SELinux blocking Gizmo on FC5

[A.J. Bonnema]

Michael Wiktowy wrote:
> I just fixed my problem with
> chcon -t texrel_shlib_t /usr/lib/libsipphoneapi.so.0.78.20060211
> I am not exactly sure what that does though.
Craig,

I wonder how many people do these statements without understanding the 
implications? How secure would that be?
On this line, what we actually need is some kind of easifier / 
dumbifier, if you get my meaning. So it is obvious what the implications 
are.

Think of implementing an application: no user fully understands the 
implications of that application, even less are they able to check these 
implications: they trust the builders. Obviously, this is inherently 
insecure. (example? One of the anti-virus vendors had parts of a rootkit 
implemented, creating a possible security hole. The software was 
generally trusted by users to be secure).

Now, back to SELInux, I suspect that in general non-admin user can not 
fully understand what he/she is doing when doing a chcon or changing a 
policy.
So, what we need is some sort of high translation of the implications, 
so that even non-programmer, non-admin users can understand what they 
are doing on a bit of a higher level than what is currently possible.

Would it be possible to have a non-technical layer around SELInux so 
that users can have a more high level view of their security than admins 
have?
[Regretfully, many users are admin by default, but not by choice, i.e. 
home users. They need the high level view...]. Meaning, a user can 
change the system (high-level) and still know what he/she is doing 
(high-level).

Guus.

-- 
A.J. Bonnema, Leiden The Netherlands,
user #328198 (Linux Counter http://counter.li.org)