RemoveSETUID feature (Was: Summary/Minutes from today's FESCo meeting (2010-10-26) NEW TIME!)

[Dick Tayter]

2010/12/21 Miloslav Trmač:

> If an attacker were controlling a process running with uid 0 and no
> capabilities at all, and /bin/sh were 0555, nothing prevents the
> attacker from chmod()ing /bin/sh to 0755 and overwriting it.  This makes
> any attempts to change the file permissions rather pointless.
>

You don't even need to change permissions for root to be able to delete or
change the contents of the directory.

Dick
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