[pam/f19] Minor security and bugfix updates
Tomáš Mráz
tmraz at fedoraproject.org
Thu Dec 4 10:53:45 UTC 2014
commit 58164a7568580209def7a3ed679119d22be578a1
Author: Tomas Mraz <tmraz at fedoraproject.org>
Date: Thu Dec 4 11:53:47 2014 +0100
Minor security and bugfix updates
- fix CVE-2014-2583: potential path traversal issue in pam_timestamp
- fix CVE-2013-7041: use case sensitive comparison in pam_userdb
- be tolerant to corrupted opasswd file
pam-1.1.6-cve-2013-7041.patch | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
pam-1.1.8-cve-2014-2583.patch | 56 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
pam-1.1.8-opasswd-tolerant.patch | 50 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
pam.spec | 14 ++++++++-
4 files changed, 154 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
---
diff --git a/pam-1.1.6-cve-2013-7041.patch b/pam-1.1.6-cve-2013-7041.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c33f774
--- /dev/null
+++ b/pam-1.1.6-cve-2013-7041.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+diff -up Linux-PAM-1.1.6/modules/pam_userdb/pam_userdb.c.case Linux-PAM-1.1.6/modules/pam_userdb/pam_userdb.c
+--- Linux-PAM-1.1.6/modules/pam_userdb/pam_userdb.c.case 2014-12-04 11:46:33.225540015 +0100
++++ Linux-PAM-1.1.6/modules/pam_userdb/pam_userdb.c 2014-12-04 11:48:54.492734888 +0100
+@@ -214,24 +214,23 @@ user_lookup (pam_handle_t *pamh, const c
+ /* crypt(3) password storage */
+
+ char *cryptpw;
+- char salt[2];
+
+- if (data.dsize != 13) {
++ if (data.dsize < 13) {
+ compare = -2;
+ } else if (ctrl & PAM_ICASE_ARG) {
+ compare = -2;
+ } else {
+- salt[0] = *data.dptr;
+- salt[1] = *(data.dptr + 1);
++ cryptpw = crypt (pass, data.dptr);
+
+- cryptpw = crypt (pass, salt);
+-
+- if (cryptpw) {
+- compare = strncasecmp (data.dptr, cryptpw, data.dsize);
++ if (cryptpw && strlen(cryptpw) == (size_t)data.dsize) {
++ compare = memcmp(data.dptr, cryptpw, data.dsize);
+ } else {
+ compare = -2;
+ if (ctrl & PAM_DEBUG_ARG) {
+- pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_INFO, "crypt() returned NULL");
++ if (cryptpw)
++ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_INFO, "lengths of computed and stored hashes differ");
++ else
++ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_INFO, "crypt() returned NULL");
+ }
+ };
+
diff --git a/pam-1.1.8-cve-2014-2583.patch b/pam-1.1.8-cve-2014-2583.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f2aa2de
--- /dev/null
+++ b/pam-1.1.8-cve-2014-2583.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+From 9dcead87e6d7f66d34e7a56d11a30daca367dffb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "Dmitry V. Levin" <ldv at altlinux.org>
+Date: Wed, 26 Mar 2014 22:17:23 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] pam_timestamp: fix potential directory traversal issue
+ (ticket #27)
+
+pam_timestamp uses values of PAM_RUSER and PAM_TTY as components of
+the timestamp pathname it creates, so extra care should be taken to
+avoid potential directory traversal issues.
+
+* modules/pam_timestamp/pam_timestamp.c (check_tty): Treat
+"." and ".." tty values as invalid.
+(get_ruser): Treat "." and ".." ruser values, as well as any ruser
+value containing '/', as invalid.
+
+Fixes CVE-2014-2583.
+
+Reported-by: Sebastian Krahmer <krahmer at suse.de>
+---
+ modules/pam_timestamp/pam_timestamp.c | 13 ++++++++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/modules/pam_timestamp/pam_timestamp.c b/modules/pam_timestamp/pam_timestamp.c
+index 5193733..b3f08b1 100644
+--- a/modules/pam_timestamp/pam_timestamp.c
++++ b/modules/pam_timestamp/pam_timestamp.c
+@@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ check_tty(const char *tty)
+ tty = strrchr(tty, '/') + 1;
+ }
+ /* Make sure the tty wasn't actually a directory (no basename). */
+- if (strlen(tty) == 0) {
++ if (!strlen(tty) || !strcmp(tty, ".") || !strcmp(tty, "..")) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ return tty;
+@@ -243,6 +243,17 @@ get_ruser(pam_handle_t *pamh, char *ruserbuf, size_t ruserbuflen)
+ if (pwd != NULL) {
+ ruser = pwd->pw_name;
+ }
++ } else {
++ /*
++ * This ruser is used by format_timestamp_name as a component
++ * of constructed timestamp pathname, so ".", "..", and '/'
++ * are disallowed to avoid potential path traversal issues.
++ */
++ if (!strcmp(ruser, ".") ||
++ !strcmp(ruser, "..") ||
++ strchr(ruser, '/')) {
++ ruser = NULL;
++ }
+ }
+ if (ruser == NULL || strlen(ruser) >= ruserbuflen) {
+ *ruserbuf = '\0';
+--
+1.8.3.1
+
diff --git a/pam-1.1.8-opasswd-tolerant.patch b/pam-1.1.8-opasswd-tolerant.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fb9b198
--- /dev/null
+++ b/pam-1.1.8-opasswd-tolerant.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+diff --git a/modules/pam_pwhistory/opasswd.c b/modules/pam_pwhistory/opasswd.c
+index 836d713..c36628e 100644
+--- a/modules/pam_pwhistory/opasswd.c
++++ b/modules/pam_pwhistory/opasswd.c
+@@ -82,10 +82,15 @@ parse_entry (char *line, opwd *data)
+ {
+ const char delimiters[] = ":";
+ char *endptr;
++ char *count;
+
+ data->user = strsep (&line, delimiters);
+ data->uid = strsep (&line, delimiters);
+- data->count = strtol (strsep (&line, delimiters), &endptr, 10);
++ count = strsep (&line, delimiters);
++ if (data->user == NULL || data->uid == NULL || count == NULL)
++ return 1;
++
++ data->count = strtol (count, &endptr, 10);
+ if (endptr != NULL && *endptr != '\0')
+ return 1;
+
+diff --git a/modules/pam_unix/passverify.c b/modules/pam_unix/passverify.c
+index 4840bb2..7f7bc49 100644
+--- a/modules/pam_unix/passverify.c
++++ b/modules/pam_unix/passverify.c
+@@ -639,11 +639,23 @@ save_old_password(pam_handle_t *pamh, const char *forwho, const char *oldpass,
+ continue;
+ buf[strlen(buf) - 1] = '\0';
+ s_luser = strtok_r(buf, ":", &sptr);
++ if (s_luser == NULL) {
++ found = 0;
++ continue;
++ }
+ s_uid = strtok_r(NULL, ":", &sptr);
++ if (s_uid == NULL) {
++ found = 0;
++ continue;
++ }
+ s_npas = strtok_r(NULL, ":", &sptr);
++ if (s_npas == NULL) {
++ found = 0;
++ continue;
++ }
+ s_pas = strtok_r(NULL, ":", &sptr);
+ npas = strtol(s_npas, NULL, 10) + 1;
+- while (npas > howmany) {
++ while (npas > howmany && s_pas != NULL) {
+ s_pas = strpbrk(s_pas, ",");
+ if (s_pas != NULL)
+ s_pas++;
diff --git a/pam.spec b/pam.spec
index 702a901..e40f0d5 100644
--- a/pam.spec
+++ b/pam.spec
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
Summary: An extensible library which provides authentication for applications
Name: pam
Version: 1.1.6
-Release: 12%{?dist}
+Release: 13%{?dist}
# The library is BSD licensed with option to relicense as GPLv2+
# - this option is redundant as the BSD license allows that anyway.
# pam_timestamp, pam_loginuid, and pam_console modules are GPLv2+.
@@ -60,6 +60,9 @@ Patch27: pam-1.1.6-strict-aliasing.patch
Patch28: pam-1.1.6-selinux-manualctx.patch
Patch29: pam-1.1.6-pwhistory-helper.patch
Patch30: pam-1.1.6-rootok-audit.patch
+Patch35: pam-1.1.6-cve-2013-7041.patch
+Patch36: pam-1.1.8-cve-2014-2583.patch
+Patch38: pam-1.1.8-opasswd-tolerant.patch
%define _pamlibdir %{_libdir}
%define _moduledir %{_libdir}/security
@@ -145,7 +148,9 @@ mv pam-redhat-%{pam_redhat_version}/* modules
%patch28 -p1 -b .manualctx
%patch29 -p1 -b .pwhhelper
%patch30 -p1 -b .audit
-
+%patch35 -p1 -b .case
+%patch36 -p1 -b .timestamp-ruser
+%patch38 -p1 -b .opasswd-tolerant
%build
autoreconf -i
@@ -393,6 +398,11 @@ fi
%doc doc/adg/*.txt doc/adg/html
%changelog
+* Thu Dec 4 2014 Tomáš Mráz <tmraz at redhat.com> 1.1.6-13
+- fix CVE-2014-2583: potential path traversal issue in pam_timestamp
+- fix CVE-2013-7041: use case sensitive comparison in pam_userdb
+- be tolerant to corrupted opasswd file
+
* Thu Jul 11 2013 Tomáš Mráz <tmraz at redhat.com> 1.1.6-12
- add auditing of SELinux policy violation in pam_rootok (#965723)
- add SELinux helper to pam_pwhistory
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