[unzip] Fixes few security bugs and overflow on long file sizes
pstodulk
pstodulk at fedoraproject.org
Tue Feb 10 20:27:43 UTC 2015
commit f6883dfa8599e8b93a75c8f85f08879be28a5910
Author: Petr Stodulka <pstodulk at redhat.com>
Date: Tue Feb 10 21:26:05 2015 +0100
Fixes few security bugs and overflow on long file sizes
unzip-6.0-cve-2014-8139.patch | 79 ++++++++++++++++++++
unzip-6.0-cve-2014-8140.patch | 25 ++++++
unzip-6.0-cve-2014-8141.patch | 138 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
unzip-6.0-overflow-long-fsize.patch | 34 +++++++++
unzip.spec | 20 +++++-
5 files changed, 295 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
---
diff --git a/unzip-6.0-cve-2014-8139.patch b/unzip-6.0-cve-2014-8139.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..226b35a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/unzip-6.0-cve-2014-8139.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
+diff --git a/extract.c b/extract.c
+index 9ef80b3..c741b5f 100644
+--- a/extract.c
++++ b/extract.c
+@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
+ /*
+- Copyright (c) 1990-2009 Info-ZIP. All rights reserved.
++ Copyright (c) 1990-2014 Info-ZIP. All rights reserved.
+
+ See the accompanying file LICENSE, version 2009-Jan-02 or later
+ (the contents of which are also included in unzip.h) for terms of use.
+@@ -298,6 +298,8 @@ char ZCONST Far TruncNTSD[] =
+ #ifndef SFX
+ static ZCONST char Far InconsistEFlength[] = "bad extra-field entry:\n \
+ EF block length (%u bytes) exceeds remaining EF data (%u bytes)\n";
++ static ZCONST char Far TooSmallEBlength[] = "bad extra-field entry:\n \
++ EF block length (%u bytes) invalid (< %d)\n";
+ static ZCONST char Far InvalidComprDataEAs[] =
+ " invalid compressed data for EAs\n";
+ # if (defined(WIN32) && defined(NTSD_EAS))
+@@ -2020,7 +2022,8 @@ static int TestExtraField(__G__ ef, ef_len)
+ ebID = makeword(ef);
+ ebLen = (unsigned)makeword(ef+EB_LEN);
+
+- if (ebLen > (ef_len - EB_HEADSIZE)) {
++ if (ebLen > (ef_len - EB_HEADSIZE))
++ {
+ /* Discovered some extra field inconsistency! */
+ if (uO.qflag)
+ Info(slide, 1, ((char *)slide, "%-22s ",
+@@ -2155,11 +2158,29 @@ static int TestExtraField(__G__ ef, ef_len)
+ }
+ break;
+ case EF_PKVMS:
+- if (makelong(ef+EB_HEADSIZE) !=
+- crc32(CRCVAL_INITIAL, ef+(EB_HEADSIZE+4),
+- (extent)(ebLen-4)))
+- Info(slide, 1, ((char *)slide,
+- LoadFarString(BadCRC_EAs)));
++ /* 2015-01-30 SMS. Added sufficient-bytes test/message
++ * here. (Removed defective ebLen test above.)
++ *
++ * If sufficient bytes (EB_PKVMS_MINLEN) are available,
++ * then compare the stored CRC value with the calculated
++ * CRC for the remainder of the data (and complain about
++ * a mismatch).
++ */
++ if (ebLen < EB_PKVMS_MINLEN)
++ {
++ /* Insufficient bytes available. */
++ Info( slide, 1,
++ ((char *)slide, LoadFarString( TooSmallEBlength),
++ ebLen, EB_PKVMS_MINLEN));
++ }
++ else if (makelong(ef+ EB_HEADSIZE) !=
++ crc32(CRCVAL_INITIAL,
++ (ef+ EB_HEADSIZE+ EB_PKVMS_MINLEN),
++ (extent)(ebLen- EB_PKVMS_MINLEN)))
++ {
++ Info(slide, 1, ((char *)slide,
++ LoadFarString(BadCRC_EAs)));
++ }
+ break;
+ case EF_PKW32:
+ case EF_PKUNIX:
+diff --git a/unzpriv.h b/unzpriv.h
+index 005cee0..5c83a6e 100644
+--- a/unzpriv.h
++++ b/unzpriv.h
+@@ -1806,6 +1806,8 @@
+ #define EB_NTSD_VERSION 4 /* offset of NTSD version byte */
+ #define EB_NTSD_MAX_VER (0) /* maximum version # we know how to handle */
+
++#define EB_PKVMS_MINLEN 4 /* minimum data length of PKVMS extra block */
++
+ #define EB_ASI_CRC32 0 /* offset of ASI Unix field's crc32 checksum */
+ #define EB_ASI_MODE 4 /* offset of ASI Unix permission mode field */
+
+
diff --git a/unzip-6.0-cve-2014-8140.patch b/unzip-6.0-cve-2014-8140.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..148cca6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/unzip-6.0-cve-2014-8140.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+diff --git a/extract.c b/extract.c
+index c741b5f..e4a4c7b 100644
+--- a/extract.c
++++ b/extract.c
+@@ -2240,10 +2240,17 @@ static int test_compr_eb(__G__ eb, eb_size, compr_offset, test_uc_ebdata)
+ if (compr_offset < 4) /* field is not compressed: */
+ return PK_OK; /* do nothing and signal OK */
+
++ /* Return no/bad-data error status if any problem is found:
++ * 1. eb_size is too small to hold the uncompressed size
++ * (eb_ucsize). (Else extract eb_ucsize.)
++ * 2. eb_ucsize is zero (invalid). 2014-12-04 SMS.
++ * 3. eb_ucsize is positive, but eb_size is too small to hold
++ * the compressed data header.
++ */
+ if ((eb_size < (EB_UCSIZE_P + 4)) ||
+- ((eb_ucsize = makelong(eb+(EB_HEADSIZE+EB_UCSIZE_P))) > 0L &&
+- eb_size <= (compr_offset + EB_CMPRHEADLEN)))
+- return IZ_EF_TRUNC; /* no compressed data! */
++ ((eb_ucsize = makelong( eb+ (EB_HEADSIZE+ EB_UCSIZE_P))) == 0L) ||
++ ((eb_ucsize > 0L) && (eb_size <= (compr_offset + EB_CMPRHEADLEN))))
++ return IZ_EF_TRUNC; /* no/bad compressed data! */
+
+ method = makeword(eb + (EB_HEADSIZE + compr_offset));
+ if ((method == STORED) && (eb_size - compr_offset != eb_ucsize))
diff --git a/unzip-6.0-cve-2014-8141.patch b/unzip-6.0-cve-2014-8141.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..584c576
--- /dev/null
+++ b/unzip-6.0-cve-2014-8141.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,138 @@
+diff --git a/fileio.c b/fileio.c
+index 03fc4be..2a61a30 100644
+--- a/fileio.c
++++ b/fileio.c
+@@ -176,6 +176,8 @@ static ZCONST char Far FilenameTooLongTrunc[] =
+ #endif
+ static ZCONST char Far ExtraFieldTooLong[] =
+ "warning: extra field too long (%d). Ignoring...\n";
++static ZCONST char Far ExtraFieldCorrupt[] =
++ "warning: extra field (type: 0x%04x) corrupt. Continuing...\n";
+
+ #ifdef WINDLL
+ static ZCONST char Far DiskFullQuery[] =
+@@ -2300,7 +2302,13 @@ int do_string(__G__ length, option) /* return PK-type error code */
+ length = length2;
+ }
+ /* Looks like here is where extra fields are read */
+- getZip64Data(__G__ G.extra_field, length);
++ if (getZip64Data(__G__ G.extra_field, length) != PK_COOL)
++ {
++ Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide,
++ LoadFarString( ExtraFieldCorrupt), EF_PKSZ64));
++ error = PK_WARN;
++ }
++
+ #ifdef UNICODE_SUPPORT
+ G.unipath_filename = NULL;
+ if (G.UzO.U_flag < 2) {
+diff --git a/process.c b/process.c
+index be6e006..0d57ab4 100644
+--- a/process.c
++++ b/process.c
+@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
+ /*
+- Copyright (c) 1990-2009 Info-ZIP. All rights reserved.
++ Copyright (c) 1990-2014 Info-ZIP. All rights reserved.
+
+ See the accompanying file LICENSE, version 2009-Jan-02 or later
+ (the contents of which are also included in unzip.h) for terms of use.
+@@ -1894,48 +1894,83 @@ int getZip64Data(__G__ ef_buf, ef_len)
+ and a 4-byte version of disk start number.
+ Sets both local header and central header fields. Not terribly clever,
+ but it means that this procedure is only called in one place.
++
++ 2014-12-05 SMS.
++ Added checks to ensure that enough data are available before calling
++ makeint64() or makelong(). Replaced various sizeof() values with
++ simple ("4" or "8") constants. (The Zip64 structures do not depend
++ on our variable sizes.) Error handling is crude, but we should now
++ stay within the buffer.
+ ---------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
+
++#define Z64FLGS 0xffff
++#define Z64FLGL 0xffffffff
++
+ if (ef_len == 0 || ef_buf == NULL)
+ return PK_COOL;
+
+ Trace((stderr,"\ngetZip64Data: scanning extra field of length %u\n",
+ ef_len));
+
+- while (ef_len >= EB_HEADSIZE) {
++ while (ef_len >= EB_HEADSIZE)
++ {
+ eb_id = makeword(EB_ID + ef_buf);
+ eb_len = makeword(EB_LEN + ef_buf);
+
+- if (eb_len > (ef_len - EB_HEADSIZE)) {
+- /* discovered some extra field inconsistency! */
++ if (eb_len > (ef_len - EB_HEADSIZE))
++ {
++ /* Extra block length exceeds remaining extra field length. */
+ Trace((stderr,
+ "getZip64Data: block length %u > rest ef_size %u\n", eb_len,
+ ef_len - EB_HEADSIZE));
+ break;
+ }
+- if (eb_id == EF_PKSZ64) {
+
++ if (eb_id == EF_PKSZ64)
++ {
+ int offset = EB_HEADSIZE;
+
+- if (G.crec.ucsize == 0xffffffff || G.lrec.ucsize == 0xffffffff){
+- G.lrec.ucsize = G.crec.ucsize = makeint64(offset + ef_buf);
+- offset += sizeof(G.crec.ucsize);
++ if ((G.crec.ucsize == Z64FLGL) || (G.lrec.ucsize == Z64FLGL))
++ {
++ if (offset+ 8 > ef_len)
++ return PK_ERR;
++
++ G.crec.ucsize = G.lrec.ucsize = makeint64(offset + ef_buf);
++ offset += 8;
+ }
+- if (G.crec.csize == 0xffffffff || G.lrec.csize == 0xffffffff){
+- G.csize = G.lrec.csize = G.crec.csize = makeint64(offset + ef_buf);
+- offset += sizeof(G.crec.csize);
++
++ if ((G.crec.csize == Z64FLGL) || (G.lrec.csize == Z64FLGL))
++ {
++ if (offset+ 8 > ef_len)
++ return PK_ERR;
++
++ G.csize = G.crec.csize = G.lrec.csize = makeint64(offset + ef_buf);
++ offset += 8;
+ }
+- if (G.crec.relative_offset_local_header == 0xffffffff){
++
++ if (G.crec.relative_offset_local_header == Z64FLGL)
++ {
++ if (offset+ 8 > ef_len)
++ return PK_ERR;
++
+ G.crec.relative_offset_local_header = makeint64(offset + ef_buf);
+- offset += sizeof(G.crec.relative_offset_local_header);
++ offset += 8;
+ }
+- if (G.crec.disk_number_start == 0xffff){
++
++ if (G.crec.disk_number_start == Z64FLGS)
++ {
++ if (offset+ 4 > ef_len)
++ return PK_ERR;
++
+ G.crec.disk_number_start = (zuvl_t)makelong(offset + ef_buf);
+- offset += sizeof(G.crec.disk_number_start);
++ offset += 4;
+ }
++#if 0
++ break; /* Expect only one EF_PKSZ64 block. */
++#endif /* 0 */
+ }
+
+- /* Skip this extra field block */
++ /* Skip this extra field block. */
+ ef_buf += (eb_len + EB_HEADSIZE);
+ ef_len -= (eb_len + EB_HEADSIZE);
+ }
diff --git a/unzip-6.0-overflow-long-fsize.patch b/unzip-6.0-overflow-long-fsize.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..80cd708
--- /dev/null
+++ b/unzip-6.0-overflow-long-fsize.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+diff --git a/list.c b/list.c
+index f7359c3..4c3d703 100644
+--- a/list.c
++++ b/list.c
+@@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ int list_files(__G) /* return PK-type error code */
+ {
+ int do_this_file=FALSE, cfactor, error, error_in_archive=PK_COOL;
+ #ifndef WINDLL
+- char sgn, cfactorstr[10];
++ char sgn, cfactorstr[13];
+ int longhdr=(uO.vflag>1);
+ #endif
+ int date_format;
+@@ -339,7 +339,19 @@ int list_files(__G) /* return PK-type error code */
+ G.crec.compression_method == ENHDEFLATED) {
+ methbuf[5] = dtype[(G.crec.general_purpose_bit_flag>>1) & 3];
+ } else if (methnum >= NUM_METHODS) {
+- sprintf(&methbuf[4], "%03u", G.crec.compression_method);
++ /* 2013-02-26 SMS.
++ * http://sourceforge.net/tracker/?func=detail
++ * &aid=2861648&group_id=118012&atid=679786
++ * Unexpectedly large compression methods overflow
++ * &methbuf[]. Use the old, three-digit decimal format
++ * for values which fit. Otherwise, sacrifice the
++ * colon, and use four-digit hexadecimal.
++ */
++ if (G.crec.compression_method <= 999) {
++ sprintf( &methbuf[ 4], "%03u", G.crec.compression_method);
++ } else {
++ sprintf( &methbuf[ 3], "%04X", G.crec.compression_method);
++ }
+ }
+
+ #if 0 /* GRR/Euro: add this? */
diff --git a/unzip.spec b/unzip.spec
index ce892ea..bf2a6b4 100644
--- a/unzip.spec
+++ b/unzip.spec
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
Summary: A utility for unpacking zip files
Name: unzip
Version: 6.0
-Release: 18%{?dist}
+Release: 19%{?dist}
License: BSD
Group: Applications/Archiving
Source: http://downloads.sourceforge.net/infozip/unzip60.tar.gz
@@ -32,6 +32,10 @@ Patch10: unzip-6.0-format-secure.patch
Patch11: unzip-6.0-valgrind.patch
Patch12: unzip-6.0-x-option.patch
Patch13: unzip-6.0-overflow.patch
+Patch14: unzip-6.0-cve-2014-8139.patch
+Patch15: unzip-6.0-cve-2014-8140.patch
+Patch16: unzip-6.0-cve-2014-8141.patch
+Patch17: unzip-6.0-overflow-long-fsize.patch
URL: http://www.info-zip.org/UnZip.html
BuildRequires: bzip2-devel
@@ -61,6 +65,10 @@ a zip archive.
%patch11 -p1 -b .valgrind
%patch12 -p1 -b .x-option
%patch13 -p1 -b .overflow
+%patch14 -p1 -b .cve-2014-8139
+%patch15 -p1 -b .cve-2014-8140
+%patch16 -p1 -b .cve-2014-8141
+%patch17 -p1 -b .overflow-long-fsize
%build
# IZ_HAVE_UXUIDGID is needed for right functionality of unzip -X
@@ -79,6 +87,16 @@ make -f unix/Makefile prefix=$RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_prefix} MANDIR=$RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{
%{_mandir}/*/*
%changelog
+* Tue Feb 10 2015 Petr Stodulka <pstodulk at redhat.com> - 6.0-19
+- Fix CVE-2014-8139 - CRC32 verification heap-based buffer overread
+ (#1174844)
+- Fix CVE-2014-8140 - out-of-bounds write issue in test_compr_eb()
+ (#1174851)
+- Fix CVE-2014-8141 - getZip64Data() out-of-bounds read issues
+ (#1174856)
+- Fix buffer overflow on long file sizes
+ (#1191136)
+
* Mon Jan 26 2015 Petr Stodulka <pstodulk at redhat.com> - 6.0-18
- Fix security bug - CVE-2014-9636
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