Emergency destruction of LUKS partition

[Lyos Gemini Norezel]

Personally... I just use the thermite/C4 method.

Ie., someone removes the hard drive == auto hd destruction via hidden 
thermite or c4 ignition.

I also set it to trigger via too many incorrect password attempts.

That's only for my really important data though... the rest I don't care 
enough about to be that paranoid.

Given that I also have roughly 50 hard drives (200GB and up)... there's 
a level of security by obscurity as well... in that they'd have to find 
the correct one first.


If your data is that important... relying on software shredding is 
idiotic, at best.

--Lyos Gemini Norezel

On 09/30/2013 04:27 PM, aragonx at dcsnow.com wrote:
> > On Mon, Sep 30, 2013 at 12:52:13 -0400,
> > "Eric H. Christensen" <sparks at fedoraproject.org> wrote:
> >
> > They'll just keep using the wrench until you tell them all of the
> > passwords.
> >
> > Even plausible deniability might not work so well, if someone who knows
> > what their doing looks at you disk.
>
> If your data is valuable enough (or you are paranoid enough) you could 
> try something like this:
>
> There are services that provide disappearing web sites.  You could 
> have your encryption program make part of your key from such a web 
> site. Every time you decrypt your volume for use, it removes the old 
> site/key and creates a new site/key (which you would have to 
> memorize).  The site would disappear after 24 hours automatically or 2 
> failed login attempts.  So, if you wait long enough or give them a bad 
> password, your data is gone because you no longer actually have the 
> key. Well, there isn't a key anymore so...
>
> ---
> Will Y.
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