattern($1_t, $1_image_t, $1_image_t)
-+ fs_hugetlbfs_filetrans($1_t, $1_image_t, file)
-
- manage_dirs_pattern($1_t, $1_tmp_t, $1_tmp_t)
- manage_files_pattern($1_t, $1_tmp_t, $1_tmp_t)
-@@ -57,20 +63,6 @@ template(`virt_domain_template',`
- manage_lnk_files_pattern($1_t, $1_tmpfs_t, $1_tmpfs_t)
- fs_tmpfs_filetrans($1_t, $1_tmpfs_t, { dir file lnk_file })
-
+-
+- manage_dirs_pattern($1_t, $1_image_t, $1_image_t)
+- manage_files_pattern($1_t, $1_image_t, $1_image_t)
+- read_lnk_files_pattern($1_t, $1_image_t, $1_image_t)
+- rw_blk_files_pattern($1_t, $1_image_t, $1_image_t)
+-
+- manage_dirs_pattern($1_t, $1_tmp_t, $1_tmp_t)
+- manage_files_pattern($1_t, $1_tmp_t, $1_tmp_t)
+- manage_lnk_files_pattern($1_t, $1_tmp_t, $1_tmp_t)
+- files_tmp_filetrans($1_t, $1_tmp_t, { file dir })
+-
+- manage_dirs_pattern($1_t, $1_tmpfs_t, $1_tmpfs_t)
+- manage_files_pattern($1_t, $1_tmpfs_t, $1_tmpfs_t)
+- manage_lnk_files_pattern($1_t, $1_tmpfs_t, $1_tmpfs_t)
+- fs_tmpfs_filetrans($1_t, $1_tmpfs_t, { dir file lnk_file })
+-
- stream_connect_pattern(virtd_t, $1_var_run_t, $1_var_run_t, virt_domain)
- manage_dirs_pattern(virtd_t, $1_var_run_t, $1_var_run_t)
- manage_files_pattern(virtd_t, $1_var_run_t, $1_var_run_t)
@@ -61205,10 +70118,13 @@ index 6f0736b..3e6749b 100644
-
- auth_use_nsswitch($1_t)
-
- optional_policy(`
- xserver_rw_shm($1_t)
- ')
-@@ -98,14 +90,32 @@ interface(`virt_image',`
+- optional_policy(`
+- xserver_rw_shm($1_t)
+- ')
+ ')
+
+ ########################################
+@@ -98,14 +61,32 @@ interface(`virt_image',`
dev_node($1)
')
@@ -61243,7 +70159,7 @@ index 6f0736b..3e6749b 100644
## </param>
#
interface(`virt_domtrans',`
-@@ -116,9 +126,45 @@ interface(`virt_domtrans',`
+@@ -116,9 +97,45 @@ interface(`virt_domtrans',`
domtrans_pattern($1, virtd_exec_t, virtd_t)
')
@@ -61290,7 +70206,7 @@ index 6f0736b..3e6749b 100644
## </summary>
## <param name="domain">
## <summary>
-@@ -166,13 +212,13 @@ interface(`virt_attach_tun_iface',`
+@@ -166,13 +183,13 @@ interface(`virt_attach_tun_iface',`
#
interface(`virt_read_config',`
gen_require(`
@@ -61306,7 +70222,7 @@ index 6f0736b..3e6749b 100644
')
########################################
-@@ -187,13 +233,13 @@ interface(`virt_read_config',`
+@@ -187,13 +204,13 @@ interface(`virt_read_config',`
#
interface(`virt_manage_config',`
gen_require(`
@@ -61322,7 +70238,7 @@ index 6f0736b..3e6749b 100644
')
########################################
-@@ -233,6 +279,24 @@ interface(`virt_read_content',`
+@@ -233,6 +250,24 @@ interface(`virt_read_content',`
########################################
## <summary>
@@ -61347,7 +70263,7 @@ index 6f0736b..3e6749b 100644
## Read virt PID files.
## </summary>
## <param name="domain">
-@@ -252,6 +316,28 @@ interface(`virt_read_pid_files',`
+@@ -252,6 +287,28 @@ interface(`virt_read_pid_files',`
########################################
## <summary>
@@ -61376,7 +70292,7 @@ index 6f0736b..3e6749b 100644
## Manage virt pid files.
## </summary>
## <param name="domain">
-@@ -263,10 +349,42 @@ interface(`virt_read_pid_files',`
+@@ -263,10 +320,47 @@ interface(`virt_read_pid_files',`
interface(`virt_manage_pid_files',`
gen_require(`
type virt_var_run_t;
@@ -61409,6 +70325,11 @@ index 6f0736b..3e6749b 100644
+## the transition will occur.
+## </summary>
+## </param>
++## <param name="name" optional="true">
++## <summary>
++## The name of the object being created.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
+#
+interface(`virt_pid_filetrans',`
+ gen_require(`
@@ -61419,7 +70340,7 @@ index 6f0736b..3e6749b 100644
')
########################################
-@@ -310,6 +428,24 @@ interface(`virt_read_lib_files',`
+@@ -310,6 +404,24 @@ interface(`virt_read_lib_files',`
########################################
## <summary>
@@ -61444,7 +70365,7 @@ index 6f0736b..3e6749b 100644
## Create, read, write, and delete
## virt lib files.
## </summary>
-@@ -354,9 +490,9 @@ interface(`virt_read_log',`
+@@ -354,9 +466,9 @@ interface(`virt_read_log',`
## virt log files.
## </summary>
## <param name="domain">
@@ -61456,7 +70377,7 @@ index 6f0736b..3e6749b 100644
## </param>
#
interface(`virt_append_log',`
-@@ -390,6 +526,25 @@ interface(`virt_manage_log',`
+@@ -390,6 +502,25 @@ interface(`virt_manage_log',`
########################################
## <summary>
@@ -61482,7 +70403,7 @@ index 6f0736b..3e6749b 100644
## Allow domain to read virt image files
## </summary>
## <param name="domain">
-@@ -410,6 +565,7 @@ interface(`virt_read_images',`
+@@ -410,6 +541,7 @@ interface(`virt_read_images',`
read_files_pattern($1, virt_image_type, virt_image_type)
read_lnk_files_pattern($1, virt_image_type, virt_image_type)
read_blk_files_pattern($1, virt_image_type, virt_image_type)
@@ -61490,7 +70411,7 @@ index 6f0736b..3e6749b 100644
tunable_policy(`virt_use_nfs',`
fs_list_nfs($1)
-@@ -426,6 +582,24 @@ interface(`virt_read_images',`
+@@ -426,6 +558,42 @@ interface(`virt_read_images',`
########################################
## <summary>
@@ -61512,10 +70433,28 @@ index 6f0736b..3e6749b 100644
+
+########################################
+## <summary>
++## Allow domain to read/write virt image chr files
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`virt_rw_chr_files',`
++ gen_require(`
++ attribute virt_image_type;
++ ')
++
++ rw_chr_files_pattern($1, virt_image_type, virt_image_type)
++')
++
++########################################
++## <summary>
## Create, read, write, and delete
## svirt cache files.
## </summary>
-@@ -435,15 +609,15 @@ interface(`virt_read_images',`
+@@ -435,15 +603,15 @@ interface(`virt_read_images',`
## </summary>
## </param>
#
@@ -61536,40 +70475,83 @@ index 6f0736b..3e6749b 100644
')
########################################
-@@ -468,18 +642,7 @@ interface(`virt_manage_images',`
+@@ -468,18 +636,52 @@ interface(`virt_manage_images',`
manage_files_pattern($1, virt_image_type, virt_image_type)
read_lnk_files_pattern($1, virt_image_type, virt_image_type)
rw_blk_files_pattern($1, virt_image_type, virt_image_type)
--
++ rw_chr_files_pattern($1, virt_image_type, virt_image_type)
++')
+
- tunable_policy(`virt_use_nfs',`
- fs_manage_nfs_dirs($1)
- fs_manage_nfs_files($1)
- fs_read_nfs_symlinks($1)
- ')
--
++#######################################
++## <summary>
++## Allow domain to manage virt image files
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed access.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`virt_manage_default_image_type',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type virt_var_lib_t;
++ type virt_image_t;
++ ')
++
++ virt_search_lib($1)
++ manage_dirs_pattern($1, virt_image_t, virt_image_t)
++ manage_files_pattern($1, virt_image_t, virt_image_t)
++ read_lnk_files_pattern($1, virt_image_t, virt_image_t)
++')
+
- tunable_policy(`virt_use_samba',`
- fs_manage_cifs_files($1)
- fs_manage_cifs_files($1)
- fs_read_cifs_symlinks($1)
-- ')
-+ rw_chr_files_pattern($1, virt_image_type, virt_image_type)
++########################################
++## <summary>
++## Execute virt server in the virt domain.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="domain">
++## <summary>
++## Domain allowed to transition.
++## </summary>
++## </param>
++#
++interface(`virt_systemctl',`
++ gen_require(`
++ type virtd_unit_file_t;
++ type virtd_t;
+ ')
++
++ systemd_exec_systemctl($1)
++ allow $1 virtd_unit_file_t:file read_file_perms;
++ allow $1 virtd_unit_file_t:service manage_service_perms;
++
++ ps_process_pattern($1, virtd_t)
')
########################################
-@@ -502,10 +665,19 @@ interface(`virt_manage_images',`
+@@ -502,10 +704,20 @@ interface(`virt_manage_images',`
interface(`virt_admin',`
gen_require(`
type virtd_t, virtd_initrc_exec_t;
+ attribute virt_domain;
+ type virt_lxc_t;
++ type virtd_unit_file_t;
')
- allow $1 virtd_t:process { ptrace signal_perms };
+ allow $1 virtd_t:process signal_perms;
ps_process_pattern($1, virtd_t)
+ tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',`
-+ allow $1 virtd_t:process ptrace_perms;
-+ allow $1 virt_lxc_t:process ptrace_perms;
++ allow $1 virtd_t:process ptrace;
++ allow $1 virt_lxc_t:process ptrace;
+ ')
+
+ allow $1 virt_lxc_t:process signal_perms;
@@ -61577,7 +70559,7 @@ index 6f0736b..3e6749b 100644
init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, virtd_initrc_exec_t)
domain_system_change_exemption($1)
-@@ -517,4 +689,290 @@ interface(`virt_admin',`
+@@ -517,4 +729,306 @@ interface(`virt_admin',`
virt_manage_lib_files($1)
virt_manage_log($1)
@@ -61585,6 +70567,10 @@ index 6f0736b..3e6749b 100644
+ virt_manage_images($1)
+
+ allow $1 virt_domain:process signal_perms;
++
++ virt_systemctl($1)
++ admin_pattern($1, virtd_unit_file_t)
++ allow $1 virtd_unit_file_t:service all_service_perms;
+')
+
+########################################
@@ -61606,22 +70592,26 @@ index 6f0736b..3e6749b 100644
+#
+interface(`virt_transition_svirt',`
+ gen_require(`
-+ type svirt_t;
++ attribute virt_domain;
+ type virt_bridgehelper_t;
+ type svirt_image_t;
++ type svirt_socket_t;
+ ')
+
-+ allow $1 svirt_t:process transition;
-+ role $2 types svirt_t;
++ allow $1 virt_domain:process transition;
++ role $2 types virt_domain;
+ role $2 types virt_bridgehelper_t;
++ role $2 types svirt_socket_t;
+
+ allow $1 svirt_image_t:file { relabelfrom relabelto };
+ allow $1 svirt_image_t:fifo_file { read_fifo_file_perms relabelto };
++ allow $1 svirt_image_t:sock_file { create_sock_file_perms relabelto };
++ allow $1 svirt_socket_t:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
+
+ virt_signal_svirt($1)
+
+ optional_policy(`
-+ ptchown_run(svirt_t, $2)
++ ptchown_run(virt_domain, $2)
+ ')
+')
+
@@ -61757,10 +70747,13 @@ index 6f0736b..3e6749b 100644
+ userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans($1, virt_home_t, dir, ".libvirt")
+ userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans($1, virt_home_t, dir, ".virtinst")
+ filetrans_pattern($1, virt_home_t, svirt_home_t, dir, "qemu")
-+ gnome_config_filetrans($1, virt_home_t, dir, "libvirt")
-+ gnome_cache_filetrans($1, virt_home_t, dir, "libvirt")
-+ gnome_cache_filetrans($1, virt_home_t, dir, "gnome-boxes")
-+ gnome_data_filetrans($1, svirt_home_t, dir, "images")
++
++ optional_policy(`
++ gnome_config_filetrans($1, virt_home_t, dir, "libvirt")
++ gnome_cache_filetrans($1, virt_home_t, dir, "libvirt")
++ gnome_cache_filetrans($1, virt_home_t, dir, "gnome-boxes")
++ gnome_data_filetrans($1, svirt_home_t, dir, "images")
++ ')
+')
+
+########################################
@@ -61803,6 +70796,8 @@ index 6f0736b..3e6749b 100644
+ mls_rangetrans_target($1_t)
+ mcs_untrusted_proc($1_t)
+ role system_r types $1_t;
++
++ kernel_read_system_state($1_t)
+')
+
+########################################
@@ -61836,9 +70831,12 @@ index 6f0736b..3e6749b 100644
+interface(`virt_filetrans_named_content',`
+ gen_require(`
+ type virt_lxc_var_run_t;
++ type virt_var_run_t;
+ ')
+
+ files_pid_filetrans($1, virt_lxc_var_run_t, dir, "libvirt-sandbox")
++ files_pid_filetrans($1, virt_var_run_t, dir, "libvirt")
++ files_pid_filetrans($1, virt_var_run_t, dir, "libguestfs")
+')
+
+########################################
@@ -61869,15 +70867,29 @@ index 6f0736b..3e6749b 100644
+ allow svirt_lxc_domain $1:process sigchld;
')
diff --git a/virt.te b/virt.te
-index 947bbc6..eb0a7dc 100644
+index 947bbc6..0b607f1 100644
--- a/virt.te
+++ b/virt.te
-@@ -5,56 +5,87 @@ policy_module(virt, 1.5.0)
+@@ -5,56 +5,104 @@ policy_module(virt, 1.5.0)
# Declarations
#
+attribute virsh_transition_domain;
+attribute virt_ptynode;
++attribute virt_domain;
++attribute virt_image_type;
++attribute virt_tmpfs_type;
++
++type svirt_tmp_t;
++files_tmp_file(svirt_tmp_t)
++
++type svirt_tmpfs_t, virt_tmpfs_type;
++files_tmpfs_file(svirt_tmpfs_t)
++
++type svirt_image_t, virt_image_type;
++files_type(svirt_image_t)
++dev_node(svirt_image_t)
++dev_associate_sysfs(svirt_image_t)
+
## <desc>
## <p>
@@ -61934,6 +70946,13 @@ index 947bbc6..eb0a7dc 100644
+gen_tunable(virt_use_sanlock, false)
+
+## <desc>
++## <p>
++## Allow confined virtual guests to interact with rawip sockets
++## </p>
++## </desc>
++gen_tunable(virt_use_rawip, false)
++
++## <desc>
## <p>
-## Allow virt to use usb devices
+## Allow confined virtual guests to interact with the xserver
@@ -61954,13 +70973,11 @@ index 947bbc6..eb0a7dc 100644
-type svirt_cache_t;
-files_type(svirt_cache_t)
-+virt_domain_template(svirt_prot_exec)
-+role system_r types svirt_prot_exec_t;
++virt_domain_template(svirt_tcg)
++role system_r types svirt_tcg_t;
- attribute virt_domain;
- attribute virt_image_type;
-+attribute virt_tmpfs_type;
-+
+-attribute virt_domain;
+-attribute virt_image_type;
+type qemu_exec_t;
+
+type virt_cache_t alias svirt_cache_t;
@@ -61968,7 +70985,7 @@ index 947bbc6..eb0a7dc 100644
type virt_etc_t;
files_config_file(virt_etc_t)
-@@ -62,26 +93,37 @@ files_config_file(virt_etc_t)
+@@ -62,26 +110,37 @@ files_config_file(virt_etc_t)
type virt_etc_rw_t;
files_type(virt_etc_rw_t)
@@ -62009,7 +71026,13 @@ index 947bbc6..eb0a7dc 100644
type virtd_t;
type virtd_exec_t;
-@@ -92,6 +134,11 @@ domain_subj_id_change_exemption(virtd_t)
+@@ -89,9 +148,17 @@ init_daemon_domain(virtd_t, virtd_exec_t)
+ domain_obj_id_change_exemption(virtd_t)
+ domain_subj_id_change_exemption(virtd_t)
+
++type virtd_unit_file_t;
++systemd_unit_file(virtd_unit_file_t)
++
type virtd_initrc_exec_t;
init_script_file(virtd_initrc_exec_t)
@@ -62021,7 +71044,7 @@ index 947bbc6..eb0a7dc 100644
ifdef(`enable_mcs',`
init_ranged_daemon_domain(virtd_t, virtd_exec_t, s0 - mcs_systemhigh)
')
-@@ -100,6 +147,35 @@ ifdef(`enable_mls',`
+@@ -100,28 +167,53 @@ ifdef(`enable_mls',`
init_ranged_daemon_domain(virtd_t, virtd_exec_t, s0 - mls_systemhigh)
')
@@ -62036,126 +71059,128 @@ index 947bbc6..eb0a7dc 100644
+domain_entry_file(virt_bridgehelper_t, virt_bridgehelper_exec_t)
+role system_r types virt_bridgehelper_t;
+
-+########################################
-+#
-+# Declarations
-+#
-+attribute svirt_lxc_domain;
-+
-+type virtd_lxc_t;
-+type virtd_lxc_exec_t;
-+init_system_domain(virtd_lxc_t, virtd_lxc_exec_t)
++# policy for qemu_ga
++type virt_qemu_ga_t;
++type virt_qemu_ga_exec_t;
++init_daemon_domain(virt_qemu_ga_t, virt_qemu_ga_exec_t)
+
-+type virt_lxc_var_run_t;
-+files_pid_file(virt_lxc_var_run_t)
-+typealias virt_lxc_var_run_t alias virtd_lxc_var_run_t;
++type virt_qemu_ga_var_run_t;
++files_pid_file(virt_qemu_ga_var_run_t)
+
-+# virt lxc container files
-+type svirt_lxc_file_t;
-+files_mountpoint(svirt_lxc_file_t)
++type virt_qemu_ga_log_t;
++logging_log_file(virt_qemu_ga_log_t)
+
########################################
#
- # svirt local policy
-@@ -107,15 +183,12 @@ ifdef(`enable_mls',`
+-# svirt local policy
++# Declarations
+ #
++attribute svirt_lxc_domain;
- allow svirt_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms;
+-allow svirt_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms;
++type virtd_lxc_t;
++type virtd_lxc_exec_t;
++init_system_domain(virtd_lxc_t, virtd_lxc_exec_t)
-manage_dirs_pattern(svirt_t, svirt_cache_t, svirt_cache_t)
-manage_files_pattern(svirt_t, svirt_cache_t, svirt_cache_t)
-files_var_filetrans(svirt_t, svirt_cache_t, { file dir })
--
- read_lnk_files_pattern(svirt_t, virt_image_t, virt_image_t)
-
- allow svirt_t svirt_image_t:dir search_dir_perms;
- manage_dirs_pattern(svirt_t, svirt_image_t, svirt_image_t)
- manage_files_pattern(svirt_t, svirt_image_t, svirt_image_t)
-+manage_fifo_files_pattern(svirt_t, svirt_image_t, svirt_image_t)
- fs_hugetlbfs_filetrans(svirt_t, svirt_image_t, file)
++type virt_lxc_var_run_t;
++files_pid_file(virt_lxc_var_run_t)
++typealias virt_lxc_var_run_t alias virtd_lxc_var_run_t;
- list_dirs_pattern(svirt_t, virt_content_t, virt_content_t)
-@@ -133,9 +206,17 @@ corenet_tcp_connect_all_ports(svirt_t)
+-read_lnk_files_pattern(svirt_t, virt_image_t, virt_image_t)
++# virt lxc container files
++type svirt_lxc_file_t;
++files_mountpoint(svirt_lxc_file_t)
- dev_list_sysfs(svirt_t)
+-allow svirt_t svirt_image_t:dir search_dir_perms;
+-manage_dirs_pattern(svirt_t, svirt_image_t, svirt_image_t)
+-manage_files_pattern(svirt_t, svirt_image_t, svirt_image_t)
+-fs_hugetlbfs_filetrans(svirt_t, svirt_image_t, file)
++########################################
++#
++# svirt local policy
++#
-+fs_getattr_xattr_fs(svirt_t)
-+
- userdom_search_user_home_content(svirt_t)
- userdom_read_user_home_content_symlinks(svirt_t)
- userdom_read_all_users_state(svirt_t)
-+append_files_pattern(svirt_t, virt_home_t, virt_home_t)
-+manage_dirs_pattern(svirt_t, svirt_home_t, svirt_home_t)
-+manage_files_pattern(svirt_t, svirt_home_t, svirt_home_t)
-+manage_sock_files_pattern(svirt_t, svirt_home_t, svirt_home_t)
-+filetrans_pattern(svirt_t, virt_home_t, svirt_home_t, { dir sock_file file })
-+stream_connect_pattern(svirt_t, svirt_home_t, svirt_home_t, virtd_t)
+-list_dirs_pattern(svirt_t, virt_content_t, virt_content_t)
+-read_files_pattern(svirt_t, virt_content_t, virt_content_t)
+-dontaudit svirt_t virt_content_t:file write_file_perms;
+-dontaudit svirt_t virt_content_t:dir write;
++# it was a part of auth_use_nsswitch
++allow svirt_t self:netlink_route_socket r_netlink_socket_perms;
- tunable_policy(`virt_use_comm',`
- term_use_unallocated_ttys(svirt_t)
-@@ -143,18 +224,26 @@ tunable_policy(`virt_use_comm',`
- ')
+ corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if(svirt_t)
+ corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_node(svirt_t)
+@@ -131,67 +223,69 @@ corenet_udp_bind_all_ports(svirt_t)
+ corenet_tcp_bind_all_ports(svirt_t)
+ corenet_tcp_connect_all_ports(svirt_t)
- tunable_policy(`virt_use_fusefs',`
+-dev_list_sysfs(svirt_t)
+-
+-userdom_search_user_home_content(svirt_t)
+-userdom_read_user_home_content_symlinks(svirt_t)
+-userdom_read_all_users_state(svirt_t)
+-
+-tunable_policy(`virt_use_comm',`
+- term_use_unallocated_ttys(svirt_t)
+- dev_rw_printer(svirt_t)
+-')
+-
+-tunable_policy(`virt_use_fusefs',`
- fs_read_fusefs_files(svirt_t)
-+ fs_manage_fusefs_dirs(svirt_t)
-+ fs_manage_fusefs_files(svirt_t)
- fs_read_fusefs_symlinks(svirt_t)
-+ fs_getattr_fusefs(svirt_t)
- ')
-
- tunable_policy(`virt_use_nfs',`
- fs_manage_nfs_dirs(svirt_t)
- fs_manage_nfs_files(svirt_t)
-+ fs_manage_nfs_named_sockets(svirt_t)
-+ fs_read_nfs_symlinks(svirt_t)
-+ fs_getattr_nfs(svirt_t)
+- fs_read_fusefs_symlinks(svirt_t)
+-')
+-
+-tunable_policy(`virt_use_nfs',`
+- fs_manage_nfs_dirs(svirt_t)
+- fs_manage_nfs_files(svirt_t)
+-')
+-
+-tunable_policy(`virt_use_samba',`
+- fs_manage_cifs_dirs(svirt_t)
+- fs_manage_cifs_files(svirt_t)
++optional_policy(`
++ xen_rw_image_files(svirt_t)
')
- tunable_policy(`virt_use_samba',`
- fs_manage_cifs_dirs(svirt_t)
- fs_manage_cifs_files(svirt_t)
-+ fs_manage_cifs_named_sockets(svirt_t)
-+ fs_read_cifs_symlinks(virtd_t)
-+ fs_getattr_cifs(svirt_t)
+-tunable_policy(`virt_use_sysfs',`
+- dev_rw_sysfs(svirt_t)
++optional_policy(`
++ nscd_use(svirt_t)
')
- tunable_policy(`virt_use_sysfs',`
-@@ -163,11 +252,28 @@ tunable_policy(`virt_use_sysfs',`
-
- tunable_policy(`virt_use_usb',`
- dev_rw_usbfs(svirt_t)
-+ dev_read_sysfs(svirt_t)
- fs_manage_dos_dirs(svirt_t)
- fs_manage_dos_files(svirt_t)
- ')
+-tunable_policy(`virt_use_usb',`
+- dev_rw_usbfs(svirt_t)
+- fs_manage_dos_dirs(svirt_t)
+- fs_manage_dos_files(svirt_t)
+-')
++#######################################
++#
++# svirt_prot_exec local policy
++#
- optional_policy(`
-+ tunable_policy(`virt_use_sanlock',`
-+ sanlock_stream_connect(svirt_t)
-+ ')
-+')
-+
-+optional_policy(`
-+ tunable_policy(`virt_use_xserver',`
-+ xserver_stream_connect(svirt_t)
-+ ')
-+')
-+
-+optional_policy(`
-+ virt_domtrans_bridgehelper(svirt_t)
-+')
-+
-+optional_policy(`
- xen_rw_image_files(svirt_t)
- ')
+-optional_policy(`
+- xen_rw_image_files(svirt_t)
+-')
++allow svirt_tcg_t self:process { execmem execstack };
++corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if(svirt_tcg_t)
++corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_node(svirt_tcg_t)
++corenet_udp_sendrecv_all_ports(svirt_tcg_t)
++corenet_udp_bind_generic_node(svirt_tcg_t)
++corenet_udp_bind_all_ports(svirt_tcg_t)
++corenet_tcp_bind_all_ports(svirt_tcg_t)
++corenet_tcp_connect_all_ports(svirt_tcg_t)
-@@ -176,22 +282,41 @@ optional_policy(`
+ ########################################
+ #
# virtd local policy
#
-allow virtd_t self:capability { chown dac_override fowner ipc_lock kill mknod net_admin net_raw setpcap setuid setgid sys_admin sys_nice sys_ptrace };
-allow virtd_t self:process { getcap getsched setcap sigkill signal signull execmem setexec setfscreate setsched };
+allow virtd_t self:capability { chown dac_override fowner ipc_lock kill mknod net_admin net_raw setpcap setuid setgid sys_admin sys_nice };
++allow virtd_t self:capability2 compromise_kernel;
+allow virtd_t self:process { getcap getsched setcap sigkill signal signull execmem setexec setfscreate setsockcreate setsched };
+ifdef(`hide_broken_symptoms',`
+ # caused by some bogus kernel code
@@ -62198,7 +71223,7 @@ index 947bbc6..eb0a7dc 100644
read_files_pattern(virtd_t, virt_etc_t, virt_etc_t)
read_lnk_files_pattern(virtd_t, virt_etc_t, virt_etc_t)
-@@ -202,19 +327,28 @@ manage_lnk_files_pattern(virtd_t, virt_etc_rw_t, virt_etc_rw_t)
+@@ -202,19 +296,28 @@ manage_lnk_files_pattern(virtd_t, virt_etc_rw_t, virt_etc_rw_t)
filetrans_pattern(virtd_t, virt_etc_t, virt_etc_rw_t, dir)
manage_files_pattern(virtd_t, virt_image_type, virt_image_type)
@@ -62233,7 +71258,7 @@ index 947bbc6..eb0a7dc 100644
manage_dirs_pattern(virtd_t, virt_var_lib_t, virt_var_lib_t)
manage_files_pattern(virtd_t, virt_var_lib_t, virt_var_lib_t)
manage_sock_files_pattern(virtd_t, virt_var_lib_t, virt_var_lib_t)
-@@ -225,16 +359,21 @@ manage_files_pattern(virtd_t, virt_var_run_t, virt_var_run_t)
+@@ -225,16 +328,22 @@ manage_files_pattern(virtd_t, virt_var_run_t, virt_var_run_t)
manage_sock_files_pattern(virtd_t, virt_var_run_t, virt_var_run_t)
files_pid_filetrans(virtd_t, virt_var_run_t, { file dir })
@@ -62248,6 +71273,7 @@ index 947bbc6..eb0a7dc 100644
+kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(virtd_t)
kernel_request_load_module(virtd_t)
kernel_search_debugfs(virtd_t)
++kernel_setsched(virtd_t)
corecmd_exec_bin(virtd_t)
corecmd_exec_shell(virtd_t)
@@ -62256,7 +71282,7 @@ index 947bbc6..eb0a7dc 100644
corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(virtd_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(virtd_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_node(virtd_t)
-@@ -247,22 +386,31 @@ corenet_tcp_connect_soundd_port(virtd_t)
+@@ -247,22 +356,31 @@ corenet_tcp_connect_soundd_port(virtd_t)
corenet_rw_tun_tap_dev(virtd_t)
dev_rw_sysfs(virtd_t)
@@ -62290,7 +71316,7 @@ index 947bbc6..eb0a7dc 100644
fs_list_auto_mountpoints(virtd_t)
fs_getattr_xattr_fs(virtd_t)
-@@ -270,6 +418,18 @@ fs_rw_anon_inodefs_files(virtd_t)
+@@ -270,6 +388,18 @@ fs_rw_anon_inodefs_files(virtd_t)
fs_list_inotifyfs(virtd_t)
fs_manage_cgroup_dirs(virtd_t)
fs_rw_cgroup_files(virtd_t)
@@ -62309,20 +71335,22 @@ index 947bbc6..eb0a7dc 100644
mcs_process_set_categories(virtd_t)
-@@ -284,6 +444,8 @@ term_use_ptmx(virtd_t)
+@@ -284,7 +414,8 @@ term_use_ptmx(virtd_t)
auth_use_nsswitch(virtd_t)
+-miscfiles_read_localization(virtd_t)
+init_dbus_chat(virtd_t)
+
- miscfiles_read_localization(virtd_t)
miscfiles_read_generic_certs(virtd_t)
miscfiles_read_hwdata(virtd_t)
-@@ -293,17 +455,32 @@ modutils_read_module_config(virtd_t)
+
+@@ -293,17 +424,33 @@ modutils_read_module_config(virtd_t)
modutils_manage_module_config(virtd_t)
logging_send_syslog_msg(virtd_t)
+logging_send_audit_msgs(virtd_t)
++logging_stream_connect_syslog(virtd_t)
+
+selinux_validate_context(virtd_t)
@@ -62351,7 +71379,7 @@ index 947bbc6..eb0a7dc 100644
tunable_policy(`virt_use_nfs',`
fs_manage_nfs_dirs(virtd_t)
-@@ -322,6 +499,10 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -322,6 +469,10 @@ optional_policy(`
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -62362,7 +71390,7 @@ index 947bbc6..eb0a7dc 100644
dbus_system_bus_client(virtd_t)
optional_policy(`
-@@ -335,19 +516,30 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -335,19 +486,34 @@ optional_policy(`
optional_policy(`
hal_dbus_chat(virtd_t)
')
@@ -62385,6 +71413,10 @@ index 947bbc6..eb0a7dc 100644
+ dnsmasq_create_pid_dirs(virtd_t)
+ dnsmasq_filetrans_named_content_fromdir(virtd_t, virt_var_run_t);
+ dnsmasq_manage_pid_files(virtd_t)
++')
++
++optional_policy(`
++ firewalld_dbus_chat(virtd_t)
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -62394,7 +71426,7 @@ index 947bbc6..eb0a7dc 100644
# Manages /etc/sysconfig/system-config-firewall
iptables_manage_config(virtd_t)
-@@ -362,6 +554,12 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -362,6 +528,12 @@ optional_policy(`
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -62407,7 +71439,7 @@ index 947bbc6..eb0a7dc 100644
policykit_dbus_chat(virtd_t)
policykit_domtrans_auth(virtd_t)
policykit_domtrans_resolve(virtd_t)
-@@ -369,11 +567,11 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -369,11 +541,11 @@ optional_policy(`
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -62424,7 +71456,7 @@ index 947bbc6..eb0a7dc 100644
')
optional_policy(`
-@@ -384,6 +582,7 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -384,6 +556,7 @@ optional_policy(`
kernel_read_xen_state(virtd_t)
kernel_write_xen_state(virtd_t)
@@ -62432,10 +71464,11 @@ index 947bbc6..eb0a7dc 100644
xen_stream_connect(virtd_t)
xen_stream_connect_xenstore(virtd_t)
xen_read_image_files(virtd_t)
-@@ -403,34 +602,51 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -402,35 +575,85 @@ optional_policy(`
+ #
# virtual domains common policy
#
-
+-
-allow virt_domain self:capability { dac_read_search dac_override kill };
-allow virt_domain self:process { execmem execstack signal getsched signull };
-allow virt_domain self:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
@@ -62445,11 +71478,49 @@ index 947bbc6..eb0a7dc 100644
allow virt_domain self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
allow virt_domain self:unix_dgram_socket { create_socket_perms sendto };
allow virt_domain self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
-
++allow virt_domain self:udp_socket create_socket_perms;
++
++list_dirs_pattern(virt_domain, virt_content_t, virt_content_t)
++read_files_pattern(virt_domain, virt_content_t, virt_content_t)
++dontaudit virt_domain virt_content_t:file write_file_perms;
++dontaudit virt_domain virt_content_t:dir write;
++
++userdom_search_user_home_content(virt_domain)
++userdom_read_user_home_content_symlinks(virt_domain)
++userdom_read_all_users_state(virt_domain)
++append_files_pattern(virt_domain, virt_home_t, virt_home_t)
++manage_dirs_pattern(virt_domain, svirt_home_t, svirt_home_t)
++manage_files_pattern(virt_domain, svirt_home_t, svirt_home_t)
++manage_sock_files_pattern(virt_domain, svirt_home_t, svirt_home_t)
++filetrans_pattern(virt_domain, virt_home_t, svirt_home_t, { dir sock_file file })
++stream_connect_pattern(virt_domain, svirt_home_t, svirt_home_t, virtd_t)
++
+manage_dirs_pattern(virt_domain, virt_cache_t, virt_cache_t)
+manage_files_pattern(virt_domain, virt_cache_t, virt_cache_t)
+files_var_filetrans(virt_domain, virt_cache_t, { file dir })
+
++read_lnk_files_pattern(virt_domain, virt_image_t, virt_image_t)
++
++manage_dirs_pattern(virt_domain, svirt_image_t, svirt_image_t)
++manage_files_pattern(virt_domain, svirt_image_t, svirt_image_t)
++manage_sock_files_pattern(virt_domain, svirt_image_t, svirt_image_t)
++manage_fifo_files_pattern(virt_domain, svirt_image_t, svirt_image_t)
++read_lnk_files_pattern(virt_domain, svirt_image_t, svirt_image_t)
++rw_chr_files_pattern(virt_domain, svirt_image_t, svirt_image_t)
++rw_blk_files_pattern(virt_domain, svirt_image_t, svirt_image_t)
++fs_hugetlbfs_filetrans(virt_domain, svirt_image_t, file)
++
++manage_dirs_pattern(virt_domain, svirt_tmp_t, svirt_tmp_t)
++manage_files_pattern(virt_domain, svirt_tmp_t, svirt_tmp_t)
++manage_lnk_files_pattern(virt_domain, svirt_tmp_t, svirt_tmp_t)
++files_tmp_filetrans(virt_domain, svirt_tmp_t, { file dir lnk_file })
++userdom_user_tmp_filetrans(virt_domain, svirt_tmp_t, { dir file lnk_file })
++
++manage_dirs_pattern(virt_domain, svirt_tmpfs_t, svirt_tmpfs_t)
++manage_files_pattern(virt_domain, svirt_tmpfs_t, svirt_tmpfs_t)
++manage_lnk_files_pattern(virt_domain, svirt_tmpfs_t, svirt_tmpfs_t)
++fs_tmpfs_filetrans(virt_domain, svirt_tmpfs_t, { dir file lnk_file })
++
+manage_dirs_pattern(virt_domain, qemu_var_run_t, qemu_var_run_t)
+manage_files_pattern(virt_domain, qemu_var_run_t, qemu_var_run_t)
+manage_sock_files_pattern(virt_domain, qemu_var_run_t, qemu_var_run_t)
@@ -62460,20 +71531,18 @@ index 947bbc6..eb0a7dc 100644
+dontaudit virtd_t virt_domain:process { siginh noatsecure rlimitinh };
+
+dontaudit virt_domain virt_tmpfs_type:file { read write };
-+
+
append_files_pattern(virt_domain, virt_log_t, virt_log_t)
append_files_pattern(virt_domain, virt_var_lib_t, virt_var_lib_t)
- kernel_read_system_state(virt_domain)
-
-+fs_getattr_xattr_fs(virt_domain)
-+
+-kernel_read_system_state(virt_domain)
+-
corecmd_exec_bin(virt_domain)
corecmd_exec_shell(virt_domain)
-corenet_all_recvfrom_unlabeled(virt_domain)
- corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(virt_domain)
+-corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(virt_domain)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(virt_domain)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_node(virt_domain)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_ports(virt_domain)
@@ -62484,12 +71553,13 @@ index 947bbc6..eb0a7dc 100644
corenet_tcp_connect_virt_migration_port(virt_domain)
+corenet_rw_inherited_tun_tap_dev(virt_domain)
++dev_list_sysfs(virt_domain)
+dev_getattr_fs(virt_domain)
+dev_read_generic_symlinks(virt_domain)
dev_read_rand(virt_domain)
dev_read_sound(virt_domain)
dev_read_urand(virt_domain)
-@@ -438,10 +654,11 @@ dev_write_sound(virt_domain)
+@@ -438,34 +661,601 @@ dev_write_sound(virt_domain)
dev_rw_ksm(virt_domain)
dev_rw_kvm(virt_domain)
dev_rw_qemu(virt_domain)
@@ -62502,7 +71572,8 @@ index 947bbc6..eb0a7dc 100644
files_read_usr_files(virt_domain)
files_read_var_files(virt_domain)
files_search_all(virt_domain)
-@@ -449,8 +666,16 @@ files_search_all(virt_domain)
+
++fs_getattr_xattr_fs(virt_domain)
fs_getattr_tmpfs(virt_domain)
fs_rw_anon_inodefs_files(virt_domain)
fs_rw_tmpfs_files(virt_domain)
@@ -62514,20 +71585,25 @@ index 947bbc6..eb0a7dc 100644
+# I think we need these for now.
+miscfiles_read_public_files(virt_domain)
+storage_raw_read_removable_device(virt_domain)
++
++sysnet_read_config(virt_domain)
-term_use_all_terms(virt_domain)
+term_use_all_inherited_terms(virt_domain)
term_getattr_pty_fs(virt_domain)
term_use_generic_ptys(virt_domain)
term_use_ptmx(virt_domain)
-@@ -459,13 +684,461 @@ logging_send_syslog_msg(virt_domain)
-
- miscfiles_read_localization(virt_domain)
+-logging_send_syslog_msg(virt_domain)
+tunable_policy(`virt_use_execmem',`
+ allow virt_domain self:process { execmem execstack };
+')
-+
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(virt_domain)
++optional_policy(`
++ alsa_read_rw_config(virt_domain)
++')
+
optional_policy(`
ptchown_domtrans(virt_domain)
')
@@ -62541,7 +71617,67 @@ index 947bbc6..eb0a7dc 100644
virt_read_lib_files(virt_domain)
virt_read_content(virt_domain)
virt_stream_connect(virt_domain)
- ')
++ virt_domtrans_bridgehelper(virt_domain)
++')
++
++optional_policy(`
++ xserver_rw_shm(virt_domain)
++')
++
++tunable_policy(`virt_use_comm',`
++ term_use_unallocated_ttys(virt_domain)
++ dev_rw_printer(virt_domain)
++')
++
++tunable_policy(`virt_use_fusefs',`
++ fs_manage_fusefs_dirs(virt_domain)
++ fs_manage_fusefs_files(virt_domain)
++ fs_read_fusefs_symlinks(virt_domain)
++ fs_getattr_fusefs(virt_domain)
++')
++
++tunable_policy(`virt_use_nfs',`
++ fs_manage_nfs_dirs(virt_domain)
++ fs_manage_nfs_files(virt_domain)
++ fs_manage_nfs_named_sockets(virt_domain)
++ fs_read_nfs_symlinks(virt_domain)
++ fs_getattr_nfs(virt_domain)
++')
++
++tunable_policy(`virt_use_samba',`
++ fs_manage_cifs_dirs(virt_domain)
++ fs_manage_cifs_files(virt_domain)
++ fs_manage_cifs_named_sockets(virt_domain)
++ fs_read_cifs_symlinks(virt_domain)
++ fs_getattr_cifs(virt_domain)
++')
++
++tunable_policy(`virt_use_sysfs',`
++ dev_rw_sysfs(virt_domain)
++')
++
++tunable_policy(`virt_use_usb',`
++ dev_rw_usbfs(virt_domain)
++ dev_read_sysfs(virt_domain)
++ fs_manage_dos_dirs(virt_domain)
++ fs_manage_dos_files(virt_domain)
++')
++
++optional_policy(`
++ tunable_policy(`virt_use_sanlock',`
++ sanlock_stream_connect(virt_domain)
++ ')
++')
++
++tunable_policy(`virt_use_rawip',`
++ allow virt_domain self:rawip_socket create_socket_perms;
++')
++
++optional_policy(`
++ tunable_policy(`virt_use_xserver',`
++ xserver_stream_connect(virt_domain)
++ ')
++')
+
+########################################
+#
@@ -62553,12 +71689,14 @@ index 947bbc6..eb0a7dc 100644
+typealias virsh_t alias xm_t;
+typealias virsh_exec_t alias xm_exec_t;
+
-+allow virsh_t self:capability { setpcap dac_override ipc_lock sys_nice sys_tty_config };
++allow virsh_t self:capability { setpcap dac_override ipc_lock sys_chroot sys_nice sys_tty_config };
+allow virsh_t self:process { getcap getsched setsched setcap signal };
+allow virsh_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms;
+allow virsh_t self:unix_stream_socket { create_stream_socket_perms connectto };
+allow virsh_t self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
+
++ps_process_pattern(virsh_t, svirt_lxc_domain)
++
+can_exec(virsh_t, virsh_exec_t)
+virt_domtrans(virsh_t)
+virt_manage_images(virsh_t)
@@ -62577,6 +71715,10 @@ index 947bbc6..eb0a7dc 100644
+manage_fifo_files_pattern(virsh_t, svirt_lxc_file_t, svirt_lxc_file_t)
+virt_transition_svirt_lxc(virsh_t, system_r)
+
++manage_dirs_pattern(virsh_t, virt_lxc_var_run_t, virt_lxc_var_run_t)
++manage_files_pattern(virsh_t, virt_lxc_var_run_t, virt_lxc_var_run_t)
++virt_filetrans_named_content(virsh_t)
++
+dontaudit virsh_t virt_var_lib_t:file read_inherited_file_perms;
+
+kernel_read_system_state(virsh_t)
@@ -62613,13 +71755,16 @@ index 947bbc6..eb0a7dc 100644
+
+term_use_all_inherited_terms(virsh_t)
+
++userdom_search_admin_dir(virsh_t)
++userdom_read_home_certs(virsh_t)
++
+init_stream_connect_script(virsh_t)
+init_rw_script_stream_sockets(virsh_t)
+init_use_fds(virsh_t)
+
+auth_read_passwd(virsh_t)
+
-+miscfiles_read_localization(virsh_t)
++logging_send_syslog_msg(virsh_t)
+
+sysnet_dns_name_resolve(virsh_t)
+
@@ -62640,6 +71785,10 @@ index 947bbc6..eb0a7dc 100644
+')
+
+optional_policy(`
++ rhcs_domtrans_fenced(virsh_t)
++')
++
++optional_policy(`
+ rpm_exec(virsh_t)
+')
+
@@ -62686,6 +71835,8 @@ index 947bbc6..eb0a7dc 100644
+# virt_lxc local policy
+#
+allow virtd_lxc_t self:capability { dac_override net_admin net_raw setpcap chown sys_admin sys_boot sys_resource };
++allow virtd_lxc_t self:capability2 compromise_kernel;
++
+allow virtd_lxc_t self:process { setexec setrlimit setsched getcap setcap signal_perms };
+allow virtd_lxc_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms;
+allow virtd_lxc_t self:netlink_route_socket rw_netlink_socket_perms;
@@ -62751,6 +71902,8 @@ index 947bbc6..eb0a7dc 100644
+fs_unmount_all_fs(virtd_lxc_t)
+fs_relabelfrom_tmpfs(virtd_lxc_t)
+
++logging_send_audit_msgs(virtd_lxc_t)
++
+selinux_mount_fs(virtd_lxc_t)
+selinux_unmount_fs(virtd_lxc_t)
+seutil_read_config(virtd_lxc_t)
@@ -62763,8 +71916,6 @@ index 947bbc6..eb0a7dc 100644
+
+logging_send_syslog_msg(virtd_lxc_t)
+
-+miscfiles_read_localization(virtd_lxc_t)
-+
+seutil_domtrans_setfiles(virtd_lxc_t)
+seutil_read_default_contexts(virtd_lxc_t)
+
@@ -62788,7 +71939,7 @@ index 947bbc6..eb0a7dc 100644
+#
+# virt_lxc_domain local policy
+#
-+allow svirt_lxc_domain self:capability { kill setuid setgid dac_override sys_boot };
++allow svirt_lxc_domain self:capability { kill setuid setgid dac_override sys_boot ipc_lock };
+
+allow virtd_t svirt_lxc_domain:unix_stream_socket { create_stream_socket_perms connectto };
+allow virtd_t svirt_lxc_domain:process { signal_perms };
@@ -62806,7 +71957,6 @@ index 947bbc6..eb0a7dc 100644
+allow svirt_lxc_domain self:msgq create_msgq_perms;
+allow svirt_lxc_domain self:unix_stream_socket { create_stream_socket_perms connectto };
+allow svirt_lxc_domain self:unix_dgram_socket { sendto create_socket_perms };
-+dontaudit svirt_lxc_domain self:netlink_audit_socket { create_netlink_socket_perms nlmsg_relay };
+
+manage_dirs_pattern(svirt_lxc_domain, svirt_lxc_file_t, svirt_lxc_file_t)
+manage_files_pattern(svirt_lxc_domain, svirt_lxc_file_t, svirt_lxc_file_t)
@@ -62822,13 +71972,11 @@ index 947bbc6..eb0a7dc 100644
+kernel_getattr_proc(svirt_lxc_domain)
+kernel_list_all_proc(svirt_lxc_domain)
+kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(svirt_lxc_domain)
-+kernel_read_net_sysctls(svirt_lxc_domain)
-+kernel_read_system_state(svirt_lxc_domain)
++kernel_rw_net_sysctls(svirt_lxc_domain)
+kernel_dontaudit_search_kernel_sysctl(svirt_lxc_domain)
+
+corecmd_exec_all_executables(svirt_lxc_domain)
+
-+files_read_kernel_modules(svirt_lxc_net_t)
+files_dontaudit_getattr_all_dirs(svirt_lxc_domain)
+files_dontaudit_getattr_all_files(svirt_lxc_domain)
+files_dontaudit_getattr_all_symlinks(svirt_lxc_domain)
@@ -62861,11 +72009,12 @@ index 947bbc6..eb0a7dc 100644
+
+libs_dontaudit_setattr_lib_files(svirt_lxc_domain)
+
-+miscfiles_read_localization(svirt_lxc_domain)
+miscfiles_dontaudit_setattr_fonts_cache_dirs(svirt_lxc_domain)
+miscfiles_read_fonts(svirt_lxc_domain)
+
-+mta_dontaudit_read_spool_symlinks(svirt_lxc_domain)
++optional_policy(`
++ mta_dontaudit_read_spool_symlinks(svirt_lxc_domain)
++')
+
+systemd_read_unit_files(svirt_lxc_domain)
+
@@ -62875,13 +72024,14 @@ index 947bbc6..eb0a7dc 100644
+
+optional_policy(`
+ apache_exec_modules(svirt_lxc_domain)
-+')
++ apache_read_sys_content(svirt_lxc_domain)
+ ')
+
+virt_lxc_domain_template(svirt_lxc_net)
+
+allow svirt_lxc_net_t self:capability { chown dac_read_search dac_override fowner fsetid net_raw net_admin net_bind_service sys_admin sys_nice sys_ptrace sys_resource setpcap };
-+dontaudit svirt_lxc_net_t self:capability2 { block_suspend };
-+
++dontaudit svirt_lxc_net_t self:capability2 block_suspend;
++allow svirt_lxc_net_t self:netlink_socket create_socket_perms;
+allow svirt_lxc_net_t self:process setrlimit;
+
+allow svirt_lxc_net_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms;
@@ -62898,6 +72048,8 @@ index 947bbc6..eb0a7dc 100644
+
+dev_read_sysfs(svirt_lxc_net_t)
+dev_getattr_mtrr_dev(svirt_lxc_net_t)
++dev_read_rand(svirt_lxc_net_t)
++dev_read_urand(svirt_lxc_net_t)
+
+corenet_tcp_bind_generic_node(svirt_lxc_net_t)
+corenet_udp_bind_generic_node(svirt_lxc_net_t)
@@ -62907,26 +72059,22 @@ index 947bbc6..eb0a7dc 100644
+corenet_tcp_bind_all_ports(svirt_lxc_net_t)
+corenet_tcp_connect_all_ports(svirt_lxc_net_t)
+
++files_read_kernel_modules(svirt_lxc_net_t)
++
+fs_noxattr_type(svirt_lxc_file_t)
++fs_mount_cgroup(svirt_lxc_net_t)
++fs_manage_cgroup_dirs(svirt_lxc_net_t)
++fs_manage_cgroup_files(svirt_lxc_net_t)
++
+term_pty(svirt_lxc_file_t)
+
+auth_use_nsswitch(svirt_lxc_net_t)
+
+rpm_read_db(svirt_lxc_net_t)
+
-+userdom_use_inherited_user_ptys(svirt_lxc_net_t)
-+
-+fs_mount_cgroup(svirt_lxc_net_t)
-+fs_manage_cgroup_dirs(svirt_lxc_net_t)
-+fs_manage_cgroup_files(svirt_lxc_net_t)
-+
-+
-+#######################################
-+#
-+# svirt_prot_exec local policy
-+#
++logging_send_audit_msgs(svirt_lxc_net_t)
+
-+allow svirt_prot_exec_t self:process { execmem execstack };
++userdom_use_inherited_user_ptys(svirt_lxc_net_t)
+
+########################################
+#
@@ -62952,11 +72100,8 @@ index 947bbc6..eb0a7dc 100644
+
+domain_use_interactive_fds(virt_qmf_t)
+
-+
+logging_send_syslog_msg(virt_qmf_t)
+
-+miscfiles_read_localization(virt_qmf_t)
-+
+sysnet_read_config(virt_qmf_t)
+
+optional_policy(`
@@ -62977,43 +72122,87 @@ index 947bbc6..eb0a7dc 100644
+allow virt_bridgehelper_t self:tun_socket create_socket_perms;
+allow virt_bridgehelper_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms;
+
++manage_files_pattern(virt_bridgehelper_t, svirt_home_t, svirt_home_t)
++
+kernel_read_network_state(virt_bridgehelper_t)
+
+corenet_rw_tun_tap_dev(virt_bridgehelper_t)
+
+userdom_use_inherited_user_ptys(virt_bridgehelper_t)
++
++#######################################
++#
++# virt_qemu_ga local policy
++#
++
++allow virt_qemu_ga_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms;
++allow virt_qemu_ga_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
++
++manage_files_pattern(virt_qemu_ga_t, virt_qemu_ga_var_run_t, virt_qemu_ga_var_run_t)
++manage_dirs_pattern(virt_qemu_ga_t, virt_qemu_ga_var_run_t, virt_qemu_ga_var_run_t)
++filetrans_pattern(virt_qemu_ga_t, virt_qemu_ga_var_run_t, virt_qemu_ga_var_run_t,{ dir file } )
++
++manage_files_pattern(virt_qemu_ga_t, virt_qemu_ga_log_t, virt_qemu_ga_log_t)
++logging_log_filetrans(virt_qemu_ga_t, virt_qemu_ga_log_t, file )
++
++corecmd_exec_shell(virt_qemu_ga_t)
++corecmd_exec_bin(virt_qemu_ga_t)
++
++files_read_etc_files(virt_qemu_ga_t)
++
++term_use_virtio_console(virt_qemu_ga_t)
++
++logging_send_syslog_msg(virt_qemu_ga_t)
++
++sysnet_dns_name_resolve(virt_qemu_ga_t)
++
++optional_policy(`
++ devicekit_manage_pid_files(virt_qemu_ga_t)
++')
++
++type svirt_socket_t;
++role system_r types svirt_socket_t;
++allow svirt_t svirt_socket_t:unix_stream_socket connectto;
++
++
diff --git a/vlock.te b/vlock.te
-index 2511093..9e5625e 100644
+index 2511093..669dc13 100644
--- a/vlock.te
+++ b/vlock.te
-@@ -50,4 +50,4 @@ logging_send_syslog_msg(vlock_t)
- miscfiles_read_localization(vlock_t)
+@@ -47,7 +47,5 @@ init_dontaudit_rw_utmp(vlock_t)
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(vlock_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(vlock_t)
+-
userdom_dontaudit_search_user_home_dirs(vlock_t)
-userdom_use_user_terminals(vlock_t)
+userdom_use_inherited_user_terminals(vlock_t)
diff --git a/vmware.te b/vmware.te
-index 7d334c4..ac07e8b 100644
+index 7d334c4..979e82f 100644
--- a/vmware.te
+++ b/vmware.te
-@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ ifdef(`enable_mcs',`
+@@ -68,7 +68,8 @@ ifdef(`enable_mcs',`
# VMWare host local policy
#
-allow vmware_host_t self:capability { setgid setuid net_raw sys_nice sys_time sys_ptrace kill dac_override };
++allow vmware_host_t self:capability { net_admin sys_module };
+allow vmware_host_t self:capability { setgid setuid net_raw sys_nice sys_time kill dac_override };
dontaudit vmware_host_t self:capability sys_tty_config;
allow vmware_host_t self:process { execstack execmem signal_perms };
allow vmware_host_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms;
-@@ -98,7 +98,6 @@ kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(vmware_host_t)
+@@ -97,8 +98,8 @@ logging_log_filetrans(vmware_host_t, vmware_log_t, { file dir })
+ kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(vmware_host_t)
kernel_read_system_state(vmware_host_t)
kernel_read_network_state(vmware_host_t)
++kernel_request_load_module(vmware_host_t)
-corenet_all_recvfrom_unlabeled(vmware_host_t)
corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(vmware_host_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(vmware_host_t)
corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if(vmware_host_t)
-@@ -122,6 +121,7 @@ dev_getattr_all_blk_files(vmware_host_t)
+@@ -122,6 +123,7 @@ dev_getattr_all_blk_files(vmware_host_t)
dev_read_sysfs(vmware_host_t)
dev_read_urand(vmware_host_t)
dev_rw_vmware(vmware_host_t)
@@ -63021,7 +72210,7 @@ index 7d334c4..ac07e8b 100644
domain_use_interactive_fds(vmware_host_t)
domain_dontaudit_read_all_domains_state(vmware_host_t)
-@@ -129,7 +129,7 @@ domain_dontaudit_read_all_domains_state(vmware_host_t)
+@@ -129,7 +131,7 @@ domain_dontaudit_read_all_domains_state(vmware_host_t)
files_list_tmp(vmware_host_t)
files_read_etc_files(vmware_host_t)
files_read_etc_runtime_files(vmware_host_t)
@@ -63030,14 +72219,28 @@ index 7d334c4..ac07e8b 100644
fs_getattr_all_fs(vmware_host_t)
fs_search_auto_mountpoints(vmware_host_t)
-@@ -157,10 +157,22 @@ netutils_domtrans_ping(vmware_host_t)
+@@ -145,8 +147,6 @@ libs_exec_ld_so(vmware_host_t)
+
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(vmware_host_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(vmware_host_t)
+-
+ sysnet_dns_name_resolve(vmware_host_t)
+ sysnet_domtrans_ifconfig(vmware_host_t)
+
+@@ -156,11 +156,27 @@ userdom_dontaudit_search_user_home_dirs(vmware_host_t)
+ netutils_domtrans_ping(vmware_host_t)
optional_policy(`
- hostname_exec(vmware_host_t)
--')
-+')
+- hostname_exec(vmware_host_t)
++ unconfined_domain(vmware_host_t)
+ ')
optional_policy(`
++ hostname_exec(vmware_host_t)
++')
++
++optional_policy(`
modutils_domtrans_insmod(vmware_host_t)
+')
+
@@ -63054,9 +72257,11 @@ index 7d334c4..ac07e8b 100644
')
optional_policy(`
-@@ -271,7 +283,7 @@ libs_read_lib_files(vmware_t)
+@@ -269,9 +285,8 @@ libs_exec_ld_so(vmware_t)
+ # Access X11 config files
+ libs_read_lib_files(vmware_t)
- miscfiles_read_localization(vmware_t)
+-miscfiles_read_localization(vmware_t)
-userdom_use_user_terminals(vmware_t)
+userdom_use_inherited_user_terminals(vmware_t)
@@ -63093,7 +72298,7 @@ index 727fe95..47ec114 100644
files_list_var_lib($1)
admin_pattern($1, vnstatd_var_lib_t)
diff --git a/vnstatd.te b/vnstatd.te
-index 8121937..275409f 100644
+index 8121937..f90b43b 100644
--- a/vnstatd.te
+++ b/vnstatd.te
@@ -28,9 +28,13 @@ allow vnstatd_t self:process signal;
@@ -63111,7 +72316,16 @@ index 8121937..275409f 100644
manage_files_pattern(vnstatd_t, vnstatd_var_run_t, vnstatd_var_run_t)
manage_dirs_pattern(vnstatd_t, vnstatd_var_run_t, vnstatd_var_run_t)
-@@ -62,9 +66,9 @@ allow vnstat_t self:process signal;
+@@ -47,8 +51,6 @@ fs_getattr_xattr_fs(vnstatd_t)
+
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(vnstatd_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(vnstatd_t)
+-
+ optional_policy(`
+ cron_system_entry(vnstat_t, vnstat_exec_t)
+ ')
+@@ -62,9 +64,9 @@ allow vnstat_t self:process signal;
allow vnstat_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms;
allow vnstat_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
@@ -63122,6 +72336,12 @@ index 8121937..275409f 100644
kernel_read_network_state(vnstat_t)
kernel_read_system_state(vnstat_t)
+@@ -76,5 +78,3 @@ files_read_etc_files(vnstat_t)
+ fs_getattr_xattr_fs(vnstat_t)
+
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(vnstat_t)
+-
+-miscfiles_read_localization(vnstat_t)
diff --git a/vpn.if b/vpn.if
index 7b93e07..a4e2f60 100644
--- a/vpn.if
@@ -63146,7 +72366,7 @@ index 7b93e07..a4e2f60 100644
########################################
diff --git a/vpn.te b/vpn.te
-index 83a80ba..bc840ec 100644
+index 83a80ba..ddf48c0 100644
--- a/vpn.te
+++ b/vpn.te
@@ -5,13 +5,15 @@ policy_module(vpn, 1.15.0)
@@ -63208,8 +72428,13 @@ index 83a80ba..bc840ec 100644
libs_exec_ld_so(vpnc_t)
libs_exec_lib_files(vpnc_t)
-@@ -105,12 +107,13 @@ miscfiles_read_localization(vpnc_t)
- seutil_dontaudit_search_config(vpnc_t)
+@@ -100,17 +102,15 @@ locallogin_use_fds(vpnc_t)
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(vpnc_t)
+ logging_dontaudit_search_logs(vpnc_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(vpnc_t)
+-
+-seutil_dontaudit_search_config(vpnc_t)
seutil_use_newrole_fds(vpnc_t)
-sysnet_run_ifconfig(vpnc_t, vpnc_roles)
@@ -63225,36 +72450,55 @@ index 83a80ba..bc840ec 100644
optional_policy(`
dbus_system_bus_client(vpnc_t)
diff --git a/w3c.te b/w3c.te
-index 1174ad8..f4c4c1b 100644
+index 1174ad8..bd7a7da 100644
--- a/w3c.te
+++ b/w3c.te
-@@ -7,11 +7,18 @@ policy_module(w3c, 1.0.0)
-
- apache_content_template(w3c_validator)
+@@ -5,20 +5,34 @@ policy_module(w3c, 1.0.0)
+ # Declarations
+ #
+-apache_content_template(w3c_validator)
++
+type httpd_w3c_validator_tmp_t;
+files_tmp_file(httpd_w3c_validator_tmp_t)
-+
+
########################################
#
# Local policy
#
-+manage_dirs_pattern(httpd_w3c_validator_script_t, httpd_w3c_validator_tmp_t, httpd_w3c_validator_tmp_t)
-+manage_files_pattern(httpd_w3c_validator_script_t, httpd_w3c_validator_tmp_t, httpd_w3c_validator_tmp_t)
-+files_tmp_filetrans(httpd_w3c_validator_script_t, httpd_w3c_validator_tmp_t, { file dir })
+-corenet_tcp_connect_ftp_port(httpd_w3c_validator_script_t)
+-corenet_tcp_sendrecv_ftp_port(httpd_w3c_validator_script_t)
+-corenet_tcp_connect_http_port(httpd_w3c_validator_script_t)
+-corenet_tcp_sendrecv_http_port(httpd_w3c_validator_script_t)
+-corenet_tcp_connect_http_cache_port(httpd_w3c_validator_script_t)
+-corenet_tcp_sendrecv_http_cache_port(httpd_w3c_validator_script_t)
++optional_policy(`
++ apache_content_template(w3c_validator)
+
- corenet_tcp_connect_ftp_port(httpd_w3c_validator_script_t)
- corenet_tcp_sendrecv_ftp_port(httpd_w3c_validator_script_t)
- corenet_tcp_connect_http_port(httpd_w3c_validator_script_t)
-@@ -22,3 +29,5 @@ corenet_tcp_sendrecv_http_cache_port(httpd_w3c_validator_script_t)
- miscfiles_read_generic_certs(httpd_w3c_validator_script_t)
-
- sysnet_dns_name_resolve(httpd_w3c_validator_script_t)
++ manage_dirs_pattern(httpd_w3c_validator_script_t, httpd_w3c_validator_tmp_t, httpd_w3c_validator_tmp_t)
++ manage_files_pattern(httpd_w3c_validator_script_t, httpd_w3c_validator_tmp_t, httpd_w3c_validator_tmp_t)
++ files_tmp_filetrans(httpd_w3c_validator_script_t, httpd_w3c_validator_tmp_t, { file dir })
+
-+apache_dontaudit_rw_tmp_files(httpd_w3c_validator_script_t)
++ corenet_tcp_connect_ftp_port(httpd_w3c_validator_script_t)
++ corenet_tcp_sendrecv_ftp_port(httpd_w3c_validator_script_t)
++ corenet_tcp_connect_http_port(httpd_w3c_validator_script_t)
++ corenet_tcp_sendrecv_http_port(httpd_w3c_validator_script_t)
++ corenet_tcp_connect_http_cache_port(httpd_w3c_validator_script_t)
++ corenet_tcp_sendrecv_http_cache_port(httpd_w3c_validator_script_t)
++
++ miscfiles_read_generic_certs(httpd_w3c_validator_script_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_generic_certs(httpd_w3c_validator_script_t)
++ sysnet_dns_name_resolve(httpd_w3c_validator_script_t)
+
+-sysnet_dns_name_resolve(httpd_w3c_validator_script_t)
++ optional_policy(`
++ apache_dontaudit_rw_tmp_files(httpd_w3c_validator_script_t)
++ ')
++')
diff --git a/watchdog.te b/watchdog.te
-index b10bb05..4f7499e 100644
+index b10bb05..f0d56b5 100644
--- a/watchdog.te
+++ b/watchdog.te
@@ -42,7 +42,6 @@ kernel_unmount_proc(watchdog_t)
@@ -63265,6 +72509,15 @@ index b10bb05..4f7499e 100644
corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(watchdog_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(watchdog_t)
corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if(watchdog_t)
+@@ -81,8 +80,6 @@ auth_append_login_records(watchdog_t)
+
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(watchdog_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(watchdog_t)
+-
+ sysnet_read_config(watchdog_t)
+
+ userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fds(watchdog_t)
diff --git a/wdmd.fc b/wdmd.fc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ad47e05
@@ -63398,10 +72651,10 @@ index 0000000..8e3570d
+')
diff --git a/wdmd.te b/wdmd.te
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..14c5c0a
+index 0000000..f2b3f6c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/wdmd.te
-@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+policy_module(wdmd,1.0.0)
+
+########################################
@@ -63419,6 +72672,9 @@ index 0000000..14c5c0a
+type wdmd_initrc_exec_t;
+init_script_file(wdmd_initrc_exec_t)
+
++type wdmd_tmpfs_t;
++files_tmpfs_file(wdmd_tmpfs_t)
++
+########################################
+#
+# wdmd local policy
@@ -63434,33 +72690,49 @@ index 0000000..14c5c0a
+manage_sock_files_pattern(wdmd_t, wdmd_var_run_t, wdmd_var_run_t)
+files_pid_filetrans(wdmd_t, wdmd_var_run_t, { file dir sock_file })
+
++manage_dirs_pattern(wdmd_t, wdmd_tmpfs_t, wdmd_tmpfs_t)
++manage_files_pattern(wdmd_t, wdmd_tmpfs_t, wdmd_tmpfs_t)
++fs_tmpfs_filetrans(wdmd_t, wdmd_tmpfs_t, { dir file })
++
+dev_read_watchdog(wdmd_t)
+dev_write_watchdog(wdmd_t)
+
+domain_use_interactive_fds(wdmd_t)
+
-+
++fs_getattr_tmpfs(wdmd_t)
+fs_read_anon_inodefs_files(wdmd_t)
+
+auth_use_nsswitch(wdmd_t)
+
+logging_send_syslog_msg(wdmd_t)
-+
-+miscfiles_read_localization(wdmd_t)
diff --git a/webadm.te b/webadm.te
-index 0ecc786..3e7e984 100644
+index 0ecc786..79a664a 100644
--- a/webadm.te
+++ b/webadm.te
-@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ userdom_base_user_template(webadm)
+@@ -23,12 +23,21 @@ role webadm_r;
+
+ userdom_base_user_template(webadm)
+
++type webadm_tmp_t;
++files_tmp_file(webadm_tmp_t)
++
+ ########################################
+ #
# webadmin local policy
#
-allow webadm_t self:capability { dac_override dac_read_search kill sys_ptrace sys_nice };
+allow webadm_t self:capability { dac_override dac_read_search kill sys_nice };
++
++manage_dirs_pattern(webadm_t, webadm_tmp_t, webadm_tmp_t)
++manage_files_pattern(webadm_t, webadm_tmp_t, webadm_tmp_t)
++manage_lnk_files_pattern(webadm_t, webadm_tmp_t, webadm_tmp_t)
++files_tmp_filetrans(webadm_t, webadm_tmp_t, { file dir })
++can_exec(webadm_t, webadm_tmp_t)
files_dontaudit_search_all_dirs(webadm_t)
files_manage_generic_locks(webadm_t)
-@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ selinux_get_enforce_mode(webadm_t)
+@@ -38,10 +47,13 @@ selinux_get_enforce_mode(webadm_t)
seutil_domtrans_setfiles(webadm_t)
logging_send_syslog_msg(webadm_t)
@@ -63468,8 +72740,15 @@ index 0ecc786..3e7e984 100644
userdom_dontaudit_search_user_home_dirs(webadm_t)
+-apache_admin(webadm_t, webadm_r)
++optional_policy(`
++ apache_admin(webadm_t, webadm_r)
++')
+
+ tunable_policy(`webadm_manage_user_files',`
+ userdom_manage_user_home_content_files(webadm_t)
diff --git a/webalizer.te b/webalizer.te
-index 32b4f76..ea008d8 100644
+index 32b4f76..b00362b 100644
--- a/webalizer.te
+++ b/webalizer.te
@@ -59,7 +59,6 @@ files_var_lib_filetrans(webalizer_t, webalizer_var_lib_t, file)
@@ -63480,7 +72759,7 @@ index 32b4f76..ea008d8 100644
corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(webalizer_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(webalizer_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_node(webalizer_t)
-@@ -69,24 +68,27 @@ fs_search_auto_mountpoints(webalizer_t)
+@@ -69,24 +68,26 @@ fs_search_auto_mountpoints(webalizer_t)
fs_getattr_xattr_fs(webalizer_t)
fs_rw_anon_inodefs_files(webalizer_t)
@@ -63490,9 +72769,9 @@ index 32b4f76..ea008d8 100644
logging_list_logs(webalizer_t)
logging_send_syslog_msg(webalizer_t)
+-miscfiles_read_localization(webalizer_t)
+auth_use_nsswitch(webalizer_t)
+
- miscfiles_read_localization(webalizer_t)
miscfiles_read_public_files(webalizer_t)
sysnet_dns_name_resolve(webalizer_t)
@@ -63643,7 +72922,7 @@ index 7a17516..56fbcc2 100644
')
diff --git a/wireshark.te b/wireshark.te
-index fc0adf8..1647930 100644
+index fc0adf8..cf479f3 100644
--- a/wireshark.te
+++ b/wireshark.te
@@ -31,18 +31,19 @@ userdom_user_tmpfs_file(wireshark_tmpfs_t)
@@ -63684,16 +72963,17 @@ index fc0adf8..1647930 100644
files_read_usr_files(wireshark_t)
fs_list_inotifyfs(wireshark_t)
-@@ -84,6 +83,8 @@ fs_search_auto_mountpoints(wireshark_t)
+@@ -84,31 +83,17 @@ fs_search_auto_mountpoints(wireshark_t)
libs_read_lib_files(wireshark_t)
+auth_use_nsswitch(wireshark_t)
+
miscfiles_read_fonts(wireshark_t)
- miscfiles_read_localization(wireshark_t)
+-miscfiles_read_localization(wireshark_t)
+
+ seutil_use_newrole_fds(wireshark_t)
-@@ -92,23 +93,8 @@ seutil_use_newrole_fds(wireshark_t)
sysnet_read_config(wireshark_t)
userdom_manage_user_home_content_files(wireshark_t)
@@ -63719,21 +72999,126 @@ index fc0adf8..1647930 100644
# Manual transition from userhelper
optional_policy(`
diff --git a/wm.if b/wm.if
-index b3efef7..50c1a74 100644
+index b3efef7..177cf16 100644
--- a/wm.if
+++ b/wm.if
-@@ -77,6 +77,11 @@ template(`wm_role_template',`
- miscfiles_read_fonts($1_wm_t)
- miscfiles_read_localization($1_wm_t)
+@@ -31,17 +31,14 @@ template(`wm_role_template',`
+ gen_require(`
+ type wm_exec_t;
+ class dbus send_msg;
++ attribute wm_domain;
+ ')
+
+- type $1_wm_t;
++ type $1_wm_t, wm_domain;
+ domain_type($1_wm_t)
+ domain_entry_file($1_wm_t, wm_exec_t)
+ role $2 types $1_wm_t;
+- allow $1_wm_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms;
+- allow $1_wm_t self:process getsched;
+- allow $1_wm_t self:shm create_shm_perms;
+-
+ allow $1_wm_t $3:unix_stream_socket connectto;
+ allow $3 $1_wm_t:unix_stream_socket connectto;
+ allow $3 $1_wm_t:process { signal sigchld signull };
+@@ -50,19 +47,19 @@ template(`wm_role_template',`
+ allow $1_wm_t $3:dbus send_msg;
+ allow $3 $1_wm_t:dbus send_msg;
+
+- domtrans_pattern($3, wm_exec_t, $1_wm_t)
+ userdom_manage_home_role($2, $1_wm_t)
+ userdom_manage_tmpfs_role($2, $1_wm_t)
+ userdom_manage_tmp_role($2, $1_wm_t)
+ userdom_exec_user_tmp_files($1_wm_t)
-+
+
+- kernel_read_system_state($1_wm_t)
++ domtrans_pattern($3, wm_exec_t, $1_wm_t)
+
+ corecmd_bin_domtrans($1_wm_t, $3)
+ corecmd_shell_domtrans($1_wm_t, $3)
+
+- dev_read_urand($1_wm_t)
+-
+- files_read_etc_files($1_wm_t)
+- files_read_usr_files($1_wm_t)
++ auth_use_nsswitch($1_wm_t)
+
+- fs_getattr_tmpfs($1_wm_t)
++ kernel_read_system_state($1_wm_t)
+
+ mls_file_read_all_levels($1_wm_t)
+ mls_file_write_all_levels($1_wm_t)
+@@ -70,22 +67,6 @@ template(`wm_role_template',`
+ mls_xwin_write_all_levels($1_wm_t)
+ mls_fd_use_all_levels($1_wm_t)
+
+- auth_use_nsswitch($1_wm_t)
+-
+- application_signull($1_wm_t)
+-
+- miscfiles_read_fonts($1_wm_t)
+- miscfiles_read_localization($1_wm_t)
+-
+- optional_policy(`
+- dbus_system_bus_client($1_wm_t)
+- dbus_session_bus_client($1_wm_t)
+- ')
+-
+- optional_policy(`
+- pulseaudio_stream_connect($1_wm_t)
+- ')
+-
optional_policy(`
- dbus_system_bus_client($1_wm_t)
- dbus_session_bus_client($1_wm_t)
+ xserver_role($2, $1_wm_t)
+ xserver_manage_core_devices($1_wm_t)
+diff --git a/wm.te b/wm.te
+index 19d447e..996a3d4 100644
+--- a/wm.te
++++ b/wm.te
+@@ -1,5 +1,7 @@
+ policy_module(wm, 1.2.0)
+
++attribute wm_domain;
++
+ ########################################
+ #
+ # Declarations
+@@ -7,3 +9,34 @@ policy_module(wm, 1.2.0)
+
+ type wm_exec_t;
+ corecmd_executable_file(wm_exec_t)
++
++allow wm_domain self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms;
++allow wm_domain self:process getsched;
++allow wm_domain self:shm create_shm_perms;
++allow wm_domain self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms;
++
++dev_read_urand(wm_domain)
++
++files_read_etc_files(wm_domain)
++files_read_usr_files(wm_domain)
++
++fs_getattr_tmpfs(wm_domain)
++
++application_signull(wm_domain)
++
++miscfiles_read_fonts(wm_domain)
++
++optional_policy(`
++ dbus_system_bus_client(wm_domain)
++ dbus_session_bus_client(wm_domain)
++')
++
++optional_policy(`
++ pulseaudio_stream_connect(wm_domain)
++')
++
++optional_policy(`
++ xserver_manage_core_devices(wm_domain)
++')
++
++
diff --git a/xen.fc b/xen.fc
index 1a1b374..574794d 100644
--- a/xen.fc
@@ -63906,7 +73291,7 @@ index 77d41b6..cc73c96 100644
files_search_pids($1)
diff --git a/xen.te b/xen.te
-index 07033bb..7d53822 100644
+index 07033bb..8358a63 100644
--- a/xen.te
+++ b/xen.te
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ policy_module(xen, 1.12.0)
@@ -63937,7 +73322,40 @@ index 07033bb..7d53822 100644
########################################
#
# blktap local policy
-@@ -170,6 +167,10 @@ files_pid_filetrans(evtchnd_t, evtchnd_var_run_t, { file sock_file dir })
+@@ -135,22 +132,21 @@ tunable_policy(`xend_run_blktap',`
+ # If yes, transition to its own domain.
+ domtrans_pattern(xend_t, blktap_exec_t, blktap_t)
+
+- allow blktap_t self:fifo_file { read write };
++',`
++ # If no, then silently refuse to run it.
++ dontaudit xend_t blktap_exec_t:file { execute execute_no_trans };
++')
+
+- dev_read_sysfs(blktap_t)
+- dev_rw_xen(blktap_t)
++allow blktap_t self:fifo_file { read write };
+
+- files_read_etc_files(blktap_t)
++dev_read_sysfs(blktap_t)
++dev_rw_xen(blktap_t)
+
+- logging_send_syslog_msg(blktap_t)
++files_read_etc_files(blktap_t)
+
+- miscfiles_read_localization(blktap_t)
++logging_send_syslog_msg(blktap_t)
+
+- xen_stream_connect_xenstore(blktap_t)
+-',`
+- # If no, then silently refuse to run it.
+- dontaudit xend_t blktap_exec_t:file { execute execute_no_trans };
+-')
++xen_stream_connect_xenstore(blktap_t)
+
+ #######################################
+ #
+@@ -170,6 +166,10 @@ files_pid_filetrans(evtchnd_t, evtchnd_var_run_t, { file sock_file dir })
#
# qemu-dm local policy
#
@@ -63948,13 +73366,21 @@ index 07033bb..7d53822 100644
# Do we need to allow execution of qemu-dm?
tunable_policy(`xend_run_qemu',`
allow qemu_dm_t self:capability sys_resource;
-@@ -208,10 +209,13 @@ tunable_policy(`xend_run_qemu',`
+@@ -195,7 +195,6 @@ tunable_policy(`xend_run_qemu',`
+ fs_manage_xenfs_dirs(qemu_dm_t)
+ fs_manage_xenfs_files(qemu_dm_t)
+
+- miscfiles_read_localization(qemu_dm_t)
+
+ xen_stream_connect_xenstore(qemu_dm_t)
+ ',`
+@@ -208,10 +207,13 @@ tunable_policy(`xend_run_qemu',`
# xend local policy
#
-allow xend_t self:capability { dac_override ipc_lock net_admin setuid sys_nice sys_tty_config net_raw };
-dontaudit xend_t self:capability { sys_ptrace };
-+allow xend_t self:capability { dac_override ipc_lock net_admin setuid sys_admin sys_nice sys_tty_config net_raw };
++allow xend_t self:capability { dac_override ipc_lock net_admin setuid sys_admin sys_nice sys_tty_config net_raw sys_rawio };
allow xend_t self:process { signal sigkill };
-dontaudit xend_t self:process ptrace;
+
@@ -63965,7 +73391,7 @@ index 07033bb..7d53822 100644
# internal communication is often done using fifo and unix sockets.
allow xend_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms;
allow xend_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
-@@ -219,6 +223,7 @@ allow xend_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms;
+@@ -219,6 +221,7 @@ allow xend_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms;
allow xend_t self:netlink_route_socket r_netlink_socket_perms;
allow xend_t self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
allow xend_t self:packet_socket create_socket_perms;
@@ -63973,7 +73399,7 @@ index 07033bb..7d53822 100644
allow xend_t xen_image_t:dir list_dir_perms;
manage_dirs_pattern(xend_t, xen_image_t, xen_image_t)
-@@ -275,7 +280,6 @@ kernel_read_network_state(xend_t)
+@@ -275,7 +278,6 @@ kernel_read_network_state(xend_t)
corecmd_exec_bin(xend_t)
corecmd_exec_shell(xend_t)
@@ -63981,7 +73407,7 @@ index 07033bb..7d53822 100644
corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(xend_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(xend_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_node(xend_t)
-@@ -294,12 +298,13 @@ corenet_sendrecv_soundd_server_packets(xend_t)
+@@ -294,12 +296,13 @@ corenet_sendrecv_soundd_server_packets(xend_t)
corenet_rw_tun_tap_dev(xend_t)
dev_read_urand(xend_t)
@@ -63996,24 +73422,28 @@ index 07033bb..7d53822 100644
files_read_etc_files(xend_t)
files_read_kernel_symbol_table(xend_t)
-@@ -309,7 +314,9 @@ files_etc_filetrans_etc_runtime(xend_t, file)
+@@ -309,7 +312,13 @@ files_etc_filetrans_etc_runtime(xend_t, file)
files_read_usr_files(xend_t)
files_read_default_symlinks(xend_t)
++fs_read_removable_blk_files(xend_t)
++
++storage_read_scsi_generic(xend_t)
++
+term_setattr_generic_ptys(xend_t)
term_getattr_all_ptys(xend_t)
+term_setattr_all_ptys(xend_t)
term_use_generic_ptys(xend_t)
term_use_ptmx(xend_t)
term_getattr_pty_fs(xend_t)
-@@ -320,13 +327,11 @@ locallogin_dontaudit_use_fds(xend_t)
+@@ -320,13 +329,10 @@ locallogin_dontaudit_use_fds(xend_t)
logging_send_syslog_msg(xend_t)
-lvm_domtrans(xend_t)
+auth_read_passwd(xend_t)
- miscfiles_read_localization(xend_t)
+-miscfiles_read_localization(xend_t)
miscfiles_read_hwdata(xend_t)
-mount_domtrans(xend_t)
@@ -64021,7 +73451,7 @@ index 07033bb..7d53822 100644
sysnet_domtrans_dhcpc(xend_t)
sysnet_signal_dhcpc(xend_t)
sysnet_domtrans_ifconfig(xend_t)
-@@ -339,8 +344,6 @@ userdom_dontaudit_search_user_home_dirs(xend_t)
+@@ -339,8 +345,6 @@ userdom_dontaudit_search_user_home_dirs(xend_t)
xen_stream_connect_xenstore(xend_t)
@@ -64030,7 +73460,7 @@ index 07033bb..7d53822 100644
optional_policy(`
brctl_domtrans(xend_t)
')
-@@ -349,6 +352,27 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -349,6 +353,28 @@ optional_policy(`
consoletype_exec(xend_t)
')
@@ -64051,6 +73481,7 @@ index 07033bb..7d53822 100644
+')
+
+optional_policy(`
++ virt_manage_default_image_type(xend_t)
+ virt_search_images(xend_t)
+ virt_read_config(xend_t)
+')
@@ -64058,7 +73489,16 @@ index 07033bb..7d53822 100644
########################################
#
# Xen console local policy
-@@ -374,8 +398,6 @@ dev_rw_xen(xenconsoled_t)
+@@ -359,7 +385,7 @@ allow xenconsoled_t self:process setrlimit;
+ allow xenconsoled_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
+ allow xenconsoled_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms;
+
+-allow xenconsoled_t xen_devpts_t:chr_file rw_term_perms;
++allow xenconsoled_t xen_devpts_t:chr_file { rw_term_perms setattr };
+
+ # pid file
+ manage_files_pattern(xenconsoled_t, xenconsoled_var_run_t, xenconsoled_var_run_t)
+@@ -374,8 +400,6 @@ dev_rw_xen(xenconsoled_t)
dev_filetrans_xen(xenconsoled_t)
dev_rw_sysfs(xenconsoled_t)
@@ -64067,7 +73507,16 @@ index 07033bb..7d53822 100644
files_read_etc_files(xenconsoled_t)
files_read_usr_files(xenconsoled_t)
-@@ -413,9 +435,10 @@ manage_dirs_pattern(xenstored_t, xenstored_tmp_t, xenstored_tmp_t)
+@@ -390,7 +414,7 @@ term_use_console(xenconsoled_t)
+ init_use_fds(xenconsoled_t)
+ init_use_script_ptys(xenconsoled_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(xenconsoled_t)
++auth_read_passwd(xenconsoled_t)
+
+ xen_manage_log(xenconsoled_t)
+ xen_stream_connect_xenstore(xenconsoled_t)
+@@ -413,9 +437,10 @@ manage_dirs_pattern(xenstored_t, xenstored_tmp_t, xenstored_tmp_t)
files_tmp_filetrans(xenstored_t, xenstored_tmp_t, { file dir })
# pid file
@@ -64079,7 +73528,7 @@ index 07033bb..7d53822 100644
# log files
manage_dirs_pattern(xenstored_t, xenstored_var_log_t, xenstored_var_log_t)
-@@ -442,9 +465,11 @@ files_read_etc_files(xenstored_t)
+@@ -442,111 +467,24 @@ files_read_etc_files(xenstored_t)
files_read_usr_files(xenstored_t)
@@ -64091,7 +73540,12 @@ index 07033bb..7d53822 100644
init_use_fds(xenstored_t)
init_use_script_ptys(xenstored_t)
-@@ -457,96 +482,9 @@ xen_append_log(xenstored_t)
+
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(xenstored_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(xenstored_t)
+-
+ xen_append_log(xenstored_t)
########################################
#
@@ -64198,7 +73652,7 @@ index 07033bb..7d53822 100644
- ')
')
diff --git a/xfs.te b/xfs.te
-index 11c1b12..b376ff9 100644
+index 11c1b12..fc5d128 100644
--- a/xfs.te
+++ b/xfs.te
@@ -37,7 +37,6 @@ files_pid_filetrans(xfs_t, xfs_var_run_t, file)
@@ -64217,8 +73671,16 @@ index 11c1b12..b376ff9 100644
files_read_etc_runtime_files(xfs_t)
files_read_usr_files(xfs_t)
+@@ -65,7 +63,6 @@ auth_use_nsswitch(xfs_t)
+
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(xfs_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(xfs_t)
+ miscfiles_read_fonts(xfs_t)
+
+ userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fds(xfs_t)
diff --git a/xguest.te b/xguest.te
-index e88b95f..37e5758 100644
+index e88b95f..3dd3d9a 100644
--- a/xguest.te
+++ b/xguest.te
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ gen_tunable(xguest_mount_media, true)
@@ -64238,6 +73700,15 @@ index e88b95f..37e5758 100644
########################################
#
+@@ -38,7 +39,7 @@ userdom_restricted_xwindows_user_template(xguest)
+ ifndef(`enable_mls',`
+ fs_exec_noxattr(xguest_t)
+
+- tunable_policy(`user_rw_noexattrfile',`
++ tunable_policy(`selinuxuser_rw_noexattrfile',`
+ fs_manage_noxattr_fs_files(xguest_t)
+ fs_manage_noxattr_fs_dirs(xguest_t)
+ # Write floppies
@@ -49,11 +50,22 @@ ifndef(`enable_mls',`
')
')
@@ -64274,7 +73745,7 @@ index e88b95f..37e5758 100644
')
')
-@@ -76,23 +87,96 @@ optional_policy(`
+@@ -76,23 +87,97 @@ optional_policy(`
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -64299,9 +73770,10 @@ index e88b95f..37e5758 100644
+
+optional_policy(`
+ gnome_role(xguest_r, xguest_t)
-+')
-+
-+optional_policy(`
+ ')
+
+ optional_policy(`
+- mozilla_role(xguest_r, xguest_t)
+ gnomeclock_dontaudit_dbus_chat(xguest_t)
+')
+
@@ -64312,25 +73784,29 @@ index e88b95f..37e5758 100644
+optional_policy(`
+ pcscd_read_pub_files(xguest_t)
+ pcscd_stream_connect(xguest_t)
- ')
-
- optional_policy(`
-- mozilla_role(xguest_r, xguest_t)
++')
++
++optional_policy(`
+ rhsmcertd_dontaudit_dbus_chat(xguest_t)
')
optional_policy(`
tunable_policy(`xguest_connect_network',`
+ networkmanager_dbus_chat(xguest_t)
++ networkmanager_read_lib_files(xguest_t)
++ ')
++')
++
++optional_policy(`
++ tunable_policy(`xguest_connect_network',`
+ kernel_read_network_state(xguest_t)
+
- networkmanager_dbus_chat(xguest_t)
-+ networkmanager_read_lib_files(xguest_t)
corenet_tcp_connect_pulseaudio_port(xguest_t)
-+ corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(xguest_t)
+ corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(xguest_t)
+ corenet_raw_sendrecv_generic_if(xguest_t)
+ corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_node(xguest_t)
+ corenet_raw_sendrecv_generic_node(xguest_t)
++ corenet_tcp_connect_commplex_port(xguest_t)
+ corenet_tcp_sendrecv_http_port(xguest_t)
+ corenet_tcp_sendrecv_http_cache_port(xguest_t)
+ corenet_tcp_sendrecv_squid_port(xguest_t)
@@ -64357,12 +73833,9 @@ index e88b95f..37e5758 100644
+ corenet_tcp_sendrecv_transproxy_port(xguest_t)
+ corenet_tcp_connect_transproxy_port(xguest_t)
')
-+
-+ #optional_policy(`
-+ # telepathy_dbus_session_role(xguest_r, xguest_t)
-+ #')
-+')
-+
+ ')
+
+-#gen_user(xguest_u,, xguest_r, s0, s0)
+optional_policy(`
+ gen_require(`
+ type mozilla_t;
@@ -64370,12 +73843,11 @@ index e88b95f..37e5758 100644
+
+ allow xguest_t mozilla_t:process transition;
+ role xguest_r types mozilla_t;
- ')
-
--#gen_user(xguest_u,, xguest_r, s0, s0)
++')
++
+gen_user(xguest_u, user, xguest_r, s0, s0)
diff --git a/xprint.te b/xprint.te
-index 68d13e5..b71fae3 100644
+index 68d13e5..4fe8668 100644
--- a/xprint.te
+++ b/xprint.te
@@ -32,7 +32,6 @@ kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(xprint_t)
@@ -64386,21 +73858,31 @@ index 68d13e5..b71fae3 100644
corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(xprint_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(xprint_t)
corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if(xprint_t)
+@@ -58,7 +57,6 @@ fs_search_auto_mountpoints(xprint_t)
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(xprint_t)
+
+ miscfiles_read_fonts(xprint_t)
+-miscfiles_read_localization(xprint_t)
+
+ sysnet_read_config(xprint_t)
+
diff --git a/xscreensaver.te b/xscreensaver.te
-index 1487a4e..f6b4217 100644
+index 1487a4e..c099b55 100644
--- a/xscreensaver.te
+++ b/xscreensaver.te
-@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ logging_send_syslog_msg(xscreensaver_t)
-
- miscfiles_read_localization(xscreensaver_t)
+@@ -33,9 +33,7 @@ init_read_utmp(xscreensaver_t)
+ logging_send_audit_msgs(xscreensaver_t)
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(xscreensaver_t)
+-miscfiles_read_localization(xscreensaver_t)
+-
-userdom_use_user_ptys(xscreensaver_t)
+userdom_use_inherited_user_ptys(xscreensaver_t)
#access to .icons and ~/.xscreensaver
userdom_read_user_home_content_files(xscreensaver_t)
diff --git a/yam.te b/yam.te
-index 223ad43..7950370 100644
+index 223ad43..a3267e5 100644
--- a/yam.te
+++ b/yam.te
@@ -58,7 +58,6 @@ corecmd_exec_bin(yam_t)
@@ -64419,15 +73901,15 @@ index 223ad43..7950370 100644
files_read_etc_runtime_files(yam_t)
# /usr/share/createrepo/genpkgmetadata.py:
files_exec_usr_files(yam_t)
-@@ -83,16 +81,17 @@ fs_search_auto_mountpoints(yam_t)
+@@ -83,16 +81,15 @@ fs_search_auto_mountpoints(yam_t)
# Content can also be on ISO image files.
fs_read_iso9660_files(yam_t)
+-logging_send_syslog_msg(yam_t)
+auth_use_nsswitch(yam_t)
-+
- logging_send_syslog_msg(yam_t)
- miscfiles_read_localization(yam_t)
+-miscfiles_read_localization(yam_t)
++logging_send_syslog_msg(yam_t)
seutil_read_config(yam_t)
@@ -64511,7 +73993,7 @@ index c9981d1..38ce620 100644
init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, zabbix_initrc_exec_t)
domain_system_change_exemption($1)
diff --git a/zabbix.te b/zabbix.te
-index 8c0bd70..3d6a4f7 100644
+index 8c0bd70..24dd920 100644
--- a/zabbix.te
+++ b/zabbix.te
@@ -5,6 +5,13 @@ policy_module(zabbix, 1.5.0)
@@ -64547,7 +74029,7 @@ index 8c0bd70..3d6a4f7 100644
-allow zabbix_t self:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
-allow zabbix_t self:process { setsched getsched signal };
+allow zabbix_t self:capability { dac_read_search dac_override setuid setgid };
-+allow zabbix_t self:process setsched;
++allow zabbix_t self:process { setsched signal_perms };
+allow zabbix_t self:sem create_sem_perms;
+allow zabbix_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms;
allow zabbix_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
@@ -64569,7 +74051,7 @@ index 8c0bd70..3d6a4f7 100644
# shared memory
rw_files_pattern(zabbix_t, zabbix_tmpfs_t, zabbix_tmpfs_t)
fs_tmpfs_filetrans(zabbix_t, zabbix_tmpfs_t, file)
-@@ -58,26 +75,49 @@ manage_dirs_pattern(zabbix_t, zabbix_var_run_t, zabbix_var_run_t)
+@@ -58,26 +75,48 @@ manage_dirs_pattern(zabbix_t, zabbix_var_run_t, zabbix_var_run_t)
manage_files_pattern(zabbix_t, zabbix_var_run_t, zabbix_var_run_t)
files_pid_filetrans(zabbix_t, zabbix_var_run_t, { dir file })
@@ -64591,11 +74073,10 @@ index 8c0bd70..3d6a4f7 100644
-miscfiles_read_localization(zabbix_t)
+files_read_usr_files(zabbix_t)
++
++auth_use_nsswitch(zabbix_t)
-sysnet_dns_name_resolve(zabbix_t)
-+auth_use_nsswitch(zabbix_t)
-+
-+miscfiles_read_localization(zabbix_t)
zabbix_agent_tcp_connect(zabbix_t)
@@ -64623,7 +74104,7 @@ index 8c0bd70..3d6a4f7 100644
########################################
#
# zabbix agent local policy
-@@ -121,7 +161,6 @@ domain_search_all_domains_state(zabbix_agent_t)
+@@ -121,7 +160,6 @@ domain_search_all_domains_state(zabbix_agent_t)
files_getattr_all_dirs(zabbix_agent_t)
files_getattr_all_files(zabbix_agent_t)
files_read_all_symlinks(zabbix_agent_t)
@@ -64631,17 +74112,26 @@ index 8c0bd70..3d6a4f7 100644
fs_getattr_all_fs(zabbix_agent_t)
+@@ -129,7 +167,6 @@ init_read_utmp(zabbix_agent_t)
+
+ logging_search_logs(zabbix_agent_t)
+
+-miscfiles_read_localization(zabbix_agent_t)
+
+ sysnet_dns_name_resolve(zabbix_agent_t)
+
diff --git a/zarafa.fc b/zarafa.fc
-index 3defaa1..560e6e3 100644
+index 3defaa1..a451e97 100644
--- a/zarafa.fc
+++ b/zarafa.fc
-@@ -8,19 +8,23 @@
+@@ -8,19 +8,24 @@
/usr/bin/zarafa-server -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:zarafa_server_exec_t,s0)
/usr/bin/zarafa-spooler -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:zarafa_spooler_exec_t,s0)
-/var/lib/zarafa-.* gen_context(system_u:object_r:zarafa_var_lib_t,s0)
+/var/lib/zarafa(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:zarafa_var_lib_t,s0)
+/var/lib/zarafa-webaccess(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:zarafa_var_lib_t,s0)
++/var/lib/zarafa-webapp(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:zarafa_var_lib_t,s0)
-/var/log/zarafa/gateway\.log -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:zarafa_gateway_log_t,s0)
-/var/log/zarafa/ical\.log -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:zarafa_ical_log_t,s0)
@@ -64668,19 +74158,23 @@ index 3defaa1..560e6e3 100644
/var/run/zarafa-server\.pid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:zarafa_server_var_run_t,s0)
/var/run/zarafa-spooler\.pid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:zarafa_spooler_var_run_t,s0)
diff --git a/zarafa.if b/zarafa.if
-index 21ae664..cb3a098 100644
+index 21ae664..3d08962 100644
--- a/zarafa.if
+++ b/zarafa.if
-@@ -42,6 +42,8 @@ template(`zarafa_domain_template',`
+@@ -42,6 +42,12 @@ template(`zarafa_domain_template',`
manage_files_pattern(zarafa_$1_t, zarafa_$1_log_t, zarafa_$1_log_t)
logging_log_filetrans(zarafa_$1_t, zarafa_$1_log_t, { file })
+
++ kernel_read_system_state(zarafa_$1_t)
++
+ auth_use_nsswitch(zarafa_$1_t)
++
++ logging_send_syslog_msg(zarafa_$1_t)
')
######################################
-@@ -118,3 +120,25 @@ interface(`zarafa_stream_connect_server',`
+@@ -118,3 +124,25 @@ interface(`zarafa_stream_connect_server',`
files_search_var_lib($1)
stream_connect_pattern($1, zarafa_server_var_run_t, zarafa_server_var_run_t, zarafa_server_t)
')
@@ -64707,7 +74201,7 @@ index 21ae664..cb3a098 100644
+ manage_dirs_pattern($1, zarafa_var_lib_t, zarafa_var_lib_t)
+')
diff --git a/zarafa.te b/zarafa.te
-index 91267bc..5bce06b 100644
+index 91267bc..0aa9870 100644
--- a/zarafa.te
+++ b/zarafa.te
@@ -18,6 +18,10 @@ files_config_file(zarafa_etc_t)
@@ -64721,15 +74215,19 @@ index 91267bc..5bce06b 100644
zarafa_domain_template(monitor)
zarafa_domain_template(server)
-@@ -51,7 +55,6 @@ auth_use_nsswitch(zarafa_deliver_t)
- allow zarafa_gateway_t self:capability { chown kill };
+@@ -48,10 +52,9 @@ auth_use_nsswitch(zarafa_deliver_t)
+ # zarafa_gateway local policy
+ #
+
+-allow zarafa_gateway_t self:capability { chown kill };
++allow zarafa_gateway_t self:capability { kill };
allow zarafa_gateway_t self:process setrlimit;
-corenet_all_recvfrom_unlabeled(zarafa_gateway_t)
corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(zarafa_gateway_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(zarafa_gateway_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_node(zarafa_gateway_t)
-@@ -59,7 +62,22 @@ corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_ports(zarafa_gateway_t)
+@@ -59,16 +62,28 @@ corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_ports(zarafa_gateway_t)
corenet_tcp_bind_generic_node(zarafa_gateway_t)
corenet_tcp_bind_pop_port(zarafa_gateway_t)
@@ -64739,7 +74237,6 @@ index 91267bc..5bce06b 100644
+# zarafa-indexer local policy
+#
+
-+allow zarafa_indexer_t self:capability chown;
+
+manage_dirs_pattern(zarafa_indexer_t, zarafa_indexer_tmp_t, zarafa_indexer_tmp_t)
+manage_files_pattern(zarafa_indexer_t, zarafa_indexer_tmp_t, zarafa_indexer_tmp_t)
@@ -64753,15 +74250,33 @@ index 91267bc..5bce06b 100644
#######################################
#
-@@ -68,7 +86,6 @@ auth_use_nsswitch(zarafa_gateway_t)
+ # zarafa-ical local policy
+ #
- allow zarafa_ical_t self:capability chown;
+-allow zarafa_ical_t self:capability chown;
-corenet_all_recvfrom_unlabeled(zarafa_ical_t)
corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(zarafa_ical_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(zarafa_ical_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_node(zarafa_ical_t)
-@@ -101,11 +118,11 @@ files_tmp_filetrans(zarafa_server_t, zarafa_server_tmp_t, { file dir })
+@@ -83,7 +98,6 @@ auth_use_nsswitch(zarafa_ical_t)
+ # zarafa-monitor local policy
+ #
+
+-allow zarafa_monitor_t self:capability chown;
+
+ auth_use_nsswitch(zarafa_monitor_t)
+
+@@ -92,7 +106,7 @@ auth_use_nsswitch(zarafa_monitor_t)
+ # zarafa_server local policy
+ #
+
+-allow zarafa_server_t self:capability { chown kill net_bind_service };
++allow zarafa_server_t self:capability { kill net_bind_service };
+ allow zarafa_server_t self:process setrlimit;
+
+ manage_dirs_pattern(zarafa_server_t, zarafa_server_tmp_t, zarafa_server_tmp_t)
+@@ -101,11 +115,11 @@ files_tmp_filetrans(zarafa_server_t, zarafa_server_tmp_t, { file dir })
manage_dirs_pattern(zarafa_server_t, zarafa_var_lib_t, zarafa_var_lib_t)
manage_files_pattern(zarafa_server_t, zarafa_var_lib_t, zarafa_var_lib_t)
@@ -64775,7 +74290,12 @@ index 91267bc..5bce06b 100644
corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(zarafa_server_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(zarafa_server_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_node(zarafa_server_t)
-@@ -139,7 +156,6 @@ allow zarafa_spooler_t self:capability { chown kill };
+@@ -135,11 +149,10 @@ optional_policy(`
+ # zarafa_spooler local policy
+ #
+
+-allow zarafa_spooler_t self:capability { chown kill };
++allow zarafa_spooler_t self:capability { kill };
can_exec(zarafa_spooler_t, zarafa_spooler_exec_t)
@@ -64783,20 +74303,54 @@ index 91267bc..5bce06b 100644
corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(zarafa_spooler_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(zarafa_spooler_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_node(zarafa_spooler_t)
-@@ -164,8 +180,13 @@ stream_connect_pattern(zarafa_domain, zarafa_server_var_run_t, zarafa_server_var
+@@ -150,11 +163,35 @@ auth_use_nsswitch(zarafa_spooler_t)
+
+ ########################################
+ #
++# zarafa_gateway local policy
++#
++
++allow zarafa_gateway_t self:capability { kill };
++allow zarafa_gateway_t self:process setrlimit;
++
++corenet_tcp_bind_pop_port(zarafa_gateway_t)
++
++#######################################
++#
++# zarafa-ical local policy
++#
++
++
++corenet_tcp_bind_http_cache_port(zarafa_ical_t)
++
++######################################
++#
++# zarafa-monitor local policy
++#
++
++
++########################################
++#
+ # zarafa domains local policy
+ #
+
+ # bad permission on /etc/zarafa
+-allow zarafa_domain self:capability { dac_override setgid setuid };
++allow zarafa_domain self:capability { dac_override chown setgid setuid };
+ allow zarafa_domain self:process signal;
+ allow zarafa_domain self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms;
+ allow zarafa_domain self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
+@@ -164,8 +201,8 @@ stream_connect_pattern(zarafa_domain, zarafa_server_var_run_t, zarafa_server_var
read_files_pattern(zarafa_domain, zarafa_etc_t, zarafa_etc_t)
+-kernel_read_system_state(zarafa_domain)
+dev_read_rand(zarafa_domain)
+dev_read_urand(zarafa_domain)
-+
- kernel_read_system_state(zarafa_domain)
files_read_etc_files(zarafa_domain)
-+logging_send_syslog_msg(zarafa_domain)
-+
- miscfiles_read_localization(zarafa_domain)
+-miscfiles_read_localization(zarafa_domain)
diff --git a/zebra.if b/zebra.if
index 6b87605..ef64e73 100644
--- a/zebra.if
@@ -64830,7 +74384,7 @@ index 6b87605..ef64e73 100644
init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, zebra_initrc_exec_t)
domain_system_change_exemption($1)
diff --git a/zebra.te b/zebra.te
-index ade6c2c..f043f14 100644
+index ade6c2c..ac46eb2 100644
--- a/zebra.te
+++ b/zebra.te
@@ -11,14 +11,14 @@ policy_module(zebra, 1.12.0)
@@ -64867,16 +74421,18 @@ index ade6c2c..f043f14 100644
corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(zebra_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(zebra_t)
corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if(zebra_t)
-@@ -106,6 +105,8 @@ files_search_etc(zebra_t)
+@@ -106,16 +105,16 @@ files_search_etc(zebra_t)
files_read_etc_files(zebra_t)
files_read_etc_runtime_files(zebra_t)
+-logging_send_syslog_msg(zebra_t)
+auth_read_passwd(zebra_t)
-+
- logging_send_syslog_msg(zebra_t)
- miscfiles_read_localization(zebra_t)
-@@ -115,7 +116,7 @@ sysnet_read_config(zebra_t)
+-miscfiles_read_localization(zebra_t)
++logging_send_syslog_msg(zebra_t)
+
+ sysnet_read_config(zebra_t)
+
userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fds(zebra_t)
userdom_dontaudit_search_user_home_dirs(zebra_t)
@@ -65262,10 +74818,10 @@ index 0000000..b34b8b4
+
diff --git a/zoneminder.te b/zoneminder.te
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..d12357b
+index 0000000..3708d3c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/zoneminder.te
-@@ -0,0 +1,123 @@
+@@ -0,0 +1,121 @@
+policy_module(zoneminder, 1.0.0)
+
+########################################
@@ -65356,8 +74912,6 @@ index 0000000..d12357b
+
+logging_send_syslog_msg(zoneminder_t)
+
-+miscfiles_read_localization(zoneminder_t)
-+
+tunable_policy(`zoneminder_anon_write',`
+ miscfiles_manage_public_files(zoneminder_t)
+')
@@ -65410,10 +74964,10 @@ index 702e768..2a4f2cc 100644
interface(`zosremote_run',`
gen_require(`
diff --git a/zosremote.te b/zosremote.te
-index f9a06d2..aed9d14 100644
+index f9a06d2..fade72a 100644
--- a/zosremote.te
+++ b/zosremote.te
-@@ -16,10 +16,9 @@ logging_dispatcher_domain(zos_remote_t, zos_remote_exec_t)
+@@ -16,13 +16,9 @@ logging_dispatcher_domain(zos_remote_t, zos_remote_exec_t)
#
allow zos_remote_t self:process signal;
@@ -65422,6 +74976,9 @@ index f9a06d2..aed9d14 100644
allow zos_remote_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
-files_read_etc_files(zos_remote_t)
-
+-
auth_use_nsswitch(zos_remote_t)
+-miscfiles_read_localization(zos_remote_t)
+-
+ logging_send_syslog_msg(zos_remote_t)
diff --git a/selinux-policy.spec b/selinux-policy.spec
index 93de10b..bcfcfed 100644
--- a/selinux-policy.spec
+++ b/selinux-policy.spec
@@ -14,12 +14,12 @@
%define BUILD_MLS 1
%endif
%define POLICYVER 27
-%define POLICYCOREUTILSVER 2.1.9-4
+%define POLICYCOREUTILSVER 2.1.13-34
%define CHECKPOLICYVER 2.1.10-3
Summary: SELinux policy configuration
Name: selinux-policy
Version: 3.11.1
-Release: 3.1%{?dist}
+Release: 66%{?dist}
License: GPLv2+
Group: System Environment/Base
Source: serefpolicy-%{version}.tgz
@@ -27,16 +27,18 @@ patch: policy-rawhide.patch
patch1: policy_contrib-rawhide.patch
patch2: policy_contrib-rawhide-roleattribute.patch
patch3: policy-rawhide-roleattribute.patch
-Source1: modules-targeted.conf
+Source1: modules-targeted-base.conf
+Source31: modules-targeted-contrib.conf
Source2: booleans-targeted.conf
Source3: Makefile.devel
Source4: setrans-targeted.conf
-Source5: modules-mls.conf
+Source5: modules-mls-base.conf
+Source32: modules-mls-contrib.conf
Source6: booleans-mls.conf
Source8: setrans-mls.conf
Source14: securetty_types-targeted
Source15: securetty_types-mls
-Source16: modules-minimum.conf
+#Source16: modules-minimum.conf
Source17: booleans-minimum.conf
Source18: setrans-minimum.conf
Source19: securetty_types-minimum
@@ -54,10 +56,9 @@ Source30: booleans.subs_dist
Url: http://oss.tresys.com/repos/refpolicy/
BuildRoot: %{_tmppath}/%{name}-%{version}-%{release}-root-%(%{__id_u} -n)
BuildArch: noarch
-BuildRequires: python gawk checkpolicy >= %{CHECKPOLICYVER} m4 policycoreutils-python >= %{POLICYCOREUTILSVER} bzip2
-Requires(pre): policycoreutils >= %{POLICYCOREUTILSVER} libsemanage >= 2.1.8-3
+BuildRequires: python gawk checkpolicy >= %{CHECKPOLICYVER} m4 policycoreutils-devel >= %{POLICYCOREUTILSVER} bzip2
+Requires(pre): policycoreutils >= %{POLICYCOREUTILSVER}
Requires(post): /bin/awk /usr/bin/sha512sum
-Requires: checkpolicy >= %{CHECKPOLICYVER} m4
%description
SELinux Base package
@@ -75,6 +76,8 @@ SELinux Base package
Summary: SELinux policy devel
Group: System Environment/Base
Requires(pre): selinux-policy = %{version}-%{release}
+Requires: m4 checkpolicy >= %{CHECKPOLICYVER}
+Requires: /usr/bin/make
%description devel
SELinux policy development and man page package
@@ -107,13 +110,21 @@ SELinux policy documentation package
%define makeCmds() \
make UNK_PERMS=%4 NAME=%1 TYPE=%2 DISTRO=%{distro} UBAC=n DIRECT_INITRC=%3 MONOLITHIC=%{monolithic} MLS_CATS=1024 MCS_CATS=1024 bare \
make UNK_PERMS=%4 NAME=%1 TYPE=%2 DISTRO=%{distro} UBAC=n DIRECT_INITRC=%3 MONOLITHIC=%{monolithic} MLS_CATS=1024 MCS_CATS=1024 conf \
-cp -f selinux_config/modules-%1.conf ./policy/modules.conf \
cp -f selinux_config/booleans-%1.conf ./policy/booleans.conf \
cp -f selinux_config/users-%1 ./policy/users \
+#cp -f selinux_config/modules-%1-base.conf ./policy/modules.conf \
+
+%define makeModulesConf() \
+cp -f selinux_config/modules-%1-%2.conf ./policy/modules-base.conf \
+cp -f selinux_config/modules-%1-%2.conf ./policy/modules.conf \
+if [ %3 == "contrib" ];then \
+ cp selinux_config/modules-%1-%3.conf ./policy/modules-contrib.conf; \
+ cat selinux_config/modules-%1-%3.conf >> ./policy/modules.conf; \
+fi; \
%define installCmds() \
-make UNK_PERMS=%4 NAME=%1 TYPE=%2 DISTRO=%{distro} UBAC=n DIRECT_INITRC=%3 MONOLITHIC=%{monolithic} MLS_CATS=1024 MCS_CATS=1024 base.pp \
-make validate UNK_PERMS=%4 NAME=%1 TYPE=%2 DISTRO=%{distro} UBAC=n DIRECT_INITRC=%3 MONOLITHIC=%{monolithic} MLS_CATS=1024 MCS_CATS=1024 modules \
+make UNK_PERMS=%4 NAME=%1 TYPE=%2 DISTRO=%{distro} UBAC=n DIRECT_INITRC=%3 MONOLITHIC=%{monolithic} MLS_CATS=1024 MCS_CATS=1024 SEMOD_EXP="/usr/bin/semodule_expand -a" base.pp \
+make validate UNK_PERMS=%4 NAME=%1 TYPE=%2 DISTRO=%{distro} UBAC=n DIRECT_INITRC=%3 MONOLITHIC=%{monolithic} MLS_CATS=1024 MCS_CATS=1024 SEMOD_EXP="/usr/bin/semodule_expand -a" modules \
make UNK_PERMS=%4 NAME=%1 TYPE=%2 DISTRO=%{distro} UBAC=n DIRECT_INITRC=%3 MONOLITHIC=%{monolithic} DESTDIR=%{buildroot} MLS_CATS=1024 MCS_CATS=1024 install \
make UNK_PERMS=%4 NAME=%1 TYPE=%2 DISTRO=%{distro} UBAC=n DIRECT_INITRC=%3 MONOLITHIC=%{monolithic} DESTDIR=%{buildroot} MLS_CATS=1024 MCS_CATS=1024 install-appconfig \
%{__mkdir} -p %{buildroot}/%{_sysconfdir}/selinux/%1/logins \
@@ -134,11 +145,14 @@ touch %{buildroot}%{_sysconfdir}/selinux/%1/modules/active/file_contexts.local \
touch %{buildroot}%{_sysconfdir}/selinux/%1/modules/active/nodes.local \
touch %{buildroot}%{_sysconfdir}/selinux/%1/modules/active/users_extra.local \
touch %{buildroot}%{_sysconfdir}/selinux/%1/modules/active/users.local \
+touch %{buildroot}%{_sysconfdir}/selinux/%1/modules/active/file_contexts.homedirs.bin \
+touch %{buildroot}%{_sysconfdir}/selinux/%1/modules/active/file_contexts.bin \
cp %{SOURCE30} %{buildroot}%{_sysconfdir}/selinux/%1 \
bzip2 -c %{buildroot}/%{_usr}/share/selinux/%1/base.pp > %{buildroot}/%{_sysconfdir}/selinux/%1/modules/active/base.pp \
rm -f %{buildroot}/%{_usr}/share/selinux/%1/base.pp \
for i in %{buildroot}/%{_usr}/share/selinux/%1/*.pp; do bzip2 -c $i > %{buildroot}/%{_sysconfdir}/selinux/%1/modules/active/modules/`basename $i`; done \
rm -f %{buildroot}/%{_usr}/share/selinux/%1/*pp* \
+touch %{buildroot}%{_sysconfdir}/selinux/%1/modules/active/modules/sandbox.disabled \
/usr/sbin/semodule -s %1 -n -B -p %{buildroot}; \
/usr/bin/sha512sum %{buildroot}%{_sysconfdir}/selinux/%1/policy/policy.%{POLICYVER} | cut -d' ' -f 1 > %{buildroot}%{_sysconfdir}/selinux/%1/.policy.sha512; \
rm -rf %{buildroot}%{_sysconfdir}/selinux/%1/contexts/netfilter_contexts \
@@ -168,7 +182,9 @@ rm -f %{buildroot}/%{_sysconfigdir}/selinux/%1/modules/active/policy.kern
%config(noreplace) %verify(not md5 size mtime) %{_sysconfdir}/selinux/%1/modules/active/users_extra \
%verify(not md5 size mtime) %{_sysconfdir}/selinux/%1/modules/active/homedir_template \
%verify(not md5 size mtime) %{_sysconfdir}/selinux/%1/modules/active/modules/*.pp \
+%verify(not md5 size mtime) %{_sysconfdir}/selinux/%1/modules/active/modules/sandbox.disabled \
%ghost %{_sysconfdir}/selinux/%1/modules/active/*.local \
+%ghost %{_sysconfdir}/selinux/%1/modules/active/*.bin \
%ghost %{_sysconfdir}/selinux/%1/modules/active/seusers \
%dir %{_sysconfdir}/selinux/%1/policy/ \
%verify(not md5 size mtime) %{_sysconfdir}/selinux/%1/policy/policy.%{POLICYVER} \
@@ -191,6 +207,7 @@ rm -f %{buildroot}/%{_sysconfigdir}/selinux/%1/modules/active/policy.kern
%dir %{_sysconfdir}/selinux/%1/contexts/files \
%verify(not md5 size mtime) %{_sysconfdir}/selinux/%1/contexts/files/file_contexts \
%verify(not md5 size mtime) %{_sysconfdir}/selinux/%1/contexts/files/file_contexts.homedirs \
+%ghost %{_sysconfdir}/selinux/%1/contexts/files/*.bin \
%config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/selinux/%1/contexts/files/file_contexts.local \
%config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/selinux/%1/contexts/files/file_contexts.subs \
%{_sysconfdir}/selinux/%1/contexts/files/file_contexts.subs_dist \
@@ -211,6 +228,7 @@ if [ $? = 0 -a "${SELINUXTYPE}" = %1 -a -f ${FILE_CONTEXT}.pre ]; then \
/sbin/fixfiles -C ${FILE_CONTEXT}.pre restore 2> /dev/null; \
/sbin/restorecon -e /run/media -R /root /var/log /var/run /etc/passwd* /etc/group* 2> /dev/null; \
rm -f ${FILE_CONTEXT}.pre; \
+ restorecon -R /home/*/.cache /home/*/.config; \
fi;
%define preInstall() \
@@ -234,11 +252,13 @@ fi;
. %{_sysconfdir}/selinux/config; \
if [ -e /etc/selinux/%2/.rebuild ]; then \
rm /etc/selinux/%2/.rebuild; \
+ (cd /etc/selinux/%2/modules/active/modules; rm -f qemu.pp nsplugin.pp razor.pp pyzord.pp phpfpm.pp hotplug.pp consoletype.pp kudzu.pp howl.pp) \
if [ %1 -ne 1 ]; then \
- /usr/sbin/semodule -n -s %2 -r xfs kudzu kerneloops execmem openoffice ada tzdata hal hotplug howl java mono moilscanner gamin audio_entropy audioentropy iscsid polkit_auth polkit rtkit_daemon ModemManager telepathysofiasip ethereal passanger qpidd pyzor razor 2>/dev/null; \
+ /usr/sbin/semodule -n -s %2 -r matahari xfs kudzu kerneloops execmem openoffice ada tzdata hal hotplug howl java mono moilscanner gamin audio_entropy audioentropy iscsid polkit_auth polkit rtkit_daemon ModemManager telepathysofiasip ethereal passanger qpidd pyzor razor pki-selinux phpfpm consoletype 2>/dev/null; \
fi \
- rm -f /etc/selinux/%2/modules/active/modules/qemu.pp /etc/selinux/%2/modules/active/modules/nsplugin.pp /etc/selinux/%2/modules/active/modules/razor.pp /etc/selinux/%2/modules/active/modules/pyzord.pp \
/usr/sbin/semodule -B -n -s %2; \
+else \
+ touch /etc/selinux/%2/modules/active/modules/sandbox.disabled \
fi; \
[ "${SELINUXTYPE}" == "%2" ] && selinuxenabled && load_policy; \
if [ %1 -eq 1 ]; then \
@@ -248,7 +268,10 @@ else \
fi;
%define modulesList() \
-awk '$1 !~ "/^#/" && $2 == "=" && $3 == "module" { printf "%%s.pp ", $1 }' ./policy/modules.conf > %{buildroot}/%{_usr}/share/selinux/%1/modules.lst \
+awk '$1 !~ "/^#/" && $2 == "=" && $3 == "module" { printf "%%s.pp ", $1 }' ./policy/modules-base.conf > %{buildroot}/%{_usr}/share/selinux/%1/modules-base.lst \
+if [ -e ./policy/modules-contrib.conf ];then \
+ awk '$1 !~ "/^#/" && $2 == "=" && $3 == "module" { printf "%%s.pp ", $1 }' ./policy/modules-contrib.conf > %{buildroot}/%{_usr}/share/selinux/%1/modules-contrib.lst; \
+fi;
%description
SELinux Reference Policy - modular.
@@ -267,7 +290,7 @@ cp $contrib_path/* $refpolicy_path/policy/modules/contrib
%install
mkdir selinux_config
-for i in %{SOURCE1} %{SOURCE2} %{SOURCE3} %{SOURCE4} %{SOURCE5} %{SOURCE6} %{SOURCE8} %{SOURCE14} %{SOURCE15} %{SOURCE16} %{SOURCE17} %{SOURCE18} %{SOURCE19} %{SOURCE20} %{SOURCE21} %{SOURCE22} %{SOURCE23} %{SOURCE25} %{SOURCE26};do
+for i in %{SOURCE1} %{SOURCE2} %{SOURCE3} %{SOURCE4} %{SOURCE5} %{SOURCE6} %{SOURCE8} %{SOURCE14} %{SOURCE15} %{SOURCE17} %{SOURCE18} %{SOURCE19} %{SOURCE20} %{SOURCE21} %{SOURCE22} %{SOURCE23} %{SOURCE25} %{SOURCE26} %{SOURCE31} %{SOURCE32};do
cp $i selinux_config
done
tar zxvf selinux_config/config.tgz
@@ -291,7 +314,9 @@ make clean
mkdir -p %{buildroot}%{_usr}/share/selinux/targeted
cp %{SOURCE28} %{buildroot}/%{_usr}/share/selinux/targeted
%makeCmds targeted mcs n allow
+%makeModulesConf targeted base contrib
%installCmds targeted mcs n allow
+%modulesList targeted
%endif
%if %{BUILD_MINIMUM}
@@ -300,6 +325,7 @@ cp %{SOURCE28} %{buildroot}/%{_usr}/share/selinux/targeted
mkdir -p %{buildroot}%{_usr}/share/selinux/minimum
cp %{SOURCE28} %{buildroot}/%{_usr}/share/selinux/minimum
%makeCmds minimum mcs n allow
+%makeModulesConf targeted base contrib
%installCmds minimum mcs n allow
%modulesList minimum
%endif
@@ -307,7 +333,9 @@ cp %{SOURCE28} %{buildroot}/%{_usr}/share/selinux/minimum
%if %{BUILD_MLS}
# Build mls policy
%makeCmds mls mls n deny
+%makeModulesConf mls base contrib
%installCmds mls mls n deny
+%modulesList mls
%endif
mkdir -p %{buildroot}%{_mandir}
@@ -384,6 +412,7 @@ Obsoletes: mod_fcgid-selinux <= %{version}-%{release}
Obsoletes: cachefilesd-selinux <= 0.10-1
Conflicts: seedit
Conflicts: 389-ds-base < 1.2.7, 389-admin < 1.1.12
+Conflicts: pki-selinux < 10-0.0-0.45.b1
%description targeted
SELinux Reference policy targeted base module.
@@ -403,6 +432,8 @@ exit 0
%defattr(-,root,root,-)
%config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/selinux/targeted/contexts/users/unconfined_u
%fileList targeted
+%{_usr}/share/selinux/targeted/modules-base.lst
+%{_usr}/share/selinux/targeted/modules-contrib.lst
%endif
%if %{BUILD_MINIMUM}
@@ -422,18 +453,18 @@ SELinux Reference policy minimum base module.
%pre minimum
%preInstall minimum
if [ $1 -ne 1 ]; then
- /usr/sbin/semodule -s minimum -l 2>/dev/null | awk '{ print $1 }' > /usr/share/selinux/minimum/instmodules.lst
+ /usr/sbin/semodule -s minimum -l 2>/dev/null | awk '{ if ($3 != "Disabled") print $1; }' > /usr/share/selinux/minimum/instmodules.lst
fi
%post minimum
-allpackages=`cat /usr/share/selinux/minimum/modules.lst`
+contribpackages=`cat /usr/share/selinux/minimum/modules-contrib.lst`
+basepackages=`cat /usr/share/selinux/minimum/modules-base.lst`
if [ $1 -eq 1 ]; then
-packages="clock.pp execmem.pp unconfined.pp unconfineduser.pp application.pp userdomain.pp authlogin.pp logging.pp selinuxutil.pp init.pp systemd.pp sysnetwork.pp miscfiles.pp libraries.pp modutils.pp sysadm.pp locallogin.pp dbus.pp rpm.pp mount.pp fstools.pp usermanage.pp mta.pp"
-for p in $allpackages; do
- touch /etc/selinux/minimum/modules/active/modules/$p.disabled
+for p in $contribpackages; do
+ touch /etc/selinux/minimum/modules/active/modules/$p.disabled
done
-for p in $packages; do
- rm -f /etc/selinux/minimum/modules/active/modules/$p.disabled
+for p in $basepackages apache.pp dbus.pp inetd.pp kerberos.pp mta.pp nis.pp; do
+ rm -f /etc/selinux/minimum/modules/active/modules/$p.disabled
done
/usr/sbin/semanage -S minimum -i - << __eof
login -m -s unconfined_u -r s0-s0:c0.c1023 __default__
@@ -443,10 +474,10 @@ __eof
/usr/sbin/semodule -B -s minimum
else
instpackages=`cat /usr/share/selinux/minimum/instmodules.lst`
-for p in $allpackages; do
+for p in $contribpackages; do
touch /etc/selinux/minimum/modules/active/modules/$p.disabled
done
-for p in $instpackages; do
+for p in $instpackages apache dbus inetd kerberos mta nis; do
rm -f /etc/selinux/minimum/modules/active/modules/$p.pp.disabled
done
/usr/sbin/semodule -B -s minimum
@@ -458,7 +489,8 @@ exit 0
%defattr(-,root,root,-)
%config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/selinux/minimum/contexts/users/unconfined_u
%fileList minimum
-%{_usr}/share/selinux/minimum/modules.lst
+%{_usr}/share/selinux/minimum/modules-base.lst
+%{_usr}/share/selinux/minimum/modules-contrib.lst
%endif
%if %{BUILD_MLS}
@@ -487,12 +519,668 @@ SELinux Reference policy mls base module.
%defattr(-,root,root,-)
%config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/selinux/mls/contexts/users/unconfined_u
%fileList mls
-
+%{_usr}/share/selinux/mls/modules-base.lst
+%{_usr}/share/selinux/mls/modules-contrib.lst
%endif
%changelog
-* Tue Aug 8 2012 Dan Walsh <dwalshl at redhat.com> 3.11.1-3.1
-- Update with fixes for SECure linux containers
+* Mon Dec 17 2012 Miroslav Grepl <mgrepl at redhat.com> 3.11.1-66
+- Allow munin disk plugins to get attributes of all directories
+- Allow munin disk plugins to get attributes of all directorie
+- Allow logwatch to get attributes of all directories
+- Fix networkmanager_manage_lib() interface
+- Fix gnome_manage_config() to allow to manage sock_file
+- Fix virtual_domain_context
+- Add support for dynamic DNS for DHCPv6
+
+* Sat Dec 15 2012 Miroslav Grepl <mgrepl at redhat.com> 3.11.1-65
+- Allow svirt to use netlink_route_socket which was a part of auth_use_nsswitch
+- Add additional labeling for /var/www/openshift/broker
+- Fix rhev policy
+- Allow openshift_initrc domain to dbus chat with systemd_logind
+- Allow httpd to getattr passenger log file if run_stickshift
+- Allow consolehelper-gtk to connect to xserver
+- Add labeling for the tmp-inst directory defined in pam_namespace.conf
+- Add lvm_metadata_t labeling for /etc/multipath
+
+* Fri Dec 14 2012 Miroslav Grepl <mgrepl at redhat.com> 3.11.1-64
+- consoletype is no longer used
+
+* Wed Dec 12 2012 Miroslav Grepl <mgrepl at redhat.com> 3.11.1-63
+- Add label for efivarfs
+- Allow certmonger to send signal to itself
+- Allow plugin-config to read own process status
+- Add more fixes for pacemaker
+- apache/drupal can run clamscan on uploaded content
+- Allow chrome_sandbox_nacl_t to read pid 1 content
+
+* Tue Dec 11 2012 Miroslav Grepl <mgrepl at redhat.com> 3.11.1-62
+- Fix MCS Constraints to control ingres and egres controls on the network.
+- Change name of svirt_nokvm_t to svirt_tcg_t
+- Allow tuned to request the kernel to load kernel modules
+
+* Mon Dec 10 2012 Miroslav Grepl <mgrepl at redhat.com> 3.11.1-61
+- Label /var/lib/pgsql/.ssh as ssh_home_t
+- Add labeling for /usr/bin/pg_ctl
+- Allow systemd-logind to manage keyring user tmp dirs
+- Add support for 7389/tcp port
+- gems seems to be placed in lots of places
+- Since xdm is running a full session, it seems to be trying to execute lots of executables via dbus
+- Add back tcp/8123 port as http_cache port
+- Add ovirt-guest-agent\.pid labeling
+- Allow xend to run scsi_id
+- Allow rhsmcertd-worker to read "physical_package_id"
+- Allow pki_tomcat to connect to ldap port
+- Allow lpr to read /usr/share/fonts
+- Allow open file from CD/DVD drive on domU
+- Allow munin services plugins to talk to SSSD
+- Allow all samba domains to create samba directory in var_t directories
+- Take away svirt_t ability to use nsswitch
+- Dontaudit attempts by openshift to read apache logs
+- Allow apache to create as well as append _ra_content_t
+- Dontaudit sendmail_t reading a leaked file descriptor
+- Add interface to have admin transition /etc/prelink.cache to the proper label
+- Add sntp support to ntp policy
+- Allow firewalld to dbus chat with devicekit_power
+- Allow tuned to call lsblk
+- Allow tor to read /proc/sys/kernel/random/uuid
+- Add tor_can_network_relay boolean
+
+* Wed Dec 5 2012 Miroslav Grepl <mgrepl at redhat.com> 3.11.1-60
+- Add openshift_initrc_signal() interface
+- Fix typos
+- dspam port is treat as spamd_port_t
+- Allow setroubleshoot to getattr on all executables
+- Allow tuned to execute profiles scripts in /etc/tuned
+- Allow apache to create directories to store its log files
+- Allow all directories/files in /var/log starting with passenger to be labeled passenger_log_t
+- Looks like apache is sending sinal to openshift_initrc_t now,needs back port to RHEL6
+- Allow Postfix to be configured to listen on TCP port 10026 for email from DSPAM
+- Add filename transition for /etc/tuned/active_profile
+- Allow condor_master to send mails
+- Allow condor_master to read submit.cf
+- Allow condor_master to create /tmp files/dirs
+- Allow condor_mater to send sigkill to other condor domains
+- Allow condor_procd sigkill capability
+- tuned-adm wants to talk with tuned daemon
+- Allow kadmind and krb5kdc to also list sssd_public_t
+- Allow accountsd to dbus chat with init
+- Fix git_read_generic_system_content_files() interface
+- pppd wants sys_nice by nmcli because of "syscall=sched_setscheduler"
+- Fix mozilla_plugin_can_network_connect to allow to connect to all ports
+- Label all munin plugins which are not covered by munin plugins policy as unconfined_munin_plugin_exec_t
+- dspam wants to search /var/spool for opendkim data
+- Revert "Add support for tcp/10026 port as dspam_port_t"
+- Turning on labeled networking requires additional access for netlabel_peer_t; these allow rules need to be back ported to RHEL6
+- Allow all application domains to use fifo_files passed in from userdomains, also allow them to write to tmp_files inherited from userdomain
+- Allow systemd_tmpfiles_t to setattr on mandb_cache_t
+
+* Sat Dec 1 2012 Miroslav Grepl <mgrepl at redhat.com> 3.11.1-59
+- consolekit.pp was not removed from the postinstall script
+
+* Fri Nov 30 2012 Miroslav Grepl <mgrepl at redhat.com> 3.11.1-58
+- Add back consolekit policy
+- Silence bootloader trying to use inherited tty
+- Silence xdm_dbusd_t trying to execute telepathy apps
+- Fix shutdown avcs when machine has unconfined.pp disabled
+- The host and a virtual machine can share the same printer on a usb device
+- Change oddjob to transition to a ranged openshift_initr_exec_t when run from oddjob
+- Allow abrt_watch_log_t to execute bin_t
+- Allow chrome sandbox to write content in ~/.config/chromium
+- Dontaudit setattr on fontconfig dir for thumb_t
+- Allow lircd to request the kernel to load module
+- Make rsync as userdom_home_manager
+- Allow rsync to search automount filesystem
+- Add fixes for pacemaker
+
+* Wed Nov 28 2012 Miroslav Grepl <mgrepl at redhat.com> 3.11.1-57
+- Add support for 4567/tcp port
+- Random fixes from Tuomo Soini
+- xdm wants to get init status
+- Allow programs to run in fips_mode
+- Add interface to allow the reading of all blk device nodes
+- Allow init to relabel rpcbind sock_file
+- Fix labeling for lastlog and faillog related to logrotate
+- ALlow aeolus_configserver to use TRAM port
+- Add fixes for aeolus_configserver
+- Allow snmpd to connect to snmp port
+- Allow spamd_update to create spamd_var_lib_t directories
+- Allow domains that can read sssd_public_t files to also list the directory
+- Remove miscfiles_read_localization, this is defined for all domains
+
+* Mon Nov 26 2012 Miroslav Grepl <mgrepl at redhat.com> 3.11.1-56
+- Allow syslogd to request the kernel to load a module
+- Allow syslogd_t to read the network state information
+- Allow xdm_dbusd_t connect to the system DBUS
+- Add support for 7389/tcp port
+- Allow domains to read/write all inherited sockets
+- Allow staff_t to read kmsg
+- Add awstats_purge_apache_log boolean
+- Allow ksysguardproces to read /.config/Trolltech.conf
+- Allow passenger to create and append puppet log files
+- Add puppet_append_log and puppet_create_log interfaces
+- Add puppet_manage_log() interface
+- Allow tomcat domain to search tomcat_var_lib_t
+- Allow pki_tomcat_t to connect to pki_ca ports
+- Allow pegasus_t to have net_admin capability
+- Allow pegasus_t to write /sys/class/net/<interface>/flags
+- Allow mailserver_delivery to manage mail_home_rw_t lnk_files
+- Allow fetchmail to create log files
+- Allow gnomeclock to manage home config in .kde
+- Allow bittlebee to read kernel sysctls
+- Allow logrotate to list /root
+
+* Mon Nov 19 2012 Miroslav Grepl <mgrepl at redhat.com> 3.11.1-55
+- Fix userhelper_console_role_template()
+- Allow enabling Network Access Point service using blueman
+- Make vmware_host_t as unconfined domain
+- Allow authenticate users in webaccess via squid, using mysql as backend
+- Allow gathers to get various metrics on mounted file systems
+- Allow firewalld to read /etc/hosts
+- Fix cron_admin_role() to make sysadm cronjobs running in the sysadm_t instead of cronjob_t
+- Allow kdumpgui to read/write to zipl.conf
+- Commands needed to get mock to build from staff_t in enforcing mode
+- Allow mdadm_t to manage cgroup files
+- Allow all daemons and systemprocesses to use inherited initrc_tmp_t files
+- dontaudit ifconfig_t looking at fifo_files that are leaked to it
+- Add lableing for Quest Authentication System
+
+* Thu Nov 15 2012 Miroslav Grepl <mgrepl at redhat.com> 3.11.1-54
+- Fix filetrans interface definitions
+- Dontaudit xdm_t to getattr on BOINC lib files
+- Add systemd_reload_all_services() interface
+- Dontaudit write access on /var/lib/net-snmp/mib_indexes
+- Only stop mcsuntrustedproc from relableing files
+- Allow accountsd to dbus chat with gdm
+- Allow realmd to getattr on all fs
+- Allow logrotate to reload all services
+- Add systemd unit file for radiusd
+- Allow winbind to create samba pid dir
+- Add labeling for /var/nmbd/unexpected
+- Allow chrome and mozilla plugin to connect to msnp ports
+
+* Mon Nov 12 2012 Miroslav Grepl <mgrepl at redhat.com> 3.11.1-53
+- Fix storage_rw_inherited_fixed_disk_dev() to cover also blk_file
+- Dontaudit setfiles reading /dev/random
+- On initial boot gnomeclock is going to need to be set buy gdm
+- Fix tftp_read_content() interface
+- Random apps looking at kernel file systems
+- Testing virt with lxc requiers additional access for virsh_t
+- New allow rules requied for latest libvirt, libvirt talks directly to journald,lxc setup tool needs compromize_kernel,and we need ipc_lock in the container
+- Allow MPD to read /dev/radnom
+- Allow sandbox_web_type to read logind files which needs to read pulseaudio
+- Allow mozilla plugins to read /dev/hpet
+- Add labeling for /var/lib/zarafa-webap
+- Allow BOINC client to use an HTTP proxy for all connections
+- Allow rhsmertd to domain transition to dmidecod
+- Allow setroubleshootd to send D-Bus msg to ABRT
+
+* Thu Nov 8 2012 Miroslav Grepl <mgrepl at redhat.com> 3.11.1-52
+- Define usbtty_device_t as a term_tty
+- Allow svnserve to accept a connection
+- Allow xend manage default virt_image_t type
+- Allow prelink_cron_system_t to overide user componant when executing cp
+- Add labeling for z-push
+- Gnomeclock sets the realtime clock
+- Openshift seems to be storing apache logs in /var/lib/openshift/.log/httpd
+- Allow lxc domains to use /dev/random and /dev/urandom
+
+* Wed Nov 7 2012 Miroslav Grepl <mgrepl at redhat.com> 3.11.1-51
+- Add port defintion for tcp/9000
+- Fix labeling for /usr/share/cluster/checkquorum to label also checkquorum.wdmd
+- Add rules and labeling for $HOME/cache/\.gstreamer-.* directory
+- Add support for CIM provider openlmi-networking which uses NetworkManager dbus API
+- Allow shorewall_t to create netlink_socket
+- Allow krb5admind to block suspend
+- Fix labels on /var/run/dlm_controld /var/log/dlm_controld
+- Allow krb5kdc to block suspend
+- gnomessytemmm_t needs to read /etc/passwd
+- Allow cgred to read all sysctls
+
+* Tue Nov 5 2012 Miroslav Grepl <mgrepl at redhat.com> 3.11.1-50
+- Allow all domains to read /proc/sys/vm/overcommit_memory
+- Make proc_numa_t an MLS Trusted Object
+- Add /proc/numactl support for confined users
+- Allow ssh_t to connect to any port > 1023
+- Add openvswitch domain
+- Pulseaudio tries to create directories in gnome_home_t directories
+- New ypbind pkg wants to search /var/run which is caused by sd_notify
+- Allow NM to read certs on NFS/CIFS using use_nfs_*, use_samba_* booleans
+- Allow sanlock to read /dev/random
+- Treat php-fpm with httpd_t
+- Allow domains that can read named_conf_t to be able to list the directories
+- Allow winbind to create sock files in /var/run/samba
+
+* Thu Nov 1 2012 Miroslav Grepl <mgrepl at redhat.com> 3.11.1-49
+- Add smsd policy
+- Add support for OpenShift sbin labelin
+- Add boolean to allow virt to use rawip
+- Allow mozilla_plugin to read all file systems with noxattrs support
+- Allow kerberos to write on anon_inodefs fs
+- Additional access required by fenced
+- Add filename transitions for passwd.lock/group.lock
+- UPdate man pages
+- Create coolkey directory in /var/cache with the correct label
+
+* Tue Oct 30 2012 Miroslav Grepl <mgrepl at redhat.com> 3.11.1-48
+- Fix label on /etc/group.lock
+- Allow gnomeclock to create lnk_file in /etc
+- label /root/.pki as a home_cert_t
+- Add interface to make sure rpcbind.sock is created with the correct label
+- Add definition for new directory /var/lib/os-probe and bootloader wants to read udev rules
+- opendkim should be a part of milter
+- Allow libvirt to set the kernel sched algorythm
+- Allow mongod to read sysfs_t
+- Add authconfig policy
+- Remove calls to miscfiles_read_localization all domains get this
+- Allow virsh_t to read /root/.pki/ content
+- Add label for log directory under /var/www/stickshift
+
+* Mon Oct 29 2012 Miroslav Grepl <mgrepl at redhat.com> 3.11.1-47
+- Allow getty to setattr on usb ttys
+- Allow sshd to search all directories for sshd_home_t content
+- Allow staff domains to send dbus messages to kdumpgui
+- Fix labels on /etc/.pwd.lock and friends to be passwd_file_t
+- Dontaudit setfiles reading urand
+- Add files_dontaudit_list_tmp() for domains to which we added sys_nice/setsched
+- Allow staff_gkeyringd_t to read /home/$USER/.local/share/keyrings dir
+- Allow systemd-timedated to read /dev/urandom
+- Allow entropyd_t to read proc_t (meminfo)
+- Add unconfined munin plugin
+- Fix networkmanager_read_conf() interface
+- Allow blueman to list /tmp which is needed by sys_nic/setsched
+- Fix label of /etc/mail/aliasesdb-stamp
+- numad is searching cgroups
+- realmd is communicating with networkmanager using dbus
+- Lots of fixes to try to get kdump to work
+
+* Fri Oct 26 2012 Miroslav Grepl <mgrepl at redhat.com> 3.11.1-46
+- Allow loging programs to dbus chat with realmd
+- Make apache_content_template calling as optional
+- realmd is using policy kit
+
+* Fri Oct 26 2012 Miroslav Grepl <mgrepl at redhat.com> 3.11.1-45
+- Add new selinuxuser_use_ssh_chroot boolean
+- dbus needs to be able to read/write inherited fixed disk device_t passed through it
+- Cleanup netutils process allow rule
+- Dontaudit leaked fifo files from openshift to ping
+- sanlock needs to read mnt_t lnk files
+- Fail2ban needs to setsched and sys_nice
+
+* Wed Oct 24 2012 Miroslav Grepl <mgrepl at redhat.com> 3.11.1-44
+- Change default label of all files in /var/run/rpcbind
+- Allow sandbox domains (java) to read hugetlbfs_t
+- Allow awstats cgi content to create tmp files and read apache log files
+- Allow setuid/setgid for cupsd-config
+- Allow setsched/sys_nice pro cupsd-config
+- Fix /etc/localtime sym link to be labeled locale_t
+- Allow sshd to search postgresql db t since this is a homedir
+- Allow xwindows users to chat with realmd
+- Allow unconfined domains to configure all files and null_device_t service
+
+* Tue Oct 23 2012 Miroslav Grepl <mgrepl at redhat.com> 3.11.1-43
+- Adopt pki-selinux policy
+
+* Mon Oct 22 2012 Miroslav Grepl <mgrepl at redhat.com> 3.11.1-42
+- pki is leaking which we dontaudit until a pki code fix
+- Allow setcap for arping
+- Update man pages
+- Add labeling for /usr/sbin/mcollectived
+- pki fixes
+- Allow smokeping to execute fping in the netutils_t domain
+
+* Fri Oct 19 2012 Miroslav Grepl <mgrepl at redhat.com> 3.11.1-41
+- Allow mount to relabelfrom unlabeled file systems
+- systemd_logind wants to send and receive messages from devicekit disk over dbus to make connected mouse working
+- Add label to get bin files under libreoffice labeled correctly
+- Fix interface to allow executing of base_ro_file_type
+- Add fixes for realmd
+- Update pki policy
+- Add tftp_homedir boolean
+- Allow blueman sched_setscheduler
+- openshift user domains wants to r/w ssh tcp sockets
+
+* Wed Oct 17 2012 Miroslav Grepl <mgrepl at redhat.com> 3.11.1-40
+- Additional requirements for disable unconfined module when booting
+- Fix label of systemd script files
+- semanage can use -F /dev/stdin to get input
+- syslog now uses kerberos keytabs
+- Allow xserver to compromise_kernel access
+- Allow nfsd to write to mount_var_run_t when running the mount command
+- Add filename transition rule for bin_t directories
+- Allow files to read usr_t lnk_files
+- dhcpc wants chown
+- Add support for new openshift labeling
+- Clean up for tunable+optional statements
+- Add labeling for /usr/sbin/mkhomedir_helper
+- Allow antivirus domain to managa amavis spool files
+- Allow rpcbind_t to read passwd
+- Allow pyzor running as spamc to manage amavis spool
+
+
+* Tue Oct 16 2012 Miroslav Grepl <mgrepl at redhat.com> 3.11.1-39
+- Add interfaces to read kernel_t proc info
+- Missed this version of exec_all
+- Allow anyone who can load a kernel module to compromise kernel
+- Add oddjob_dbus_chat to openshift apache policy
+- Allow chrome_sandbox_nacl_t to send signals to itself
+- Add unit file support to usbmuxd_t
+- Allow all openshift domains to read sysfs info
+- Allow openshift domains to getattr on all domains
+
+* Fri Oct 12 2012 Miroslav Grepl <mgrepl at redhat.com> 3.11.1-38
+- MLS fixes from Dan
+- Fix name of capability2 secure_firmware->compromise_kerne
+
+* Thu Oct 11 2012 Miroslav Grepl <mgrepl at redhat.com> 3.11.1-37
+- Allow xdm to search all file systems
+- Add interface to allow the config of all files
+- Add rngd policy
+- Remove kgpg as a gpg_exec_t type
+- Allow plymouthd to block suspend
+- Allow systemd_dbus to config any file
+- Allow system_dbus_t to configure all services
+- Allow freshclam_t to read usr_files
+- varnishd requires execmem to load modules
+
+* Thu Oct 11 2012 Miroslav Grepl <mgrepl at redhat.com> 3.11.1-36
+- Allow semanage to verify types
+- Allow sudo domain to execute user home files
+- Allow session_bus_type to transition to user_tmpfs_t
+- Add dontaudit caused by yum updates
+- Implement pki policy but not activated
+
+* Wed Oct 10 2012 Miroslav Grepl <mgrepl at redhat.com> 3.11.1-35
+- tuned wants to getattr on all filesystems
+- tuned needs also setsched. The build is needed for test day
+
+* Wed Oct 10 2012 Miroslav Grepl <mgrepl at redhat.com> 3.11.1-34
+- Add policy for qemu-qa
+- Allow razor to write own config files
+- Add an initial antivirus policy to collect all antivirus program
+- Allow qdisk to read usr_t
+- Add additional caps for vmware_host
+- Allow tmpfiles_t to setattr on mandb_cache_t
+- Dontaudit leaked files into mozilla_plugin_config_t
+- Allow wdmd to getattr on tmpfs
+- Allow realmd to use /dev/random
+- allow containers to send audit messages
+- Allow root mount any file via loop device with enforcing mls policy
+- Allow tmpfiles_t to setattr on mandb_cache_t
+- Allow tmpfiles_t to setattr on mandb_cache_t
+- Make userdom_dontaudit_write_all_ not allow open
+- Allow init scripts to read all unit files
+- Add support for saphostctrl ports
+
+* Mon Oct 8 2012 Miroslav Grepl <mgrepl at redhat.com> 3.11.1-33
+- Add kernel_read_system_state to sandbox_client_t
+- Add some of the missing access to kdumpgui
+- Allow systemd_dbusd_t to status the init system
+- Allow vmnet-natd to request the kernel to load a module
+- Allow gsf-office-thum to append .cache/gdm/session.log
+- realmd wants to read .config/dconf/user
+- Firewalld wants sys_nice/setsched
+- Allow tmpreaper to delete mandb cache files
+- Firewalld wants sys_nice/setsched
+- Allow firewalld to perform a DNS name resolution
+- Allown winbind to read /usr/share/samba/codepages/lowcase.dat
+- Add support for HTTPProxy* in /etc/freshclam.conf
+- Fix authlogin_yubike boolean
+- Extend smbd_selinux man page to include samba booleans
+- Allow dhcpc to execute consoletype
+- Allow ping to use inherited tmp files created in init scripts
+- On full relabel with unconfined domain disabled, initrc was running some chcon's
+- Allow people who delete man pages to delete mandb cache files
+
+* Thu Oct 4 2012 Miroslav Grepl <mgrepl at redhat.com> 3.11.1-32
+- Add missing permissive domains
+
+* Thu Oct 4 2012 Miroslav Grepl <mgrepl at redhat.com> 3.11.1-31
+- Add new mandb policy
+- ALlow systemd-tmpfiles_t to relabel mandb_cache_t
+- Allow logrotate to start all unit files
+
+* Thu Oct 4 2012 Miroslav Grepl <mgrepl at redhat.com> 3.11.1-30
+- Add fixes for ctbd
+- Allow nmbd to stream connect to ctbd
+- Make cglear_t as nsswitch_domain
+- Fix bogus in interfaces
+- Allow openshift to read/write postfix public pipe
+- Add postfix_manage_spool_maildrop_files() interface
+- stickshift paths have been renamed to openshift
+- gnome-settings-daemon wants to write to /run/systemd/inhibit/ pipes
+- Update man pages, adding ENTRYPOINTS
+
+* Tue Oct 2 2012 Miroslav Grepl <mgrepl at redhat.com> 3.11.1-29
+- Add mei_device_t
+- Make sure gpg content in homedir created with correct label
+- Allow dmesg to write to abrt cache files
+- automount wants to search virtual memory sysctls
+- Add support for hplip logs stored in /var/log/hp/tmp
+- Add labeling for /etc/owncloud/config.php
+- Allow setroubleshoot to send analysys to syslogd-journal
+- Allow virsh_t to interact with new fenced daemon
+- Allow gpg to write to /etc/mail/spamassassiin directories
+- Make dovecot_deliver_t a mail server delivery type
+- Add label for /var/tmp/DNS25
+
+* Thu Sep 27 2012 Miroslav Grepl <mgrepl at redhat.com> 3.11.1-28
+- Fixes for tomcat_domain template interface
+
+* Thu Sep 27 2012 Miroslav Grepl <mgrepl at redhat.com> 3.11.1-27
+- Remove init_systemd and init_upstart boolean, Move init_daemon_domain and init_system_domain to use attributes
+- Add attribute to all base os types. Allow all domains to read all ro base OS types
+
+* Wed Sep 26 2012 Miroslav Grepl <mgrepl at redhat.com> 3.11.1-26
+- Additional unit files to be defined as power unit files
+- Fix more boolean names
+
+* Tue Sep 25 2012 Miroslav Grepl <mgrepl at redhat.com> 3.11.1-25
+- Fix boolean name so subs will continue to work
+
+* Tue Sep 25 2012 Miroslav Grepl <mgrepl at redhat.com> 3.11.1-24
+- dbus needs to start getty unit files
+- Add interface to allow system_dbusd_t to start the poweroff service
+- xdm wants to exec telepathy apps
+- Allow users to send messages to systemdlogind
+- Additional rules needed for systemd and other boot apps
+- systemd wants to list /home and /boot
+- Allow gkeyringd to write dbus/conf file
+- realmd needs to read /dev/urand
+- Allow readahead to delete /.readahead if labeled root_t, might get created before policy is loaded
+
+* Thu Sep 20 2012 Miroslav Grepl <mgrepl at redhat.com> 3.11.1-23
+- Fixes to safe more rules
+- Re-write tomcat_domain_template()
+- Fix passenger labeling
+- Allow all domains to read man pages
+- Add ephemeral_port_t to the 'generic' port interfaces
+- Fix the names of postgresql booleans
+
+* Tue Sep 18 2012 Miroslav Grepl <mgrepl at redhat.com> 3.11.1-22
+- Stop using attributes form netlabel_peer and syslog, auth_use_nsswitch setsup netlabel_peer
+- Move netlable_peer check out of booleans
+- Remove call to recvfrom_netlabel for kerberos call
+- Remove use of attributes when calling syslog call
+- Move -miscfiles_read_localization to domain.te to save hundreds of allow rules
+- Allow all domains to read locale files. This eliminates around 1500 allow rules- Cleanup nis_use_ypbind_uncond interface
+- Allow rndc to block suspend
+- tuned needs to modify the schedule of the kernel
+- Allow svirt_t domains to read alsa configuration files
+- ighten security on irc domains and make sure they label content in homedir correctly
+- Add filetrans_home_content for irc files
+- Dontaudit all getattr access for devices and filesystems for sandbox domains
+- Allow stapserver to search cgroups directories
+- Allow all postfix domains to talk to spamd
+
+* Mon Sep 17 2012 Miroslav Grepl <mgrepl at redhat.com> 3.11.1-21
+- Add interfaces to ignore setattr until kernel fixes this to be checked after the DAC check
+- Change pam_t to pam_timestamp_t
+- Add dovecot_domain attribute and allow this attribute block_suspend capability2
+- Add sanlock_use_fusefs boolean
+- numad wants send/recieve msg
+- Allow rhnsd to send syslog msgs
+- Make piranha-pulse as initrc domain
+- Update openshift instances to dontaudit setattr until the kernel is fixed.
+
+* Fri Sep 14 2012 Miroslav Grepl <mgrepl at redhat.com> 3.11.1-20
+- Fix auth_login_pgm_domain() interface to allow domains also managed user tmp dirs because of #856880 related to pam_systemd
+- Remove pam_selinux.8 which conflicts with man page owned by the pam package
+- Allow glance-api to talk to mysql
+- ABRT wants to read Xorg.0.log if if it detects problem with Xorg
+- Fix gstreamer filename trans. interface
+
+* Thu Sep 13 2012 Miroslav Grepl <mgrepl at redhat.com> 3.11.1-19
+- Man page fixes by Dan Walsh
+
+* Tue Sep 11 2012 Miroslav Grepl <mgrepl at redhat.com> 3.11.1-18
+- Allow postalias to read postfix config files
+- Allow man2html to read man pages
+- Allow rhev-agentd to search all mountpoints
+- Allow rhsmcertd to read /dev/random
+- Add tgtd_stream_connect() interface
+- Add cyrus_write_data() interface
+- Dontaudit attempts by sandboxX clients connectiing to the xserver_port_t
+- Add port definition for tcp/81 as http_port_t
+- Fix /dev/twa labeling
+- Allow systemd to read modules config
+
+* Mon Sep 10 2012 Miroslav Grepl <mgrepl at redhat.com> 3.11.1-17
+- Merge openshift policy
+- Allow xauth to read /dev/urandom
+- systemd needs to relabel content in /run/systemd directories
+- Files unconfined should be able to perform all services on all files
+- Puppet tmp file can be leaked to all domains
+- Dontaudit rhsmcertd-worker to search /root/.local
+- Allow chown capability for zarafa domains
+- Allow system cronjobs to runcon into openshift domains
+- Allow virt_bridgehelper_t to manage content in the svirt_home_t labeled directories
+
+* Fri Sep 7 2012 Miroslav Grepl <mgrepl at redhat.com> 3.11.1-16
+- nmbd wants to create /var/nmbd
+- Stop transitioning out of anaconda and firstboot, just causes AVC messages
+- Allow clamscan to read /etc files
+- Allow bcfg2 to bind cyphesis port
+- heartbeat should be run as rgmanager_t instead of corosync_t
+- Add labeling for /etc/openldap/certs
+- Add labeling for /opt/sartest directory
+- Make crontab_t as userdom home reader
+- Allow tmpreaper to list admin_home dir
+- Add defition for imap_0 replay cache file
+- Add support for gitolite3
+- Allow virsh_t to send syslog messages
+- allow domains that can read samba content to be able to list the directories also
+- Add realmd_dbus_chat to allow all apps that use nsswitch to talk to realmd
+- Separate out sandbox from sandboxX policy so we can disable it by default
+- Run dmeventd as lvm_t
+- Mounting on any directory requires setattr and write permissions
+- Fix use_nfs_home_dirs() boolean
+- New labels for pam_krb5
+- Allow init and initrc domains to sys_ptrace since this is needed to look at processes not owned by uid 0
+- Add realmd_dbus_chat to allow all apps that use nsswitch to talk to realmd
+
+* Fri Aug 31 2012 Dan Walsh <dwalsh at redhat.com> 3.11.1-15
+- Separate sandbox policy into sandbox and sandboxX, and disable sandbox by default on fresh installs
+- Allow domains that can read etc_t to read etc_runtime_t
+- Allow all domains to use inherited tmpfiles
+
+* Wed Aug 29 2012 Miroslav Grepl <mgrepl at redhat.com> 3.11.1-14
+- Allow realmd to read resolv.conf
+- Add pegasus_cache_t type
+- Label /usr/sbin/fence_virtd as virsh_exec_t
+- Add policy for pkcsslotd
+- Add support for cpglockd
+- Allow polkit-agent-helper to read system-auth-ac
+- telepathy-idle wants to read gschemas.compiled
+- Allow plymouthd to getattr on fs_t
+- Add slpd policy
+- Allow ksysguardproces to read/write config_usr_t
+
+* Sat Aug 25 2012 Dan Walsh <dwalsh at redhat.com> 3.11.1-13
+- Fix labeling substitution so rpm will label /lib/systemd content correctly
+
+* Fri Aug 24 2012 Miroslav Grepl <mgrepl at redhat.com> 3.11.1-12
+- Add file name transitions for ttyACM0
+- spice-vdagent(d)'s are going to log over to syslog
+- Add sensord policy
+- Add more fixes for passenger policy related to puppet
+- Allow wdmd to create wdmd_tmpfs_t
+- Fix labeling for /var/run/cachefilesd\.pid
+- Add thumb_tmpfs_t files type
+
+* Mon Aug 20 2012 Miroslav Grepl <mgrepl at redhat.com> 3.11.1-11
+- Allow svirt domains to manage the network since this is containerized
+- Allow svirt_lxc_net_t to send audit messages
+
+* Mon Aug 20 2012 Miroslav Grepl <mgrepl at redhat.com> 3.11.1-10
+- Make "snmpwalk -mREDHAT-CLUSTER-MIB ...." working
+- Allow dlm_controld to execute dlm_stonith labeled as bin_t
+- Allow GFS2 working on F17
+- Abrt needs to execute dmesg
+- Allow jockey to list the contents of modeprobe.d
+- Add policy for lightsquid as squid_cron_t
+- Mailscanner is creating files and directories in /tmp
+- dmesg is now reading /dev/kmsg
+- Allow xserver to communicate with secure_firmware
+- Allow fsadm tools (fsck) to read /run/mount contnet
+- Allow sysadm types to read /dev/kmsg
+-
+
+* Thu Aug 16 2012 Dan Walsh <dwalsh at redhat.com> 3.11.1-9
+- Allow postfix, sssd, rpcd to block_suspend
+- udev seems to need secure_firmware capability
+- Allow virtd to send dbus messages to firewalld so it can configure the firewall
+
+* Thu Aug 16 2012 Dan Walsh <dwalsh at redhat.com> 3.11.1-8
+- Fix labeling of content in /run created by virsh_t
+- Allow condor domains to read kernel sysctls
+- Allow condor_master to connect to amqp
+- Allow thumb drives to create shared memory and semaphores
+- Allow abrt to read mozilla_plugin config files
+- Add labels for lightsquid
+- Default files in /opt and /usr that end in .cgi as httpd_sys_script_t, allow
+- dovecot_auth_t uses ldap for user auth
+- Allow domains that can read dhcp_etc_t to read lnk_files
+- Add more then one watchdog device
+- Allow useradd_t to manage etc_t files so it can rename it and edit them
+- Fix invalid class dir should be fifo_file
+- Move /run/blkid to fsadm and make sure labeling is correct
+
+* Tue Aug 14 2012 Dan Walsh <dwalsh at redhat.com> 3.11.1-7
+- Fix bogus regex found by eparis
+- Fix manage run interface since lvm needs more access
+- syslogd is searching cgroups directory
+- Fixes to allow virt-sandbox-service to manage lxc var run content
+
+* Mon Aug 13 2012 Dan Walsh <dwalsh at redhat.com> 3.11.1-6
+- Fix Boolean settings
+- Add new libjavascriptcoregtk as textrel_shlib_t
+- Allow xdm_t to create xdm_home_t directories
+- Additional access required for systemd
+- Dontaudit mozilla_plugin attempts to ipc_lock
+- Allow tmpreaper to delete unlabeled files
+- Eliminate screen_tmp_t and allow it to manage user_tmp_t
+- Dontaudit mozilla_plugin_config_t to append to leaked file descriptors
+- Allow web plugins to connect to the asterisk ports
+- Condor will recreate the lock directory if it does not exist
+- Oddjob mkhomedir needs to connectto user processes
+- Make oddjob_mkhomedir_t a userdom home manager
+
+* Thu Aug 9 2012 Miroslav Grepl <mgrepl at redhat.com> 3.11.1-5
+- Put placeholder back in place for proper numbering of capabilities
+- Systemd also configures init scripts
+
+* Thu Aug 9 2012 Miroslav Grepl <mgrepl at redhat.com> 3.11.1-4
+- Fix ecryptfs interfaces
+- Bootloader seems to be trolling around /dev/shm and /dev
+- init wants to create /etc/systemd/system-update.target.wants
+- Fix systemd_filetrans call to move it out of tunable
+- Fix up policy to work with systemd userspace manager
+- Add secure_firmware capability and remove bogus epolwakeup
+- Call seutil_*_login_config interfaces where should be needed
+- Allow rhsmcertd to send signal to itself
+- Allow thin domains to send signal to itself
+- Allow Chrome_ChildIO to read dosfs_t
* Tue Aug 7 2012 Miroslav Grepl <mgrepl at redhat.com> 3.11.1-3
- Add role rules for realmd, sambagui
diff --git a/sources b/sources
index 955e429..bb07f17 100644
--- a/sources
+++ b/sources
@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
-dbea318af516689d48155ba4677b5303 config.tgz
ee1c09715a7b04a16aa2e7004703b72a serefpolicy-3.11.1.tgz
8637c3e6add4e83a882c5cea26625257 serefpolicy-contrib-3.11.1.tgz
+c107c73fcdf6cd137d2e79ce07d15601 config.tgz
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