[kernel/f19] Update secureboot patch for 3.10

Justin M. Forbes jforbes at fedoraproject.org
Mon Jul 22 19:38:25 UTC 2013


commit e4971813cbe625768cceb856d15fe21c2e9c086e
Author: Justin M. Forbes <jforbes at redhat.com>
Date:   Mon Jul 22 14:28:26 2013 -0500

    Update secureboot patch for 3.10

 ...patch => devel-pekey-secure-boot-20130502.patch |  395 +++---
 kernel.spec                                        |    9 +-
 secure-boot-20130218.patch                         | 1435 --------------------
 3 files changed, 204 insertions(+), 1635 deletions(-)
---
diff --git a/devel-pekey-secure-boot-20130306.patch b/devel-pekey-secure-boot-20130502.patch
similarity index 95%
rename from devel-pekey-secure-boot-20130306.patch
rename to devel-pekey-secure-boot-20130502.patch
index 85bcec7..703bbf5 100644
--- a/devel-pekey-secure-boot-20130306.patch
+++ b/devel-pekey-secure-boot-20130502.patch
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
-From 1693ee9461cddd18c607f7126ac3d300915dbc05 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From 888c361d20210d39863ba6f2b71adb84e0a926a7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: David Howells <dhowells at redhat.com>
 Date: Fri, 18 Jan 2013 13:53:35 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH 02/48] KEYS: Load *.x509 files into kernel keyring
+Subject: [PATCH 01/47] KEYS: Load *.x509 files into kernel keyring
 
 Load all the files matching the pattern "*.x509" that are to be found in kernel
 base source dir and base build dir into the module signing keyring.
@@ -15,10 +15,10 @@ Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells at redhat.com>
  2 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
 
 diff --git a/kernel/Makefile b/kernel/Makefile
-index bbde5f1..6cb07a0 100644
+index d1574d4..64c97da 100644
 --- a/kernel/Makefile
 +++ b/kernel/Makefile
-@@ -140,17 +140,40 @@ $(obj)/timeconst.h: $(obj)/hz.bc $(src)/timeconst.bc FORCE
+@@ -141,17 +141,40 @@ $(obj)/timeconst.h: $(obj)/hz.bc $(src)/timeconst.bc FORCE
  	$(call if_changed,bc)
  
  ifeq ($(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG),y)
@@ -78,13 +78,13 @@ index 246b4c6..0a60203 100644
 +	.incbin "kernel/x509_certificate_list"
  GLOBAL(modsign_certificate_list_end)
 -- 
-1.8.1.2
+1.8.1.4
 
 
-From 80e06b81dec8a01819170c4d102a05d98df4c6f7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From 26a6bf8ffbe82d706c6de06746d760d9bc425ee5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: David Howells <dhowells at redhat.com>
 Date: Tue, 15 Jan 2013 18:39:54 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH 03/48] KEYS: Separate the kernel signature checking keyring
+Subject: [PATCH 02/47] KEYS: Separate the kernel signature checking keyring
  from module signing
 
 Separate the kernel signature checking keyring from module signing so that it
@@ -136,10 +136,10 @@ index 0000000..8dabc39
 +
 +#endif /* _KEYS_SYSTEM_KEYRING_H */
 diff --git a/init/Kconfig b/init/Kconfig
-index 22616cd..e988655 100644
+index a76d131..b9d8870 100644
 --- a/init/Kconfig
 +++ b/init/Kconfig
-@@ -1575,6 +1575,18 @@ config BASE_SMALL
+@@ -1615,6 +1615,18 @@ config BASE_SMALL
  	default 0 if BASE_FULL
  	default 1 if !BASE_FULL
  
@@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ index 22616cd..e988655 100644
  menuconfig MODULES
  	bool "Enable loadable module support"
  	help
-@@ -1647,6 +1659,7 @@ config MODULE_SRCVERSION_ALL
+@@ -1687,6 +1699,7 @@ config MODULE_SRCVERSION_ALL
  config MODULE_SIG
  	bool "Module signature verification"
  	depends on MODULES
@@ -167,10 +167,10 @@ index 22616cd..e988655 100644
  	select CRYPTO
  	select ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE
 diff --git a/kernel/Makefile b/kernel/Makefile
-index 6cb07a0..a9ecd52 100644
+index 64c97da..ecff938 100644
 --- a/kernel/Makefile
 +++ b/kernel/Makefile
-@@ -51,8 +51,9 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SMP) += spinlock.o
+@@ -52,8 +52,9 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SMP) += spinlock.o
  obj-$(CONFIG_DEBUG_SPINLOCK) += spinlock.o
  obj-$(CONFIG_PROVE_LOCKING) += spinlock.o
  obj-$(CONFIG_UID16) += uid16.o
@@ -181,7 +181,7 @@ index 6cb07a0..a9ecd52 100644
  obj-$(CONFIG_KALLSYMS) += kallsyms.o
  obj-$(CONFIG_BSD_PROCESS_ACCT) += acct.o
  obj-$(CONFIG_KEXEC) += kexec.o
-@@ -139,13 +140,14 @@ targets += timeconst.h
+@@ -140,13 +141,14 @@ targets += timeconst.h
  $(obj)/timeconst.h: $(obj)/hz.bc $(src)/timeconst.bc FORCE
  	$(call if_changed,bc)
  
@@ -199,7 +199,7 @@ index 6cb07a0..a9ecd52 100644
  X509_CERTIFICATES-y := $(wildcard *.x509) $(wildcard $(srctree)/*.x509)
  X509_CERTIFICATES-$(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG) += signing_key.x509
  X509_CERTIFICATES := $(sort $(X509_CERTIFICATES-y))
-@@ -161,10 +163,11 @@ $(shell rm $(obj)/.x509.list)
+@@ -162,10 +164,11 @@ $(shell rm $(obj)/.x509.list)
  endif
  endif
  
@@ -213,7 +213,7 @@ index 6cb07a0..a9ecd52 100644
  targets += $(obj)/x509_certificate_list
  $(obj)/x509_certificate_list: $(X509_CERTIFICATES) $(obj)/.x509.list
  	$(call if_changed,x509certs)
-@@ -174,7 +177,9 @@ $(obj)/.x509.list:
+@@ -175,7 +178,9 @@ $(obj)/.x509.list:
  	@echo $(X509_CERTIFICATES) >$@
  
  clean-files := x509_certificate_list .x509.list
@@ -497,13 +497,13 @@ index 0000000..a3ca76f
 +}
 +late_initcall(load_system_certificate_list);
 -- 
-1.8.1.2
+1.8.1.4
 
 
-From a2512743c97ac3c236eaf9ce6b2879cb0ff61dd5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From 4e2b0f425d73360fc40b8719b36e6e3ca94d458e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: David Howells <dhowells at redhat.com>
 Date: Thu, 17 Jan 2013 16:25:00 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH 04/48] KEYS: Add a 'trusted' flag and a 'trusted only' flag
+Subject: [PATCH 03/47] KEYS: Add a 'trusted' flag and a 'trusted only' flag
 
 Add KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED to indicate that a key either comes from a trusted source
 or had a cryptographic signature chain that led back to a trusted key the
@@ -626,13 +626,13 @@ index 6ece7f2..f18d7ff 100644
  	if (ret == 0) {
  		ret = __key_link_check_live_key(keyring, key);
 -- 
-1.8.1.2
+1.8.1.4
 
 
-From a466fb7f25a238e646970d1dbdbb5143f9b3b066 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From 3deae827abdd3de9b7976b423279812d7559e580 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: David Howells <dhowells at redhat.com>
 Date: Tue, 15 Jan 2013 15:33:32 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH 05/48] KEYS: Rename public key parameter name arrays
+Subject: [PATCH 04/47] KEYS: Rename public key parameter name arrays
 
 Rename the arrays of public key parameters (public key algorithm names, hash
 algorithm names and ID type names) so that the array name ends in "_name".
@@ -781,13 +781,13 @@ index 0034e36..0b6b870 100644
  
  	key = request_asymmetric_key(sig, ms.signer_len,
 -- 
-1.8.1.2
+1.8.1.4
 
 
-From bb9a97b29085a9dfbda5b32a6dbdfaec5612e46b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From 2acf1a703de1213ad85515a71873f57535dc057d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: David Howells <dhowells at redhat.com>
 Date: Tue, 15 Jan 2013 15:33:33 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH 06/48] KEYS: Move the algorithm pointer array from x509 to
+Subject: [PATCH 05/47] KEYS: Move the algorithm pointer array from x509 to
  public_key.c
 
 Move the public-key algorithm pointer array from x509_public_key.c to
@@ -863,13 +863,13 @@ index 619d570..46bde25 100644
  enum pkey_hash_algo {
  	PKEY_HASH_MD4,
 -- 
-1.8.1.2
+1.8.1.4
 
 
-From 35da3ee1a151d44c8e0b38422584918f39d66298 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From 3cc2c6f01277dfa00106c3e4f3f3ab8184025b90 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: David Howells <dhowells at redhat.com>
 Date: Tue, 15 Jan 2013 15:33:33 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH 07/48] KEYS: Store public key algo ID in public_key struct
+Subject: [PATCH 06/47] KEYS: Store public key algo ID in public_key struct
 
 Store public key algo ID in public_key struct for reference purposes.  This
 allows it to be removed from the x509_certificate struct and used to find a
@@ -948,13 +948,13 @@ index 46bde25..05778df 100644
  	union {
  		MPI	mpi[5];
 -- 
-1.8.1.2
+1.8.1.4
 
 
-From a837dc33a6ca6a4c11d7485ac51951992e7ccf53 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From 7dcc63793a873198d3b3c4299f896e2896292d84 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: David Howells <dhowells at redhat.com>
 Date: Tue, 15 Jan 2013 15:33:34 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH 08/48] KEYS: Split public_key_verify_signature() and make
+Subject: [PATCH 07/47] KEYS: Split public_key_verify_signature() and make
  available
 
 Modify public_key_verify_signature() so that it now takes a public_key struct
@@ -1064,13 +1064,13 @@ index fac574c..8cb2f70 100644
  	pr_debug("Cert Verification: %d\n", ret);
  
 -- 
-1.8.1.2
+1.8.1.4
 
 
-From def87e748398cfd083e79ae48556aa2144873fc4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From da18477d1a1987dce0f3c5f78b62e5b223e2bf90 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: David Howells <dhowells at redhat.com>
 Date: Tue, 15 Jan 2013 15:33:35 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH 09/48] KEYS: Store public key algo ID in public_key_signature
+Subject: [PATCH 08/47] KEYS: Store public key algo ID in public_key_signature
  struct
 
 Store public key algorithm ID in public_key_signature struct for reference
@@ -1097,13 +1097,13 @@ index 05778df..b34fda4 100644
  	union {
  		MPI mpi[2];
 -- 
-1.8.1.2
+1.8.1.4
 
 
-From 87230ff62f9901069b350c57aaa996dabe191165 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From 29d80acc90a95ef5614cf36d4e30835bcc014cc4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: David Howells <dhowells at redhat.com>
 Date: Tue, 15 Jan 2013 15:33:35 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH 10/48] X.509: struct x509_certificate needs struct tm
+Subject: [PATCH 09/47] X.509: struct x509_certificate needs struct tm
  declaring
 
 struct x509_certificate needs struct tm declaring by #inclusion of linux/time.h
@@ -1129,13 +1129,13 @@ index e583ad0..2d01182 100644
  
  struct x509_certificate {
 -- 
-1.8.1.2
+1.8.1.4
 
 
-From 82c121f975c92d34202a9248f94de9c9ada4f9a2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From ba3ba9e41abb17a7632075668e4f0a30edb59896 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: David Howells <dhowells at redhat.com>
 Date: Tue, 15 Jan 2013 15:33:35 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH 11/48] X.509: Add bits needed for PKCS#7
+Subject: [PATCH 10/47] X.509: Add bits needed for PKCS#7
 
 PKCS#7 validation requires access to the serial number and the raw names in an
 X.509 certificate.
@@ -1227,13 +1227,13 @@ index 2d01182..a6ce46f 100644
  
  /*
 -- 
-1.8.1.2
+1.8.1.4
 
 
-From 57fb22f1b578187da39d5edfdcaf22daea5fddcb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From 4d2f837ab3629d5b4b3bac2bbdbdf2d0060e74a8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: David Howells <dhowells at redhat.com>
 Date: Tue, 15 Jan 2013 15:33:36 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH 12/48] X.509: Embed public_key_signature struct and create
+Subject: [PATCH 11/47] X.509: Embed public_key_signature struct and create
  filler function
 
 Embed a public_key_signature struct in struct x509_certificate, eliminating
@@ -1495,13 +1495,13 @@ index 8cb2f70..b7c81d8 100644
  	if (!cert->fingerprint || !cert->authority) {
  		pr_warn("Cert for '%s' must have SubjKeyId and AuthKeyId extensions\n",
 -- 
-1.8.1.2
+1.8.1.4
 
 
-From c882d17501c48b2ea515b2c6cba21d91ad3ce4c4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From 822175026ad1d4640240d1fdd77b1f45ddd9e7a9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: David Howells <dhowells at redhat.com>
 Date: Tue, 15 Jan 2013 15:33:36 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH 13/48] X.509: Check the algorithm IDs obtained from parsing an
+Subject: [PATCH 12/47] X.509: Check the algorithm IDs obtained from parsing an
  X.509 certificate
 
 Check that the algorithm IDs obtained from the ASN.1 parse by OID lookup
@@ -1536,13 +1536,13 @@ index b7c81d8..eb368d4 100644
  	pr_devel("Cert Valid From: %04ld-%02d-%02d %02d:%02d:%02d\n",
  		 cert->valid_from.tm_year + 1900, cert->valid_from.tm_mon + 1,
 -- 
-1.8.1.2
+1.8.1.4
 
 
-From a5e4fc67608e4f63189263c9840eab47569ab78b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From 4a1a540f79d36d8b0b8970ea638648cef080057b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: David Howells <dhowells at redhat.com>
 Date: Tue, 15 Jan 2013 15:33:37 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH 14/48] X.509: Handle certificates that lack an
+Subject: [PATCH 13/47] X.509: Handle certificates that lack an
  authorityKeyIdentifier field
 
 Handle certificates that lack an authorityKeyIdentifier field by assuming
@@ -1583,13 +1583,13 @@ index eb368d4..0f55e3b 100644
  		if (ret < 0)
  			goto error_free_cert;
 -- 
-1.8.1.2
+1.8.1.4
 
 
-From 91fc935afe02fedb2cbf4e77994d226f0fbd25eb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From f5e443e719cfb7cae2aea764ad3c9ec9ffba4f60 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: David Howells <dhowells at redhat.com>
 Date: Tue, 15 Jan 2013 15:33:37 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH 15/48] X.509: Export certificate parse and free functions
+Subject: [PATCH 14/47] X.509: Export certificate parse and free functions
 
 Export certificate parse and free functions for use by modules.
 
@@ -1629,13 +1629,13 @@ index 931f069..9cf0e16 100644
  /*
   * Note an OID when we find one for later processing when we know how
 -- 
-1.8.1.2
+1.8.1.4
 
 
-From 14b152615af5ca6b274714b1e515d7dcf142a55b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From 792a56d205765cf4ece16868929ad5fbe6b89df4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: David Howells <dhowells at redhat.com>
 Date: Tue, 15 Jan 2013 15:33:38 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH 16/48] PKCS#7: Implement a parser [RFC 2315]
+Subject: [PATCH 15/47] PKCS#7: Implement a parser [RFC 2315]
 
 Implement a parser for a PKCS#7 signed-data message as described in part of
 RFC 2315.
@@ -2242,13 +2242,13 @@ index 6926db7..edeff85 100644
  	/* Distinguished Name attribute IDs [RFC 2256] */
  	OID_commonName,			/* 2.5.4.3 */
 -- 
-1.8.1.2
+1.8.1.4
 
 
-From ec62dd1e7576f4b83d6374cd900049c7c555a7d0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From 3b4b82eecde52c1bd75ab11ef7f8a5c13ec73c40 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: David Howells <dhowells at redhat.com>
 Date: Tue, 15 Jan 2013 15:33:38 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH 17/48] PKCS#7: Digest the data in a signed-data message
+Subject: [PATCH 16/47] PKCS#7: Digest the data in a signed-data message
 
 Digest the data in a PKCS#7 signed-data message and attach to the
 public_key_signature struct contained in the pkcs7_message struct.
@@ -2416,13 +2416,13 @@ index 0000000..2f9f26c
 +}
 +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pkcs7_verify);
 -- 
-1.8.1.2
+1.8.1.4
 
 
-From e90ddcd9bc29ed13b4b2808029c6580f3444c5b3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From e67fed4626a30dd11967abad9187013ff4185991 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: David Howells <dhowells at redhat.com>
 Date: Tue, 15 Jan 2013 15:33:39 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH 18/48] PKCS#7: Find the right key in the PKCS#7 key list and
+Subject: [PATCH 17/47] PKCS#7: Find the right key in the PKCS#7 key list and
  verify the signature
 
 Find the appropriate key in the PKCS#7 key list and verify the signature with
@@ -2515,13 +2515,13 @@ index 2f9f26c..3f6f0e2 100644
  }
  EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pkcs7_verify);
 -- 
-1.8.1.2
+1.8.1.4
 
 
-From 8e22cd5881575b9dcdd45b29671935fce505d056 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From 87ec8d783c887617ee6e85f66a9ce1a03c627e87 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: David Howells <dhowells at redhat.com>
 Date: Tue, 15 Jan 2013 15:33:39 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH 19/48] PKCS#7: Verify internal certificate chain
+Subject: [PATCH 18/47] PKCS#7: Verify internal certificate chain
 
 Verify certificate chain in the X.509 certificates contained within the PKCS#7
 message as far as possible.  If any signature that we should be able to verify
@@ -2631,13 +2631,13 @@ index 6b1d877..5e35fba 100644
  	char		*issuer;		/* Name of certificate issuer */
  	char		*subject;		/* Name of certificate subject */
 -- 
-1.8.1.2
+1.8.1.4
 
 
-From 185c80f1aa2a59a7494db7f57eba30f54a46152a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From cc6c40318a05330e4bb201b35378d7c0a0278aaa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: David Howells <dhowells at redhat.com>
 Date: Tue, 15 Jan 2013 15:33:42 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH 20/48] PKCS#7: Find intersection between PKCS#7 message and
+Subject: [PATCH 19/47] PKCS#7: Find intersection between PKCS#7 message and
  known, trusted keys
 
 Find the intersection between the X.509 certificate chain contained in a PKCS#7
@@ -2838,13 +2838,13 @@ index 0000000..cc226f5
 +}
 +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pkcs7_validate_trust);
 -- 
-1.8.1.2
+1.8.1.4
 
 
-From 5b9065e00fb0d0b5fd87f41d8e4c19522a624d6f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From f20b0d77771133bd0d7e89932fef494f00687607 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: David Howells <dhowells at redhat.com>
 Date: Tue, 15 Jan 2013 15:33:39 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH 21/48] Provide PE binary definitions
+Subject: [PATCH 20/47] Provide PE binary definitions
 
 Provide some PE binary structural and constant definitions as taken from the
 pesign package sources.
@@ -3311,13 +3311,13 @@ index 0000000..9234aef
 +
 +#endif /* __LINUX_PE_H */
 -- 
-1.8.1.2
+1.8.1.4
 
 
-From 0514d1400ccf6602fa4f4a45d54e82c0386788fb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From d329754b0c2881b6331aacafab74a26b2d9262b3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: David Howells <dhowells at redhat.com>
 Date: Tue, 15 Jan 2013 15:33:40 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH 22/48] pefile: Parse a PE binary to find a key and a signature
+Subject: [PATCH 21/47] pefile: Parse a PE binary to find a key and a signature
  contained therein
 
 Parse a PE binary to find a key and a signature contained therein.  Later
@@ -3605,13 +3605,13 @@ index 0000000..82bcaf6
 +	enum pkey_hash_algo digest_algo;	/* Digest algorithm */
 +};
 -- 
-1.8.1.2
+1.8.1.4
 
 
-From 84598b0ba0da9e914fe13cd8e73b4d77a77f8a8e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From 3794d7963e17fc0b0c2f62164306b9a45cb2254e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: David Howells <dhowells at redhat.com>
 Date: Tue, 15 Jan 2013 15:33:40 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH 23/48] pefile: Strip the wrapper off of the cert data block
+Subject: [PATCH 22/47] pefile: Strip the wrapper off of the cert data block
 
 The certificate data block in a PE binary has a wrapper around the PKCS#7
 signature we actually want to get at.  Strip this off and check that we've got
@@ -3709,13 +3709,13 @@ index fb80cf0..f2d4df0 100644
  }
  
 -- 
-1.8.1.2
+1.8.1.4
 
 
-From 6c9fdc4a6bb91f67ba83a164bed515f86b487804 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From f23895761a15e08959140091dc17004e7e6e2035 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: David Howells <dhowells at redhat.com>
 Date: Tue, 15 Jan 2013 15:33:40 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH 24/48] pefile: Parse the presumed PKCS#7 content of the
+Subject: [PATCH 23/47] pefile: Parse the presumed PKCS#7 content of the
  certificate blob
 
 Parse the content of the certificate blob, presuming it to be PKCS#7 format.
@@ -3763,13 +3763,13 @@ index f2d4df0..056500f 100644
  
  static struct asymmetric_key_parser pefile_key_parser = {
 -- 
-1.8.1.2
+1.8.1.4
 
 
-From 7816d32941300ae8ed25cc98baf13064854e6cb9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From fcdb91196beb6235eed676c368a662cbdf92b804 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: David Howells <dhowells at redhat.com>
 Date: Tue, 15 Jan 2013 15:33:41 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH 25/48] pefile: Parse the "Microsoft individual code signing"
+Subject: [PATCH 24/47] pefile: Parse the "Microsoft individual code signing"
  data blob
 
 The PKCS#7 certificate should contain a "Microsoft individual code signing"
@@ -4006,13 +4006,13 @@ index edeff85..332dcf5 100644
  	OID_sha256,			/* 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.1 */
  
 -- 
-1.8.1.2
+1.8.1.4
 
 
-From 9e97d5c51460969ff04d3027e734a69437518cfd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From 63204898d9491f8ba1b90dea8660e8ff778db993 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: David Howells <dhowells at redhat.com>
 Date: Tue, 15 Jan 2013 15:33:41 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH 26/48] pefile: Digest the PE binary and compare to the PKCS#7
+Subject: [PATCH 25/47] pefile: Digest the PE binary and compare to the PKCS#7
  data
 
 Digest the signed parts of the PE binary, canonicalising the section table
@@ -4242,13 +4242,13 @@ index f1c8cc1..dfdb85e 100644
  
  error:
 -- 
-1.8.1.2
+1.8.1.4
 
 
-From 2b5752323fc40cd9145150158f32b088fb0d4fa2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From 17ed825e5f3f595665abd3fc11a6c180e6762b87 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: David Howells <dhowells at redhat.com>
 Date: Fri, 18 Jan 2013 13:58:35 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH 27/48] PEFILE: Validate PKCS#7 trust chain
+Subject: [PATCH 26/47] PEFILE: Validate PKCS#7 trust chain
 
 Validate the PKCS#7 trust chain against the contents of the system keyring.
 
@@ -4294,13 +4294,13 @@ index dfdb85e..edad948 100644
  
  error:
 -- 
-1.8.1.2
+1.8.1.4
 
 
-From 1d94bb9d91322f250d870a1df94e24f9717a1660 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From ce9ca4236f691264a94bcbe10beda9ec5a035baf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: David Howells <dhowells at redhat.com>
 Date: Tue, 15 Jan 2013 15:33:42 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH 28/48] PEFILE: Load the contained key if we consider the
+Subject: [PATCH 27/47] PEFILE: Load the contained key if we consider the
  container to be validly signed
 
 Load the key contained in the PE binary if the signature on the container can
@@ -4385,13 +4385,13 @@ index 0f55e3b..c3e5a6d 100644
  static struct asymmetric_key_parser x509_key_parser = {
  	.owner	= THIS_MODULE,
 -- 
-1.8.1.2
+1.8.1.4
 
 
-From ef929c440551421ba319fe2305a063706ce7c8a6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From 395cc1b55a0645ced39f92b31ba3bcc141e59383 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Chun-Yi Lee <joeyli.kernel at gmail.com>
 Date: Thu, 21 Feb 2013 19:23:49 +0800
-Subject: [PATCH 29/48] MODSIGN: Fix including certificate twice when the
+Subject: [PATCH 28/47] MODSIGN: Fix including certificate twice when the
  signing_key.x509 already exists
 
 This issue was found in devel-pekey branch on linux-modsign.git tree. The
@@ -4424,10 +4424,10 @@ Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells at redhat.com>
  1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
 
 diff --git a/kernel/Makefile b/kernel/Makefile
-index a9ecd52..c94d081 100644
+index ecff938..52f3426 100644
 --- a/kernel/Makefile
 +++ b/kernel/Makefile
-@@ -148,7 +148,10 @@ $(obj)/timeconst.h: $(obj)/hz.bc $(src)/timeconst.bc FORCE
+@@ -149,7 +149,10 @@ $(obj)/timeconst.h: $(obj)/hz.bc $(src)/timeconst.bc FORCE
  #
  ###############################################################################
  ifeq ($(CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING),y)
@@ -4440,13 +4440,13 @@ index a9ecd52..c94d081 100644
  X509_CERTIFICATES := $(sort $(X509_CERTIFICATES-y))
  
 -- 
-1.8.1.2
+1.8.1.4
 
 
-From 614232115eed153b4f56f37319114a18d590daaa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From 0ef575739cff3fda47dd2a9415f066ab44dcc922 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Matthew Garrett <mjg at redhat.com>
 Date: Thu, 20 Sep 2012 10:40:56 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH 30/48] Secure boot: Add new capability
+Subject: [PATCH 29/47] Secure boot: Add new capability
 
 Secure boot adds certain policy requirements, including that root must not
 be able to do anything that could cause the kernel to execute arbitrary code.
@@ -4477,13 +4477,13 @@ index ba478fa..7109e65 100644
  #define cap_valid(x) ((x) >= 0 && (x) <= CAP_LAST_CAP)
  
 -- 
-1.8.1.2
+1.8.1.4
 
 
-From 5c31721c6ec69d901a3f81a1cfa1518ca138ab75 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From 7312bed4fb9125d4880f11a64521b110079a3c0a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer at redhat.com>
 Date: Thu, 20 Sep 2012 10:41:05 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH 31/48] SELinux: define mapping for new Secure Boot capability
+Subject: [PATCH 30/47] SELinux: define mapping for new Secure Boot capability
 
 Add the name of the new Secure Boot capability.  This allows SELinux
 policies to properly map CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL to the appropriate
@@ -4510,13 +4510,13 @@ index 14d04e6..ed99a2d 100644
  	{ "tun_socket",
  	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, "attach_queue", NULL } },
 -- 
-1.8.1.2
+1.8.1.4
 
 
-From b7c947a5862f33eb44bc33211a89ac1d8fd32475 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From e99e1273b0a50d874d2a53461e95f74460e1b812 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer at redhat.com>
 Date: Thu, 20 Sep 2012 10:41:02 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH 32/48] Secure boot: Add a dummy kernel parameter that will
+Subject: [PATCH 31/47] Secure boot: Add a dummy kernel parameter that will
  switch on Secure Boot mode
 
 This forcibly drops CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL from both cap_permitted and cap_bset
@@ -4530,10 +4530,10 @@ Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer at redhat.com>
  2 files changed, 24 insertions(+)
 
 diff --git a/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
-index 4609e81..7c0b137 100644
+index 8c01a02..ee6c1ca 100644
 --- a/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
 +++ b/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
-@@ -2683,6 +2683,13 @@ bytes respectively. Such letter suffixes can also be entirely omitted.
+@@ -2744,6 +2744,13 @@ bytes respectively. Such letter suffixes can also be entirely omitted.
  			Note: increases power consumption, thus should only be
  			enabled if running jitter sensitive (HPC/RT) workloads.
  
@@ -4576,13 +4576,13 @@ index e0573a4..c3f4e3e 100644
   * prepare_kernel_cred - Prepare a set of credentials for a kernel service
   * @daemon: A userspace daemon to be used as a reference
 -- 
-1.8.1.2
+1.8.1.4
 
 
-From b218aab3dcc56d27324b2fc170d620e98c726603 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From eeac2b5391d834eefebfae49a100244fdccc82e5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Matthew Garrett <mjg at redhat.com>
 Date: Thu, 20 Sep 2012 10:41:03 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH 33/48] efi: Enable secure boot lockdown automatically when
+Subject: [PATCH 32/47] efi: Enable secure boot lockdown automatically when
  enabled in firmware
 
 The firmware has a set of flags that indicate whether secure boot is enabled
@@ -4616,10 +4616,10 @@ index 199f453..ff651d3 100644
  290/040	ALL	edd_mbr_sig_buffer EDD MBR signatures
  2D0/A00	ALL	e820_map	E820 memory map table
 diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c
-index c205035..96d859d 100644
+index 35ee62f..0998ec7 100644
 --- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c
 +++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c
-@@ -861,6 +861,36 @@ fail:
+@@ -906,6 +906,36 @@ fail:
  	return status;
  }
  
@@ -4656,7 +4656,7 @@ index c205035..96d859d 100644
  /*
   * Because the x86 boot code expects to be passed a boot_params we
   * need to create one ourselves (usually the bootloader would create
-@@ -1155,6 +1185,8 @@ struct boot_params *efi_main(void *handle, efi_system_table_t *_table,
+@@ -1200,6 +1230,8 @@ struct boot_params *efi_main(void *handle, efi_system_table_t *_table,
  	if (sys_table->hdr.signature != EFI_SYSTEM_TABLE_SIGNATURE)
  		goto fail;
  
@@ -4664,12 +4664,12 @@ index c205035..96d859d 100644
 +
  	setup_graphics(boot_params);
  
- 	setup_efi_pci(boot_params);
+ 	setup_efi_vars(boot_params);
 diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/bootparam_utils.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/bootparam_utils.h
-index ae93f72..05ecc52 100644
+index 653668d..69a6c08 100644
 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/bootparam_utils.h
 +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/bootparam_utils.h
-@@ -22,9 +22,13 @@ static void sanitize_boot_params(struct boot_params *boot_params)
+@@ -38,9 +38,13 @@ static void sanitize_boot_params(struct boot_params *boot_params)
  		memset(&boot_params->olpc_ofw_header, 0,
  		       (char *)&boot_params->efi_info -
  			(char *)&boot_params->olpc_ofw_header);
@@ -4686,10 +4686,10 @@ index ae93f72..05ecc52 100644
  		       (char *)&boot_params->edd_mbr_sig_buffer[0] -
  			(char *)&boot_params->_pad7[0]);
 diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h
-index c15ddaf..85d7685 100644
+index 0874424..56b7d39 100644
 --- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h
 +++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h
-@@ -131,7 +131,8 @@ struct boot_params {
+@@ -132,7 +132,8 @@ struct boot_params {
  	__u8  eddbuf_entries;				/* 0x1e9 */
  	__u8  edd_mbr_sig_buf_entries;			/* 0x1ea */
  	__u8  kbd_status;				/* 0x1eb */
@@ -4700,10 +4700,10 @@ index c15ddaf..85d7685 100644
  	 * The sentinel is set to a nonzero value (0xff) in header.S.
  	 *
 diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
-index 84d3285..2485897 100644
+index 56f7fcf..3af6cf8 100644
 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
 +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
-@@ -1098,6 +1098,13 @@ void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p)
+@@ -1131,6 +1131,13 @@ void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p)
  
  	io_delay_init();
  
@@ -4731,10 +4731,10 @@ index 04421e8..9e69542 100644
   * check for validity of credentials
   */
 diff --git a/include/linux/efi.h b/include/linux/efi.h
-index 9bf2f1f..1bf382b 100644
+index 2bc0ad7..10b167a 100644
 --- a/include/linux/efi.h
 +++ b/include/linux/efi.h
-@@ -627,6 +627,7 @@ extern int __init efi_setup_pcdp_console(char *);
+@@ -634,6 +634,7 @@ extern int __init efi_setup_pcdp_console(char *);
  #define EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES	3	/* Can we use runtime services? */
  #define EFI_MEMMAP		4	/* Can we use EFI memory map? */
  #define EFI_64BIT		5	/* Is the firmware 64-bit? */
@@ -4743,13 +4743,13 @@ index 9bf2f1f..1bf382b 100644
  #ifdef CONFIG_EFI
  # ifdef CONFIG_X86
 -- 
-1.8.1.2
+1.8.1.4
 
 
-From c2a1ee697d989d5d5ba7c5d7c20abf6d320afe74 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From a1ac3b80b7a85d4fce665047b9701713fcfc1ea0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Dave Howells <dhowells at redhat.com>
 Date: Tue, 23 Oct 2012 09:30:54 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH 34/48] Add EFI signature data types
+Subject: [PATCH 33/47] Add EFI signature data types
 
 Add the data types that are used for containing hashes, keys and certificates
 for cryptographic verification.
@@ -4760,10 +4760,10 @@ Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells at redhat.com>
  1 file changed, 20 insertions(+)
 
 diff --git a/include/linux/efi.h b/include/linux/efi.h
-index 1bf382b..8902faf 100644
+index 10b167a..d3ef7c6 100644
 --- a/include/linux/efi.h
 +++ b/include/linux/efi.h
-@@ -388,6 +388,12 @@ typedef efi_status_t efi_query_capsule_caps_t(efi_capsule_header_t **capsules,
+@@ -389,6 +389,12 @@ typedef efi_status_t efi_query_variable_store_t(u32 attributes, unsigned long si
  #define EFI_FILE_SYSTEM_GUID \
      EFI_GUID(  0x964e5b22, 0x6459, 0x11d2, 0x8e, 0x39, 0x00, 0xa0, 0xc9, 0x69, 0x72, 0x3b )
  
@@ -4776,7 +4776,7 @@ index 1bf382b..8902faf 100644
  typedef struct {
  	efi_guid_t guid;
  	u64 table;
-@@ -523,6 +529,20 @@ typedef struct {
+@@ -524,6 +530,20 @@ typedef struct {
  
  #define EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR		(~0UL)
  
@@ -4798,13 +4798,13 @@ index 1bf382b..8902faf 100644
   * All runtime access to EFI goes through this structure:
   */
 -- 
-1.8.1.2
+1.8.1.4
 
 
-From 03401c77362c324756e7f4ce3b0e72f06e79e0d7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From fac308c18ba449322666325f37f6a08ad818cf9f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Dave Howells <dhowells at redhat.com>
 Date: Tue, 23 Oct 2012 09:36:28 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH 35/48] Add an EFI signature blob parser and key loader.
+Subject: [PATCH 34/47] Add an EFI signature blob parser and key loader.
 
 X.509 certificates are loaded into the specified keyring as asymmetric type
 keys.
@@ -4963,10 +4963,10 @@ index 0000000..424896a
 +	return 0;
 +}
 diff --git a/include/linux/efi.h b/include/linux/efi.h
-index 8902faf..ff3c599 100644
+index d3ef7c6..4f0fbb7 100644
 --- a/include/linux/efi.h
 +++ b/include/linux/efi.h
-@@ -612,6 +612,10 @@ extern int efi_set_rtc_mmss(unsigned long nowtime);
+@@ -619,6 +619,10 @@ extern int efi_set_rtc_mmss(unsigned long nowtime);
  extern void efi_reserve_boot_services(void);
  extern struct efi_memory_map memmap;
  
@@ -4978,13 +4978,13 @@ index 8902faf..ff3c599 100644
   * efi_range_is_wc - check the WC bit on an address range
   * @start: starting kvirt address
 -- 
-1.8.1.2
+1.8.1.4
 
 
-From 5f7f02ad9d46cf93090a0aed55530c44ce96cb96 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From 75560e565cb8a4e853a3b6f6c65ed70c1ba29039 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer at redhat.com>
 Date: Fri, 26 Oct 2012 12:36:24 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH 36/48] KEYS: Add a system blacklist keyring
+Subject: [PATCH 35/47] KEYS: Add a system blacklist keyring
 
 This adds an additional keyring that is used to store certificates that
 are blacklisted.  This keyring is searched first when loading signed modules
@@ -5015,10 +5015,10 @@ index 8dabc39..e466de1 100644
  
  #endif /* _KEYS_SYSTEM_KEYRING_H */
 diff --git a/init/Kconfig b/init/Kconfig
-index e988655..3cac597 100644
+index b9d8870..4f9771f 100644
 --- a/init/Kconfig
 +++ b/init/Kconfig
-@@ -1587,6 +1587,15 @@ config SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING
+@@ -1627,6 +1627,15 @@ config SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING
  
  	  Keys in this keyring are used by module signature checking.
  
@@ -5093,13 +5093,13 @@ index dae8778..2913c70 100644
  }
  
 -- 
-1.8.1.2
+1.8.1.4
 
 
-From 4fa15a799f5955b7f82b83953fc6726f9113e385 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From e46bf80471882ce1ab0b75dc954b2b59deec6fbb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer at redhat.com>
 Date: Fri, 26 Oct 2012 12:42:16 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH 37/48] MODSIGN: Import certificates from UEFI Secure Boot
+Subject: [PATCH 36/47] MODSIGN: Import certificates from UEFI Secure Boot
 
 Secure Boot stores a list of allowed certificates in the 'db' variable.
 This imports those certificates into the system trusted keyring.  This
@@ -5119,15 +5119,15 @@ Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer at redhat.com>
  include/linux/efi.h   |  6 ++++
  init/Kconfig          |  9 +++++
  kernel/Makefile       |  3 ++
- kernel/modsign_uefi.c | 91 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
- 4 files changed, 109 insertions(+)
+ kernel/modsign_uefi.c | 92 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 4 files changed, 110 insertions(+)
  create mode 100644 kernel/modsign_uefi.c
 
 diff --git a/include/linux/efi.h b/include/linux/efi.h
-index ff3c599..8400949 100644
+index 4f0fbb7..7ac7a17 100644
 --- a/include/linux/efi.h
 +++ b/include/linux/efi.h
-@@ -394,6 +394,12 @@ typedef efi_status_t efi_query_capsule_caps_t(efi_capsule_header_t **capsules,
+@@ -395,6 +395,12 @@ typedef efi_status_t efi_query_variable_store_t(u32 attributes, unsigned long si
  #define EFI_CERT_X509_GUID \
      EFI_GUID(  0xa5c059a1, 0x94e4, 0x4aa7, 0x87, 0xb5, 0xab, 0x15, 0x5c, 0x2b, 0xf0, 0x72 )
  
@@ -5141,10 +5141,10 @@ index ff3c599..8400949 100644
  	efi_guid_t guid;
  	u64 table;
 diff --git a/init/Kconfig b/init/Kconfig
-index 3cac597..e7e0216 100644
+index 4f9771f..da92f1c 100644
 --- a/init/Kconfig
 +++ b/init/Kconfig
-@@ -1705,6 +1705,15 @@ config MODULE_SIG_ALL
+@@ -1745,6 +1745,15 @@ config MODULE_SIG_ALL
  comment "Do not forget to sign required modules with scripts/sign-file"
  	depends on MODULE_SIG_FORCE && !MODULE_SIG_ALL
  
@@ -5161,10 +5161,10 @@ index 3cac597..e7e0216 100644
  	prompt "Which hash algorithm should modules be signed with?"
  	depends on MODULE_SIG
 diff --git a/kernel/Makefile b/kernel/Makefile
-index c94d081..94be1fc 100644
+index 52f3426..e2a616f 100644
 --- a/kernel/Makefile
 +++ b/kernel/Makefile
-@@ -54,6 +54,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_UID16) += uid16.o
+@@ -55,6 +55,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_UID16) += uid16.o
  obj-$(CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING) += system_keyring.o system_certificates.o
  obj-$(CONFIG_MODULES) += module.o
  obj-$(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG) += module_signing.o
@@ -5172,7 +5172,7 @@ index c94d081..94be1fc 100644
  obj-$(CONFIG_KALLSYMS) += kallsyms.o
  obj-$(CONFIG_BSD_PROCESS_ACCT) += acct.o
  obj-$(CONFIG_KEXEC) += kexec.o
-@@ -113,6 +114,8 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_CONTEXT_TRACKING) += context_tracking.o
+@@ -114,6 +115,8 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_CONTEXT_TRACKING) += context_tracking.o
  
  $(obj)/configs.o: $(obj)/config_data.h
  
@@ -5183,15 +5183,16 @@ index c94d081..94be1fc 100644
  targets += config_data.gz
 diff --git a/kernel/modsign_uefi.c b/kernel/modsign_uefi.c
 new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..df831ff
+index 0000000..94b0eb3
 --- /dev/null
 +++ b/kernel/modsign_uefi.c
-@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
+@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
 +#include <linux/kernel.h>
 +#include <linux/sched.h>
 +#include <linux/cred.h>
 +#include <linux/err.h>
 +#include <linux/efi.h>
++#include <linux/slab.h>
 +#include <keys/asymmetric-type.h>
 +#include <keys/system_keyring.h>
 +#include "module-internal.h"
@@ -5279,13 +5280,13 @@ index 0000000..df831ff
 +}
 +late_initcall(load_uefi_certs);
 -- 
-1.8.1.2
+1.8.1.4
 
 
-From 439626853a29ad3a731d5563a0ee82645eb4f012 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From 8724600edad99706cce510645eff15f28787561a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Matthew Garrett <mjg at redhat.com>
 Date: Thu, 20 Sep 2012 10:40:57 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH 38/48] PCI: Lock down BAR access in secure boot environments
+Subject: [PATCH 37/47] PCI: Lock down BAR access in secure boot environments
 
 Any hardware that can potentially generate DMA has to be locked down from
 userspace in order to avoid it being possible for an attacker to cause
@@ -5300,7 +5301,7 @@ Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg at redhat.com>
  3 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
 
 diff --git a/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c b/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c
-index 9c6e9bb..b966089 100644
+index 5b4a9d9..db2ff9e 100644
 --- a/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c
 +++ b/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c
 @@ -622,6 +622,9 @@ pci_write_config(struct file* filp, struct kobject *kobj,
@@ -5334,11 +5335,11 @@ index 9c6e9bb..b966089 100644
  }
  
 diff --git a/drivers/pci/proc.c b/drivers/pci/proc.c
-index 0b00947..7639f68 100644
+index 0812608..544132d 100644
 --- a/drivers/pci/proc.c
 +++ b/drivers/pci/proc.c
-@@ -139,6 +139,9 @@ proc_bus_pci_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, size_t nbytes, lof
- 	int size = dp->size;
+@@ -136,6 +136,9 @@ proc_bus_pci_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, size_t nbytes, lof
+ 	int size = dev->cfg_size;
  	int cnt;
  
 +	if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL))
@@ -5347,7 +5348,7 @@ index 0b00947..7639f68 100644
  	if (pos >= size)
  		return 0;
  	if (nbytes >= size)
-@@ -219,6 +222,9 @@ static long proc_bus_pci_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
+@@ -215,6 +218,9 @@ static long proc_bus_pci_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
  #endif /* HAVE_PCI_MMAP */
  	int ret = 0;
  
@@ -5357,7 +5358,7 @@ index 0b00947..7639f68 100644
  	switch (cmd) {
  	case PCIIOC_CONTROLLER:
  		ret = pci_domain_nr(dev->bus);
-@@ -259,7 +265,7 @@ static int proc_bus_pci_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
+@@ -253,7 +259,7 @@ static int proc_bus_pci_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
  	struct pci_filp_private *fpriv = file->private_data;
  	int i, ret;
  
@@ -5380,13 +5381,13 @@ index e1c1ec5..97e785f 100644
  
  	dev = pci_get_bus_and_slot(bus, dfn);
 -- 
-1.8.1.2
+1.8.1.4
 
 
-From 55d73bfee2d162dadf4f697cfeb1235a68c90aa8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From 2361c561632c00e3974a092454ecc7daafb7cdf6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Matthew Garrett <mjg at redhat.com>
 Date: Thu, 20 Sep 2012 10:40:58 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH 39/48] x86: Lock down IO port access in secure boot
+Subject: [PATCH 38/47] x86: Lock down IO port access in secure boot
  environments
 
 IO port access would permit users to gain access to PCI configuration
@@ -5437,13 +5438,13 @@ index 2c644af..7eee4d8 100644
  		return -EFAULT;
  	while (count-- > 0 && i < 65536) {
 -- 
-1.8.1.2
+1.8.1.4
 
 
-From 985b096320b1689dbe91a97e999d0607f5461068 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From e97f4dd5b1baaae0854e8a5c87aa4be4d03d1854 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Matthew Garrett <mjg at redhat.com>
 Date: Thu, 20 Sep 2012 10:40:59 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH 40/48] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method
+Subject: [PATCH 39/47] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method
 
 It must be impossible for even root to get code executed in kernel context
 under a secure boot environment. custom_method effectively allows arbitrary
@@ -5469,13 +5470,13 @@ index 12b62f2..edf0710 100644
  		/* parse the table header to get the table length */
  		if (count <= sizeof(struct acpi_table_header))
 -- 
-1.8.1.2
+1.8.1.4
 
 
-From 6fe8ea348f67771efa9738b4484e658521f42d1e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From f0389c3a6d823e2386ab4e21d9e012c4ebd310ac Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Matthew Garrett <mjg at redhat.com>
 Date: Thu, 20 Sep 2012 10:41:00 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH 41/48] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface
+Subject: [PATCH 40/47] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface
 
 We have no way of validating what all of the Asus WMI methods do on a
 given machine, and there's a risk that some will allow hardware state to
@@ -5522,13 +5523,13 @@ index c11b242..6d5f88f 100644
  				     1, asus->debug.method_id,
  				     &input, &output);
 -- 
-1.8.1.2
+1.8.1.4
 
 
-From ddaafd6f64c317ad0fc33d06449e01632883b4b3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From 2e507337fc23547c7a15e5a102647becf20dba77 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Matthew Garrett <mjg at redhat.com>
 Date: Thu, 20 Sep 2012 10:41:01 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH 42/48] Restrict /dev/mem and /dev/kmem in secure boot setups
+Subject: [PATCH 41/47] Restrict /dev/mem and /dev/kmem in secure boot setups
 
 Allowing users to write to address space makes it possible for the kernel
 to be subverted. Restrict this when we need to protect the kernel.
@@ -5563,13 +5564,13 @@ index 7eee4d8..772ee2b 100644
  		unsigned long to_write = min_t(unsigned long, count,
  					       (unsigned long)high_memory - p);
 -- 
-1.8.1.2
+1.8.1.4
 
 
-From acb828bd8b69f66957865a66420e543bf0666b21 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From ff22d9716846844f8c249dbc965684a8014efed0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer at redhat.com>
 Date: Thu, 20 Sep 2012 10:41:04 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH 43/48] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel parameter in a secure
+Subject: [PATCH 42/47] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel parameter in a secure
  boot environment
 
 This option allows userspace to pass the RSDP address to the kernel.  This
@@ -5585,7 +5586,7 @@ Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer at redhat.com>
  1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
 
 diff --git a/drivers/acpi/osl.c b/drivers/acpi/osl.c
-index 586e7e9..8950454 100644
+index e721863..ed82da7 100644
 --- a/drivers/acpi/osl.c
 +++ b/drivers/acpi/osl.c
 @@ -245,7 +245,7 @@ early_param("acpi_rsdp", setup_acpi_rsdp);
@@ -5598,13 +5599,13 @@ index 586e7e9..8950454 100644
  #endif
  
 -- 
-1.8.1.2
+1.8.1.4
 
 
-From 0d76357d15402c418cf3345239462e30062a3245 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From b08ac626fbcf917bc219133d49c347d7d58eaae1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Matthew Garrett <mjg at redhat.com>
 Date: Tue, 4 Sep 2012 11:55:13 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH 44/48] kexec: Disable in a secure boot environment
+Subject: [PATCH 43/47] kexec: Disable in a secure boot environment
 
 kexec could be used as a vector for a malicious user to use a signed kernel
 to circumvent the secure boot trust model. In the long run we'll want to
@@ -5617,10 +5618,10 @@ Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg at redhat.com>
  1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
 
 diff --git a/kernel/kexec.c b/kernel/kexec.c
-index bddd3d7..cbdb930 100644
+index 59f7b55..8bf1336 100644
 --- a/kernel/kexec.c
 +++ b/kernel/kexec.c
-@@ -946,7 +946,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE4(kexec_load, unsigned long, entry, unsigned long, nr_segments,
+@@ -939,7 +939,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE4(kexec_load, unsigned long, entry, unsigned long, nr_segments,
  	int result;
  
  	/* We only trust the superuser with rebooting the system. */
@@ -5630,13 +5631,13 @@ index bddd3d7..cbdb930 100644
  
  	/*
 -- 
-1.8.1.2
+1.8.1.4
 
 
-From 8ef1f60c8c529785450ee97365714c940d4f2d8e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From f0d9c2906c1145585882fb7eb167e47e998c2e24 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer at redhat.com>
 Date: Fri, 5 Oct 2012 10:12:48 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH 45/48] MODSIGN: Always enforce module signing in a Secure Boot
+Subject: [PATCH 44/47] MODSIGN: Always enforce module signing in a Secure Boot
  environment
 
 If a machine is booted into a Secure Boot environment, we need to
@@ -5692,13 +5693,13 @@ index 0925c9a..af4a476 100644
  static int param_set_bool_enable_only(const char *val,
  				      const struct kernel_param *kp)
 -- 
-1.8.1.2
+1.8.1.4
 
 
-From b1e2ed158dd5ba3e18a9542802bdeb9d762f0656 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From 1c6bfec7db39e46eeb456fb84e3153281690bbe0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer at redhat.com>
 Date: Fri, 26 Oct 2012 14:02:09 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH 46/48] hibernate: Disable in a Secure Boot environment
+Subject: [PATCH 45/47] hibernate: Disable in a Secure Boot environment
 
 There is currently no way to verify the resume image when returning
 from hibernate.  This might compromise the secure boot trust model,
@@ -5806,13 +5807,13 @@ index 4ed81e7..b11a0f4 100644
  
  	if (!atomic_add_unless(&snapshot_device_available, -1, 0)) {
 -- 
-1.8.1.2
+1.8.1.4
 
 
-From 4c086b0bca62d3028dfd4faf6e6852ce59788333 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From 07cda990d2f18774522889ece30bddf67c703157 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer at redhat.com>
 Date: Tue, 5 Feb 2013 19:25:05 -0500
-Subject: [PATCH 47/48] efi: Disable secure boot if shim is in insecure mode
+Subject: [PATCH 46/47] efi: Disable secure boot if shim is in insecure mode
 
 A user can manually tell the shim boot loader to disable validation of
 images it loads.  When a user does this, it creates a UEFI variable called
@@ -5826,10 +5827,10 @@ Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer at redhat.com>
  1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
 
 diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c
-index 96d859d..c9ffd2f 100644
+index 0998ec7..4945ee5 100644
 --- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c
 +++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c
-@@ -863,8 +863,9 @@ fail:
+@@ -908,8 +908,9 @@ fail:
  
  static int get_secure_boot(efi_system_table_t *_table)
  {
@@ -5840,7 +5841,7 @@ index 96d859d..c9ffd2f 100644
  	efi_guid_t var_guid = EFI_GLOBAL_VARIABLE_GUID;
  	efi_status_t status;
  
-@@ -888,6 +889,23 @@ static int get_secure_boot(efi_system_table_t *_table)
+@@ -933,6 +934,23 @@ static int get_secure_boot(efi_system_table_t *_table)
  	if (setup == 1)
  		return 0;
  
@@ -5865,13 +5866,13 @@ index 96d859d..c9ffd2f 100644
  }
  
 -- 
-1.8.1.2
+1.8.1.4
 
 
-From 8225ade084c6137223579c69f17677fdd994940c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From e61066577405c37c2758f9b7fb2694967bdbe921 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Kees Cook <keescook at chromium.org>
 Date: Fri, 8 Feb 2013 11:12:13 -0800
-Subject: [PATCH 48/48] x86: Lock down MSR writing in secure boot
+Subject: [PATCH 47/47] x86: Lock down MSR writing in secure boot
 
 Writing to MSRs should not be allowed unless CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL is
 set since it could lead to execution of arbitrary code in kernel mode.
@@ -5907,5 +5908,5 @@ index ce13049..fa4dc6c 100644
  			err = -EFAULT;
  			break;
 -- 
-1.8.1.2
+1.8.1.4
 
diff --git a/kernel.spec b/kernel.spec
index b448eb6..9cfdc02 100644
--- a/kernel.spec
+++ b/kernel.spec
@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ Summary: The Linux kernel
 # For non-released -rc kernels, this will be appended after the rcX and
 # gitX tags, so a 3 here would become part of release "0.rcX.gitX.3"
 #
-%global baserelease 300
+%global baserelease 301
 %global fedora_build %{baserelease}
 
 # base_sublevel is the kernel version we're starting with and patching
@@ -654,7 +654,7 @@ Patch800: crash-driver.patch
 # crypto/
 
 # secure boot
-Patch1000: devel-pekey-secure-boot-20130306.patch
+Patch1000: devel-pekey-secure-boot-20130502.patch
 
 # virt + ksm patches
 
@@ -1390,7 +1390,7 @@ ApplyPatch crash-driver.patch
 # crypto/
 
 # secure boot
-ApplyPatch devel-pekey-secure-boot-20130306.patch
+ApplyPatch devel-pekey-secure-boot-20130502.patch
 
 # Assorted Virt Fixes
 
@@ -2306,6 +2306,9 @@ fi
 # and build.
 
 %changelog
+* Mon Jul 22 2013 Justin M. Forbes <jforbes at redhat.com> 3.10.2-301
+- Update secureboot patch for 3.10
+
 * Mon Jul 22 2013 Josh Boyer <jwboyer at redhat.com>
 - Fix timer issue in bridge code (rhbz 980254)
 


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