Heads up - Anaconda 22.17 will enforce 'good' passwords
Matthias Clasen
mclasen at redhat.com
Thu Feb 5 08:53:30 UTC 2015
On Mon, 2015-02-02 at 18:38 -0500, David Cantrell wrote:
> On Sun, Feb 01, 2015 at 09:53:05PM -0500, Matthias Clasen wrote:
> > On Fri, 2015-01-30 at 14:03 -0800, Adam Williamson wrote:
> >
> > > I think the main point is the one nirik made; I don't think the devs
> > > agree with your assessment of how significant this is. It's a minor
> > > inconvenience; you just have to come up with a password that passes
> > > the check, or use a kickstart. So I don't think they agree that it
> > > needs a full-blown security audit and FESCo review or whatever,
> > > because they don't think it's really that huge of a change in
> > > behaviour.
> >
> > Having to come up with a password that passes the check is not 'a minor
> > inconvenience'. Given how capricious libpwquality is about scoring
> > (there have been some examples in this thread, there are more in
> > gnome-initial-setup bugs), it is next to impossible.
> >
> > This discussion has been pretty heated, but I agree with there being
> > some aspect of 'collective punishment' here: just because _some_ systems
> > get installed with sshd enabled, all users who install the Workstation
> > have to spend a couple of frustrating minutes trying to find a password
> > that gets them past this hurdle.
> >
> > If this change stays, I anticipate the Workstation WG asking for a way
> > to the workstation installer not enforce this. I know the anaconda folks
> > are not eager to add variations like this, but that is exactly what we
> > need: If you want to enforce product-specific policy in the installer,
> > it needs to be a product-specific installer.
>
> You're assuming before asking. With the structure of the installer now, we
> can look at changes like taking the password aspect and making it
> product-specific controllable by a number of different methods. Our
> historic aim to end variant specifics in the installer was because the old
> code (and variants) lacked a way to assign owners to those product
> specifics, which meant that requests of the installer to be product specific
> meant we were asked to be the owners of those specifics.
Let me ask now, then: can we make the change to reject 'weak' passwords
specific to only those products that enable sshd by default, please ?
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