Mounting an encrypted volume presents the volume to all users on a machine

[Gregory Maxwell]

On Tue, Oct 26, 2010 at 4:10 PM, Bruno Wolff III <bruno at wolff.to> wrote:
> This is where we should be going. Encryption is really irrelavent. The issue
> should be if a removable device is inserted, who should have access to it
> if it gets automounted. I would expect encrypted and unencrypted devices
> to get the same treatment. The encrypted devices do already have a pop up,
> so maybe that makes it not as much effort to ask a question when the device
> is mounted. But I don't see otherwise why one would want to treat encrypted
> and uncrypted removable devices differently.

We don't know which of multiple users plugged the device in but we
know which user provided the key to decrypt the device.

The existence of encryption shows that the user may care more about
the confidentiality of the data, and there is less of an previously
existing "installed base" of expectations about how an encrypted
volume works when you plug it in.

If we wanted to get fancy (e.g. go beyond just a change in the default
modes) additional users could authenticate themselves to an already
mounted encrypted volume one at a time by providing the key.

::shrugs::