cracklib dicts size (and fedora password policy)

Daniel J Walsh dwalsh at redhat.com
Fri Sep 6 13:17:44 UTC 2013


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On 09/06/2013 09:08 AM, Tomas Mraz wrote:
> On Fri, 2013-09-06 at 09:04 -0400, Matthew Miller wrote:
>> The cracklib dicts in Fedora is 8.3M. (I'm sure some of this is my fault,
>> as I've added to it over the years.) The cracklib pam module supports a 
>> compressed dictionary, but apparently it has a serious performance
>> impact (https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1004896).
>> 
>> Meanwhile, in many systems today, local passwords are entirely unused. 
>> Authentication is done via keys or by kerberos.
>> 
>> At the same time, we have an increased need for smaller systems. That
>> 8MB starts to be a meaningful fraction of a container or an ultra-small
>> cloud image.
>> 
>> I do recognize the value of protecting against dictionary-based attacks
>> when passwords are used. Maybe we could have a policy which requires
>> _longer_ passwords but uses a much smaller dictionary?
> 
> The other option would be to fix the gzip support in cracklib to cache the
> unpacked data somehow. However that would require to keep the unpacked
> dictionary in RAM when cracklib is loaded, which is suboptimal as well. Or
> we could make the cracklib-dicts optional somehow so it is possible to
> install an ultra small cloud image without the dictionary at all - I expect
> ultra small cloud image not needing password quality checking at all.
> 
Could anaconda decompress the file to another location to fix their problem.
Then we ship it compressed?  I am willing to wait an extra 10 seconds while
changing my password which I do very seldom.  Maybe have the library look for a
decompressed file first and fail over the the compressed one. Then admins could
decompress it if they see this as a problem.
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