Not enough info, so no point

[Sam Varshavchik]

JD writes:

> A user process (such as yum), even with root privs,
> CANNOT JUMP OUT OF THE BOUNDARIES OF IT'S ROOT,
> NAMELY (for example) /mnt/f15

Umm, that's not true. The chroot(2) man page has a nice explanation of how a  
root userid can trivially escape a chroot jail.

> So there is no danger that yum executed within a chrooted environment
> will affect the enclosing host's yum database (in this case F14).

Nope, that's definitely possible.

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