Security release criterion proposal
awilliam at redhat.com
Wed May 18 17:01:15 UTC 2011
On Wed, 2011-05-18 at 16:28 +0000, "Jóhann B. Guðmundsson" wrote:
> On 05/18/2011 03:57 PM, Adam Williamson wrote:
> > Feedback please! Thanks:)
> Given that we ship selinux on by default should this proposal only be
> applicable to exploits/vulnerability that selinux cant catch and prevent
> which leaves us with <insert type of exploits here )?
I kinda considered that to be implicit in the criterion as written, but
as two people have asked about it, obviously we should clarify that :)
> Don't we need individual(s) from the security team that will be doing
> actively security audit during the development cycle and reporting back
> to QA?
Well, 'enforcing' the criteria is a separate issue from determining
them, and we don't really need to discuss it here. Having an explicit
criterion adds value even if we don't set up a formal validation system,
because it gives us solid ground to review any security issues which get
proposed as release blockers on an ad hoc basis.
> Would not applying this security release proposal to final only suffice?
Well, I mean, it depends what you mean by 'suffice' :). I worked on the
basis that we probably don't want to ship any widely-distributed
'release' with a major security issue, but as I wrote, it's certainly up
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