[openssl/f20] Fix multiple security issues.
Tomáš Mráz
tmraz at fedoraproject.org
Thu Oct 16 10:52:03 UTC 2014
commit f2b479874ece8a4b025aca90239c84ab9e39b754
Author: Tomas Mraz <tmraz at fedoraproject.org>
Date: Thu Oct 16 12:51:57 2014 +0200
Fix multiple security issues.
- fix CVE-2014-3567 - memory leak when handling session tickets
- fix CVE-2014-3513 - memory leak in srtp support
- add support for fallback SCSV to partially mitigate CVE-2014-3566
(padding attack on SSL3)
- print ephemeral key size negotiated in TLS handshake (#1057715)
openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-3513.patch | 186 ++++++++++++
openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-3567.patch | 14 +
openssl-1.0.1e-ephemeral-key-size.patch | 135 +++++++++
openssl-1.0.1e-fallback-scsv.patch | 466 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
openssl.spec | 18 ++-
5 files changed, 818 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
---
diff --git a/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-3513.patch b/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-3513.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0d42eec
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-3513.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,186 @@
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/d1_srtp.c.srtp-leak openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/d1_srtp.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/d1_srtp.c.srtp-leak 2013-02-11 16:26:04.000000000 +0100
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/d1_srtp.c 2014-10-15 13:23:34.253040160 +0200
+@@ -168,25 +168,6 @@ static int find_profile_by_name(char *pr
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+-static int find_profile_by_num(unsigned profile_num,
+- SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE **pptr)
+- {
+- SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *p;
+-
+- p=srtp_known_profiles;
+- while(p->name)
+- {
+- if(p->id == profile_num)
+- {
+- *pptr=p;
+- return 0;
+- }
+- p++;
+- }
+-
+- return 1;
+- }
+-
+ static int ssl_ctx_make_profiles(const char *profiles_string,STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) **out)
+ {
+ STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *profiles;
+@@ -209,11 +190,19 @@ static int ssl_ctx_make_profiles(const c
+ if(!find_profile_by_name(ptr,&p,
+ col ? col-ptr : (int)strlen(ptr)))
+ {
++ if (sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_find(profiles,p) >= 0)
++ {
++ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_MAKE_PROFILES,SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST);
++ sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_free(profiles);
++ return 1;
++ }
++
+ sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_push(profiles,p);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_MAKE_PROFILES,SSL_R_SRTP_UNKNOWN_PROTECTION_PROFILE);
++ sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_free(profiles);
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+@@ -305,13 +294,12 @@ int ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(SSL
+
+ int ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *d, int len,int *al)
+ {
+- SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *cprof,*sprof;
+- STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *clnt=0,*srvr;
++ SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *sprof;
++ STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *srvr;
+ int ct;
+ int mki_len;
+- int i,j;
+- int id;
+- int ret;
++ int i, srtp_pref;
++ unsigned int id;
+
+ /* Length value + the MKI length */
+ if(len < 3)
+@@ -341,22 +329,32 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(S
+ return 1;
+ }
+
++ srvr=SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s);
++ s->srtp_profile = NULL;
++ /* Search all profiles for a match initially */
++ srtp_pref = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(srvr);
+
+- clnt=sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_new_null();
+-
+ while(ct)
+ {
+ n2s(d,id);
+ ct-=2;
+ len-=2;
+
+- if(!find_profile_by_num(id,&cprof))
++ /*
++ * Only look for match in profiles of higher preference than
++ * current match.
++ * If no profiles have been have been configured then this
++ * does nothing.
++ */
++ for (i = 0; i < srtp_pref; i++)
+ {
+- sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_push(clnt,cprof);
+- }
+- else
+- {
+- ; /* Ignore */
++ sprof = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(srvr, i);
++ if (sprof->id == id)
++ {
++ s->srtp_profile = sprof;
++ srtp_pref = i;
++ break;
++ }
+ }
+ }
+
+@@ -371,36 +369,7 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(S
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+- srvr=SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s);
+-
+- /* Pick our most preferred profile. If no profiles have been
+- configured then the outer loop doesn't run
+- (sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num() = -1)
+- and so we just return without doing anything */
+- for(i=0;i<sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(srvr);i++)
+- {
+- sprof=sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(srvr,i);
+-
+- for(j=0;j<sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(clnt);j++)
+- {
+- cprof=sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(clnt,j);
+-
+- if(cprof->id==sprof->id)
+- {
+- s->srtp_profile=sprof;
+- *al=0;
+- ret=0;
+- goto done;
+- }
+- }
+- }
+-
+- ret=0;
+-
+-done:
+- if(clnt) sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_free(clnt);
+-
+- return ret;
++ return 0;
+ }
+
+ int ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, int *len, int maxlen)
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/t1_lib.c.srtp-leak openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/t1_lib.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/t1_lib.c.srtp-leak 2014-10-15 13:19:59.955202293 +0200
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/t1_lib.c 2014-10-15 13:23:34.254040182 +0200
+@@ -696,7 +696,7 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsex
+ #endif
+
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
+- if(SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s))
++ if(SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s))
+ {
+ int el;
+
+@@ -829,7 +829,7 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsex
+ #endif
+
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
+- if(s->srtp_profile)
++ if(SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile)
+ {
+ int el;
+
+@@ -1377,7 +1377,8 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s,
+
+ /* session ticket processed earlier */
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
+- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
++ else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)
++ && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
+ {
+ if(ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
+ al))
+@@ -1631,7 +1632,7 @@ int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s,
+ }
+ #endif
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
+- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
++ else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
+ {
+ if(ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
+ al))
diff --git a/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-3567.patch b/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-3567.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a01ee69
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-3567.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/t1_lib.c.ticket-leak openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/t1_lib.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/t1_lib.c.ticket-leak 2014-10-15 13:19:26.825454374 +0200
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/t1_lib.c 2014-10-15 13:19:59.955202293 +0200
+@@ -2280,7 +2280,10 @@ static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, co
+ HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
+ HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
+ if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
++ {
++ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+ return 2;
++ }
+ /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
+ /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
+ p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
diff --git a/openssl-1.0.1e-ephemeral-key-size.patch b/openssl-1.0.1e-ephemeral-key-size.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..14f7940
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.0.1e-ephemeral-key-size.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,135 @@
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/apps/s_apps.h.ephemeral openssl-1.0.1e/apps/s_apps.h
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/apps/s_apps.h.ephemeral 2014-02-12 14:49:14.333513753 +0100
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/apps/s_apps.h 2014-02-12 14:49:14.417515629 +0100
+@@ -156,6 +156,7 @@ int MS_CALLBACK verify_callback(int ok,
+ int set_cert_stuff(SSL_CTX *ctx, char *cert_file, char *key_file);
+ int set_cert_key_stuff(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert, EVP_PKEY *key);
+ #endif
++int ssl_print_tmp_key(BIO *out, SSL *s);
+ int init_client(int *sock, char *server, char *port, int type);
+ int should_retry(int i);
+ int extract_host_port(char *str,char **host_ptr,char **port_ptr);
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/apps/s_cb.c.ephemeral openssl-1.0.1e/apps/s_cb.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/apps/s_cb.c.ephemeral 2013-02-11 16:26:04.000000000 +0100
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/apps/s_cb.c 2014-02-12 14:56:25.584142499 +0100
+@@ -338,6 +338,38 @@ void MS_CALLBACK apps_ssl_info_callback(
+ }
+ }
+
++int ssl_print_tmp_key(BIO *out, SSL *s)
++ {
++ EVP_PKEY *key;
++ if (!SSL_get_server_tmp_key(s, &key))
++ return 1;
++ BIO_puts(out, "Server Temp Key: ");
++ switch (EVP_PKEY_id(key))
++ {
++ case EVP_PKEY_RSA:
++ BIO_printf(out, "RSA, %d bits\n", EVP_PKEY_bits(key));
++ break;
++
++ case EVP_PKEY_DH:
++ BIO_printf(out, "DH, %d bits\n", EVP_PKEY_bits(key));
++ break;
++
++ case EVP_PKEY_EC:
++ {
++ EC_KEY *ec = EVP_PKEY_get1_EC_KEY(key);
++ int nid;
++ const char *cname;
++ nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec));
++ EC_KEY_free(ec);
++ cname = OBJ_nid2sn(nid);
++ BIO_printf(out, "ECDH, %s, %d bits\n",
++ cname, EVP_PKEY_bits(key));
++ }
++ }
++ EVP_PKEY_free(key);
++ return 1;
++ }
++
+
+ void MS_CALLBACK msg_cb(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg)
+ {
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/apps/s_client.c.ephemeral openssl-1.0.1e/apps/s_client.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/apps/s_client.c.ephemeral 2014-02-12 14:49:14.407515406 +0100
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/apps/s_client.c 2014-02-12 14:49:14.418515652 +0100
+@@ -2032,6 +2032,8 @@ static void print_stuff(BIO *bio, SSL *s
+ BIO_write(bio,"\n",1);
+ }
+
++ ssl_print_tmp_key(bio, s);
++
+ BIO_printf(bio,"---\nSSL handshake has read %ld bytes and written %ld bytes\n",
+ BIO_number_read(SSL_get_rbio(s)),
+ BIO_number_written(SSL_get_wbio(s)));
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/ssl.h.ephemeral openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/ssl.h
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/ssl.h.ephemeral 2014-02-12 14:49:14.391515049 +0100
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/ssl.h 2014-02-12 14:49:14.418515652 +0100
+@@ -1563,6 +1563,8 @@ DECLARE_PEM_rw(SSL_SESSION, SSL_SESSION)
+ #define SSL_CTRL_GET_EXTRA_CHAIN_CERTS 82
+ #define SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_EXTRA_CHAIN_CERTS 83
+
++#define SSL_CTRL_GET_SERVER_TMP_KEY 109
++
+ #define DTLSv1_get_timeout(ssl, arg) \
+ SSL_ctrl(ssl,DTLS_CTRL_GET_TIMEOUT,0, (void *)arg)
+ #define DTLSv1_handle_timeout(ssl) \
+@@ -1604,6 +1606,9 @@ DECLARE_PEM_rw(SSL_SESSION, SSL_SESSION)
+ #define SSL_CTX_clear_extra_chain_certs(ctx) \
+ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_EXTRA_CHAIN_CERTS,0,NULL)
+
++#define SSL_get_server_tmp_key(s, pk) \
++ SSL_ctrl(s,SSL_CTRL_GET_SERVER_TMP_KEY,0,pk)
++
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BIO
+ BIO_METHOD *BIO_f_ssl(void);
+ BIO *BIO_new_ssl(SSL_CTX *ctx,int client);
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_lib.c.ephemeral openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_lib.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_lib.c.ephemeral 2014-02-12 14:49:14.412515518 +0100
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_lib.c 2014-02-12 14:49:14.418515652 +0100
+@@ -3350,6 +3350,44 @@ long ssl3_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, long lar
+ #endif
+
+ #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
++ case SSL_CTRL_GET_SERVER_TMP_KEY:
++ if (s->server || !s->session || !s->session->sess_cert)
++ return 0;
++ else
++ {
++ SESS_CERT *sc;
++ EVP_PKEY *ptmp;
++ int rv = 0;
++ sc = s->session->sess_cert;
++#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC)
++ if (!sc->peer_rsa_tmp && !sc->peer_dh_tmp
++ && !sc->peer_ecdh_tmp)
++ return 0;
++#endif
++ ptmp = EVP_PKEY_new();
++ if (!ptmp)
++ return 0;
++ if (0);
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
++ else if (sc->peer_rsa_tmp)
++ rv = EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(ptmp, sc->peer_rsa_tmp);
++#endif
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
++ else if (sc->peer_dh_tmp)
++ rv = EVP_PKEY_set1_DH(ptmp, sc->peer_dh_tmp);
++#endif
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
++ else if (sc->peer_ecdh_tmp)
++ rv = EVP_PKEY_set1_EC_KEY(ptmp, sc->peer_ecdh_tmp);
++#endif
++ if (rv)
++ {
++ *(EVP_PKEY **)parg = ptmp;
++ return 1;
++ }
++ EVP_PKEY_free(ptmp);
++ return 0;
++ }
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
diff --git a/openssl-1.0.1e-fallback-scsv.patch b/openssl-1.0.1e-fallback-scsv.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0e28c00
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.0.1e-fallback-scsv.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,466 @@
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/apps/s_client.c.fallback-scsv openssl-1.0.1e/apps/s_client.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/apps/s_client.c.fallback-scsv 2014-10-15 17:06:01.000000000 +0200
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/apps/s_client.c 2014-10-15 17:07:36.392502320 +0200
+@@ -336,6 +336,7 @@ static void sc_usage(void)
+ BIO_printf(bio_err," -tls1_1 - just use TLSv1.1\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err," -tls1 - just use TLSv1\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err," -dtls1 - just use DTLSv1\n");
++ BIO_printf(bio_err," -fallback_scsv - send TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err," -mtu - set the link layer MTU\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err," -no_tls1_2/-no_tls1_1/-no_tls1/-no_ssl3/-no_ssl2 - turn off that protocol\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err," -bugs - Switch on all SSL implementation bug workarounds\n");
+@@ -616,6 +617,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
+ char *sess_out = NULL;
+ struct sockaddr peer;
+ int peerlen = sizeof(peer);
++ int fallback_scsv = 0;
+ int enable_timeouts = 0 ;
+ long socket_mtu = 0;
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_JPAKE
+@@ -829,6 +831,10 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
+ socket_mtu = atol(*(++argv));
+ }
+ #endif
++ else if (strcmp(*argv,"-fallback_scsv") == 0)
++ {
++ fallback_scsv = 1;
++ }
+ else if (strcmp(*argv,"-bugs") == 0)
+ bugs=1;
+ else if (strcmp(*argv,"-keyform") == 0)
+@@ -1240,6 +1246,10 @@ bad:
+ SSL_set_session(con, sess);
+ SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
+ }
++
++ if (fallback_scsv)
++ SSL_set_mode(con, SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV);
++
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ if (servername != NULL)
+ {
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/doc/apps/s_client.pod.fallback-scsv openssl-1.0.1e/doc/apps/s_client.pod
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/doc/apps/s_client.pod.fallback-scsv 2014-10-15 17:06:01.000000000 +0200
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/doc/apps/s_client.pod 2014-10-15 17:08:17.354427053 +0200
+@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ B<openssl> B<s_client>
+ [B<-no_tls1>]
+ [B<-no_tls1_1>]
+ [B<-no_tls1_2>]
++[B<-fallback_scsv>]
+ [B<-bugs>]
+ [B<-cipher cipherlist>]
+ [B<-starttls protocol>]
+@@ -200,6 +201,10 @@ cannot handle this technique and will fa
+ work if TLS is turned off with the B<-no_tls> option others will only
+ support SSL v2 and may need the B<-ssl2> option.
+
++=item B<-fallback_scsv>
++
++Send TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV in the ClientHello.
++
+ =item B<-bugs>
+
+ there are several known bug in SSL and TLS implementations. Adding this
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_mode.pod.fallback-scsv openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_mode.pod
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_mode.pod.fallback-scsv 2013-02-11 16:26:04.000000000 +0100
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_mode.pod 2014-10-15 17:09:57.577689637 +0200
+@@ -71,6 +71,12 @@ SSL_CTX->freelist_max_len, which default
+ save around 34k per idle SSL connection.
+ This flag has no effect on SSL v2 connections, or on DTLS connections.
+
++=item SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV
++
++Send TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV in the ClientHello.
++To be set by applications that reconnect with a downgraded protocol
++version; see draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-scsv-00 for details.
++
+ =back
+
+ =head1 RETURN VALUES
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/dtls1.h.fallback-scsv openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/dtls1.h
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/dtls1.h.fallback-scsv 2014-10-15 14:39:30.862907615 +0200
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/dtls1.h 2014-10-15 14:39:30.973910121 +0200
+@@ -84,6 +84,8 @@ extern "C" {
+ #endif
+
+ #define DTLS1_VERSION 0xFEFF
++#define DTLS_MAX_VERSION DTLS1_VERSION
++
+ #define DTLS1_BAD_VER 0x0100
+
+ #if 0
+@@ -284,4 +286,3 @@ typedef struct dtls1_record_data_st
+ }
+ #endif
+ #endif
+-
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/d1_lib.c.fallback-scsv openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/d1_lib.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/d1_lib.c.fallback-scsv 2014-10-15 14:39:30.911908721 +0200
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/d1_lib.c 2014-10-15 14:39:30.973910121 +0200
+@@ -263,6 +263,16 @@ long dtls1_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, long la
+ case DTLS_CTRL_LISTEN:
+ ret = dtls1_listen(s, parg);
+ break;
++ case SSL_CTRL_CHECK_PROTO_VERSION:
++ /* For library-internal use; checks that the current protocol
++ * is the highest enabled version (according to s->ctx->method,
++ * as version negotiation may have changed s->method). */
++#if DTLS_MAX_VERSION != DTLS1_VERSION
++# error Code needs update for DTLS_method() support beyond DTLS1_VERSION.
++#endif
++ /* Just one protocol version is supported so far;
++ * fail closed if the version is not as expected. */
++ return s->version == DTLS_MAX_VERSION;
+
+ default:
+ ret = ssl3_ctrl(s, cmd, larg, parg);
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/ssl_err.c.fallback-scsv openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/ssl_err.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/ssl_err.c.fallback-scsv 2013-02-11 16:26:04.000000000 +0100
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/ssl_err.c 2014-10-15 14:39:30.973910121 +0200
+@@ -382,6 +382,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_reasons[]
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_HTTPS_PROXY_REQUEST) ,"https proxy request"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_HTTP_REQUEST) ,"http request"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_ILLEGAL_PADDING) ,"illegal padding"},
++{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK),"inappropriate fallback"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION),"inconsistent compression"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_INVALID_CHALLENGE_LENGTH),"invalid challenge length"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_INVALID_COMMAND) ,"invalid command"},
+@@ -528,6 +529,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_reasons[]
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_DECRYPTION_FAILED),"tlsv1 alert decryption failed"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_DECRYPT_ERROR),"tlsv1 alert decrypt error"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_EXPORT_RESTRICTION),"tlsv1 alert export restriction"},
++{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK),"tlsv1 alert inappropriate fallback"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY),"tlsv1 alert insufficient security"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_INTERNAL_ERROR),"tlsv1 alert internal error"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_NO_RENEGOTIATION),"tlsv1 alert no renegotiation"},
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/ssl.h.fallback-scsv openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/ssl.h
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/ssl.h.fallback-scsv 2014-10-15 14:39:30.940909375 +0200
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/ssl.h 2014-10-15 14:41:46.174962343 +0200
+@@ -638,6 +638,10 @@ struct ssl_session_st
+ * TLS only.) "Released" buffers are put onto a free-list in the context
+ * or just freed (depending on the context's setting for freelist_max_len). */
+ #define SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS 0x00000010L
++/* Send TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV in the ClientHello.
++ * To be set by applications that reconnect with a downgraded protocol
++ * version; see draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-scsv-00 for details. */
++#define SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV 0x00000080L
+
+ /* Note: SSL[_CTX]_set_{options,mode} use |= op on the previous value,
+ * they cannot be used to clear bits. */
+@@ -1453,6 +1457,7 @@ DECLARE_PEM_rw(SSL_SESSION, SSL_SESSION)
+ #define SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE
+ #define SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE
+ #define SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY /* fatal */
++#define SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK TLS1_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK /* fatal */
+
+ #define SSL_ERROR_NONE 0
+ #define SSL_ERROR_SSL 1
+@@ -1565,6 +1570,8 @@ DECLARE_PEM_rw(SSL_SESSION, SSL_SESSION)
+
+ #define SSL_CTRL_GET_SERVER_TMP_KEY 109
+
++#define SSL_CTRL_CHECK_PROTO_VERSION 119
++
+ #define DTLSv1_get_timeout(ssl, arg) \
+ SSL_ctrl(ssl,DTLS_CTRL_GET_TIMEOUT,0, (void *)arg)
+ #define DTLSv1_handle_timeout(ssl) \
+@@ -2298,6 +2305,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void);
+ #define SSL_R_HTTPS_PROXY_REQUEST 155
+ #define SSL_R_HTTP_REQUEST 156
+ #define SSL_R_ILLEGAL_PADDING 283
++#define SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK 373
+ #define SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION 340
+ #define SSL_R_INVALID_CHALLENGE_LENGTH 158
+ #define SSL_R_INVALID_COMMAND 280
+@@ -2444,6 +2452,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void);
+ #define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_DECRYPTION_FAILED 1021
+ #define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_DECRYPT_ERROR 1051
+ #define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_EXPORT_RESTRICTION 1060
++#define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK 1086
+ #define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY 1071
+ #define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_INTERNAL_ERROR 1080
+ #define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_NO_RENEGOTIATION 1100
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/ssl_lib.c.fallback-scsv openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/ssl_lib.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/ssl_lib.c.fallback-scsv 2014-10-15 14:39:30.912908743 +0200
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/ssl_lib.c 2014-10-15 14:39:30.975910166 +0200
+@@ -1383,6 +1383,8 @@ int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s,STAC
+
+ if (sk == NULL) return(0);
+ q=p;
++ if (put_cb == NULL)
++ put_cb = s->method->put_cipher_by_char;
+
+ for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++)
+ {
+@@ -1402,24 +1404,36 @@ int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s,STAC
+ s->psk_client_callback == NULL)
+ continue;
+ #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
+- j = put_cb ? put_cb(c,p) : ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s,c,p);
++ j = put_cb(c,p);
+ p+=j;
+ }
+- /* If p == q, no ciphers and caller indicates an error. Otherwise
+- * add SCSV if not renegotiating.
+- */
+- if (p != q && !s->renegotiate)
++ /* If p == q, no ciphers; caller indicates an error.
++ * Otherwise, add applicable SCSVs. */
++ if (p != q)
+ {
+- static SSL_CIPHER scsv =
++ if (!s->renegotiate)
+ {
+- 0, NULL, SSL3_CK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
+- };
+- j = put_cb ? put_cb(&scsv,p) : ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s,&scsv,p);
+- p+=j;
++ static SSL_CIPHER scsv =
++ {
++ 0, NULL, SSL3_CK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
++ };
++ j = put_cb(&scsv,p);
++ p+=j;
+ #ifdef OPENSSL_RI_DEBUG
+- fprintf(stderr, "SCSV sent by client\n");
++ fprintf(stderr, "TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV sent by client\n");
+ #endif
+- }
++ }
++
++ if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV)
++ {
++ static SSL_CIPHER scsv =
++ {
++ 0, NULL, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
++ };
++ j = put_cb(&scsv,p);
++ p+=j;
++ }
++ }
+
+ return(p-q);
+ }
+@@ -1430,11 +1444,12 @@ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_ciphe
+ const SSL_CIPHER *c;
+ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
+ int i,n;
++
+ if (s->s3)
+ s->s3->send_connection_binding = 0;
+
+ n=ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s,NULL,NULL);
+- if ((num%n) != 0)
++ if (n == 0 || (num%n) != 0)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,SSL_R_ERROR_IN_RECEIVED_CIPHER_LIST);
+ return(NULL);
+@@ -1449,7 +1464,7 @@ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_ciphe
+
+ for (i=0; i<num; i+=n)
+ {
+- /* Check for SCSV */
++ /* Check for TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV */
+ if (s->s3 && (n != 3 || !p[0]) &&
+ (p[n-2] == ((SSL3_CK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) &&
+ (p[n-1] == (SSL3_CK_SCSV & 0xff)))
+@@ -1469,6 +1484,23 @@ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_ciphe
+ continue;
+ }
+
++ /* Check for TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV */
++ if ((n != 3 || !p[0]) &&
++ (p[n-2] == ((SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) &&
++ (p[n-1] == (SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV & 0xff)))
++ {
++ /* The SCSV indicates that the client previously tried a higher version.
++ * Fail if the current version is an unexpected downgrade. */
++ if (!SSL_ctrl(s, SSL_CTRL_CHECK_PROTO_VERSION, 0, NULL))
++ {
++ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
++ if (s->s3)
++ ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
++ goto err;
++ }
++ continue;
++ }
++
+ c=ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s,p);
+ p+=n;
+ if (c != NULL)
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/ssl3.h.fallback-scsv openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/ssl3.h
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/ssl3.h.fallback-scsv 2014-10-15 14:39:30.949909579 +0200
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/ssl3.h 2014-10-15 14:39:30.975910166 +0200
+@@ -128,9 +128,14 @@
+ extern "C" {
+ #endif
+
+-/* Signalling cipher suite value: from draft-ietf-tls-renegotiation-03.txt */
++/* Signalling cipher suite value from RFC 5746
++ * (TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV) */
+ #define SSL3_CK_SCSV 0x030000FF
+
++/* Signalling cipher suite value from draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-scsv-00
++ * (TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV) */
++#define SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV 0x03005600
++
+ #define SSL3_CK_RSA_NULL_MD5 0x03000001
+ #define SSL3_CK_RSA_NULL_SHA 0x03000002
+ #define SSL3_CK_RSA_RC4_40_MD5 0x03000003
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s2_lib.c.fallback-scsv openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s2_lib.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s2_lib.c.fallback-scsv 2014-10-15 14:39:30.901908495 +0200
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s2_lib.c 2014-10-15 14:39:30.975910166 +0200
+@@ -391,6 +391,8 @@ long ssl2_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, long lar
+ case SSL_CTRL_GET_SESSION_REUSED:
+ ret=s->hit;
+ break;
++ case SSL_CTRL_CHECK_PROTO_VERSION:
++ return ssl3_ctrl(s, SSL_CTRL_CHECK_PROTO_VERSION, larg, parg);
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+@@ -437,7 +439,7 @@ int ssl2_put_cipher_by_char(const SSL_CI
+ if (p != NULL)
+ {
+ l=c->id;
+- if ((l & 0xff000000) != 0x02000000) return(0);
++ if ((l & 0xff000000) != 0x02000000 && l != SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV) return(0);
+ p[0]=((unsigned char)(l>>16L))&0xFF;
+ p[1]=((unsigned char)(l>> 8L))&0xFF;
+ p[2]=((unsigned char)(l ))&0xFF;
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s23_clnt.c.fallback-scsv openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s23_clnt.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s23_clnt.c.fallback-scsv 2013-02-11 16:26:04.000000000 +0100
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s23_clnt.c 2014-10-15 14:39:30.975910166 +0200
+@@ -715,6 +715,9 @@ static int ssl23_get_server_hello(SSL *s
+ goto err;
+ }
+
++ /* ensure that TLS_MAX_VERSION is up-to-date */
++ OPENSSL_assert(s->version <= TLS_MAX_VERSION);
++
+ if (p[0] == SSL3_RT_ALERT && p[5] != SSL3_AL_WARNING)
+ {
+ /* fatal alert */
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s23_srvr.c.fallback-scsv openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s23_srvr.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s23_srvr.c.fallback-scsv 2014-10-15 14:39:30.966909962 +0200
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s23_srvr.c 2014-10-15 14:39:30.976910188 +0200
+@@ -421,6 +421,9 @@ int ssl23_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
+ }
+ }
+
++ /* ensure that TLS_MAX_VERSION is up-to-date */
++ OPENSSL_assert(s->version <= TLS_MAX_VERSION);
++
+ #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+ if (FIPS_mode() && (s->version < TLS1_VERSION))
+ {
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_enc.c.fallback-scsv openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_enc.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_enc.c.fallback-scsv 2013-02-11 16:26:04.000000000 +0100
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_enc.c 2014-10-15 14:39:30.976910188 +0200
+@@ -892,7 +892,7 @@ int ssl3_alert_code(int code)
+ case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE: return(SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE: return(SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ case SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY:return(TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY);
++ case SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK:return(TLS1_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
+ default: return(-1);
+ }
+ }
+-
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_lib.c.fallback-scsv openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_lib.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_lib.c.fallback-scsv 2014-10-15 14:39:30.941909398 +0200
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_lib.c 2014-10-15 14:39:30.976910188 +0200
+@@ -3388,6 +3388,33 @@ long ssl3_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, long lar
+ EVP_PKEY_free(ptmp);
+ return 0;
+ }
++
++ case SSL_CTRL_CHECK_PROTO_VERSION:
++ /* For library-internal use; checks that the current protocol
++ * is the highest enabled version (according to s->ctx->method,
++ * as version negotiation may have changed s->method). */
++ if (s->version == s->ctx->method->version)
++ return 1;
++ /* Apparently we're using a version-flexible SSL_METHOD
++ * (not at its highest protocol version). */
++ if (s->ctx->method->version == SSLv23_method()->version)
++ {
++#if TLS_MAX_VERSION != TLS1_2_VERSION
++# error Code needs update for SSLv23_method() support beyond TLS1_2_VERSION.
++#endif
++ if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2))
++ return s->version == TLS1_2_VERSION;
++ if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1))
++ return s->version == TLS1_1_VERSION;
++ if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1))
++ return s->version == TLS1_VERSION;
++ if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3))
++ return s->version == SSL3_VERSION;
++ if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2))
++ return s->version == SSL2_VERSION;
++ }
++ return 0; /* Unexpected state; fail closed. */
++
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+@@ -3747,6 +3774,7 @@ long ssl3_ctx_callback_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx
+ break;
+ #endif
+ #endif
++
+ default:
+ return(0);
+ }
+@@ -4317,4 +4345,3 @@ long ssl_get_algorithm2(SSL *s)
+ return SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256;
+ return alg2;
+ }
+-
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/tls1.h.fallback-scsv openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/tls1.h
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/tls1.h.fallback-scsv 2014-10-15 14:39:30.775905650 +0200
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/tls1.h 2014-10-15 14:39:30.976910188 +0200
+@@ -159,17 +159,19 @@ extern "C" {
+
+ #define TLS1_ALLOW_EXPERIMENTAL_CIPHERSUITES 0
+
++#define TLS1_VERSION 0x0301
++#define TLS1_1_VERSION 0x0302
+ #define TLS1_2_VERSION 0x0303
+-#define TLS1_2_VERSION_MAJOR 0x03
+-#define TLS1_2_VERSION_MINOR 0x03
++#define TLS_MAX_VERSION TLS1_2_VERSION
++
++#define TLS1_VERSION_MAJOR 0x03
++#define TLS1_VERSION_MINOR 0x01
+
+-#define TLS1_1_VERSION 0x0302
+ #define TLS1_1_VERSION_MAJOR 0x03
+ #define TLS1_1_VERSION_MINOR 0x02
+
+-#define TLS1_VERSION 0x0301
+-#define TLS1_VERSION_MAJOR 0x03
+-#define TLS1_VERSION_MINOR 0x01
++#define TLS1_2_VERSION_MAJOR 0x03
++#define TLS1_2_VERSION_MINOR 0x03
+
+ #define TLS1_get_version(s) \
+ ((s->version >> 8) == TLS1_VERSION_MAJOR ? s->version : 0)
+@@ -187,6 +189,7 @@ extern "C" {
+ #define TLS1_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION 70 /* fatal */
+ #define TLS1_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY 71 /* fatal */
+ #define TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR 80 /* fatal */
++#define TLS1_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK 86 /* fatal */
+ #define TLS1_AD_USER_CANCELLED 90
+ #define TLS1_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION 100
+ /* codes 110-114 are from RFC3546 */
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/t1_enc.c.fallback-scsv openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/t1_enc.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/t1_enc.c.fallback-scsv 2014-10-15 14:39:30.936909285 +0200
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/t1_enc.c 2014-10-15 14:39:30.977910211 +0200
+@@ -1265,6 +1265,7 @@ int tls1_alert_code(int code)
+ case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE: return(TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE);
+ case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE: return(TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE);
+ case SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY:return(TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY);
++ case SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK:return(TLS1_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
+ #if 0 /* not appropriate for TLS, not used for DTLS */
+ case DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE: return
+ (DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE);
diff --git a/openssl.spec b/openssl.spec
index d80fd8a..a56336d 100644
--- a/openssl.spec
+++ b/openssl.spec
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@
Summary: Utilities from the general purpose cryptography library with TLS implementation
Name: openssl
Version: 1.0.1e
-Release: 39%{?dist}
+Release: 40%{?dist}
Epoch: 1
# We have to remove certain patented algorithms from the openssl source
# tarball with the hobble-openssl script which is included below.
@@ -87,6 +87,7 @@ Patch85: openssl-1.0.1e-arm-use-elf-auxv-caps.patch
Patch86: openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2013-6449.patch
Patch87: openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2013-6450.patch
Patch88: openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2013-4353.patch
+Patch89: openssl-1.0.1e-ephemeral-key-size.patch
Patch90: openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0160.patch
Patch91: openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2010-5298.patch
Patch92: openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0195.patch
@@ -101,6 +102,9 @@ Patch103: openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-3508.patch
Patch104: openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-3509.patch
Patch105: openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-3510.patch
Patch106: openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-3511.patch
+Patch110: openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-3567.patch
+Patch111: openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-3513.patch
+Patch112: openssl-1.0.1e-fallback-scsv.patch
License: OpenSSL
Group: System Environment/Libraries
@@ -223,6 +227,7 @@ cp %{SOURCE12} %{SOURCE13} crypto/ec/
%patch86 -p1 -b .hash-crash
%patch87 -p1 -b .dtls1-mitm
%patch88 -p1 -b .handshake-crash
+%patch89 -p1 -b .ephemeral
%patch90 -p1 -b .heartbeat
%patch91 -p1 -b .freelist
%patch92 -p1 -b .dtls1-overflow
@@ -237,6 +242,9 @@ cp %{SOURCE12} %{SOURCE13} crypto/ec/
%patch104 -p1 -b .tlsext-race
%patch105 -p1 -b .adh-dos
%patch106 -p1 -b .frag-downgrade
+%patch110 -p1 -b .ticket-leak
+%patch111 -p1 -b .srtp-leak
+%patch112 -p1 -b .fallback-scsv
sed -i 's/SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER "1.0.0"/SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER "%{version}"/' crypto/opensslv.h
@@ -500,6 +508,14 @@ rm -rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_libdir}/fipscanister.*
%postun libs -p /sbin/ldconfig
%changelog
+* Thu Oct 16 2014 Tomáš Mráz <tmraz at redhat.com> 1.0.1e-40
+- fix CVE-2014-3567 - memory leak when handling session tickets
+- fix CVE-2014-3513 - memory leak in srtp support
+- add support for fallback SCSV to partially mitigate CVE-2014-3566
+ (padding attack on SSL3)
+- print ephemeral key size negotiated in TLS handshake (#1057715)
+
+
* Fri Aug 8 2014 Tomáš Mráz <tmraz at redhat.com> 1.0.1e-39
- fix CVE-2014-3505 - doublefree in DTLS packet processing
- fix CVE-2014-3506 - avoid memory exhaustion in DTLS
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