tcp/routing question...

[bruce]

andy...

right....

which means that a mitm attack would have to appear to be both the
client/server to the actual server/client...

but if what you say is true... then mitm attacks aren't really possible with
a server/app in the middle of the client/server.

keep in mind, i'm not sure this kind of attack is really worth worrying
about. but i am concerned.

-bruce



-----Original Message-----
From: fedora-list-bounces at redhat.com
[mailto:fedora-list-bounces at redhat.com]On Behalf Of Andy Green
Sent: Tuesday, June 07, 2005 8:21 AM
To: For users of Fedora Core releases
Subject: Re: tcp/routing question...


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bruce wrote:
| are you sure about this...??
|
| here's my question...
|  client (a)  --->>>> bank server (b)
|  client (a)  <<<---  bank server (b)
|
| if server b gets the data/information from 'a', server 'b should get ip
| address 1.2.3.4, which is the real ip address of client 'a'.
|
| is there away for a mitm server, to get in the middle, manipulate the data
| from 'a' to 'b', send the data to 'b' and spoof the ip address to look as
| though the data came from 'a'..

Google "three way handshake".  If the MITM machine pretends to be
1.2.3.4, then the bank server is going to address its replies to 1.2.3.4
and not the MITM machine.

- -Andy
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