[openssl] Multiple security issues fixed.
Tomáš Mráz
tmraz at fedoraproject.org
Thu Mar 19 17:08:16 UTC 2015
commit 729d2d0e11358df28a8cd6700e1da7b13f2d5a9d
Author: Tomas Mraz <tmraz at fedoraproject.org>
Date: Thu Mar 19 18:08:12 2015 +0100
Multiple security issues fixed.
- fix CVE-2015-0209 - potential use after free in d2i_ECPrivateKey()
- fix CVE-2015-0286 - improper handling of ASN.1 boolean comparison
- fix CVE-2015-0287 - ASN.1 structure reuse decoding memory corruption
- fix CVE-2015-0289 - NULL dereference decoding invalid PKCS#7 data
- fix CVE-2015-0293 - triggerable assert in SSLv2 server
openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-0286.patch | 13 +++
openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-0287.patch | 46 +++++++++++
openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-0288.patch | 12 +++
openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-0293.patch | 102 +++++++++++++++++++++++
openssl-1.0.1k-cve-2015-0209.patch | 27 ++++++
openssl-1.0.1k-cve-2015-0289.patch | 163 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
openssl.spec | 21 ++++-
7 files changed, 383 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
---
diff --git a/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-0286.patch b/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-0286.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..64ec2b7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-0286.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/asn1/a_type.c.bool-cmp openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/asn1/a_type.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/asn1/a_type.c.bool-cmp 2015-03-18 13:02:36.000000000 +0100
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/asn1/a_type.c 2015-03-18 14:38:07.111401390 +0100
+@@ -124,6 +124,9 @@ int ASN1_TYPE_cmp(const ASN1_TYPE *a, co
+ case V_ASN1_OBJECT:
+ result = OBJ_cmp(a->value.object, b->value.object);
+ break;
++ case V_ASN1_BOOLEAN:
++ result = a->value.boolean - b->value.boolean;
++ break;
+ case V_ASN1_NULL:
+ result = 0; /* They do not have content. */
+ break;
diff --git a/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-0287.patch b/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-0287.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f77b099
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-0287.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c.item-reuse openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c.item-reuse 2013-02-11 16:26:04.000000000 +0100
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c 2015-03-19 15:46:51.097022616 +0100
+@@ -310,9 +310,19 @@ int ASN1_item_ex_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval,
+ case ASN1_ITYPE_CHOICE:
+ if (asn1_cb && !asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_D2I_PRE, pval, it, NULL))
+ goto auxerr;
+-
+- /* Allocate structure */
+- if (!*pval && !ASN1_item_ex_new(pval, it))
++ if (*pval)
++ {
++ /* Free up and zero CHOICE value if initialised */
++ i = asn1_get_choice_selector(pval, it);
++ if ((i >= 0) && (i < it->tcount))
++ {
++ tt = it->templates + i;
++ pchptr = asn1_get_field_ptr(pval, tt);
++ ASN1_template_free(pchptr, tt);
++ asn1_set_choice_selector(pval, -1, it);
++ }
++ }
++ else if (!ASN1_item_ex_new(pval, it))
+ {
+ ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I,
+ ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR);
+@@ -407,6 +417,19 @@ int ASN1_item_ex_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval,
+ if (asn1_cb && !asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_D2I_PRE, pval, it, NULL))
+ goto auxerr;
+
++ /* Free up and zero any ADB found */
++ for (i = 0, tt = it->templates; i < it->tcount; i++, tt++)
++ {
++ if (tt->flags & ASN1_TFLG_ADB_MASK)
++ {
++ const ASN1_TEMPLATE *seqtt;
++ ASN1_VALUE **pseqval;
++ seqtt = asn1_do_adb(pval, tt, 1);
++ pseqval = asn1_get_field_ptr(pval, seqtt);
++ ASN1_template_free(pseqval, seqtt);
++ }
++ }
++
+ /* Get each field entry */
+ for (i = 0, tt = it->templates; i < it->tcount; i++, tt++)
+ {
diff --git a/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-0288.patch b/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-0288.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c8dc6b9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-0288.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/x509/x509_req.c.req-null-deref openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/x509/x509_req.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/x509/x509_req.c.req-null-deref 2013-02-11 16:26:04.000000000 +0100
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/x509/x509_req.c 2015-03-18 18:34:35.732448017 +0100
+@@ -92,6 +92,8 @@ X509_REQ *X509_to_X509_REQ(X509 *x, EVP_
+ goto err;
+
+ pktmp = X509_get_pubkey(x);
++ if (pktmp == NULL)
++ goto err;
+ i=X509_REQ_set_pubkey(ret,pktmp);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pktmp);
+ if (!i) goto err;
diff --git a/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-0293.patch b/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-0293.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1ca78b3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-0293.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,102 @@
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s2_lib.c.ssl2-assert openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s2_lib.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s2_lib.c.ssl2-assert 2015-03-18 13:02:36.000000000 +0100
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s2_lib.c 2015-03-18 18:22:20.195322489 +0100
+@@ -488,7 +488,7 @@ int ssl2_generate_key_material(SSL *s)
+
+ OPENSSL_assert(s->session->master_key_length >= 0
+ && s->session->master_key_length
+- < (int)sizeof(s->session->master_key));
++ <= (int)sizeof(s->session->master_key));
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx,s->session->master_key,s->session->master_key_length);
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx,&c,1);
+ c++;
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s2_srvr.c.ssl2-assert openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s2_srvr.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s2_srvr.c.ssl2-assert 2013-02-11 16:26:04.000000000 +0100
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s2_srvr.c 2015-03-18 18:30:11.403974038 +0100
+@@ -446,9 +446,6 @@ static int get_client_master_key(SSL *s)
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY,SSL_R_NO_PRIVATEKEY);
+ return(-1);
+ }
+- i=ssl_rsa_private_decrypt(s->cert,s->s2->tmp.enc,
+- &(p[s->s2->tmp.clear]),&(p[s->s2->tmp.clear]),
+- (s->s2->ssl2_rollback)?RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
+
+ is_export=SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->session->cipher);
+
+@@ -467,21 +464,61 @@ static int get_client_master_key(SSL *s)
+ else
+ ek=5;
+
++ /*
++ * The format of the CLIENT-MASTER-KEY message is
++ * 1 byte message type
++ * 3 bytes cipher
++ * 2-byte clear key length (stored in s->s2->tmp.clear)
++ * 2-byte encrypted key length (stored in s->s2->tmp.enc)
++ * 2-byte key args length (IV etc)
++ * clear key
++ * encrypted key
++ * key args
++ *
++ * If the cipher is an export cipher, then the encrypted key bytes
++ * are a fixed portion of the total key (5 or 8 bytes). The size of
++ * this portion is in |ek|. If the cipher is not an export cipher,
++ * then the entire key material is encrypted (i.e., clear key length
++ * must be zero).
++ */
++ if ((!is_export && s->s2->tmp.clear != 0) ||
++ (is_export && s->s2->tmp.clear + ek != EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c)))
++ {
++ ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
++ SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY,SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
++ return -1;
++ }
++ /*
++ * The encrypted blob must decrypt to the encrypted portion of the key.
++ * Decryption can't be expanding, so if we don't have enough encrypted
++ * bytes to fit the key in the buffer, stop now.
++ */
++ if ((is_export && s->s2->tmp.enc < ek) ||
++ (!is_export && s->s2->tmp.enc < EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c)))
++ {
++ ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
++ SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
++ return -1;
++ }
++
++ i = ssl_rsa_private_decrypt(s->cert, s->s2->tmp.enc,
++ &(p[s->s2->tmp.clear]),
++ &(p[s->s2->tmp.clear]),
++ (s->s2->ssl2_rollback) ? RSA_SSLV23_PADDING : RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
++
+ /* bad decrypt */
+ #if 1
+ /* If a bad decrypt, continue with protocol but with a
+ * random master secret (Bleichenbacher attack) */
+- if ((i < 0) ||
+- ((!is_export && (i != EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c)))
+- || (is_export && ((i != ek) || (s->s2->tmp.clear+(unsigned int)i !=
+- (unsigned int)EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c))))))
++ if ((i < 0) || ((!is_export && i != EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c))
++ || (is_export && i != ek)))
+ {
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ if (is_export)
+ i=ek;
+ else
+ i=EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c);
+- if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,i) <= 0)
++ if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(&p[s->s2->tmp.clear],i) <= 0)
+ return 0;
+ }
+ #else
+@@ -505,7 +542,8 @@ static int get_client_master_key(SSL *s)
+ }
+ #endif
+
+- if (is_export) i+=s->s2->tmp.clear;
++ if (is_export)
++ i = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c);
+
+ if (i > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
+ {
diff --git a/openssl-1.0.1k-cve-2015-0209.patch b/openssl-1.0.1k-cve-2015-0209.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..994f963
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.0.1k-cve-2015-0209.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1k/crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c.use-after-free openssl-1.0.1k/crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1k/crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c.use-after-free 2014-10-15 15:49:54.000000000 +0200
++++ openssl-1.0.1k/crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c 2015-03-19 17:28:03.349627040 +0100
+@@ -1142,8 +1142,6 @@ EC_KEY *d2i_ECPrivateKey(EC_KEY **a, con
+ ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+- if (a)
+- *a = ret;
+ }
+ else
+ ret = *a;
+@@ -1225,11 +1223,13 @@ EC_KEY *d2i_ECPrivateKey(EC_KEY **a, con
+ ret->enc_flag |= EC_PKEY_NO_PUBKEY;
+ }
+
++ if (a)
++ *a = ret;
+ ok = 1;
+ err:
+ if (!ok)
+ {
+- if (ret)
++ if (ret && (a == NULL || *a != ret))
+ EC_KEY_free(ret);
+ ret = NULL;
+ }
diff --git a/openssl-1.0.1k-cve-2015-0289.patch b/openssl-1.0.1k-cve-2015-0289.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ef95c7c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.0.1k-cve-2015-0289.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,163 @@
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1k/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c.pkcs7-null-deref openssl-1.0.1k/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1k/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c.pkcs7-null-deref 2015-01-08 15:00:36.000000000 +0100
++++ openssl-1.0.1k/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c 2015-03-19 17:30:36.797650980 +0100
+@@ -272,6 +272,27 @@ BIO *PKCS7_dataInit(PKCS7 *p7, BIO *bio)
+ PKCS7_RECIP_INFO *ri=NULL;
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING *os=NULL;
+
++ if (p7 == NULL)
++ {
++ PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAINIT, PKCS7_R_INVALID_NULL_POINTER);
++ return NULL;
++ }
++ /*
++ * The content field in the PKCS7 ContentInfo is optional, but that really
++ * only applies to inner content (precisely, detached signatures).
++ *
++ * When reading content, missing outer content is therefore treated as an
++ * error.
++ *
++ * When creating content, PKCS7_content_new() must be called before
++ * calling this method, so a NULL p7->d is always an error.
++ */
++ if (p7->d.ptr == NULL)
++ {
++ PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAINIT, PKCS7_R_NO_CONTENT);
++ return NULL;
++ }
++
+ i=OBJ_obj2nid(p7->type);
+ p7->state=PKCS7_S_HEADER;
+
+@@ -433,6 +454,18 @@ BIO *PKCS7_dataDecode(PKCS7 *p7, EVP_PKE
+ unsigned char *ek = NULL, *tkey = NULL;
+ int eklen = 0, tkeylen = 0;
+
++ if (p7 == NULL)
++ {
++ PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE, PKCS7_R_INVALID_NULL_POINTER);
++ return NULL;
++ }
++
++ if (p7->d.ptr == NULL)
++ {
++ PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE, PKCS7_R_NO_CONTENT);
++ return NULL;
++ }
++
+ i=OBJ_obj2nid(p7->type);
+ p7->state=PKCS7_S_HEADER;
+
+@@ -752,6 +785,18 @@ int PKCS7_dataFinal(PKCS7 *p7, BIO *bio)
+ STACK_OF(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO) *si_sk=NULL;
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING *os=NULL;
+
++ if (p7 == NULL)
++ {
++ PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAFINAL, PKCS7_R_INVALID_NULL_POINTER);
++ return 0;
++ }
++
++ if (p7->d.ptr == NULL)
++ {
++ PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAFINAL, PKCS7_R_NO_CONTENT);
++ return 0;
++ }
++
+ EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx_tmp);
+ i=OBJ_obj2nid(p7->type);
+ p7->state=PKCS7_S_HEADER;
+@@ -796,6 +841,7 @@ int PKCS7_dataFinal(PKCS7 *p7, BIO *bio)
+ /* If detached data then the content is excluded */
+ if(PKCS7_type_is_data(p7->d.sign->contents) && p7->detached) {
+ M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(os);
++ os = NULL;
+ p7->d.sign->contents->d.data = NULL;
+ }
+ break;
+@@ -806,6 +852,7 @@ int PKCS7_dataFinal(PKCS7 *p7, BIO *bio)
+ if(PKCS7_type_is_data(p7->d.digest->contents) && p7->detached)
+ {
+ M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(os);
++ os = NULL;
+ p7->d.digest->contents->d.data = NULL;
+ }
+ break;
+@@ -878,23 +925,32 @@ int PKCS7_dataFinal(PKCS7 *p7, BIO *bio)
+ M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(p7->d.digest->digest, md_data, md_len);
+ }
+
+- if (!PKCS7_is_detached(p7) && !(os->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_NDEF))
++ if (!PKCS7_is_detached(p7))
+ {
+- char *cont;
+- long contlen;
+- btmp=BIO_find_type(bio,BIO_TYPE_MEM);
+- if (btmp == NULL)
+- {
+- PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAFINAL,PKCS7_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_MEM_BIO);
++ /*
++ * NOTE(emilia): I think we only reach os == NULL here because detached
++ * digested data support is broken.
++ */
++ if (os == NULL)
+ goto err;
++ if (!(os->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_NDEF))
++ {
++ char *cont;
++ long contlen;
++ btmp=BIO_find_type(bio,BIO_TYPE_MEM);
++ if (btmp == NULL)
++ {
++ PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAFINAL,PKCS7_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_MEM_BIO);
++ goto err;
++ }
++ contlen = BIO_get_mem_data(btmp, &cont);
++ /* Mark the BIO read only then we can use its copy of the data
++ * instead of making an extra copy.
++ */
++ BIO_set_flags(btmp, BIO_FLAGS_MEM_RDONLY);
++ BIO_set_mem_eof_return(btmp, 0);
++ ASN1_STRING_set0(os, (unsigned char *)cont, contlen);
+ }
+- contlen = BIO_get_mem_data(btmp, &cont);
+- /* Mark the BIO read only then we can use its copy of the data
+- * instead of making an extra copy.
+- */
+- BIO_set_flags(btmp, BIO_FLAGS_MEM_RDONLY);
+- BIO_set_mem_eof_return(btmp, 0);
+- ASN1_STRING_set0(os, (unsigned char *)cont, contlen);
+ }
+ ret=1;
+ err:
+@@ -971,6 +1027,18 @@ int PKCS7_dataVerify(X509_STORE *cert_st
+ STACK_OF(X509) *cert;
+ X509 *x509;
+
++ if (p7 == NULL)
++ {
++ PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAVERIFY, PKCS7_R_INVALID_NULL_POINTER);
++ return 0;
++ }
++
++ if (p7->d.ptr == NULL)
++ {
++ PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAVERIFY, PKCS7_R_NO_CONTENT);
++ return 0;
++ }
++
+ if (PKCS7_type_is_signed(p7))
+ {
+ cert=p7->d.sign->cert;
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1k/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_lib.c.pkcs7-null-deref openssl-1.0.1k/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_lib.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1k/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_lib.c.pkcs7-null-deref 2014-10-15 15:49:15.000000000 +0200
++++ openssl-1.0.1k/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_lib.c 2015-03-19 17:30:36.797650980 +0100
+@@ -459,6 +459,8 @@ int PKCS7_set_digest(PKCS7 *p7, const EV
+
+ STACK_OF(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO) *PKCS7_get_signer_info(PKCS7 *p7)
+ {
++ if (p7 == NULL || p7->d.ptr == NULL)
++ return NULL;
+ if (PKCS7_type_is_signed(p7))
+ {
+ return(p7->d.sign->signer_info);
diff --git a/openssl.spec b/openssl.spec
index d638755..71e568b 100644
--- a/openssl.spec
+++ b/openssl.spec
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@
Summary: Utilities from the general purpose cryptography library with TLS implementation
Name: openssl
Version: 1.0.1k
-Release: 5%{?dist}
+Release: 6%{?dist}
Epoch: 1
# We have to remove certain patented algorithms from the openssl source
# tarball with the hobble-openssl script which is included below.
@@ -90,6 +90,12 @@ Patch84: openssl-1.0.1k-trusted-first.patch
Patch85: openssl-1.0.1e-arm-use-elf-auxv-caps.patch
Patch86: openssl-1.0.1k-ephemeral-key-size.patch
Patch87: openssl-1.0.1e-cc-reqs.patch
+Patch101: openssl-1.0.1k-cve-2015-0209.patch
+Patch102: openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-0286.patch
+Patch103: openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-0287.patch
+Patch104: openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-0288.patch
+Patch105: openssl-1.0.1k-cve-2015-0289.patch
+Patch106: openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-0293.patch
License: OpenSSL
Group: System Environment/Libraries
@@ -213,6 +219,12 @@ cp %{SOURCE12} %{SOURCE13} crypto/ec/
%patch85 -p1 -b .armcap
%patch86 -p1 -b .ephemeral
%patch87 -p1 -b .cc-reqs
+%patch101 -p1 -b .use-after-free
+%patch102 -p1 -b .bool-cmp
+%patch103 -p1 -b .item-reuse
+%patch104 -p1 -b .req-null-deref
+%patch105 -p1 -b .pkcs7-null-deref
+%patch106 -p1 -b .ssl2-assert
sed -i 's/SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER "1.0.0"/SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER "%{version}"/' crypto/opensslv.h
@@ -480,6 +492,13 @@ rm -rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_libdir}/fipscanister.*
%postun libs -p /sbin/ldconfig
%changelog
+* Thu Mar 19 2015 Tomáš Mráz <tmraz at redhat.com> 1.0.1k-6
+- fix CVE-2015-0209 - potential use after free in d2i_ECPrivateKey()
+- fix CVE-2015-0286 - improper handling of ASN.1 boolean comparison
+- fix CVE-2015-0287 - ASN.1 structure reuse decoding memory corruption
+- fix CVE-2015-0289 - NULL dereference decoding invalid PKCS#7 data
+- fix CVE-2015-0293 - triggerable assert in SSLv2 server
+
* Mon Mar 16 2015 Tomáš Mráz <tmraz at redhat.com> 1.0.1k-5
- fix bug in the CRYPTO_128_unwrap()
More information about the scm-commits
mailing list