SELinux domains for relabeling

[Dominick Grift]

On 01/26/2010 05:40 PM, Stephen Smalley wrote:
> On Tue, 2010-01-26 at 17:14 +0100, Dominick Grift wrote:
>> On 01/26/2010 02:27 PM, Roberto Sassu wrote:
>>> Hello all
>>>
>>> i'm trying to investigate what domains in the Fedora 12 policy are allowed to 
>>> modify SELinux labels (in particular domain entrypoints).
>>
>> sesearch --allow -s domain -t exec_type -c file -p relabelto
>> sesearch --allow -s domain -t exec_type -c file -p relabelfrom
>>
>> This lists all source domain types relabelto and relabelfrom access to
>> executable file types (entry types)
> 
> Does that work for you?

You are right it does not work. I wonder why. Why would sysadm_t be a
"domain" and unconfined_t not?

> sesearch --allow -s domain -t exec_type -c file -p relabelto | awk '/allow/{print $2}' | sort | uniq -c
>       1 prelink_t
>     568 restorecond_t
>     568 rpm_t
>     568 sysadm_t
> 
> Where is unconfined_t and friends?
> 
> sesearch --allow -s unconfined_t -t sshd_exec_t -c file -p relabelto
> Found 1 semantic av rules:
>    allow files_unconfined_type file_type : file { ioctl read write
> create getattr setattr lock relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link
> rename execute swapon quotaon mounton execute_no_trans entrypoint
> open } ; 
> 


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